THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.
SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON--SHERMAN BEGINS THE CAMPAIGN--JOHNSTON ABANDONS
RESACA--FIGHTING AT NEW HOPE CHURCH--THE POSITION AT PINE
MOUNTAIN--JOHNSTON AT KENESAW--FALL OF GENERAL POLK--SHERMAN EMPLOYS
NEGROES--BATTLE OF KENESAW--CROSSING THE CHATTAHOOCHEE--HOOD
SUPERSEDES JOHNSTON--ACTION AT PEACH TREE CREEK--BATTLE OF
ATLANTA--DEATH OF GENERAL McPHERSON--THE LOSSES--CAVALRY
EXPEDITIONS--STONEMAN'S RAID--FALL Of ATLANTA.
The expeditions described in the foregoing chapter were preliminary to
the great campaign that General Grant had designed for an army under
Sherman, simultaneous with that conducted by himself in Virginia, and
almost equal to it in difficulty and importance. The object was to
move southward from Chattanooga, cutting into the heart of the
Confederacy where as yet it had been untouched, and reach and capture
Atlanta, which was important as a railroad centre and for its
manufactures of military supplies. This involved conflict with the
army under Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, by some esteemed the ablest
general in the Confederate service. If he was not the ablest in all
respects, he was certainly equal to the conducting of a defensive
campaign with great skill. There could be no running over an army
commanded by him; it must be approached cautiously and fought
valiantly. The distance from Chattanooga to Atlanta, in a straight
line, is a hundred miles, through a country of hills and streams, with
a great many naturally strong defensive positions. Johnston was at
Dalton, with an army which he sums up at about forty-three thousand,
infantry, cavalry, and artillery. But this (according to the
Confederate method of counting) means only the men actually carrying
muskets or sabres or handling the guns, excluding all officers,
musicians, teamsters, etc. If counted after the ordinary method, his
army probably numbered not fewer than fifty-five thousand.
[Illustration: GENERAL JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, C. S. A.]
[Illustration: GENERAL JOHN B. HOOD, C. S. A.]
To contend with this force, Sherman had about a hundred thousand men,
consisting of the Army of the Cumberland commanded by Gen. George H.
Thomas, the Army of the Tennessee commanded by Gen. James B.
McPherson, and the Army of the Ohio commanded by Gen. John M.
Schofield. The discrepancy in numbers seems very great, until we
consider that Sherman was not only to take the offensive, but must
constantly leave detachments to guard his communications; for he drew
all his supplies from Nashville, over one single-track railroad, and
it was liable to be broken at any time by guerilla raids. As he
advanced into the enemy's country, this line would become longer, and
the danger of its being broken still greater. Johnston, on the
contrary, had nothing to fear in the rear, for he was fighting on his
own ground, and could bring his entire force to the front at every
emergency. All things considered, it was pretty nearly an even match.
In one respect, however, Sherman had a decided advantage; he possessed
the confidence of the Government that he served, while Johnston did
not. At least, Johnston complains that Mr. Davis did not trust him as
he should, and thwarted him in many ways; and in this the general
appears to be corroborated by the circumstances of the campaign.
When Sherman concentrated his forces at Chattanooga, and considered
the means of supply, he found that about one hundred and thirty cars
loaded with provisions must arrive at that point every day. But that
railroad had not cars and locomotives enough for such a task, and so
he sent orders to Louisville for the seizure of trains arriving there
from the North, and soon had rolling-stock in great abundance and
variety. While he thus provided liberally for necessary supplies, he
excluded all luxuries. Tents were taken only for the sick and wounded.
The sole exception to this was made in favor of General Thomas, who
needed a tent and a small wagon-train, which the soldiers immediately
christened "Thomas's Circus." Sherman had no tent or train. Every man,
whether officer or private, carried provisions for five days.
{384} [Illustration: THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA, GA., JULY 22, 1864.]
Thus equipped and disciplined, the army set out from Chattanooga on
the 5th of May (the day on which Grant entered the Wilderness),
following the line of the railroad south toward Atlanta. A direct
approach to Dalton was impossible, because of Johnston's
fortifications at Tunnel Hill. So Sherman made a feint of attacking
there, and sent McPherson southward to march through the gap in the
mountains, strike Resaca, and cut the railroad over which Johnston
drew all his supplies. Here at the very outset was the brilliant
opportunity of the campaign, not to occur again. McPherson reached
Resaca, but found fortifications and an opposing force there, and just
lacked the necessary boldness to attack promptly and vigorously,
thrusting his army into a position where it would have made the
destruction of Johnston's almost certain. Instead of this, he fell
back to the gap, and waited for the remainder of the army to join him
there. But this enabled Johnston to learn what was going on, and when
Sherman had passed down to the gap with his entire {385} army, he
found, of course, that his antagonist had fallen back to Resaca and
concentrated his forces there in a strong position.
General Sherman says of this error of McPherson's: "McPherson had
startled Johnston in his fancied security, but had not done the full
measure of his work. He had in hand twenty-three thousand of the best
men of the army, and could have walked into Resaca (then held only by
a small brigade), or he could have placed his whole force astride the
railroad above Resaca, and there have easily withstood the attack of
all of Johnston's army, with the knowledge that Thomas and Schofield
were on his heels. Had he done so, I am certain that Johnston would
not have ventured to attack him in position, but would have retreated
eastward by Spring Place, and we should have captured half his army
and all his artillery and wagons at the very beginning of the
campaign. But at the critical moment McPherson seems to have been a
little cautious. Still he was perfectly justified by his orders, and
fell back and assumed an unassailable defensive position in Sugar
Valley, on the Resaca side of Snake Creek Gap. As soon as informed of
this, I determined to pass the whole army through Snake Creek Gap, and
to move on Resaca with the main army."
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN M. SCHOFIELD.]
On the 14th of May, Sherman's army was in position around Resaca on
the north and west, and on that and the next day there was continual
skirmishing and artillery firing, though nothing like a great battle.
Neither general was willing to fight at disadvantage; Sherman would
not attack the intrenchments, and Johnston would not come out of them.
McPherson, on the right, advanced his line of battle till he gained an
elevated position from which his guns could destroy the railroad
bridge over the Oostenaula in the Confederate rear, and all attempts
to drive him out of this position ended only in bloody repulse. On the
left of the line, Hooker exhibited something of his usual dash by
capturing a small portion of the enemy's intrenchments, with four guns
and some prisoners. Meanwhile, Sherman had thrown two pontoon bridges
across the river three miles below the town, so that he could send
over a detachment to break the railroad, and had also sent a division
of cavalry down the river, to cross at some lower point for the same
purpose. Johnston, therefore, seeing his communications threatened so
seriously, and having no good roads by which he could retreat
eastward, did not wait to be cooped up in Resaca, but in the night of
the 15th retired southward across the river, following the railroad,
and burned the bridges behind him. Sherman thus came into possession
of Resaca; but Resaca was not what he wanted, and without the
slightest delay he started his entire army in pursuit of the enemy.
Hooker crossed the river by fords and ferries above the town; Thomas
and Schofield repaired the half-burned bridges and used them;
McPherson crossed by the pontoons.
The enemy was found, on the 19th, in position at Cassville, just east
of Kingston, and apparently ready to fight; but when Sherman's columns
converged on the place the Confederates, after some sharp skirmishing,
retreated again in the night of the 20th, and crossed Etowah River.
Johnston had really intended to fight here, and he explains his
refusal to do so by saying that Hood and Polk told him their corps
could not hold their positions, as a portion of each was enfiladed by
the National artillery. Hood's version of the mysterious retreat is to
the effect that he wanted to assume the offensive, marching out with
his own corps and a part of Polk's to overwhelm Schofield, who was
separated from the remainder of the National army.
Here Sherman halted for a few days, to get his army well together,
re-provision it, and repair the railroad in his rear. Twenty years
before, when he was a young lieutenant, he had ridden through the
country from Charleston, S. C., to northwestern Georgia, and he still
retained a good recollection of the topography. Knowing that Allatoona
Pass, through which runs the railroad south of Kingston, was very
strong and would probably be held by Johnston, he diverged from the
railroad at Kingston, passing considerably west of it, and directed
his columns toward Dallas; his purpose being to threaten Marietta and
Atlanta so as to cause Johnston to withdraw from Allatoona and release
his hold on the railroad, which became more and more necessary to the
invading army as it advanced into the country. Johnston understood
this manoeuvre, and moved westward to meet it. The armies, in an
irregular way--for each was somewhat scattered and uncertain of the
other's exact position--came into collision at the cross-roads by New
Hope Church. Around this place for six days there was continuous
fighting, sometimes mere skirmishing, and sometimes an attack by a
heavy detachment of one party or the other; but all such attacks, on
either side, were costly and fruitless. The general advantage,
however, was with Sherman; for as he gradually got his lines into
proper order, he strengthened his right, and then reached out with his
left toward the railroad, secured all the wagon-roads from Allatoona,
and sent out a strong force of cavalry to occupy that pass and repair
the railroad. Johnston then left his position at New Hope Church, and
took up a new one.
Thus ended the month of May in this campaign, where each commander
exercised the utmost skill, neither was guilty of anything rash, and
the results were such as would naturally follow from the military
conditions with which it began. The losses on each side, thus far,
were fewer than ten thousand men--killed, wounded, and missing; but
strong positions had been successively taken up, turned, abandoned;
and Sherman was steadily drawing nearer to his goal.
Johnston's new position was on the slopes of Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost
Mountains, thus crossing the railroad above Marietta. It had the
advantage of a height from which everything done by Sherman's
approaching army could be seen; but it had the {386} disadvantage of a
line ten miles long, and so disposed that one part could not readily
reinforce another. Though heavy rains were falling, the National army
kept close to its antagonist, and intrenched at every advance. The
railroad was repaired behind it, and the trains that brought its
supplies ran up almost to its front. In one instance, an engineer
detached his locomotive and ran forward to a tank, where he quietly
took in the necessary supply of water, while a Confederate battery on
the mountain fired several shots, but none of them quite hit the
locomotive, which woke the echoes with its shrill whistling as it ran
back out of range.
[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. S. ROBINSON.]
[Illustration: BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL T. H. RUGER.]
[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. F. BARTLETT.]
[Illustration: BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL W. Q. GRESHAM.]
When the rain was over, Sherman occupied a strongly intrenched line
that followed the contour of Johnston's, and was at nearly all points
close to it. Both sides maintained skirmish lines that were almost as
strong as lines of battle, and occupied rifle-pits. From these the
roar of musketry was almost unceasing, and there was a steady loss of
men. On June 14, while General Sherman was reconnoitring the enemy's
position, he observed a battery on the crest of Pine Mountain, and
near it a group of officers with field-glasses. Ordering a battery to
fire two or three volleys at them, he rode on. A few hours later, his
signal officer told him that the Confederates had signalled from Pine
Mountain to Marietta, "Send an ambulance for General Polk's body." The
group on the mountain had consisted of Generals Johnston, Hardee, and
Polk, and a few soldiers that had gathered around them. One of the
cannon-balls had struck General Polk in the chest and cut him in two.
He was fifty-eight years old at the time of his death, had been
educated at West Point, but afterward studied theology, and at the
outbreak of the war had been for twenty years the Protestant Episcopal
Bishop of Louisiana.
The next day Sherman advanced his lines, intending to attack between
Kenesaw and Pine Mountain, but found that Johnston had withdrawn from
Pine Mountain, taking up a shorter line, from Kenesaw to Lost
Mountain. Sherman promptly occupied the ground, and gathered in a
large number of prisoners, including the Fourteenth Alabama Regiment
entire. The next day he pressed forward again, only to find that the
enemy had still further contracted his lines, abandoning Lost
Mountain, but still occupying Kenesaw, and covering Marietta and the
roads to Atlanta with the extension of his left wing. The successive
positions to which Johnston's army had fallen back were prepared
beforehand by gangs of slaves impressed for the purpose, so that his
soldiers had little digging to do, and could save their strength for
fighting. After a time Sherman adopted a similar policy, by setting at
work the crowds of negroes that flocked to his camp, feeding them from
the army supplies, and promising them ten dollars a month, as he was
authorized to do by an act of Congress. The fortifications consisted
of a sort of framework of rails and logs, covered with earth thrown up
from a ditch on each side. When there was opportunity, they were
finished with a heavy head-log laid along the top, which rested in
notches cut in other logs that extended back at right angles and
formed an inclined plane down which the head-log could roll harmlessly
if knocked out of place by a cannon-shot. Miles of such works were
often constructed in a single night; and they were absolutely
necessary, when veteran armies were facing each other with weapons of
precision in their hands.
Sherman was now facing a little south of east, and kept pressing his
lines closer up to Johnston's, with rifle and artillery firing going
on all the time. On the 21st the divisions of Generals Wood and
Stanley gained new positions, on the southern flank of Kenesaw, where
several determined assaults failed to dislodge them; and the next day
the troops of Hooker and Schofield {387} pressed forward to within
three miles of Marietta, and withstood an attack by Hood's corps,
inflicting upon him a loss of a thousand men. As the National line was
now lengthened quite as far as seemed prudent, and still the
Confederate communications were not severed, Sherman determined upon
the hazardous experiment of attacking the enemy in his intrenchments.
He chose two points for assault, about a mile apart, and on the
morning of the 27th launched heavy columns against them, while firing
was at the same time kept up all along the line. He expected to break
the centre, and with half of his army take half of Johnston's in
reverse, while with the remainder of his troops he held the other half
so close that it could not go to the rescue. But his columns wasted
away before the fire from the intrenchments, and as in Pickett's
charge at Gettysburg, and Grant's assault at Cold Harbor, only a
remnant reached the enemy's works, there to be killed or captured.
Among those sacrificed were Brig.-Gens. Daniel McCook and Charles G.
Harker, both of whom died of their wounds. This experiment cost
Sherman over two thousand five hundred men, while Johnston's loss was
but little over eight hundred.
It was evident that any repetition would be useless, and the approved
principles of warfare seemed to supply no alternative. What General
Sherman therefore did was to disregard the maxim that an army must
always hold fast to its communications; and by doing the same thing on
a grander scale six months later he won his largest fame. He
determined to let go of the railroad north of Kenesaw, take ten days'
provisions in wagons, and move his whole army southward to seize the
road below Marietta. This would compel Johnston either to fall back
farther toward Atlanta, or come out and fight him in his
intrenchments--which, as both commanders well knew, was almost certain
destruction to the assaulting party. In the night of July 2,
McPherson's troops, who had the left or north of the line, drew out of
their works and marched southward, passing behind the lines held by
Thomas and Schofield. This was the same manoeuvre as that by which
Grant had carried his army to its successive positions between the
Wilderness and the James River, except that he moved by the left flank
and Sherman by the right, and Grant never had to let go of his
communications, being supplied by lines of wagons from various points
on the Potomac.
When Johnston saw what Sherman was doing he promptly abandoned his
strong position at Kenesaw, and fell back to the Chattahoochee; but he
did not, as Sherman hoped, attempt to cross the stream at once.
Intrenchments had been prepared for him on the north bank, and here he
stopped. Sherman, expecting to catch his enemy in the confusion of
crossing a stream, pressed on rapidly with his whole army, and ran up
against what he says was one of the strongest pieces of field
fortification he had ever seen. A thousand slaves had been at work on
it for a month. And yet, like many other things in the costly business
of war, it was an enormous outlay to serve a very brief purpose. For
Sherman not only occupied ground that overlooked it, but held the
river for miles above and below, and was thus able to cross over and
turn the position. Johnston must have known this when the
fortifications were in process of construction, and their only use was
to protect his army from assault while it was crossing the river. On
the 9th of July, Schofield's army crossed above the Confederate
position, laying two pontoon bridges, and intrenched itself in a
strong position on the left bank. Johnston, thus compelled to
surrender the stream, crossed that night with his entire army, and
burned the railroad and other bridges behind him. Sherman was almost
as cautious in the pursuit, wherever there was any serious danger, as
Johnston was in the retreat; and he not only chose an upper crossing,
farther from Atlanta, but spent a week in preparations to prevent
disaster, before he threw over his entire army. This he did on the
17th, and the next day moved it by a grand right wheel toward the city
of Atlanta.
The Chattahoochee was the last great obstruction before the
fortifications of the Gate City were reached, and on the day that
Sherman crossed it something else took place, which, in the opinion of
many military critics, was even more disastrous to the fortunes of the
Confederacy. This was the supersession of the careful and skilful
Johnston by Gen. John B. Hood, an impetuous and sometimes reckless
fighter, but no strategist. The controversy over the wisdom of this
action on the part of the Confederate Government will probably never
be satisfactorily closed. The merits of it can be sufficiently
indicated by two brief extracts. The telegram conveying the orders of
the War Department said: "As you have failed to arrest the advance of
the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta, far in the interior of Georgia,
and express no confidence that you can defeat or repel him, you are
hereby relieved from the command of the Army and Department of
Tennessee, which you will immediately turn over to General Hood."
General Johnston said in his reply: "As to the alleged cause of my
removal, I assert that Sherman's army is much stronger compared with
that of Tennessee than Grant's compared with that of Northern
Virginia. Yet the enemy has been compelled to advance much more slowly
to the vicinity of Atlanta than to that of Richmond and Petersburg,
and penetrated much deeper into Virginia than into Georgia. Confident
language by a military commander is not usually regarded as evidence
of competence."
Within twenty-four hours the National army learned that its antagonist
had a new commander, and there was eager inquiry as to Hood's
character as a soldier. Schofield and McPherson had been his
classmates at West Point, and from their testimony and the career of
Hood as a corps commander it was easily inferred that a new policy
might be looked for, very different from Johnston's. Sherman warned
his army to be constantly prepared for sallies of the enemy, and his
prediction did not wait long for fulfilment. On the 20th, at noonday,
as his army was slowly closing in upon the city, the Confederates left
the intrenchments that Johnston had prepared for them along the line
of Peach Tree Creek, where he would have awaited attack, and made a
heavy assault upon Thomas, who held the right of the National line.
The weight of the blow fell mainly upon Hooker's corps, and the attack
was so furious and reckless that in many places friend and foe were
intermingled, fighting hand to hand. A heavy column of Confederates
attempted to fall upon an exposed flank of the Fourth Corps; but
Thomas promptly brought several batteries to play upon it, and at the
end of two hours the enemy was driven back to his intrenchments,
leaving hundreds of dead on the field. Hooker also lost heavily,
because his men fought without intrenchments or cover of any kind.
{388} [Illustration: FALL OF GENERAL JAMES B. McPHERSON, NEAR
ATLANTA.]
The Confederates now abandoned the line of works along Peach Tree
Creek, and fell back to the immediate defences of the city. It was
seen that one point in their line was an eminence--then called Bald
Hill, but since known as Leggett's Hill--from which, if it could be
occupied, the city could be shelled. After a consultation between
Generals Blair and McPherson on the afternoon of the 20th, it was
agreed that this hill ought to be captured, and the task was assigned
to Gen. Mortimer D. Leggett's {389} division. Leggett accordingly said
to Gen. M. F. Force, who commanded his first brigade: "I want you to
carry that hill. Move as soon as it is light enough to move. I will
support your left and rear with the rest of the division, and the
fourth division will make a demonstration as you go up to distract the
attention of the enemy in their front." Accordingly, at daylight,
Leggett's skirmish line cautiously went forward, and got as near as
possible to the Confederate works without alarming the enemy. After
some little delay, caused by waiting for the fourth division, General
Force gave the order for the assault. What then followed is told by
Col. Gilbert D. Munson, of the Seventy-eighth Ohio Regiment: "The
skirmish line sprang forward; the brigade debouched from its
concealment in the wood. In the front line on came the Twelfth and
Sixteenth Wisconsin, close supported by the Twentieth, Thirtieth, and
Thirty-first Illinois--the second line of battle; flags flying,
bayonets fixed; arms right shoulder shift and unloaded; Force and his
aid, Adams, just in rear of the Wisconsin regiments, and his
adjutant-general, Capt. J. Bryant Walker, and another aid, Evans, with
the Illinois boys--mounted; all regimental officers on foot. The
skirmishers, for a moment, distracted the enemy by their rapid advance
and firing; then the brigade received and enveloped them as it reached
the crest of the hill, and exposed its full front to the steady fire
of Cleburne's rifles. Our men fell in bunches; still came the charging
column on; faster and faster it pressed forward. 'Close up! close up!'
the command, and each regiment closed on its colors, and over the
barricades went the first line, handsomely, eagerly, and well aligned.
Then began our firing and our fun. Into the gray-coats the Sixteenth
Wisconsin poured a rattling fire, as they scattered and ran along the
level ground, down the slope of the hill, and on toward Atlanta. I
joined General Force after the skirmish line was merged in his line of
battle, and was with him when it came to and went over the barricades.
'Our orders are to carry this hill, General; the Sixteenth are away
beyond, where, I understand, we are to go.' Force said something about
being able to take the next hill, too, but immediately sent Captain
Walker after Colonel Fairchild, and his 'Right about, march,' brought
the regiment back. Captain Walker then reported the capture of the
hill to General Leggett, who was with the rest of the division. Walker
said to me, on his return, that, having a message for Gen. Giles A.
Smith, commanding the fourth division, he told him the hill was won
and held by Force, but Smith would hardly believe him: he thought he
was joking. It seemed doubtful to him that such an important point had
been won so quickly."
[Illustration: COLONEL CHARLES CANDY. (Afterward Brigadier-General.)]
[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL GEORGE H. GORDON.]
[Illustration: BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL EDWARD M. McCOOK.]
The fourth division, on the right of Force's brigade, met with a
stubborn resistance, but finally overcame it, and other troops were
brought up, and after a little the place was firmly held. This hill
was the key-point of the line, and its capture was what caused Hood to
come out and give battle the next day. He found that Sherman's left
flank, which crossed the line of railroad to Augusta, was without
proper protection, and consequently he moved to the attack at that
point. He marched by a road parallel with the railroad, and the
contour of the ground and the forests hid him until his men burst in
upon the rear of Sherman's extreme left, seized a battery that was
moving through the woods, and took possession of some of the camps.
But McPherson's veterans were probably in expectation of such a
movement, and under the direction of Generals Logan, Charles R. Wood,
and Morgan L. Smith, quickly formed to meet it. That flank of the army
was "refused"--turned back at a right angle with the main line--and
met the onsets of the Confederates with steady courage from noon till
night. Seven heavy assaults were made, resulting in seven bloody
repulses, guns were taken and retaken, and finally a counter attack
was made on the Confederate flank by Wood's division, assisted by
twenty guns that fired over the heads of Wood's men as they advanced,
which drove back the enemy, who retired slowly to their defences,
carrying with them some of the captured guns. It had been intended
that Wheeler's Confederate cavalry should capture McPherson's
supply-trains, which were at Decatur; but the troopers were fought off
till the trains could be drawn back to a place of safety, and Wheeler
only secured a very few wagons. The National loss in this battle was
thirty-five hundred and twenty-one men killed, {390} wounded, and
missing, and ten guns. The total Confederate loss is unknown, but it
was very heavy; General Logan reported thirty-two hundred and twenty
dead in front of his lines, and two thousand prisoners, half of whom
were wounded. The most grievous loss to Sherman was General McPherson,
who rode off into the woods at the first sounds of battle, almost
alone. His horse soon came back, bleeding and riderless, and an hour
later the general's dead body was brought to headquarters. McPherson
was a favorite in the army. He was but thirty-four years old, and with
the exception of his error at the outset of the campaign, by which
Johnston was allowed to escape from Dalton, he had a brilliant
military record. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, who had lost an arm at Fair
Oaks and was now in command of the Fourth Corps, was promoted to
McPherson's place in command of the Army of the Tennessee; whereupon
General Hooker, commanding the Twentieth Corps, who believed that the
promotion properly belonged to him, asked to be relieved, and left the
army. His corps was given to Gen. Henry W. Slocum.
Sherman now repeated his former manoeuvre, of moving by the right
flank to strike the enemy's communications and compel him either to
retreat again or fight at a disadvantage. The Army of the Tennessee
was withdrawn from the left on the 27th, and marched behind the Army
of the Cumberland to the extreme right, with the intention of
extending the flank far enough to cross the railroad south of Atlanta.
The movement was but partially performed when Hood made a heavy attack
on that flank, and for four or five hours on the 28th there was bloody
fighting. Logan's men hastily threw up a slight breastwork, from which
they repelled six charges in quick succession, and later in the day
several other charges by the Confederates broke against the immovable
lines of the Fifteenth Corps. Meanwhile Sherman sent Gen. Jefferson C.
Davis's division to make a detour, and come up into position where it
could strike the Confederate flank in turn; but Davis lost his way and
failed to appear in time. In this battle Logan's corps lost five
hundred and seventy-two men; while they captured five battle-flags and
buried about six hundred of the enemy's dead. The total Confederate
losses during July, in killed and wounded, were reported by the
surgeon-general at eighty-eight hundred and forty-one, to which
Sherman adds two thousand prisoners. Sherman reports his own losses
during that month--killed, wounded, and missing--at ninety-seven
hundred and nineteen; but this does not include the cavalry.
Johnston's estimate of Sherman's losses is so enormous that if it had
been correct his government would have been clearly justified when it
censured him for not driving the National army out of the State.
Sherman had sent out several cavalry expeditions to break the
railroads south of Atlanta, but with no satisfactory results. They
tore up a few miles of track each time, but the damage was quickly
repaired. The marvellous facility with which both sides mended broken
railroads and replaced burned bridges is illustrated by many
anecdotes. Sherman had duplicates of the important bridges on the road
that brought his supplies, and whenever the guerillas destroyed one,
he had only to order the duplicate to be set up. On the 26th Gen.
George Stoneman had set out with a cavalry force to break up the
railroad at Jonesboro', with the intention of pushing on rapidly to
Macon and Andersonville, and releasing a large number of prisoners
that were confined there in stockades; while at the same time another
cavalry force, under McCook, was sent around by the right to join
Stoneman at Jonesboro'. They destroyed two miles of track, burned two
trains of cars and five hundred wagons, killed eight hundred mules,
and took three or four hundred prisoners. But McCook was surrounded by
the enemy at Newnan, and only escaped with a loss of six hundred men;
while Stoneman destroyed seventeen locomotives and a hundred cars, and
threw a few shells into Macon, but was surrounded at Clifton, where he
allowed himself and seven hundred of his men to be captured in order
to facilitate the escape of the remainder of his command.
[Illustration: BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL MANNING F. FORCE.]
Perhaps it was quite as well that he did not reach Andersonville, for
General Winder, in command there, had issued this order on July 27th:
"The officers on duty and in charge of battery of Florida artillery
will, on receiving notice that the enemy has approached within seven
miles of this post, open fire on the stockade with grape-shot, without
reference to the situation beyond this line of defence." The conduct
of those on guard duty at the prison leaves little doubt that this
order would have been obeyed with alacrity.
Two or three weeks later, Wheeler's Confederate cavalry passed to the
rear of Sherman's army, captured a large drove of cattle, and broke up
two miles of railroad; and about the same time Kilpatrick's cavalry
rode entirely round Atlanta, fought and defeated a combined cavalry
and infantry force, and inflicted upon the railroad such damage as he
thought it would take ten days to repair; but within twenty-four hours
trains were again running into the city.
Finding that cavalry raids could effect nothing, Sherman posted
Slocum's corps at the railroad bridge over the Chattahoochee, and,
moving again by the right, rapidly but cautiously, concealing the
movement as far as possible, he swung all the remainder of his army
into position south of Atlanta, where they tore up the railroads,
burning the ties and twisting the rails, and then advanced toward the
city. There was some fighting, and Govan's Confederate brigade was
captured entire, with ten guns; but the greater part of Hood's forces
escaped eastward in the night of September 1st. They destroyed a large
part of the Government property that night, and the sound of the
explosions caused Slocum to move down from the bridge, when he soon
found that he had nothing to do but walk into Atlanta. A few days
later Sherman made his headquarters there, disposed his army in and
around the city, and prepared for permanent possession.
{391}