POPE'S CAMPAIGN.
FORMATION OF THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA--HALLECK MADE
GENERAL-IN-CHIEF--McCLELLAN LEAVES THE PENINSULA--BATTLE OF CEDAR
MOUNTAIN--POPE AND LEE MANOEUVRE--BATTLE OF GROVETON--THE SECOND BULL
RUN--BATTLE OF CHANTILLY--THE PORTER DISPUTE--GENERAL GRANT'S
OPINION--COMPLICATED MOVEMENTS OF THE CAMPAIGN--INTERESTING INCIDENTS.
While McClellan was before Richmond, it was determined to consolidate
in one command the corps of Banks, Frémont, and McDowell, which were
moving about in an independent and ineffectual way between Washington
and the Shenandoah Valley. Gen. John Pope, who had won considerable
reputation by his capture of Island No. 10, was called from the West
and given command (June 26, 1862) of the new organization, which was
called the Army of Virginia. Frémont declined to serve under a
commander who had once been his subordinate, and consequently his
corps was given to General Sigel. General Pope, on taking command of
this force, which numbered all told about thirty-eight thousand men,
and also of the troops in the fortifications around Washington, had
the bad taste to issue a general order that had three capital defects:
it boasted of his own prowess at the West, it underrated his enemy,
and it contained a bit of sarcasm pointed at General McClellan, the
commander of the army with which his own was to coöperate. Pope says,
in his report, that he wrote a cordial letter to McClellan, asking for
his views as to the best plan of campaign, and offering to render him
any needed assistance; and that he received but a cold and indefinite
reply. It is likely enough that a courteous man and careful soldier
like McClellan would be in no mood to fall in with the suggestions of
a commander that entered upon his work with a gratuitous piece of
bombast, and seemed to have no conception of the serious nature of the
task. When it became evident that these two commanders could not act
sufficiently in harmony, the President called Gen. Henry W. Halleck
from the West to be General-in-Chief, with headquarters at Washington,
and command them both. Halleck had perhaps more military learning than
any other man in the country, and his patriotic intentions were
unquestionably good; but in practical warfare he proved to be little
more than a great obstructor. He had been the bane of the Western
armies, preventing them from following up their victories, and had
almost driven Grant out of the service; and from the day he took
command at Washington (July 12) the troubles in the East became more
complicated than ever.
McClellan held a strong position at Harrison's Landing, where, if he
accomplished nothing else, he was a standing menace to Richmond, so
that Lee dared not withdraw his army from its defence. He wanted to be
heavily reinforced, cross the James, and strike at Richmond's southern
communications, just as Grant actually did two years later; and he was
promised reinforcements from the troops of Burnside and Hunter, on the
coast of North and South Carolina. Lee's anxiety was to get McClellan
off from the peninsula, so that he could strike out toward Washington.
He first sent a detachment to bombard McClellan's camp from the
opposite side of the James; but McClellan crossed the river with a
sufficient force and easily swept it out of the way. Then Lee sent
Jackson to make a demonstration against Pope, holding the main body of
his army ready to follow as soon as some erratic and energetic
movements of Jackson had caused a sufficient alarm at Washington to
determine the withdrawal of McClellan. The unwitting Halleck was all
too swift to coöperate with his enemy, and had already determined upon
that withdrawal. Burnside's troops, coming up on transports, were not
even landed, but were forwarded up the Potomac and sent to Pope.
McClellan marched his army to Fort Monroe, and there embarked it by
divisions for the same destination.
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN POPE.]
Pope's intention was to push southward, strike Lee's western and
northwestern communications, and cut them off from the Shenandoah
Valley. He first ordered Banks (July 14) to push his whole cavalry
force to Gordonsville, and destroy the railroads and bridges in that
vicinity. But the cavalry commander, General Hatch, took with him
infantry, artillery, and a wagon train, and consequently did not move
at cavalry speed. Before he could get to Gordonsville, Jackson's
advance reached it, and his movement was frustrated. He was relieved
of his command, and it was given to Gen. John Buford, an able cavalry
leader.
As soon as Jackson came in contact with Pope's advance, he called upon
Lee for reinforcements, and promptly received them. On the 8th of
August he crossed the Rapidan, and moved toward Culpeper. Pope, who
had but recently taken the field in person, having remained in
Washington till July 29th, attempted to concentrate the corps of Banks
and Sigel at Culpeper. Banks arrived there promptly on the 8th; but
Sigel sent a note from Sperryville in the afternoon, asking by what
road he should march. "As there was but one road between those two
points," {164} says Pope, "and that a broad stone turnpike, I was at a
loss to understand how General Sigel could entertain any doubt as to
the road by which he should march." On the morning of the 9th Banks's
corps went out alone to meet the enemy at Cedar Mountain. Banks had
eight thousand men (Pope says he had supposed that corps numbered
fourteen thousand), and attacked an enemy twice as strong. He first
struck Jackson's right wing, and afterward furiously attacked the
left, rolled up the flank, opened a fire in the rear, and threw
Jackson's whole line into confusion. It was as if the two commanders
had changed characters, and Banks had suddenly assumed the part that,
according to the popular idea, Jackson was always supposed to play. If
Sigel had only known what road to take, that might have been the last
of Jackson. But Banks's force had become somewhat broken in its
advance through the woods, and at the same time the Confederates were
reinforced, so that Jackson was able to rally his men and check the
movement. Banks in turn was forced back a short distance, where he
took up a strong position.
Sigel's corps arrived in the evening, relieved Banks's corps, and made
immediate preparations for a renewal of the fight in the morning. The
dead were buried, the wounded carried forth, and through the night
trains were moving and everything being put in readiness, but at
daylight it was discovered that the enemy had fallen back two miles to
a new position. Partly because of the strong position held by each,
and partly because of the very hot weather, there was little further
disposition to renew the fight, and two days later Jackson fell still
further back to Gordonsville. In this action, which for the numbers
engaged was one of the fiercest and most rapid of the war, the
Confederates lost about thirteen hundred men and the National army
about eighteen hundred. "Besides which," says General Pope, "fully one
thousand men straggled back to Culpeper Court House and beyond, and
never entirely returned to their commands." On the other hand, the
cavalry under Buford and Bayard pursued the enemy and captured many
stragglers. The Confederate Gen. Charles S. Winder was struck by a
shell and killed while leading his division.
[Illustration: POPE'S BAGGAGE-TRAIN IN THE MUD.]
[Illustration: VIEW IN CULPEPER.]
Immediately after this action the cavalry resumed its former position
along the Rapidan from Raccoon Ford to the mountains. On the 14th of
August General Pope was reinforced by eight thousand men under General
Reno, whereupon he pushed his whole force forward toward the Rapidan,
and took up a position with his right on Robertson's River, his centre
on the slopes of Cedar Mountain and his left near Raccoon Ford. From
this point he sent out cavalry expeditions to destroy the enemy's
communications with Richmond, and one of these captured General
Stuart's adjutant, with a letter from Lee to General Stuart, dated
August 15th, which to a large extent revealed Lee's plans. The
incident that resulted in this important capture is thus related by
Stuart's biographer, Major H. B. McClellan: "Stuart reached
Verdiersville on the evening of the 17th, and hearing nothing from
Fitz Lee, sent his adjutant, Major Norman R. Fitz Hugh, to meet him
and ascertain his position. A body of the enemy's cavalry had,
however, started on a reconnoissance on the previous day, and in the
darkness of the night Major Fitz Hugh rode into this party and was
captured. On his person was found an autograph letter from the
commanding general to Stuart which disclosed to General Pope the
design of turning his left flank. The fact that Fitz Hugh did not
return aroused no apprehension, and Stuart and his staff imprudently
passed the night on the porch of an old house on the Plank Road. At
daybreak he was aroused by the noise of approaching horsemen, and
sending Mosby and Gibson, two of his aides, to ascertain who was
coming, he himself walked out to the front gate, bareheaded, to greet
Fitz Lee, as he supposed. The result did not justify his expectations.
In another instant pistol shots were heard, and Mosby and Gibson were
seen running back, pursued by a party of the enemy. Stuart, Von
Borcke, and Dabney had their horses inside of the inclosure of the
yard. Von Borcke gained the gate and the {165} road, and escaped
unhurt after a long and hard run. Stuart and Dabney were compelled to
leap the yard fence and take across the fields to the nearest woods.
They were pursued but a short distance. Returning to a post of
observation, Stuart saw the enemy depart in triumph with his hat and
cloak, which he had been compelled to leave on the porch where he had
slept. He bore this mortification with good nature. In a letter of
about that date he writes: 'I am greeted on all sides with
congratulations and "Where's your hat?" I intend to make the Yankees
pay for that hat.' And Pope did cancel the debt a few nights afterward
at Catlett's Station."
[Illustration: HENRY AND ROBINSON HOUSES, BULL RUN. (From photograph
taken in 1884.)]
[Illustration: CONFEDERATE DEAD LAID OUT FOR BURIAL.]
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL G. W. C. LEE. GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE,
C. S. A. COLONEL WALTER TAYLOR.]
[Illustration: JOHN LETCHER. Governor of Virginia.]
The captured despatch revealed to Pope the fact that Lee intended to
fall upon him with his entire army and crush him before he could be
reinforced from the Army of the Potomac. Pope says: "I held on to my
position, thus far to the front, for the purpose of affording all time
possible for the arrival of the Army of the Potomac at Acquia and
Alexandria, and to embarrass and delay the movements of the enemy as
far as practicable. On the 18th of August it became apparent to me
that this advanced position, with the small force under my command,
was no longer tenable in the face of the overwhelming forces of the
enemy. I determined, accordingly, to withdraw behind the Rappahannock
with all speed, and, as I had been instructed, to defend, as far as
practicable, the line of that river. I directed Major-General Reno to
send back his trains, on the morning of the 18th, by the way of
Stevensburg, to Kelly's or Burnett's Ford, and, as soon as the trains
had gotten several hours in advance, to follow them with his whole
corps, and take post behind the Rappahannock, {166} leaving all his
cavalry in the neighborhood of Raccoon Ford to cover this movement.
General Banks's corps, which had been ordered, on the 12th, to take
position at Culpeper Court House, I directed, with its trains
preceding it, to cross the Rappahannock at the point where the Orange
and Alexandria railroad crosses that river. General McDowell's train
was ordered to pursue the same route, while the train of General Sigel
was directed through Jefferson, to cross the Rappahannock at Warrenton
Sulphur Springs. So soon as these trains had been sufficiently
advanced, McDowell's corps was directed to take the route from
Culpeper to Rappahannock Ford, whilst General Sigel, who was on the
right and front, was instructed to follow the movements of his train
to Sulphur Springs. These movements were executed during the day and
night of the 18th, and the day of the 19th, by which time the whole
army, with its trains, had safely recrossed the Rappahannock and was
posted behind that stream, with its left at Kelly's Ford and its right
about three miles above Rappahannock Station." The Confederates
followed rapidly, and on the 20th confronted Pope at Kelly's Ford, but
with the river between. For two days they made strenuous efforts to
cross, but a powerful artillery fire, which was kept up continuously
for seven or eight miles along the river, made any crossing in force
impossible. Lee therefore sent Jackson to make a flank march westward
along that stream, cross it at Sulphur Springs, and come down upon
Pope's right. But when Jackson arrived at the crossing, he found a
heavy force occupying Sulphur Springs and ready to meet him. Meanwhile
Gen. James E. B. Stuart, with fifteen hundred cavalrymen, in the dark
and stormy night of August 22d, had ridden around to the rear of
Pope's position, to cut the railroad. He struck Pope's headquarters at
Catlett's Station, captured three hundred prisoners and all the
personal baggage and papers of the commander, and got back in safety.
These papers informed Lee of Pope's plans and dispositions.
Jackson, being thwarted at Sulphur Springs, moved still farther up the
south bank of the Rappahannock, crossed the headwaters, and turned
Pope's right. He passed through Thoroughfare Gap in the Bull Run
Mountains on the 26th, destroyed Bristoe Station on the Orange and
Alexandria railroad, and sent out Stuart to Manassas Junction, where
prisoners were taken and a large amount of commissary stores fell into
his hands.
Pope knew exactly the size of Jackson's force, and the direction it
had taken in its flank march; for Col. J. S. Clark, of Banks's staff,
had spent a day where he had a plain view of the enemy's moving
columns, and carefully counted the regiments and batteries. But from
this point the National commander, who had hitherto done reasonably
well, seemed suddenly to become bewildered.
He explains in his report that his force was too small to enable him
to extend his right any further without too greatly weakening his
line, and says he telegraphed the facts repeatedly to Washington,
saying that he could not extend further West without losing his
connections with Fredericksburg. He declares he was assured on the
21st, that if he could hold the line of the river two days longer he
should be heavily reinforced, but that this promise was not kept, the
only troops that were added to his army during the next four days
being seven thousand men under Generals Reynolds and Kearny.
[Illustration: THE SEAT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AUGUST AND
SEPTEMBER, 1862.]
Lee, whose grand strategy was correct, had here blundered seriously in
his manoeuvres, dividing his army so that the two parts were not
within supporting distance of each other, and the united enemy was
between. An ordinarily good general, standing in Pope's boots, would
naturally have fallen in force upon Jackson, and could have completely
destroyed or captured him. But Pope out-blundered Lee, and gave the
victory to the Confederates.
He began by sending forty thousand men under McDowell, on the 27th,
toward Thoroughfare Gap, to occupy the road by which Lee with
Longstreet's division was marching to join Jackson; and at the same
time he moved with the remainder of his army to strike Jackson at
Bristoe Station. This was a good beginning, but was immediately ruined
by his own lack of steadiness. The advance guard had an engagement at
that place {167} with Jackson's rear guard, while his main body
retired to Manassas Junction. Pope became elated at the prospect of a
great success, and ordered a retrograde movement by McDowell, telling
him to march eastward on the 28th, adding: "If you will march promptly
and rapidly at the earliest dawn upon Manassas Junction, we shall bag
the whole crowd." McDowell obeyed, the way was thus left open for
Jackson to move out to meet his friends, and Jackson promptly took
advantage of the opportunity and planted himself on the high land
around Groveton, near the battlefield of Bull Run. Here King's
division of McDowell's corps came suddenly in contact with the enemy,
and a sharp fight, with severe loss on either side, ensued. Among the
Confederate wounded was Gen. Richard S. Ewell, one of their best
commanders, who lost a leg. In the night, King's men fell back to
Manassas; and Ricketts's division, which McDowell had left to delay
Longstreet when he should attempt to pass through Thoroughfare Gap,
was also retired.
All apprehensions on the part of the lucky Jackson were now at an end.
His enemies had removed every obstruction, and he was in possession of
the Warrenton Turnpike, the road by which Longstreet was to join him.
The cut of an abandoned railroad formed a strong, ready-made
intrenchment, and along this he placed his troops, his right flank
being on the turnpike and his left at Sudley Mill.
[Illustration: DAM ACROSS BULL RUN, NEAR BLACKBURN'S FORD.]
[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL HERMANN HAUPT.]
[Illustration: BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. GORDON.]
[Illustration: BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL GEO. W. GILL.]
General Pope says of his forces at this time: "From the 18th of August
until the morning of the 27th the troops under my command had been
continuously marching and fighting night and day, and during the whole
of that time there was scarcely an interval of an hour without the
roar of artillery. The men had had little sleep, were greatly worn
down with fatigue, had had little time to get proper food or to eat
it, had been engaged in constant battles and skirmishes, and had
performed services laborious, dangerous, and excessive beyond any
previous experience in this country. As was to be expected under such
circumstances, the numbers of the army under my command have been
greatly reduced by deaths, by wounds, by sickness, and by fatigue, so
that on the morning of the 27th of August I estimated my whole
effective force (and I {168} think the estimate was large) as follows:
Sigel's corps, nine thousand men; Banks's corps, five thousand men;
McDowell's corps, including Reynolds's division, fifteen thousand five
hundred men; Reno's corps, seven thousand men; the corps of
Heintzelman and Porter (the freshest by far in that army), about
eighteen thousand men--making in all fifty-four thousand five hundred
men. Our cavalry numbered on paper about four thousand men; but their
horses were completely broken down, and there were not five hundred
men, all told, capable of doing such service as should be expected
from cavalry. The corps of Heintzelman had reached Warrenton Junction,
but it was without wagons, without artillery, with only forty rounds
of ammunition to the man, and without even horses for the general and
field officers. The corps of Porter had also reached Warrenton
Junction with a very small supply of provisions, and but forty rounds
of ammunition for each man."
Longstreet reached the field in the forenoon of the 29th, and took
position at Jackson's right, on the other side of the turnpike,
covering also the Manassas Gap railroad. He was confronted by Fitz
John Porter's corps. McDowell says he ordered Porter to move out and
attack Longstreet; Porter says he ordered him simply to hold the
ground where he was. At three o'clock in the afternoon Pope ordered
Hooker to attack Jackson directly in front. Hooker, who was never
loath to fight where there was a prospect of success, remonstrated;
but Pope insisted, and the attack was made. Hooker's men charged with
the bayonet, had a terrific hand-to-hand fight in the cut, and
actually ruptured Jackson's seemingly impregnable line; but
reinforcements were brought up, and the assailants were at length
driven back. Kearny's division was sent to support Hooker, but too
late, and it also was repelled. An hour or two later, Pope, who did
not know that Longstreet had arrived on the field, sent orders to Fitz
John Porter to attack Jackson's right, supposing that was the right of
the whole Confederate line. There is a dispute as to the hour at which
this order reached Porter. But it was impossible for him to obey it,
since he could not move upon Jackson's flank without exposing his own
flank to Longstreet. About six o'clock, when he imagined Porter's
attack must have begun, Pope ordered another attack on the Confederate
left. It was gallantly made, and in the first rush was successful.
Jackson's extreme left was doubled up and broken by Kearny's men, who
seized the cut and held it for a time. At this point a Confederate
regiment that had exhausted its ammunition fought with stones. There
were plenty of fragments of rock at hand, and several men were killed
by them. Again the Confederates, undisturbed on their right, hurried
across reinforcements to their imperilled left; and Kearny's division,
too small to hold what it had gained, was driven back. This day's
action is properly called the battle of Groveton.
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL FRANZ SIGEL.]
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL FITZ JOHN PORTER.]
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL PHILIP KEARNY.]
Pope's forces had been considerably cut up and scattered, but he got
them together that night, re-formed his lines, and prepared to renew
the attack the next day. Lee at the same time drew back his left
somewhat, advanced and strengthened his right, and prepared to take
the offensive. Each intended to attack the other's left flank.
When Pope moved out the next day (August 30th) to strike Lee's left,
and found it withdrawn, he imagined that the enemy was in retreat, and
immediately ordered McDowell to follow it up and "press the enemy
vigorously the whole day." Porter's corps--the advance of McDowell's
force--had no sooner begun this movement than it struck the foe in a
strong position, and was subjected to a heavy artillery fire. Then a
cloud of dust was seen to the south, and it was evident that Lee was
pushing a force around on the flank. McDowell sent Reynolds to meet
and check it. Porter then attempted to obey his orders. He advanced
against Jackson's right in charge after charge, but was met by a fire
that repelled him every time with bloody loss. Moreover, Longstreet
found an eminence that commanded a part of his line, promptly took
advantage of it by placing a battery there, and threw in an enfilading
fire. It was impossible for anything to withstand this, and Porter's
corps in a few minutes fell back defeated. The whole Confederate line
was {169} advanced, and an attempt was made, by still further
extending their right, to cut off retreat; but key-points were firmly
held by Warren's brigade and the brigades of Meade and Seymour, and
the army was withdrawn in order from the field whence it had retired
so precipitously a year before. After dark it crossed the stone bridge
over Bull Run, and encamped on the heights around Centreville.
The corps of Sumner and Franklin here joined Pope, and the whole army
fell back still further, taking a position around Fairfax Court House
and Germantown. Lee meanwhile ordered Jackson to make another of the
flank marches that he was so fond of, with a view of striking Pope's
right and perhaps interrupting his communication with Washington. It
was the evening of September 1st when he fell heavily upon Pope's
flank. He was stoutly resisted, and finally repelled by the commands
of Hooker and Reno, and a part of those of McDowell and Kearny.
General Stevens, of Reno's corps, was killed, and his men, having used
up their ammunition, fell back. General Kearny sent Birney's brigade
into the gap, and brought up a battery. He then rode forward to
reconnoitre, came suddenly upon a squad of Confederates, and in
attempting to ride away was shot dead. Kearny was one of the most
experienced and efficient soldiers in the service. He had lost an arm
in the Mexican war, was with Napoleon III. at Solferino and Magenta,
and had just passed through the peninsula campaign with McClellan.
[Illustration: MILL AND HOTEL AT SUDLEY SPRINGS.]
[Illustration: MAP OF SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN, SHOWING IMPORTANT
POSITIONS OCCUPIED FROM AUGUST 27th TO SEPTEMBER 1st.]
Lee made no further attempt upon Pope's army, and on September 2d, by
Halleck's orders, it was withdrawn to the fortifications of
Washington, where it was merged in the Army of the Potomac. In this
campaign, both the numbers engaged on either side and the respective
losses are in dispute, and the exact truth never will be known. Lee
claimed that he had captured nine thousand prisoners and thirty guns,
and it is probable that Pope's total loss numbered at least fifteen
thousand. Pope maintained that he would have won the battle of
Groveton and made a successful campaign if General Porter had obeyed
his orders. Porter, for this supposed disobedience, was
court-martialed in January, 1863, and was condemned and dismissed from
the service, and forever disqualified from holding any office of
trust or profit under the Government of the United States. Thousands
of pages have been written and printed to prove or {170} disprove
his innocence, and the evidence has been reviewed again and again.
It appears to be established at last that he did not disobey
any order that it was possible for him to obey, and that he was
blameless--except, perhaps, in having exhibited a spirit of personal
hostility to General Pope, who was then his superior officer. A bill
to relieve him of the penalty was passed by the Forty-sixth Congress,
but was vetoed by President Arthur. Substantially the same bill was
passed in 1886 and was signed by President Cleveland. It restored him
to his place as colonel in the regular army, and retired him with that
rank, but with no compensation for the intervening years.
[Illustration: SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN. (From a war-time sketch.)]
General Grant, reviewing the case in 1882, came to the conclusion that
Porter was innocent, and gave his reasons for it in a magazine
article, significantly remarking that "if he was guilty, the
punishment awarded was not commensurate with the offence committed."
But some other military authorities still believe that his sentence
was just. Grant seems to make the question perfectly clear by drawing
two simple diagrams. This, he says, is what Pope supposed to be the
position of the armies when he ordered Porter to attack:
JACKSON
================
===================== ================
PORTER POPE
But this is what the situation really was:
LONGSTREET JACKSON
===================== ================
===================== ================
PORTER POPE
The movements of this campaign were more complicated than those of any
other during the war, and it appears to have been {171} carried on
with less of definite plan and connected purpose on either side. It is
not probable that its merits, if it had any merits, will ever be
satisfactorily agreed upon. On the part of Pope's army, whether by his
fault or not, it was a disastrous failure. On the part of Lee's, while
it resulted in tactical successes, it did not seriously menace the
safety of Washington, and it led him on to his first great failure in
an attempted invasion of the North. It is only fair to give General
Pope's last word on the subject, which we quote from his article in
"Battles and Leaders of the Civil War." "At no time could I have hoped
to fight a successful battle with the superior forces of the enemy
which confronted me, and which were able at any time to out-flank and
bear my small army to the dust. It was only by constant movement,
incessant watchfulness, and hazardous skirmishes and battles, that the
forces under my command were saved from destruction, and that the
enemy was embarrassed and delayed in his advance until the army of
General McClellan was at length assembled for the defence of
Washington. I did hope that in the course of these operations the
enemy might commit some imprudence, or leave some opening of which I
could take such advantage as to gain at least a partial success. This
opportunity was presented by the advance of Jackson on Manassas
Junction; but although the best dispositions possible in my view were
made, the object was frustrated by causes which could not have been
foreseen, and which perhaps are not yet completely known to the
country."
[Illustration: RUINS OF THE STONE BRIDGE ON THE WARRENTON TURNPIKE.
(From a War Department photograph.)]
From Capt. Henry N. Blake, of the Eleventh Massachusetts regiment, we
have these interesting incidents of the campaign:
"Matches were very scarce upon this campaign, and a private who
intended to light one gave public notice to the crowd, who surrounded
him with slips of paper and pipes in their hands. Some soldiers were
in a destitute condition, and suffered from blistered feet, as they
had no shoes, and others required a pair of pants or a blouse; but all
gladly pursued Jackson, and his capture {172} was considered a certain
event. The column cheered General Pope when he rode along, accompanied
by a vast body-guard, and he responded: 'I am glad to see you in such
good spirits to-day.' ... The stream was forded, and the graves and
bones of the dead, the rusty fragments of iron, and the weather-beaten
_débris_ of that contest reminded the men that they were again in the
midst of the familiar scenes of the first battle of Bull Run. The
cannonading was brisk at intervals during the day. Large tracts of the
field were black and smoking from the effect of the burning grass
which the shells ignited, and a small force was occasionally engaged
upon the right, but there was no general conflict. The brigade took
the position assigned to it, upon a slope of a hill, to support a
battery which was attached to Sigel's corps, and no infantry was
visible in any direction, although the land was open and objects
within the distance of half a mile were readily seen. There was no
firing, with the exception of the time when the troops debouched from
the road in the morning, and the soldiers rested until four P.M. At
this moment the enemy opened with solid shot upon the battery, which
did not discharge one piece in response. The drivers mounted their
horses; all rushed pell-mell through the ranks of the fearless and
enraged support, and did not halt within the range of the artillery
from which they had so cowardly fled. A member of the staff, dressed
like an officer of the day, immediately arrived and gave a verbal
order to the brigade commander, after which the regiments were formed
and marched, unmindful of the cannon-balls, toward the right of the
line, and halted in the border of a thick forest in which many
skirmishes had taken place. 'What does the general want me to do now?'
General Grover asked the aide who again rode up to the brigade. 'Go
into the woods and charge,' was the answer. 'Where is my support?' the
commander wisely inquired, for there were no troops near the position.
'It is coming.' After waiting fifteen minutes for this body to appear,
the officer returned and said that 'the general was much displeased'
because the charge had not been made, and the order was at once
issued: 'Fix bayonets.' Each man was inspired by these magical words;
great enthusiasm arose when this command was 'passed' from company to
company, and the soldiers, led by their brave general, advanced upon a
hidden foe through tangled woods which constantly interfered with the
formation of the ranks. 'Colonel, do you know what we are going to
charge on?' a private inquired. 'Yes; a good dinner.' The rebel
skirmishers were driven in upon their reserve behind the bank of an
unfinished railroad, and detachments from {173} five brigades were
massed in three lines, under the command of Ewell, to resist the onset
of the inferior force that menaced them. The awful volleys did not
impede the storming party that pressed on over the bodies of the dead
and dying; while the thousands of bullets which flew through the air
seemed to create a breeze that made the leaves upon the trees rustle,
and a shower of small boughs and twigs fell upon the ground. The balls
penetrated the barrels and shattered the stocks of many muskets; but
the soldiers who carried them picked up those that had been dropped
upon the ground by helpless comrades, and allowed no slight accident
of this character to interrupt them in the noble work. The railroad
bank was gained, and the column with cheers passed over it, and
advanced over the groups of the slain and mangled rebels who had
rolled down the declivity when they lost their strength. The second
line was broken; both were scattered through the woods, and victory
appeared to be certain until the last support, that had rested upon
their breasts on the ground, suddenly rose up and delivered a
destructive volley which forced the brigade, that had already lost
more than one-third of its number in killed and wounded, to retreat.
Ewell, suffering from his shattered knee, was borne to the rear in a
blanket, and his leg was amputated. The horse of General Grover was
shot upon the railroad bank while he was encouraging the men to go
forward, and he had barely time to dismount before the animal, mad
with pain, dashed into the ranks of the enemy. The woods always
concealed the movements of the troops, and at one point a portion of
the foe fell back while the others remained. The forces sometimes met
face to face, and the bayonet and sword--weapons that do not pierce
soldiers in nine-tenths of the battles that are fought--were used with
deadly effect in several instances. A corporal exclaimed in the din of
this combat, 'Dish ish no place for de mens,' and fled to the rear
with the speed of the mythical Flying Dutchman. In one company of the
regiment a son was killed by the side of his father, who continued to
perform his duty with the firmness of a stoic, and remarked to his
amazed comrades, in a tone which showed how a strong patriotic ardor
can triumph over the deepest emotion of affection: 'I had rather see
him shot dead as he was than see him run away.' ... The victors
rallied the fugitives after this repulse, and their superior force
enabled them to assault in front and upon both flanks the line which
had been contracted by the severe losses in the charge, and the
brigade fell back to the first position under a fire of grape and
canister which was added to the musketry. The regimental flag was torn
from the staff by unfriendly limbs in passing through the forest, and
the eagle that surmounted it was cut off in the contest. The commander
of the color-company saved these precious emblems, and earnestly
shouted, when the lines were re-formed: 'Eleventh, rally round the
pole!' which was then, if possible, more honored than when it was
bedecked in folds of bunting. General Grover, who displayed the
gallantry throughout this action that he had exhibited upon the
peninsula, waved his hat upon the point of his sword to animate his
brigade and prepare for a renewal of the fight. Many were scarcely
able to speak on account of hoarseness caused by intense cheering, and
some officers blistered the palms of their hands by waving swords when
they charged with their commands."
[Illustration: GATHERING UP DÉBRIS OF POPE'S RETREAT AFTER THE SECOND
BATTLE OF BULL RUN. (From a War Department photograph.)]
[Illustration: GENERAL HANCOCK AND FRIENDS. (From a war-time
photograph.)]
{174} [Illustration: HARPER'S FERRY IN POSSESSION OF THE CONFEDERATE
FORCES.]
{175}