EMANCIPATION.
_This Chapter is illustrated with portraits of early abolitionists,
and Virginia officials at the time of the celebrated John Brown Raid._
LINCOLN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SLAVERY--McCLELLAN'S ATTITUDE--THE
DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S ATTITUDE--PREDICTIONS BY THE POETS--SLAVES DECLARED
CONTRABAND--ACTION OF FRÉMONT--HUNTER'S PROCLAMATION--BLACKS FIRST
ENLISTED--DIVISION OF SENTIMENT IN THE ARMY--MARYLAND ABOLISHES
SLAVERY--THE PRESIDENT AND HORACE GREELEY CORRESPOND ON THE
SUBJECT--EMANCIPATION PROCLAIMED--AUTUMN ELECTIONS--ABOLITION OF
SLAVERY IN DELAWARE, KENTUCKY, AND MISSOURI--THE FINAL
PROCLAMATION--THE RIGHT OF THE PRESIDENT TO DECLARE THE SLAVES FREE.
The war had now (September, 1862) been in progress almost a year and a
half; and nearly twenty thousand men had been shot dead on the
battlefield, and upward of eighty thousand wounded, while an unknown
number had died of disease contracted {182} in the service, or been
carried away into captivity. The money that had been spent by the
United States Government alone amounted to about one billion dollars.
All this time there was not an intelligent man in the country but knew
the cause of the war, and yet more than a hundred thousand American
citizens were killed or mangled before a single blow was delivered
directly at that cause. General Frémont had aimed at it; General
Hunter had aimed at it; but in each case the arm was struck up by the
Administration. One would naturally suppose, from the thoroughness
with which the slavery question had been discussed for thirty years,
that when the time came for action there would be little doubt or
hesitation on either side. On the Confederate side there was neither
doubt nor hesitation. On the National side there was both doubt and
hesitation, and it took a long time to arrive at a determination to
destroy slavery in order to preserve the Union. The old habit of
compromise and conciliation half paralyzed the arm of war, and
thousands of well-meaning citizens were unable to comprehend the fact
that we were dealing with a question that it was useless to compromise
and a force that it was impossible to conciliate.
Mr. Lincoln had hated slavery ever since, when a young man, he made a
trip on a flat-boat to New Orleans, and there saw it in some of its
more hideous aspects. That he realized its nature and force as an
organized institution and a power in politics, appears from one of his
celebrated speeches, delivered in 1858, wherein he declared that as a
house divided against itself cannot stand, so our Government could not
endure permanently half slave and half free. "Either the opponents of
slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the
public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of
ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward till it
shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North
as well as South." Why, then, hating slavery personally, and
understanding it politically, and knowing it to be the cause of the
war, did he not sooner declare it abolished?
On the one hand, he was not, like some of our chief magistrates, under
the impression that he had been placed in office to carry out
irresponsibly a personal policy of his own; and, on the other, he was
shrewd enough to know that it would be as futile for a President to
place himself far in advance of his people on a great question, as for
a general to precede his troops on the battlefield. Hence he turned
over and over, and presented again and again, the idea that the war
might be stopped and the question settled by paying for the slaves and
liberating them. It looked like a very simple calculation to figure
out the cost of purchased emancipation and compare it with the
probable cost of the war. The comparison seemed to present an
unanswerable argument, and in the end the money cost of the war was
more than one thousand dollars for every slave emancipated, while in
the most profitable days of the institution the blacks, young and old
together, had not been worth half that price. The fallacy of the
argument lay in its blindness to the fact that the Confederates were
not fighting to retain possession of their actual slaves, but to
perpetuate the institution itself. The unthrift of slavery as an
economic system had been many times demonstrated, notably in Helper's
"Impending Crisis," but these demonstrations, instead of inducing the
slaveholders to seek to get rid of it on the best attainable terms,
appeared only to excite their anger. And it ought to have been seen
that a proud people with arms in their hands, either flushed with
victory or confident in their own prowess, no matter where their real
interests may lie, can never be reasoned with except through the
syllogisms of lead and steel. Perhaps Mr. Lincoln did know it, but was
waiting for his people to find it out.
[Illustration: JOHN BROWN.]
The Louisville (Ky.) _Courier_, in a paragraph quoted on page 63 of
this volume, had told a great deal of bitter and shameful truth; but
when it entered upon the prophecy that the North would soon resume the
yoke of the slaveholders, it was not so happy. And yet it had strong
grounds for its confident prediction. Not only had a great Peace
Convention been held in February, 1861, which strove to prevent
secession by offering new guaranties for the protection of slavery,
but the chief anxiety of a large number of Northern citizens and
officers in the military service appeared to be to manifest their
desire that the institution should not be harmed.
The most eminent of the Federal generals, McClellan, when he first
took the field in West Virginia, issued a proclamation to the
Unionists, in which he said: "Notwithstanding all that has been said
by the traitors to induce you to believe our advent among you will be
signalized by an interference with your slaves, understand one thing
clearly: not only will we abstain from all such interference, but we
will, on the contrary, with an iron hand crush any attempt at
insurrection on their part." In pursuance of this, he returned to
their owners all slaves that escaped and sought refuge within his
lines. It was an every-day occurrence for slaveholders who were in
active rebellion against the Government that he was serving, to come
into his camps under flag of truce and demand and receive their
runaway slaves. The Hutchinsons, a family of popular singers, by
permission of the Secretary of War, visited his camp in the winter of
1861-62, to sing to the soldiers. But when the general found them
singing some stanzas of Whittier's that spoke of slavery as a curse to
be abolished, he forthwith issued an order that their pass should be
revoked and they should not sing any more to the troops. And even
after his retreat on the peninsula, McClellan wrote a long letter of
advice to the President, in the course of which he said: "Neither
confiscation of {183} property ... nor forcible abolition of slavery
should be contemplated for a moment.... Military power should not be
allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by
supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for
repressing disorder."
[Illustration: ANDREW HUNTER. Prosecuting Attorney at the trial of
John Brown.]
[Illustration: HON. H. A. WISE. Governor of Virginia.]
[Illustration: COLONEL ROBERT E. LEE. Commanding Virginia troops that
captured John Brown.]
In all this General McClellan was only clinging blindly and
tenaciously to the idea that had underlain the whole administration of
the government while it was in the hands of his party: that the
perpetuation of slavery, whether against political opposition or
against the growth of civilization and the logic of political economy,
was the first purpose of the Constitution and the most imperative duty
of the Government. Democratic politicians had never formulated this
rule, but Democratic Presidents had always followed it. President Polk
had obeyed it when with one hand he secured the slave State of Texas
at the cost of the Mexican War, and with the other relinquished to
Great Britain the portion of Oregon north of the forty-ninth parallel,
but for which we should now possess every harbor on the Pacific coast.
President Pierce had obeyed it when he sent troops to Kansas to assist
the invaders from Missouri and overawe the free-State settlers.
President Buchanan had obeyed it when he vetoed the Homestead Bill,
which would have accelerated the development of the northern
Territories into States. And innumerable other instances might be
cited. The existence of this party in the North was the most serious
embarrassment with which the Administration had to contend in the
conduct of the war--not even excepting the border States. As
individuals, its members were undoubtedly loyal to the Constitution
and Government as they understood them, though they wofully
misunderstood them. As a party, it was placed in a singular dilemma.
It did not want the Union dissolved; for without the vote of the slave
States it would be in a hopeless minority in Congress and at every
Presidential election; but neither did it wish to see its strongest
cohesive element overthrown, or its natural leaders defeated and
exiled. What it wanted was "the Union as it was," and for this it
continued to clamor long after it had become as plain as daylight that
the Union as it was could never again exist. Whenever the National
armies met with a reverse, if an election was pending, this party was
the gainer thereby; if they won a victory, it became weaker. Whenever
a new measure was proposed, Congress and the President were obliged to
consider not only what would be its legitimate effect, but whether in
any way the Democratic press could use it as a weapon against them.
Hence the idea of emancipation, though not altogether slow in
conception--for many of the ablest minds had leaped at it from the
beginning--was tardy in execution.
{184} [Illustration: ORIGIN OF THE WORDS, "CONTRABAND OF WAR," APPLIED
TO SLAVES--FIRST USED BY GENERAL BUTLER.]
As early as 1836 John Quincy Adams, speaking in Congress, had said:
"From the instant that your slaveholding States become the theatre of
war, from that instant the war-powers of the Constitution extend to
interference with the institution of slavery in every way in which it
can be interfered with." And in 1842 he had expressed the idea more
strongly and fully: "Whether the war be civil, servile, or foreign, I
lay this down as the law of nations--I say that the military authority
takes for the time the place of all municipal institutions, slavery
among the rest. Under that state of things, so far from its being true
that the States where slavery exists have the exclusive management of
the subject, not only the President of the United States, but the
commander of the army has power to order the universal emancipation of
the slaves." The poets, wiser than the politicians, had long foretold
the great struggle and its results. James Russell Lowell, before he
was thirty years of age, wrote:
"Out from the land of bondage 'tis decreed our slaves shall go,
And signs to us are offered, as erst to Pharaoh;
If we are blind, their exodus, like Israel's of yore,
Through a Red Sea is doomed to be, whose surges are of gore."
Twenty years later he saw his prediction fulfilled. But generally the
anticipation was that the institution would be extinguished through a
general rising of the slaves themselves. Thus Henry W. Longfellow
wrote in 1841: {185}
"There is a poor, blind Samson in this land,
Shorn of his strength, and bound in bonds of steel,
Who may, in some grim revel, raise his hand,
And shake the pillars of this commonweal,
Till the vast temple of our liberties
A shapeless mass of wreck and rubbish lies."
It seems a singular fact that throughout the war there was no
insurrection of the slaves. They were all anxious enough for liberty,
and ran away from bondage whenever they could; but, except by regular
enlistment in the National army, there never was any movement among
them to assist in the emancipation of their race.
The first refusal to return fugitive slaves was made as early as May
26, 1861, by Gen. B. F. Butler, commanding at Fort Monroe. Three
slaves, who had belonged to Colonel Mallory, commanding the
Confederate forces near Hampton, came within Butler's lines that day,
saying they had run away because they were about to be sent South.
Colonel Mallory sent by flag of truce to claim their rendition under
the Fugitive Slave Law, but was informed by General Butler, that, as
slaves could be made very useful to a belligerent in working on
fortifications and other labor, they were contraband of war, like lead
or powder or any other war material, and therefore could not and would
not be delivered up. He offered, however, to return these three if
Colonel Mallory would come to his headquarters and take an oath to
obey the laws of the United States. This declaration--at once a
witticism, a correct legal point, and sound common sense--was the
first practical blow that was struck at the institution; and it gave
us a new word, for from that time fugitive slaves were commonly spoken
of as "contrabands." They came into the National camps by thousands,
and commanding officers and correspondents frequently questioned the
more intelligent of them, in the hope of eliciting valuable
information as to the movements of the enemy; but so many apocryphal
stories were thus originated that at length "intelligent contraband"
became solely a term of derision.
The next step was the passage of a law by Congress (approved August 6,
1861), wherein it was enacted that property, including slaves,
actually employed in the service of the rebellion with the knowledge
and consent of the owner, should be confiscated, and might be seized
by the National forces wherever found. But it cautiously provided that
slaves thus confiscated were not to be manumitted at once, but to be
held subject to some future decision of the United States courts or
action of Congress.
Gen. John C. Frémont, the first Republican candidate for the
Presidency (1856), who has had a romantic life, and in whose
administration, instead of Lincoln's, the war would have occurred if
he had been elected, was in Europe in 1861, and did the Government a
timely service in the purchase of arms. Hastening home, he was made a
major-general, and given command in Missouri. On the 30th of August he
issued a proclamation placing the whole State under martial law,
confiscating the property of all citizens who should take up arms
against the United States, or assist its enemies by burning bridges,
cutting wires, etc., and adding, "their slaves, if any they have, are
hereby declared free men." The President called General Frémont's
attention to the fact that the clause relating to slaves was not in
conformity with the act of Congress, and requested him to modify it;
to which Frémont replied by asking for an open order to that
effect--in plain words, that the President should modify it himself,
which Mr. Lincoln did.
On the 6th of March, 1862, the President, in a special message to
Congress, recommended the adoption of a joint resolution to the effect
that the United States ought to coöperate with, and render pecuniary
aid to, any State that should enter upon a gradual abolition of
slavery; and Congress passed such a resolution by a large majority.
Gen. David Hunter, who commanded the National forces on the coast of
South Carolina, with headquarters at Hilton Head, issued a general
order on April 12, 1862, that all slaves in Fort Pulaski and on
Cockspur Island should be confiscated and thenceforth free. On the 9th
of May he issued another order, wherein, after mentioning that the
three States in his department--Georgia, Florida, and South
Carolina--had been declared under martial law, he proceeded to say:
"Slavery and martial law, in a free country, are altogether
incompatible. The persons in these three States heretofore held as
slaves are therefore declared forever free." On the 19th of the same
month the President issued a proclamation annulling General Hunter's
order, and adding that the question of emancipation was one that he
reserved to himself and could not feel justified in leaving to the
decision of commanders in the field. General Hunter also organized a
regiment of black troops, designated as the First South Carolina
Volunteers, which was the first body of negro soldiers mustered into
the National service during the war. This proceeding, which now seems
the most natural and sensible thing the general could have done,
created serious alarm in Congress. A representative from Kentucky
introduced a resolution asking for information concerning the
"regiment of fugitive slaves," and the Secretary of War referred the
inquiry to General Hunter, who promptly answered: "No regiment of
fugitive slaves has been or is being organized in this department.
There is, however, a fine regiment of persons whose late masters are
fugitive rebels, men who everywhere fly before the appearance of the
National flag, leaving their servants behind them to shift as best
they can for themselves. In the absence of any fugitive-master law,
the deserted slaves would be wholly without remedy, had not their
crime of treason given the slaves the right to pursue, capture, and
bring back these persons of whose protection they have been so
suddenly bereft."
Frémont's and Hunter's attempts at emancipation created a great
excitement, the Democratic journals declaring that the struggle was
being "turned into an abolition war," and many Union men in the border
States expressing the gravest apprehensions as to the consequences.
The commanders were by no means of one mind on the subject. Gen.
Thomas Williams, commanding in the Department of the Gulf, ordered
that all fugitive slaves should be expelled from his camps and sent
beyond the lines; and Col. Halbert E. Paine, of the Fourth Wisconsin
Regiment, who refused to obey the order, on the ground that it was a
"violation of law for the purpose of returning fugitives to rebels,"
was deprived of his command and placed under arrest. Col. Daniel R.
Anthony, of the Seventh Kansas Regiment, serving in Tennessee, ordered
that men coming in and demanding the privilege of searching for
fugitive slaves should be turned out of the camp, and that no officer
or soldier in his regiment should engage in the arrest and delivery of
fugitives to their masters; and for this Colonel Anthony received from
his superior officer the same treatment that had been accorded to
Colonel Paine. The division of sentiment ran through the entire army.
Soldiers that would rob a granary, or cut down trees, or reduce fences
to firewood, without the slightest compunction, still recognized {186}
the ancient taboo, and expressed the nicest scruples in regard to
property in slaves.
On the 14th of July the President recommended to Congress the passage
of a bill for the payment, in United States interest-bearing bonds, to
any State that should abolish slavery, of an amount equal to the value
of all slaves within its borders according to the census of 1860; and
at the same time he asked the Congressional representatives of the
border States to use their influence with their constituents to bring
about such action in those States. The answer was not very favorable;
but Maryland did abolish slavery before the close of the war, in
October, 1864. On the very day in which the popular vote of that State
decided to adopt a new constitution without slavery, October 12th,
died Roger B. Taney, a native of Maryland, Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, who had been appointed by the first distinctly
pro-slavery President, and from that bench had handed down the
Dred-Scott decision, which was calculated to render forever impossible
any amelioration of the condition of the negro race.
On July 22, 1862, all the National commanders were ordered to employ
as many negroes as could be used advantageously for military and naval
purposes, paying them for their labor and keeping a record as to their
ownership, "as a basis on which compensation could be made in proper
cases."
[Illustration: HORACE GREELEY.]
[Illustration: REV. HENRY WARD BEECHER.]
Thus events were creeping along toward a true statement of the great
problem, without which it could never be solved, when Horace Greeley,
through the columns of his _Tribune_, addressed an open letter to the
President (August 19), entitling it "The Prayer of Twenty Millions."
It exhorted Mr. Lincoln, not to general emancipation, but to such an
execution of the existing laws as would free immense numbers of slaves
belonging to men in arms against the Government. It was impassioned
and powerful; a single passage will show its character: "On the face
of this wide earth, Mr. President, there is not one disinterested,
determined, intelligent champion of the Union cause who does not feel
that all attempts to put down the rebellion, and at the same time
uphold its exciting cause, are preposterous and futile; that the
rebellion, if crushed out to-morrow, would be renewed within a year if
slavery were left in full vigor; that army officers who remain to this
day devoted to slavery can at best be but half-way loyal to the Union;
and that every hour of deference to slavery is an hour of added and
deepened peril to the Union."
Any one less a genius than Mr. Lincoln would have found it difficult
to answer Mr. Greeley at all, and his answer was not one in the sense
of being a refutation, but it exhibited his view of the question, and
is perhaps as fine a piece of literature as was ever penned by any one
in an official capacity: "If there be perceptible in it [Mr. Greeley's
letter] an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it in deference to
an old friend whose heart I have always supposed to be right.... As to
the policy I 'seem to be pursuing,' as you say, I have not meant to
leave any one in doubt.... My paramount object is to save the Union,
and not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union
without freeing any slave, I would do it; if I could save it by
freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could do it by freeing
some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. I have here
stated my purpose according to my views of official duty; and I intend
no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men
everywhere could be free."
[Illustration: JAMES G. BIRNEY.]
[Illustration: THE SALE OF A SLAVE.]
In truth, the President was already contemplating emancipation as a
war measure, and about this time he prepared his preliminary
proclamation; but he did not wish to issue it till it could follow a
triumph of the National arms. Pope's defeat in Virginia in August set
it back; but McClellan's success at Antietam, though not the decisive
victory that was wanted, appeared to be as good an opportunity as was
likely soon to present itself, and five days later (September 22,
1862) the proclamation was issued. It declared that the President
would, {187} at the next session, renew his suggestion to Congress of
pecuniary aid to the States disposed to abolish slavery gradually or
otherwise, and gave notice that on the 1st of January, 1863, he would
declare forever free all persons held as slaves within any State, or
designated part of a State, the people whereof should then be in
rebellion against the United States. On that day he issued the final
and decisive proclamation, as promised, in which he also announced
that black men would be received into the military and naval service
of the United States, as follows:
* * * * *
"Whereas, on the twenty-second day of September, in the year of our
Lord 1862, a proclamation was issued by the President of the United
States, containing, among other things, the following, to wit:
"'That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord 1863, all
persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State,
the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United
States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the
Executive Government of the United States, including the military and
naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of
such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or
any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.'
"'That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by
proclamation, designate the States and parts of States, if any, in
which the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion
against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the people
thereof, shall on that day be in good faith represented in the
Congress of the United States, by members chosen thereto at elections
wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have
participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing
testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State, and the
people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.'
"Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States,
by virtue of the power in me vested as commander-in-chief of the army
and navy of the United States in time of actual armed rebellion
against the authority and government of the United States, and as a
fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on
this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight
hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so to do,
publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred days from the
day first above mentioned, order and designate as the States and parts
of States wherein the people thereof respectively are this day in
rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit:
"Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana (except the parishes of St. Bernard,
Plaquemine, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension,
Assumption, Terre Bonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans,
including the city of New Orleans), Mississippi, Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia (except the
forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the
counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York,
Princess Anne, and Norfolk, including the cities of {189} Norfolk and
Portsmouth), and which excepted parts are, for the present, left
precisely as if this proclamation were not issued.
"And, by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order
and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated
States and parts of States are and henceforward shall be free; and
that the Executive Government of the United States, including the
military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain
the freedom of said persons.
"And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to abstain
from all violence, unless in necessary self-defence; and I recommend
to them that, in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for
reasonable wages.
"And I further declare and make known that such persons, of suitable
condition, will be received into the armed service of the United
States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and
to man vessels of all sorts in said service.
"And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice,
warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the
considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty
God.
"In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my name, and caused the
seal of the United States to be affixed.
(L.S.) "Done at the city of Washington, this first day of January, in
the year of our Lord 1863, and of the Independence of the United
States the 87th.
"By the President: ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
"WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State."
* * * * *
{188} [Illustration: THE BROKEN SHACKLES. ALLEGORICAL PICTURE, FROM AN
ORIGINAL DRAWING BY JAMES E. TAYLOR.]
The immediate effect of this action was what had been expected. The
friends of liberty, and supporters of the Administration generally,
rejoiced at it, believing that the true line of combat had been drawn
at last. Robert Dale Owen probably expressed the opinion of most of
them when he wrote, "The true and fit question is whether, without a
flagrant violation of official duty, the President had the right to
refrain from doing it." The effect in Europe is said to have been
decisive of the question whether the Confederacy should be recognized
as an established nation; but as to this there is some uncertainty. It
is certain, however, that much friendship for the Union was won in
England, where it had been withheld on account of our attitude on the
slavery question. In Manchester, December 31, a mass-meeting of
factory operatives was held, and resolutions of sympathy with the
Union, and an address to President Lincoln, were voted. The full
significance of this can only be understood when it is remembered that
these men were largely out of work for want of the cotton that the
blockade prevented the South from exporting. The Confederate journals
chose to interpret the proclamation as nothing more than an attempt to
excite a servile insurrection. The Democratic editors of the North
assailed Mr. Lincoln with every verbal weapon of which they were
masters, though these had been somewhat blunted by previous use, for
he had already been freely called a usurper, a despot, a destroyer of
the Constitution, and a keeper of Bastiles. They declared with horror
(doubtless in some cases perfectly sincere) that the proclamation had
changed the whole character of the war. And this was true, though not
in the sense in which they meant it. When begun, it was a war for a
temporary peace; the proclamation converted it into a war for a
permanent peace. But the autumn elections showed how near Mr. Lincoln
came to being ahead of his people after all; for they went largely
against the Administration, and even in the States that the Democrats
did not carry there was a falling off in the Republican majorities;
though the result was partly due to the failure of the peninsula
campaign, and the escape of Lee's army after Antietam. Yet this did
not shake the great emancipator's faith in the justice and wisdom of
what he had done. He said on New Year's evening to a knot of callers:
"The signature looks a little tremulous, for my hand was tired, but my
resolution was firm. I told them in September, if they did not return
to their allegiance and cease murdering our soldiers, I would strike
at this pillar of their strength. And now the promise shall be kept,
and not one word of it will I ever recall."
[Illustration: HARRIET BEECHER STOWE.]
[Illustration: CHARLES SUMNER.]
If we wonder at the slowness with which that great struggle arrived at
its true theme and issue, we shall do well to note that it has a close
parallel in our own history. The first battle of the Revolution was
fought in April, 1775, but the Declaration of Independence was not
made till July, 1776--a period of nearly fifteen months. The first
battle in the war of secession took place in April, 1861, and the
Emancipation Proclamation was issued in September, 1862--seventeen
{190} months. In the one case, as in the other, the interval was
filled with doubt, hesitation, and divided counsels; and Lincoln's
reluctance finds its match in Washington's confession that when he
took command of the army (after Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill
had been fought) he still abhorred the idea of independence. And
again, as the great Proclamation was preceded by the attempts of
Frémont and Hunter, so the great Declaration had been preceded by
those of Mendon, Mass., Chester, Penn., and Mecklenburg, N. C., which
anticipated its essential propositions by two or three years. A period
of fifteen or seventeen months, however slow for an individual, is
perhaps for an entire people as rapid development of a radical purpose
as we could have any reason to expect.
In the District of Columbia there were three thousand slaves at the
time the war began. In December, 1861, Henry Wilson, senator from
Massachusetts, afterward Vice-President, introduced in the Senate a
bill for the immediate emancipation of these slaves, with a provision
for paying to such owners as were loyal an average compensation of
three hundred dollars for each slave. The bill was opposed violently
by senators and representatives from Kentucky and Maryland, and by
some others, conspicuous among whom was Mr. Vallandigham.
Nevertheless, it passed both houses, and the President signed it April
16, 1862.
In Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri slavery continued until it was
abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment to the National Constitution,
which in December, 1865, was declared ratified by three-fourths of the
States, and consequently a part of the fundamental law of the land.
[Illustration: WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON AND DAUGHTER.]
[Illustration: WENDELL PHILLIPS.]
[Illustration: HENRY W. LONGFELLOW.]
[Illustration: JOHN G. WHITTIER.]
The President's right to proclaim the slaves free, as a war measure,
was questioned not only by his violent political opponents, but also
by a considerable number who were friendly to him, or at least to the
cause of the Union, but whose knowledge of international law and war
powers was limited. Among these were Congressman Crittenden and
Wickliffe, of Kentucky, who were stanch supporters of the Union, and
Mr. Wickliffe offered resolutions declaring that the President has no
right whatever to interfere with slavery even during a rebellion. The
whole subject was treated in a masterly way by the Hon. William
Whiting in his book entitled "War Powers under the Constitution of the
United States." He says: "The liberation of slaves is looked upon as a
means of embarrassing or weakening the enemy, or of strengthening the
military power of our army. If slaves be treated as contraband of war,
on the ground that they may be used by their masters to aid in
prosecuting war, as employees upon military works, {191} or as
laborers furnishing by their industry the means of carrying on
hostilities; or if they be treated as, in law, belligerents, following
the legal condition of their owners; or if they be deemed loyal
subjects having a just claim upon the Government to be released from
their obligations to give aid and service to disloyal and belligerent
masters, in order that they may be free to perform their higher duty
of allegiance and loyalty to the United States; or if they be regarded
as subjects of the United States, liable to do military duty; or if
they be made citizens of the United States, and soldiers; or if the
authority of the masters over their slaves is the means of aiding and
comforting the enemy, or of throwing impediments in the way of the
Government, or depriving it of such aid and assistance, in successful
prosecution of the war, as slaves would and could afford if released
from the control of the enemy; or if releasing the slaves would
embarrass the enemy, and make it more difficult for them to collect
and maintain large armies; in either of these cases, the taking away
of these slaves from the 'aid and service' of the enemy, and putting
them to the aid and service of the United States, is justifiable as an
act of war. The ordinary way of depriving the enemy of slaves is by
declaring emancipation."
He then cites abundant precedents and authorities from British,
French, South American, and other sources, one of the most striking of
which is this quotation from Thomas Jefferson's letter to Dr. Gordon,
complaining of the injury done to his estates by Cornwallis: "He
destroyed all my growing crops and tobacco; he burned all my barns,
containing the same articles of last year. Having first taken what
corn he wanted, he used, as was to be expected, all my stock of
cattle, sheep, and hogs for the sustenance of his army, and carried
off all the horses capable of service. He carried off also about
thirty slaves. Had this been to give them freedom, he would have done
right. From an estimate made at the time on the best information I
could collect, I suppose the State of Virginia lost, under Lord
Cornwallis's hands, that year, about thirty thousand slaves." Whiting
says in conclusion: "It has thus been proved, by the law and usage of
modern civilized nations, confirmed by the judgment of eminent
statesmen, and by the former practice of this Government, that the
President, as commander-in-chief, has the authority, as an act of war,
to liberate the slaves of the enemy; that the United States have in
former times sanctioned the liberation of slaves--even of loyal
citizens--by military commanders, in time of war, without compensation
therefor, and have deemed slaves captured in war from belligerent
subjects as entitled to their freedom."