WAR IN THE WEST.
CONSCRIPTION ACT PASSED BY CONFEDERATE CONGRESS--GENERAL BRAGGS'S
OPERATIONS IN KENTUCKY AND EAST TENNESSEE--BATTLE OF
PERRYVILLE--GRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF THE CONFEDERATE CHARGE--BATTLE OF
IUKA--BATTLE OF STONE RIVER, OR MURFREESBORO'--ESTRANGEMENT BETWEEN
GRANT AND ROSECRANS--BATTLE OF CORINTH--CONFEDERATE RETREAT--HEAVY
LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES.
The Confederate Congress in 1862 passed a sweeping conscription act,
forcing into the ranks every man of military age. Even boys of sixteen
were taken out of school and sent to camps of instruction. This
largely increased their forces in the field, and at the West
especially they exhibited a corresponding activity. General
Beauregard, whose health had failed, was succeeded by Gen. Braxton
Bragg, a man of more energy than ability, who, with forty thousand
men, marched northward into eastern Kentucky, defeating a National
force near Richmond, and another at Munfordville. He then assumed that
Kentucky was a State of the Confederacy, appointed a provisional
governor, forced {201} Kentuckians into his army, and robbed the
farmers not only of their stock and provisions, but of their wagons
for carrying away the plunder, paying them in worthless Confederate
money. He carried with him twenty thousand muskets, expecting to find
that number of Kentuckians who would enroll themselves in his command;
but he confessed afterward that he did not even secure enough recruits
to take up the arms that fell from the hands of his dead and wounded.
With the supplies collected by his army of "liberators," as he called
them, in a wagon-train said to have been forty miles long, he was
moving slowly back into Tennessee, when General Buell, with about
fifty-eight thousand men (one-third of them new recruits), marched in
pursuit.
Bragg turned and gave battle at Perryville (October 8), and the fight
lasted nearly all day. At some points it was desperate, with
hand-to-hand fighting, and troops charging upon batteries where the
gunners stood to their pieces and blew them from the very muzzles. The
National left, composed entirely of raw troops, was crushed by a heavy
onset; but the next portion of the line, commanded by Gen. Philip H.
Sheridan, not only held its ground and repelled the assault, but
followed up the retiring enemy with a counter attack. Gooding's
brigade (National) lost five hundred and forty-nine men out of
fourteen hundred and twenty-three, and its commander became a
prisoner. When night fell, the Confederates had been repelled at all
points, and a portion of them had been driven through Perryville,
losing many wagons and prisoners. Buell prepared to attack at
daylight, but found that Bragg had moved off in the night with his
whole army, continuing his retreat to East Tennessee, leaving a
thousand of his wounded on the ground. He also abandoned twelve
hundred of his men in hospital at Harrodsburg, with large quantities
of his plunder, some of which he burned, and made all haste to get
away. Buell reported his loss in the battle as forty-three hundred and
forty-eight, which included Gens. James S. Jackson and William R.
Terrill killed. Bragg's loss was probably larger, though he gave
considerably smaller figures.
The battle of Perryville is more noteworthy for its fierce fighting
and numerous instances of determined gallantry than for any importance
in its bearing on the campaign. It was especially notable for the work
of the artillery, and the struggles to capture or preserve the various
batteries. One National battery of eight guns was commanded by Capt.
Charles C. Parsons, and the Confederates making a fierce charge upon
it captured seven of the pieces, but not without the most desperate
hand-to-hand fighting, in the course of which Parsons at one time was
lying on his back under the guns and firing his revolver at the
assailants. Sixteen years afterward this man, who in the meantime had
become a clergyman, sacrificed his life in attending to the victims of
yellow fever on the Mississippi. When Sheridan was heavily pressed by
the enemy and his right was in special danger, the brigade of Colonel
Carlin was sent to his relief. Carlin's men, reaching the brow of a
hill, discovered the advancing enemy, and immediately charged at the
double quick with such impetuosity that they not only drove back the
Confederates, but passed entirely through their lines where they were
in momentary danger of being captured _en masse_. But, during the
confusion which they caused, they skilfully fell back, carrying with
them a heavily loaded ammunition train which they had captured with
its guard. Pinney's Fifth Wisconsin battery was worked to its utmost
capacity for three hours without supports, and withstood several
charges, piling its front with the bodies of the slain. In the Third
Ohio Regiment six color sergeants were shot in succession, but the
flag was never allowed to touch the earth. That regiment lost two
hundred out of five hundred men. A correspondent of the _Cincinnati
Gazette_, who was on the field, thus relates one of the many
interesting incidents of the battle: "The Tenth Ohio were lying upon
their faces to the left of the Third, near the summit of the same
hill, and upon the other side of a lane. The retreat of the Third Ohio
and Fifteenth Kentucky had left the right wing of the Tenth uncovered,
and a whole brigade of the enemy, forming in mass, advanced toward
them over the ground of such a nature that if the Tenth did not
receive warning from some source the rebel column would be upon them,
and annihilate them before they could rise from their faces and change
front. Colonel Lytle was expecting the enemy to appear in his front,
over the crest of the hill, and had intended to have the gallant Tenth
charge them with the bayonet. And they still lay upon their faces
while the enemy was advancing upon their flank, stealthily as a cat
steals upon her prey. Nearer and nearer they come. Great heavens! Will
no one tell the Tenth of their fearful peril? Where is the eagle eye
which ought to overlook the field and send swift-footed couriers to
save this illustrious band from destruction? Alas, there is none! The
heroes of Carnifex are doomed. The mass of Confederates, which a
rising ground just to the right of the tent has hitherto concealed
from view, rush upon the hapless regiment, and from the distance of a
hundred yards pour into it an annihilating fire even while the men are
still upon their faces. Overwhelmed and confounded, they leap to their
feet and vainly endeavor to change front to meet the enemy. It is
impossible to do it beneath that withering, murderous fire; and for
the first time in its history the Tenth Regiment turns its back upon
the enemy. They will not run; they only walk away, and they are mowed
down by scores as they go. The noble, gifted, generous Lytle was
pierced with bullets and fell where the storm was fiercest. One of his
sergeants lifted him in his arms, and was endeavoring to carry him
from the field. 'You may do some good yet,' said the hero; 'I can do
no more; let me die here.' He was left there, and fell into the hands
of the enemy."
{202} [Illustration: BATTLE OF STONE RIVER--THE DECISIVE CHARGE OF THE
FEDERAL TROOPS ACROSS THE RIVER.]
On hearing of this disaster to the Tenth Ohio Regiment, which formed
the right of Lytle's Seventeenth Brigade, General Rousseau immediately
rode to the scene of it. He says in his report: "Whilst near the
Fifteenth Kentucky, I saw a heavy force of the enemy advancing upon
our right, the same that had turned Lytle's right flank. It was moving
steadily up in full view of where General Gilbert's army corps had
been during the day, the left flank of which was not more than four
hundred yards from it. On approaching, the Fifteenth Kentucky, though
broken and shattered, rose to its feet and cheered, and as one man
moved to the top of the hill where it could see the enemy, and I
ordered it to lie down. I then rode up to Loomis's battery, and
directed him to open upon the enemy. He replied he was ordered by
General McCook to reserve what ammunition he had for close work.
Pointing to the enemy advancing, I said it was close enough, and would
be closer in a moment. He at once opened fire with alacrity, and made
fearful havoc upon the ranks of the enemy. It was admirably done, but
the enemy moved straight ahead. His ranks were raked by the battery,
and terribly thinned by the musketry of the Seventeenth Brigade; but
he scarcely faltered, and finally, hearing that reinforcements were
approaching, the brigade was ordered to retire and give place to them,
which it did in good order. The reinforcements {203} were from
Mitchell's division, as I understood, and were Pea Ridge men. I wish I
knew who commanded the brigade, that I might do him justice; I can
only say that the brigade moved directly into the fight, like true
soldiers, and opened a terrific fire and drove back the enemy. After
repulsing the enemy, they retired a few hundred yards into a piece of
woods to encamp in, and during the night the enemy advanced his
pickets in the woods on our left front and captured a good many of our
men who went there believing we still held the woods."
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL PHILIP H. SHERIDAN.]
[Illustration: COLONEL WILLIAM P. CARLIN. (Afterward Brevet
Major-General.)]
General Halleck, at Washington, now planned for Buell's army a
campaign in East Tennessee; but as that was more than two hundred
miles away, and the communications were not provided for, Buell
declined to execute it. For this reason, and also on the ground that
if he had moved more rapidly and struck more vigorously he might have
destroyed Bragg's army, he was removed from command, and Gen. William
S. Rosecrans succeeded him.
In September, when Bragg had first moved northward, a Confederate army
of about forty thousand men, under Generals Price and Van Dorn, had
crossed from Arkansas into Mississippi with the purpose of capturing
Grant's position at Corinth, and thus breaking the National line of
defence and coöperating with Bragg. Price seized Iuka, southeast of
Corinth, and Grant sent out against him a force under Rosecrans,
consisting of about nine thousand men, which included the divisions of
Gens. David S. Stanley and Charles S. Hamilton, and the cavalry under
Col. John K. Mizner. It was Grant's intention that while this force
moved toward Iuka from the south, Gen. E. O. C. Ord's command,
consisting of eight thousand men, should move upon it from the west.
There are two roads running south from Iuka, about two miles apart,
and Grant intended that Rosecrans should approach by both of these
roads, so as to cut off the enemy's retreat. But Rosecrans marched
only by the westernmost road, leaving the eastern, known as the Fulton
road, open. Hamilton's division was in advance, and at four o'clock in
the afternoon, at a point two miles from Iuka, the head of his column,
ascending a long hill, found the enemy deployed across the road and in
the woods a few hundred yards beyond its crest. Hamilton had thrown
out a heavy skirmish line, which for four or five miles had kept up a
running fight with sharp-shooters. The enemy, in force, occupied a
strong line along a deep ravine, from which they moved forward to
attack as soon as Hamilton's men appeared on the crest. Hamilton
himself, being close to the skirmish line, saw the situation with its
dangers and its advantages, and made haste to prepare for what was
coming. He deployed his infantry along the crest, got a battery into
position under heavy fire where it could command the road in front,
placed every regiment personally, and gave each regimental commander
orders to hold his ground at all hazards. As the remainder of his
forces came up, he placed them so as to extend his flanks and prevent
them from being turned. But while he was doing this, the enemy was
advancing and the battle was becoming very serious. The enemy came on
in heavy masses against his centre, charging steadily up to his guns,
which fired canister into them at short range, until nearly every man
and horse in the battery was disabled, and it was captured. Brig.-Gen.
Jeremiah C. Sullivan then gathered a portion of the right wing, which
had been thrown into some disorder, and retook the battery, driving
the Confederates back to their line; but rallying in turn they
captured it a second time, and a second time it was recaptured.
General Stanley's division was now brought up to the assistance of
Hamilton's, and the Confederates were driven back once more. They then
made an attempt by {204} marching through a ravine to fall upon the
National left in heavy force; but their movement was discovered, and
the Tenth Iowa Regiment, together with part of a battery, met them
with such a reception that they quickly withdrew. The front on which
the troops could be deployed was not long enough to permit more than
three thousand men of the Nationals to be in action at once; but along
this line the fighting was kept up until dark, when the enemy retired,
and in the morning, when Rosecrans prepared to attack him, it was
found that he was gone. The losses in the National army in this battle
were 141 killed, 613 wounded, and 36 missing. On the Confederate side,
where not many more men could be engaged at once than on the National,
the losses were reported as 85 killed, 410 wounded, and 40 missing,
the killed including Brig.-Gen. Henry Little. But these figures are
probably altogether too small. General Hamilton reported that 263
Confederates were buried on the field.
General Rosecrans, in a congratulatory order to his troops a few days
later, said: "You may well be proud of the battle of Iuka. On the 18th
you concentrated at Jacinto; on the 19th you marched twenty miles,
driving in the rebel outposts for the last eight; reached the front of
Price's army, advantageously posted in unknown woods, and opened the
action by four P.M. On a narrow front, intersected by ravines and
covered by dense undergrowths, with a single battery, Hamilton's
division went into action against the combined rebel hosts. On that
unequal ground, which permitted the enemy to outnumber them three to
one, they fought a glorious battle, mowing down the rebel hordes,
until, night closing in, they rested on their arms on the
battleground, from which the enemy retired during the night, leaving
us masters of the field. The general commanding bears cheerful
testimony to the fiery alacrity with which the troops of Stanley's
division moved up, cheering, to support the third division, and took
their places to give them an opportunity to replenish their
ammunition; and to the magnificent fighting of the Eleventh Missouri
under the gallant Mower. To all the regiments who participated in the
fight, he presents congratulations on their bravery and good conduct.
He deems it an especial duty to signalize the Forty-eighth Indiana,
which, posted on the left, held its ground until the brave Eddy fell,
and a whole brigade of Texans came in through a ravine on the little
band, and even then only yielded a hundred yards until relieved. The
Sixteenth Iowa, amid the roar of battle, the rush of wounded artillery
horses, the charge of the rebel brigade, and a storm of grape,
canister, and musketry, stood like a rock, holding the centre; while
the glorious Fifth Iowa, under the brave and distinguished Matthias,
sustained by Boomer with part of his noble little Twenty-sixth
Missouri, bore the thrice defeated charges and cross-fires of the
rebel left and centre with a valor and determination seldom equalled,
never excelled, by the most veteran soldiery.... The unexpected
accident which alone prevented us from cutting off the retreat and
capturing Price and his army only shows how much success depends on
Him in whose hands are the accidents as well as the laws of life."
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM S. ROSECRANS.]
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN PEGRAM, C. S. A.]
As the conduct of this battle began a series of causes that resulted
in an unfortunate estrangement between Grant and Rosecrans, the
bitterness of which was exhibited by the latter in his place in
Congress even when Grant was in his dying days, it is interesting to
note what Grant says of it. In his official report, written the day
after the battle, he said: "I cannot speak too highly of the energy
and skill displayed by General Rosecrans in the attack, and of the
endurance of the troops under him." In his "Memoirs" he wrote:
"General Rosecrans had previously had his headquarters at Iuka. While
there he had a most excellent map prepared, showing all the roads and
streams in the surrounding country. He was also personally familiar
with the ground, so that I deferred very much to him in my plans for
the approach.... Ord was on the northwest, and even if a rebel
movement had been possible in that direction it could have brought
only temporary relief, for it would have carried Price's army to the
rear of the National forces and isolated it from all support. It
looked to me that, if Price would remain in Iuka until we could get
there, his annihilation was inevitable. On the morning of the 18th of
September General Ord moved by rail to Burnsville, and there left the
cars and moved to perform his part of the programme. He was to get as
near the enemy as possible during the day and intrench himself so as
to hold his position until the next morning. Rosecrans was to be up by
the morning of the 19th on the two roads, and the attack was to be
from all three quarters simultaneously.... I remained at Burnsville
with a detachment of nine hundred men from Ord's command and
communicated with my two wings by courier. Ord met the advance of the
enemy soon after leaving Burnsville. Quite a sharp engagement ensued,
but he drove the rebels back with considerable loss, including one
general officer killed. He maintained his position and was ready to
attack by daylight the next morning. I was very much disappointed at
receiving a despatch from Rosecrans after midnight from Jacinto,
twenty miles from Iuka, saying that some of his command had been
delayed, and that the rear of his column was not yet up as far as
Jacinto. He said, however, that he would still be at Iuka by two
o'clock the next day. I did not believe this possible, because of the
distance and condition of the roads. I immediately sent Ord a copy of
Rosecrans's despatch and ordered him to {205} be in readiness to
attack the moment he heard the sound of guns to the south or
southeast. During the 19th the wind blew in the wrong direction to
transmit sound, either toward the point where Ord was or to Burnsville
where I remained. [This appears to be the 'unexpected accident' to
which General Rosecrans refers in his congratulatory order.] A couple
of hours before dark, on the 19th, Rosecrans arrived with the head of
his column at Barnets. He here turned north without sending any troops
to the Fulton road. While still moving in column up the Jacinto road,
he met a force of the enemy and had his advance badly beaten and
driven back upon the main road. In this short engagement his loss was
considerable for the number engaged, and one battery was taken from
him. The wind was still blowing hard, and in the wrong direction to
transmit sound toward either Ord or me. Neither he nor I nor any one
in either command heard a gun that was fired upon the battlefield.
After the engagement Rosecrans sent me a despatch announcing the
result. The courier bearing the message was compelled to move west
nearly to Jacinto before he found a road leading to Burnsville. This
made it a late hour of the night before I learned of the battle that
had taken place during the afternoon. I at once notified Ord of the
fact and ordered him to attack early in the morning. The next morning
Rosecrans himself renewed the attack and went into Iuka with but
little resistance. Ord also went in according to orders, without
hearing a gun from the south of the town, but supposing the troops
coming from the southwest must be up before that time. Rosecrans,
however, had put no troops upon the Fulton road, and the enemy had
taken advantage of this neglect and retreated by that road during the
night. I rode into town and found that the enemy was not being pursued
even by the cavalry. I ordered pursuit by the whole of Rosecrans's
command, and went on with him a few miles in person. He followed only
a few miles after I left him, and then went into camp, and the pursuit
was continued no further. I was disappointed at the result of the
battle of Iuka, but I had so high an opinion of General Rosecrans that
I found no fault at the time." General Grant says that the plan of the
battle, which included the occupation of the Fulton road, was
suggested by Rosecrans himself.
[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL ROBERT B. MITCHELL.]
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL ALEXANDER McDOWELL McCOOK.]
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL LOVELL H. ROUSSEAU.]
[Illustration: LOOMIS'S BATTERY IN ACTION.]
A Confederate soldier, who participated in the engagement, gave a
graphic account of it in a letter, a few extracts from which are
interesting and suggestive. "I wrote you a short communication from
Iuka, announcing its peaceable capture on the 4th, by the army under
General Price. I believe I was a little congratulatory in my remarks,
and spread out on the rich fruits of the bloodless capture. Indeed, it
was a sight to gladden the heart of a poor soldier whose only diet for
some time had been unsalted beef and white leather hoe-cake--the
stacks of cheese, crackers, preserves, mackerel, coffee, and other
good things that line the shelves of the sutlers' shops, and fill the
commissary stores of the Yankee army. But, alas! The good {206} things
which should have been distributed to the brave men who won them were
held in reserve for what purpose I know not, unless to sweeten the
teeth of those higher in authority (whilst the men were fed on husks),
and I suppose were devoured by the flames on the day of our retreat.
We held peaceable possession of Iuka one day, and on the next day were
alarmed by the booming of cannon, and called out to spend the evening
in battle array in the woods. How on earth, with the woods full of our
cavalry, they could have approached so near our lines, is a mystery!
They had planted a battery sufficiently near to shell General Price's
headquarters, and were cracking away at the Third Brigade in line of
battle under General Herbert when our brigade (the Fourth) came up at
a double quick and formed on their left. And then for two hours and
fifteen minutes was kept up the most terrific fire of musketry that
ever dinned my ears. There was one continuous roar of small arms,
while grape and canister howled in fearful concert above our heads and
through our ranks. General Little, our division commander, whose
bravery and kindness had endeared him to the men under his command,
was shot through the head early in the action, and fell from his horse
dead. He was sitting by General Price and conversing with him at the
time. The Third Brigade was in the hottest of the fire. They charged
and took the battery, which was doing so much damage, after a
desperate struggle, piling the ground with dead. The Third Louisiana
Regiment, of this brigade, entered the fight with two hundred and
thirty-eight men, and lost one hundred and eight in killed and
wounded. The Third Texas fared about as badly. The troops against
which we were contending were Western men, the battery manned by Iowa
troops, who fought bravely and well. I know this, that the events of
that evening have considerably increased my appetite for peace, and if
the Yankees will not shoot at us any more I shall be perfectly
satisfied to let them alone. All night could be heard the groans of
the wounded and dying of both armies, forming a sequel of horror and
agony to the deadly struggle over which night had kindly thrown its
mantle. Saddest of all, our dead were left unburied, and many of the
wounded on the battlefield to be taken in charge by the enemy....
During the entire retreat we lost but four or five wagons, which broke
down on the road and were left. Acts of vandalism disgraceful to the
army were, however, perpetrated along the road, which made me blush to
own such men as my countrymen. Cornfields were laid waste,
potato-patches robbed, barn-yards and smoke-houses despoiled, hogs
killed, and all kinds of outrages perpetrated in broad daylight and in
full view of officers. I doubted, on the march up and on the retreat,
whether I was in an army of brave men fighting for their country, or
merely following a band of armed marauders who are as terrible to
their friends as foes. The settlements through which we passed were
made to pay heavy tribute to the rapacity of our soldiers. This
plunder, too, was without excuse, for rations were regularly issued
every night."
Early in October the combined forces of Price and Van Dorn attempted
the capture of Corinth, which had been abandoned by Beauregard in May,
and from that time had been held by Grant's forces. Grant was now in
Jackson, Tenn., where he had been ordered to make his headquarters,
and Rosecrans was in immediate command at Corinth with about twenty
thousand men. The place was especially tempting to the Confederates
because of the enormous amount of supplies in store there, and also
for other reasons, which are well stated in Van Dorn's report made
after the battle: "Surveying the whole field of operations before me,
the conclusion forced itself irresistibly upon my mind, that the
taking of Corinth was a condition precedent to the accomplishment of
anything of importance in West Tennessee. To take Memphis would be to
destroy an immense amount of property without any adequate military
advantage, even admitting that it could be held without heavy guns
against the enemy's gun and mortar boats. The line of fortifications
around Bolivar is intersected by the Hatchie River, rendering it
impossible to take the place by quick assault. It was clear to my mind
that if a successful attack could be made upon Corinth from the west
and northwest, the forces there driven back on the Tennessee and cut
off, Bolivar and Jackson would easily fall, and then, upon the arrival
of the exchanged prisoners of war (about nine thousand), West
Tennessee would soon be in our possession, and communication with
General Bragg effected through middle Tennessee. I determined to
attempt Corinth. I had a reasonable hope of success. Field returns at
Ripley showed my strength to be about twenty-two thousand men.
Rosecrans at Corinth had about fifteen thousand, with about eight
thousand additional men at outposts from twelve to fifteen miles
distant. I might surprise him and carry the place before these troops
could be brought in. It was necessary that this blow should be sudden
and decisive. The troops were in fine spirits, and the whole Army of
West Tennessee seemed eager to emulate the armies of the Potomac and
Kentucky. No army ever marched to battle with prouder steps, more
hopeful countenances, or with more courage, than marched the Army of
West Tennessee out of Ripley on the morning of September 29th, on its
way to Corinth."
Rosecrans had several days' notice of the attack, and had placed the
main body of the troops in an inner line of intrenchments nearer the
town than the old Confederate fortifications. Skirmishing began on the
3d of October, when the Confederates approached from the north and
west. The skirmishers were soon driven in, and the advance troops,
under McArthur and Oliver, made a more determined resistance than
Rosecrans had intended; his idea in thrusting them forward being that
they should merely develop the enemy's purpose, find out what point he
intended to attack, and then fall back on the main body. In the
afternoon this advanced detachment had been pushed back to the main
line, and there the fighting became very obstinate and bloody. General
Hamilton's division was on the right, Davies's next, Stanley's in
reserve, and McKean on the left. The force of the first heavy blow
fell upon McKean and Davies. As the Confederates overlapped Davies a
little on his right, General Rosecrans ordered Hamilton to move up his
left and connect with Davies, then to swing his right around the
enemy's left and get in his rear. Hamilton asked for more definite
instructions than he had received verbally from the staff officer, and
Rosecrans sent him a written order, which he received at five o'clock.
Hamilton says: "A simple order to attack the enemy in flank could have
reached me by courier from General Rosecrans any time after two P.M.
in fifteen minutes. I construed it [the written order] as an order for
attack, and at once proceeded to carry it out." A somewhat similar
misunderstanding arose between General Hamilton and his brigade
commanders, in consequence of which Buford's brigade went astray and a
precious hour was lost. During that time the battle was apparently
going in favor of the Confederates, although they were purchasing
their advantages at heavy cost. Each commander believed that if he
could have had an hour more of {207} sunlight the victory would have
been his that day. In the evening Rosecrans assembled his division
commanders and made his dispositions for a renewal of the battle on
the morrow.
At half-past four o'clock in the morning the Confederates opened the
fight with their artillery, to which that of Rosecrans promptly
replied, and extended their infantry lines farther to the north of the
town. Here, on their extreme left, they formed behind a low hill, and
then suddenly advanced in line of battle only three hundred yards
distant from the National intrenchments. They were soon subjected to a
cross-fire from the batteries, their line was broken, and only
fragments of it reached the edge of the town, from which they were
soon driven away by the reserves. Rosecrans then sent forward one of
Hamilton's brigades to attack the broken enemy, which prevented them
from re-forming and drove them into the woods. At the most advanced
point of the National line, which was a small work called Battery
Robinett, the heaviest fighting of the day took place. Here for more
than two hours the roar of artillery and small arms was incessant and
the smoke was in thick clouds. Through this heavy smoke the
Confederates made three determined charges upon Battery Robinett, and
the troops on either side of it, all of which were repelled. The heavy
assaulting columns were raked through and through by the shot, but
they persistently closed up and moved forward until, in one instance,
a colonel carrying the colors actually planted them on the edge of the
ditch, and then was immediately shot. After this the Confederates gave
up the fight and slowly withdrew. At sunset General McPherson arrived
from Jackson with reinforcements for the Nationals, and General
Hurlbut was on the way with more. General Rosecrans says: "Our pursuit
of the enemy was immediate and vigorous, but the darkness of the night
and the roughness of the country, covered with woods and thickets,
made movement impracticable by night, and slow and difficult by day.
General McPherson's brigade of fresh troops with a battery was ordered
to start at daylight and follow the enemy over the Chewalla road, and
Stanley's and Davies's divisions to support him. McArthur, with all of
McKean's division except Crocker's brigade, and with a good battery
and a battalion of cavalry, took the route south of the railroad
toward Pocahontas; McKean followed on this route with the rest of his
division and Ingersoll's cavalry; Hamilton followed McKean with his
entire force." But General Grant says in his "Memoirs": "General
Rosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory, although I had
given specific orders in advance of the battle for him to pursue the
moment the enemy was repelled. He did not do so, and I repeated the
order after the battle. In the first order he was notified that the
force of four thousand men which was going to his assistance would be
in great peril if the enemy was not pursued. General Ord had joined
Hurlbut on the 4th, and, being senior, took command of his troops.
This force encountered the head of Van Dorn's retreating column just
as it was crossing the Hatchie by a bridge some ten miles out from
Corinth. The bottom land here was swampy and bad for the operations of
troops, making a good place to get an enemy into. Ord attacked the
troops that had crossed the bridge and drove them back in a panic.
Many were killed, and others were drowned by being pushed off the
bridge in their hurried retreat. Ord followed, and met the main force.
He was too weak in numbers to assault, but he held the bridge and
compelled the enemy to resume his retreat by another bridge higher up
the stream. Ord was wounded in this engagement, and the command
devolved on Hurlbut. Rosecrans did not start in pursuit till the
morning of the 5th, and then took the wrong road. Moving in the
enemy's country, he travelled with a wagon train to carry his
provisions and munitions of war. His march was therefore slower than
that of the enemy, who was moving toward his supplies. Two or three
hours' pursuit on the day of battle, without anything except what the
men carried on their persons, would have been worth more than any
pursuit commenced the next day could have possibly been. Even when he
did start, if Rosecrans had followed the route taken by the enemy, he
would have come upon Van Dorn in a swamp, with a stream in front and
Ord holding the only bridge; but he took the road leading north and
toward Chewalla instead of west, and, after having marched as far as
the enemy had moved to {209} get to the Hatchie, he was as far from
battle as when he started. Hurlbut had not the numbers to meet any
such force as Van Dorn's if they had been in any mood for fighting,
and he might have been in great peril. I now regarded the time to
accomplish anything by pursuit as past, and after Rosecrans reached
Jonesboro' I ordered him to return."
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL EDWARD O. C. ORD AND STAFF.]
{208} [Illustration: THE PURSUIT. (FROM A PAINTING BY WILLIAM T.
TREGO.)]
[Illustration: CHARGE OF THE FEDERALS AT CORINTH.]
General Grant considered that General Rosecrans had made the same
serious mistake twice, at Iuka and at Corinth; and for this reason
Rosecrans was soon relieved from further service in that department.
The Confederate authorities also were dissatisfied with their general,
for they accounted the defeat at Corinth a heavy disaster, and Van
Dorn was soon superseded by Gen. John C. Pemberton.
Rosecrans superseded Buell October 24th, when his army--thenceforth
called the Army of the Cumberland--was at Bowling Green, slowly
pursuing Bragg. Rosecrans sent a portion of it to the relief of
Nashville, which was besieged by a Confederate force, and employed the
remainder in repairing the railroad from Louisville, over which his
supplies must come. This done, about the end of November he united his
forces at Nashville. At the same time Bragg was ordered to move
forward again, and went as far as Murfreesboro', forty miles from
Nashville, where he fortified a strong position on Stone River, a
shallow stream fordable at nearly all points. There was high festivity
among the secessionists in Murfreesboro' that winter, for Bragg had
brought much plunder from Kentucky. No one dreamed that Rosecrans
would attack the place before spring, and several roving bands of
guerilla cavalry were very active, and performed some exciting if not
important exploits. The leader of one of these, John H. Morgan, was
married in Murfreesboro', the ceremony being performed by Bishop and
Gen. Leonidas Polk, and Jefferson Davis being present. It is said that
the floor was carpeted with a United States flag, on which the company
danced, to signify that they had put its authority under their feet.
The revelry was rudely interrupted when Rosecrans, leaving Nashville
with forty-three thousand men, in a rain-storm, the day after
Christmas, encamped on the 30th within sight of Bragg's intrenchments.
A correspondent of the Louisville _Journal_, who went over the ground
at the time and witnessed the battle, gave a careful description of
its peculiarities, which is necessary to a complete understanding of
the action: "As the road from Nashville to Murfreesboro' approaches
the latter place, it suddenly finds itself parallel to Stone River.
The stream flowing east crosses the road a mile this [west] side of
Murfreesboro'. Abruptly changing its course, it flows north along the
road, and not more than four hundred yards distant, for more than two
miles. It is a considerable stream, but fordable in many places at low
water. The narrow tongue of land between the turnpike road and the
river is divided by the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, which,
running down the centre of the wedge-like tract, bisects the turnpike
half a mile this side of where the latter crosses the river. {210}
Just in rear of the spot where the third milestone from Murfreesboro'
stands, the turnpike and railroad--at that point about sixty yards
apart--run through a slight cut, and this a few rods farther on is
succeeded by a slight fill. The result is to convert both railroad and
turnpike for a distance of two or three hundred yards into a natural
rifle-pit. On each side of the road at this point there are open
fields. That on the left extends to a curtain of timber which fringes
the river, and also half a mile to the front along the road, where it
gives place to an oak wood of no great density or extent. To the left
and front, however, it opens out into a large open plain, which flanks
the wood just mentioned, and extends up the river in the direction of
Murfreesboro' for a mile. In the field on the left of the railroad
there is a hill of no great height sloping down to the railroad and
commanding all the ground to the front and right. It was here that
Guenther's and Loomis's batteries were posted in the terrible conflict
of Wednesday. The open field on the right of the turnpike road, three
hundred yards wide, is bounded on the west by an almost impenetrable
cedar forest. Just in rear of the forest, and marking its extreme
northern limit, is a long, narrow opening, containing about ten acres.
There is a swell in the field on the right of the road, corresponding
with the one on the left. The crest of this hill is curiously concave.
From its beginning point at the corner of the cedars, the northern end
of the crest curves back upon itself, so that after fortifying the
front of the position it renders the right flank well-nigh
impregnable."
Rosecrans intended to attack the next day; but Bragg anticipated him,
crossed the river before sunrise, concealed by a thick fog, reached
the woods on the right of the National line, and burst out upon the
bank in overwhelming force. McCook's command, on the extreme right,
was crumbled and thrown back, losing several guns and many prisoners.
Sheridan's command, next in line, made a stubborn fight till its
ammunition was nearly exhausted, and then slowly retired. General
Thomas's command, which formed the centre, now held the enemy back
till Rosecrans established a new line, nearly at right angles to the
first, with artillery advantageously posted, when Thomas fell back to
this and maintained his ground. Through the forenoon the Confederates
had seemed to have everything their own way, and they had inflicted
grievous loss upon Rosecrans, besides sending their restless cavalry
to annoy his army in the rear. But here, as usual, the tide was
turned. The first impetuous rush of the Southern soldier had spent
itself, and the superior staying qualities of his Northern opponent
began to tell. Bragg hurled his men again and again upon the new line;
but as they left the cedar thickets and charged across the open field
they were mercilessly swept down by artillery and musketry fire, and
every effort was fruitless. Even when seven thousand fresh men were
drawn over from Bragg's right and thrown against the National centre,
the result was still the same. The day ended with Rosecrans immovable
in his position; but he had been driven from half of the ground that
he held in the morning, and had lost twenty-eight guns and many men,
while the enemy's cavalry was upon his communications. Finding that he
had ammunition enough for another battle, he determined to remain
where he was and sustain another assault. His men slept on their arms
that night, and the next day there was no evidence of any disposition
on either side to attack. Both sides were correcting their lines,
constructing rifle-pits, caring for their wounded, and preparing for a
renewal of the fight.
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES B. McPHERSON.]
[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL FRANK C. ARMSTRONG, C. S. A.]
This came on the second day of the new year, when there was some
desultory fighting, and Rosecrans advanced a division across the
stream to strike at Bragg's communications. Breckenridge's command was
sent to attack this division, and drove it back to the river, when
Breckenridge suddenly found himself subjected to a terrible artillery
fire, and lost two thousand men in twenty minutes. Following this, a
charge by National infantry drove him back with a loss of four guns
and many prisoners, and this ended the great battle of Stone River, or
Murfreesboro'. After the repulse of Breckenridge, Rosecrans advanced
his left again, and that night occupied with some of his batteries
high ground, from which Murfreesboro' could be shelled. The next day
there was a heavy rain-storm, and in the ensuing night the Confederate
army quietly retreated, leaving Murfreesboro' to its fate. Rosecrans
reported his loss in killed and wounded as eight thousand seven
hundred and seventy-eight, {211} and in prisoners as somewhat fewer
than twenty-eight hundred. Bragg acknowledged a loss of over ten
thousand, and claimed that he had taken over six thousand prisoners.
The number of men engaged on the National side was about forty-three
thousand, and on the Confederate about thirty-eight thousand,
according to the reports, which are not always reliable.
The losses on the National side included Brig.-Gens. Joshua W. Sill
and Edward N. Kirk among the killed, while on the Confederate side
Brig.-Gens. James E. Rains and Roger W. Hanson were killed.
[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN H. MORGAN, C. S. A., AND WIFE.]
[Illustration: MAP OF THE BATTLEFIELDS OF STONE RIVER, OR
MURFREESBORO'.]
The incidents of this great and complicated battle were very numerous,
and have been related at great length by different correspondents and
participants. The cavalry fighting that preceded the infantry
engagement was severe, and in some respects brilliant. This arm of the
service was commanded on the National side by Gen. David S. Stanley,
and on the Confederate by Gen. Joseph Wheeler. Col. R. H. G. Minty,
commanding the First Brigade of the National cavalry, says in his
account of the first day's battle: "Crossing Overall's Creek, I took
up position parallel to and about three-quarters of a mile from the
Murfreesboro' and Nashville pike; the Fourth Michigan forming a line
of dismounted skirmishers close to the edge of the woods. My entire
force at this time numbered nine hundred and fifty men. The enemy
advanced rapidly with twenty-five hundred cavalry, mounted and
dismounted, and three pieces of artillery. They drove back the Fourth
Michigan, and then attacked the Seventh Pennsylvania with great fury,
but met with a determined resistance. I went forward to the line of
dismounted skirmishers, and endeavored to move them to the right to
strengthen the Seventh Pennsylvania; but the moment the right of the
line showed itself from behind the fence where they were posted, the
whole of the enemy's fire was directed on it, turning it completely
round. At this moment the Fifteenth Pennsylvania gave way and
retreated rapidly, leaving the battalion of the Seventh Pennsylvania
no alternative but to retreat. I fell back a couple of fields and
re-formed in the rear of a rising ground. The rebel cavalry followed
us up promptly into the open ground, and now menaced us with three
strong lines. General Stanley ordered a charge, and he himself led two
companies of the Fourth Michigan, with about fifty men of the
Fifteenth Pennsylvania, against the line in front of our left. He
routed the enemy, and captured one stand of colors. At the same time I
charged the first line in our front with the Fourth Michigan and First
Tennessee, and drove them from the field. The second line was formed
on the far side of a lane with a partially destroyed fence on each
side, and still stood their ground. I reformed my men and again
charged. The enemy again broke and were driven from the field in the
wildest confusion."
A correspondent of the Cincinnati _Commercial_, in an account of the
battle written on the field, says: "Colonel Innes with the Ninth
Michigan engineers, posted at La Vergne to protect the road, had just
been reinforced by several companies of the Tenth Ohio, when Wheeler's
cavalry brigade made a strong dash at that position. Colonel Innes had
protected himself by a stockade of brush, and fought securely. The
enemy charged several times with great fury, but were murderously
repulsed. About fifty rebels were dismounted, and nearly a hundred of
the horses were killed. Wheeler finally withdrew, and sent in a flag
of truce demanding surrender. Colonel Innes replied, 'We don't
surrender much.' Wheeler then asked permission to bury his dead, which
was granted.... General Rosecrans, as usual, was in the midst of the
fray, directing the movement of troops and the range of batteries."
Some of the things that soldiers have to endure, which are not often
mentioned among the stirring events of the field, are indicated in the
report of Col. Jason Marsh of the Seventy-fourth Illinois Regiment. He
says: "My command was formed in line of battle close behind a narrow
strip of cedar thicket, nearly covering our front, and skirting a
strip of open level ground about twenty rods wide to the cornfield
occupied by the enemy's pickets. Being thus satisfied of the close
proximity of the enemy in strong force, and apprehending an attack at
any moment, I deemed it {212} necessary to use the utmost precaution
against surprise, and, in addition to general instructions to bivouac
without fires, and to maintain a cautious, quiet vigilance, I ordered
my command to stack arms, and each man to rest at the butt of his
musket without using his shelter tent. Although the night was dark,
chilly, and somewhat rainy, and the men cold, wet, weary, and hungry,
I deemed it objectionable to use their shelter tents, not only because
of the hindrance in case of a sudden attack, but even in a dark night
they would be some guide to the enemy to trace our line. At a little
before four o'clock A.M., our men were quietly waked up, formed into
line, and remained standing at their arms until moved by subsequent
orders. As soon as it became sufficiently light to observe objects at
a distance, I could plainly discern the enemy moving in three heavy
columns across my front, one column striking out of the cornfield and
moving defiantly along the edge of the open ground not more than
eighty rods from my line. It was plainly to be seen that the fire of
my skirmishers took effect in their ranks, and in emptying their
saddles; to which, however, the enemy seemed to pay no attention."
Some of the most stubborn fighting of the day was done by Palmer's
division, and especially by Hazen's brigade of that division, on the
National left, in the angle between the railroad and the turnpike.
When the right of Rosecrans's army had been driven back, heavy columns
of the Confederates were directed against the exposed flank of his
left, which was also subjected to a fierce artillery fire. Palmer's
men formed along the railroad and in the woods to the right of the
pike, with Cruft's brigade nearest to the enemy, and several batteries
were hastily brought up to check the advancing tide. The Confederates
moved steadily onward, apparently sure of a victory, overpowered Cruft
and drove him back, and were still advancing against Hazen, some of
whose regiments had expended their ammunition and were simply waiting
with fixed bayonets, when Grose's brigade came to the relief of Hazen,
and all stood firm and met the enemy with a terrific and unceasing
fire of musketry, to which Parsons's remarkable battery added a rain
of shells and canister. The ranks of the Confederates were thinned so
rapidly that one regiment after another gave up and fell back, until a
single regiment was left advancing and came within three hundred yards
of the National line. At this point, when every one of its officers
and half its men had been struck down, the remainder threw themselves
flat upon the ground, and were unable either to go forward any farther
or to retreat. In the afternoon the Confederates made two more similar
attempts, but were met in the same way and achieved no success.
[Illustration: BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL D. S. STANLEY.]
[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOSEPH WHEELER, C. S. A.]
Rousseau's division, which had been held in reserve, was brought into
action when the fight became critical, and performed some of the most
gallant work of the day. A participant has given a vivid description
of some of the scenes in Rousseau's front: "The broken and dispirited
battalions of our right wing, retreating by the flank, were pouring
out of the cornfields and through the skirts of the woods, while from
the far end of the field rose the indescribable crackle and slowly
curling smoke of the enemy's fire. The line of fire now grew rapidly
nearer and nearer, seeming to close in slowly, but with fatal
certainty, around our front and flank; and presently the long gray
lines of the enemy, three or four deep, could be seen through the
cornstalks vomiting flame on the retreating host. The right of
Rousseau's division opened its lines and let our brave but unfortunate
columns pass through. The gallant and invincible legion came through
in this way with fearfully decimated ranks, drawing away by hand two
pieces of our artillery. When all the horses belonging to the battery,
and all the other guns, had been disabled, the brave boys refused to
leave these two behind, and drew them two miles through fields and
thickets to a place of safety. It was a most touching sight to see
these brave men, in that perilous hour, flocking around Rousseau like
children, with acclamations of delight, and every token of love, as
soon as they recognized him, embracing his horse, his legs, his
clothes. Flying back to the open ground which was now to be the scene
of so terrific a conflict, Rousseau galloped rapidly across it, and
read with a single eagle glance all of its advantages. Guenther's and
Loomis's batteries were ordered to take position on the hill on the
left of the railroad, and Stokes's Chicago battery, which had got with
our division, was placed there also. History furnishes but few
spectacles to be compared with that which now ensued. The rebels
pressed up to the edge of the cedar forest and swarmed out into the
open field. I saw the first few gray suits that dotted the dark green
line of the cedars with their contrasted color thicken into a line of
battle, and the bright glitter of their steel flashed like an endless
chain of lightning amid the thick and heavy green of the thicket. This
I saw before our fire, opening on them around the whole extent of our
line, engirdled them with a belt of flame and smoke. After that I saw
them no more, nor will any human eye ever see them more. Guenther,
Loomis, and Stokes, with peal after peal, too rapid to be counted,
mowed them down with double-shotted canister; the left of our line of
infantry poured a {213} continuous sheet of flame into their front,
while the right of our line, posted in its remarkable position by the
genius of Rousseau, enveloped their left flank and swept their entire
line with an enfilading fire. Thick smoke settled down upon the scene;
the rim of the hill on which our batteries stood seemed to be
surrounded by a wall of living fire; the turnpike road and the crest
of the hill on the right were wrapped in an unending blaze; flames
seemed to leap out of the earth and dance through the air. No troops
on earth could withstand such a fire as that. One regiment of rebels,
the boldest of their line, advanced to within seventy-five yards of
our line, but there it was blown out of existence. It was utterly
destroyed; and the rest of the rebel line, broken and decimated, fled
like sheep into the depths of the woods. The terrific firing ceased,
the smoke quickly rolled away, and the sun shone out bright and clear
on the scene that was lately so shrouded in smoke and mortal gloom.
How still everything was! Everybody seemed to be holding his breath.
As soon as the firing ceased, General Rousseau and his staff galloped
forward to the ground the rebels had advanced over. Their dead lay
there in frightful heaps, some with the life-blood not yet all flowed
from their mortal wounds, some propped upon their elbows and gasping
their last. The flag of the Arkansas regiment lay there on the ground
beside its dead bearer. Every depression in the field was full of
wounded, who had crawled thither to screen themselves from the fire,
and a large number of prisoners came out of a little copse in the
middle of the field and surrendered themselves to General Rousseau in
person. Among them was one captain. They were all that were left alive
of the bold Arkansas regiment that had undertaken to charge our line."
[Illustration: BURYING A COMRADE.]
[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL ROBERT B. VANCE, C. S. A.]
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE, C. S. A.]
There was great disappointment and dissatisfaction among the
secessionists at the failure of Lee's invasion of Maryland and Bragg's
of Kentucky. Pollard, the Southern historian, wrote, "No subject was
at once more dispiriting and perplexing to the South than the cautious
and unmanly reception given to our armies both in Kentucky and
Maryland." They seemed unable to comprehend how there could be such a
thing as a slave State that did not want to break up the Union.
Pollard, in his account of the response of the people of Maryland to
Lee's proclamation, says, "Instead of the twenty or thirty thousand
recruits which he had believed he would obtain on the soil of
Maryland, he found the people content to gaze with wonder on his
ragged and poorly equipped army, but with little disposition to join
his ranks."
{214} [Illustration: DELAWARE INDIANS ACTING AS SCOUTS FOR THE FEDERAL
ARMY IN THE WEST.]
{215} [Illustration: A SUTLER'S CABIN.]