CHAPTER XXXI.

THE OVERLAND CAMPAIGN.

GRANT MADE LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WITH COMMAND OF ALL THE

ARMIES--HEADQUARTERS WITH THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC--PLAN OF THE

CAMPAIGN--POSITION OF THE ARMIES--RELATIVE NUMBERS--A GREAT ARMY IN

WINTER QUARTERS--PICTURESQUE AND INTERESTING DETAILS OF CAMP

LIFE--GRANT CROSSES THE RAPIDAN--BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS--BATTLE OF

SPOTTSYLVANIA--BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR--THE LOSSES OF BOTH SIDES--GRANT

CROSSES THE JAMES--CAVALRY OPERATIONS--CRITICISMS OF GENERAL

GRANT--GENERAL LONGSTREET WOUNDED--EWELL SEES THE END.

At the close of the third year of the war--the winter of 1863-4--it

was evident to all thoughtful citizens that something was lacking in

its conduct. To those who understood military operations on a large

scale this had been apparent long before. It was true that there had

been great successes as well as great failures. Both of Lee's attempts

at invasion of the North had resulted disastrously to him--the one at

the Antietam, the other at Gettysburg; and when he recrossed the

Potomac the second time, with half of his army disabled, it was

morally certain that he would invade no more. Grant, first coming into

notice as the captor of an army in February, 1862, had captured

another, more than twice as large, in the summer of 1863, thus

securing the stronghold of Vicksburg, and enabling the Mississippi, as

Lincoln expressed it, to flow unvexed to the sea. Later in the same

year he had won a brilliant victory over Bragg at Chattanooga,

securing that important point and relieving East Tennessee. New

Orleans, by far the largest city in the South, had been firmly held by

the National forces ever since Farragut captured it, in April, 1862.

There were also numerous points on the coast of the Carolinas,

Georgia, and Florida where the Stars and Stripes floated every day in

assertion of the nation's claim to supreme authority. Missouri,

Kentucky, Maryland, West Virginia, and Tennessee--all confidently

counted upon by the Confederates at the outset--were now hopelessly

lost to them. Though it had seemed, from the reports of the great

battles, and the manner in which they were discussed, that the

Confederates must be making headway, yet a glance at the map showed

that the territory covered by Confederate authority had been steadily

diminishing. Only one recapture of any consequence had taken place,

and that was in Texas. Faulty though it was, if the military process

thus far pursued by the Administration had been kept up, it must

ultimately have destroyed the Confederacy. And there was no military

reason (using the word in its narrow sense) why it could not be kept

up; for the resources of the North, in men and material, were not

seriously impaired. All the farms were tilled, all the workshops were

busy, the colleges had almost their usual number of students; and

there were not nearly so many young women keeping books or standing

behind counters as now. Moreover, the ports of the North were all

open, and the markets of the world accessible. It is true that the

currency and the national securities were at a discount, and it was

certain that their value would be diminished still further by the

prolongation of the war; but this was not fatal so long as our own

country produced everything essential, and it was equally certain that

with a restored Union the national credit would be so high that we

could take {351} our own time about paying the debt, distributing the

burden over as many generations as we chose.

[Illustration: IN WINTER QUARTERS.]

[Illustration: PICKETS EXAMINING PASSES.]

The necessity for a swifter process was more political than military.

There was a half-informed populace to be satisfied, and a half-loyal

party to be silenced. The subtlest foe was in our own household; and

the approach of the Presidential and Congressional elections, unless

great National victories should intervene, might bring its opportunity

and seal the fate of the Republic.

The one thing required was a single supreme military head for all the

armies in the field. The faulty disposition by which, in many of the

great battles, the several parts of an army had struck the enemy

successively instead of all at once, existed also on the grander

scale. There was no concert of action between the armies of the East,

the West, and the Southwest; so that large detachments of the

Confederate forces were sent back and forth on their shorter interior

lines, to fight wherever they were most needed. Thus Longstreet's

powerful corps was at one time engaged in Pennsylvania, a little later

besieging Burnside in Tennessee, and again with Lee in Virginia. Not

only was the need for a supreme commander apparent, but it was now no

longer possible to doubt who was the man. We had one general that from

the first had gone directly for the most important objects in his

department, and thus far had secured everything he went for.

Accordingly Congress passed a bill reviving the grade of

lieutenant-general in February, 1864, and President Lincoln promptly

conferred that rank upon General Ulysses S. Grant. Only Washington and

Scott had previously borne this commission in the United States

service, and through three years of the war we had nothing higher than

a major-general in the field. Rank was cheaper in the Confederacy,

where there were not only lieutenant-generals, but several full

generals. The corps commanders in Lee's army, at the head of ten

thousand or fifteen thousand men, had nominally the same rank

(lieutenant-general) as Grant when he assumed command of all the

National forces in the field. When Lincoln handed Grant his

commission, they met for the first time. A year and a month later the

war was ended, Grant was the foremost soldier in the world, and

Lincoln was in his grave. When the question of headquarters arose,

General Sherman, who was one of the warmest of Grant's personal

friends as well as his ablest lieutenant, besought him to remain in

the West, for he feared the Washington influences that had always been

most heavily felt in the army covering the capital. General Sherman,

never afraid of anything else, was always in mortal terror of

politicians. Grant appears not to have feared even the politicians;

for he promptly fixed his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac,

thus placing himself where, on the one hand, he could withstand

interference that might thwart the operations of a subordinate, and

where, on the other, he would personally conduct the campaign against

the strongest army of the Confederacy and its most trusted leader.

{352} [Illustration: WHARF AT BELLE PLAIN, VA.]

He planned a campaign in which he considered the Army of the Potomac

his centre; the Army of the James, under General Butler, his left

wing; the Western armies, now commanded by Sherman, his right wing;

and the army under Banks in Louisiana, a force operating in the rear

of the enemy. In its great {353} features, the plan was this: that all

should move simultaneously--Butler against Petersburg, to seize the

southern communications of the Confederate capital; Sherman against

Johnston's army (then at Dalton, Ga.), to defeat and destroy it if

possible, or at least to force it back and capture Atlanta with its

workshops and important communications; Banks to set out on an

expedition toward Mobile, to capture that city and close its harbor to

blockade-runners; Sigel to drive back the Confederate force in the

Shenandoah valley, and prevent that fertile region from being used any

longer as a Confederate granary; while the Army of the Potomac, taking

Lee's army for its objective, should follow it wherever it went,

fighting and flanking it until it should be captured or dispersed.

South of the Rapidan is a peculiar region twelve or fifteen miles

square, known as the Wilderness. Some of the earliest iron-works in

the country were here, and much of the ground was dug over for the

ore, while the woods were cut off to supply fuel for the furnaces. A

thick second growth sprang up, with tangled underbrush; the mines were

deserted, the furnaces went to decay, and the whole region was

desolate, save a roadside tavern or two, and here and there a little

clearing. Chancellorsville, where a great battle was fought in May,

1863, was upon the eastern edge of this Wilderness. The bulk of Lee's

army was now (May, 1864) upon its western edge, with a line of

observation along the Rapidan, and headquarters at Orange Court-House.

The Army of the Potomac was north of the Rapidan, opposite the

Wilderness, where it had lain since November, when it had crossed to

the south side with the purpose of attacking the Army of Northern

Virginia (as narrated in a previous chapter), but found it too

strongly intrenched along Mile Run, and so recrossed and went into

winter quarters.

The conduct of affairs where a great army lies in winter quarters,

making a peculiar sort of community by itself, has its picturesque and

interesting details and incidents, as well as its general dulness. The

reader may get a suggestive glimpse of the camp on the north side of

the Rapidan that winter, if he will look at it through the eyes of

Captain Blake:

"The army steadily advanced in successive years from river to river,

and erected its winter quarters upon the banks of the Potomac, the

Rappahannock, and the Rapidan. The headquarters were established at

the same point that had been occupied by Lee, and the staff which he

left in his hasty flight was unadorned; while the American flag daily

ascended and descended the high pole when the call 'to the color' was

sounded at sunrise and sunset. The telegraph office in the town was

occupied by the same operator for the fifth time in the various

changes that had taken place in the position of the army--the rebels

always possessed it for a similar purpose as soon as it was abandoned;

and both parties used the same table, and several miles of the same

wire. Operations against the enemy, and drills, were suspended during

the inclement season; and details to guard the trains, the camps, and

the picket-lines, and labor upon the roads, comprised the routine of

duty. Courts-martial assembled frequently to determine the nature and

punishment of military crimes; and one tribunal, of which the author

was judge-advocate, tried about forty men for misconduct in skulking

from Mine Run; and a chaplain was found guilty of stealing a horse,

and dismissed from the service by order of the President.

"The face of the country soon assumed the barren aspect of Falmouth;

and the pickets of the brigade, for a month, made their fires of the

woodwork of corn-shelling, threshing, and the numerous other machines

with which a large farm was supplied; and iron rods, bolts,

ploughshares, cranks, and cogwheels were sprinkled upon the ground in

the vicinity of the posts. The fifteen hundred inhabitants that lived

in Culpeper before the Rebellion had been reduced to only eighty

persons, who were chiefly dependent upon the Government for the means

of sustenance. The court-house and slave-pen had been gutted, and were

used as places of confinement for rebel prisoners. The fences that

enclosed the cemeteries which were attached to the churches had been

torn down and burned; and sinks, booths, stables for horses, and the

fires of the cooks were scattered in the midst of the gravestones and

tombs. The state of destitution that prevailed may be illustrated more

clearly by quoting the remark of a young woman who resided in the

place: 'My father was worth three hundred thousand dollars; but all

his people, except a small boy, ran away with your folks; his large

house was burned by your cavalry; we eat your pork and bread; and,

just think of it, I haven't had a new dress or bonnet since the war

began!' The refugees and their families constantly entered the lines;

and one of them said that he was assisted by a friend, who gave him

his horse, and manifested much indignation and declared that the

animal had been stolen, to mislead the neighbors, when he received the

news of his successful escape. Deserters exhausted their ingenuity in

finding ways to reach the cavalry videttes; and some gladly swam

across the Rappahannock in the coldest nights of the year.

"The old residents asserted that the ground upon which the division

had encamped was always submerged in winter, and it would be

impossible for the men to remain there until spring: but the barracks

were never swept away by any inundation; and they explained the matter

by saying that it was the dryest season that had existed for thirty

years. The results of one severe rain, that deluged the plain, showed

that, if they were often repeated, all persons would perceive the

wisdom of the warning. The river rose and overflowed the swamp so

suddenly that the members of seven posts which were located near it

were obliged to climb trees to avoid the unlooked-for danger of

drowning; and the brief tour of picket duty was extended many hours.

Squads that were not stationed in the forest found themselves upon an

island, and waded through the deep water a long distance; and some

were compelled to swim to reach the reserve upon what was the

mainland. A small stream was enlarged to the dimensions of a lake

one-fourth of a mile in width; and a part of the cavalry provost-camp

was submerged, and an officer discovered that the rushing water was

two feet deep in his tent when he awoke. The weather-wisers always

glanced at the mountains; and the voices of experience uttered the

following precept--that there would be rain once in every two days as

long as the snow crowned the crests of the Blue Ridge.

"During this period the enemy did not attempt to make any movement,

although a long line of railroad conveyed supplies from Alexandria;

and the troops of Lee labored unceasingly, and constructed miles of

earthworks upon the bluffs that had been fortified by nature; while

the Union forces rested in their camps, and relied for defence upon

the strong arm and loyal heart. A number of false alarms occurred, and

the soldiers were sometimes ordered to be in readiness to march at a

second's notice to resist an advance.

"The number of officers' wives and other ladies that were present in

the camps was much larger than at any previous period; and balls and

similar festivities relieved the monotony of many winter quarters.

Large details, that sometimes comprised a thousand men, were ordered

to report at certain {354} headquarters for the purpose of

constructing suitable halls of logs on the 'sacred soil' of Virginia.

A chapel was built within the limits of the brigade by the soldiers,

who daily labored upon it for three weeks; and many of the officers

contributed money to purchase whatever appeared to be required for it.

An agent of the Christian Commission furnished a capacious tent, which

formed the roof; and religious, temperance, and Masonic meetings were

frequently held, until this apostle, who employed most of his time in

writing long letters for the press, that portrayed in vivid colors the

'good work' which he was accomplishing, removed the canvas because an

innocent social assembly occupied it during one evening. The enlisted

men, who rarely enjoyed the benefit of these structures which they

erected, originated dances of a singular character. By searching the

cabins and houses of the natives, and borrowing apparel, and a liberal

use of pieces of shelter tents and the hoops of barrels, one-half of

the soldiers were arrayed as women, and filled the places of the

seemingly indispensable partners of the gentler sex. The resemblance

in the features of some of these persons were so perfect that a

stranger would be unable to distinguish between the assumed and the

genuine characters.

"Thousands of crows rendered good service by devouring the entrails of

animals which had been slaughtered by the butchers, and the carcasses

of dead horses and mules. They were never shot, because the citizens

had no guns, and the soldiers would be punished if they wasted

ammunition; and they grew tame and fat in opposition to the well-known

saying, and propagated so rapidly that their immense numbers blackened

acres of ground in the vicinity of the camps. One noticeable event was

a fire which swept over the field of Cedar Mountain, and caused the

explosion of shells that had remained there nearly two years after the

battle.

"The ordinary preparations for active operations were made as soon as

the roads became dry and hard: the ladies were notified to leave the

camps previous to a specified date; surplus baggage resumed its annual

visit to the storehouses in the rear; and reviews, inspections, and

target-practice daily took place."

[Illustration: IN THE WILDERNESS.]

The Army of the Potomac was now organized in three infantry corps, the

Second, Fifth, and Sixth--commanded respectively by Gens. Winfield S.

Hancock, Gouverneur K. Warren, and John Sedgwick--and a cavalry corps

commanded by Gen. Philip H. Sheridan; Gen. George G. Meade being still

in command of the whole. Burnside's corps, the Ninth, nearly twenty

thousand strong, was at Annapolis, and nobody but General Grant knew

its destination. President Lincoln and his Cabinet thought it was to

be sent on some duty down the coast; and so perhaps did the enemy.

Grant knew too well that there was a leak somewhere in Washington,

through which every Government secret escaped to the Confederates; and

he therefore delayed till the last moment the movement of Burnside's

corps to a point from which it could follow the Army of the Potomac

across the Rapidan within twenty-four hours.

The Army of Northern Virginia consisted of two infantry corps,

commanded by Gens. Richard S. Ewell and Ambrose P. Hill, with a

cavalry corps commanded by Gen. James E. B. Stuart; the whole

commanded by Gen. Robert E. Lee; while, as an offset to Burnside's

corps, Gen. James Longstreet's was within call. The exact number of

men in either army cannot be told, as reports and authorities differ;

nor can the approximate numbers be mentioned fairly, unless with an

explanation. The method of counting for the official reports was

different in the two armies. In the National army, a report that a

certain number of men were present for duty included every man that

was borne on the pay-rolls, whether officer, soldier, musician,

teamster, cook, or mechanic, and also all that had been sent away on

special duty, guarding trains and the like. This was necessary,

because they were all paid regularly, and the money had to be

accounted for. In the Confederate army there was no pay worth speaking

of, and the principal object of a morning report was to show the exact

effective force available that day; accordingly, the Confederate

reports included only the men actually bearing muskets or sabres, or

handling the artillery. Counted in this way, Lee had sixty thousand,

or perhaps sixty-five thousand, men--for exact reports are wanting,

even on that basis. If counted after the fashion in the National army,

his men numbered about eighty thousand. Grant puts his own numbers,

everything included, at one hundred and sixteen thousand, and thinks

the preponderance was fully offset by the fact that the enemy was on

the defensive, seldom leaving his intrenchments, in a country

admirably suited for defence, and with the population friendly to him.

As each side received reinforcements from time to time about equal to

its losses, the two armies may be considered as having, throughout the

campaign from the Rapidan to the James, the strength just stated.

It was clearly set forth by General Grant at the outset that the true

objective was the Army of Northern Virginia. In that lay the chief

strength of the Confederacy; while that stood, the Confederacy would

stand, whether in Richmond or out of it; when that fell, the

Confederacy would fall. To follow that {355} army wherever it went,

fight it, and destroy it, was the task that lay before the Army of the

Potomac; and every man in the army, as well as most men in the

country, knew it was a task that could be accomplished only through

immense labor and loss of life, hard marching, heavy fighting, and all

manner of suffering.

The intention was to have the simultaneous movement of all the armies

begin as near the 1st of May as possible. It actually began at

midnight of the 3d, when the Army of the Potomac was set in motion and

crossed the Rapidan, which is there about two hundred feet wide, on

five pontoon bridges near Germania, Culpeper Mine, and Ely's fords. On

crossing, it plunged at once into the Wilderness, which is here

traversed from north to south by two roads, a mile or two apart. And

these roads are crossed by two--the Orange turnpike and Orange plank

road--running nearly east and west. Besides these, there are numerous

cross-roads and wood-paths. It would have been easy for the army to

pass through this wooded tract in a very few hours, and deploy in the

open country; but the supply and ammunition train consisted of four

thousand wagons, and the reserve artillery of more than one hundred

guns--all of which must be protected by keeping the army between them

and the enemy. Consequently the troops remained in the Wilderness

during the whole of the 4th, while the long procession was filing

across the bridges and stretching away on the easternmost roads. And

after this the bridges themselves were taken up. Grant's headquarters

that night were at the old Wilderness Tavern, on the Orange turnpike,

near the intersection of the road from Germania Ford. It had been

supposed that Lee would either dispute the passage of the river, or

(as he had done on previous occasions) await attack on some chosen

ground that was suitable for fighting. As he had not disputed the

passage, the army now expected to march out of the Wilderness the next

day, thus turning the enemy's right flank, and placing itself between

him and his capital.

But Grant kept pickets out on all the roads to the west; and it cannot

be said that he was surprised, though he was probably disappointed,

when he found his lines attacked on the morning of the 5th. The

movement was believed at first to be only a feint, intended to keep

the Army of the Potomac in the Wilderness, while the bulk of the enemy

should slip by to the south and take up a position covering the

approach to Richmond. But it was developed rapidly, and it soon became

evident that the Confederate commander had resorted to the bold device

of launching his whole army down the two parallel roads, with the

purpose of striking the Army of the Potomac when it was ill-prepared

to receive battle. Under some circumstances he would thus have gained

a great advantage; as it was, the army was clear of the river, with

all its trains safe in the rear, was reasonably well together, had had

a night's rest, and was not in any proper sense surprised. Hancock's

corps, which had the lead and was marching out of the Wilderness, was

quickly recalled, Burnside's was hurried up from the rear, and a line

of battle was formed--so far as there could be any line of battle in a

jungle. Neither artillery nor cavalry could be used to any extent by

either side, and the contest was little more than a murdering-match

between two bodies of men, each individual having a musket in his

hand, and being unable to see more than a few of his nearest

neighbors. This went on all day, increasing hourly as more of the

troops came into position, with no real advantage to either side when

night fell upon the gloomy forest, already darkened by smoke that

there was no breeze to waft away. Lee's attack had been vigorous on

his left, but imperfect on his right, where Longstreet's corps did not

get up in time to participate in the fighting that day. No sooner had

the battle ended than both sides began to intrench for the struggle of

the morrow, and they would hear the sound of each other's axes, only a

few rods distant, as they worked through the night, cutting down

trees, piling up logs for breastworks, and digging the customary

trench.

[Illustration: PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. Reproduced by

permission of Dick & Fitzgerald, N. Y., from "Twelve Decisive Battles

of the War."]

Grant intended to take the initiative on the morning of the 6th, and

gave orders for an attack at five o'clock. But Lee, who did not want

the real battle of the day to begin till Longstreet's corps should be

in place on his right, attacked {356} with his left at a still earlier

hour. Grant recognized this as a feint, and went on with his purpose

of attacking the enemy's right before Longstreet should come up. This

work devolved upon Hancock's corps, which, as usual, was ready to

advance at the hour named; but just then came rumors of a flank

movement by Longstreet, and Hancock, detaching troops to meet it,

greatly weakened the blow he was ordered to deliver. This was all a

mistake, as there was no enemy in that direction, save Rosser's

Confederate cavalry, which Sheridan's defeated that day in three

encounters. But Hancock's advance was powerful enough to drive the

enemy before him for more than a mile. At that juncture Longstreet

came up, the broken Confederate line rallied on his corps, and Hancock

was driven back in turn. Here the fighting was stubborn, and the

losses heavy. Gen. James S. Wadsworth, one of the most patriotic men

in the service, was mortally wounded, and died within the Confederate

lines. The Confederate General Jenkins was killed, and Longstreet was

seriously wounded in almost exactly the same way that Stonewall

Jackson had been, a year and three days before, on nearly the same

ground. As he was returning from the front with his staff, some of his

own men mistook them for National cavalry and fired upon them.

Longstreet was shot through the neck and shoulder, and had to be

carried from the field. His men had been thrown into great confusion,

and General Lee, who now took command of them in person, found it

impossible to rally them for an attack on Hancock's intrenchments, or

at least deferred the attack that had been planned. But late in the

afternoon such an assault was made, and met with a little temporary

success. The Confederates burst through the line at one point, but

were soon driven back again with heavy loss. At this time a fire broke

out in Hancock's front, and soon his log breastworks were burning. His

men were forced back by the heat, but continued firing at their enemy

through the flame. Large numbers of the dead and wounded were still

lying where they fell, scattered over the belt of ground, nearly a

mile wide, where the tide of battle had swayed back and forth, and an

unknown number of the wounded perished by the fire and smoke. Burnside

had come into line during the day, and fighting had been kept up along

the entire front, but it was nowhere so fierce as on the left or

southern end of the line, where each commander was trying to double up

the other's flank. At night the Confederates withdrew to their

intrenchments, and from that time till the end of the campaign they

seldom showed a disposition to leave them.

[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-GENERAL ULYSSES S. GRANT.]

[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL PHILIP H. SHERIDAN. BRIGADIER-GENERAL J.

I. GREGG. MAJOR-GENERAL WESLEY MERRITT. BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOMAS C.

DEVIN. BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE A. CUSTER.]

The terrible tangle of the Wilderness in which this great battle was

fought is indicated by the fact that in several instances squads from

either army, who were guarding prisoners and intending to take them to

the rear, lost their way and carried them into their opponents' lines,

where the guards in turn became prisoners. A participant says of the

fighting on the National right, where the Confederates gained some

ground the first day: "The extreme heat of the day increased the

fatigue, and tears were shed by some who overrated the results of the

disaster. The slaughter in many regiments had been large, and at one

point the bodies of the killed defined with terrible exactness the

position held by the Union troops, and a long line of rebel corpses

was extended in front of it. One of the flag-staffs of the {357}

regiment was severed by a bullet, and each hand of the bearer grasped

a piece of it." The same participant says of the fighting on his part

of the line during the second day:

"The division was posted once more behind the slight breastwork which

had been erected upon the Germania-Ford road; the skirmishers were

deployed in its front at four P.M., and the author commanded the

detachment from the regiment. The groups were properly aligned within

the next ten minutes, when the tramp of a heavy force resounded

through the woods. Orders were excitedly repeated--'Forward!' 'Guide

right!' 'Close up those intervals!'--and finally a voice shouted:

'Now, men, for the love of God and your country, forward!' The legions

of Longstreet advanced without skirmishers; the muskets of the feeble

line were discharged to alarm the reserve; the men upon the outposts

rushed to the main body; and thousands of glistening gun-barrels which

were resting upon the works opened, and the fusillade began. The

soldiers crouched upon the ground, loaded their pieces with the utmost

celerity, rose, fired, and then reloaded behind the shelter; so that

the loss was very slight; while the enemy suffered severely, as the

trees were small, and there was no protection. The only artillery that

was used in the afternoon was planted upon the left of the brigade,

and consisted of four cannons, which hurled canister, shell, and solid

shot until their ammunition was exhausted. Unfortunately, the dry logs

of which the breastwork was formed were only partially covered with

earth; and the flames, ignited by the burning wadding during the

conflict (an enemy that could not be resisted as easily as the

myrmidons of Longstreet), destroyed them, and every second of time

widened the breaches. The undaunted men crowded together until they

formed fourteen or sixteen ranks; and those who were in the front

discharged the guns which were constantly passed to them by their

comrades that were in the rear and could not aim with accuracy or

safety. The fingers of many men were blistered by the muskets, which

became hot from the rapid firing. The fire triumphed when it flashed

along the entire barrier of wood, reduced it to ashes, and forced the

defenders, who had withstood to the last its intolerable heat, to

retire to the rifle-pits a short distance in the rear. The shattered

rebel columns cautiously approached the road; but the impartial flames

which had caused the discomfiture of the division became an obstacle

that they could not surmount. The same misfortune followed the Union

forces, and no exertions could check the consuming element; and the

second line was burned like the first. The conflagration in the road

had nearly ceased at this time; the enemy yelled with exultation; the

odious colors were distinctly seen when the smoke slowly disappeared;

a general charge was made, which resulted in the capture of the

original position; and the pickets were stationed half of a mile in

the advance at sunset without opposition. Many were eating their

dinners when the assault commenced; and an officer hurriedly rushed to

the works with a spoon in one hand and a fork in the other."

[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOSHUA J. OWENS.]

The losses in this great two-days' battle cannot be stated accurately.

The best authorities vary as to the National loss, from fewer than

fourteen thousand--killed, wounded, and missing--to about fifteen

thousand four hundred. As to the Confederate loss, the figures can

only be made up from partial reports, estimates, and inferences.

According to these, it did not differ materially from the National

loss, and in the circumstances of the battle there was no reason for

thinking it would. Among the officers lost, besides those already

mentioned, were, on the National side, Gen. Alexander Hays killed;

Generals Getty, Baxter, and McAllister, and Colonels Carroll and

Keifer wounded; and Generals Seymour and Shaler captured; on the

Confederate side, Generals Pegram and Benning wounded.

[Illustration: BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOMAS A. SMYTH.]

[Illustration: COLONEL WILLIAM H. MORRIS.]

If General Lee supposed that the Army of the Potomac, after a sudden

blow and a bloody battle, would turn about and go home to repair

damages--as it had been in the habit of doing--he omitted from his

calculation the fact that it was now led by a soldier who never did

anything of the sort. Indeed, he is reported to have said to his

lieutenants, after this costly experiment: "Gentlemen, at last the

Army of the Potomac has a head." Tactically, it had been a drawn

battle. Grant accounts it a victory, which he says "consisted in

having successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of

an enemy, and in getting the army together as a unit." It was also a

National victory in a certain dismal sense, from the fact that--in

changing off man for man to the extent of twelve or fifteen

thousand--that had been done which the enemy could least afford.

{358} There was no fighting on the 7th except a cavalry engagement at

Todd's Tavern, by which Sheridan cleared the road for the southward

movement of the army; and in the afternoon Grant gave the order to

move by the left flank toward Spottsylvania. Gen. William T. Sherman

says in a private letter: "It was then probably that General Grant

best displayed his greatness. Forward by the left flank!--that settled

that campaign." That the same opinion was held by a large part of the

army itself at the time, is shown by the testimony of various men who

were there. Frank Wilkeson writes: "Grant's military standing with the

enlisted men this day hung on the direction we turned at the

Chancellorsville House. If to the left, he was to be rated with Meade

and Hooker and Burnside and Pope--the generals who preceded him. At

the Chancellorsville House we turned to the right. Instantly all of us

heard a sigh of relief. Our spirits rose. We marched free. The men

began to sing. The enlisted men understood the flanking movement. That

night we were happy."

[Illustration: WOUNDING OF GENERAL LONGSTREET BY HIS OWN MEN.]

Grant's general purpose was to place his army between the enemy and

Richmond, interfering with the communications and compelling Lee to

fight at disadvantage. The immediate purpose was a rapid march to

Spottsylvania Court-House, fifteen miles southeast of the Wilderness

battle-field, and a dozen miles southwest of Fredericksburg, to take a

strong position covering the roads that radiate from that point.

Warren's corps was to take the advance, marching by the Brock road, to

be followed by Hancock's on the same road. Sedgwick's and Burnside's

were to take a route farther north, through Chancellorsville. The

trains were put in motion on Saturday, May 7th, and Warren began his

march at nine o'clock that evening. To withdraw an army in this

manner, in the presence of a powerful enemy, and send it forward to a

new position, is a difficult and delicate task, as it may be attacked

after it has left the old position and before it has gained the new.

The method adopted by General Grant was repeated in each of his

flanking movements between the Wilderness and the James. It consisted

in withdrawing the corps that held his right flank, and passing it

behind the others while they maintained their position. Four small

rivers rise in this region--the Mat, the Ta, the Po, and the Ny--which

unite to form the Mattapony. Spottsylvania Court-House is on the ridge

between the Po and the Ny. The country around it is heavily wooded,

and somewhat broken by ravines.

The distances that the two armies had to march to reach Spottsylvania

Court-House were very nearly the same; if there was any difference, it

favored the National; but two unforeseen circumstances determined the

race and the form of the ensuing battle. The Brock road was occupied

by a detachment of Confederate cavalry, and Warren's corps stood still

while the National cavalry undertook to clear the way. This was not

done easily, and the road was further obstructed where the

Confederates had felled trees across it. After precious time had been

lost Warren's corps went forward and cleared the way for itself. The

other circumstance was more purely fortuitous. Anderson's division of

Longstreet's corps led the Confederate advance, and Anderson had his

orders to begin the march early on Sunday morning, the 8th. But from

the burning of the woods he found no suitable ground for bivouac, and

consequently marched all night. The National cavalry were in

Spottsylvania Court-House Sunday morning, and found there but a slight

force of cavalry, easily brushed away; but they had to retire before

the Confederate infantry when Anderson came down the road.

Consequently, when Warren came within sight of the Court-House, he

found the same old foe intrenched in his front. Still, if Hancock had

come up promptly, the works might have been carried by a rapid

movement, and held till the army should be where Grant wanted it, in

position between the enemy and their capital. But Hancock had been

held back, because of apprehensions that the Confederates would make a

heavy attack upon the rear of the moving columns. So the remainder of

Longstreet's corps, and finally all of Lee's troops, poured into the

rude sylvan fortress, and once more the Army of Northern Virginia

stood at bay.

At this point of time, May 8th, Grant sent Sheridan with his {359}

cavalry to do to the Confederate army what in previous campaigns its

cavalry had twice done to the Army of the Potomac--to ride entirely

around it, tearing up railroads, destroying bridges and depots, and

capturing trains. Sheridan set out to execute his orders with the

energy and skill for which he was becoming famous. He destroyed ten

miles of railroad and several trains of cars, cut all the telegraph

wires, and recaptured four hundred prisoners who had been taken in the

battle of the Wilderness and were on their way to Richmond. As soon as

it was known which way he had gone, the Confederate cavalry set out to

intercept him, and by hard riding got between him and Richmond.

Sheridan's troops met them at Yellow Tavern, seven miles north of the

city, and after a hard fight defeated and dispersed them, Gen. J. E.

B. Stuart, the ablest cavalry leader in the Confederacy, being

mortally wounded. Sheridan dashed through the outer defences of

Richmond and took some prisoners, but found the inner ones too strong

for him. He then crossed the Chickahominy, and rejoined the army on

the 25th.

As the National army came into position before the intrenchments of

Spottsylvania, Hancock's corps had the extreme right or western end of

the line; then came Warren's, then Sedgwick's, and on the extreme left

Burnside's. While Sedgwick's men were placing their batteries, they

were annoyed by sharp-shooters, one of whom, apparently posted in a

tree, seemed to be an unerring marksman. He is said to have destroyed

twenty lives that day. The men naturally shrank back from their work,

when General Sedgwick, coming up, expostulated with them, remarking

that "they couldn't hit an elephant at this distance." As he stepped

forward to the works, a bullet struck him in the face, and he fell

dead. In his fall the army lost one of its best soldiers, and the

country one of its purest patriots. Sedgwick had been offered higher

command than he held, but had firmly declined it, from a modest

estimate of his own powers. Gen. Horatio G. Wright succeeded him in

the command of the Sixth Corps.

On the evening of the 9th Hancock's corps moved to the right, with a

view to flanking and attacking the Confederate left, and made a

reconnoissance at the point where the road from Shady Grove church

crosses the Po on a wooden bridge. A brigade of Barlow's division laid

down bridges and crossed the stream, but was confronted by

intrenchments manned by a portion of Early's corps. It was now seen

that the Confederate left rested on the stream at a point above, so

that Hancock by crossing would only have isolated himself from the

rest of the army and invited destruction. But before he could withdraw

Barlow, the enemy sallied out from their intrenchments and attacked

that brigade in heavy force. The assault was met with steady courage

and repelled, with considerable loss to Barlow, but with much greater

loss to the assailants. After a short interval the experiment was

renewed, with precisely the same result; and Barlow then recrossed,

under cover of a supporting column, and took up his bridges.

The weak point in the Confederate line was the salient at the northern

point of their intrenchment. A salient is weak because almost any fire

directed against it becomes an enfilading fire for one or another part

of it. But the National army were not up in balloons, looking down

upon the earth as a map; and they could only learn the shape of the

Confederate intrenchments after traversing thick woods, following out

by-paths and scrambling through dark ravines. As soon as the salient

was discovered, preparations were made for assaulting it. The storming

party consisted of twelve regiments of Wright's corps, commanded by

Col. Emory Upton, and was to be supported by Mott's division of

Hancock's, while at the same time the remainder of Wright's and all of

Warren's corps were to advance and take advantage of any opportunity

that should be made for them. While a heavy battery was firing rapidly

at the salient and enfilading one of its sides, Upton's men formed

under cover of the woods, near the enemy's line, and the instant the

battery ceased firing, about six o'clock in the evening, burst out

with a cheer, swept over the works after a short hand-to-hand fight,

and captured more than a thousand prisoners, and a few guns. Mott,

forming in open ground, did not move so promptly, suffered more from

the fire of the enemy, and effected nothing. Warren's corps moved

forward, but was driven back with heavy loss. In a second assault,

they reached the breastworks and captured them after fierce fighting,

but were not able to hold them when strong Confederate reinforcements

came up, and retired again. Upton, who had broken through a second

line of intrenchments, seemed to have opened a way for the destruction

of the Confederate army; but the difficulties of the ground and the

lateness of the hour made it impracticable to follow up the advantage

by pouring a whole corps through the gap and taking everything in

reverse. After dark, Upton's men withdrew, bringing the prisoners and

the captured battle-flags, but leaving the guns behind. For this

exploit, in which he was severely wounded, Colonel Upton was made a

brigadier-general on the field. While this was going on, Burnside, at

the extreme left of the line, had obtained a good position, from which

he could have assaulted advantageously the Confederate right, which he

overlapped. But this was not perceived, and as there was a dangerous

gap between his corps and Wright's, he was drawn back in the night,

and the advantage was lost.

{360} [Illustration: FALL OF GENERAL JOHN SEDGWICK, AT SPOTTSYLVANIA.]

On the 11th it rained heavily, and there was no fighting; but there

were reconnoissances and preparations for a renewal of the battle on

the next day. Grant determined to make a heavier and more persistent

assault upon the tempting salient, and moved Hancock's corps by a

wood-road, after dark, to a point opposite the apex. The morning of

the 12th was foggy, but by half-past four o'clock it was light enough,

and Hancock's men advanced, some of them passing through thickets of

dead pines. When they were half-way across the open ground in front of

the salient, they burst into a wild cheer and rushed for the works.

Here they were met by a brave and determined resistance on the part of

the half-surprised Confederates, who fought irregularly with clubbed

muskets. But nothing could resist the impetus of Hancock's corps,

which was over the breastworks in a few seconds. Large numbers of

Confederates were killed, mostly with the bayonet. So sudden was

Hancock's irruption into the enemy's works, that he captured Gen.

Edward Johnson's entire division of nearly four thousand men, with its

commander and also Brigadier-General Steuart. "How are you, Steuart?"

said Hancock, recognizing in his prisoner an old army friend, and

extending his hand. "I am General Steuart, of the Confederate army,"

was the reply, "and under the circumstances I decline to take your

hand." "Under any other circumstances," said Hancock quietly, "I

should not have offered it." Hancock's men had also captured twenty

guns, with their horses and caissons, thousands of small arms, and

thirty battle-flags. The guns were immediately turned upon the enemy,

who was followed through the woods toward Spottsylvania Court-House

till the pursuers ran up against another line of intrenchments, which

had been constructed in the night across the base of the salient. At

the same time that Hancock assaulted at the apex, {361} Warren and

Burnside had assaulted at the sides, but with less success, though

their men reached the breastworks.

Lee understood too well the danger of having his line thus ruptured at

the centre, and poured his men into the salient with a determination

to retake it, for which some of his critics have censured him.

Hancock's men, when the pressure became too great for them, fell back

slowly to the outer intrenchments, and turning, used them as their

own. Five times the Confederates attacked these in heavy masses, and

five times they were repelled with bloody loss. Before, they had been

at disadvantage from defending a salient, and now they were at equal

disadvantage in assailing a reëntrant angle. To add to the slaughter,

Hancock had established several batteries on high ground, where they

could fire over the heads of his own men and strike the enemy beyond.

Here and along the west face of the angle the fighting was kept up all

day, and was most desperate and destructive. Field guns were run up

close to the works and fired into the masses of Confederate troops

within the salient, creating terrible havoc; but in turn the horses

and gunners were certain to be shot down. There was hand-to-hand

fighting over the breastworks, and finally the men of the two armies

were crouching on either side of them, shooting and stabbing through

the crevices between the logs. Sometimes one would mount upon the

works and have loaded muskets passed up to him rapidly, which he would

fire in quick succession till the certain bullet came that was to end

his career, and he tumbled into the ditch. In several instances men

were pulled over the breastworks and made prisoners. One doughty but

diminutive Georgian officer nearly died of mortification when a huge

Wisconsin colonel reached over, seized him by the collar, and in a

twinkling jerked him out of the jurisdiction of the Confederacy and

into that of the United States. The fighting around the "death-angle,"

as the soldiers called it, was kept up till past midnight, when the

Confederates finally withdrew to their interior line. The dead were

not only literally piled in heaps, but their bodies were terribly torn

and mangled by the shot. Every tree and bush was cut down or killed by

the balls, and in one instance the body of an oak tree nearly two feet

in diameter was completely cut through by bullets, and in falling

injured several men of a South Carolina regiment. Not even Sickles'

salient at Gettysburg had been so fatal as this. If courage were all

that a nation required, there was courage enough at Spottsylvania, on

either side of the intrenchments, to have made a nation out of every

State in the Union.

It was extremely difficult for either side to rescue or care for any

of the wounded. A note from Col. Leander W. Cogswell, of the Ninth New

Hampshire Regiment, gives a suggestive incident: "During the night of

the 13th, as officer of the day, I was ordered to take a detail of men

from our brigade, and, if possible, find the dead bodies of members of

the Ninth Regiment. We went over the intrenchments and into that

terrible darkness, under orders 'to strike not a match, nor speak

above a whisper.' When near the spot where they fell, we crawled upon

our hands and knees, and felt for the dead ones, and in this manner

succeeded in finding upwards of twenty, and conveyed them within our

lines, where, with a few others, they were buried the next morning in

one trench."

[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN M. JONES, C. S. A. Killed at the

Wilderness.]

[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALEXANDER HAYS. Killed at the

Wilderness.]

Thus far we have looked only at what was going on in front. A few

sentences from the diary of Chaplain Alanson A. Haines, of the

Fifteenth New Jersey Regiment, will give the reader an idea of the

rear at Spottsylvania: "With Dr. Hall, our good and brave surgeon, I

found a place in the rear, a little hollow with grass and a spring of

water, where we made hasty preparations to receive the coming wounded.

Those that could walk soon began to find their way in of themselves,

and some few were helped in by their comrades as soon as the charge

was over and a portion withdrawn. It was a terrible thing to lay some

of our best and truest men in a long row on the blankets, waiting

their turn for the surgeon's care. Some came with body wounds, and

arms shattered, and hands dangling. At ten o'clock, with the drum

corps, I sought the regiment to take off any of our wounded we could

find. On my way, met some men carrying Orderly-Sergeant Van Gilder,

mortally wounded, in a blanket. With his hand all blood, he seized

mine, saying, 'Chaplain, I am going. Tell my wife I am happy.' At two

o'clock A.M. I lay down amid a great throng of poor, bleeding

sufferers, whose moans and cries for water kept me awake. At four

o'clock got up and had coffee made, and, going around among the

wounded, found a Pennsylvanian who had lain at my feet, dead. At noon

the regiment moved off to the right. I retained five drummers to bury

Sergeants Schenck and Rubadeau. A number of men from several regiments

were filling their canteens at the spring. I asked them if they could

come for a few moments around a soldier's grave. Most of them came,

and uncovered their heads. I repeated some passages of Scripture, and

offered a short prayer. Drum-Sergeant Kline filled up the grave,

nailing to two posts which he planted a piece of cracker-box, on which

I cut the names of the dead. While he was doing this, with my other

men I gathered the muskets and {362} accoutrements left by the

wounded. Laying the muskets with the muzzle on a stump, one heavy

stamp of the foot bent the barrel, broke the stock, and made the piece

useless. The accoutrements we heaped together and threw on the fire,

and with hasty steps sought the regiment."

The National losses in the fighting around Spottsylvania, from the 8th

to the 21st of May, were thirteen thousand six hundred--killed,

wounded, and missing. Somewhat over half of this loss occurred on the

12th. There are no exact statistics of the Confederate loss; but it

appears to have been ten thousand on the 12th, and was probably about

equal in the aggregate to the National loss. The losses were heavy in

general officers. In the National army, besides Sedgwick, Gens. T. G.

Stevenson and J. C. Rice were killed, and Gens. H. G. Wright and

Alexander S. Webb and Col. Samuel S. Carroll were wounded; the last

named being promoted to brigadier-general on the field. Of the

Confederates, Generals Daniel and Perrin were killed; Gens. R. D.

Johnston, McGowan, Ramseur, and Walker wounded, and Gens. Edward

Johnston and Steuart captured.

[Illustration: BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL R. O. TYLER.]

[Illustration: BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL GRIFFIN A. STEDMAN, JR.]

[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILLIAM H. SEWARD.]

[Illustration: BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILLIAM DE LACEY.]

General Grant had written to Halleck on the 11th: "We have now ended

the sixth day of very hard fighting. The result up to this time is

much in our favor. But our losses have been heavy, as well as those of

the enemy.... I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons for a

fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it out

on this line if it takes all summer." A week was spent in manoeuvring

to find a new point of attack that promised success, but without

avail, and at the end of that time it was determined to move again by

the left flank. The movement was to the North Anna River; again it was

a race, and this time the Confederates had the shorter line.

The distance from Spottsylvania Court House to Richmond is a little

more than fifty miles. About midway between them is Hanover Junction,

where the railroad from Richmond to Fredericksburg is crossed by the

Virginia Central road. Grant did not wish to conceal his movement

altogether. He was anxious to induce the enemy to fight without the

enormous advantage of intrenchments. So he planned to send one corps

toward Richmond, hoping that Lee would be tempted to attack it with

all his army, whereupon the other corps might follow up sharply and

attack the Confederates before they had time to intrench. When the

movement was begun, Lee, instead of moving at once in the same

direction, sent Ewell's corps to attack the National right. It

happened that six thousand raw recruits, under Gen. R. O. Tyler, were

on their way to reinforce the Army of the Potomac, and had not quite

reached their place in line when they were struck by Ewell's flank

movement. Grant says they maintained their position in a manner worthy

of veterans, till they were reinforced by the divisions of Birney and

Crawford, which promptly moved up to the right and left, and Ewell was

then quickly driven back with heavy loss. This was on the 19th of May.

The corps thrown forward as a bait was Hancock's, and it marched on

the night of the 20th, going easterly to Guinea Station, and then

southerly to Milford. Warren's corps followed twelve hours later, and

twelve hours later still the corps of Burnside and Wright. Some

trifling resistance was met by the advance; but the Confederates had

no notion of taking any risk. They made a reconnoissance to their

left, to be sure that Grant had not kept a corps at Spottsylvania to

fall upon their rear, and then set out by a shorter line than his to

interpose themselves once more between him and their capital.

The new position that was taken up after some tentative movements was

one of the strongest that could have been devised. The Confederate

left stretched in a straight line, a mile and a half long, from Little

River to the North Anna at Oxford. Here, bending at a right angle, the

line followed the North Anna down stream for three quarters of a mile,

thence {363} continuing in a straight line southeastward, to and

around Hanover Junction. The North Anna here makes a bend to the

south, and on the most southerly point of the bend the Confederate

line touched and held it. If we imagine a ring cut in halves, and the

halves placed back to back, in contact, and call one the line of

Confederate intrenchments and the other the river, we shall have a

fair representation of the essential features of the situation. It is

evident that any enemy approaching from the north, and attempting to

envelop this position, would have his own line twice divided by the

river, so that his army would be in three parts. Any reinforcements

passing from one wing to the other would have to cross the stream

twice, and, long before they could reach their destination, the army

holding the intrenchments could strengthen its threatened wing. The

obvious point to assail in such a position would be the apex of the

salient line where it touched the river; and Burnside was ordered to

force a passage at that point. But the banks were high and steep, and

the passage was covered by artillery. Moreover, an enfilading fire

from the north bank was thwarted by traverses--intrenchments at right

angles to the main line. Wright's corps crossed the river above the

Confederate position, and destroyed some miles of the Virginia Central

Railroad; while Hancock's crossed below, and destroyed a large section

of the road to Fredericksburg. By this time they had learned the

effective method of not only tearing up the track, but piling up the

ties and setting them on fire, heating the rails, and bending and

twisting them so that they could not be used again. These operations

were not carried on without frequent sharp fighting, which cost each

side about two thousand men; but there was no general battle on the

North Anna.

[Illustration: BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN C. ROBINSON.]

[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL HARRY T. HAYS, C. S. A.]

Before the next flank movement was made by the Army of the Potomac,

Gen. James H. Wilson's cavalry division was sent to make a

demonstration on the right, to give the enemy the impression that this

time the turning movement would be in that direction. In the night of

May 26, which was very dark, the army withdrew to the north bank of

the North Anna, took up its pontoon bridges, destroyed all the others,

and was put in motion again by the left flank. Sheridan's cavalry led

the way and guarded the crossings of the Pamunkey, which is formed by

the junction of the North and South Anna Rivers. The Sixth Corps was

the advance of the infantry, followed by the Second, while the Fifth

and Ninth moved by roads farther north. The direction was southeast,

and the distance about thirty miles to a point at which the army would

cross the Pamunkey and move southwest toward Richmond, the crossing

being about twenty miles from that city. But between lie the swamps of

the Chickahominy. In the morning of the 28th the cavalry moved out on

the most direct road to Richmond, and at a cross-roads known as

Hawes's Shop encountered a strong force of Confederate cavalry, which

was dismounted and intrenched. After a bloody fight of some hours'

duration, the divisions commanded by Gens. David M. Gregg and George

A. Custer broke over the intrenchments and forced back the enemy; the

other divisions came up promptly, and the position was held.

A member of the First New Jersey cavalry, which participated in this

action, writes: "One company being sent on each flank, mounted,

Captain Robbins with four companies, dismounted, moved forward and

occupied a position on the right of the road, opening a rapid fire

from their carbines on the line of the enemy, which was forming for

attack. The remainder of the regiment was moved to the left of the

road, and having been dismounted, was ordered to the support of the

First Pennsylvania, which was hotly engaged. Robbins, as usual, moved

with a rush to the assault, and soon cleared his immediate front of

the rebels, chasing them across the open ground beyond the wood in

which they had taken cover. In this field there was a double ditch,

lined by fencing, with another of the same character facing it, only

forty or fifty paces distant. As Captain Beekman, heading his men,

sprang across the first fence at charging speed, they were met by a

desperate volley from the second line of the rebels lying in the other

cover. Instinctively, as they saw the flash, the men threw themselves

upon the ground, and now Beekman, rolling into the ditch, called his

troops there beside him. From the two covers there was kept up a

tremendous fire--our men sometimes charging toward the hostile ditch,

but in each case falling back, and the fight going on, both parties

holding their own, but neither gaining ground upon the other.

Meanwhile Captain Robbins, on the right of the {364} road, was being

sorely pressed. Major Janeway was sent with two squadrons to his

relief, and the fight redoubled in intensity. The ammunition of the

men giving out, a supply was brought from the rear and distributed

along the line itself by the officers, several of whom fell while

engaged in the service. Captain Beekman was shot through both hands as

he stretched them forth full of ammunition. Lieutenant Bellis was

almost at the same moment mortally wounded, as was also Lieutenant

Stewart. Captain Robbins was wounded severely in the shoulder,

Lieutenant Shaw severely in the head, Lieutenant Wynkoop fearfully in

the foot. Lieutenant Bowne was the only officer of the first battalion

on the field who was untouched, and he had several narrow escapes.

Major Janeway also had a narrow escape, a ball passing so close to his

forehead as to redden the skin. As Lieutenant Brooks was manoeuvring

the fifth squadron under fire, a ball fired close at hand struck him

near his belt-clasp, slightly penetrating the skin in two places, and,

doubling him up, sent him rolling headlong for thirty feet across the

road. As he recovered steadiness, he saw his whole squadron hurrying

to pick him up, and, in the excitement, losing all sensation of pain,

he ordered them again forward, and walked after them half-way to the

front. There he was obliged to drop upon the ground, and was carried

from the field. Lieutenant Craig also, of the same squadron, was badly

bruised by some missile that struck him in the breast, but, though

suffering severely from the blow, he did not leave the field. Still

the men bravely held their own. And now Custer, coming up with his

Michigan brigade, charged down the road, the whole body of the First

Jersey skirmishers simultaneously springing from their cover and

dashing upon the enemy, sweeping him from the field, and pursuing him

until the whole mass had melted into disordered rout. Meanwhile the

fighting on the left of the road had been of the severest character.

Malsbury received a mortal wound; Dye was killed instantly; Cox was

hit in the back, but remained the only officer with the squadron till,

toward the close of the action, he received a wound which disabled

him. The total loss of the nine companies of the First New Jersey

engaged, in killed and wounded, was sixty-four, eleven being

officers."

[Illustration: PONTOON BRIDGE AT DEEP BOTTOM ON THE JAMES RIVER.]

Soon after noon of that day three-fourths of the army had crossed the

Pamunkey, and the remaining corps crossed that night. Here were

several roads leading to the Confederate capital; but the Confederate

army, as soon as it found the enemy gone from its front, had moved in

the same direction, by a somewhat shorter route, and had quickly taken

up a strong position across all these roads, with flanks on Beaver Dam

and Totopotomoy creeks. Moreover, at this time it was heavily {365}

reinforced by troops that were drawn from the defences east of

Richmond.

The next day the opposing forces were in close proximity, each trying

to find out what the other was about, and all day the crack of the

skirmisher's rifle was heard. Near Bethesda church there was a small

but bloody engagement, where a portion of Early's corps made an attack

on the National left and gained a brief advantage, but was soon driven

back, with a brigade commander and two regimental commanders among its

killed. At dusk, one brigade of Barlow's division made a sudden rush

and carried a line of Confederate rifle-pits. But it was ascertained

that the position offered no chance of success in a serious assault.

Furthermore, Grant was expecting reinforcements from Butler's Army of

the James, to come by way of White House, at the head of navigation on

York River, and he feared that Lee would move out with a large part of

his army to interpose between him and his reinforcements and overwhelm

them. So he extended his left toward Cold Harbor, sending Sheridan

with cavalry and artillery to secure that place. Sheridan was heavily

attacked there on the morning of June 1st, but held his ground, and

twice drove back the assailants. In the course of the day he was

relieved by the Sixth corps, to which the ten thousand reinforcements

under Gen. William F. Smith were added. At the same time the

Confederate line had been extended in the same direction, so as still

to cover all roads leading to Richmond. The Army of the Potomac, in

its movement down the streams, was now at the highest point that it

had reached in its movement up the peninsula, when led by McClellan

two years before.

At six o'clock in the evening, Smith's and Wright's corps attacked the

Confederate intrenchments. Along most of the front they were obliged

to cross open ground that was swept by artillery and musketry; but

they moved forward steadily, in spite of their rapid losses, and

everywhere carried the first line of works, taking some hundreds of

prisoners, but were stopped by the second. They intrenched and held

their advanced position; but it had been dearly bought, since more

than two thousand of their men were killed or wounded, including many

officers.

When the other corps had followed the Sixth, and the entire army was

in its new position at Cold Harbor, eight or ten miles from Richmond,

with its enemy but a little distance in front of it, an attack was

planned for the morning of the 3d. The Confederate position was very

strong. The line was from three to six miles from the outer defences

of Richmond, the right resting on the Chickahominy, and the left

protected by the woods and swamps about the head-waters of several

small streams. The Chickahominy was between it and Richmond, but the

water was low and everywhere fordable. The only chance for attack was

in front, and it remained to be demonstrated by experiment whether

anything could be done there. If Lee's line could be disrupted at the

centre, and a strong force thrust through, it would for the time being

disorganize his army, though a large part of it would undoubtedly

escape across the river and rally in the intrenchments nearer the

city.

At half-past four o'clock on the morning of the 3d, the Second, Sixth,

and Eighteenth (Smith's) corps began the attack as planned. They moved

forward as rapidly and regularly as the nature of the ground would

admit, under a destructive fire of artillery and musketry, till they

carried the first line of intrenchments. Barlow's division of

Hancock's corps struck a salient, and, after a desperate hand-to-hand

contest, captured it, taking nearly three hundred prisoners and three

guns, which were at once turned upon the enemy. But every assaulting

column, on reaching the enemy's first line, found itself subjected to

cross-fires from the enemy's skilfully placed artillery, and not one

of them could go any farther. Most of them fell back speedily, leaving

large numbers prisoners or bleeding on the ground, and took up

positions midway between the lines, where they rapidly dug trenches

and protected themselves. General Grant had given orders to General

Meade to suspend the attack the moment it should appear hopeless, and

the heavy fighting did not last more than an hour, though firing was

kept up all day. A counter-attack by Early's corps was as unsuccessful

as those of the National troops had been; and one or two lighter

attacks by the Confederates, later in the day, were also repelled.

{366} [Illustration: INTRENCHMENTS AT KENESAW MOUNTAIN, GA.]

The Ninety-eighth New York regiment was among the troops that were

brought up from the Army of the James and joined the Army of the

Potomac two or three days before the battle of Cold Harbor. Its

colonel, William Kreutzer, writes a graphic account of the regiment's

experience during those first three days of June:

"After ten o'clock, Devens, putting the Ninety-eighth in charge of one

of his staff, sent it, marching by the right flank, through the wood

to support one of his regiments. Soon the rattling of the men among

the brush and trees attracted some one's attention in front, and he

poured a volley down along our line lengthwise. We stop; the ground

rises before us, and the aim of the firing is too high. Staff-officer

says: 'These are our men, there is some mistake; wait awhile, and the

firing will stop.' Firing does not stop, and the aim is better.

Staff-officer goes to report, hastens for orders and instructions, and

never comes back. Our position is terribly embarrassing, frightfully

uncomfortable. Our ignorance of the place, the darkness, the wood, the

uncertainty whether the firing is from friend or foe, increase the

horrors of that night's battle. The writer walked from the centre to

the head of the regiment and asked Colonel Wead what the firing meant.

Wead replied: 'We are the victims of some one's blunder.' We

suggested: 'Let us withdraw the regiment, or fire at the enemy in

front. We can't stay here and make no reply. Our men are being killed

or wounded fast.' Wead remarked: 'I have no orders to do either; they

may be our men in front. I am here by direction of General Devens, and

one of his staff has gone to report the facts to him. He will return

in a short time. If we are all killed, I don't see that I can prevent

it, or am to blame for it.'

"We asked Colonel Wead to have the men lie down. The order, 'Lie

down,' was passed along the line, and we returned to our position by

the colors. Subsequently, Colonel Wead joined us there. The firing

continued; the range became lower; the men lying down were wounded

fast. We all lay down. Colonel Wead was struck a glancing blow on the

shoulder-strap by a rifle-ball, and, after lying senseless for a

moment, said to the writer, 'I am wounded; take the command.' We arose

immediately, walked along the line, and quietly withdrew the men to

the lower edge of the wood where we had entered. In that night's

blunder the regiment lost forty-two men, killed and wounded. During

the night and early morning, Colonel Wead and the wounded crawled back

to the regiment. The more severely wounded were carried back half a

mile farther to an old barn, where their wounds were dressed and

whence they were taken in ambulances to White House. Nothing could

equal the horrors of that night's battle; the blundering march into

the enemy's intrenchments, his merciless fire, the cries of our {367}

wounded and dying, the irresolute stupidity and want of sagacity of

the conducting officer, deepen the plot and color the picture.

"At 4 A.M. of the 3d, the Eighteenth Corps was formed for the charge

in three lines; first, a heavy skirmish line; second, a line

consisting of regiments deployed; third, a line formed of regiments in

solid column doubled on the centre. The Ninety-eighth was in the third

line. The whole army advanced together at sunrise. Within twenty

minutes after the order to advance had been given, one of the most

sanguinary battles of the war, quick, sharp, and decisive, had taken

place. By this battle the Army of the Potomac gained nothing, but the

Eighteenth Corps captured and held a projecting portion of the enemy's

breastwork in front. The Ninety-eighth knew well the ground that it

helped to capture, for there lay its dead left on the night of the

1st.

"The men at once began the construction of a breastwork, using their

hands, tin cups, and bayonets. Later they procured picks and shovels.

They laid the dead in line and covered them over, and to build the

breastwork used rails, logs, limbs, leaves, and dirt. The enemy's

shells, solid shot and rifle-balls all the while showered upon them,

and hit every limb and twig about or above them. Nothing saved us but

a slight elevation of the ground in front. A limb cut by a solid shot

felled General Marston to the ground. Three boyish soldiers, thinking

to do the State service, picked him up, and were hurrying him to the

rear, when he recovered his consciousness and compelled them to drop

himself. In a short time he walked slowly back to the front. In this

advance and during the day our regimental flag received fifty-two

bullet-holes, and the regiment lost, killed and wounded, sixty-one.

Colonel Wead rose to his feet an instant on the captured line, when a

rifle-ball pierced his neck and cut the subclavian vein. He was

carried back to the barn beside the road, where he died the same

day....

"On the night of the 4th the Ninety-eighth moved from the second line

through the approach to the front line, and relieved the One Hundred

and Eighteenth New York and the Tenth New Hampshire. It had barely

time to take its position when the Confederates made a night attack

along our whole front. For twenty minutes before, the rain of shells

and balls was terrific; the missiles tore and screamed and sang and

howled along the air. Every branch and leaf was struck; every inch of

the trees and breastworks was pierced. Then the firing ceased along

his line for a few minutes, while the enemy crossed his breastworks

and formed for the charge, when,

'At once there rose so wild a yell,

As all the fiends from heaven that fell

Had pealed the banner cry of hell.'

But no living thing could face that 'rattling shower' of ball and

shell which poured from our lines upon them. They fell to the ground,

they crept away, they hushed the yell of battle. The horrors of that

night assault baffle description."

[Illustration: BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL EMORY UPTON.]

[Illustration: MAJOR MARTIN T. McMAHON. (Afterward Brevet

Major-General.)]

[Illustration: COLONEL SAMUEL S. CARROLL. (Afterward Brevet

Major-General.)]

The entire loss of the National Army at Cold Harbor in the first

twelve days of June--including the battles just described and the

almost constant skirmishing and minor engagements--was ten thousand

and eighty-eight; and among the dead and wounded were many valuable

officers. General Tyler and Colonel Brooke were wounded, and Colonels

Porter, Morris, Meade, and Byrnes were killed.[1]

[Footnote 1: The lines of the two armies were so close to each other

that it was impossible to care for the wounded that lay between them,

except by a cessation of hostilities. As the National forces had been

the assailants, most of the wounded were theirs. General Grant made an

immediate effort to obtain a cessation for this humane purpose, but

General Lee delayed it with various trivial excuses for forty-eight

hours, and at the end of that time all but two of the wounded were

dead. See a part of the correspondence in Grant's "Memoirs," Vol. II.,

pp. 273 _et seq._ As to the losses here and at Spottsylvania,

authorities differ. The figures given above are from a statement

compiled in the Adjutant-General's office.]

{368} The Confederate loss--which included Brigadier-General Doles

among the killed, and Brigadier-Generals Kirkland, Lane, Law, and

Finnegan among the wounded--is unknown; but it was much smaller than

the National. The attack of June 3d is recognized as the most serious

error in Grant's military career. He himself says, in his "Memoirs,"

that he always regretted it was ever made. It was as useless, and

almost as costly, as Lee's assault upon Meade's centre at Gettysburg.

But we do not read that any of Grant's lieutenants protested against

it, as Longstreet protested against the attack on Cemetery Ridge.

For some days Grant held his army as close to the enemy as possible,

to prevent the Confederates from detaching a force to operate against

Hunter in the Shenandoah Valley.

General Halleck now proposed that the Army of the Potomac should

invest Richmond on the north. This might have prevented any

possibility of Lee's launching out toward Washington, but it could

hardly have effected anything else. The Confederate lines of supply

would have been left untouched, while the National troops would have

perished between impregnable intrenchments on the one side and

malarious swamps on the other. Grant determined to move once more by

the left flank, swing his army across the James, and invest the city

from the south. A direct investment of the Confederate capital on that

side was out of the question, because the south bank of the James is

lower than the city; and the movement would, therefore, resolve itself

into a struggle for Petersburg, thirty miles south of Richmond, which

was its railroad centre.

To withdraw an army from so close contact with the enemy, march it

fifty miles, cross two rivers, and bring it into a new position, was a

very delicate and hazardous task, and Grant performed it with

consummate skill. He sent a part of his cavalry to make a

demonstration on the James above Richmond and destroy portions of

Lee's line of supplies from the Shenandoah; he had a line of

intrenchments constructed along the north bank of the Chickahominy,

from his position at Cold Harbor down to the point where he expected

to cross; and directed General Butler to send two vessels loaded with

stone to be sunk in the channel of the James as far up-stream as

possible, so that the Confederate gunboats could not come down and

attack the army while it was crossing. A large number of vessels had

been collected at Fort Monroe, to be used as ferry-boats when the army

should reach the James. The so-called "bridges" on the Chickahominy

were now only names of geographical points, for all the bridges had

been destroyed; but each column was to carry its pontoon train.

[Illustration: BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL P. ST. GEORGE COOKE.]

[Illustration: BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAMES A. BEAVER.]

[Illustration: BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL ISAAC S. CATLIN.]

The march began in the evening of June 12th, and at midday of the 13th

a pontoon was thrown across at Long Bridge, fifteen miles below the

Cold Harbor position, and Wilson's cavalry crossed and immediately

moved out a short distance on the roads toward Richmond, to watch the

movements of the enemy and prevent a surprise. The Fifth corps

followed quickly, and took a position covering these roads till the

remainder of the army could cross. The Second, Sixth, and Ninth corps

crossed the Chickahominy a few miles farther down; while the

Eighteenth had embarked at White House, to be sent around by water. In

the evening of the 13th, the Fifth reached Wilcox's Landing on the

James, ten miles below Haxall's, where McClellan had reached the river

at the close of his peninsula campaign. The other corps reached the

landing on the 14th. The river there is more than two thousand feet

wide; but between four o'clock, P.M., and midnight a pontoon was laid,

and the crossing began. The artillery and trains were sent over first,

and the infantry followed in a long procession that occupied

forty-eight hours, the rear guard of the Sixth corps passing over at

midnight of the 16th. Thus an army of more than one hundred thousand

men was taken from a line of trenches within a few yards of the enemy,

marched fifty miles, and, with all its paraphernalia, carried across

two rivers and placed in a position threatening that enemy's capital,

without a serious collision or disaster. General Ewell said that when

the National army got across the James River he knew that the

Confederate cause was lost, and it was the duty of their authorities

to make {369} the best terms they could while they still had a right

to claim concessions.

Most critics of this campaign have persistently proceeded on the

assumption that Grant's objective was the city of Richmond, and have

accordingly condemned his plan of marching overland, and with apparent

conclusiveness have pointed to his heavy losses and to the fact that

Richmond was still uncaptured, and then asked the question, which has

been wearisomely repeated, why he might not as well have carried his

army by water in the first place to a position before Richmond,

without loss, as McClellan had done two years before, instead of

getting there along a bloody overland trail at such heavy cost. These

critics should know, even if Grant himself had not distinctly declared

it at the outset, that his objective was not the city of Richmond;

that it was Lee's army, which it was his business to follow and fight

until he destroyed it. The same critics appear to think also that he

ought to have found a way to accomplish his purpose without bloodshed,

and that because he did not he was no general, but a mere "butcher,"

as some of them boldly call him. If they were asked to name a general

who had won great victories without himself losing men by the

thousand, they would find it difficult to do so, for no such general

figures in the pages of history. If there ever was a chance to defeat

the Army of Northern Virginia and destroy the Confederacy by anything

but hard fighting, it was when McClellan planted his army on the

peninsula; but McClellan's timidity was not the quality necessary for

a bold and brilliant stroke. Nearly the whole State of Virginia is

admirably adapted for defence against an invading army; and by the

time that Grant set out on his overland campaign every position where

Lee's army could make a stand was thoroughly known, and most of them

were fortified; furthermore, the men of his army were now veterans and

understood how to use every one of their advantages, while Lee as a

general had only to move his army over ground that it had already

traversed several times, and manoeuvre for a constant defence. Under

these circumstances, nothing but hard and continuous fighting could

have conquered such an army. The same criticism that finds fault with

General Grant for not transporting his army by water to the front of

Richmond instead of fighting his way thither overland, must also

condemn General Lee for not surrendering in the Wilderness instead of

fighting all the way to Appomattox and then surrendering at last.

[Illustration: NEWSPAPER HEADQUARTERS AT THE FRONT. (From a war-time

photograph.)]

{370} [Illustration: A GROUP OF NAVAL OFFICERS, U. S. N. COMMANDER

ROBERT W. SHUFELDT. REAR-ADMIRAL HIRAM PAULDING. COMMANDER S. L.

BREESE. LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER HENRY ERBEN. COMMANDER E. T. NICHOLS.

COMMANDER NAPOLEON COLLINS. COMMODORE GEORGE HENRY PREBLE. CAPTAIN

JOHN FAUNCE. REAR-ADMIRAL H. K. HOFF.]

{371}