HOWE

1726-1799

The name of Howe, albeit that of a stranger to the land, has a special

claim upon the esteem and cordial remembrance of Americans. The elder

brother of the subject of this sketch, during the few short months in

which he was brought into close contact with the colonists of 1758,

before the unlucky campaign of Ticonderoga, won from them not merely the

trust inspired by his soldierly qualities and his genius for war,--the

genius of sound common sense and solidity of character,--but got a deep

hold upon their affections by the consideration and respect shown to

them by him, traits to which they had been too little accustomed in the

British officers of that day. Nor was this attitude on his part only a

superficial disguise assumed by policy to secure a needed support. The

shrewd, suspicious provincials would soon have penetrated a veil so

thin, that covered only the usual supercilious arrogance which they had

heretofore encountered. Lord Howe, almost alone among his military

contemporaries, warmly greeted them as fellow-countrymen, men of no

alien or degenerate blood. He admitted at once the value of their

experience, sought their advice, and profited by both; thus gaining,

besides the material advantage of methods adapted to the difficulties

before him, the adhesion of willing hearts that followed

enthusiastically, confident in their leader's wisdom, and glowing with

the unaccustomed sense of being appreciated, of receiving recognition

long withheld, but now at last ungrudgingly accorded. "The army felt

him, from general to drummer boy. He was its soul; and while breathing

into it his own energy and ardor, he broke through the traditions of the

service, and gave it new shapes to suit the time and place.... He made

himself greatly beloved by the provincial officers, and he did what he

could to break down the barriers between the colonial soldiers and the

British regulars."[12]

In campaign, Lord Howe adopted the tried expedients of forest warfare,

associating with himself its most practised exponents; and on the

morning of his death, in one of those petty skirmishes which have cut

short the career of so many promising soldiers, he discussed the

question of Ticonderoga and its approaches, lying on a bearskin beside

the colonial ranger, John Stark, to whose energy, nineteen years later,

was due the serious check that precipitated the ruin of Burgoyne's

expedition. Endeared as he was to American soldiers by the ties of

mutual labors and mutual perils gladly shared, and to all classes by

genial bearing and social accomplishments, his untimely end was followed

throughout the Northern colonies by a spontaneous outburst of sorrow,

elicited not only by the anticipated failure of the enterprise that hung

upon his life, but also by a sense of personal regret and loss.

Massachusetts perpetuated the memory of her grief by a tablet in

Westminster Abbey, which hands down to our day "the affection her

officers and soldiers bore to his command."

Captain Richard Howe of the Royal Navy, afterwards Admiral and Earl,

succeeded him in the Irish viscounty which had been bestowed upon their

grandfather by William III. Of a temperament colder, at least in

external manifestation, than that of his brother, the new Lord Howe was

distinguished by the same fairness of mind, and by an equanimity to

which perturbation and impulsive injustice were alike unknown. There

seems to have been in his bearing something of that stern, impassive

gravity that marked Washington, and imposed a constraint upon

bystanders; but whatever apparent harshness there was in the face only

concealed a genuine warmth of heart, which at times broke with an

illumining smile through the mask that covered it, and was always ready

to respond to the appeals of benevolence. If, as an officer, he had a

fault conspicuously characteristic, it was a reluctance to severity, a

tendency to push indulgence to undue extremes, into which may perhaps

have entered not merely leniency of disposition, but the weakness of

loving popularity. To be called by the seamen, as Howe was, the

"sailor's friend," is in the experience of navies a suspicious encomium,

involving more of flattery to a man's foibles than of credit to his

discretion and his judgment. But at the time when the quarrel between

Great Britain and her colonies was fast becoming imbittered, the same

kindliness, coupled with a calm reasonableness of temper, ruled his

feelings and guided his action. Although by political creed a moderate

Tory, he had none of the wrong-headedness of the party zealot; and the

growing alienation between those whom he, like his brother, regarded as

of one family, caused only distress and an earnest desire to avert

coming evils. Influenced by these sentiments, he sought the acquaintance

of Franklin, then in London as a commissioner from the colonies; and the

interviews between them, while resultless by reason of the

irreconcilable differences of opinion severing the two parties to the

dispute, convinced the wary American of the good will and

open-mindedness of the already distinguished British seaman. The same

qualities doubtless suggested the selection of Howe for the mission of

conciliation to America, in 1776, where his associate was his younger

brother, Sir William, in whom the family virtues had, by exaggeration,

degenerated into an indolent good humor fatal to his military

efficiency. The admiral, on the contrary, was not more remarkable for

amiability and resolute personal courage than he was for sustained

energy and untiring attention to duty,--traits which assured adequate

naval direction, in case conciliation should give place, as it did, to

coercive measures.

It is to be regretted that the methods, or the opportunities, of naval

biographers and historians of the past century have preserved to us

little, in personal detail and anecdote, of a period the peculiarities

of which, if not exactly picturesque, were at least grotesque and

amusing. The humor of Smollett has indeed drawn in broad caricature some

of the salient features of the seaman of his day, which was that of

Howe's entrance into the navy; and those who are familiar with the naval

light literature based upon the times of Nelson can recognize in it

characteristics so similar, though evidently softened by advancing

civilization and increased contact with the world, as to vouch for the

accuracy of the general impression conveyed by the earlier novelist. It

is, however, correct only as a _general_ impression, in which, too,

allowance must be made for the animus of an author who had grievances to

exploit, and whose great aim was to amuse, even if exact truthfulness

were sacrificed at the shrine of exaggerated portrayal. Though not

wholly without occasional gleams of light, shed here and there by

recorded incident and anecdote upon the strange life of the seamen of

that period, the early personal experiences of individuals have had

scant commemoration; and with the exception of St. Vincent, who

fortunately had a garrulous biographer, we learn little of men like

Hawke, Howe, Hood, and Keppel, until, already possessors of naval rank,

they stand forth as actors in events rather historical than

biographical.

Of Howe's first services, therefore, not much record remains except a

bare summary of dates,--of promotions, and of ships to which he was

attached,--until 1755, the beginning of the Seven Years War, when he was

already a post-captain. Born in 1726, he entered the navy in 1739, at

the outbreak of the war with Spain which initiated a forty years'

struggle over colonies and colonial trade. With short intervals of

peace, this contest was the prominent characteristic of the middle of

the eighteenth century, and terminated in the conquest of Canada, the

independence of the United States, and the establishment of British

predominance in India and upon the ocean. This rupture of a quiet that

had then endured a quarter of a century was so popular with the awakened

intelligence of England, aroused at last to the imminent importance of

her call to expansion by sea, that it was greeted by a general pealing

of the bells, which drew from the reluctant prime minister, Walpole,

that bitter gibe, "Ay, to-day they are ringing their bells, and

to-morrow they will be wringing their hands." Howe embarked with Anson's

squadron, celebrated for its sufferings, its persistence, and its

achievements, to waste the Spanish colonies of the Pacific; but the ship

in which he had started was so racked in the attempt to double Cape Horn

that she was forced to return to England. The young officer afterwards

served actively in the West Indies and in home waters. On the 1st of

May, 1746, being then in command of a small sloop of war, he was

severely wounded in action with a superior enemy's force off the coast

of Scotland. A few days before that, on the 10th of April, he had been

promoted post-captain, being barely turned twenty. Thus early he was

securely placed on the road to the highest honors of his profession,

which, however, were not to prove beyond the just claim of his already

established personal merit.

During the first thirty months of the Seven Years War, Howe was closely

engaged with, and at times in command of, the naval part of combined

expeditions of the army and navy, fitted out to harass the French

coasts. The chief, though not the sole aim in these undertakings was to

effect diversions in favor of Frederick the Great, then plunged in his

desperate struggle with the allied forces of Russia, Austria, and

France. It was believed that the last would be compelled, for the

defence of her own shores against those raids,--desultory, it is true

but yet uncertain as to the time and place where the attack would

fall,--to withdraw a number of troops that would sensibly reduce the

great odds then overbearing the Prussian king. It is more than doubtful

whether this direction of British power, in partial, eccentric efforts,

produced results adequate to the means employed. In immediate injury to

France they certainly failed, and it is questionable whether they

materially helped Frederick; but they made a brisk stir in the Channel

ports, their operations were within easy reach of England in a day when

news travelled slowly, and they drew the attention of the public and of

London society in a degree wholly disproportionate to their importance

relatively to the great issues of the war. Their failures, which

exceeded their achievements, caused general scandal; and their

occasional triumphs aroused exaggerated satisfaction at this earlier

period, before the round of unbroken successes under the first Pitt had

accustomed men, to use Walpole's lively phrase, to come to breakfast

with the question, "What new victory is there this morning?" The

brilliant letter-writer's correspondence is full of the gossip arising

from these usually paltry affairs; and throughout, whether in success or

disaster, the name of Howe appears frequently, and always as the subject

of praise. "Howe, brother of the lord of that name, was the third on the

naval list. He was undaunted as a rock, and as silent, the

characteristics of his whole race. He and Wolfe soon contracted a

friendship like the union of cannon and gunpowder." "Howe," he says in

another place, "never made a friendship except at the mouth of a

cannon."

Of his professional merits, however, professional opinions will be more

convincing. A Frenchman, who had acted as pilot of his ship, the

_Magnanime_, when going into action, was asked if it were possible to

take a lighter vessel, the _Burford_, close to the walls of another fort

farther in. "Yes," he replied, "but I should prefer to take the

_Magnanime_." "But why?" it was rejoined; "for the _Burford_ draws less

water." "True," he said, "_mais le capitaine Howe est jeune et brave_."

Sir Edward Hawke, the most distinguished admiral of that generation,

gave a yet higher commendation to the "young and brave" captain, who at

this time served under his orders,--one that must cause a sigh of

regretful desire to many a troubled superior. Several years later, when

First Lord of the Admiralty, he nominated Howe, in October, 1770, to

command a squadron destined to the Mediterranean, when hostilities with

Spain were expected. The appointment was criticised on the ground that

he was a junior admiral in the fleet, having been very recently

promoted; but Hawke, doubtless mindful that the same objection had been

made to him at a similar period of his career, answered, in the spirit

of St. Vincent defending his choice of Nelson, "I have tried Lord Howe

on most important occasions. He never asked me _how_ he was to execute

any service entrusted to his charge, but always went straight forward

and _did it_." Some quaint instances are recorded of the taciturnity for

which he was also noted. Amid the recriminations that followed the

failure at Rochefort, Howe neither wrote nor said anything. At last the

Admiralty asked why he had not expressed an opinion. In the somewhat

ponderous style that marked his utterances, he replied, "With regard to

the operations of the troops I was silent, as not being at that time

well enough informed thereof, and to avoid the mention of any

particulars that might prove not exactly agreeable to the truth." The

next year, an army officer of rank, putting questions to him and

receiving no answer, said, "Mr. Howe, don't you hear me? I have asked

you several questions." Howe answered curtly, "I don't like

questions,"--in which he was perhaps not peculiar.

It was during the continuance of these petty descents upon the French

coast, in 1758, that Howe was directed to receive on board, as

midshipman, and for service in the fleet, the Duke of York, a grandson

of the reigning monarch; in connection with whom arose a saying that was

long current, perhaps is still current, in the British navy. The young

lad of nineteen, before beginning his routine duties, held a reception

on board Commodore Howe's ship, at which the captains of the squadron

were presented to him. The seamen, unpractised in ceremonial

distinctions other than naval, saw with wonder that the midshipman kept

on his hat, while the rest uncovered. "The young gentleman," whispered

one, "isn't over civil, as I thinks. Look if he don't keep his hat on

before all the captains!" "Why," another was heard to reply, "where

should he learn manners, seeing as how he was never at sea before?"

It is likewise from this period of Howe's career that two of the rare

personal anecdotes have been transmitted, illustrative of his coolness

and self-possession under all circumstances of danger, as well as when

under the enemy's fire; one of them also touched with a bit of

humor,--not a usual characteristic of his self-contained reticence. The

service involved considerable danger, being close in with the enemy's

coast, which was indifferently well known and subject to heavy gales of

wind blowing dead on shore. On one such occasion his ship had anchored

with two anchors ahead, and he had retired to his cabin, when the

officer of the watch hurriedly entered, saying, "My lord, the anchors

are coming home,"--the common sea expression for their failure to grip

the bottom, whereupon the ship of course drags toward the beach. "Coming

home, are they?" rejoined Howe. "I am sure they are very right. I don't

know who would stay abroad on such a night, if he could help it." Yet

another time he was roused from sleep by a lieutenant in evident

perturbation: "My lord, the ship is on fire close to the magazine; but

don't be frightened; we shall get it under shortly." "Frightened, sir!"

said Howe. "What do you mean? I never was frightened in my life." Then,

looking the unlucky officer in the face, he continued, "Pray, Mr. ----,

how does a man _feel_ when he is frightened? I need not ask how he

_looks_."

The even, unaffected self-possession indicated by these anecdotes of the

early prime of life remained with him to the end, as is shown by another

incident collected by a biographer who knew many of his contemporaries.

"When Howe was in command of the Channel Fleet, after a dark and

boisterous night, in which the ships had been in some danger of running

foul of each other, Lord Gardner, then the third in command, the next

day went on board the _Queen Charlotte_ and inquired of Lord Howe how he

had slept, for that he himself had not been able to get any rest from

anxiety of mind. Lord Howe said he had slept perfectly well, for as he

had taken every possible precaution he could before dark, he laid

himself down with a conscious feeling that everything had been done,

which it was in his power to do, for the safety of the ships, and the

lives of those intrusted to his care, and this conviction set his mind

at ease." The apprehensiveness with which Gardner was afflicted "is

further exemplified by an anecdote told by Admiral Sir James Whitshed,

who commanded the _Alligator_, next him in the line. Such was his

anxiety, even in ordinary weather, that, though each ship carried three

poop lanterns, he always kept one burning in his cabin, and when he

thought the _Alligator_ was approaching too near he used to run out into

the stern gallery with the lantern in his hand, waving it so as to be

noticed." From Gardner's rank at the time, the conversation narrated

must have occurred during the early years of the French Revolution, when

Howe was over sixty-seven. As illustrative of character it is

particularly interesting, for Gardner was not only a much younger man,

but one whose gallantry and competence had been eminently proved as a

captain in several hard fought battles, while as an admiral in chief

command he later acquired considerable reputation as a tactician.

Composure under suspense is chiefly a matter of temperament; of the

constitutional outfit with which Nature favors some, and does not

others. It may be cultivated by its happy possessor; but when wanting,

the sufferer can supply its place only by laborious self-control, the

tension of which by itself expends the energies it seeks to maintain,

and so imposes limitations of strength that are often insuperable

obstacles to achievement, especially if prolonged. The strain of this

endurance is prominent among those borne by commanders-in-chief, who can

at no moment afford to be lax, nor yet precipitate; and it increases

with time at compound interest. Howe's native imperturbability was

therefore one of the chief factors in his great professional powers,

making possible the full exercise of all the others. By dint of it

principally he reached the eminence which must be attributed to him as a

general officer; for it underlay the full, continuous, and sustained

play of the very marked faculties, personal and professional, natural

and acquired, which he had. It insured that they should be fully

developed, and should not flag; for it preserved his full command over

them by delivering him from the factitious burdens of the imagination.

This quality not only entered into his external professional life, but

characterized the habitual temper of his mind. "He divested himself in a

remarkable manner," says his biographer, "of every approach to a state

of anger or resentment"--instancing herein, it may be noted, the

improvement of a natural gift; "and he carefully abstained from all

irritating language, whether in speaking or writing. In the perusal of

the four hundred letters and upwards that have been mentioned, embracing

opinions of, and unreserved discussions upon, the merits or otherwise of

many and various characters, of all classes of individuals, it did not

fail forcibly to strike the reader of them, how invariably, with one

single exception, he takes the good natured and favorable side of every

question. In the whole series, the harshest word employed is

'blockhead,' bestowed on his steward for not taking care of his _own_

interests."

This equable frame of mind was thus a fundamental trait in Howe, private

as well as public, personal as well as professional; not assumed for the

moment, but constant in operation. He had none of the irritability

attributed to genius, as also he gives no sign of its inspiration,--of

originality. He is seen at his strongest in dealing stage by stage with

difficult situations created for him, following step by step, and step

by step checking, the lead of another; his action being elicited by

successive circumstances, not deriving from some creative, far-reaching

conception of his own. The temperament is one eminently practical,

capable on due opportunity of very great deeds, as Howe showed; for,

having improved much native capacity by the constant cultivation of

professional knowledge, and with the self-confidence which naturally

springs from such acquisition, he rose readily to the level of exertion

demanded by any emergency not in excess of his abilities, and so long as

the need lasted maintained himself there easily, without consciousness

of exhaustive effort, or apprehension of improbable contingencies.

"Never hasting, never resting," might be safely affirmed of him.

He is seen therefore at his best in a defensive campaign, such as that

against D'Estaing in the summer of 1778, which in the writer's opinion

was his greatest achievement; or again in a great deliberate operation

like the relief of Gibraltar,--the one of his deeds most esteemed, it is

said, by himself,--protracted over a month in its performance, and

essentially defensive in character, not only because of the much

superior fleet of the enemies, but because the adverse forces of nature

and the obstinate incapacity of the captains of supply ships had to be

counteracted by unremitting watchfulness, foresight, and skill, dealing

however with conditions determined for him, not imposed by his own

initiative; or, finally, in the chase and partial actions of May 28 and

29, 1794, in which persistence, endurance, and aptitude are alike and

equally displayed, assuring to him beyond dispute the credit of a great

tactician. Accordingly, in direct consequence of what has been noted, it

is as a tactician, and not as a strategist, that he can claim rank; for

whatever may be the fundamental identity of principles in the military

art, whether applied to strategy or to tactics, it in the end remains

true that the tactician deals with circumstances immediately before him

and essentially transient, while the strategist has to take wider views

of more lasting conditions, and into them to introduce his own

conceptions to be modifying factors. Creative thought and faculty of

initiation are therefore more characteristic of the natural endowments

of the born strategist. There is also more room for them in his work,

because in the larger and more complicated field there is greater

elasticity and opportunity to effect new combinations, to contrive which

makes a greater call upon originative power.

In the chain of eminent typical names which leads up to that of Nelson,

there will be found between Howe and his next conspicuous

successor,--conspicuous, that is, not only by merit, as was Hood, but by

achievement, which was denied to Hood,--between Howe and Jervis, just

that difference which essentially separates the tactician from the

strategist: the lifting of the eye from the moves of the game

immediately before one, to glance over the whole board, to view the

wider field, and from its possibilities to form conceptions directive of

immediate action for distant ends. In both these distinguished general

officers,--for such both were,--there is seen a similar close attention

to details, based upon and guided by an acquaintance with their

profession profound as well as extensive, minute as well as general; in

both the same diligence and iron equanimity in difficult situations,

although in Jervis the impression received is rather that of a burden

borne with resolute fortitude, whereas in Howe the burden is thrown off

by a placid, unforeboding temper; but in the adoption of measures, those

of Howe will be found generally not to extend beyond the situation

immediately before him, by which they are dictated, whereas Jervis seeks

to bend circumstances to his will, according to a conception he has

formed of what the situation ought to be, and can be forced to become.

The idiosyncrasy of either officer is emphasized in their respective

plans of campaign, while commanding the Channel Fleet during the French

Revolution. Howe will maintain a certain station in port, keeping his

fleet there in hand, well conditioned, and as far as may be well

drilled; then, when the French do something, he also will do something

to counteract them. Jervis, on the contrary, confronting substantially

the same conditions, frames his measures with a view to prevent the

enemy from doing anything, and all the details of his plan rest upon

this one idea, to the fulfilment of which they contribute. He puts the

fleet at once into the position of action, instead of that of awaiting,

as Howe does. Both are charged with the same duty,--the defence of Great

Britain,--and by the same Government, which evidently in each case

frames its instructions upon the ascertained views of the eminent

officer intrusted with the work. To carry out this defensive campaign,

Howe of his own choice narrows his strategic plan to the sheer

defensive, which follows the initiative of the enemy; Jervis of set

purpose seeks the same object by offensive dispositions, by which the

enemy is to be forced to regulate his movements. Howe sees the defence

of the empire in the preservation of his own fleet; Jervis in the

destruction of the enemy. The one view is local, narrow, and negative;

the other general, broad, and positive. As often happens--and very

naturally--Jervis's preoccupation with considerations wider than his own

command found expression, twice at least, in phrases which pithily

summed up his steadfast enduring habit of mind. On the morning of St.

Vincent he was overheard to mutter, "A victory is very necessary to

England at this time." The present odds to his own fleet, twenty-seven

against fifteen, disappeared in the larger needs of the country. Again,

when wrestling with the perplexities and exigencies of the wild Brest

blockade in midwinter, in January, 1801, he wrote concerning repairs to

his own vessels, "Under the present impending storm from the north of

Europe, and the necessity there is of equipping every ship in the royal

ports that can swim, no ship under my command must have anything done to

her at Plymouth or Portsmouth that can be done at this anchorage,"--at

Torbay, an open though partially sheltered roadstead. Here again is seen

the subordination of the particular and personal care to the broad

considerations of a great strategic emergency.

The series of diversions upon the French coast in which Howe was

employed during 1758, terminated with that season, and he returned to

his own ship, the _Magnanime_, rejoining with her the main fleet under

Hawke in the great Brest blockade of 1759. The French Government, after

four years of disaster upon the continent, of naval humiliation, and of

loss of maritime and colonial power, had now realized that its worst

evils and chief danger sprang from the sea power of Great Britain, and,

like Napoleon a half-century later, determined to attempt an invasion.

Its preparations and Hawke's dispositions to counteract them, have been

described in the life of that admiral, as have Rodney's bombardment of

Havre and interception of coastwise communications; all directed to the

same general end of confounding designs against England, but no longer

as mere diversions in favor of Frederick. Howe was still a private

captain, but he bore a characteristically conspicuous part in the stormy

final scene at Quiberon, when Hawke drove Conflans before him to utter

confusion. When the French fleet was sighted, the _Magnanime_ had been

sent ahead to make the land. She was thus in the lead in the headlong

chase which ensued, and was among the first in action; at 3 P.M., by

Howe's journal, the firing having begun at 2.30, according to Hawke's

despatch. The foreyard being soon shot away, the consequent loss of

manoeuvring power impeded her captain's designs in placing her, but she

remained closely engaged throughout, compelling one French vessel to

strike and anchor alongside her. The bad weather prevented taking

possession that night of the prize, which, in consequence, availed

herself of her liberty by running ashore, and so was lost to her

captors. The _Magnanime_ was reported as having thirteen killed and

sixty-six wounded, out of a total of hurt not much exceeding three

hundred in the entire fleet. The casualty list proves exposure to fire,

doubtless; but is no sure test of the effectiveness of a vessel's

action. The certainty of Howe's conduct in this affair, otherwise

imperfectly described, rests on a broader and firmer basis of

reputation, won by unvarying efficiency in many differing capacities and

circumstances.

He continued to serve, but without further noteworthy incident, up to

the peace made in the winter of 1762-63. From that time until the

difficulties with the American colonies came to a head in 1775, he was

not actively employed afloat, although continuously engaged upon

professional matters, especially as a close student of naval tactics and

its kindred subjects, to which he always gave sympathetic attention.

During this period, also, he became a member of the House of Commons,

and so continued until transferred from the Irish peerage to that of

Great Britain, in 1782. In 1770, at the age of forty-five, he became a

rear-admiral, and, as has been already stated, received at once a proof

of Hawke's high confidence, by being appointed to the command of the

squadron destined for the Mediterranean, when hostilities concerning the

Falkland Islands threatened with Spain; a dispute chiefly memorable as

the means of bringing into the navy both Nelson and Exmouth. In 1775 he

was promoted to vice-admiral, and in February of the following year was

appointed commander-in-chief of the North American station. Together

with his military duties, he was, as has before been said, given powers,

conjointly with his brother, to treat for the settlement of existing

troubles.

Although his habitual reticence restrained his sentiments from finding

expression in positive words, there can be little doubt that the

necessity of raising his hand against the Americans caused Howe keener

regret than it did to many of his brother officers. He took instant

occasion to address to Franklin a personal note, recalling their former

association, and expressing an earnest hope that their friendship might

contribute something to insure the success of his official mission. In

the five years that had elapsed, however, Franklin had been in the heat

of the political struggle, and, philosopher though he was, he had not

Howe's natural phlegm. Hence, his reply, while marked by respect and

even formal cordiality toward the admiral himself, displayed a vivacity

of resentment and a bitterness for which the latter had scarcely looked.

Still, his habitual equanimity was not ruffled, and he read the letter

with the simple comment, "My old friend expresses himself very warmly."

Howe's arrival antedated the signature of the Declaration of

Independence by less than a week. During the period of attempted

negotiation, while scrupulously faithful to his instructions, he showed

to his late fellow-countrymen all the courtesy and consideration that

the most cordial esteem could extend. The incident of the official

communication addressed by the Howes to Washington, in which they sought

to evade giving him the title of "General," is sufficiently familiar;

but it is more rarely recalled that, in verbal intercourse with American

officers, the admiral habitually styled him "General Washington," and

sent complimentary messages to him as such. He even spoke of the

colonies as "states," and at the same time dwelt with evident emotion

upon the testimonials of respect and affection which had been shown to

his brother's memory by the colonists.

To narrate Howe's share in the operations by which New York in 1776, and

Philadelphia in 1777, fell into the hands of the British, would be only

to repeat well-known historical episodes, enlivened by few or no

incidents personal to himself. In them the navy played a part at once

subordinate and indispensable, as is the office of a foundation to its

superstructure. The cause of the Americans was hopeless as long as their

waters remained in the undisputed control of the enemy's ships; and it

was the attempt of Great Britain to cast aside this essential support,

and to rely upon the army alone in a wild and intricate country, that

led to her first great disaster,--Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga. Upon

this, France at once recognized the independence of the colonies, and

their alliance with that kingdom followed. A French fleet of twelve

ships-of-the-line under the Count D'Estaing, left Toulon April 15, 1778,

for the American coast. This force far exceeded Howe's; and it was no

thanks to the British Government, but only to the admiral's sleepless

vigilance and activity, seconded, as such qualities are apt to be, by at

least an average degree of supineness on the part of his antagonist,

that his scanty squadron was not surprised and overpowered in Delaware

Bay, when Sir Henry Clinton evacuated Philadelphia to retreat upon New

York. Howe, who had the defects of his qualities, whose deliberate and

almost stolid exterior evinced a phlegmatic composure of spirit which

required the spur of imminent emergency to rouse it into vehement

action, never in his long career appeared to greater advantage, nor

achieved military results more truly brilliant, than at this time, and

up to the abandonment of the attack on Rhode Island by the Americans

under Sullivan, three months later. Then only, if ever, did he rise

above the level of an accomplished and resolute general officer, and

establish a claim to genius, of that order, however, which is not

originative in character, but signalized by an infinite capacity for

taking pains; and that not for a short time merely, but through a long,

protracted period of strain. The display, nevertheless, does not assure

him a place in the front rank of great commanders, whose actions find

their source in the living impulse of their own creative energy; for it

is elicited by extreme circumstances alone, by obvious pressure, to

which he must adapt himself. This he does with unfailing adequacy,

indeed; resolutely checkmating, but never initiating. Steady as a rock,

like a rock, also, Howe only gave forth sparks under blows that would

have broken weaker men.

D'Estaing was twelve weeks in coming from Toulon to Cape May, but Howe

knew nothing of his sailing until three weeks after he had started. Then

orders were received to abandon Philadelphia and concentrate upon New

York. The naval forces were scattered, and had to be collected; the

supplies of the army, except those needed for the march across Jersey,

were to be embarked at Philadelphia, and the great train of transports

and ships of war moved over a hundred miles down a difficult river, and

thence to New York. Despite every effort, a loss of ten days was

incurred, through calms, in the mere transit from Philadelphia to the

sea; but during this momentous crisis D'Estaing did not appear. Two days

more sufficed to bring the fleet into New York Bay on June 29th; but yet

the grave admiral, roused to the full tension of his great abilities,

rested not. With a force little more than half that coming against him,

he knew that all depended upon the rapidity with which his squadron took

the imposing position he had in mind. Still D'Estaing tarried, giving

to his untiring enemy twelve more precious days, during which the army

of Sir Henry Clinton, reaching Navesink beach the day after the fleet,

was snatched by it from the hot pursuit of the disappointed Washington,

and carried safely to New York.

In the expected French squadron were eight ships of seventy-four guns or

over, with three sixty-fours. To confront these, for the defence of the

port, Howe disposed of six, none heavier than a sixty-four; but they

were ranged to command the entrance of the harbor upon a tactical plan

that evinced both a careful study of the ground and the resources of a

thorough seaman. This instance alone, had Howe never done anything else,

would have established his reputation as a tactician. The ships, placed

in échelon, and enabled to turn their batteries in any direction, by the

provision of springs and adaptation to the tide conditions at the moment

when alone attack would be possible, could concentrate their entire

force of guns upon the enemy, raking them as they advanced up channel;

while, if they succeeded in coming abreast, then also the broadsides

would be turned upon them. When D'Estaing at last came, all was ready;

the energy that had improved every fleeting moment then gave place to

the imperturbable resolution which was Howe's greatest attribute, and

against which, seconded by his careful preparation, success could be

won only by a desperate and sanguinary struggle. The attempt was not

made. Ten days after arriving, the French admiral again put to sea,

heading to the southward. By combined energy and skill Howe had won the

first move in the game. Clinton's army and New York were saved.

"The arrival of the French fleet," wrote Washington a little later, "is

a great and striking event; but the operations of it have been injured

by a number of unforeseen and unfavorable circumstances, which have

lessened the importance of its services to a great degree. The length of

the passage, in the first instance, was a capital misfortune; for, had

even one of common length taken place, Lord Howe, with the British ships

of war and all the transports in the river Delaware, must inevitably

have fallen; and Sir Henry Clinton must have had better luck than is

commonly dispensed to men of his profession under such circumstances, if

he and his troops had not shared at least the fate of Burgoyne." If this

narration of events is so carefully worded as not to imply a censure

upon D'Estaing, it none the less, however unintentionally, measures the

great military merit of Lord Howe.

Nor did this end his achievements. Two or three days after the French

departed a small reinforcement from England reached New York, and in the

course of a week Howe, who had not failed to keep touch with the enemy's

fleet till it was ninety miles at sea, heard that it had been seen

again, heading for Narragansett Bay, then controlled by a British

garrison on Rhode Island. This was in pursuance of a prearranged plan to

support the American forces under General Sullivan, which had already

advanced against the place. Adapting anew his action to the

circumstances of the enemy's movements, Howe, though still much

inferior, hurried to the spot, arriving and anchoring off Point Judith,

at the entrance to Newport, on August 9th, the day after D'Estaing had

run the fire of the British works and entered the harbor. With correct

strategic judgment, with a flash of insight which did not usually

distinguish him when an enemy was not in view, and contrary to his

avowed policy when commander of the Channel Fleet, he saw that the true

position for his squadron was in face of the hostile port, ready to act

as circumstances might dictate. His mere presence blocked this operation

also. D'Estaing, either fearing that the British admiral might take the

offensive and gain some unexpected advantage, or tempted by the apparent

opportunity of crushing a small hostile division, put to sea the next

day. Howe, far superior as a seaman to his antagonist, manoeuvred to

avoid a battle with a force superior by a half to his own; and this

purpose was effected by his skilful management of his fleet, aided by

his adversary's irresolution, notwithstanding that the unusual action of

the wind thwarted his effort to control the situation by gaining the

weather gage. Both the general manoeuvres, and the special dispositions

made of his ships to meet the successive intentions of the enemy, as

they became apparent, showed a mind fortified by previous preparation as

well as by the natural self-possession for which he was conspicuous. It

was eminently a tactical triumph.

A tremendous gale followed, scattered both fleets, and dismasted several

of the French. D'Estaing appeared again off Rhode Island only to notify

Sullivan that he could no longer aid him; and the latter, deprived of an

indispensable support, withdrew in confusion. The disappointment of the

Americans showed itself by mobbing some French seamen in Boston, whither

their fleet retired. "After the enterprise upon Rhode Island had been

planned," continues Washington, in the letter above quoted, "and was in

the moment of execution, that Lord Howe with the British ships should

interpose merely to create a diversion, and draw the French fleet from

the island, was again unlucky, as the Count had not returned on the 17th

to the island, though drawn from it on the 10th; by which the whole was

subjected to a miscarriage." What Washington politicly calls bad luck

was French bad management, provoked and baffled by Howe's accurate

strategy, untiring energy, consummate seamanship, and tactical

proficiency. Clinton's army delivered, the forcing of New York

frustrated, Rhode Island and its garrison saved, by a squadron never

more than two thirds of that opposed to it, were achievements to

illustrate any career; and the more so that they were effected by sheer

scientific fencing, like some of Bonaparte's greatest feats, with little

loss of blood. They form Howe's highest title to fame, and his only

claim as a strategist. It will be observed, however, that the

characteristic of his course throughout is untiring and adequate

adaption to the exigencies of the situation, as momentarily determined

by the opponent's movements. There is in it no single original step.

Such, indeed, is commonly the case with a strictly defensive campaign by

a decisively inferior force. It is only the rare men who solve such

difficulties by unexpected exceptional action.

It is indicative of Howe's personal feelings about the colonial quarrel,

during the two years in which he thus ably discharged his official

duties, that both he and his brother determined to ask relief from their

commands as soon as it appeared that all hopes of conciliation were

over. The appointment of other commissioners hastened their decision,

and the permission to return was already in the admiral's hands when the

news of D'Estaing's coming was received. Fighting a traditional foreign

foe was a different thing from shedding the blood of men between whom

and himself there was so much in common; nor was Howe the man to dodge

responsibility by turning over an inferior force, threatened by such

heavy odds, to a junior officer before the new commander-in-chief came.

His resolution to remain was as happy for his renown as it was

creditable to his character. After the brief campaign just sketched,

true to his steady previous policy, he followed the French fleet to

Newport when he heard of its reappearance there, and thence to Boston,

coming off that port only three days after it; but finding it now

sheltered under shore batteries, impregnable to his still inferior

numbers, and learning that it was in need of extensive repairs, he

resigned the command in New York to a rear-admiral, and departed to

Newport to meet his successor, Vice-Admiral Byron. Upon the latter's

arrival he sailed for England, towards the end of September, 1778.

General Howe had preceded him by four months.

The two brothers went home with feelings of great resentment against the

ministry. The course of the war had so far been unfortunate. The loss of

Boston, the surrender of Burgoyne, the evacuation of Philadelphia, and

finally the entrance of France into the contest, constituted a

combination of mishaps which certainly implied fault somewhere. As

usual, no one was willing to accept blame, and hot disputes, with

injurious imputations, raged in Parliament. There is here, happily, no

necessity for apportioning the responsibility, except in the case of

Lord Howe; and as to him, it is reasonably clear that all was done that

could be up to the coming of the French, while it is incontestable that

afterwards, with a force utterly inadequate, for which the Government

was answerable, he had averted imminent disaster by most masterly

management. His words in the House of Commons were bitter. "He had been

deceived into his command, and he was deceived while he retained it.

Tired and disgusted, he had desired permission to resign it; and he

would have returned as soon as he obtained leave, but he could not think

of doing so while a superior enemy remained in American seas; that, as

soon as that impediment was removed, he gladly embraced the first

opportunity of returning to Europe. Such, and the recollection of what

he had suffered, were his motives for resigning the command, and such

for declining any future service so long as the present ministry

remained in office."

In terms like these could officers holding seats in Parliament speak

concerning the Government of the day. It was a period in which not only

did party feeling run high, but corruption was an almost avowed method

of political management. The navy itself was split into factions by

political bias and personal jealousies, and there was a saying that "if

a naval officer were to be roasted, another officer could always be

found to turn the spit." The head of the Admiralty, Lord Sandwich, was a

man of much ability, but also of profligate character, as well public as

private. He doubtless wished the success of his department,--under the

terrible chances of war no chief can do otherwise, for the

responsibility of failure must fall upon his own head; but through

corrupt administration the strength of the navy, upon the outbreak of

war, had been unequal to the work it had to do. Some one must suffer for

this remissness, and who more naturally than the commander of a distant

station, who confessed himself "no politician"? Hence, Howe certainly

thought, the neglect with which he had been treated. "It would not be

prudent to trust the little reputation he had earned by forty years'

service, his personal honor and everything else he held dear, in the

hands of men who have neither the ability to act on their own judgment,

nor the integrity and good sense to follow the advice of others who

might know more of the matter." A year later, it was roundly charged

that the Channel Fleet had been brought home at a most critical moment,

losing an exceptional opportunity for striking the enemy, in order to

affect the elections in a dockyard town. Admiral Keppel considered that

he had been sacrificed to party feeling; and a very distinguished

officer, Barrington, refused to take a fleet, although willing to serve

as second, even under a junior. "Who," he wrote, "would trust himself in

chief command with such a set of scoundrels as are now in office?" Even

a quarter of a century later, Earl St. Vincent gave to George III.

himself the same reason for declining employment. After eliciting from

him an unfavorable opinion as to the discipline and efficiency of the

Channel Fleet, the king asked, "Where such evils exist, does Lord St.

Vincent feel justified in refusing his conspicuous ability to remedy

them?" "My life," replied the old seaman, "is at your Majesty's

disposal, and at that of my country; but my honour is in my own keeping,

and I will not expose myself to the risk of losing it by the

machinations of this ministry, under which I should hold command." To

such feelings it was due that Howe, Keppel, and Barrington did not go to

sea during the anxious three years that followed the return of the

first. The illustrious Rodney, their only rival, but in himself a host,

was the one distinguished naval chief who belonged heart and soul to the

party with which Sandwich was identified.

Thus it happened that Rodney's period of activity during the war of the

American Revolution coincided substantially with that of Howe's

retirement. The same change of administration, in the spring of 1782,

that led to the recall of the older man, brought Howe again into

service, to replace the mediocrities who for three campaigns had

commanded the Channel Fleet, the mainstay of Great Britain's safety.

Upon it depended not only the protection of the British Islands and of

the trade routes converging upon them, but also the occasional

revictualling of Gibraltar, now undergoing the third year of the famous

siege. Its operations extended to the North Sea, where the Dutch, now

hostile, flanked the road to the Baltic, whence came the naval stores

essential to the efficiency of the British fleet; to the Bay of Biscay,

intercepting the convoys despatched from France to her navies abroad;

and to the Chops of the Channel, where focussed the trade routes from

East and West, and where more than once heavy losses had been inflicted

upon British commerce by the allies. All these services received

conspicuous and successful illustration during Howe's brief command, at

the hands either of the commander-in-chief or of his subordinates, among

whom were the very distinguished Barrington and Kempenfelt. Howe

himself, with twenty-five sail-of-the-line, in July encountered an

allied fleet of forty off Scilly. By an adroit tactical movement, very

characteristic of his resolute and adequate presence of mind, he carried

his ships between Scilly and Land's End by night, disappearing before

morning from the enemy's view. He thus succeeded in meeting to the

westward a valuable Jamaica convoy, homeward bound, and taking it under

his protection. The allies being afterwards driven south by a heavy

gale, the vessels of war and trade slipped by and reached England

safely. Thus does good luck often give its blessing to good management.

To relieve Gibraltar, however, was the one really great task,

commensurate to his abilities, that devolved upon Howe during this

short command. In the summer of 1782, the Spaniards were completing ten

heavy floating batteries, expected to be impervious to shot and to

combustion, and from an attack by which upon the sea front of the works

decisive results were anticipated. At the same time prolonged blockade

by land and sea, supported by forty-nine allied ships-of-the-line

anchored at Algeciras, the Spanish port on the opposite side of the Bay,

was producing its inevitable results, and the place was now in the last

extremity for provisions and munitions of war. To oppose the hostile

fleets and introduce the essential succors, to carry which required

thirty-one sail of supply ships, Great Britain could muster only

thirty-four of-the-line, but to them were adjoined the superb

professional abilities of Lord Howe, never fully evoked except when in

sight of an enemy, as he here must act, with Barrington and Kempenfelt

as seconds; the one the pattern of the practical, experienced, division

commander, tested on many occasions, the other an officer much of Howe's

own stamp, and like him a diligent student and promoter of naval

manoeuvres and naval signals, to the development of which both had

greatly contributed. To the train of supply ships were added for convoy

a number of merchant vessels destined to different parts of the world,

so that the grand total which finally sailed on September 11th was 183.

While this great body was gathering at Spithead, there occurred the

celebrated incident of the oversetting of the _Royal George_ at her

anchors, on August 29th,

"When Kempenfelt went down

With twice four hundred men."

Howe thus lost the man upon whom principally he must have relied for the

more purely tactical development of the fleet, opportunity for which he

anticipated in the necessarily slow and graduated progress of so large

an assemblage.

The occasion was indeed one that called for deliberation as well as for

calculated audacity, both controlled by a composure and ability rarely

conjoined to the same great extent as in Howe. Circumstances were more

imminent than in the two previous reliefs by Rodney and Darby; for the

greatly superior numbers of the allies were now not in Cadiz, as before,

but lying only four miles from the anchorage which the supply vessels

must gain. True, certainly, that for these a certain portion of their

path would be shielded by the guns of the fortress, but a much greater

part would be wholly out of their range; and the mere question of

reaching his berth, a navigational problem complicated by uncertain

winds, and by a very certain current sweeping in from the Atlantic, was

extremely difficult for the merchant skipper of the day, a seaman rough

and ready, but not always either skilful or heedful. The problem before

Howe demanded therefore the utmost of his seamanlike qualities and of

his tactical capacity.

The length of the passage speaks for the deliberate caution of Howe's

management, as his conduct at the critical moment of approach, and

during the yet more critical interval of accomplishing the entrance of

the supply ships, evinces the cool and masterful self-control which

always assured the complete and sustained exertion of his great

professional powers at a required instant. Thirty days were consumed in

the voyage from Spithead to Gibraltar, but no transport was dropped. Of

the huge convoy even, it is narrated that after a heavy gale, just

before reaching Cape Finisterre, the full tally of 183 was counted.

After passing that cape, the traders probably parted for their several

destinations, each body under a suitable escort. The stoppages for the

rounding-up of straying or laggard vessels, or for re-establishing the

observance of order which ever contributes to regulated movement, and

through it to success, were not in this case time lost. The admiral made

of them opportunities for exercising his ships-of-the-line in the new

system of signals, and in the simple evolutions depending upon them,

which underlie flexibility of action, and in the day of battle enable

the fleet to respond to the purposes of its commander with reasonable

precision, and in mutual support.

Such drill was doubly necessary, for it not only familiarized the

intelligence of the captains with ideas too generally neglected by

seamen until called upon to put them into practice, and revealed to them

difficulties not realized until encountered, but also enforced

recognition of the particular qualities of each vessel, upon the due

observance of which substantial accuracy of manoeuvre depends. The

experience gained during this cruise, going and returning, probably

opened the eyes of many officers to unsuspected deficiencies in

themselves, in handling a ship under the exigencies of fleet tactics.

Howe certainly was in this respect disappointed in his followers, but

probably not greatly surprised. At the same time it is but fair to note

that the service was performed throughout without any marked hitch

traceable to want of general professional ability. A French writer has

commented upon this. "There occurred none of those events, so frequent

in the experiences of a squadron, which often oblige admirals to take a

course wholly contrary to the end they have in view. It is impossible

not to recall the unhappy incidents which, from the 9th to the 12th of

April, of this same year, befell the squadron of the Count De Grasse. If

it is just to admit that Lord Howe displayed the highest talent, it

should be added that he had in his hands excellent instruments."

On the 10th of October the fleet and storeships drew nigh the Straits of

Gibraltar. On that day it was rejoined by a frigate, which forty-eight

hours before had been sent ahead to communicate the approach of the

relief, and to concert action. She brought the cheering news of the

victorious repulse by the British of the grand attack by sea and land

upon September 13th, with the entire destruction of the trusted floating

batteries. Under this flush of national triumph, and with a fair

westerly wind, the great expedition entered the straits on October 11th,

in ranged order for action. The convoy went first, because, sailing

before the wind, it was thus to leeward of the ships of war, in position

to be immediately defended, if attacked. Two squadrons of the fleet

succeeded them, in line-of-battle ahead, formed thus for instant

engagement, Howe leading in the _Victory_; while the third of the

squadrons followed in reserve, in an order not stated, but probably in a

line abreast, sweeping a broader belt of sea, and more nearly under the

eye of the Commander-in-chief, who, for the purposes of the present

operation, had left his traditional post in the centre. Howe's reasons

for this change of position, if ever stated, have not come under the

eyes of the writer; but analysis shows that he was there close to the

storeships, whose safe entrance to the port was at once the main object

of the enterprise and the one most critically uncertain of achievement,

because of the general bad behavior of convoys. There he could control

them more surely, and at the same time by his own conduct indicate his

general purposes to subordinates, who, however deficient in distinctly

tactical proficiency, had the seamanship and the willingness adequately

to support him.

At 6 P.M. the supply ships were off the mouth of the bay, with the wind

fair for their anchorage; but, although full and particular instructions

had been issued to them concerning currents and other local conditions,

all save four missed the entrance and were swept to the eastward of the

Rock. The fleet of course had to follow its charge, and by their failure

a new task confronted Howe's professional abilities and endurance.

Fortunately he had an able adviser in the captain of the fleet, who had

had long experience of the locality, invaluable during the trying week

that ensued. The allies had not yet stirred. To move near fifty

sail-of-the-line in pursuit of an enemy, inferior indeed, but ranged for

battle, and the precise moment of whose appearance could not have been

foreseen, was no slight undertaking, as Nelson afterwards said. It may

be recalled that before Trafalgar over twenty-four hours were needed for

the allied thirty-three to get out of Cadiz Bay. On the 13th, however,

the combined French and Spaniards sailed, intent primarily, it would

seem, not on the true and vital offensive purpose of frustrating the

relief, but upon the very secondary defensive object of preserving two

of their own numbers, which in a recent gale had been swept to the

eastward. Thus trivially preoccupied, they practically neglected Howe,

who on his part stripped for action by sending the supply vessels to the

Zaffarine Islands, where the vagarious instincts of their captains would

be controlled by an anchor on the bottom. On the 14th the allies bore

north from the British, close under the Spanish coast, and visible only

from the mastheads. On the 15th the wind came east, and the convoy and

fleet began cautiously to move towards Gibraltar, the enemy apparently

out of sight, and certainly to the eastward. On the evening of the 16th

eighteen supply ships were at the mole, and on the 18th all had arrived.

Gibraltar was equipped for another year's endurance.

We have less than could be wished of particulars touching this

performance of Howe's, from the day of leaving England to that of

fulfilment, five full weeks later. Inference and comment has to be built

up upon incidents transmitted disconnectedly, interpreted in connection

with the usual known conditions and the relative strength of the two

opposing parties. To professional understanding, thus far supplemented,

much is clear; quite enough, at the least, to avouch the deliberation,

the steadiness, the professional aptitude, the unremitting exertion that

so well supplies the place of celerity,--never resting, if never

hasting,--the calculated daring at fit moments, and above all the

unfailing self-possession and self-reliance which at every instant up

to the last secured to the British enterprise the full value of the

other qualities possessed by the Commander-in-chief. A biographical

notice of Howe cannot be complete without quoting the tribute of an

accomplished officer belonging to one of the navies then arrayed against

him. "The qualities displayed by Lord Howe during this short campaign,"

says Captain Chevalier of the French service, "rose to the full height

of the mission which he had to fulfil. This operation, one of the finest

in the War of American Independence, merits a praise equal to that of a

victory. If the English fleet was favored by circumstances,--and it is

rare that in such enterprises one can succeed without the aid of

fortune,--it was above all the Commander-in-chief's quickness of

perception, the accuracy of his judgment, and the rapidity of his

decisions that assured success."

Having accomplished his main object and landed besides fifteen hundred

barrels of powder from his own ships, Howe tarried no longer. Like

Nelson, at Gibraltar on his way to St. Vincent, he would not trifle with

an easterly wind, without which he could not leave the Straits against

the constant inset; neither would he adventure action, against a force

superior by a third, amid the currents that had caused him so trying an

experience. There was, moreover, the important strategic consideration

that if the allied fleets, which were again in sight, followed him out,

they would thereby be drawn from any possible molestation of the

unloading of the supply ships, which had been attempted, though with no

great success, on the occasion of the relief by Darby, in 1781. Howe

therefore at once headed for the Atlantic. The allies pursued, and

engaged partially on the afternoon and evening of October 20th; but the

attack was not pushed home, although they had the advantage of the wind

and of numbers. On the 14th of November the British fleet regained

Spithead. It may be remarked that Admirals Barrington and Millbank both

praised their captains very highly, for the maintenance of the order in

their respective divisions during this action; the former saying it "was

the finest close connected line I ever saw during my service at sea."

Howe, who held higher ideals, conceived through earnest and prolonged

study and reflection, was less well satisfied. It seems, however,

reasonable to infer that the assiduity of his efforts to promote

tactical precision had realized at least a partial measure of success.

Another long term of shore life now intervened, carrying the gallant

admiral over the change-fraught years of failing powers from fifty-six

to sixty-seven, at which age he was again called into service, in the

course of which he was to perform the most celebrated, but, it may

confidently be affirmed, not the most substantial, nor even the most

brilliant, action of his career. During much of this intermediate

period, between 1783 and 1788, Howe occupied the Cabinet position of

First Lord of the Admiralty, the civil head and administrator of the

Navy. Into the discharge of this office he carried the same qualities of

assiduous attention to duty, and of close devotion to details of

professional progress, which characterized him when afloat; but, while

far from devoid of importance, there is but little in this part of his

story that needs mention as distinctive. Perhaps the most interesting

incidents, seen in the light of afterwards, are that one of his earliest

appointments to a ship was given to Nelson; and that the cordiality of

his reception at the end of the cruise is said to have removed from the

hero an incipient but very strong disgust for the service. "You ask me,"

wrote the future admiral to his brother, "by what interest did I get a

ship? I answer, having served with credit was my recommendation to Lord

Howe. Anything in reason that I can ask, I am sure of obtaining from his

justice."

At the outbreak of the French Revolution, Howe stood conspicuously at

the head of the navy, distinguished at once for well-known professional

accomplishments and for tried capacity in chief command. His rivals in

renown among his contemporaries--Keppel, Barrington, and Rodney--had

gone to their rest. Jervis, Duncan, Nelson, Collingwood, and their

compeers, had yet to show what was in them as general officers. Lord

Hood alone remained; and he, although he had done deeds of great

promise, had come to the front too late in the previous war for his

reputation to rest upon sustained achievement as well as upon hopeful

indication. The great commands were given to these two: Hood, the

junior, going to the Mediterranean with twenty ships-of-the-line, Howe

taking the Channel Fleet of somewhat superior numbers.

The solid, deliberate, methodical qualities of the veteran admiral were

better adapted to the more purely defensive rôle, forced upon Great

Britain by the allied superiority in 1782, than to the continuous,

vigilant, aggressive action demanded by the new conditions with which he

now had to deal, when the great conflagration of the Revolution was to

be hemmed in and stamped out by the unyielding pressure and massive

blows of the British sea power. The days of regulated, routine

hostilities between rulers had passed away with the uprising of a

people; the time foretold, when nation should rise against nation, was

suddenly come with the crash of an ancient kingdom and of its social

order. An admirable organizer and indefatigable driller of ships, though

apparently a poor disciplinarian, Howe lacked the breadth of view, the

clear intuitions, the alacrity of mind, brought to bear upon the problem

by Jervis and Nelson, who, thus inspired, framed the sagacious plan to

which, more than to any other one cause, was due the exhaustion alike

of the Revolutionary fury and of Napoleon's imperial power. Keenly

interested in the material efficiency of his ships, as well as in the

precision with which they could perform necessary evolutions and

maintain prescribed formations, he sought to attain these ends by long

stays in port, varied by formal cruises devoted to secondary objects and

to fleet tactics. For these reasons also he steadfastly refused to

countenance the system of close-watching the enemy's ports, by the

presence before each of a British force adequate to check each movement

at its beginning.

Thus nursing ships and men, Howe flattered himself he should insure the

perfection of the instrument which should be his stay in the hour of

battle. Herein he ignored the fundamental truth, plainly perceived by

his successor, St. Vincent, that the effectiveness of a military

instrument consists more in the method of its use, and in the practised

skill of the human element that wields it, than in the material

perfection of the weapon itself. It may justly be urged on his behalf

that the preparation he sought should have been made, but was not, by

the Government in the long years of peace. This is true; but yet the

fact remains that he pursued his system by choice and conviction

repeatedly affirmed; that continuous instead of occasional cruising in

the proper positions would better have reached the ends of drill; and

that to the material well being of his ships he sacrificed those correct

military dispositions before the enemy's ports, instituted and

maintained by Hawke, and further developed and extended by Jervis, who

at the same time preserved the efficiency of the vessels by increased

energy and careful prevision of their wants. The brilliant victory of

the 1st of June has obscured the accompanying fact, that lamentable

failure characterized the general strategic use of the Channel Fleet

under Howe and his immediate successor.

Once in sight of the enemy, however, the old man regained the fire of

youth, and showed the attainments which long study and careful thought

had added to his natural talent for war, enabling him to introduce

distinct advances upon the tactical conceptions of his predecessors. The

battle of June 1, 1794, was brought about in the following manner.

Political anarchy and a bad season had combined to ruin the French

harvests in 1793, and actual famine threatened the land. To obviate

this, at least partially, the Government had bought in the United States

a large quantity of breadstuffs, which were expected to arrive in May or

June, borne by one hundred and eighty merchant vessels. To insure the

safety of this valuable convoy, the Brest Fleet was sent to meet it at a

designated point; five ships going first, and twenty-five following a

few days later. Robespierre's orders to the admiral, Villaret-Joyeuse,

were to avoid battle, if possible, but at all hazards to secure the

merchant fleet, or his head would answer for it.

About the same time, Howe, who had kept his vessels in port during the

winter, sailed from the Channel with thirty-two ships-of-the-line. These

he soon divided into two squadrons; one of which, numbering six, after

performing a specific service, was not ordered to rejoin the main body,

but to cruise in a different spot. These ships were sadly missed on the

day of battle, when they could have changed a brilliant into a crushing

victory. Howe himself went to seek the French, instead of taking a

position where they must pass; and after some running to and fro, in

which the British actually got to the westward of their foes, and might

well have missed them altogether, he was lucky enough, on the 28th of

May, some four hundred miles west of the island of Ushant, to find the

larger of their two detachments. This having been meanwhile joined by

one ship from the smaller, both opponents now numbered twenty-six heavy

vessels.

The French were to windward, a position which gives the power of

refusing or delaying decisive action. The average speed of any fleet,

however, must fall below the best of some of the force opposed to it;

and Howe, wishing to compel battle, sent out six of his fastest and

handiest ships. These were directed to concentrate their fire upon the

enemy's rear, which, from the point of view of naval tactics, was the

weakest part of a line-of-battle of sailing ships; because, to aid it,

vessels ahead must turn round and change their formation, performing a

regular evolution, whereas, if the van be assailed, the rear naturally

advances to its help. If this partial attack crippled one or more of the

French, the disabled ships would drift towards the British, where either

they would be captured, or their comrades would be obliged to come to

their rescue, hazarding the general engagement that Howe wanted. As it

happened, the French had in the rear an immense ship of one hundred and

ten guns, which beat off in detail the successive attacks of her smaller

antagonists; but in so doing she received so much injury that she left

the fleet after nightfall, passing the British unmolested, and went back

to Brest. One of her assailants, also, had to return to England; but, as

the relative force of the units thus clipped from the respective

opponents was as three to two, the general result was a distinct

material gain for Howe. It is to be scored to his credit as a tactician

that he let this single enemy go, rather than scatter his fleet and lose

ground in trying to take her. He had a more important object.

The next morning, May 29th, the French by poor seamanship had lost to

leeward, and were consequently somewhat nearer. Both fleets were heading

southeasterly, with the wind at south-southwest; both, consequently, on

the starboard tack. Howe saw that, by tacking in succession, his column

would so head that several of his vessels in passing could bring the

hostile rear under their guns, and that it was even possible that three

or four might be cut off, unless reinforced; to attempt which by the

enemy would involve also tactical possibilities favorable to the

British. The necessary movement was ordered; and the French admiral,

seeing things in the same light, was justly so alarmed for the result

that he turned his head ships, and after them his whole column in

succession, to run down to help the rear. Judicious, and indeed

necessary, as this was, it played right into Howe's hands, and was a

tribute to his tactical skill, by which it was compelled; for in doing

this the French necessarily gave up much of their distance to windward,

and so hastened the collision they wished to avoid. Although the attack

upon their rear was limited to a few desultory broadsides, the two

fleets were at last nearly within cannon shot, whereas the day before

they had been eight or ten miles apart. Both were now on the port tack,

running west in parallel lines.

Towards noon, Howe saw that the morning's opportunity of directing his

whole column upon the enemy's rear again offered, but with a far better

chance; that if his ships manoeuvred well half a dozen of the French

must be cut off, unless their admiral, to save them, repeated his

previous manoeuvre of running down to their assistance, which would

infallibly entail the general engagement sought by the British. The

signal to tack in succession was again made, and to pass through the

enemy's line; but here Howe's purpose was foiled, as Rodney's on April

17th, by the failure of his leading vessel. Her captain, like Carkett,

was of considerable seniority, having commanded a ship-of-the-line under

Howe at New York, in 1778. His conduct during this brief campaign was so

unfavorably noticed by his admiral that he asked a Court-Martial, which

dismissed him from his ship, though clearing him of cowardice. Upon the

present occasion he for some time delayed obedience; and, when he did go

about, wore instead of tacking, which lost ground and caused confusion

by going to leeward. The second ship acted well, and struck the French

column some distance from its rear, proving Howe right in judging that

the enemy's order could there be pierced. As this vessel was not closely

supported, she received such injuries from successive fires, that, when

she at last found an opening through which to pass, she was unable to

manoeuvre.

Seeing that the van was failing him, Howe, whose flag-ship, the _Queen

Charlotte_, was tenth from the head of his column, now took the lead

himself, tacked his own vessel, though her turn was not yet come, and,

accompanied by his next ahead and astern,--another striking instance of

the inspiring influence of a high example,--stood straight for the

hostile order. The three broke through astern of the sixth ship from the

French rear, and cut off two of the enemy, which were speedily

surrounded by others of the British. Villaret-Joyeuse then repeated his

former evolution, and nothing could have saved a general engagement

except the disorder into which the British had fallen, and Howe's

methodical abhorrence of attacks made in such confusion as prevailed.

Moreover, the decisive result of this last brush was that the French

entirely lost the windward position, and the British admiral knew that

he now had them where they could not escape; he could afford to postpone

the issue. Accordingly, fighting ceased for the day; but the French had

been so mauled that three more ships had to go into port, leaving them

but twenty-two to the enemy's twenty-five.

To appreciate Howe's personal merit as a tactician, reflection should be

bestowed upon the particulars of his conduct on these two days, with

which the First of June is not to be compared; for in them culminated,

so to speak, a long course of preparation in the study of tactical

possibilities, and of the system of signals needed to insure necessary

evolutions. His officers, as a body, do not appear to have deserved by

their manoeuvring the encomium passed by Rodney upon his, during the

long chase to windward in May, 1780; and, as Howe had now held command

for a year, this failure may probably be assigned to lack of that

punctilious severity to which Rodney attributed his own success. But in

the matter of personal acquirement Howe shows a distinct advance upon

Rodney's ideas and methods. There is not to be noted in Rodney's actions

any foreshadowing of the judicious attack upon the enemy's rear, on May

28th, by a smart flying squadron. This doubtless presents some analogy

to a general chase, but there is in it more of system and of regulated

action; in short, there is development. Again, although Rodney doubtless

tacked in succession repeatedly, between May 9th and May 20th, in his

efforts to reach the enemy to windward, there does not then appear, nor

did there appear on either of the two occasions when he succeeded in

striking their column from to leeward, any intention, such as Howe on

the 29th communicated by signal and enforced by action, of breaking

through the enemy's line even at the cost of breaking his own. Not even

on April 12th had Rodney, as far as appears, any such formulated plan.

There is here, therefore, distinct progress, in the nature of reflective

and reasoned development; for it is scarcely to be supposed that Howe's

assiduity and close contact with the navy had failed to note, for future

application, the incidents of Rodney's battles, which had been the

subject of animated discussion and censure by eye-witnesses.

It will be recognized that the conception in Howe's mind, maintained

unchangeably and carried consistently into effect during these two days,

was to attack continually, as opportunity offered, the rear end of the

enemy's column, which corresponds precisely with the attack upon the

flank of a line of battle on shore. Merit does not depend upon result,

but fortunate result should be noted for the encouragement and guidance

of the future. In consequence of these sustained and judiciously

directed movements, and of the steps found necessary by the French

admiral because of injuries received, the enemy had lost from their line

four ships, of which one was of one hundred and twenty guns, another of

eighty; while of those retained one had lost all her spars save the

lower masts, and had thenceforth to be towed in action. Against this was

to be set only one British seventy-four, disabled on the 28th and

returned to port; their other damaged vessels refitted at sea and stayed

with the fleet. On the other hand, Howe's separated division of six

remained separated, whereas four fresh French ships joined their main

fleet on the 30th. Admirable tactics were thus neutralized by defective

strategy; and therefore it may with substantial accuracy be said that

Howe's professional qualities and defects were both signally illustrated

in this, his last conspicuous service.

The French admiral on the evening of the 29th saw that he now must

fight, and at a disadvantage; consequently, he could not hope to protect

the convoy. As to save this was his prime object, the next best thing

was to entice the British out of its path. With this view he stood away

to the northwest; while a dense fog coming on both favored his design

and prevented further encounter during the two ensuing days, throughout

which Howe continued to pursue. In the evening of May 31st the weather

cleared, and at daybreak the next morning the enemies were in position,

ready for battle, two long columns of ships, heading west, the British

twenty-five, the French again twenty-six through the junction of the

four vessels mentioned. Howe now had cause to regret his absent six, and

to ponder Nelson's wise saying, "Only numbers can annihilate."

The time for manoeuvring was past. Able tactician as he personally was,

and admirable as had been the direction of his efforts in the two days'

fighting, Howe had been forced in them to realize two things, namely,

that his captains were, singly, superior in seamanship, and their crews

in gunnery, to the French; and again, that in the ability to work

together as a fleet the British were so deficient as to promise very

imperfect results, if he attempted any but the simplest formation. To

such, therefore, he resorted; falling back upon the old, unskilful,

sledge-hammer fashion of the British navy. Arranging his ships in one

long line, three miles from the enemy, he made them all go down

together, each to attack a specified opponent, coming into action as

nearly as might be at the same instant. Thus the French, from the

individual inferiority of the units of their fleet, would be at all

points overpowered. The issue justified the forecast; but the manner of

performance was curiously and happily marked by Howe's own peculiar

phlegm. There was a long summer day ahead for fighting, and no need for

hurry. The order was first accurately formed, and canvas reduced to

proper proportions. Then the crews went to breakfast. After breakfast,

the ships all headed for the hostile line, under short sail, the admiral

keeping them in hand during the approach, as an infantry officer dresses

his company. Hence the shock from end to end was so nearly simultaneous

as to induce success unequalled in any engagement conducted on the same

primitive plan.

Picturesque as well as sublime, animating as well as solemn, on that

bright Sunday morning, was this prelude to the stern game of war about

to be played: the quiet summer sea stirred only by a breeze sufficient

to cap with white the little waves that ruffled its surface; the dark

hulls gently rippling the water aside in their slow advance, a ridge of

foam curling on either side of the furrow ploughed by them in their

onward way; their massive sides broken by two, or at times three, rows

of ports, whence, the tompions drawn, yawned the sullen lines of guns,

behind which, unseen, but easily realized by the instructed eye,

clustered the groups of ready seamen who served each piece. Aloft swung

leisurely to and fro the tall spars, which ordinarily, in so light a

wind, would be clad in canvas from deck to truck, but whose naked

trimness now proclaimed the deadly purpose of that still approach. Upon

the high poops, where floated the standard of either nation, gathered

round each chief the little knot of officers through whom commands were

issued and reports received, the nerves along which thrilled the

impulses of the great organism, from its head, the admiral, through

every member to the dark lowest decks, nearly awash, where, as farthest

from the captain's own oversight, the senior lieutenants controlled the

action of the ships' heaviest batteries.

On board the _Queen Charlotte_, Lord Howe, whose burden of sixty-eight

years had for four days found no rest save what he could snatch in an

arm-chair, now, at the prospect of battle, "displayed an animation,"

writes an eye-witness, "of which, at his age, and after such fatigue of

body and mind, I had not thought him capable. He seemed to contemplate

the result as one of unbounded satisfaction." By his side stood his

fleet-captain, Curtis, of whose service among the floating batteries,

and during the siege of Gibraltar, the governor of the fortress had

said, "He is the man to whom the king is chiefly indebted for its

security;" and Codrington, then a lieutenant, who afterwards commanded

the allied fleets at Navarino. Five ships to the left, Collingwood, in

the _Barfleur_, was making to the admiral whose flag she bore the remark

that stirred Thackeray: "Our wives are now about going to church, but

we will ring about these Frenchmen's ears a peal which will drown their

bells." The French officers, both admirals and captains, were mainly

unknown men, alike then and thereafter. The fierce flames of the

Revolution had swept away the men of the old school, mostly aristocrats,

and time had not yet brought forward the very few who during the

Napoleonic period showed marked capacity. The commander-in-chief,

Villaret-Joyeuse, had three years before been a lieutenant. He had a

high record for gallantry, but was without antecedents as a general

officer. With him, on the poop of the _Montagne_, which took her name

from Robespierre's political supporters, stood that anomalous companion

of the generals and admirals of the day, the Revolutionary commissioner,

Jean Bon Saint-André, about to learn by experience the practical working

of the system he had advocated, to disregard all tests of ability save

patriotism and courage, depreciating practice and skill as unnecessary

to the valor of the true Frenchman.

As the British line drew near the French, Howe said to Curtis, "Prepare

the signal for close action." "There is no such signal," replied Curtis.

"No," said the admiral, "but there is one for closer action, and I only

want that to be made in case of captains not doing their duty." Then

closing a little signal book he always carried, he continued to those

around him, "Now, gentlemen, no more book, no more signals. I look to

you to do the duty of the _Queen Charlotte_ in engaging the flag-ship. I

don't want the ships to be bilge to bilge, but if you can lock the

yardarms, so much the better; the battle will be the quicker decided."

His purpose was to go through the French line, and fight the _Montagne_

on the far side. Some doubted their succeeding, but Howe overbore them.

"That's right, my lord!" cried Bowen, the sailing-master, who looked to

the ship's steering. "The _Charlotte_ will make room for herself." She

pushed close under the French ship's stern, grazing her ensign, and

raking her from stern to stem with a withering fire, beneath which fell

three hundred men. A length or two beyond lay the French _Jacobin_. Howe

ordered the _Charlotte_ to luff, and place herself between the two. "If

we do," said Bowen, "we shall be on board one of them." "What is that to

you, sir?" asked Howe quickly. "Oh!" muttered the master, not inaudibly.

"D----n my eyes if I care, if you don't. I'll go near enough to singe

some of our whiskers." And then, seeing by the _Jacobins_ rudder that

she was going off, he brought the _Charlotte_ sharp round, her jib boom

grazing the second Frenchman as her side had grazed the flag of the

first.

From this moment the battle raged furiously from end to end of the field

for nearly an hour,--a wild scene of smoke and confusion, under cover of

which many a fierce ship duel was fought, while here and there men

wandered, lost, in a maze of bewilderment that neutralized their better

judgment. An English naval captain tells a service tradition of one who

was so busy watching the compass, to keep his position in the ranks,

that he lost sight of his antagonist, and never again found him. Many a

quaint incident passed, recorded or unrecorded, under that sulphurous

canopy. A British ship, wholly dismasted, lay between two enemies, her

captain desperately wounded. A murmur of surrender was somewhere heard;

but as the first lieutenant checked it with firm authority, a cock flew

upon the stump of a mast and crowed lustily. The exultant note found

quick response in hearts not given to despair, and a burst of merriment,

accompanied with three cheers, replied to the bird's triumphant scream.

On board the _Brunswick_, in her struggle with the _Vengeur_, one of the

longest and fiercest fights the sea has ever seen, the cocked hat was

shot off the effigy of the Duke of Brunswick, which she bore as a

figure-head. A deputation from the crew gravely requested the captain to

allow the use of his spare chapeau, which was securely nailed on, and

protected his grace's wig during the rest of the action. After this

battle with the ships of the new republic, the partisans of monarchy

noted with satisfaction that, among the many royal figures that

surmounted the stems of the British fleet, not one lost his crown. Of a

harum-scarum Irish captain are told two droll stories. After being

hotly engaged for some time with a French ship, the fire of the latter

slackened, and then ceased. He called to know if she had surrendered.

The reply was, "No." "Then," shouted he, "d----n you, why don't you

fire?" Having disposed of his special antagonist without losing his own

spars, the same man kept along in search of new adventures, until he

came to a British ship totally dismasted and otherwise badly damaged.

She was commanded by a captain of rigidly devout piety. "Well, Jemmy,"

hailed the Irishman, "you are pretty well mauled; but never mind, Jemmy,

whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth."

The French have transmitted to us less of anecdote, nor is it easy to

connect the thought of humor with those grimly earnest republicans and

the days of the Terror. There is, indeed, something unintentionally

funny in the remark of the commander of one of the captured ships to his

captors. They had, it was true, dismasted half the French fleet, and had

taken over a fourth; yet he assured them it could not be considered a

victory, "but merely a butchery, in which the British had shown neither

science nor tactics." The one story, noble and enduring, that will ever

be associated with the French on the 1st of June is in full keeping with

the temper of the times and the enthusiasm of the nation. The

seventy-four-gun ship _Vengeur_, after a three hours' fight, yardarm to

yardarm, with the British _Brunswick_, was left in a sinking state by

her antagonist, who was herself in no condition to help. In the

confusion, the _Vengeur's_ peril was for some time not observed; and

when it was, the British ships that came to her aid had time only to

remove part of her survivors. In their report of the event the latter

said: "Scarcely had the boats pulled clear of the sides, when the most

frightful spectacle was offered to our gaze. Those of our comrades who

remained on board the _Vengeur du Peuple_, with hands raised to heaven,

implored, with lamentable cries, the help for which they could no longer

hope. Soon disappeared the ship and the unhappy victims it contained. In

the midst of the horror with which this scene inspired us all, we could

not avoid a feeling of admiration mingled with our grief. As we drew

away, we heard some of our comrades still offering prayers for the

welfare of their country. The last cries of these unfortunates were,

'Vive la République!' They died uttering them." Over a hundred Frenchmen

thus went down.

Seven French ships were captured, including the sunk _Vengeur_. Five

more were wholly dismasted, but escaped,--a good fortune mainly to be

attributed to Howe's utter physical prostration, due to his advanced

years and the continuous strain of the past five days. He now went to

bed, completely worn out. "We all got round him," wrote an officer,

Lieutenant Codrington, who was present; "indeed, I saved him from a

tumble, he was so weak that from a roll of the ship he was nearly

falling into the waist. 'Why, you hold me up as if I were a child,' he

said good-humoredly." Had he been younger, there can be little doubt

that the fruits of victory would have been gathered with an ardor which

his assistant, Curtis, failed to show. The fullest proof of this is the

anecdote, already quoted in the sketch of Rodney,[13] which has been

transmitted by Admiral Sir Byam Martin direct from the sailing-master of

the _Queen Charlotte_, afterwards Admiral Bowen; but his account is

abundantly confirmed by other officers, eye and ear witnesses. Taken in

connection with these, Codrington's story of his physical weakness bears

the note, not of pathos only, but of encouragement; for the whole

testifies assuredly to the persistence, through great bodily debility,

of a strong quality diligently cultivated in the days of health and

vigor. In truth, it was impossible for Howe to purpose otherwise. Having

been continuously what he was in his prime, it could not be that he

would not intend, with all the force of his will, to persevere to the

utmost in the duty before him. The faithfulness of a lifetime does not

so forsake a man in his end. What he lacked in that critical hour was

not the willing mind, but the instrument by which to communicate to the

fleet the impulse which his own failing powers were no longer able

directly to impart.

Lord Howe's career practically ended with this battle and the honors

that followed it. Infirmities then gained rapidly upon him, and it would

have been well had his own wish to retire been granted by the

Government. He remained in nominal command of the Channel Fleet, though

not going to sea, until the occurrence of the great mutinies of 1797.

The suppression--or, more properly, the composing--of this ominous

outbreak was devolved upon him by the ministry. He very wisely observed

that "preventive measures rather than corrective are to be preferred for

preserving discipline in fleets and armies;" but it was in truth his own

failure to use such timely remedies, owing to the lethargy of increasing

years, acting upon a temperament naturally indulgent and unapprehensive,

that was largely responsible for disorders of whose imminence he had

warning. From the military standpoint, the process of settlement had

much the air of opéra bouffe,--a consummation probably inevitable when

just grievances and undeniable hardships get no attention until the

sufferers break through all rules, and seek redress by force. The

mutinous seamen protested to Howe the bitterness of their sorrow at the

sense of wrong doing, but in the same breath insisted that their demands

must be conceded, and that certain obnoxious officers must be removed

from their ships. The demands were yielded, Howe gently explaining to

the men how naughty they had been; and that, as to the unpopular

officers, they themselves asked relief from so unpleasant a situation.

In his curiously involved style, he wrote: "This request has been

complied with, under the pretext of an equal desire on the part of the

officers not to be employed in ships where exception, without

specification of facts, has been taken to their conduct. However

ineligible the concession, it was become indispensably necessary." Under

this thin veil, men persuaded themselves that appearances were saved, as

a woman hides a smile behind her fan. Admiral Codrington, a firm admirer

of Howe, justly said: "It was want of discipline which led to the

discontent and mutiny in the Channel Fleet. Lord Howe got rid of the

mutiny by granting the men all they asked; but discipline was not

restored until the ships most remarkable for misconduct had been, one

after the other, placed under the command of Lord St. Vincent."

With the settlement of this mutiny Lord Howe's long career of active

service closed. Immediately afterwards he retired formally, as he

sometime before had actually, from the command of the Channel Fleet, and

on the 5th of August, 1799, he died full of years and honors; having

lived just long enough to welcome the rising star of Nelson's glory as

it burst upon men's sight at Cape St. Vincent and the Nile.