SAUMAREZ

1757-1836

"These were honourable among the thirty," says the ancient Hebrew

chronicler, "yet they attained not unto the first three." Since that

far-away day, when the three mighty men broke through the host of the

Philistines that they might bring their chieftain water from the well of

Bethlehem, to how many fighters, land and sea, have these words been

applicable!--men valiant in deed, wise in council, patient in endurance,

yet lacking that divine somewhat which, for want of a better name, we

call genius. Of such an one now, and, in contrasted sequence, of another

of his peers, we are about to give an account; men who in their

respective careers illustrated more conspicuously, the one the

distinctively military, the other the more purely nautical, aspects, in

the due blending of which the excellence of the profession is realized;

foremost, both, among the ocean warriors whose pennants flew through the

wild scenes where England's flag was called to brave the battle and the

breeze,

"Till danger's troubled night depart,

And the star of peace return."

James Saumarez was born on the 11th of March, 1757, in Guernsey, one of

the Channel group of islands that still remain attached to the English

crown,--the sole remaining fragment of the Norman duchy to which the

kingdom itself was for a while but an appendage. In Saumarez's

childhood, French was still so generally spoken there that, despite the

very early age at which he went to sea, he always retained a perfect

mastery of that language; and it is recorded that one of his uncles,

being intended for the sea service, was sent to school in England when

ten years old, in order to acquire the use of English. From such a

stock, whose lineage among the gentry of the island can be traced to the

fourteenth century, sprang three distinguished officers of this name,

destined to illustrate the British flag by their deeds in several wars,

in which their chief opponent was the French navy. Among these, the

subject of this article attained the most brilliant renown. Eighteen

months older than Nelson, not even Nelson saw more or harder fighting

than did James Saumarez, nor bore himself more nobly throughout their

day and generation.

Having early shown a taste for the navy, his father, who had six sons

and a restricted income, obtained of a naval captain to have his name

borne on the books of a ship of war at the early age of ten; a curious

custom of that day allowing such constructive service to be counted in

the time prescribed for attaining a lieutenant's commission. The boy did

not actually go afloat until 1770, when a little over thirteen. This

first employment kept him from home continuously for five years, a

period spent wholly in the Mediterranean, and for the most part in the

Levant; the active naval war then existing between Turkey and Russia, in

the waters of Asia Minor, necessitating a special protection to British

interests. It is a singular circumstance that this sea, esteemed so

important to Great Britain, was never again visited by him, with the

exception of the few brief months from May to October, 1798, when, as

second in command, he followed Nelson's flag during the pursuit of

Bonaparte's fleet which ended in its destruction at the Battle of the

Nile.

Returning to England in 1775, his actual and constructive service

permitted Saumarez to appear for examination for a lieutenancy. This he

passed, but was not at once promoted. The troubles with the American

colonies had now become open hostilities, and he was appointed, as

master's mate or passed midshipman, to the _Bristol_ of fifty guns,

selected as flag-ship for the expedition against Charleston. This duty,

which, by bringing him immediately under the eyes of the naval

commander-in-chief, placed him also on the highway to advancement, he

owed to Admiral Keppel, then one of the leading flag officers of the

British navy. His uncle, Philip Saumarez, and Keppel had shared the

perils and sufferings of Anson's well-known expedition to the South Seas

in 1740. Together they had buffeted the wild weather off Cape Horn, with

ships' companies more than decimated by scurvy; together they had spread

terror among the Spanish colonies of the Pacific; together they had

captured the great galleon off Manila; and Keppel still retained an

affectionate interest in the kinsman of his old shipmate, who had long

since fallen gloriously on the deck of his ship, in close action with a

French vessel of far superior force.

The squadron, which was commanded by Commodore Sir Peter Parker,

assembled at Cork, whence it sailed in January, 1776. Embarked on board

the _Bristol_ was Lord Cornwallis, afterwards so closely, and for

himself disastrously, associated with the course of the American

Revolution. Struck by Saumarez's activity and efficiency, he offered him

a commission in his own regiment, with the position of aide-de-camp to

himself. The young seaman, having a naturally strong military bent,

which at that moment seemed more likely to receive satisfaction on shore

than at sea, and swayed doubtless also by the prospect of a powerful

patron, in the days when patronage had so much to do with men's careers,

was on the point of accepting; but his messmates chaffed him so

mercilessly upon adopting a profession which habitually supplied them

with derisive illustrations and comparisons, that he finally declined.

Many years later, when Saumarez was among the senior captains of the

navy, the two gentlemen met as guests at the table of the head of the

Admiralty, who upon hearing the incident from Cornwallis remarked that

he would have deprived the navy of one of its best officers.

Owing partly to delays inseparable from sailing vessels, and partly to

the dilatoriness with which war was most often waged before the days of

the French Revolution, the British expedition did not appear off

Charleston until the beginning of June, 1776. To Americans who know

their own history, the stirring story of Fort Moultrie and its repulse

of the British fleet has been familiar from childhood. Few are the

American boys to whom the names of Jasper, of Marion, and of their brave

commander, Moultrie himself, are unknown. But while all honor is due to

the band of raw provincials who at this critical moment--one week before

the Declaration of Independence was signed--withstood the enemy, and for

the moment saved the province, the steady, obstinate valor shown by the

seamen of kindred race, who contended with them, was no less brilliant,

and was even more severely tested. The loss of the fort was thirty-seven

killed and wounded; that of the _Bristol_ alone was one hundred and

eleven out of a crew of three hundred and fifty; and during much of the

action, which lasted thirteen hours, she was powerless to return the

raking fire of the enemy, in consequence of shot severing the ropes that

kept her broadside in position. Saumarez was here for the first time

engaged, and had two narrow escapes. Once, when pointing a gun, a

cannon-ball entering the port swept away seven of the eight men who

served the piece; and somewhat later another ball struck off the head of

a messmate by whom he was standing, covering him with blood.

In this, his maiden action, Saumarez gave full proof of the steady

courage which ever distinguished him; and it is worthy of passing remark

that, in the doggedness of the fighting and the severity of the

slaughter, the battle was typical of a great part of his after

experience. Several death vacancies resulting among the officers, he was

promoted to be lieutenant a fortnight later; and when the _Bristol_ went

north he was again actively engaged in the operations on Long Island,

and along the East and Hudson rivers, up to the evacuation of New York

by the Americans. His conspicuous activity at length obtained for him

the command of a galley, with which he was sent to Rhode Island in

February, 1778. The judgment of the illustrious Rodney, as well as the

repeated efforts of the Americans to regain control of Narragansett Bay,

may be cited against the opinion expressed by Bancroft, that the seizure

of this important naval centre by the British was a mistake. The tenure

of the island, however, depended upon the control of the surrounding

waters, and upon the active destruction of the American means of

transport. Saumarez's galley was one of the force stationed in the

eastern, or Seakonnet, passage; and in the five months thus employed it

is recorded that he was forty-seven times under fire.

Sullivan was at this time preparing for his attack upon the British

lines, expecting co-operation by the French fleet. This arrived on the

29th of July, and six days later Seakonnet Channel was entered by a

detachment superior in force to the British there. The latter burned

their ships and retreated to Rhode Island, where the officers and

seamen, Saumarez among them, continued actively engaged in the defence

of the works. On August 8th, the main French fleet, under the Count

d'Estaing, ran the batteries of the principal channel, and anchored off

the north end of the island, seriously increasing the perils of the

defenders; but next day the appearance of Lord Howe with an inferior

squadron lured the French admiral out of the bay, his vessels were

crippled by a storm, and he abandoned the coast. Sullivan, deprived of

an essential factor in his scheme, had then to fall back; and the

British captains, with their crews, being no longer needed, returned to

England to seek other ships.

Both by fortune and by choice, Saumarez's lot throughout life was thrown

with the line-of-battle force of the navy, that body of heavy fighting

ships which constitute the true backbone of a sea service, because their

essential function is to fight, not singly, but in masses, co-operating

with others like themselves. In that respect they correspond to the

solid masses of infantry, which, however disposed tactically, form the

strength of armies. The aptitudes of brilliant officers differ. Some are

born frigate-captains, partisan warriors, ever actively on the wing, and

rejoicing in the comparative freedom and independence of their

movements, like the cavalry raider and outpost officer. Of this type was

Pellew, Lord Exmouth, a seaman inbred, if ever there was one, who in

this sphere won the renown most distinctively associated with his name,

while giving proof throughout a long career of high professional

capacity in many directions. But while Saumarez, in his turn, was

occasionally employed in frigate and light cruiser service, and always

with great credit, his heart was with the ship-of-the-line, whose high

organization, steady discipline, and decisive influence upon the issues

of war appealed to a temperament naturally calm, methodical, and

enduring. "He always preferred the command of a ship-of-the-line to a

frigate," says his biographer, who knew him well,--"notwithstanding the

chances of prize-money are in favor of the latter;" and he himself

confirmed the statement, not only by casual utterance,--"My station as

repeating frigate is certainly more desirable than a less conspicuous

one, at the same time I would rather command a seventy-four,"--but by

repeated formal applications. In variety and interest of operations, as

well as in prize-money, did a cruising frigate have advantages; for much

of the time of ships-of-the-line passed necessarily in methodical

routine and combined movements, unfavorable to individual initiative.

Nevertheless, their functions are more important and more military in

character. In accordance with this preference Saumarez is found, whether

by his own asking or not, serving the remaining three years of his

lieutenant's time upon vessels of that class; and in one of them he

passed through his next general action, a scene of carnage little

inferior to the Charleston fight, illustrated by the most dogged courage

on the part of the combatants, but also, it must be said, unrelieved by

any display of that skill which distinguishes scientific warfare from

aimless butchery. This, however, was not Saumarez's fault.

Towards the end of 1780, Great Britain, having already France, Spain,

and America upon her hands, found herself also confronted by a league

between the Baltic states to enforce by arms certain neutral claims

which she contested. To this league, called the Armed Neutrality,

Holland acceded, whereupon England at once declared war. Both nations

had extensive commercial interests in the Baltic, and it was in

protecting vessels engaged in this trade, by a large body of ships of

war, that the only general action between the two navies occurred. This

was on the 5th of August, 1781, in the North Sea, off the Dogger-Bank,

from which it has taken its name.

At the time of meeting, the British, numbering six ships-of-the-line,

were returning from the Baltic; the Dutch, with seven ships, were bound

thither. Despite the numerical difference, no great error is made in

saying that the two squadrons were substantially of equal force. Each at

once ordered the merchant vessels under its protection to make the best

of their way towards port, while the ships of war on either side began

to form in order of battle between the enemy and their own convoy. The

lists being thus cleared and the lines ranged, the British vessels,

which were to windward, stood down together, after what was then the

time-honored and unintelligent practice of their service, each to attack

one of the Dutch; disdaining to attempt doubling upon any part of the

hostile line. Their ideal appears to have been that of the tournament,

where every advantage of numbers and combination was rejected in order

to insure that the test should be that of individual courage and skill.

So strong was this tradition in the British navy that its ablest

contemporary chronicler, James, has sought to explain away, half

apologetically, the advantage gained by Nelson in doubling on the French

van at the Nile.

The Dutch, equally quixotic, refrained from taking advantage of the

enemy's inability to use his broadsides while thus approaching nearly

head-on. Arrayed in a close column, the ships about six hundred feet

apart, the crews at the guns, and the marines drawn up on the poops,

they waited in silence until the English, at 8 A.M., were in position at

half musket shot. Then the battle-flag was hoisted by each admiral, and

all opened together, the conflict raging with fury for nearly four

hours. It was the first time since the days of the great De Ruyter, more

than a century before, that these kindred people had thus met in fair

fight upon the sea. Equal in courage and in seamanship, and each

neglecting to seek a tactical advantage, the usual result followed. Many

men were killed and wounded, no ship was taken, and the combatants

separated after a drawn battle; but as one Dutch ship sank the next day,

and their convoy could not proceed, the British claimed a victory. Their

own merchant vessels, being on the return voyage, were able to complete

it.

Saumarez had shown his usual gallantry, and was again promoted. On the

23d of August, eighteen days after the action, he was made commander

into the _Tisiphone_, a small but fast cruiser, technically called a

fire-ship, and attached to the Channel fleet. In December, the British

government learned that a large number of transports and supply ships

were about to sail from Brest for the West Indies. These were to carry

troops and stores to the fleet of Count De Grasse, who had returned to

Martinique after the surrender at Yorktown, and was now about to

undertake the conquest of Jamaica. It was imperative to intercept an

expedition so essential to the success of the French plan, and Admiral

Kempenfelt--the same who afterwards, in the _Royal George_, "went down

with twice four hundred men"--was sent in pursuit with twelve

ships-of-the-line. The _Tisiphone_ accompanied them as lookout vessel,

and on the 12th of December, 1781, being then well ahead of the fleet,

she was able to signal the admiral that the enemy was in sight to

leeward with seventeen of-the-line; but that the latter, instead of

being between the British and the transports, were on the far side.

Kempenfelt, an able tactician as well as seaman, seized his advantage,

pushed between the men-of-war and the convoy, and carried off fifteen

sail laden with military and naval stores, of great money value and

greater military importance. More could not be done without risking a

battle with a too superior force. It was essential, therefore, to

apprise the British commander in the West Indies of the approach of the

French reinforcements as well as of Kempenfelt's successes, and the

_Tisiphone_ was the same day despatched on this errand.

Although he knew it not, Saumarez was now being borne by the tide which

leads on to fortune. The next step in promotion then fixed, and still

fixes, the seniority of a British officer, and the _Tisiphone's_

mission led him straight to it. Easily outsailing the unwieldy mass of

enemies, he reached Barbados, and there learned that the British fleet,

under Sir Samuel Hood, was anchored off the island of St. Christopher,

then invaded by a French army supported by De Grasse's fleet. The tenure

of the island depended upon a fort on Brimstone Hill, still held by the

British; and Hood, though much inferior in force, had by a brilliant

tactical move succeeded in dislodging De Grasse from his anchorage

ground, taking it himself, and establishing there his fleet in such

order that its position remained impregnable. The French, however,

continued cruising to the southward, off the adjoining island of Nevis,

where they interposed between Hood and Saumarez; and the latter could

reach his commander only by threading the reefs lining the passage

between the two islands,--a feat considered hazardous, if not

impracticable. Nevertheless, the _Tisiphone_ effected it by diligent

care and seamanship, joining the fleet on January 31st, 1782.

Saumarez now found himself in the midst of the most active operations,

at the opening of a campaign which promised to be of singular and

critical importance. But in the midst of his rejoicing at the good

fortune which had transferred him from the comparative inactivity of the

Channel fleet, a momentary reverse befell. Called by signal on board the

flag-ship, he received a bag of despatches, with orders to sail that

night for England. As he went dejectedly down the ship's side to his

boat and was shoving off, the gig of a post-captain pulled alongside.

"Hallo, Saumarez," said its occupant, "where are you going?" "To

England, I grieve to say." "Grieve!" rejoined the other. "I wish I were

in your place. I have been wanting this long time to go home for my

health. Hold on a moment; perhaps it can be arranged." The new-comer,

named Stanhope, went at once to the admiral, who a few minutes later

sent for Saumarez. Hood had learned to value the active young officer

who had taken a forward part in the guerilla enterprises of the fleet.

"Captain Saumarez," he said, "you know not how much I wish to serve you.

Captain Stanhope shall go home, as he desires, and you shall have

command of the _Russell_." The same night the _Tisiphone_ sailed;

Saumarez remaining as an acting post-captain, with a ship of

seventy-four guns under him.

Thus it happened that two months later, at the age of twenty-five,

Saumarez commanded a ship-of-the-line in Rodney's renowned battle of the

12th of April; with one exception the most brilliant and decisive action

fought by the British navy in a century. This circumstance alone would

have insured the confirmation of his rank by the Admiralty, even had he

not also eminently distinguished himself; but it was for him one of

those periods when inconstant fortune seems bent upon lavishing her

favors. He was near the head of the British column, as the hostile

fleets passed in opposite directions, exchanging broadsides. As his ship

cleared the French rear, a neighboring British vessel, commanded by one

of the senior captains, turned to pursue the enemy. Saumarez gladly

imitated him; but when the other resumed his former course, because the

admiral of the van, his immediate superior, had not turned, the

_Russell_ kept on after the French. At this moment, Rodney in the centre,

and Hood in the rear, favored by a change of wind, were breaking through

the French line. The _Russell's_ course carried her toward them, and

consequently, in the _mêlée_ which followed, she had the distinguished

honor of engaging De Grasse's flag-ship, and of being in action with her

when she surrendered. Indeed, although Saumarez with characteristic

modesty refrained from pressing his claim, he always, when questioned on

the subject, maintained that although the enemy's vessel certainly

struck to Hood's flag-ship, she did so immediately upon the latter

joining the _Russell_.

However regarded, this was a brilliant achievement for so young a

captain, less than a twelvemonth having elapsed since he was but a

lieutenant. Rodney, who had meanwhile signalled his van to go about, was

somewhat perplexed at finding a single ship thus opportunely in the

direction whence the _Russell_ appeared; and, upon being informed that

she belonged to the van squadron, declared that her commander had

distinguished himself above all others in the fleet. It proved, in fact,

the keen military sense of the demands of an occasion which constitutes

the born corps or division commander. This was Saumarez's third general

action, at a time when Nelson, although three years a post-captain, had

commanded only frigates, and had never seen a battle between fleets.

But, if Saumarez used well the singular opportunities with which fortune

favored him, it was characteristic of Nelson that his value transpired

through the simplest intercourse and amid the most commonplace incidents

of service. Men felt, rather than realized, that under the slight,

quaint, boyish exterior there lay the elements of a great man, who would

one day fulfil his own boast of climbing to the top of the tree; and he

had been made a full captain in 1779, when not quite twenty-one.

According to the rule of the British service, already mentioned, this

assured for life his precedence over Saumarez, promoted in 1782.

The latter, however, if outstripped by a younger competitor, who was to

become the greatest of British admirals, had secured a position of

vantage for that great war which then lay in the womb of the future.

Returning to England in 1782, he passed in retirement the ten years that

preceded the outbreak of hostilities with the French republic. During

this period he was twice called out for service upon occasions of war

threatening,--in 1787 with France, and in 1790 with Spain; but though in

each case appointed to a ship, the employment went no farther, as

hostilities were timely averted. This protracted withdrawal from active

pursuit of his profession, viewed in connection with his prolonged and

efficient service of the twenty following years, may be taken as

indicating two things: first, that to professional excellence once

attained such a break is not as fatal as is commonly argued; and second,

considered with his favorable entertainment of Cornwallis's proposal to

exchange into the army, this contentment with shore life during the

peace confirms the remark already made, that, although a thorough

seaman, Saumarez was so incidentally. His quickening interest was in the

military rather than the nautical side of his calling. Pellew, on the

contrary, now eagerly sought duty at sea, impelled thereto by clear

restless predilection as well as, possibly, by need of increased income.

It was during this interval of repose, in 1788, that Saumarez married; a

step which did not in his case entail the professional deterioration

charged against it by the cynical criticisms of St. Vincent. At this

time, also, he made a trip to France, upon the occasion of sinking the

first cone of the great Cherbourg breakwater, designed to give the

French navy a first-class arsenal upon the Channel,--a purpose which it

now fulfils. Louis XVI. was present at this ceremony, and treated

Saumarez with much attention. This was the only time that he ever set

foot upon French soil, although his home was in sight of the coast and

he spoke the language fluently.

When war with France again began, in 1793, Saumarez was appointed to the

frigate _Crescent_, of thirty-six guns, with which he served actively in

the Channel. In her, on the 20th of October, 1793, he succeeded in

intercepting the French frigate _Réunion_, of substantially equal force,

which he had learned was in the habit of quitting Cherbourg in pursuit

of British merchant vessels every night, returning in the morning. The

ensuing action called for an exhibition of seamanship which showed he

had not lost aptitude during his retirement. In the beginning he placed

the _Crescent_ on the weather quarter of the French ship,--that is, on

the windward side, but a little to the rear. This was well judged,

because (1) the all-important rudder is thus less exposed, (2) in case

of an unfavorable accident the adversary tends to leave rather than to

approach, and (3) the vessel, moving ahead, is at once under command to

stop short of the opponent. After being placed, speed was regulated by

backing or filling the mizzen-topsail, thus maintaining the relative

positions, and directing fire upon the enemy's rudder. In this situation

the fore-topsail yard and foretopmast of the _Crescent_ were shot away

in quick succession, and the ship flew up head to wind, bringing all her

sails aback. For a moment she was in an awkward plight, but the

_Réunion_, drawing away, could not rake; and Saumarez, by adroit

management of the rudder and sails, _backed_ his ship round,--always a

nice operation and especially when near an enemy,--till the wind came

again abaft, restoring the normal conditions of moving ahead under

control of the helm. The contest was then renewed, and ended in the

surrender of the French vessel. The disparity of loss--1 British to 118

French--proved the discipline of the _Crescent_ and the consummate

seamanship of her commander. For this exploit Saumarez was knighted.

Faithful to his constant preference, he as soon as possible exchanged

into a ship-of-the-line, the _Orion_, of seventy-four guns. In her he

again bore a foremost part, in 1795, in a fleet-battle off the Biscay

coast of France, where three enemy's ships were taken; and two years

later he was in the action with the Spaniards off Cape St. Vincent, of

which an account has been given in the sketch of Earl St. Vincent. After

this Saumarez remained on the same station, blockading Cadiz.

In the following year, 1798, it became necessary to send a small

detachment into the Mediterranean, and off the chief arsenal of the

enemy, Toulon, to ascertain the facts concerning a great armament, since

known as Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition, which rumor said was there in

preparation. The hazardous nature of the duty, which advanced three

ships of medium size, unsupported, in the very teeth of over a dozen

enemies, many of superior strength, demanded the utmost efficiency in

each member of the little body so exposed; a consideration which

doubtless led Lord St. Vincent to choose Saumarez, though one of the

senior captains, for this service, of which Nelson, the junior flag

officer of the fleet, was given charge.

It seems scarcely credible that, when it was afterwards decided to raise

this detachment to fourteen ships-of-the-line, sufficient to cope with

the enemy, both St. Vincent and Nelson wished to remove Saumarez, with

his antecedents of brilliant service, so as to allow Troubridge, his

junior, to be second in command. The fact, however, is certain. Nelson

had orders which would have allowed him to send the _Orion_ back, when

thus proceeding on a service pregnant with danger and distinction, to

the immeasurable humiliation of her brave commander. After making every

deduction for the known partiality for Troubridge of both St. Vincent

and Nelson, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Saumarez, with

all his undoubted merit, was in their eyes inferior to Troubridge in the

qualities necessary to chief command, in case of Nelson's death, at a

juncture which called for the highest abilities of a general officer.

The moment was too critical to permit mere favoritism to sway two such

men against their judgment. As it was, however, Nelson felt he could not

part with so efficient a ship; and he therefore contented himself with

giving Troubridge and Saumarez each a subdivision of four vessels,

keeping six under his own immediate direction.

As all know, the French, when found, were at anchor. Thus surprised, the

British fleet was hurled at them in a single mass; nor was there any

subordinate command exercised, by Saumarez or any other, except that of

each captain over his particular ship. Nelson's first expectation was to

overtake the unwieldy numbers of the enemy, amounting to over four

hundred sail, at sea, and there to destroy both convoy and escort. In

such an encounter there would be inestimable tactical advantage in those

compact subdivisions, which could be thrown as units, under a single

head, in a required direction. For such a charge Saumarez possessed most

eminent capacity.

The warm family affection that was among the many winning traits of

Saumarez's symmetrical and attractive character impelled him to copious

letter-writing. Hence we have a record of this pursuit of the French

fleet, with almost daily entries; an inside picture, reflecting the

hopes, fears, and perplexities of the squadron. Bonaparte's enterprise

has been freely condemned in later days as chimerical; but it did not so

appear at the time to the gallant seamen who frustrated it. The

preparations had been so shrouded in mystery that neither Nelson nor his

government had any certainty as to its destination,--an ignorance

shared by most of the prominent French officials. When, after many

surmises, the truth gradually transpired, the British officers realized

that much time must yet elapse before the English ministry could know

it. Two months, for instance, passed before news of the Battle of the

Nile reached London. Then, if India were the ultimate object, to which

Egypt was but the stepping-stone, four months more, at least, would be

needed to get a naval reinforcement to the threatened point. What if,

meanwhile, the ally of France in the peninsula, Tippoo Saib, had been

assembling transports with the secrecy observed at Toulon and the other

ports whence the divisions had sailed? "I dined with Sir Horatio

to-day," writes Saumarez on June 15th, nearly four weeks after

Bonaparte's starting, "and find that his intelligence extends only to

the enemy's fleet having been seen off Sicily; but we have reason to

suppose them gone for Alexandria, the distance from which to the Red Sea

is only three days' journey. They may soon be transported thence by

water to the East Indies, with the assistance of Tippoo Saib; and with

their numerous army they expect to drive us out of our possessions in

India. This profound scheme, _which is thought very feasible_, we hope

to frustrate by coming up with them before they reach the place of their

destination." A week later, Nelson received off Sicily news of the

surrender of Malta to the French. In accordance with the views above

expressed, Sir James now--June 22d--gave Nelson his written opinion,

favoring the course adopted of seeking the enemy off the coast of Egypt;

one of the most responsible decisions ever taken by an admiral in chief

command, especially at the beginning of a career, as Nelson then was.

"We are now crowding sail for Alexandria; but it is very doubtful if we

fall in with them at all, as we are proceeding on the merest conjecture,

and not on any positive information. If, at the end of our journey, we

find we are upon the wrong scent, our embarrassment will be great

indeed. Fortunately, I only act here _en second_; but did the chief

responsibility rest with me, I fear it would be more than my too

irritable nerves would bear." Nelson, in truth, was passing these hours

in a fever of anxiety, scarce able to eat or drink. Yet at that very

moment the British were crossing the enemy's wake, unseeing and unseen,

and barely fifty miles separated the two fleets.

The perplexity foreshadowed by Saumarez actually fell upon the English

admiral, through his reaching Alexandria three days before the French.

Harassed out of his better judgment, he hurried back to the westward,

touched at Sicily, and thence once more to Egypt. Meantime, the French

had landed successfully. On the 1st of August the British fleet again

sighted Alexandria; saw the French flag on the walls, but no ships of

war. "When the reconnoitring squadron made the signal that the enemy

was not there," wrote Saumarez, "despondency nearly took possession of

my mind, and I do not remember ever to have felt so utterly hopeless or

out of spirits as when we sat down to dinner. Judge, then, what a change

took place when, as the cloth was being removed, the officer of the

watch hastily came in, saying, 'Sir, a signal is just now made that the

enemy is in Aboukir Bay, and moored in a line of battle.' All sprang

from their seats, and, only staying to drink a bumper to our success, we

were in a moment on deck." As the captain appeared, the crew hailed him

with three hearty cheers, a significant token of the gloom which had

wrapped the entire squadron through the recent ordeal of suspense and

disappointment.

It is only with Saumarez's share in this renowned battle that we are

here concerned. As is generally known, Nelson's tactics consisted in

doubling upon the van and centre of the enemy, who lay at anchor in a

column head to wind, or nearly so. Their rear, being to leeward, was

thus thrown out of action. The French had thirteen ships-of-the-line, of

which one was of one hundred and twenty guns, and two eighties. The

British also had thirteen, all seventy-fours, and one of fifty guns; but

one of the former going aground left them equal in numbers and inferior

in force. There were two successive acts in the drama. In the first, ten

British ships engaged the eight leading French; in the second, the

fifty and two of the seventy-fours, which had been belated, came upon

the field and strengthened the attack upon the enemy's centre. The

_Orion_, being third in the order, was one of the five vessels which

passed within the French, and fought on that side. In so doing, she

described a wide sweep around her two predecessors. While thus standing

down to her station, an enemy's frigate, the _Sérieuse_, opened fire

upon her, wounding two men. It was then part of the chivalrous comity of

fleet-actions that frigates should not be molested by the

ships-of-the-line, so long as they minded their own business,--an

immunity which of course ceased if they became aggressive. Saumarez was

urged to return her fire. "No," he replied, "let her alone; she will get

bolder and come nearer. Shorten sail." She did draw nearer, and then the

_Orion_, swinging sharply towards her, let drive her broadside of

double-shotted guns. All the masts of the unlucky frigate went

overboard, and she shortly sank, nothing but her poop being visible the

next day. The helm of the British vessel was then shifted, but so much

ground had been lost that she could anchor only abreast the fifth French

ship; the interval left being filled by those who followed. In this

position the _Orion_ silenced her immediate opponent, the _Peuple

Souverain_, which, being in an hour and a half totally dismasted, cut

her cables and dropped out of the line; the contest being then

continued with the sixth in the French order, the _Franklin_, next ahead

of the flag-ship, _Orient_. The _Orion_ was thus near by the latter when

she blew up, but the few burning fragments which fell on board were

quickly extinguished.

Twenty-four hours after the battle, Saumarez, who had been delayed till

then by a severe wound from a splinter, went on board the flag-ship to

call on the admiral; and to this visit we owe the knowledge of two

closely related incidents, recorded by his biographer and friend, which

are significant at once of his individual ideas on tactical combination,

and of the lack of personal sympathy apparent between him and Nelson. He

"found several of his brother officers on the quarter-deck, discussing

the merits of the action. Some regret having been expressed at the

escape of the two sternmost ships of the French line, Sir James said to

the admiral, 'It was unfortunate we did not--' and was proceeding to say

'all anchor on the same side.' But, before he could finish the sentence,

Nelson hastily interrupted him, exclaiming, 'Thank God there was no

order!' Then turning the conversation, he entered his cabin and sent for

Captain Ball.... We may relate the circumstances which induced Saumarez,

without the least intention to offend, to make the observation at which

offence was taken. It was Nelson's custom, when in communication or

company with the captains under his command, to converse with them on

the various modes of attacking the enemy under different circumstances;

and, on one of these occasions, Sir James Saumarez, who had seen the

evil consequences of _doubling_ on the enemy, especially in a night

action, had differed with the admiral in that plan of attack, saying

that 'it never required two English ships to capture one French, and

that the damage which they must necessarily do each other might render

them both unable to fight an enemy's ship that had not been engaged;

and, as in this case two ships could be spared to the three-decker,

everyone might have his opponent.'"

Inasmuch as Nelson, in pursuance of his previously announced idea, had

himself in the flag-ship--the sixth to enter action--set the example of

_doubling_, by anchoring on the side of the enemy's line opposite to

that of his first five ships, and in doing so had deliberately taken

position on one side of a French vessel already engaged on the other,

Saumarez's remark was substantially a censure, inopportune to a degree

singular in a man of his kindly and generous temper; and its reception

by Nelson is not a cause for surprise. On the other hand, as a matter of

tactical criticism, based upon tactical conceptions previously adopted,

if we assume it to be true that two British ships were not needed to

capture one French, it may yet be confidently affirmed that to attack

with decisively superior force a part of the enemy's order--to combine

in short--is shown by experience to attain the same degree of success

more certainly and at less cost than the simple distribution of effort

advocated by Saumarez. To double, and to beat in detail, remained the

ideal of Nelson, as it had been of Howe. It was by him applied then and

afterwards to all cases, small or great, actual or supposed. To it he

chiefly owed his dazzling successes, and this divergence of ideals marks

the difference in professional insight which mainly determines the

relative positions of Nelson and Saumarez in naval biography. It

indicates the distinction between the great general officer and the

accomplished and resolute division or corps commander.

At the Battle of the Nile Saumarez received the only wound that ever

fell to him throughout his numerous meetings with the enemy, being

struck on the thigh and side by a heavy splinter, which had killed two

officers before reaching him. The total loss of his ship was forty-two

killed and wounded, out of a crew of six hundred. Ten days after the

action he was ordered to take charge of six of the prizes, which had

been partly repaired, and with seven of the fleet to convoy them to

Gibraltar. At the same time he was notified that the _Orion_ was to go

home as soon as this duty was performed. A more charming prospect can

scarcely be imagined than this returning to his family after a long

absence, fresh from the completest achievement ever wrought by the

British navy; but even his tranquil temper, whose expressions never

lapse into the complaints of Nelson or the querulousness of Collingwood,

was tried by the slow progress of his battered and crippled squadron.

"The prizes get on very slowly," he writes; "but I am endowed with

unparalleled patience, having scarcely uttered a murmur at their

tardiness, so perfectly satisfied am I with the prospect before me."

Some time later he notes: "We have been three weeks effecting what might

be accomplished in two days. This extraordinary delay makes me more

fractious than can be imagined, and I begin to lose the character for

patience which I had given myself, by so tiresome a situation." It was

still the season of westerly winds, and the voyage from Alexandria to

Gibraltar occupied sixty-nine days.

The _Orion_ was now completely worn out, having been continuously in

commission since the war began in 1793. Besides the three general

actions in which Saumarez commanded her, she had borne a valiant part in

Howe's great battle of the 1st of June. "This last business has so

shattered the poor _Orion_" wrote Saumarez, "that she will not, without

considerable repairs, be in a state for more service." On reaching

England she was paid off; and in February, 1799, he was appointed to the

_Cæsar_, of eighty-four guns, one of the finest ships in the navy, which

was to bear his flag in the last and most brilliant episode of his

hard-fighting career.

A year later, Lord St. Vincent, having returned from the Mediterranean,

took command of the Channel Fleet, and at once instituted in its

methods, and particularly in the blockade of Brest, changes which

gradually revolutionized the character of the general naval war;

baffling beyond any other single cause the aims of Napoleon, and

insuring the fall of his empire. One of the new requirements was the

maintenance of a powerful advanced division of six or eight

ships-of-the-line, within ten miles of the harbor's mouth. It was a duty

singularly arduous, demanding neither dash nor genius, but calmness,

steadiness, method, and seamanship of a high order, for all which

Saumarez was conspicuous. From either side of the Bay of Brest a long

line of reefs projects for fifteen miles to the westward. Far inside

their outer limits, and therefore embayed by the westerly winds which

blow at times with hurricane violence, was the station of the advanced

squadron, off some well-marked rocks of the northern reef, known as the

Black Rocks. On this spot, called Siberia by the seamen, during fifteen

weeks, from August to December, Sir James Saumarez kept so close a watch

that not a vessel of any force entered or left Brest. "With you there,"

wrote Earl St. Vincent, "I sleep as sound as if I had the key of Brest

in my pocket." No work ever done by him was more meritorious or more

useful. Near its expiration St. Vincent wrote to him, "The employment

you have conducted is the most important of this war." He there

demonstrated that what before had apparently been thought impossible

could be done, though involving a degree of anxiety and peril far

exceeding that of battle, while accompanied by none of the distinction,

nor even recognition, which battle bestows. "None but professional men

who have been on that service," says his biographer with simple truth,

"can have any idea of its difficulties,--surrounded by dangers of every

kind, exposed to the violence of storms, sailing amidst a multitude of

rocks and variable currents in the longest and darkest nights, and often

on a lee shore on the enemy's coast, while the whole of their fleet is

near, ready to take advantage of any disaster." Collingwood, who in the

next war succeeded to the same unenviable duty, wrote home that, even in

the summer month of August, "I bid adieu to comfortable naps at night,

never lying down but in my clothes. An anxious time I have of it, what

with tides and rocks, which have more of danger in them than a battle

once a week." In this laborious task Saumarez was the patient,

unobserved pioneer.

There was one man, however, who could and did recognize to the full the

quality of the work done by Saumarez, and its value to those sagacious

plans which he himself had framed, and which in the future were to sap

the foundations of the French power. That man was St. Vincent. "The

merit of Sir James Saumarez," he said, "cannot be surpassed;" and

again, to Saumarez himself, "The manner in which you have conducted the

advanced squadron calls upon me to repeat my admiration of it."

Succeeding soon after to the post of First Lord of the Admiralty, he

gave him an opportunity for distinction, which resulted in an action of

singular lustre and striking success.

Bonaparte, long before returned from Egypt, and now, as First Consul,

practically the absolute ruler of France, had overthrown all enemies on

the Continent. Peace with Austria, after her disasters of Marengo and

Hohenlinden, had been signed in February, 1801. The great objects of the

French ruler now were to compass a maritime peace and withal to retain

Egypt, associated from far back with the traditional policies of France,

and moreover a conquest in which his own reputation was peculiarly

interested. To compel Great Britain to peace, he sought, by diplomacy or

force, to exclude her commerce from the Continent, as well as to raise

up maritime enemies against her. Thus he had fostered, if not actually

engendered, the Baltic league of 1801, shattered by Nelson at

Copenhagen; and for this purpose he intended to occupy both Portugal and

the kingdom of Naples. A powerful British expedition against Egypt had

entered the Mediterranean. It was essential either to attack this

directly, or to cripple its communications. Unable to do the former,

and persistently thwarted in his attempts to reinforce his own troops in

that distant dependency by the close watch of the British navy, of which

Saumarez gave so conspicuous an illustration before Brest, Napoleon

resorted to the common and sound military expedient of collecting a

threatening force upon the flank of his enemy's line of communications.

He directed a concentration of the Spanish and French navies at Cadiz,

which, by its nearness to the straits, met the desired requirement.

Among others, three French ships were ordered thither from Toulon.

The British ministry was informed that at Cadiz were collecting Spanish

vessels, said by report to be intended against Portugal. This is

unlikely, as Bonaparte could have subdued that country from the land

side by the assistance of Spain; moreover, the object of the

concentration is stated in his letters. A squadron of five

ships-of-the-line was accordingly formed, and placed under the command

of Saumarez, who on the 1st of January, 1801, had been made a rear

admiral. His orders were to go off Cadiz, where he would find two more

vessels, and to prevent the enemies within the port from sailing, or

from being joined by any from outside. Whatever Bonaparte's object, it

would be thwarted by a force thus interposed, in a position to meet

either one or the other of the converging detachments before they could

unite.

Saumarez sailed on his mission June 16, 1801, and on the 28th arrived

off Cadiz. On the 5th of July he was informed that three French ships

had anchored off Algeciras, the Spanish port on the west side of

Gibraltar Bay, confronting the British fortress on the east side. This

was the division from Toulon, which upon reaching the straits first

learned of the British squadron that effectually prevented its entrance

to Cadiz.

Saumarez at once started for Algeciras with six of his

ships-of-the-line, the seventh being out of recall to the northward. The

following day, July 6th, he entered the bay, and found the French moored

in a strong position, under cover of Spanish land batteries, and

supported by a number of gunboats. Still, though difficult and doubtful,

the enterprise was not hopeless; and, as the breeze allowed his vessels

to head for the enemy, he steered to engage at once. Unfortunately, the

wind fell as the squadron drew nigh, and only four ships were able to

take their intended places; the other two had to anchor outside their

consorts, and fire as they could through the intervals. This mishap

lessened by one-third the fighting power of the British, and, coupled

with the acknowledged superiority of guns on solid ground over those

afloat, reduced them to inferiority. Their disadvantage was increased by

the arrangements of the French admiral, carefully elaborated during the

two preceding days. Had the preparations of Brueys at the Nile equalled

those of Linois at Algeciras, Nelson's task must have been harder and

his victory less complete. Nevertheless, after an engagement of an hour

and a half, the British fire so far prevailed that the enemy resorted to

a measure for which precautions had been taken beforehand. Lines had

been run from each French ship to the shoal water lying close inside

them; and by means of these they were warped away from their opponents

until they took the ground. This increase of distance was in every way a

gain to the party standing on the defensive, and a corresponding loss to

the assailants. Saumarez ordered the cables cut and sail made to close

once more; but the light and fickle airs both baffled this effort and

further embarrassed the British, through the difficulty of keeping their

broadsides in position. Here happened the great disaster of the day. One

of the outer ships, the _Hannibal_, tried to pass inside the headmost of

the French, not realizing that the latter had moved. In so doing she ran

aground close under a battery, to whose fire she could make no reply.

After a brave and prolonged resistance, in which she lost seventy-five

killed and seventy wounded out of a crew of six hundred, and had many of

her guns dismounted, she hauled down her flag. By this time another

ship, the _Pompée_, was dismasted, and success was plainly hopeless. The

British admiral, therefore, ordered the action discontinued, and

withdrew to the Gibraltar side; the _Pompée_ having to be towed away by

the boats of the squadron.

Saumarez had failed, and failure, however explained, can hardly be

carried to a man's credit; but his after course, by wresting success out

of seemingly irretrievable disaster, has merited the highest eulogium.

Maintaining both courage and energy unimpaired, every effort was

instantly made to get the ships once more into fighting condition, that

the attack might be renewed. "Tell the Admiralty," said he to the bearer

of his despatches, "that I feel confident I shall soon have an

opportunity of attacking the enemy again, and that they may depend upon

my availing myself of it."

The opportunity did come. On the morning of July 9th, the _Superb_, the

seventh ship, which had not been in the action, was seen rounding the

west point of the bay under all sail, with a signal flying that the

enemy was in pursuit. A few moments later appeared five Spanish vessels,

two of which, the _Real Carlos_ and the _Hermenegildo_, carrying each

one hundred and twelve guns, were among the largest then afloat. On

board them had embarked a number of the _jeunesse dorée_ of Cadiz, eager

to join the triumphal procession which it was thought would soon enter

the port, flushed with a victory considered by them to be rather Spanish

than French, and escorting the rare trophy of a British ship-of-the-line

that had struck to Spanish batteries. Besides the two giants, there

were a ninety-gun ship and two seventy-fours; and the next day a French

vessel of the latter class joined, making a total reinforcement of six

heavy ships.

To these Saumarez could oppose but five. The _Hannibal_ he had lost. The

_Pompée_ could not be repaired in time; her people were therefore

distributed among the other vessels of the squadron. Even his own

flag-ship, the _Cæsar_, was so injured that he thought it impossible to

refit her; but when her crew heard his decision, one cry arose,--to work

all day and night till she was ready for battle. This was zeal not

according to knowledge; but, upon the pleading of her captain in their

name, it was agreed that they should work all day, and by watches at

night. So it happened, by systematic distribution of effort and

enthusiastic labor, that the _Cæsar_, whose mainmast on the 9th was out

and her rigging cut to pieces, was on the 12th able to sail in pursuit

of the foe.

During the forenoon of the latter day the combined squadron was seen

getting under way. The wind, being easterly, was fair for the British,

and, besides, compelled the enemy to make some tacks to clear the land.

This delay was invaluable to Saumarez, whose preparations, rapid as they

had been, were still far from complete. Not till one in the afternoon

did the headmost Spaniards reach the straits, and there they had to

await their companions. The _Hannibal_ was unable to join them, and

reanchored at Algeciras. At half-past two the _Cæsar_ hauled out from

Gibraltar mole, her band playing, "Cheer up, my lads, 't is to glory we

steer!" which was answered from the mole-head with "Britons, strike

home!" At the same moment Saumarez's flag, provisionally shifted to

another vessel, was rehoisted at her masthead. The rugged flanks of the

rock and the shores of Algeciras were crowded with eager and cheering

sight-seers, whose shouts echoed back the hurrahs of the seamen. Rarely,

indeed, is so much of the pride and circumstance, if not of the pomp, of

war rehearsed before an audience which, breathless with expectation, has

in it no part save to admire and applaud.

Off Europa Point, on the Gibraltar side, there clustered round the

_Cæsar_ her four consorts, all but one bearing, like herself, the still

fresh wounds of the recent conflict. Four miles away, off Cabrita Point,

assembled the three French of Linois's division, having like honorable

marks, together with the six new unscarred arrivals. At 8 P.M. of the

summer evening the allies kept away for Cadiz; Linois's division

leading, the other six interposing between them and the five ships of

Saumarez, which followed at once. It was a singular sight, this pursuit

of nine ships by five, suggestive of much of the fatal difference, in

ideals and efficiency, between the navies concerned. Towards nine

o'clock Saumarez ordered the _Superb_, whose condition alone was

unimpaired by battle, to press ahead and bring the rear of the enemy to

action. The wind was blowing strong from the east, with a heavy sea. At

half-past eleven the _Superb_ overtook the _Real Carlos_, and opened

fire. Abreast the Spanish vessel, on her other side, was the

_Hermenegildo_. The latter, probably through receiving some of the

_Superb's_ shot, fancied the ship nearest her to be an enemy, and

replied. In the confusion, one of them caught fire, the other ran on

board her, and in a few moments there was presented to the oncoming

British the tremendous sight of these two huge ships, with their twenty

hundred men, locked in a fast embrace and blazing together. At half-past

two in the morning, having by that time drifted apart, they blew up in

quick succession.

Leaving them to their fate, the hostile squadron passed on. The _Superb_

next encountered the _St. Antoine_, and forced her to strike. Soon

afterwards the wind died away, and both fleets were much scattered. A

British ship brought to action one of the French which had been in the

first battle; indeed, the French accounts say that the latter had fought

three enemies. However that may be, she was again severely mauled; but

the English vessel opposed to her ran on a shoal, and lost all her

masts. With this ended the events of that awful night.

The net results of this stirring week completely relieved the fears of

the British ministers. Whatever the objects of the concentration at

Cadiz, they were necessarily frustrated. Though the first attack was

repulsed, the three French ships had been very roughly handled; and, of

the relieving force, three out of six were now lost to the enemy. "Sir

James Saumarez's action has put us upon velvet," wrote St. Vincent, then

head of the Admiralty; and in the House of Peers he highly eulogized the

admiral's conduct, as also did Nelson. The former declared that "this

gallant achievement surpassed everything he had ever met with in his

reading or service," a statement sufficiently sweeping; while the praise

of the hero of the Nile was the more to be prized because there never

was cordial sympathy between him and Saumarez. Closely as they had been

associated, Nelson's letters to his brother officer began always "My

dear Sir James," not "My dear Saumarez."

In this blaze of triumph the story of Saumarez fitly terminates. He was

never again engaged in serious encounter with the enemy. The first war

with the French republic ended three months after the battle of

Algeciras. After the second began, in 1803, he was, until 1807,

commander-in-chief at the Channel Islands, watching the preparations for

the invasion of England, and counteracting the efforts of cruisers

against British commerce. In 1808, in consequence of the agreements of

Tilsit between the Czar and Napoleon, affairs in the Baltic became such

as to demand the presence of a large British fleet,--first to support

Sweden, then at war with Russia, and later to protect the immense

British trade, which, under neutral flags and by contraband methods,

maintained by way of the northern sea the intercourse of Great Britain

with the Continent. Of this trade Sweden was an important intermediary,

and her practical neutrality was essential to its continuance. This was

insured by the firm yet moderate attitude of Sir James Saumarez, even

when she had been forced by France to declare war against Great Britain.

It may be said without exaggeration that from this time, and until the

breach between Napoleon and Russia in 1812, the maritime interest of the

war between Great Britain and France centred in the Baltic. Elsewhere

the effective but monotonous blockade of the continental ports

controlled by the French Emperor absorbed the attention of the British

fleets. Of great battles there were none after Trafalgar. To Saumarez,

therefore, fell the most distinctive, and probably also the most

decisive, field of work open to the British navy. The importance of the

Baltic was twofold. It was then the greatest source of materials

essential to ship-building--commonly called naval stores; and further,

the Russian part of its coast line, being independent of Napoleon's

direct regulation, was the chief means of approach by which Great

Britain maintained commercial intercourse with the Continent, to exclude

her from which had become the leading object with the Emperor. The

contravention of his policy in this way, in disregard, as he claimed, of

the agreements existing between him and the Czar, led eventually to the

Russian war, and so finally to his own overthrow and the deliverance of

the Continent from his domination.

The historical significance of the position now occupied by Saumarez,

and its importance to the great issues of the future, are thus manifest.

It was a post that he was eminently qualified to fill. Firm, yet calm,

sagacious, and moderate, he met with rare efficiency the varied and

varying demands of those changeful times. The unremitting and well

directed efforts of his cruisers broke up reciprocal commerce between

the countries surrounding the narrow inland sea, so essential to their

welfare while submitting to Napoleon; while the main fleet sustained the

foreign trade with Russia and Sweden, carried on through neutral ships

for the advantage of Great Britain. Two instances will illustrate his

activities better than many words. In the year 1809 four hundred and

thirty local vessels were captured, averaging the small size of sixty

tons each, three hundred and forty of which belonged to Denmark, then

under Napoleon's absolute sway. At the close of the open season of 1810,

the merchant ships for England, which ordinarily were despatched under

convoy in bodies of five hundred, numbered, according to Saumarez's

flag-lieutenant and biographer, no less than one thousand vessels,

gathered in one mass.

As long as Sweden remained friendly, the admiral's duties, though

weighty, did not differ materially from those usual to his profession;

but when she was unwillingly forced into a declaration of war by

Napoleon, his task became more complicated and more delicate. The

British minister having to leave, Saumarez succeeded to a diplomatic

situation, in which the problem was to support the interests and dignity

of his own nation, without transforming the formal war into actual

hostilities, and substituting imbitterment for the secret good will of

the Swedish government and people, who, in common with the Russian

nobles and subjects, were alienated by the imperious and merciless

exactions of the French demands. The secret aim of Great Britain was so

to nourish this ill-will towards France, and so to avoid causes of

offence by herself, as to convert covert hostility into open antagonism,

and thus to reverse the political and military combinations of Europe.

In the absence of regular accredited diplomatic representatives,

Saumarez became at once the exponent and the minister of this vital

policy. He had to avoid quarrels, and yet at the same time to restrain

Sweden from acts of injury to which she was constantly impelled by the

Emperor, whose purpose naturally was exactly the opposite of his; and

who sought further to estrange all people from Great Britain.

In the performance of this task Saumarez's success was not only

complete, but peculiarly his own. His temper was at times severely

tried, but it never got beyond his control. He repressed injury, and

demanded satisfaction for it, when committed; but, relying with good

reason on the motives of the Swedish government, he contrived to secure

redress without resorting to force, which, however understood by

statesmen, would enrage the peoples he had to conciliate. After the

ordeal was over, and Russia was at war with France, a leading Swedish

statesman wrote to him: "You have been the guardian angel of my country;

by your wise, temperate, and loyal conduct, you have been the first

cause of the plans which have been formed against the demon of the

continent.... Once more I must tell you, that _you_ were the first cause

that Russia had dared to make war against France; had you fired one

shot when we declared war against England, all had been ended and Europe

would have been enslaved." Saumarez, an extremely religious man, may

have reflected that "he who ruleth his spirit is greater than he that

taketh a city."

Though in the strictest sense professional, the Baltic service of

Saumarez involved little of purely military interest. Shortly after his

assuming the command, in 1808, a Russian fleet which had been keeping

the sea took refuge, on the approach of the allied British and Swedes,

in a harbor on the Gulf of Finland. Saumarez followed close upon their

heels, and after a consultation and reconnoissance of the position,

which consumed two days, secured the co-operation of the Swedish admiral

for an attack on the day following; an essential condition, for the

Russian force was superior to his own in the proportion of eight to six.

Unhappily, the wind shifted, and blew an adverse gale for eight days; at

the end of which time the enemy had so far fortified the surroundings

that Saumarez thought it inexpedient to attack. In this decision he was

supported by the opinion of captains of such established reputation as,

joined to his own brilliant record, must be taken to justify his action,

which seems to have caused some dissatisfaction in England. On the face,

it could not but be a disappointment to people accustomed to the

brilliant victories of Nelson, and his apparent invincibility by

obstacles; but in the end it was all for the best, for doubtless the

mortifying destruction of a Russian fleet would not have furthered the

reconciliation, which soon became a leading object with the British

government and the great bulk of the Russian nation. It is, however,

probable that to this frustration of public expectation, which had been

vividly aroused by preceding accounts of the conditions, is to be

attributed the delay in granting the peerage, eagerly desired by

Saumarez in his later days,--not for itself merely, but as a recognition

which he not unnaturally thought earned by his long and distinguished

service. Saumarez held the Baltic command through five eventful

years,--from 1808 to 1812. After Napoleon's disastrous Russian

expedition, affairs in that sea no longer required a force adequate to

his rank, and he then finally retired from service afloat, still in the

full maturity of a healthy prime, at the age of fifty-five. The

remainder of his life, with brief exception, was passed in his native

island of Guernsey, amid those charms of family affection and general

esteem which he had deserved by his fidelity to all the duties of the

man and the citizen. Though so far removed from the active centres of

life, he kept touch with it by the variety of his interests in all

useful and benevolent undertakings, to which an ample fortune allowed

him freely to contribute. "The hopes entertained of his assistance and

sympathy," observes his biographer, "were never disappointed." Among

naval biographies, there is none that presents a more pleasing picture

of genial and dignified enjoyment of well-earned repose. In 1831, upon

the accession of William IV., the Sailor King, the long-coveted peerage

was at last bestowed. Lord de Saumarez died on the 9th of October, 1836,

in his eightieth year.