In England, however, the agricultural element always has been and

remains a full counterpoise to the manufacturing and commercial element.

Agricultural England is not what Pericles called Attica, a mere suburban

garden, the embellishment of a queenly city. It is a substantive

interest and a political power. In the time of Charles I. it happened

that, owing to the great quantity of land thrown into the market in

consequence of the confiscation of the monastic estates, which had

slipped through the fingers of the spendthrift courtiers to whom they

were at first granted, small freeholders were very numerous in the

South, and these men like the middle class in the towns, being strong

Protestants, went with the Parliament against the Laudian reaction in

religion. But land in the hands of great proprietors is Conservative,

especially when it is held under entails and connected with hereditary

nobility; and into the hands of great proprietors the land of England

has now entirely passed. The last remnant of the old yeomen freeholders

departed in the Cumberland Statesmen, and the yeoman freeholder in

England is now about as rare as the other. Commerce has itself assisted

the process by giving birth to great fortunes, the owners of which are

led by social ambition to buy landed estates, because to land the odour

of feudal superiority still clings, and it is almost the necessary

qualification for a title. The land has also actually absorbed a large

portion of the wealth produced by manufactures, and by the general

development of industry; the estates of Northern landowners especially

have enormously increased in value, through the increase of population,

not to mention the not inconsiderable appropriation of commercial wealth

by marriage. Thus the Conservative element retains its predominance, and

it even seems as though the land of Milton, Vane, Cromwell, and the

Reformers of 1832, might after all become, politically as well as

territorially, the domain of a vast aristocracy of landowners, and the

most reactionary instead of the most progressive country in Europe.

Before the repeal of the Corn Laws there was a strong antagonism of

interest between the landowning aristocracy and the manufacturers of the

North, but that antagonism is now at an end; the sympathy of wealth has

taken its place; the old aristocracy has veiled its social pride and

learned to conciliate the new men, who on their part are more than

willing to enter the privileged circle. This junction is at present the

great fact of English politics, and was the main cause of the overthrow

of the Liberal Government in 1874. The growth of the great cities itself

seems likely, as the number of poor householders increases, to furnish

Reaction with auxiliaries in the shape of political Lazzaroni capable of

being organized by wealth in opposition to the higher order of workmen

and the middle class. In Harrington's "Oceana," there is much nonsense,

but it rises at least to the level of Montesquieu in tracing the

intimate connection of political power, even under elective

institutions, with wealth in land.

Hitherto, the result of the balance between the landowning and

commercial elements has been steadiness of political progress, in

contrast on the one hand to the commercial republics of Italy, whose

political progress was precocious and rapid but shortlived, and on the

other hand to great feudal kingdoms where commerce was comparatively

weak. England, as yet, has taken but few steps backwards. It remains to

be seen what the future may bring under the changed conditions which we

have just described. English commerce, moreover, may have passed its

acme. Her insular position gave Great Britain during the Napoleonic

wars, with immunity from invasion, a monopoly of manufactures and of the

carrying trade. This element of her commercial supremacy is transitory,

though others, such as the possession of coal, are not.

Let us now consider the effects of the division between the two islands

and of those between different parts of the larger island. The most

obvious effect of these is tardy consolidation, which is still indicated

by the absence of a collective name for the people of the three

kingdoms. The writer was once rebuked by a Scotchman for saying

"England" and "English," instead of saying "Great Britain" and

"British." He replied that the rebuke was just, but that we must say

"British and Irish." The Scot had overlooked his poor connections.

We always speak of Anglo-Saxons and identify the extension of the

Colonial Empire with that of the Anglo-Saxon race. But even if we assume

that the Celts of England and of the Scotch Lowlands were exterminated

by the Saxons, taking all the elements of Celtic population in the two

islands together, they must bear a very considerable proportion to the

Teutonic element. That large Irish settlements are being formed in the

cities of Northern England is proved by election addresses coquetting

with Home Rule. In the competition of the races on the American

Continent the Irish more than holds its own. In the age of the steam-

engine the Scotch Highlands, the mountains of Cumberland and

Westmoreland, of Wales, of Devonshire, and Cornwall, are the asylum of

natural beauty, of poetry and hearts which seek repose from the din and

turmoil of commercial life. In the primaeval age of conquest they, with

seagirt Ireland, were the asylum of the weaker race. There the Celt

found refuge when Saxon invasion swept him from the open country of

England and from the Scotch Lowlands. There he was preserved with his

own language, indicating by its variety of dialects the rapid flux and

change of unwritten speech; with his own Christianity, which was that of

Apostolic Britain; with his un-Teutonic gifts and weaknesses, his

lively, social, sympathetic nature, his religious enthusiasm,

essentially the same in its Calvinistic as in its Catholic guise, his

superstition, his clannishness, his devotion to chiefs and leaders, his

comparative indifference to institutions, and lack of natural aptitude

for self-government.

The further we go in these inquiries the more reason there seems to be

for believing that the peculiarities of races are not congenital, but

impressed by primaeval circumstance. Not only the same moral and

intellectual nature, but the same primitive institutions, are found in

all the races that come under our view; they appear alike in Teuton,

Celt, and Semite. That which is not congenital is probably not

indelible, so that the less favoured races, placed under happier

circumstances, may in time be brought to the level of the more favoured,

and nothing warrants inhuman pride of race. But it is surely absurd to

deny that peculiarities of race, when formed, are important factors in

history. Mr. Buckle, who is most severe upon the extravagances of the

race theory, himself runs into extravagances not less manifest in a

different direction. He connects the religious character of the

Spaniards with the influence of apocryphal volcanoes and earthquakes,

whereas it palpably had its origin in the long struggle with the Moors.

He, in like manner, connects the theological tendencies of the Scotch

with the thunderstorms which he imagines (wrongly, if we may judge by

our own experience) to be very frequent in the Highlands, whereas Scotch

theology and the religious habits of the Scotch generally were formed in

the Lowlands and among the Teutons, not among the Celts.

The remnant of the Celtic race in Cornwall and West Devon was small, and

was subdued and half incorporated by the Teutons at a comparatively

early period; yet it played a distinct and a decidedly Celtic part in

the Civil War of the seventeenth century. It played a more important

part towards the close of the following century by giving itself almost

in a mass to John Wesley. No doubt the neglect of the remote districts

by the Bishops of Exeter and their clergy left Wesley a clear field; but

the temperament of the people was also in his favour. Anything fervent

takes with the Celt, while he cannot abide the religious compromise

which commends itself to the practical Saxon.

In the Great Charter there is a provision in favour of the Welsh, who

were allied with the Barons in insurrection against the Crown. The

Barons were fighting for the Charter, the Welshmen only for their

barbarous and predatory independence. But the struggle for Welsh

independence helped those who were struggling for the Charter; and the

remark may be extended in substance to the general influence of Wales on

the political contest between the Crown and the Barons. Even under the

House of Lancaster, Llewellyn was faintly reproduced in Owen Glendower.

The powerful monarchy of the Tudors finally completed the annexation.

But isolation survived independence. The Welshman remained a Celt and

preserved his language and his clannish spirit, though local magnates,

such as the family of Wynn, filled the place in his heart once occupied

by the chief. Ecclesiastically he was annexed, but refused to be

incorporated, never seeing the advantage of walking in the middle path

which the State Church of England had traced between the extremes of

Popery and Dissent. He took Methodism in a Calvinistic and almost wildly

enthusiastic form. In this respect his isolation is likely to prove far

more important than anything which Welsh patriotism strives to

resuscitate by Eisteddfodds. In the struggle, apparently imminent,

between the system of Church Establishments and religious equality,

Wales furnishes a most favourable battle-ground to the party of

Disestablishment.

The Teutonic realm of England was powerful enough to subdue, if not to

assimilate, the remnants of the Celtic race in Wales and their other

western hills of refuge. But the Teutonic realm of Scotland was not

large or powerful enough to subdue the Celts of the Highlands, whose

fastnesses constituted in geographical area the greater portion of the

country. It seems that in the case of the Highlands, as in that of

Ireland, Teutonic adventurers found their way into the domain of the

Celts and became chieftains, but in becoming chieftains they became

Celts. Down to the Hanoverian times the chain of the Grampians which

from the Castle of Stirling is seen rising like a wall over the rich

plain, divided from each other two nationalities, differing totally in

ideas, institutions, habits, and costume, as well as in speech, and the

less civilized of which still regarded the more civilized as alien

intruders, while the more civilized regarded the less civilized as

robbers. Internally, the topographical character of the Highlands was

favourable to the continuance of the clan system, because each clan

having its own separate glen, fusion was precluded, and the progress

towards union went no further than the domination of the more powerful

clans over the less powerful. Mountains also preserve the general

equality and brotherhood which are not less essential to the

constitution of the clan than devotion to the chief, by preventing the

use of that great minister of aristocracy, the horse. At Killiecrankie

and Prestonpans the leaders of the clan and the humblest clansman still

charged on foot side by side. Macaulay is undoubtedly right in saying

that the Highland risings against William III. and the first two Georges

were not dynastic but clan movements. They were in fact the last raids

of the Gael upon the country which had been wrested from him by the

Sassenach. Little cared the clansman for the principles of Filmer or

Locke, for the claims of the House of Stuart or for those of the House

of Brunswick. Antipathy to the Clan Campbell was the nearest approach to

a political motive. Chiefs alone, such as the unspeakable Lovat, had

entered as political _condottieri_ into the dynastic intrigues of

the period, and brought the claymores of their clansmen to the standard

of their patron, as Indian chiefs in the American wars brought the

tomahawks of their tribes to the standard of France or England. Celtic

independence greatly contributed to the general perpetuation of anarchy

in Scotland, to the backwardness of Scotch civilization, and to the

abortive weakness of the Parliamentary institutions. Union with the more

powerful kingdom at last supplied the force requisite for the taming of

the Celt. Highlanders, at the bidding of Chatham's genius, became the

soldiers, and are now the pet soldiers, of the British monarchy. A

Hanoverian tailor with improving hand shaped the Highland plaid, which

had originally resembled the simple drapery of the Irish kern, into a

garb of complex beauty, well suited for fancy balls. The power of the

chiefs and the substance of the clan system were finally swept away,

though the sentiment lingers, even in the Transatlantic abodes of the

clansmen, and is prized, like the dress, as a remnant of social

picturesqueness in a prosaic and levelling age. The hills and lakes--at

the thought of which even Gibbon shuddered--are the favourite retreats

of the luxury which seeks in wildness refreshment from civilization.

After Culloden, Presbyterianism effectually made its way into the

Highlands, of which a great part had up to that time been little better

than heathen; but it did not fail to take a strong tinge of Celtic

enthusiasm and superstition.

Of all the lines of division in Great Britain, the most important

politically has been that which is least clearly traced by the hand of

nature. The natural barriers between England and Scotland were not

sufficient to prevent the extension of the Saxon settlements and

kingdoms across the border. In the name of the Scotch capital we have a

monument of a union before that of 1603. That the Norman Conquest did

not include the Saxons of the Scotch Lowlands was due chiefly to the

menacing attitude of Danish pretenders, and the other military dangers

which led the Conqueror to guard himself on the north by a broad belt of

desolation. Edward I., in attempting to extend his feudal supremacy over

Scotland, may well have seemed to himself to have been acting in the

interest of both nations, for a union would have put an end to border

war, and would have delivered the Scotch in the Lowlands from the

extremity of feudal oppression, and the rest of the country from a

savage anarchy, giving them in place of those curses by far the best

government of the time. The resistance came partly from mere barbarism,

partly from Norman adventurers, who were no more Scotch than English,

whose aims were purely selfish, and who would gladly have accepted

Scotland as a vassal kingdom from Edward's hand. But the annexation

would no doubt have formidably increased the power of the Crown, not

only by extending its dominions, but by removing that which was a

support often of aristocratic anarchy in England, but sometimes of

rudimentary freedom. Had the whole island fallen under one victorious

sceptre, the next wielder of that sceptre, under the name of the great

Edward's wittold son, would have been Piers Gaveston. But what no

prescience on the part of any one in the time of Edward I. could

possibly have foreseen was the inestimable benefit which disunion and

even anarchy indirectly conferred on the whole island in the shape of a

separate Scotch Reformation. Divines, when they have exhausted their

reasonings about the rival forms of Church government, will probably

find that the argument which had practically most effect in determining

the question was that of the much decried but in his way sagacious James

I., "No bishop, no king!" In England the Reformation was semi-Catholic;

in Sweden it was Lutheran; but in both countries it was made by the

kings, and in both Episcopacy was retained. Where the Reformation was

the work of the people, more popular forms of Church government

prevailed. In Scotland the monarchy, always weak, was at the time of the

Reformation practically in abeyance, and the master of the movement was

emphatically a man of the people. As to the nobles, they seem to have

thought only of appropriating the Church lands, and to have been willing

to leave to the nation the spiritual gratification of settling its own

religion. Probably they also felt with regard to the disinherited

proprietors of the Church lands that "stone dead had no fellow." The

result was a democratic and thoroughly Protestant Church, which drew

into itself the highest energies, political as well as religious, of a

strong and great-hearted people, and by which Laud and his confederates,

when they had apparently overcome resistance in England, were as Milton

says, "more robustiously handled." If the Scotch auxiliaries did not win

the decisive battle of Marston Moor, they enabled the English

Parliamentarians to fight and win it. During the dark days of the

Restoration, English resistance to tyranny was strongly supported on the

ecclesiastical side by the martyr steadfastness of the Scotch till the

joint effort triumphed in the Revolution. It is singular and sad to find

Scotland afterwards becoming one vast rotten borough managed in the time

of Pitt by Dundas, who paid the borough-mongers by appointments in

India, with calamitous consequences to the poor Hindoo. But the

intensity of the local evil perhaps lent force to the revulsion, and

Scotland has ever since been a distinctly Liberal element in British

politics, and seems now likely to lead the way to a complete measure of

religious freedom.

Nature to a great extent fore-ordained the high destiny of the larger

island, to at least an equal extent she fore-ordained the sad destiny of

the smaller island. Irish history, studied impartially, is a grand

lesson in political charity; so clear is it that in these deplorable

annals the more important part was played by adverse circumstance, the

less important by the malignity of man. That the stronger nation is

entitled by the law of force to conquer its weaker neighbour and to

govern the conquered in its own interest is a doctrine which civilized

morality abhors; but in the days before civilized morality, in the days

when the only law was that of natural selection, to which philosophy, by

a strange counter-revolution seems now inclined to return, the smaller

island was almost sure to be conquered by the possessors of the larger,

more especially as the smaller, cut off from the Continent by the

larger, lay completely within its grasp. The map, in short, tells us

plainly that the destiny of Ireland was subordinated to that of Great

Britain. At the same time, the smaller island being of considerable size

and the channel of considerable breadth, it was likely that the

resistance would be tough and the conquest slow. The unsettled state of

Ireland, and the half-nomad condition in which at a comparatively late

period its tribes remained, would also help to protract the bitter

process of subjugation; and these again were the inevitable results of

the rainy climate, which, while it clothed the island with green and

made pasture abundant, forbade the cultivation of grain. Ireland and

Wales alike appear to have been the scenes of a precocious civilization,

merely intellectual and literary in its character, and closely connected

with the Church, though including also a bardic element derived from the

times before Christianity, the fruits of which were poetry, fantastic

law-making, and probably the germs of scholastic theology, combined, in

the case of Ireland, with missionary enterprise and such ecclesiastical

architecture as the Round Towers. But cities there were none, and it is

evident that the native Church with difficulty sustained her higher life

amidst the influences and encroachments of surrounding barbarism. The

Anglo-Norman conquest of Ireland was a supplement to the Norman conquest

of England; and, like the Norman conquest of England, it was a religious

as well as a political enterprise. As Hildebrand had commissioned

William to bring the national Church of England into complete submission

to the See of Rome, so Adrian, by the Bull which is the stumbling-block

of Irish Catholics, granted Ireland to Henry upon condition of his

reforming, that is, Romanizing, its primitive and schismatic Church.

Ecclesiastical intrigue had already been working in the same direction,

and had in some measure prepared the way for the conqueror by disposing

the heads of the Irish clergy to receive him as the emancipator of the

Church from the secular oppression and imposts of the chiefs. But in the

case of England, a settled and agricultural country, the conquest was

complete and final; the conquerors formed everywhere a new upper class

which, though at first alien and oppressive, became in time a national

nobility, and ultimately blended with the subject race. In the case of

Ireland, though the Septs were easily defeated by the Norman soldiery,

and the formal submission of their chiefs was easily extorted, the

conquest was neither complete nor final. In their hills and bogs the

wandering Septs easily evaded the Norman arms. The Irish Channel was

wide; the road lay through North Wales, long unsubdued, and, even when

subdued, mutinous, and presenting natural obstacles to the passage of

heavy troops; the centre of Anglo-Norman power was far away in the

south-east of England, and the force of the monarchy was either

attracted to Continental fields or absorbed by struggles with baronial

factions. Richard II., coming to a throne which had been strengthened

and exalted by the achievements of his grandfather, seems in one of his

moods of fitful ambition to have conceived the design of completing the

conquest of Ireland, and he passed over with a great power; but his fate

showed that the arm of the monarchy was still too short to reach the

dependency without losing hold upon the imperial country. As a rule, the

subjugation of Ireland during the period before the Tudors was in effect

left to private enterprise, which of course confined its efforts to

objects of private gain, and never thought of undertaking the systematic

subjugation of native fortresses in the interest of order and

civilization. Instead of a national aristocracy the result was a

military colony or Pale, between the inhabitants of which and the

natives raged a perpetual border war, as savage as that between the

settlers at the Cape and the Kaffirs, or that between the American

frontierman and the Red Indian. The religious quarrel was and has always

been secondary in importance to the struggle of the races for the land.

In the period following the conquest it was the Pale that was

distinctively Romanist; but when at the Reformation the Pale became

Protestant the natives, from antagonism of race, became more intensely

Catholic, and were drawn into the league of Catholic powers on the

Continent, in which they suffered the usual fate of the dwarf who goes

to battle with the giant. By the strong monarchy of the Tudors the

conquest of Ireland was completed with circumstances of cruelty

sufficient to plant undying hatred in the breasts of the people. But the

struggle for the land did not end there, instead of the form of conquest

it took that of confiscation, and was waged by the intruder with the

arms of legal chicane. In the form of eviction it has lasted to the

present hour; and eviction in Ireland is not like eviction in England,

where great manufacturing cities receive and employ the evicted; it is

starvation or exile. Into exile the Irish people have gone by millions,

and thus, though neither maritime nor by nature colonists, they have had

a great share in the peopling of the New World. The cities and railroads

of the United States are to a great extent the monuments of their

labour. In the political sphere they have retained the weakness produced

by ages of political serfage, and are still the _debris_ of broken

clans, with little about them of the genuine republican, apt blindly to

follow the leader who stands to them as a chief, while they are

instinctively hostile to law and government as their immemorial

oppressors in their native land. British statesmen, when they had

conceded Catholic emancipation and afterwards Disestablishment, may have

fancied that they had removed the root of the evil. But the real root

was not touched till Parliament took up the question of the land, and

effected a compromise which may perhaps have to be again revised before

complete pacification is attained.

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