CHAPTER VII.

EFFECTS OF THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

PARALYSIS OF THE UNION CAUSE--FORTIFYING THE APPROACHES TO THE

CAPITAL--WHY THE CONFEDERATES DID NOT ATTEMPT THE CAPTURE OF

WASHINGTON--EFFECT OF UNION DEFEAT IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE--SLIDELL AND

MASON--CAPTURE OF THE "TRENT"--HENRY WARD BEECHER IN ENGLAND--SYMPATHY

OF THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT FOR THE NORTH.

The battle of Bull Run was undertaken with precipitation, fought with

much valor on both sides, and terminated with present ruin to the

Federal cause. For the moment the Union seemed to stagger under the

blow. On the Confederate side there was corresponding exultation; a

spirit of defiance flamed up throughout the South.

It is in the nature of things that the initial battle of a war

consolidates and crystallizes the sentiments of both the contestants.

After Bull Run there was no further hope of peaceable adjustment, but

only an increasing and settled purpose to fight out with the sword the

great issue which was dividing the Union. For a brief season after the

battle there was a paralysis of the Union cause. It was as much as the

authorities at Washington could do to make themselves secure against

further disaster. Indeed, the Potomac River now gave positive comfort

to the Government, since it furnished in some measure a natural

barrier to the northward progress of the exultant Confederates.

Immediate steps were taken to fortify the approaches to the capital;

but while this work was in progress the Government seemed to stand,

like an alarmed sentry, on the Long Bridge of the Potomac.

[Illustration: EXAMINING PASSES AT THE GEORGETOWN FERRY.]

[Illustration: FORT IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON.]

In the South as well as in the North there was much surprise that the

Confederates did not pursue the routed Union forces at the battle of

Bull Run and capture Washington. Perhaps Gen. Joseph E. Johnston is

the best witness on this subject on the Southern side. He says: "All

the military conditions, we knew, forbade an attempt on Washington.

The Confederate army was more disorganized by victory than that of the

United States by defeat. The Southern volunteers believed that the

objects of the war had been accomplished by their victory, and that

they had achieved all their country required of them. Many, therefore,

in ignorance of their military obligations, left the army--not to

return.... Exaggerated ideas of the victory, prevailing among our

troops, cost us more than the Federal army lost by defeat." In writing

this passage General Johnston probably took no account of the effect

produced in Europe. The early narratives sent there, in which the

panic of retreat was made the principal figure, gave the impression

that the result arose from constitutional cowardice in Northern men

and invincible courage in Southerners. They also gave the impression

that the Confederates were altogether superior in generalship; and the

effect was deep and long-enduring. The most notable of these was by a

correspondent of the London _Times_, who had apparently been sent

across the Atlantic for the express purpose of writing down the

Republic, writing up the South, and enlisting the sympathies of

Englishmen for the rebellion. In his second letter from Charleston

(April 30, 1861) he had written that men of all classes in South

Carolina declared to him: "If we could only get one of the royal race

of England to rule over us, we should be content." "The New Englander

must have something to persecute; and as he has hunted down all his

Indians, burnt all his witches, persecuted all his opponents to the

death, he invented abolitionism {63} as the sole resource left to him

for the gratification of his favorite passion. Next to this motive

principle is his desire to make money dishonestly, trickily, meanly,

and shabbily. He has acted on it in all his relations with the South,

and has cheated and plundered her in all his dealings, by villanous

tariffs." Many an Englishman, counting his worthless Confederate

bonds, and trying to hope that he will yet receive something for them,

knows he would never have made that investment but for such writing as

this, and the accounts from the same pen of the battle of Bull Run.

At the North the spectacle of McDowell's army streaming back in

disorder to the national capital produced first a shock of surprise,

then a sense of disgrace, and then a calm determination to begin the

war over again. It was well expressed by a Methodist minister at a

camp-meeting in Illinois, the Rev. Henry Cox. The news of the battle

came while he was preaching, and he closed his sermon with the words:

"Brethren, we'd better adjourn this camp-meeting and go home and

drill."

The effect of this over-discussed battle upon the more confident and

boastful of the Southerners was perhaps fairly expressed by an

editorial utterance of one of their journals, the Louisville, Ky.,

_Courier_: "As our Norman kinsmen in England, always a minority, have

ruled their Saxon countrymen in political vassalage up to the present

day, so have we, the 'slave oligarchs,' governed the Yankees till

within a twelvemonth. We framed the Constitution, for seventy years

moulded the policy of the government, and placed our own men, or

'Northern men with Southern principles,' in power. On the 6th of

November, 1860, the Puritans emancipated themselves, and are now in

violent insurrection against their former owners. This insane holiday

freak will not last long, however; for, dastards in fight and

incapable of self-government, they will inevitably again fall under

the control of a superior race. A few more Bull Run thrashings will

bring them once more under the yoke, as docile as the most loyal of

our Ethiopian chattels."

[Illustration: THE "SAN JACINTO" STOPPING THE "TRENT."]

{64} [Illustration: FORTIFICATION IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON.]

France and England had made all haste to recognize the Confederates as

belligerents, but had not granted them recognition as an established

nation, and never did. There was a constant fear, however, that they

would; and the Confederate Government did its utmost to bring about

such recognition. Messrs. James M. Mason, of Virginia, and John

Slidell, of Louisiana, were sent out by that Government, as duly

accredited ministers to London and Paris, in 1861. They escaped the

blockaders at Charleston, reached Havana, and there embarked on the

British mail steamer _Trent_ for Europe. But Capt. Charles Wilkes (who

had commanded the celebrated exploring expedition in Antarctic waters

twenty years before) was on the watch for them with the United States

steam frigate _San Jacinto_, overhauled the _Trent_ in the Bahama

Channel (November 8), took off the Confederate commissioners, and

allowed the steamer to proceed on her way. He carried his prisoners to

Boston, and they were incarcerated in Fort Warren. This action, for

which Wilkes {65} received the thanks of Congress, was denounced as an

outrage on British neutrality. The entire British public bristled up

as one lion, and their Government demanded an apology and the

liberation of the prisoners. The American public was unable to see any

way out of the dilemma, and was considering whether it would choose

humiliation or a foreign war, when our Secretary of State, William H.

Seward, solved the problem in a masterly manner. In his formal reply

he discussed the whole question with great ability, showing that such

detention of a vessel was justified by the laws of war, and there were

innumerable British precedents for it; that Captain Wilkes conducted

the search in a proper manner; that the commissioners were contraband

of war; and that the commander of the _Trent_ knew they were

contraband of war when he took them as passengers. But as Wilkes had

failed to complete the transaction in a legal manner by bringing the

_Trent_ into port for adjudication in a prize court, it must be

repudiated. In other words, by his consideration for the interests and

convenience of innocent persons, he had lost his prize. In summing up,

Mr. Seward said: "If I declare this case in favor of my own

Government, I must disavow its most cherished principles, and reverse

and forever abandon its most essential policy.... We are asked to do

to the British nation just what we have always insisted all nations

ought to do to us." The commissioners were released, and sailed for

England in January; but the purpose of their mission had been

practically thwarted. This was a remarkable instance of eating one's

cake and keeping it at the same time.

[Illustration: CHARLES A. DANA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR.]

[Illustration: JAMES MURRAY MASON.]

[Illustration: CAPTAIN CHARLES WILKES. (Afterward Rear-Admiral.)]

[Illustration: JOHN SLIDELL.]

But though danger of intervention was thus for the time averted, and

the relations between the British Government and our own remained

nominally friendly, so far as moral influence and bitterness of

feeling could go the Republic had no more determined enemies in the

cotton States than in the heart of England. The aristocratic classes

rejoiced at anything that threatened to destroy democratic government

or make its stability doubtful. They confidently expected to see our

country fall into a state of anarchy like that experienced so often by

the Spanish-American republics, and were willing to do everything they

safely could do to bring it about. The foremost English journals had

been predicting such a disaster ever since the beginning of the

century, had announced it as in progress when a British force burned

Washington in 1814, and now were surer of it than ever. Almost our

only friends of the London press were the _Daily News_ and _Weekly

Spectator_. The commercial classes, in a country that had fought so

many commercial wars, were of course delighted at the crippling of a

commercial rival whom they had so long hated and feared, no matter

what it might cost in the shedding of blood and the destruction of

social order. Among the working classes, though they suffered heavily

when the supply of cotton was diminished, we had many firm and devoted

friends, who saw and felt, however imperfectly, that the cause of free

labor was their own cause, no matter on which side of the Atlantic the

battlefield might lie.

To those who had for years endured the taunts of Englishmen who

pointed to American slavery and its tolerance in the American

Constitution, while they boasted that no slave could breathe on

British soil, it was a strange sight, when our country was at war over

the question, to see almost everything that had power {66} and

influence in England arrayed on the side of the slaveholders. A few

famous Englishmen--notably John Bright and Goldwin Smith--were true to

the cause of liberty, and did much to instruct the laboring classes as

to the real nature and significance of the conflict. Henry Ward

Beecher, then at the height of his powers, went to England and

addressed large audiences, enlightening them as to the real nature of

American affairs, concerning which most of them were grossly ignorant,

and produced an effect that was probably never surpassed by any

orator. The Canadians, with the usual narrowness of provincials, blind

to their own ultimate interests, were in the main more bitterly

hostile than the mother country.

Louis Napoleon, then the despotic ruler of France, was unfriendly to

the United States, and did his utmost to persuade the English

Government to unite with him in a scheme of intervention that would

probably have secured the division of the country. How far his plans

went beyond that result, can only be conjectured; but while the war

was still in progress (1864) he threw a French force into Mexico, and

established there an ephemeral empire with an Austrian archduke at its

head. That the possession of Mexico alone was not his object, is

suggested by the fact that, when the rebellion was subdued and the

secession cause extinct, he withdrew his troops from Mexico and left

the archduke to the fate of other filibusters.

The Russian Government was friendly to the United States throughout

the struggle. The imperial manifesto for the abolition of serfdom in

Russia was issued on March 3, 1861, the day before President Lincoln

was inaugurated, and this perhaps created a special bond of sympathy.

[Illustration: FORT MONROE.]

[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL BENJAMIN F. BUTLER.]

[Illustration: COMMODORE S. H. STRINGHAM. (Afterward Rear-Admiral.)]

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