In the Civil War Falkland was always "ingeminating _Peace, Peace_".

Our hearts are with him, but it was of no use. It is an unhappy part of

civil wars that there can be no real peace till one party has succumbed:

compromise only leads to a renewal of the conflict. There is sense as

well as dignity in the deliberate though mournful acceptance of

necessity, and the determination to play out the part which could not be

declined, expressed in the letter written at the outbreak of the

conflict by the Parliamentarian, Sir William Waller, to a personal

friend in the other camp:

"My affections to you are so unchangeable that hostility itself cannot

violate my friendship to your person; but I must be true to the cause

wherein I serve. The great God, who is the searcher of my heart, knows

with what reluctance I go upon this service, and with what perfect

hatred I look upon a war without an enemy. The God of peace, in His good

time, sent us peace, and in the meantime fit us to receive it! We are

both on the stage, and we must act the parts that are assigned us in

this tragedy. Let us do it in a way of honour, and without personal

animosities."

A man in this frame of mind, we submit, was likely to get to the end of

a civil war more speedily than a man in the mood, amiable as it was, of

Falkland.

Perhaps, after all, the failure, the inevitable failure of Falkland's

passionate pleadings for peace may have saved him from a worse doom than

death on the field even of civil war. In the case of the Five Members,

the King had shown how little regard he had, at least how little regard

the mistress of his councils had, for the honour of his advisers. The

pair might have used Falkland to lure by the pledge of his high

character the leaders of the Parliament into the acceptance of a treaty?

which the King, with his notions of divine right, and the Queen with her

passionate love of absolute power, would, there can be little doubt,

have violated as soon as the army of the Parliament had been disbanded,

and the power of the sword had returned into the King's hands. Falkland

might have even seen the scaffold erected, through the prostitution of

his own honour, for the men whose ardent associate he had been in the

overthrow of government by prerogative and in the impeachment of

Strafford.

Flinging epithets at Cromwell is a very harmless indulgence of

sentiment. His memory has passed unscathed even through the burning

eloquence which, from the pulpit of the Restoration, denounced him as

"wearing a bad hat, and that not paid for." Since research has placed

him before us as he really was, the opinion has been gaining ground that

he was about the greatest human force ever directed to a moral purpose;

and in that sense, about the greatest man, take him all in all, that

ever trod the scene of history. If his entire devotion to his cause, his

valour, his magnanimity, his clemency, his fidelity to the public

service, his domestic excellence and tenderness are not "conduct," all

we can say is, so much the worse for "conduct." The type to which his

character belonged, in common with the whole series of historic types,

had in it something that was special and transitory, combined with much

that, so far as we see, was universal and will endure for ever. It is in

failing to note the special and transitory element, and the limitations

which it imposed on the hero's greatness, that Carlyle's noble biography

runs into poetry, and departs from historic truth. To supply this defect

is the proper work of rational criticism; but the criticism which begins

with "Philistine" is not likely to be very rational.

The objection urged by Bolingbroke against Cromwell's foreign policy, on

the ground that to unite with France, which was gaining strength,

against Spain, which was beginning to decline, was not the way to

maintain the balance of power in Europe, is once more reproduced as

though it had not been often brought forward and answered. Cromwell was

not bound to trouble his head about such a figment of a special

diplomacy as the balance of power any more than Shakespeare was bound to

trouble his head about Voltaire's rules for the drama. He was the chief

and the defender of Protestantism, and as such he was naturally led to

ally himself with France, which was comparatively liberal, against

Spain, which was the great organ of the Catholic reaction. An alliance

with Spain was a thing impossible for a Puritan. Looking to the narrower

interest of England, much more was to be gained by a war with Spain than

by a war with France, because by a war with Spain an entrance was forced

for English enterprise through the barriers which Spanish monopoly had

raised against commercial enterprise in America. The security of England

appears, in Cromwell's judgment, to have depended on her intrinsic

strength, which no one can doubt that, under extraordinary

disadvantages, he immensely increased, rather than on the maintenance of

a European equilibrium which, as the number of the powers increased,

became palpably impracticable. It may be added, that the incipient

decline of the double-headed House of Austria, if it is visible to our

eyes as we trace back the course of events, can hardly have been visible

to any eye at that time, and, what is still more to the purpose, that

the dangerous ascendency of Louis XIV. resulted in great measure from

the betrayal of England by Charles II., and would have been impossible

had, we will not say a second Cromwell, but a Protestant or patriotic

monarch, sat on the Protector's throne.

Bolingbroke suggests, and Mr. Arnold embraces the suggestion, that

Charles I., by making war on France, showed himself more sagacious with

regard to foreign policy than Cromwell. But Mr. Arnold, in recommending

Bolingbroke's philosophy to a generation which he thinks has too much

neglected it, has discreetly warned us to let his history alone. Charles

I., or rather Buckingham, in whose hands Charles was a puppet, made war

on Spain, though in the most incapable manner, and with a most

ignominious result: he at one time lent the French Government English

ships to be used against the Protestants of Rochelle, whose resistance,

apart from the religious question, was the one great obstacle to the

concentration of the French power; and though he subsequently quarrelled

with France, few will believe--assuredly Clarendon did not believe--that

among the motives for the change, policy of any kind predominated over

the passions and the vanity of the favourite. That Cromwell would have

lent a steady and effective support to the Protestants, and thus have

prevented the concentration of the French power, is as certain as any

unfulfilled contingency can be.

Mr. Arnold is evidently anxious to bring Bolingbroke into fashion. "Hear

Bolingbroke upon the success of Puritanism." Hear Lovelace on Dr.

Johnson; one critic would be about as edifying as the other.

Bolingbroke, a sceptical writer and a scoffer at Anglican doctrine, to

say nothing about his morals, allied himself for party purposes with the

fanatical clergy of the Anglican Establishment, well represented by

Sacheverel, and, to gratify his allies, passed as Minister persecuting

laws, about the last of the series, against Nonconformists. This,

perhaps, is a proof in a certain way, of philosophic largeness of view.

But if Bolingbroke is to be commended to ingenuous youth as a guide

superior to party narrowness or bias, it may be well to remember the

passage of his letter to Sir William Wyndham, in which he very frankly

describes his own aims, and those of his confederates on their accession

to office, admitting that "the principal spring of their actions was to

have the government of the State in their hands, and that their

principal views were the conservation of this power, great employments

to themselves, and great opportunities of rewarding those who had helped

to raise them, and of hurting those who stood in opposition to them;"

though he has the grace to add that with these considerations of party

and private interest were intermingled some which had for their object

the public good. In another place he avows that he and his party

designed "to fill the employments of the kingdom down to the meanest

with Tories," by which they would have anticipated, and, indeed, by

anticipation outdone, the vilest and most noxious proceeding of the

coarsest demagogue who ever climbed to power on the shoulders of faction

in the United States. It may be instructive to compare with this the

principles upon which public employments were distributed by Cromwell.

It would be out of place to discuss the whole question of the

Protector's administration by way of reply to a passing thrust of

antipathy. But when judgment is pronounced on his external policy, his

critics ought not to leave out of consideration the Union of Scotland

and Ireland with England, successfully accomplished by him, repealed by

the Restoration, and, like not a few of his other measures, revived and

ratified by posterity, after a delay fraught with calamitous

consequences in both cases, and which, in the case of Ireland, may

perhaps even yet prove fatal.

We cannot help remarking, however, that the ecclesiastical policy of the

Protectorate was one which it would be most inconsistent on the part of

Mr. Arnold and those who hold the same view with him to decry. It was a

national church (to prevent the hasty abolition of which, seems to have

been Cromwell's main reason for dissolving the Barebones Parliament)

with the largest possible measure of comprehension. To us the weak

points of such a policy appear manifest enough, but by Mr. Arnold and

those of his way of thinking it ought, if we mistake not, to be

respected as an anticipation of their own deal.

Of one great and irretrievable error Cromwell was guilty--he died before

his hour. That his government was taking root is clear from the bearing

of Mazarin and Don Lewis De Haro, sufficiently cool judges, towards the

Stuart Pretender. The Restoration was a reaction not against the

Protectorate but against the military anarchy which ensued. Had Cromwell

lived ten years longer, or had his marshals been true to his successor,

to his cause, and to their own fortunes, there would have been an end of

the struggle against Stuart prerogative, the spirit of Laud would have

been laid for ever; the temporal power of ecclesiastics would have

troubled no more; the Union with Scotland and Ireland would have

remained unbroken; and the genuine representation of the people embodied

in the Instrument of Government would have continued to exist, in the

place of rotten boroughs, the sources of oligarchy and corruption, of

class government and class wars. Let us philosophize about general

causes as much as we will, untoward accidents occur: the loss of Pym and

Hampden in the early part of the Revolution, and that of Cromwell at its

close, may be fairly reckoned as accidents, and they were untoward in

the highest degree.

No doubt, while Falkland fits perfectly into the line of English

progress and takes his place with obvious propriety among the Saints of

Constitutionalism in the vestibule of the House of Commons, while even

Hampden finds admission as the opponent of ship-money, the kind veil of

oblivion being drawn over the part he played as a leader in the

Revolution, Cromwell, though his hold over the hearts of the English

people is growing all the time, remains in an uncovenanted condition.

The problem of his statue is still, and, so far as England is concerned,

seems likely long to be, unsolved. Put him high or low, in the line of

kings or out of it, he is hopelessly incongruous, incommensurable, and

out of place. He is in fact the man of the New World; his institutions

in the main embody the organic principles of New World society: at

Washington, not at Westminster should be his statue.

What Puritanism did for England, and what credit is due to it as an

element of English character, are questions which cannot be settled by

mere assertion, on our side at least. In its highest development, and at

the period of its greatest men, it was militant, and everything militant

is sure to bear evil traces of the battle. For that reason Christianity

has always been in favour of peace and goodwill; let the Regius

Professor of Theology at Oxford, in his Christian philosophy of war, be

as ingenious and as admirable as he may. But sometimes it is necessary

to accept the arbitrament of the sword. It was necessary at Marathon, on

the plain of Tours, on the waters which bore the Armada, at Lutzen, at

Marston, at Leipsic, at Gettysburg. Darius, the Moors, Philip II.,

Wallenstein, Prince Rupert, Bonaparte, the Slave-owners, did not offer

you the opportunity which you would so gladly have embraced, of a

tranquil and amicable discussion among lime-trees and violets. On each

occasion the cause of human progress drew along with it plenty of mud

and slime, nevertheless it was the cause of human progress. On each

occasion the wrong side no doubt had its Falklands, nevertheless it was

the wrong side.

In the beginning of the seventeenth century the Reformation was brought

to the verge of destruction. When Wallenstein sat down before Stralsund

everything was gone but England, Holland, Sweden, and some cantons of

Switzerland. In England the stream of reaction was running strong;

Holland could not have stood by herself; Sweden was nothing as a power,

though it turned out that she had a man. Fortunately the Lambeth Popedom

and the Royal Supremacy prevented the English division of the army of

Reaction from getting into line with the other divisions and compelled

it to accept decisive battle on a separate field against the most

formidable soldiers of the Reformation. These soldiers saved

Protestantism, which was their first object, and they saved English

liberty into the bargain. We who have come after can stand by the

battlefield, pouncet-box in hand, and sniff and sneer as much as we

will.

Great Tew was an anticipation, for ever beautiful and memorable, of the

time when all swords shall be sheathed, and the world shall have entered

into final peace. But in its philosophy there were, as the world then

was, two defects; it did not reach the people, and it was incapable of

protecting its own existence. Laud himself did not care to crush it; he

was an ecclesiastical despot rather than a theological bigot; he had a

genuine respect for learned men; he preferred winning them by gracious

words and preferment to coercing them with the pillory and the shears.

But had Laud's system prevailed, there would soon have been an end of

the philosophy of Great Tew. Mr. Arnold points to the free thought of

Bacon. Nobody in those days scented mischief in the inductive

philosophy, while in politics and religion Bacon was scrupulously

orthodox. Cromwell's faith was a narrower and coarser thing by far than

that of the inmates of the "college in a purer air;" but it brought

religion and morality--not the most genial or rational morality, but

still morality--into the cottage as well as into the manor-house, and it

was able to protect its own existence When it had mounted to power in

the person of its chief, the opinions of Great Tew, and all opinions

that would abstain from trying to overthrow the Government and restore

the tyranny, enjoyed practically larger and more assured liberty than

they had ever enjoyed in England before or were destined to enjoy for

many a year to come. Falkland, says Mr. Arnold, was in the grasp of

_fatality, hence the transcendent interest that attaches to him_.

Cromwell, happily for his cause and for his country, was, or felt

himself to be, not in the grasp of fatality but in the hand of God.

Might we not have done just as well without Puritanism? Might not some

other way have been found of preserving the serious element in English

character and saving English liberty from those who were conspiring for

its destruction? Such questions as these may be asked without end, and

they may be answered by any one who is endowed with a knowledge of men

who were never born, and of events that have never happened. Might not a

way have been found of rescuing the great interests of humanity without

Greek resistance to Persian invasion, or German resistance to the

tyranny of Bonaparte? Suppose in place of the Puritan chiefs there had

been raised up by miracle a set of men at once consummate soldiers and

perfect philosophers, who would have fought and won the battle without

being heated by the conflict. Suppose, to prevent the necessity of any

conflict at all, Charles, Strafford, and Laud had voluntarily abandoned

their designs. As it was, Puritanism did, and alone could do, the work.

What the Renaissance would have been without Puritan morality we can

pretty well guess from the experience of Italy. It would have probably

been like the life of Lorenzo--vice, filthy vice, decorated with art and

with elegant philosophy; an academy under the same roof with a brothel.

There were ages before morality, and there have been ages between the

moralities. There was, in England, an age between the decline of the

Catholic morality and the rise of the Puritan, marked by a laxity of

conduct, public and private, which was partly redeemed but not

neutralized by Elizabethan genius and enterprise. No doubt when the

revival came, there was a High Church as well as a Puritan morality, and

that fact ought always to be borne in mind; but the High Church morality

was inextricably bound up with sacerdotal superstition and with absolute

government; it had no hold on the people; and it found itself

suspiciously at home in the Court of James, in the households of

Somerset and Buckingham, and in the tribunal which lent itself to the

divorce of Essex.

That the Puritan Revolution was followed by a sacerdotal and sensualist

reaction is too true: all revolutions are followed by reactions; it is

one great reason for avoiding them. But let it be remembered, first,

that the disbanded soldiers of the Commonwealth and the other relics of

the Puritan party still remained the most moral and respectable element

in the country; and secondly, that the period of lassitude which follows

great efforts, whether of men or nations, is not altogether the

condemnation of the effort, but partly the weakness of humanity. Nations

as well as men, if they aim high, must sometimes overstrain themselves,

and weariness must ensue. Nor did the Commonwealth of England come to

nothing, though in a society not half emancipated from feudalism it was

premature, and therefore, at the time, a failure. It opened a glimpse of

a new order of things: it was the first example of a great national

republic, the republics of antiquity having been at once city republics

and republics of slave-owners: it not only heralded but, to some extent,

prepared the American and even the French Revolution. In its sublime

death-song, chanted by the great Puritan poet, our ears catch the

accents of a hope that did not die.

The Restoration was the end of the Puritan party, which thenceforth

separated into two portions, the high political element taking the form

of Whiggism, while the more religious element was represented in

subsequent history by the Nonconformists. Under the Marian reaction

Protestantism had been saved, and the errors which it had committed in

its hour of ascendency had been redeemed by the champions, drawn mostly

from the humbler classes, who suffered for it at the stake. Under the

Restoration it was again saved, and the errors which it had once more

committed in the hour of political triumph were once more redeemed by

martyrs of the same class, whose sufferings in the noisome and

pestilential prisons of that day were probably not much less severe than

the pangs of those who died by fire. Both in the Marian and in the

Restoration martyrs of Protestantism there was no doubt much that was

irrational and unattractive; yet the record of their services to

humanity remains, and will remain; let the free-thought of modern times,

for which their self-devoting loyalty to such truth as they knew made

way, be grateful or ungrateful to them as it will.

The relations of Nonconformity, with which we must couple Scotch

Presbyterianism, its partner in fundamental doctrine, its constant ally

in the conflict, and fellow-sufferer in the hour of adversity, to

English religion, morality, industry, education, philanthropy, science,

and to the English civilization in general, would be a most important

and instructive chapter in English history, but we are hardly called

upon to attempt to write it in refutation of jocose charges of

"hideousness" and "immense ennui." A sufficient answer to such quips and

cranks will be found, we believe, within the same covers with Mr.

Arnold's "Falkland," in the shape of an article on the Pulpit, by Mr.

Baldwin Brown, which in tone and culture appears to us a fit companion

for any other paper in the journal.

That Nonconformity has been political is true. Fortunately for the

liberties of England it has had to struggle for civil right in order to

obtain religious freedom. No doubt in the course of the conflict it has

contracted a certain gloominess of character, and shown an unamiable

side. Treat men with persistent and insolent injustice, strip them of

their rights as citizens, put on them a social brand, compel them to pay

for the maintenance of the pulpits from which their religion is

assailed, and you will run a very great risk of souring their tempers.

But without rehearsing disagreeable details, we may say generally that

whoever should undertake to prove that the Established Church had not

been, from the hour of her birth down to the last general election, at

least as political as the Free Churches, and at least as responsible for

the evils which political religion has brought upon the nation, would

show considerable confidence in his powers of dealing with history.

Could he find a parallel on the side of the Established Church to the

magnanimous loyalty to national interests shown by Nonconformists, in

rejecting the bribe offered them by James II., and supporting their

persecutors against an illegal toleration? Could he find a parallel on

the side of the Nonconformists to the conduct of the Established Church,

in turning round, the moment the victory had been won by Nonconformist

aid, and recommencing the persecution of the Nonconformists?

We fully agree with Mr. Arnold, however, in thinking that political

Nonconformity is an evil. There are two known modes of getting rid of

it--the Spanish Inquisition and religious equality. Mr. Arnold seems to

think that there is yet a third--general submission, in matters

theological and ecclesiastical, to the gentle sway of Beau Nash.

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