Early Days and the Battle of Festubert.
On the 2nd of May, 1915, Major Foley, Second Lieutenant Harris
(Transport Officer), the Machine Gun Officer, and 104 other ranks and
the whole of the Regimental Transport, entrained at BALLAST PIT SIDING,
BEDFORD, at one o’clock in the morning, arriving at SOUTHAMPTON at 6 40
a.m., where they embarked on s.s. “ROSSETTI” and sailed at 4 30 p.m.,
arriving at HAVRE at 3 a.m. on the 3rd.
On the evening of that day, the rest of the Battalion entrained at
BALLAST PIT SIDING in two trains, and travelled down to FOLKESTONE,
where they arrived about midnight, and marched straight down on to the
boat, s.s. “ONWARD,” which cast off at 1 30 a.m.
At last we were really on our way, after all the delays and waitings
we _were_ going overseas like the rest! And it had all been done so
quickly that only now, as we stood on the darkened boat and watched the
lights of England receding, did we begin to realise what it meant--this
stealthy journey of nearly a thousand souls across the Channel, which
many of us had never seen before, and which many were never to see
again.
The Adjutant’s diary gives our strength (apart from the Advance Party)
as follows:--
Lieut.-Colonel R. Hindle.
Captain and Adjutant C. C. Norman (R. Welsh Fusiliers.)
Captains Nickson, Booth, Hibbert, Peak, Whitfield, Crump, H. Parker,
Widdows.
Lieutenants Ord (Signalling Officer), Smith, Rennard, Brindle, Moore,
Gregson, Duckworth.
Second Lieutenants Houghton, Davies, Lindsay, Rogerson, P. Parker,
Bryce-Smith, Craven.
Lieutenant and Quartermaster F. W. Baker.
Captain Derham (R.A.M.C.).
Rev. Powell, C. of E. Chaplain.
And 895 W.O.’s, N.C.O.’s, and Men.
The total strength of the Battalion on this date was (including
attached) 31 Officers and 1,003 other Ranks.
No smoking or talking was allowed on deck during the passage, which
was calm and without incident, and the boat drew alongside at BOULOGNE
about 3 a.m., where we at once disembarked and marched about two miles
to a canvas rest camp at OSTROHOVE. How strange everything looked in
the early morning light, as we swung along against our instincts on
the _right-hand_ side of the pavé road, the French signs with which we
grew so familiar later on, the grilles in the front doors, the smells!
On arrival at the camp we were soon told off to our tents, where we
slept till eight, when we had breakfast. After breakfast most of us
sent off our first Field Postcards to the folks at home, and cleaned
up. We stayed in camp all day, resting and sunning ourselves, parading
again at 6 30 p.m., when we marched to PONT DE BRIQUES Station, where
we formed up in groups of 40 and waited for the train, which soon
arrived from HAVRE with the Transport. Cattle trucks! However, we
entrained, about 40 to a truck, and presently jolted off; we spent a
very uncomfortable night!
On 5th May, about 2 30 a.m., we arrived at BERGUETTE, where we
detrained and at 4 a.m. started to march to LILETTE, led by a “guide”
who took us about two miles out of our way--a serious matter, on empty
stomachs, to us who were still fresh from “the fleshpots of Egypt”;
however, we got there, and went into billets of sorts, many preferring
to sleep in the open, so villainously dirty were some of the outhouses.
Here we found the 1/8th King’s Liverpools, the 1/4th King’s Own and
Brigade Headquarters being at neighbouring places. All day and all
night an almost continuous stream of motor vehicles went through,
mostly laden with French troops in their picturesque blue and red.
Battalion Headquarters was “chez M. Rousseau,” and the Officers’ Mess
in a small estaminet. As we rested that day, we heard the distant guns
for the first time, booming intermittently the whole day through.
On the 6th, about 7 15 p.m., we received orders to move, and marched
out at 8 p.m. to LILLERS, where we joined the rear of the Brigade at
2 47 p.m. Here began the worst march that any of us remember, over
strange uneven roads, in pitch darkness. To us, marching in rear of
the whole Brigade, it seemed interminable; halts were irregular, and
by the time “ten minutes’ halt” came along to us it was time to move
again, and it was impossible to maintain a steady pace. Added to this
someone had seen fit to billet from the front of the column instead of
the rear, which held us up at each billeting village and prolonged the
march considerably. The last mile nearly finished us, but we stumbled
into CALONNE-SUR-LE-LYS at 4 a.m.--dead beat--and slept it off.
We had a pretty easy time for the next few days, as, beyond being
required to be ready to move at an hour’s notice, we were left alone.
The weather was fine, and many of us bivouacked; we did a little
training, and tried to teach the local people a little sanitation, a
word which apparently did not exist in their language. We, on the other
hand, learnt that faggots and soil had a market value; one Company,
taking soil from a heap in a field, were pounced on by the owner for
taking “ma bonne terre” to cover someone else’s smelly midden, and he
was quite rude about it. The Officers’ Mess was in a private house on
the main street; one night when an al fresco concert was in progress
to the great delight of the troops, a man passing on the road enquired
what was going on, and received the laconic reply, “Officers’ rum
issue!”
[Illustration: METEREN, 1915.]
On the 8th we were visited by Sir Douglas Haig and the Divisional
Commander.
The gunfire about eight or nine miles away increased on the 9th to what
must have been a very heavy bombardment--no doubt the second Battle of
LA BASSEE.
On the 11th blankets and Officers’ kits were allowed to be removed from
the waggons on which they had hitherto been loaded, and the state of
readiness was relaxed. Respirators for poisonous gas (the old gauze and
wadding affairs) were issued. On the 13th there was a thunderstorm,
accompanied by torrential rain, which did not add to the comfort of the
campers.
Just after midnight on the 14th, orders to move arrived, and after
breakfast we fell in and moved to the starting point by CALONNE CHURCH,
whence we marched as a Brigade to METEREN. We arrived there at 2 p.m.,
and got into billets about 3, mostly on the east and north-east sides
of the town, the Mess as usual in an estaminet, whose landlord thought
fit to start emptying his midden soon after we arrived, causing one man
to say to another, who seemed in low spirits, “What’s up, Tommy? Avez
vous mal de midden?”
The country was different from CALONNE, where the ground was flat and
intersected by ditches full of frogs which croaked all night; here it
was undulating, and windmills and hop fields became features. On the
south side of the town were a number of graves of Officers and Men who
had fallen in the fighting there on 15th October, mostly Royal Warwicks
and King’s Own--it was said that the Huns had mounted machine guns on
the tower of the church, which commands the country to the south and
west, and had simply mown them down. How difficult we found it then to
realise the story, and how peaceful the little town seemed to us. The
Adjutant took the opportunity of teaching the Officers a little field
sketching--a branch of our training which had hitherto been crowded
out. Courses in those days were few and far between, and though we had
learnt in the Regiment many things of which some of the systematically
trained Officers of later days were conspicuously ignorant, there were
gaps in our knowledge.
Sunday was fine and hot, and all denominations had Church Parades.
On Monday the Ninth Division marched through--what a fine lot they
looked, and how we envied them “their cookers.” Why hadn’t we got
cookers? And the old galling comparisons between the treatment of the
Territorial Force and Kitchener’s Army were rubbed in once more. It is
all dead now, but we had something to grouse at. On Tuesday, the 18th,
we paraded at 8 p.m. for a night march, through VIEUX BERQUIN and NEUF
BERQUIN to LA GORGUE, a suburb of ESTAIRES, where we arrived about 4
a.m. Not for months afterwards did most of us learn that we, the 51st
Division, had been moved up by General French to be in reserve for the
Second Battle of LA BASSEE.
The town was full of troops. Our men were billeted in breweries and
factories; B and A Companies were in a shell-riddled Girls’ School;
the Officers had difficulty in finding even a floor to sleep on, but
at last most of them gravitated to one estaminet, where they fed on
what they could get, and slept. An unforgettable incident rises to
the mind. Lieutenant----, having disposed himself for slumber on three
chairs and fallen asleep, tried to turn over and so rolled off--in one
piece--on to the floor, where he lay immovable, only remarking, in
injured tones: “I’m fed up with this ---- War!”
On the 19th, the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers left us and went to ST.
OMER, and 18 of our men were sent to the Tunnelling Company R.E.; this
is mentioned because it was our first separation--we had been together,
in the same sections even, with practically no change for months.
On the 20th we marched to billets in farms on the east side of LOCON;
when we got there we found them occupied by a Battalion of the
Grenadier Guards, who had been in action the night before and lost
their Colonel, Sergt.-Major, and 67 other Ranks, so we formed up in
a field opposite a large 18th century farm with a moat round it and
stayed there all day; in the evening the Guards moved out and marched
off with that inimitable swing of theirs, and we took over their
billets--untouched farms within three miles of the line. Here we were
close to the lair of a 9in. Howitzer--the only one on that front, it
was said--which had been shelling the Hun all day.
The next day we set to work with zeal to clean up and put the
sanitation right--covering middens to prevent flies breeding, building
incinerators, and fixing up a water supply; we rather specialised in
sanitation even in those days, when most people seemed rather to scoff
at it. Late at night the 5th Gordons arrived and bivouacked in the
field opposite.
On the 23rd, a very hot day, sanitary work continued, and surveys
of the billeting area were carried out by Officers, and afterwards
combined into a composite map; the next day Second Lieutenant
Sutherland, of the 2nd Leicesters, two N.C.O.’s, and 11 men reported,
to instruct us in trench work--needless to say we were keen for
anything they could teach us, as we were eagerly looking forward to our
first tour in the line. Yes, Reader, you may think this is a figure of
speech, but it is not--we really were, and we sharpened our bayonets
with zest on the old lady’s grindstone, and thought she must be a
German spy because she tried to stop us!
All the same, we expected to stay where we were for a few weeks, and
were a bit surprised to learn, after a lecture on trench work by
Captain Burton, 39th Gharwalis (we were in the Indian Corps), that
we were to go into the line on the 25th. We assembled on the road by
Battalion Headquarters at 7 p.m. and marched to a Cemetery, where we
were met by an Officer of the 1/7th Black Watch. He reported that the
trenches we were to occupy were being shelled by the enemy, so we
halted till 10 p.m., when we moved forward by platoons at 100 yards’
distance.
It is quite impossible to try to convey in print the impression of
one’s first march up to the line: one remembers the dark, strange road,
broken trees, loose telephone wires, a long halt in a battered village,
then on through interminable miles of breastworks manned by Canadians,
crawling cautiously along in single file and breathless silence--then
a halt, and platoons are sent off down various alleys, to find at the
end a trench full of Scotsmen anxiously awaiting relief. The right of
the Battalion rested on the QUINQUE RUE, the left on the road from
RUE DE L’EPINETTE to FERME COUR D’AVOUE; A and D Companies and Machine
Gun Section occupied the front line, No. 2 platoon having an advanced
post about 200 yards in front of the main line; C was in support and
B in reserve. The fire trench had only recently been built, and the
forward bit had 18in. of water in it; no wire had been put up. The
support trench was an old German trench about 300 yards to the left
rear of the fire trench, while the reserve trench was again 200 yards
behind the latter. The parapets were revetted with, and in some cases
entirely built of, sandbags; dugouts--very sketchy--were built in the
parados! The trenches were nowhere more than two feet deep, the rest of
the cover being above ground; there were narrow communication trenches.
Every house in the neighbourhood was in utter ruin, and the ground
was a mass of shell holes. Equipment, rifles, ammunition, clothing,
tins, both our own and enemy, were strewn everywhere, and dozens of
bodies--chiefly of Scots Guards and Germans--lay about as they had
fallen in the May Battle of Festubert; the stench was awful. Some
old German trenches, not occupied by us, were interesting as showing
the elaborate way they had dug themselves in. One dugout was a room
about 15ft. square, with doors and a window, lined throughout with
wood planking covered with cloth, and furnished with leather-covered
chairs and a table; in one a quantity of feminine underclothing was
found--what it was doing there could only be guessed.
Most of the above description is taken from the Adjutant’s journal,
written at the time; all we saw that night was mud and sandbags. The
Platoon which took over the forward trench had to wait for the Scots to
climb out at the back, and then stepped down about two feet and found
themselves in a good foot of muddy water. There was nothing for it but
to wait till dawn; when it came we found ourselves in a shallow ditch,
with only two rows of sandbags in front. Immediately to our front was
a huge pile of black, red, and yellow sandbags, where the Germans had
blocked and strengthened an old communication trench leading into our
lines; their main line was further off--from 200 to 400 yards; behind
us and in front were the dead bodies, also in our own parapet and under
the duckboards of the communication trench, which was soon dubbed
“Bluebottle Alley,” for as soon as the sun rose clouds of the loathsome
insects filled the air and buzzed round our heads. To our front we
could see in the distance the spire of VIOLAINES Church, and on our
right was a new parapet, very high and thick, surrounding CANADIAN
ORCHARD. We were puzzled and annoyed for some days by sniping from that
direction, till one early morning we saw a Hun crawling from under that
same parapet towards his own lines, but a rifle shot fired from a rifle
which had belonged to one of the Scots Guards settled his hash and
avenged the late owner of the rifle.
On the 26th we were shelled intermittently all day, and two men were
wounded, our first casualties; in the evening two platoons were sent
out and extended from the right of No. 2 Platoon at P 11 and started
a trench to connect up with the Canadians. On the 27th we were again
shelled intermittently, but no appreciable damage was done and we
improved our positions greatly. We did not realise then that we had
been put in to finish the consolidation of newly-taken ground--a
pretty stiff beginning for raw troops. The night was exceptionally
quiet--there was less shelling than usual and very little sniping;
during the morning our fire trenches were shelled somewhat severely
with shrapnel, and again in the afternoon, six men being wounded.
As soon as it got dark, working parties went out to get on with the
new trench to the right of P 11; the existing forward trench was
strengthened and the R.E. put a footbridge across the ditch on our
right front; it was very dark and there were no interruptions.
The next day we lost two men wounded by shell fire, which was
pretty heavy. A working party of 200, with a covering party under
Lieutenant Brindle, started a new trench from the new bridge towards
the Canadians, and did good work in spite of bursts of shrapnel at
intervals; during the night bearings were taken on gun flashes, and we
located the enemy battery which was troubling us.
On the 30th the enemy fire--both shrapnel and H.E. (known in those
days as “Jack Johnsons” or “Coalboxes”)--was heavier than usual; two
years later such activity would have provoked a perfect hurricane of
retaliation from our own guns, but in 1915 our gunners had nothing to
throw away and no retaliation could be had. That night the working
parties continued their work, and our guns at 12 15 a.m. and 2 15 a.m.
fired a few shells. The enemy retorted with vigour, wounding Second
Lieutenant Bryce-Smith and five men and killing one. The working
parties were brought in at 1 a.m. The enemy fire died down about 3 30
a.m., but burst out afresh at 11 a.m., being directed chiefly on our
fire trenches, which were damaged in several places.
On 1st June we carried out the usual programme, and were shelled fairly
heavily during the afternoon; in these early days we had three or six
men in every bay of the trench, and the wonder is that our casualties
were not much greater than they were. On the 2nd we were relieved by
58th Vaughan’s Rifles, and marched back to billets at CORNET MALO, half
a mile north-west of LOCON CHURCH. We went out by companies, and the
leading men set off at about four miles an hour, with the result that
those at the back of the long single file were running and stumbling
and out of breath, and it was great good luck that we all reached
the rendezvous; but we did, and after a short rest, tramped off by
Companies to our billets, which we reached about 4 a.m. As each Company
wheeled into its own farmyard a wild cheer went up, for there were our
C.Q.M.S. and cooks, a brand new field cooker, like the ones we had seen
and envied with the 9th Division, and, best of all, a meal--piping hot
and ready. It took about one minute to get the Company formed in close
column, arms piled, packs off and neatly dressed, and coffee served out.
We rested all day, but in the evening moved to fresh billets between
CALONNE and ROBECQ via the LA BASSEE CANAL. Lieutenant Gregson and 30
other ranks went to the new Grenadier Company, and Lieutenant Smith
and four to the Trench Mortar class. Two days later, back we went to
our old billets at CORNET MALO! That was a horrid march. Starting at
7 p.m., we marched 12 miles as ordered, but on arrival no one knew
anything about us, and on enquiring at Brigade Headquarters it was
discovered that a counter-order had been issued but had never reached
us, so we had to turn about and retrace our steps to CORNET MALO,
arriving at midnight. It was during this counter-march that we passed
a Battalion of Highlanders, and one of them shouted: “What Battalion’s
that?” Quick as thought came the answer in a tone of pitying contempt:
“Battalion! This isn’t a Battalion; it’s a ---- walking club!” Another
Scots wit asked: “What are you chaps doing? Marching?” and got prompt
answer: “Marching! No; we’re resting!”--as indeed we were, technically.
On the 7th Second Lieutenant Lindsay went to hospital with flu’; it
was a sultry day and bathing was fashionable, both in the Canal and
the clear streams, also the following day, till a thunderstorm with
torrents of rain put a stop to it. Captain Parker also went to hospital
about this time.
On 9th June we moved up to the trenches along the RUE DE BOIS, RUE
DE L’EPINETTE, through FESTUBERT VILLAGE and down LE QUINQUE RUE for
about 800 yards, and relieved the 1/7th Black Watch. FESTUBERT was
the most badly-smashed village we had yet seen--there were remnants
of barricades still standing in the streets--most of the houses were
heavily sandbagged, and some had barbed wire round them. There was a
house at the entrance to the village with all the front blown in and
the furniture of the upper bedrooms hanging shakily--half in, half out.
Where the Church had been, now only recognisable by the Crucifix which
still stood unharmed, we turned to the left. (This description and the
pages which follow were written by the late Captain Lindsay at the
time, and have been inserted practically as he wrote them.)
THURSDAY, June 10th, 1915.
The day passed away very quietly; but there were two or three very
heavy thunderstorms with torrential rains which rapidly converted the
trenches--the communication trenches in particular--into quagmires.
These communication trenches became very dirty, in no place being less
than boot-deep and in many places thigh-deep in a pestilent liquid
mud. The boards placed at the bottom of the trench were quite covered
over, and, being extremely slippery, were mainly useful in leading the
way to the deeper, wetter part of the trenches! Working parties at
night in heavy rain had very great difficulty in making progress. The
night was very dark, and the men were loaded with spades and hurdles
and sandbags. Only a section of the working party under the command of
Captain Crump managed to get through to the fire trench, and took three
hours to do it--until midnight--distance not quite a mile! Working
parties were under control of Engineers.
Lieutenant Hoit was admitted to hospital suffering from rheumatism.
Second Lieutenant Rawsthorn, Reserve Machine Gun Officer, took over the
Machine Guns.
FRIDAY, June 11th, 1915.
Second Lieutenant Lindsay rejoined the Battalion.
The morning was finer, but the trenches were still very muddy. Three
working parties were sent out in the morning to work in the open
between the reserve and the support lines in the making of bridges
across the ditches and of tracks through the long grass, of ramps in
the trenches to facilitate climbing the parapet, and in clearing up the
old German trench which lay in that area. The Germans shelled this old
trench of theirs regularly, though it was not occupied.
The Battalion was relieved unexpectedly by the 1/7th Black Watch.
Relief was completed by 10 45 p.m., and the Battalion marched back
along the Canal to billets near LE CORNET MALO, in the wood to the
south of that place. The march was a tiring one, but the men lasted out
well, and billets were reached about 5 a.m.
SATURDAY, June 12th, 1915.
The day was passed in resting and cleaning up.
SUNDAY, June 13th, 1915.
Orders were received to return to the trenches we had left on Friday
night, and relieve the Battalions which had relieved the 1/8th K.L.
Irish and ourselves then. Though no order had been issued, we all knew
that the Battalion was going up for an attack, and in anticipation of
this the Officers, or as many as cared to do so, drew men’s uniforms
from the Quartermaster’s Stores. Lieutenant Moore, hearing in hospital
word of this impending attack, rejoined us. The Battalion marched off
at 6 p.m., and relief was completed in the trenches about 1 a.m. This
time we took over the fire and support trenches from the 1/6th Black
Watch. We found the trenches very much drier than when we left them.
There was some shelling at the time of relief. The dispositions of the
Battalion (646 strong) were: B and C Companies in fire trenches, D
Company in support, A Company in reserve.
Second Lieutenant Houghton and one man were wounded going up.
It is a queer sensation going up to one’s first battle. The bracing
of the nerves to face the unknown--it is the essence of religion,
voluntary self-sacrifice for a cause, made possible only by faith, and
calling for the strongest effort of will to control the nerves. Happy
the man who is not gifted with a vivid imagination--who, like Kipling’s
oxen, can plod steadily along, living in the present--blind to the
future. Those who fall do so at the moment of their highest endeavour;
had they lived they had probably never risen so high again. Surely to
them, if to anyone, is granted the peace which passeth understanding.
MONDAY, June 14th, 1915.
The Battalion had been warned for an attack, and operation orders
issued from the Brigade in the morning made this clear. With the object
of gaining ground in the direction of RUE D’OUVERT, the Fourth Corps
was to attack the German positions in the north. The 51st Division, the
7th Division, and the Canadian Division were to attack simultaneously.
[Illustration: Map No. 1
FESTUBERT]
The 51st Division detailed the 154th Infantry Brigade, and the 154th
Infantry Brigade the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment (with 10
bombers) on the right, and the 1/6th Scottish Rifles (with 10 bombers),
on the left, as assaulting troops. Besides these there were:--
I. 2 Officers, 7 N.C.O.’s, and 36 men from Grenadier Company.
II. 12 bayonet men from 1/4th North Lancashires.
16 bayonet men from 1/6th Scottish Rifles.
III. 2 N.C.O.’s, 12 men of 1/4th North Lancashires, Blocking
parties.
1 N.C.O., 6 men of 1/6th Scottish Rifles.
IV. 1 N.C.O., 6 men of 1/4th North Lancashires, Carrying
parties.
1 N.C.O., 6 men of 1/6th Scottish Rifles.
V. 1 Sections as escort from the 1/4th North Lancashires.
(These North Lancashire details were found by D Company.)
The supporting Battalion was the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment, less
two platoons, whilst the 1/8th Liverpool Regiment was held in Brigade
Reserve.
There was also a Trench Mortar detachment with two guns of the old
“Archibald” type, under the command of Lieutenant Smith.
A working party of two platoons from the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment
was detailed to accompany one Section of the 2/2nd Highland Field
Company R.E.
The attack by the Brigade was towards the houses on the road behind the
German salient. At these houses a junction would be effected, if the
attack was successful, with the 7th Division. The two attacks converged
on this point. We were to obtain flanking fire from the rifles and
machine guns of the 152nd Brigade in the trenches to our left. They in
turn were to advance on the flank when we had consolidated our position.
The whole attack was timed for 6 p.m. on the 15th June, and was to be
preceded by a 48 hours’ bombardment.
These, in brief, were the operation orders. We had been warned to
show no signs of activity during this preliminary bombardment, which
began about dawn, and was devoted chiefly to cutting the enemy’s
barbed wire. Field guns bombarded this, whilst the heavier guns played
on the enemy’s trenches, and the heaviest on the houses behind. The
bombardment was not confined to our front, but extended all along the
ridge to the south towards VIOLAINES. This village lay over the ridge,
and only the church spire could be seen.
From the support trench, the view was of the usual kind, a flat
Flanders plain, with ditches bordered by rows of pollard willows, and
wrecked farmhouses with a few scattered trees. The plain very gradually
rose to a sky-line, the Aubers ridge being especially marked on the
right. The British bombardment was persistent and, from what we could
see, effective, whereas the Germans only replied sporadically with
some sharp bursts of shrapnel and some high explosive shell on the
communication trenches, from which B and C Companies lost a few men.
The bombardment continued all along the front, on both sides of us, all
night with only two slight stoppages.
In reply to an enquiry from the artillery as to the amount of damage
done to the wire by the artillery fire in our line of advance, Major
Nickson replied that most of the wire had been destroyed. This was at
11 a.m. on the 15th June, 1915, and shrapnel was still bursting over
it. Captain Norman reported to the same effect, and said that all
stakes were gone, and such strips of wire as remained did not appear
to be an obstacle to an advance. He added that the wire opposite the
enemy’s main trench could not be observed clearly from our fire trench.
TUESDAY, 15th June, 1915.
The British bombardment continued as on the previous day, with the
Germans still only occasionally replying. Very heavy artillery (9.2)
was brought to bear upon the houses on the road to our immediate left
front, some being set on fire. It was particularly interesting to watch
this shelling, and to note the regularity and precision with which it
was shifted from house to house. The wire and the German sap and the
fire trenches were also kept under continual fire. An advanced mountain
battery played on the enemy’s parapets.
B Company was withdrawn to the support trench to the right of D
Company, whilst C Company moved to the right of the fire trench, making
room for the charging company of the 1/6th Cameronians on their left. A
Company was still in reserve.
Orders were received in the afternoon that the British bombardment
would increase greatly in intensity at 5 30 p.m., and would continue so
until 6 p.m. For this first half-hour, the guns would be concentrated
on the enemy’s barbed wire. At 6 p.m. they would “lift,” i.e., increase
their range on to the enemy’s fire trench and shell this solely for
three minutes. At 6 3 the communication trenches would be bombarded
for a minute, and the enemy’s main trench from 6 4 to 6 15. At 6 15
the guns would lift into the road, and would shell this intensely for
half-an-hour, until 6 45. At 6 45 the artillery would form a barrage
beyond the road.
At 5 30 promptly the bombardment became terrific. Shells whistled and
shrieked overhead in enormous numbers. All the British artillery which
was massed behind the line concentrated on the assaulting positions
with rapid fire. There were also some French 75 batteries to help.
Under this rain of shells B and D Companies moved up the communication
trenches towards the fire trench from the supports, and A Company to
the supports from the reserve line.
But while the British bombardment increased greatly in intensity, the
German shelling, from being merely desultory, also became intense. High
explosive shells, in salvoes of four, dropped upon the communication
trenches, filling them, in many places, with earth and mud, and in some
cases obliterating them. It became a task of extreme difficulty to move
up to the firing line under this heavy fire. There were some dead and
wounded in the trenches.
[Illustration:
_Sketch Map of Trenches_]
At 6 p.m. precisely C Company charged from the fire trench. The leading
platoon was a composite one, made up from Nos. 9 and 12 for strength,
and under the command of Second Lieutenant Parker; No. 10 Platoon
under Second Lieutenant Craven followed at 100 yards’ distance, and
No. 11 under Second Lieutenant Davies followed this. They had to climb
the parapet, and, under a withering fire, form to the left flank
slightly and then charge. They did this almost perfectly in line, and
were in possession of the trench inside three minutes. Their losses
were chiefly from rifle and machine gun fire. This must have been
principally from the main trench, and not the advanced trench of
the salient, since they found most of the Germans there sheltering
in dugouts; these were dealt with by bombing parties. The bombers
worked in two groups: (a) (right) 1/5th Royal Lancaster Regiment under
Lieutenant Taylor, and (b) 1/6th Scottish Rifles under Lieutenant Hay
(left group). These bombing parties, supported by the various parties
told off to them, did magnificent work, and penetrated right through
the road to a much greater distance than ever the assaulting battalions
reached.
Roughly it may be said that the centre of the attack was L 8 as marked
on the map. The two leading platoons of C Company, with their left
directing the whole attack, charged the German T-head sap directly in
front, and taking that in the rush, swept to the German fire trench. On
their left were the 1/6th Scottish Rifles also charging.
When the trench was won, comparatively easily, the Germans holding
up their hands and pleading for mercy, the bombing parties extended
outwards, down past Z 1, K 6, and Z 4. Their orders were to push ahead
as far as possible, since the 7th Division, as detailed, would be
attacking at the same time. Another party was to break off up towards
the German main trench at X 7. The other main party of bombers went
towards L 10 up the communication trench--which was also a firing
trench facing M 4--at L 10 they split off, one towards L 9 and the
other down the main German trench. These bombers actually went beyond
the road so fast that their bayonet men could not keep up with them.
They mostly ran along the top of the trench, with the German and
British Artillery both bombarding the lines all this time very heavily
indeed.
Red screens were used to show the furthermost points reached by the
infantry, to enable the artillery to support. The bombing parties
carried red flags, and a red rocket was to be fired when the infantry
reached the houses on the road at L 11. (The artillery had set these
houses on fire, and they afforded a good landmark.) But the artillery
observers could see nothing because of the tremendous smoke and
dust cloud, which hid the whole area from their view. All telephone
communication was very soon smashed up, and messages had to be sent by
relays of orderlies. Lieutenant Ord at L 8 was in charge of this.
The course of the battle becomes a little obscure. The next supporting
Company was B, but Captain Peak, for some time reported missing, has
lately been reported dead, and there is no connected account of what
actually happened to this Company. At this period the German artillery
redoubled in intensity on the deploying Companies, and whereas C
Company had suffered chiefly from rifle and machine gun fire, B and D
and A Companies suffered from shrapnel and high explosive. B Company
seems to have reinforced C Company on the right. B Company men say they
had to cross a deep ditch with barbed wire entanglements at the bottom.
(This must have been the ditch marked in front of the German fire
trench at Z 1). Here, they say, Captain Peak was killed on the barbed
wire in front of the trench.
D Company, coming up the now very badly damaged communication and fire
trench, was sent to reinforce the line in the left of the centre of the
attacking line across the sap and the fire trench, and then along the
edge of the communication trench towards L 10. Both B and D Companies
moved to support in lines of platoons, through a gap in the trench,
under extremely heavy artillery fire.
Meanwhile the attack had swept on, past the German trench, up along the
German communication trenches. There were a great number of casualties
from rifle fire from the German main trench and enfilading machine gun
fire from somewhere about X 7 or Z 2. But the attack swept on and must
have carried the main trench, already bombed, but for being pulled up
suddenly by uncut barbed wire, which lay concealed in the long grass on
the German (east) side of the ditch which runs parallel to the German
main trench, south-east from L 10. The attacking line was then within
30 yards of the trench. More enfilade fire came from one of the houses
at L 11 on the road. This house must have had a good number of machine
guns in it.
The position therefore about 7 p.m. was this:--
[Illustration:
Barbed wire marked in red wavy line.
Red line marks approximate centre of attack.]
The Scottish Rifles were attacking on our left with their right resting
on the British sap head at L 8. Their advance was checked by uncut
barbed wire which ran along the northern edge of the communication
trench, very early on, and they lay in the open under galling and very
heavy fire, losing heavily in attempting to cut it, but were compelled
to advance along the communication trench. At 7 p.m. when the advance
was checked, they were in this communication trench, which they were
holding. Once a part of the German salient, it faced obliquely the
British trench at M 4; it was also a fire trench, being very narrow,
with numerous traverses and some dugouts about Z. The uncut wire here
in front of this trench prevented any further advance by them. All
their officers except one were casualties. The result of this forced
change of front by them was the formation of an angle at L 10 in the
line of attack, they themselves facing north, whilst the Loyal North
Lancashires faced east or perhaps north-east.
The ditch in which C Company lay, now reinforced by D on the left and B
on the right, with A coming up from reserve, was bordered by a row of
pollard willows. On the left it was comparatively dry, with a slight
protecting bank on the east (German) side; but the further it went to
the right the more of a quagmire it became. In some places on the right
it was thigh-deep in water. It ran parallel to the German trench along
the road, at about 30 yards’ distance from it. It afforded comparative
security after the advance because of the slight cover to be obtained
in it, and because it was too near the German trench to allow artillery
fire to be brought to bear. C Company had brought up one sandbag per
man and one shovel to every three men, with 20 wirecutters to the
Company, and B and A Companies had brought up three sandbags per man
and a pick or a shovel carried slung with spun yarn, per man, but some
of these were lost in the advance, and only a few men came up with them
all.
The Battalion entrenched itself in this ditch line as best it could.
It was rapidly going dark. A Company, as it came up, was sent to the
right of the line to strengthen and extend it and to get into touch
with the 7th Division, and several parties were sent out to the right
to find them, but fruitlessly. Entrenching in a waterlogged ditch
with the entrenching tool was slow work. At dusk the 1/4th King’s Own
sent up a Company to reinforce, under the command of Captain Barrow;
Major Nickson was in command of the front line. The Colonel had been
wounded earlier in the evening, and Major Foley took over command and
established his headquarters in the German fire trench opposite L 8.
About 11 p.m. there was a slackening of the German fire, both artillery
and rifle. The German artillery fire had been directed chiefly against
our supports and reserves, and was particularly violent at L 8. Some of
our wounded had been collected there, and were looked after there all
night by Sergeant-Major Farnworth.
By this time, in the front line, a machine gun had been placed in
position about L 10. The trench junction there had been blocked by
sandbags. It was at this point (L 10) that the Scottish Rifles were in
touch with us. It was found impossible, because of lack of material,
to block the further trench (X 7), and accordingly the line we held
in the ditch was bent back to the right to protect that flank. The
line was a bad one. There was a conference of Officers held by Major
Nickson. Both flanks were in the air. We were not in touch with the
7th Division, and enfilade rifle fire was coming from the right flank,
though fairly weak. The ditch was waterlogged, and too wide in places
and clearly marked by the row of pollard willows. Spades and picks and
sandbags were lacking. There were no bombs left, and no bombers. (There
were two advanced bomb reserves of 1,000 bombs each near L 8, but no
one knew where these were. The bombers sent to reinforce the original
party were shelled heavily on the road to the reserve trenches, and
out of 33 only five were unwounded.) Impossible to entrench ditch.
Therefore proposed line about 20 yards back in the open. This meant
beginning afresh without tools. Men too crowded in line. There were
no Verey lights. Artillery support had ceased about 8 45 because of
uncertainty as to the actual position of the attacking Battalions.
Major Nickson sent back word to Major Foley explaining this and asking
for instructions. In the meantime the German counter-attack began, and
prevented instructions arriving.
It was about midnight when the Germans began to throw up flares in
great numbers. They had been shelling L 10 and the (German) captured
salient for some time before. Their counter-attack proper began by
bombing at L 10 so severely that the machine gun there was damaged and
put out of action, and the connection with the Cameronians broken.
Almost at the same time, the Germans began to bomb down the right
communication trench (X 7), and followed this by throwing bombs
across the open. There was no means of replying, and no cover to be
had anywhere in the ditch. To stay there would have meant the wiping
out of those in the line; enfilade fire came from both flanks--on the
right from the German main trench at K 7, and on the left from L 9;
the Scottish Rifles in the German communication trench were enfiladed
down the whole length by artillery and rifle fire. Orders were given,
therefore, to retire from the position.
At the point Z (see map) a mixed body of men lined the shell craters
and held up the Germans for about two hours, losing heavily. This point
Z, which lay on the German side of their fire trench, was an absolute
mass of wrecked dugouts. These men finally retired, in the mist of
the morning, towards the sap south-west of L 8. In the retirement all
the attacking Battalions were mixed up. The sap at L 8 was held by
a composite company: 1/4th Loyal North Lancashires, 1/6th Scottish
Rifles, 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment, Grenadier Guards, 1/8th
Liverpool Irish, but the Germans, probably because of their check at Z,
did not push their counter-attack on to the British lines.
The attacking Battalions were withdrawn to the support trenches about 4
a.m. on the 16th, the men in the sap about 6 a.m., and the lines were
taken over by the 1/8th K.L. Regiment (Irish).
Motor machine guns under Captain Hammond, D.S.O., to left of L 8,
stayed up through the attack and for four days afterwards.
The casualties were heavy.
The Colonel was wounded at the beginning of the attack, when near L
8. Almost at the same time the Adjutant, Captain Norman, was severely
wounded. He advanced with the leading platoon and was on the parapet of
the German trench when he was wounded by, it is said, an officer hiding
in a dugout.
In C Company, Second Lieutenant P. Parker, who was in command of the
charging platoon was seriously wounded, Second Lieutenant Craven was
wounded in the leg, and Second Lieutenant Davies, who, wounded slightly
twice, would go on, was fatally wounded and died on the field.
In B Company, Captain Peak was reported killed, as previously
mentioned, but was posted missing, as there was no definite news of
what actually happened to him. Lieutenant Moore was wounded in the
wrist, and Captain Crump blown up and injured by a shell.
In D Company, Captain Hibbert was last seen directing the platoons
through the gap in the fire trench. After that no news can be obtained
of what happened to him, and he was posted missing. Captain Whitfield
was seriously wounded in the thighs by shrapnel and died in hospital at
Boulogne. Second Lieutenant Rawsthorn, in charge of the machine guns,
was killed by shell when leading his team across the open to the German
trenches. Lieutenant Brindle was hit on the head and in the arm.
In A Company, Lieutenant Smith[C] was in charge of the trench mortar
team during the bombardment, firing from the fire trench. When the
order to charge was given, Lieutenant Smith rushed forward with his
gun, and was seriously wounded when carrying it across the open. He
died in hospital at Lillers two days later, and was buried there.
The Officers who came through the fight unhurt were Major Foley, Major
Nickson, Captain Booth, Captain Widdows, Lieutenant Rennard, Lieutenant
Ord, Lieutenant Duckworth, Second Lieutenant Lindsay.
Second Lieutenant Rogerson was away at General Headquarters attending
a Machine Gun Course, and Lieutenant Gregson was attached to the
Grenadier Company at the time.
The casualties among the men were heavy, especially among the
N.C.O.’s.[D] They were:--
Killed 26
Wounded 266
Missing 110
---
Total 402
It must be assumed that most of the missing are killed. The list
therefore stands with a high ratio of killed to wounded.
The respective strengths of the Companies on June 30th, according to
Orderly Room returns, were:--
A Company 146
B Company 99
C Company 149
D Company 126
----
Total 520
15 Officers on strength. The effective rifle strength was 358.
The German trenches after the two days’ bombardment were in a bad
state. In many places they had been completely destroyed, and when we
took them we found them piled deep with German dead. The dugouts, which
had been made in the parados, seemed whole, but were full of dead and
wounded, probably the work of the bombers. The communication trench
was also partially destroyed, and littered with German dead. The whole
series of trenches were full of German equipment in great confusion.
Like our trenches, they were built of sandbags, but their communication
trench was very deep and well traversed, and was probably intended
to serve as a fire trench against M 4. There was an abandoned German
machine gun in the fire trench in a stretcher carriage, which could
not be moved. There was a good amount of German equipment outside the
trench about the point Z. This place was the wildest spot, a mass of
shell holes and fragments of works. The German barbed wire was very
strong, of abnormal thickness in closeness and strength of spikes and
in the wire itself. The ditch in front of the sap was heavily wired
under the water. The German casualties must have been very heavy. The
artillery Officers said they caught the reinforcements coming up on
the road first with the 4.5 howitzers, and later with the 9in. guns.
Bombers say something of what they saw there, but not all of them agree
on the point. The trenches were occupied at the time of the attack
by Bavarians, it is said. The counter-attack was made by the reserve
Division of the Prussian Guards.
The British trenches suffered severely too. In the morning L 8 was a
wreck, most of the trench battered down, and the communication trench,
which was revetted with hurdles, also badly damaged. The trench was
saved in many cases, though, by the hurdles bending and not collapsing
as sandbag revetting would have done. It was at L 8 that the brunt of
the firing was. In some places there the trench lines were completely
obliterated, and in very many places so badly damaged as to need
extensive repair before being of much use again.
The British report of June 16th, as issued by the Press Bureau, read:--
“Yesterday evening, we captured the German front line of
trenches east of Festubert, on a mile of front, but failed to
hold them during the night against the strong counter-attacks
delivered by the enemy.”
The communique issued at the German Main Headquarters says, according
to the “Daily Telegraph”:--
“Wednesday.
“Again influenced by Russian defeats, the French and English
yesterday attacked with strong forces of men at many points on
the Western front.
“On the other hand, two attacks of four English Divisions
between the roads of Estaires--La Bassée and La Bassée Canal
completely collapsed. Our brave Westphalian regiments and
reinforcements, consisting of portions of our Guard, repulsed
the attacks after desperate hand-to-hand fighting. The enemy
suffered heavy losses. We captured several machine guns and
one mine-throwing howitzer.”
JUNE 16th, 1915-JUNE 21st, 1915.
The Battalion regathered at LE TOURET and was given breakfast there
from the cookers which had been brought up, with a rum issue. The roll
was called, and only 243 men answered it.[E] We moved off about 10
a.m. In spite of their exhausted condition and their heavy losses, the
men marched well and in good spirits, singing for the first half-hour
of the journey, but a halt was made just before reaching billets for
the purposes of a rest. The day was very hot and close. The march was
resumed about 4 30 p.m., and billets at LE CORNET MALO were reached
about 5 30 p.m. Billets were of the usual type--barns with adjacent
orchards.
Lieutenant Ord was admitted to hospital on June 17th. The men were
very exhausted, and the days passed in resting and cleaning-up and
reorganising. All the Companies needed reorganising. B Company was
without an Officer until Lieutenant Gregson came back from the Bomb
School on June 19th. There was a great shortage of N.C.O.’s, since most
of them were casualties. B, C, and D Companies had an average of five
or six each, and A Company was not much better. Platoons were very weak
in strength. A few odd men rolled up during the first few days. One,
Corporal Smalley, of D Company, came in from the German lines wounded,
with German field dressings on his wounds.
The system of Officers messing by Companies had to be abandoned, and a
Battalion mess was reinstituted. This system was abandoned on the 9th
July, when three messes were constituted: Headquarters, A and B, and C
and D, when out of the trenches.
Brigadier-General Hibbert inspected the Battalion, together with the
1/8th Liverpool Regiment, on June 18th, and conveyed to Officers and
Men the appreciation of himself and of the Corps Commander for the
services they had rendered. He said that though the attack had failed
in its immediate object, yet it had been instrumental in attracting
to itself reinforcements which might otherwise have been directed
against the French, attacking further south. The G.O.C. Division
held an inspection on June 19th, and conveyed to us a message from
Field-Marshal Sir John French, congratulating the Brigade on the fight
it had made.