I looked at the filing-cases and waited for him to explain.

"When we were first married," he went on presently, "she said, 'It seems

to me, if I were a public man, I should keep everything relating to

myself--every speech, all that the newspapers said, every meeting and

the lists of the important people who were there, notes of _all_ the

people I ever met anywhere, every letter or telegram or note I received.

If you do, you may find after a few years that you have an enormous list

of acquaintances. You've forgotten them because you meet so many, but

they will not have forgotten you, who were one of the principal figures

at the meeting or reception.' That's in substance what she said. And so,

we began and kept it up"--he paused in his deliberate manner, compressed

his lips, then added--"together."

I opened one of the filing-cases, glanced at him for permission, took

out a slip of paper under the M's. It was covered with notes, in Mrs.

Burbank's writing, of a reception given to him at the Manufacturers'

Club in St. Louis three years before. A lot of names, after each some

reminders of the standing and the personal appearance of the man.

Another slip, taken at random from the same box, contained similar notes

of a trip through Montana eight years before.

"Wonderful!" I exclaimed, as the full value of these accumulations

loomed in my mind. "I knew she was an extraordinary woman. Now I see

that she had genius for politics."

His expression--a peering through that eternal pose of his--made me

revise my first judgment of his mourning. For I caught a glimpse of a

real human being, one who had loved and lost, looking grief and pride

and gratitude. "If she had left me two or three years earlier," he said

in that solemn, posing tone, "I doubt if I should have got one step

further. As it is, I may be able to go on, though--I have lost--my

staff."

What fantastic envelopes does man, after he has been finished by

Nature, wrap about himself in his efforts to improve her handiwork!

Physically, even when most dressed, we are naked in comparison with the

enswathings that hide our real mental and moral selves from one

another--and from ourselves.

My campaign was based on the contents of those filing-cases. I learned

all the places throughout the West--cities, towns, centrally-located

villages--where he had been and had made an impression; and by simple

and obvious means we were able to convert them into centers of "the

Burbank boom." I could afterward trace to the use we made of those

memoranda the direct getting of no less than one hundred and seven

delegates to the national convention--and that takes no account of the

vaster indirect value of so much easily worked-up, genuine, unpurchased

and unpurchasable "Burbank sentiment." The man of only local prominence,

whom Burbank remembered perfectly after a chance meeting years before,

could have no doubt who ought to be the party's nominee for President.

The national machine of our party was then in the custody, and

supposedly in the control, of Senator Goodrich of New Jersey. He had a

reputation for Machiavellian dexterity, but I found that he was an

accident rather than an actuality.

The dominion of the great business interests over politics was the rapid

growth of about twenty years--the consolidations of business naturally

producing concentrations of the business world's political power in the

hands of the few controllers of the big railway, industrial and

financial combines. Goodrich had happened to be acquainted with some of

the most influential of these business "kings"; they naturally made him

their agent for the conveying of their wishes and their bribes of one

kind and another to the national managers of both parties. They knew

little of the details of practical politics, knew only what they needed

in their businesses; and as long as they got that, it did not interest

them what was done with the rest of the power their "campaign

contributions" gave.

With such resources any man of good intelligence and discretion could

have got the same results as Goodrich's. He was simply a lackey,

strutting and cutting a figure in his master's clothes and under his

master's name. He was pitifully vain of his reputation as a Machiavelli

and a go-between. Vanity is sometimes a source of great strength; but

vanity of that sort, and about a position in which secrecy is the prime

requisite, could mean only weakness.

Throughout his eight years of control of our party it had had possession

of all departments of the national administration--except of the House

of Representatives during the past two years. This meant the

uninterrupted and unchecked reign of the interests. To treat with

consideration the interests, the strong men of the country, they who

must have a free hand for developing its resources, to give them

privileges and immunities beyond what can be permitted the ordinary

citizen or corporation--that is a course which, however offensive to

abstract justice, still has, as it seems to me, a practical justice in

it, and, at any rate, must be pursued so long as the masses of the

voters are short-sighted, unreasoning and in nose-rings to political

machines. A man's rights, whatever they may be in theory, are in

practice only what he has the intelligence and the power to compel.

But, for the sake of the nation, for the upholding of civilization

itself, these over-powerful interests should never be given their heads,

should be restrained as closely as may be to their rights--their

_practical_ rights. Goodrich had neither the sagacity nor the

patriotism--nor the force of will, for that matter--to keep them within

the limits of decency and discretion. Hence the riot of plunder and

privilege which revolted and alarmed me when I came to Washington and

saw politics in the country-wide, yes, history-wide, horizon of that

view-point.

Probably I should have been more leisurely in bringing my presidential

plans to a focus, had I not seen how great and how near was the peril to

my party. It seemed to me, not indeed a perfect or even a satisfactory,

but the best available, instrument for holding the balances of order as

even as might be between our country's two opposing elements of

disorder--the greedy plunderers and the rapidly infuriating plundered.

And I saw that no time was to be lost, if the party was not to be blown

to fragments. The first mutterings of the storm were in our summary

ejection from control of the House in the midway election. If the party

were not to be dismembered, I must oust Goodrich, must defeat his plans

for nominating Cromwell, must nominate Burbank instead. If I should

succeed in electing him, I reasoned that I could through him carry out

my policy of moderation and _practical_ patriotism--to yield to the

powerful few a minimum of what they could compel, to give to the

prostrate but potentially powerful many at least enough to keep them

quiet--a stomachful. The world may have advanced; but patriotism still

remains the art of restraining the arrogance of full stomachs and the

anger of empty ones.

In Cromwell, Goodrich believed he had a candidate with sufficient hold

upon the rank and file of the party to enable him to carry the election

by the usual means--a big campaign fund properly distributed in the

doubtful states. I said to Senator Scarborough of Indiana soon after

Cromwell's candidacy was announced: "What do you think of Goodrich's

man?"

Scarborough, though new to the Senate then, had shown himself far and

away the ablest of the opposition Senators. He had as much intellect as

any of them; and he had what theorists, such as he, usually lack, skill

at "grand tactics"--the management of men in the mass. His one

weakness--and that, from my standpoint, a great one--was a literal

belief in democratic institutions and in the inspiring but in practice

pernicious principle of exact equality before the law.

"Cromwell's political sponsors," was his reply, "are two as shrewd

bankers as there are in New York. I have heard it said that a fitting

sign for a bank would be: 'Here we do nothing for nothing for nobody.'"

An admirable summing up of Cromwell's candidacy. And I knew that it

would so appear to the country, that no matter how great a corruption

fund Goodrich might throw into the campaign, we should, in that time of

public exasperation, be routed if Cromwell was our standard-bearer--so

utterly routed that we could not possibly get ourselves together again

for eight, perhaps twelve years. There might even be a re-alignment of

parties with some sort of socialism in control of one of them. If

control were to be retained by the few who have the capital and the

intellect to make efficient the nation's resources and energy, my

projects must be put through at once.

I had accumulated a fund of five hundred thousand dollars for my

"presidential flotation"--half of it contributed by Roebuck in exchange

for a promise that his son-in-law should have an ambassadorship if

Burbank were elected; the other half set aside by me from the "reserve"

I had formed out of the year-by-year contributions of my combine. By the

judicious investment of that capital I purposed to get Burbank the

nomination on the first ballot--at least four hundred and sixty of the

nine hundred-odd delegates.

In a national convention the delegates are, roughly speaking, about

evenly divided among the three sections of the country--a third from

east of the Alleghanies; a third from the West; a third from the South.

It was hopeless for us to gun for delegates in the East; that was the

especial bailiwick of Senator Goodrich. The most we could do there would

be to keep him occupied by quietly encouraging any anti-Cromwell

sentiment--and it existed a-plenty. Our real efforts were to be in the

West and South.

I organized under Woodruff a corps of about thirty traveling agents.

Each man knew only his own duties, knew nothing of the general plan, not

even that there was a general plan. Each was a trained political worker,

a personal retainer of ours. I gave them their instructions; Woodruff

equipped them with the necessary cash. During the next five months they

were incessantly on the go--dealing with our party's western machines

where they could; setting up rival machines in promising localities

where Goodrich controlled the regular machines; using money here,

diplomacy there, both yonder, promises of patronage everywhere.

Such was my department of secrecy. At the head of my department of

publicity I put De Milt, a sort of cousin of Burbank's and a newspaper

man. He attended to the subsidizing of news agencies that supplied

thousands of country papers with boiler-plate matter to fill their

inside pages. He also subsidized and otherwise won over many small town

organs of the party. Further, he and three assistants wrote each week

many columns of "boom" matter, all of which was carefully revised by

Burbank himself before it went out as "syndicate letters." If Goodrich

hadn't been ignorant of conditions west of the Alleghanies and confident

that his will was law, he would have scented out this department of

publicity of mine and so would have seen into my "flotation." But he

knew nothing beyond his routine. I once asked him how many country

newspapers there were in the United States, and he said: "Oh, I don't

know. Perhaps three or four thousand." Even had I enlightened him to the

extent of telling him that there were about five times that number, he

would have profited nothing. Had he been able to see the importance of

such a fact to capable political management, he would have learned it

long before through years of constant use of the easiest avenue into the

heart of the people.

He did not wake up to adequate action until the fourth of that group of

states whose delegations to our national conventions were habitually

bought and sold, broke its agreement with him and instructed its

delegation to vote for Burbank. By the time he had a corps of agents in

those states, Doc Woodruff had "acquired" more than a hundred delegates.

Goodrich was working only through the regular machinery of the party and

was fighting against a widespread feeling that Cromwell shouldn't, and

probably couldn't, be elected; we, on the other hand, were manufacturing

presidential sentiment for a candidate who was already popular. Nor had

Goodrich much advantage over us with the regular machines anywhere

except in the East.

Just as I was congratulating myself that nothing could happen to prevent

our triumph at the convention, Roebuck telegraphed me to come to

Chicago. I found with him in the sitting-room of his suite in the

Auditorium Annex, Partridge and Granby, next to him the most important

members of my combine, since they were the only ones who had interests

that extended into many states. It was after an uneasy silence that

Granby, the uncouth one of the three, said:

"Senator, we brought you here to tell you this Burbank nonsense has gone

far enough."

The Plum Tree · 第 41 / 102 题