WASHINGTON IN DANGER.
CONFEDERATE FORCES THREATEN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL--GENERAL GRANT SENDS
TROOPS TO ITS DEFENCE--BATTERIES AND INTRENCHMENTS AROUND
WASHINGTON--CONFEDERATE FORCES IN SIGHT OF THE DOME OF THE
CAPITOL--PRESIDENT LINCOLN EXPOSED TO THE FIRE OF CONFEDERATE
SHARP-SHOOTERS--GENERAL EARLY'S RETREAT UP THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.
Partly to check the movements of General Hunter in the Shenandoah
Valley, and partly with the hope that an attack on Washington would
cause Grant to withdraw from before Richmond and Petersburg, Lee sent
Early's corps into the valley. Hunter, being out of ammunition, was
obliged to retire before the Confederates, and Early marched down the
Potomac unopposed, and threatened the National capital. Serious fears
were entertained that he would actually enter the city, and all sorts
of hurried preparations were made to prevent him, department clerks
being under arms, and every available man pressed into the service.
The defences of Washington, which had been in course of construction
ever since the war began, consisted of sixty-eight enclosed forts or
batteries, connected by lines of intrenchments, forming a circle about
that city and Alexandria, and being on an average four miles from the
centre of the city. These mounted about eight hundred guns and one
hundred mortars, and, with their connecting works, were calculated to
give fighting room for thirty-five thousand men. But at this time they
were manned by not more than thirteen thousand. Some of these were
members of the invalid corps, which was formed of soldiers who had
been wounded so as to be unfit for the hard duty at the front; others
were hundred-day men. There was great excitement in Washington, and
serious fears that the Confederates might succeed in marching into the
capital.
[Illustration: INTERIOR OF A FORT--PART OF THE DEFENCES OF WASHINGTON.
(From a Government photograph.)]
[Illustration: ABRAHAM LINCOLN.]
Gen. Lew Wallace, in command at Baltimore, gathered a body of recruits
and went out to meet Early, not with the hope of defeating him, but
only of delaying him till a sufficient force could be sent from the
Army of the Potomac. Ricketts's division of the Sixth Corps had
already set out for Baltimore, and on arriving there immediately
followed Wallace. They met the enemy at the Monocacy, thirty-five
miles from Washington, July 9, and took up a position on the left bank
of the stream, covering the roads to the capital. Wallace had six
field guns and a small force of cavalry, and disposed his line so as
to hold the bridges and fords as long as possible. The Confederates
attacked at first in front, with a strong skirmish line and sixteen
guns, and there was bloody fighting at one of the bridges. Then they
changed their tactics, marched a heavy force down stream, crossed at a
ford out of range of the National artillery, and then marched up
stream again to strike Wallace's left flank. That part of the line was
held by Ricketts, who changed front to meet the attack, and was
promptly reinforced from Wallace's scanty resources. Two assaults in
line of battle were repelled, after some destructive fighting, and
Wallace determined still to hold his ground, as he was hourly
expecting three additional regiments. But the afternoon wore away
without any appearance of assistance, and when he saw preparations for
another and heavier assault he determined to retreat. While the left
was being withdrawn, the right, under General Tyler, was ordered to
prevent the remaining Confederate force from crossing at the bridges.
The wooden bridge was burned, and the stone bridge was held to the
last possible moment, when Tyler also retreated. The missing regiments
were met on the road, and there was no pursuit. This {403} action was
not important from its magnitude; but in that it probably saved the
city of Washington from pillage and destruction, it was of the first
importance. Wallace has received high praise for his promptness and
energy in fighting a battle of great strategic value when he knew that
the immediate result must be the defeat of his own force. He lost
about fourteen hundred men, half of whom were prisoners. The
Confederates admitted a loss of six hundred.
Early now marched on Washington, and on the 12th was within a few
miles of it, where some heavy skirmishing took place with a force sent
out by Gen. Christopher C. Augur. His nearest approach was at Fort
Stevens, directly north of the city. General Early says in his memoir:
"I rode ahead of the infantry and arrived in sight of Fort Stevens a
short time after noon, when I discovered that the works were but
feebly manned. Rodes, whose division was in front, was immediately
ordered to bring it into line as rapidly as possible, and move into
the works if he could." This is supposed to have been Early's golden
opportunity, which he somehow missed, for the capture of Washington.
His own explanation is this: "My whole column was then moving by
flank, which was the only practicable mode of marching on the road we
were on; and before Rodes's division could be brought up we saw a
cloud of dust in the rear of the works toward Washington, and soon a
column of the enemy filed into them on the right and left, and
skirmishers were thrown out in front, while an artillery fire was
opened on us from a number of batteries. This defeated our hopes of
getting possession of the works by surprise, and it became necessary
to reconnoitre. Rodes's skirmishers were thrown to the front, driving
those of the enemy to the cover of the works, and we proceeded to
examine the fortifications in order to ascertain if it was practicable
to carry them by assault. They were found to be exceedingly strong.
The timber had been felled within cannon range all round, and left on
the ground, making a formidable obstacle, and every possible approach
was raked by artillery. On the right was Rock Creek, running through a
deep ravine, which had been rendered impassable by the felling of the
timber on each side, and beyond were the works on the Georgetown pike,
which had been reported to be the strongest of all. On the left, as
far as the eye could reach, the works appeared to be of the same
impregnable character. This reconnoissance consumed the balance of the
day. The rapid marching, which had broken a number of the men who were
weakened by previous exposure, and had been left in the valley and
directed to be collected at Winchester, and the losses in killed and
wounded at Harper's Ferry, Maryland Heights, and Monocacy, had reduced
my infantry to about eight thousand muskets. Of those remaining, a
very large number were greatly exhausted by the last two days'
marching, some having fallen by sunstroke; and I was satisfied, when
we arrived in front of the fortifications, that not more than
one-third of my force could have been carried into action. After dark
on the 11th, I held a consultation with Major-Generals Breckenridge,
Rodes, Gordon, and Ramseur, in which I stated to them the danger of
remaining where we were, and the necessity of doing something
immediately, as the probability was that the passes of the South
Mountain and the fords of the upper Potomac would soon be closed
against us. After interchanging views with them, being very reluctant
to abandon the project of capturing Washington, I determined to make
an assault at daylight next morning. During the night a despatch was
received from Gen. Bradley Johnson, from near Baltimore, informing me
that two corps had arrived from General Grant's army, and that his
whole army was probably in motion. As soon as it was light enough to
see, I rode to the front and found the parapets lined with troops. I
had, therefore, reluctantly to give up all hopes of capturing
Washington, after I had arrived in sight of the dome of the Capitol."
Early's information was correct, as Grant had sent to Washington the
remainder of the Sixth Corps, and also the Nineteenth Corps, which had
just arrived from Louisiana.
[Illustration: BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. G. SAWTELLE.]
[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL ANDREW PORTER.]
[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. A. HASKIN.]
[Illustration: BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL THEO. RUNYON.]
{404} [Illustration: JOHN CABIN BRIDGE NEAR WASHINGTON.]
[Illustration: AN EARNEST REQUEST FOR A FURLOUGH.]
During the fighting at Fort Stevens, President Lincoln was in the
fort, and was exposed to the fire of the Confederate sharp-shooters.
General Wright had the greatest difficulty in persuading him to leave
his dangerous position, and could not do so until an officer standing
near the President had been struck down by a shot from the enemy. Even
then, Mr. Lincoln persisted in looking over the parapet to see what
was going on, and when finally the Sixth Corps men drove back the
enemy he was as excited and jubilant in the cheering as any of those
around him.
Early retreated up the valley, carrying with him considerable plunder,
and was followed some distance until the pursuing force was withdrawn.
The Sixth and Nineteenth Corps were ordered to rejoin Grant's army,
and were on their way to it when it was learned that Early was again
advancing. Grant now determined to finish him and clear the valley,
and accordingly sent General Sheridan to command in that quarter, in
August. Meanwhile, a part of Early's force had been struck at
Winchester by a force under General Averell, who defeated it and
captured four guns and about four hundred men. Three days later, Early
defeated a force under Gen. George Crook, and drove it across the
Potomac, after which he sent his cavalry, under Generals McCausland
and Bradley T. Johnson, to make a raid into Pennsylvania. McCausland,
in the course of his raid, burned Chambersburg, the particulars of
which have been given in another chapter.
This raid created a panic among the inhabitants of western Maryland
and southern Pennsylvania, many of whom fled from their homes, driving
off their cattle and carrying whatever they could.
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