_THE DIFFERENTIATION OF FEAR_
Fear, according to the analysis we have made, includes representation of
object in its feeling value, predominant tone of mental pain, and will
recoil. Fear in its primitive form, as we have seen, was a sudden and
transitory phenomenon in consciousness, a simple thrill of feeling
awaking will to spasmodic violent effort in the struggle for existence.
All states of fear in early psychical history were practically alike in
quantity, quality and intensity. Every fear is like every other fear in
its pain tone and will effort. Every object and event considered as
painful is equally feared; there is no distinction of more or less fear,
nor any qualitative differentiation. Very young children manifest equal
fear disturbance and seemingly identical in nature on all fearful
occasions. Prospect of vaccination, of a scratch, of the pulling of a
tooth, of a whipping, of an amputation, produce equally paroxysms of
fear, waves of painful emotion, which discharge themselves in muscular
contortions. The lowest animals likewise appear in all cases frightened
to the same degree and in the same way. It must be said, however, that
this period of simple undifferentiated fear is undoubtedly very brief,
and embraces in the individual and the race but a comparatively small
number of phenomena; but a careful study, even by the method of
approximation will, I believe, show it to be a definite initial phase.
While this primitive undifferentiated fear, which acts with the same
force and quality in all instances, confers upon the organism which
possesses it a great superiority over those which do not possess it, in
the race for life, and thus marks a great advance in psychical progress,
yet it is manifestly uneconomical in its action in that there should be
precisely the same amount and quality of reaction in all cases. So when
a considerable number of organisms had attained the power to fear,
competition would inevitably lead to some differentiation, and this
doubtless first in the direction of greater economy. The animal which
could fear much or little, according to the degree of actual injury
threatened, would have a great advantage in the struggle for existence
over his fellows. The amount of pain in prospect is definitely gauged,
and the fear pain becomes proportioned thereto, and so the will effort
and muscular exertions. Fear in its earliest form sets the whole motor
apparatus going at the highest rate, the whole organism is at the
highest pitch of activity, and life and death struggle happens at every
apprehension of pain, no matter how small the reality. Later, through
discrimination, animals become capable of either a slight scare or a
great fear, according to circumstances. The fear force is gradually
rationalized and made less spasmodic and so more adaptive. The fear pain
becomes proportioned to the real amount of pain and so to injury
actually imminent.
This mode of evolution by decrease rather than increase of intensity
may seem peculiar. Fear, however, certainly originates as a simple
outburst of considerable strength relative to the individual organism,
and the first step in fear growth is a development in the
representation-of-object element in fear which tends to reduce the
essence of fear as pain-emotion. Spasmodic primitive fear in becoming
intelligent loses intensity in the essential feeling aspect. Other
things being equal, the intensity of fear is inversely as the
definition of its object. The dimly and uncertainly known is always
thereby more fearful than the well known and familiar. However, as
regards primitive psychism, we must remark that all phenomena are very
large in relative quantity to individual capacity, but very small in
absolute psychological quantity. A fear which convulses a very small
mind would make but a very small disturbance in a mind of very great
capacity. An amount of fear which would absorb completely one
consciousness capacity, would require comparatively little force in a
mind of greater calibre. The lowest minds are possessed by their
fears, higher minds possess them, do not “lose their heads,” _i.e._,
both cognition and will co-exist as stable controlling elements.
Primitive consciousness is constantly at saturation point, phenomena
occur only in linear consecutive order, and every phenomenon is a
feeling-willing which absorbs the low conscious capacity. It may then,
perhaps, be regarded that the evolution of fear is not through
absolute decrease in intensity, but an increase of conscious capacity,
whereby greater definition of object becomes possible and coincident
with fear-pain of original quantity. The complete determination of
this question must then await a fuller analysis, but the relation to
individual capacity in the evolution of fear remains apparent.
Whatever may be the absolute quantity and intensity of the fear
phenomenon, its relative quantity and intensity changes very greatly.
The number of adaptive degrees of fear which are ultimately evolved and
of which any very high mind is susceptible, is quite beyond our present
means of psychological analysis. We have no phobometer to register all
the gradations, other than the popular usage of language, but between “I
was scared just the least bit,” and “I was scared stiff,” or “scared to
death,” there is certainly a vast number of intermediaries. Terror is an
intensive term denoting strong fear, and a terrible fright is a
redundancy for extreme fear. By the use of adjectives and various
qualifying phases we roughly denote a number of fear degrees, but
scientific precision is wholly lacking. Such expressions as “I have very
little fear of him,” “I fear him a little,” “I fear him greatly,” “I
fear him very much,” convey a meaning indeed, but no exact measurement
is indicated.
Terror is often used as a term not merely for fear in general, but for
fear which paralyzes by its force. The individual is often “rooted to
the spot” by terror, he loses all power of motion and becomes as an
inert mass. With animals even of the lower grades this is doubtless
often a pathological manifestation. We find that predatory animals are
often furnished with apparatus to inspire benumbing fear in their
victims. Various means, as inflation of size, strident noises, etc., are
employed with great effect. On the other hand, we find that predacious
animals seek to reduce the stimulus of fear in their victims by quieting
and alluring methods. Both hypertrophy and atrophy of fear are
disadvantageous, and we should see then in paralyzing terror an instance
of over-development of useful function which produces the direct
opposite of the normal fear. Fear, the great means of salvation to all
weaker organisms, is also in its highest intensities taken advantage of
by enemies. Hence the due graduation and restraint of fear becomes one
of the most important lines of mental evolution for the organism preyed
upon, but the over stimulation or undue weakening of the fear function
in its prey becomes a most important object and advantage for the
predacious animal. This evolution is often by the individual
disadvantageous variation when this is advantage to some other organism;
and, as living beings are soon divided into the two classes, those who
flee and those who pursue, the destroying and preserving of the chief
psychological defence becomes a leading form of psychic growth of a
pathologic character. Fear in its origin was certainly a stimulant to
action and not sedative. However, so far as fear effects an unconscious
mimicry of death it often reaches thereby negatively to conservative
action, and paralyzing fear is thus explained by the general law of
advantage in the struggle for existence. We can then trace a double
evolution of fear, on the one hand as leading to action, on the other to
inaction, but the former will, I think, be found to be the primitive
form. The primary and main function of fear in all life is in a duly
modulated energizing in view of approaching injury, and the depressing
mode is secondary and exceptional.
Again, we must remark upon the sense of personal weakness, or,
objectively stated, the sense of overwhelming power, as entering into
fear. I cannot agree with Mr. Mercier that this is a mark of all fear.
In its origin and early gradations fear, as we have noticed it in the
immediately preceding paragraphs, requires no other cognition than that
of pain to come. Self-measurement of power in relation to that of pain
giving object is certainly too complex to be primitive, nor do the
simplest forms of fear as we observe them in ourselves and judge of them
in lower organisms pre-suppose any such process. Primitively every
perception of painful event fills consciousness with the impetuous
self-conserving fear revulsion. There is neither time nor capacity for
estimating one’s own strength or weakness in relation to opposing power.
By the very low intelligence only the immediately imminent is
apprehended, and action is always immediate, short, and decisive. In
fact, it is now probable that originally painful events are really
actualized by the mind, and the fear is thus at the event as actual,
rather than as ideal, as represented as to be. Certain it is that mind,
in its hurry to get ahead of natural harmful agencies in their action,
must in its earliest pre-apprehensions have no room or time for dynamic
interpretations.
Of course the whole value of sense of one’s own superior power is in
fear, thereby securing the contingency of the painful event, but sense
of contingency upon one’s own efforts no doubt first occurs at a
considerably advanced stage, much beyond that of simple fear.
Primitively mind regards events as being, or about to be, with no sense
either of their certainty or uncertainty. Early mind cannot appreciate
certainty, for it knows not uncertainty, it has not yet accomplished the
prevision to which certainty and uncertainty may attach; it cannot say,
“I fear this will happen,” or “I fear that will not happen,” but only “I
fear or do not fear the thing happening, the event coming.” The world of
the earliest psychical life is simply factual, and the fears are simple
and wholly undifferentiated. Fear certainly antedates the perception of
contingency and of one’s own agency in producing contingency. Even in
the ordinary fears in human consciousness sense of personal power in
relation to pain-giver is actually subsequent to the fear phenomenon and
reacts upon it, but is not constitutive of it in its first impulse.
Fear is first graduated by the increasing discrimination as to the
amount of pain and injury to be inflicted, and later it is graduated by
the sense of the painful event as more or less contingent, either in the
natural course of things, or as determined by the individual’s strength
in warding off impending evil. Taking chances and risks is learned, and
becomes often very advantageous. Fear is also greatly diminished and
modified by acquiring a sense of one’s individual power in overcoming or
resisting pain given. The rabbit, often chased by a clumsy dog,
evidently fears him less and less. Man, both by his increasing knowledge
of natural contingencies and by his increasing power over elemental and
animal pain-giving forces, fears less and less. The inevitable evil,
sure to come, and sure to overcome, is that which strikes intensest
fear, as we often see in criminals led to execution.
The discrimination between the animate and the inanimate also
differentiates fear. When this distinction is fully achieved, the
attitude of mind toward each in fear is plainly distinct. The thing,
perceived as having psychic powers, and capable of purposive evil and
self-directive of its movements, awakens thereby a complex of feelings
which rapidly develops beyond our present powers of analysis to follow
them. For the present sketch of the early natural history of fear it is
sufficient merely to remark this differentiation as one of prime value
in the struggle for existence.
However, as we have before suggested (p. 106), the nature of fear,
purely in itself considered, does not depend on the nature of the object
feared; thus fear of cold and fear of heat are perfectly alike as
psychic facts, though having regard to very diverse physical facts.
Animistic mind, indeed, reacts to all objects differently from
naturalistic mind, yet in its essential quality fear is identical in
both. In fear of a storm, both as a purely physical manifestation and as
the expression of the psychical nature of a deity, the fear act is by
itself quite the same; the fear pain and the willing are quite the same,
but on the more external, the representation side, they do greatly
differ, the complication being greater in the latter instance, and
introducing a complex of feelings. Fear in the narrowest sense does not
reach to the object to consider its nature, to regard its objective
quality, for this is the base of very different feelings; but fear
proper is engrossed in object purely for its immediate pain
significance; it is given up to viewing personal pain infliction. I am
inclined to think, then, that we shall find that mind is primarily
neither animistic nor naturalistic. The only interpretation of object
which is first made is as pain or pleasure given, and a personalizing
and impersonalizing stage is decidedly later. We must remember that mind
at first goes only so far as it is positively obliged to by the struggle
for existence; and hence, though it is quite impossible for us to fully
realize such a simple state, yet originally objects were discriminated
merely as pleasure and pain sources. Object at first was of the more
vague sort, merely an indefinite _locus_ for pleasure-pain; something
painful or pleasurable is the discrimination, but attribution of
sentiency or insentiency is not yet reached, for no interpretation of
the sort is yet imperatively demanded. It is so ingrained in us to
perceive beings as either living or non-living, that it is quite
impossible to thoroughly conceive a state so primitive as to be unable
to rise to this attribution or distinction. However, like the bare
statement of a fourth dimension in space, the statement that
pre-animistic mind exists or has existed, a way of looking at objects
entirely without reference to their personal or impersonal quality—this
is intelligible, and hypothetically required by a complete theory of the
evolution of mind. In a _dolce far niente_ of perfect sensuousness, even
the adult man sometimes approximates this stage, and the actions of very
young infants are best interpreted as expressions of a similar state.
Things for them seem entirely uninterpreted and unperceived, except as
imparters of crass sensual pains and pleasures, as mere pleasure-pain
potencies.
A very important differentiation of fear is brought about by the
extension of the time sense. Fear begins with a _minimum_ of time sense;
only the immediately impending, the absolutely imminent danger, suffices
to awaken fear. But in the struggle for existence the advantage of being
influenced for action by the more and more remote, in time, determines a
rapid extension in time to feared events. With man actions are thus
influenced by fears, which reach even beyond the present life. The
cautious and prudent are those whose fears are far-sighted, and who,
conducting themselves accordingly, maintain supremacy over the
short-sighted and improvident. _Carpe diem_ is, from the point of view
of evolutionary psychology, the cry of the retrogressive fool.
The time differentiation of fear is recognised in popular language in
the term—dread. I am frightened in the night by a sudden noise; I am
alarmed for the safety of a child awaking near a precipice; but I dread
next week’s task. Of course dread, like other popular psychological
terms, is plastic, and often denotes fear in general, and is often used
intensively, or to denote vague fear, still it is the most correct and
distinctive term for fear of a more or less remote event. It would be
most interesting to investigate the relation of distance in time of
feared event to intensity of the fear, but we have as yet no standards
for estimating in mathematical ratios either time or intensity
psychologically considered. It is not, of course, physical determination
of time as minutes, hours, etc., with which we are concerned, but only
with variations in sense of nearness or remoteness of event. Our sense
of time is most variable, and fluctuates from many causes, so that hours
sometimes seem minutes, and minutes at other times seem hours. However,
there is, doubtless, other things being equal, some fixed relation
between our sense of the nearness and remoteness of a fearful event and
the intensity of the fear, but we may well doubt whether it can ever be
reduced to any law of inverse squares like that of physical intensities.
A criminal sentenced to die at the expiration of thirty days certainly
has a marked increase in fear as time approaches, or rather, as he has
sense of the time approaching, but a quantitative analysis is beyond our
present powers.
A most important but tolerably late differentiation is the altruistic
form of fear—fear, not of others, but for others. Psychic life is at
first wholly self-centred, there is no perception of things or interest
in them otherwise than as bearing on the experience of the self. Other
selves are wholly unrecognised, and pain-giving effects to them are then
unperceivable. In very young infants we see a close approximation to
primitive selfish life. The exact point in the history of life when
altruism is developed by the struggle of existence is not at present
determinable, but we may well believe that it arose with the evolution
of the sexes in separate individuals. Fear for mate and offspring is
obviously an essential advantage in the progress and perpetuation of the
kind. Pure altruism is not at first attained, and there is only the
faintest gleam of appreciation of pain-states in others, and genuine
feeling therefor. The sexual appetite is, like other appetites, purely
selfish at first, and the animal fears the loss of what will satisfy in
an individualistic way, quite as he fears that food may be taken away or
destroyed. Even in higher psychisms much that we readily interpret as
altruistic is often mainly personal; it is not a true regard and emotion
at pain and injury imminent to others, a manifestation of feeling at
their experience as such, but mostly a feeling for their experience only
so far as it involves our pleasure-pain. When sociality and
interdependence of organisms is attained as a great advantage in the
struggle of life, when personal experience is perceived as dependent
upon experiences of others, then a feeling value attaches to the
experienceable for others, yet selfishly at first. Even parental
oversight and care must originally have been selfish—the satisfaction of
a personal craving, rather than the promotion of the well-being of
another, considered for its own sake. Real and pure altruism must,
indeed, be accounted, even in human society, as a rare phenomenon,
perfect self-forgetfulness being almost impossible even for the most
developed consciousness, owing to the strength and persistence of an
indefinite heredity of selfishness. Fear for others is, then, in truth,
merely an indirect fear for ourselves; and particularly so is this true
in all lower consciousness. But we must acknowledge that elements of
real altruism do enter and do grow in value and strength in the
evolution of consciousness, and we must, if we adhere strictly to the
principle of personal advantage as determining evolution, find a reason
here for a singular and seemingly incompatible manifestation. Regard for
the good of others is not always indirectly regard for personal good,
and self-sacrifice is certainly an element in psychic life, even in
lower consciousness, where we often seem to see a distinct struggle
between egoistic fear and altruistic fear, as in animals protecting
their young. But we see the same in an animal defending food from being
acquired by its enemies.
Advantage for the race is certainly gained, but this wholly
unconsciously; and it plays no part in the actual psychism of the
individual. In a highly social, which is also in the most effective and
advantageous mode of life, it is certain that the purely self-seeking
will be at a disadvantage in general, whereas those who give themselves
up to help others are by others so helped, that the final _status_ of
the individual is higher and better than if he had been wholly a
self-seeker. However, he who, perceiving this law, sets out to be
altruistic for his own ends, invariably suffers defeat in the long run,
for entire disinterestedness can alone avail. But the problem of
altruism, from an evolutionary point of view, cannot here be further
remarked on; a fuller discussion would lead us too far afield. However,
we are convinced that altruism springs up and grows like the other
elements of psychic life, as functional in the largest way to the
demands of life in the struggle for existence.
Horror is a distinctive term for altruistic fear. When on a train, I am
_terrified_ if I perceive a collision imminent and inevitable, but as a
mere spectator walking near the tracks, I am _horrified_ by the prospect
of a collision. One may be “in mortal terror,” but not in mortal horror.
Our sense of the feelings of others towards us, whether they be egoistic
or altruistic, determines a large class of reflex emotions which are
often very subtle. If we perceive that some one is fearing us or fearing
for us there is immediate reaction on our part. Feeling response to
feeling acts and reacts in a multitude of complex ways, as we cannot but
observe when in the company of very “sensitive” people. The “sensitive”
one is he whose emotional life is governed by his perception of the
feelings of others toward himself, and he becomes wonderfully responsive
to the least expressions of emotion toward himself. The delicate
responsiveness of women, their intuitions, are merely quick
perceptiveness of emotion expression. The fears of such are largely
concerned with this dependence on the emotional attitudes of others
toward themselves; they fear to incur displeasure, they fear loss of
love, etc. Thus psychical phenomena become more and more determined by
psychical phenomena as interpreted and considered with reference to the
self. Panic is contagious fear, and has originated and been developed as
securing mutual safety in societies of animals. However, there is less
real fear on occasions of panic than is often supposed, for much of the
expression which we read as fear inspired is really merely imitative,
and does not signify any real basis of emotion. Moreover, we must note
that there is no direct contagion, but the perception of fear in others
merely leads us to dimly body forth some fearful events as impending,
which representation involves the full phenomenon of fear. There is also
a discrimination as to those who shall impart fear; the fear of a child
on shipboard will not start a panic, while the fear of a captain would.
Convinced that there is something worth fearing, we fear, and make
frantic efforts to escape.
We have before mentioned (p. 89) the peculiar fear of fear. The latest
and culminating differentiation of fear is awe, and the highest, most
refined development of awe is in the feeling for the sublime. The sense
of magnitude and mighty potency of injurious agents or agencies in
themselves considered, and not as immediately affecting the individual
or any individual, is the essential element in awe as a species of fear.
This fear is then neither egoistic nor altruistic, but impersonal. We
fear neither for ourselves nor others in standing awestruck at the foot
of Niagara, but a sense of overwhelming greatness and might stirs a
thrill of emotion which is at bottom a sublimation of fear. The view
which to a peasant or an animal would give terror, or produce no
emotional effect whatever, with very rational and sensitive minds
produces awe. Awe does not, as early emotions and fear generally, lead
directly to will, it is not a stimulant to action, and thus has not been
evolved by the principle of usefulness for action which governs the
general course of physiological and psychical evolution. It is evident
that with awe and the sense of the sublime emotion has a value and end
in itself. In the higher evolution of man we see that the psychic
elements evolve no longer in a strict dependency for their value in
securing advantage and success in the struggle for existence, but
comfortable existence being practically assured, psychic development is
pushed on in lines ethical, emotional and intellectual, for no practical
end, but for their own intrinsic value. Thus the feeling for the sublime
is a purely independent development, which, indeed, is based upon man’s
capacity to fear egoistically and altruistically, but is really
exercised solely for its own sake. A consciousness which has had no
common fear stage, could never arrive at awe. We stand in awe of persons
who are totally beyond us in their superiority, who exist in a sphere of
power and glory, which transcends even our understanding, and thus awe
has a religious as well as æsthetic side.
The chief differentiations then of fear we note as intensive dread, as
altruistic horror, as impersonal awe. The chronological order of
evolution may be denoted in this order—fright, alarm, terror, dread,
horror.