THE PASSAGE OF THE RHONE.
B.C. 217
Difficulties anticipated.--Reconnoitering party.--Some tribes
reduced.--Alarm of the Gauls.--The Alps.--Difficulty of their
passage.--Hannibal's message to the Gauls.--Success of his
policy.--Cornelius Scipio.--He embarks his army.--Both armies on
the Rhone.--Exploring party.--Feelings of the Gauls in respect
to Hannibal.--The Gauls beyond the river oppose Hannibal's
passage.--Preparations for crossing the river.--Boat
building.--Rafts.--The enemy look on in silence.--Difficulties of
crossing a river.--Hannibal's tactics.--His stratagem.--Detachment
under Hanno.--Success of Hanno.--The signal.--Passage of the
river.--Scene of confusion.--Attack of Hanno.--Flight of the
Gauls.--Transportation of the elephants.--Manner of doing it.--A
new plan.--Huge rafts.--The elephants got safely over.--The
reconnoitering parties.--The detachments meet.--A battle ensues.
Hannibal, after he had passed the Pyrenees, did not anticipate any new
difficulty till he should arrive at the Rhone. He knew very well that
that was a broad and rapid river, and that he must cross it near its
mouth, where the water was deep and the banks low; and, besides, it
was not impossible that the Romans who were coming to meet him, under
Cornelius Scipio, might have reached the Rhone before he should arrive
there, and be ready upon the banks to dispute his passage. He had sent
forward, therefore, a small detachment in advance, to reconnoiter the
country and select a route to the Rhone, and if they met with no
difficulties to arrest them there, they were to go on till they
reached the Alps, and explore the passages and defiles through which
his army could best cross those snow-covered mountains.
It seems that before he reached the Pyrenees--that is, while he was
upon the Spanish side of them, some of the tribes through whose
territories he had to pass undertook to resist him, and he,
consequently, had to attack them and reduce them by force; and then,
when he was ready to move on, he left a guard in the territories thus
conquered to keep them in subjection. Rumors of this reached Gaul. The
Gauls were alarmed for their own safety. They had not intended to
oppose Hannibal so long as they supposed that he only wished for a
safe passage through their country on his way to Italy; but now, when
they found, from what had occurred in Spain, that he was going to
conquer the countries he traversed as he passed along, they became
alarmed. They seized their arms, and assembled in haste at Ruscino,
and began to devise measures of defense. Ruscino was the same place as
that in which the Roman embassadors met the great council of the Gauls
on their return to Italy from Carthage.
While this great council, or, rather, assembly of armies, was
gathering at Ruscino, full of threats and anger, Hannibal was at
Illiberis, a town at the foot of the Pyrenean Mountains. He seems to
have had no fear that any opposition which the Gauls could bring to
bear against him would be successful, but he dreaded the delay. He
was extremely unwilling to spend the precious months of the early
summer in contending with such foes as they, when the road to Italy
was before him. Besides, the passes of the Alps, which are difficult
and laborious at any time, are utterly impracticable except in the
months of July and August. At all other seasons they are, or were in
those days, blocked up with impassable snows. In modern times roads
have been made, with galleries cut through the rock, and with the
exposed places protected by sloping roofs projecting from above, over
which storms sweep and avalanches slide without injury; so that now
the intercourse of ordinary travel between France and Italy, across
the Alps, is kept up, in some measure, all the year. In Hannibal's
time, however, the mountains could not be traversed except in the
summer months, and if it had not been that the result justified the
undertaking, it would have been considered an act of inexcusable
rashness and folly to attempt to cross with an army at all.
Hannibal had therefore no time to lose, and that circumstance made
this case one of those in which forbearance and a show of generosity
were called for, instead of defiance and force. He accordingly sent
messengers to the council at Ruscino to say, in a very complaisant and
affable manner, that he wished to see and confer with their princes in
person, and that, if they pleased, he would advance for this purpose
toward Ruscino; or they might, if they preferred, come on toward him
at Illiberis, where he would await their arrival. He invited them to
come freely into his camp, and said that he was ready, if they were
willing to receive him, to go into theirs, for he had come to Gaul as
a friend and an ally, and wanted nothing but a free passage through
their territory. He had made a resolution, he said, if the Gauls would
but allow him to keep it, that there should not be a single sword
drawn in his army till he got into Italy.
The alarm and the feelings of hostility which prevailed among the
Gauls were greatly allayed by this message. They put their camp in
motion, and went on to Illiberis. The princes and high officers of
their armies went to Hannibal's camp, and were received with the
highest marks of distinction and honor. They were loaded with
presents, and went away charmed with the affability, the wealth, and
the generosity of their visitor. Instead of opposing his progress,
they became the conductors and guides of his army. They took them
first to Ruscino, which was, as it were, their capital, and thence,
after a short delay, the army moved on without any further molestation
toward the Rhone.
In the mean time, the Roman consul Scipio, having embarked the troops
destined to meet Hannibal in sixty ships at the mouth of the Tiber,
set sail for the mouth of the Rhone. The men were crowded together in
the ships, as armies necessarily must be when transported by sea. They
could not go far out to sea, for, as they had no compass in those
days, there were no means of directing the course of navigation, in
case of storms or cloudy skies, except by the land. The ships
accordingly made their way slowly along the shore, sometimes by means
of sails and sometimes by oars, and, after suffering for some time the
hardships and privations incident to such a voyage--the sea-sickness
and the confinement of such swarming numbers in so narrow a space
bringing every species of discomfort in their train--the fleet entered
the mouth of the Rhone. The officers had no idea that Hannibal was
near. They had only heard of his having crossed the Iberus. They
imagined that he was still on the other side of the Pyrenees. They
entered the Rhone by the first branch they came to--for the Rhone,
like the Nile, divides near its mouth, and flows into the sea by
several separate channels--and sailed without concern up to
Marseilles, imagining that their enemy was still hundreds of miles
away, entangled, perhaps, among the defiles of the Pyrenees. Instead
of that, he was safely encamped upon the banks of the Rhone, a short
distance above them, quietly and coolly making his arrangements for
crossing it.
When Cornelius got his men upon the land, they were too much exhausted
by the sickness and misery they had endured upon the voyage to move on
to meet Hannibal without some days for rest and refreshment.
Cornelius, however, selected three hundred horsemen who were able to
move, and sent them up the river on an exploring expedition, to learn
the facts in respect to Hannibal, and to report them to him.
Dispatching them accordingly, he remained himself in his camp,
reorganizing and recruiting his army, and awaiting the return of the
party that he had sent to explore.
Although Hannibal had thus far met with no serious opposition in his
progress through Gaul it must not, on that account, be supposed that
the people, through whose territories he was passing, were really
friendly to his cause, or pleased with his presence among them. An
army is always a burden and a curse to any country that it enters,
even when its only object is to pass peacefully through. The Gauls
assumed a friendly attitude toward this dreaded invader and his horde
only because they thought that by so doing he would the sooner pass
and be gone. They were too weak, and had too few means of resistance
to attempt to stop him; and, as the next best thing that they could
do, resolved to render him every possible aid to hasten him on. This
continued to be the policy of the various tribes until he reached the
river. The people on the _further_ side of the river, however, thought
it was best for them to resist. They were nearer to the Roman
territories, and, consequently, somewhat more under Roman influence.
They feared the resentment of the Romans if they should, even
passively, render any co-operation to Hannibal in his designs; and, as
they had the broad and rapid river between them and their enemy, they
thought there was a reasonable prospect that, with its aid, they could
exclude him from their territories altogether.
Thus it happened that, when Hannibal came to the stream, the people on
one side were all eager to promote, while those on the other were
determined to prevent his passage, both parties being animated by the
same desire to free their country from such a pest as the presence of
an army of ninety thousand men; so that Hannibal stood at last upon
the banks of the river, with the people on _his_ side of the stream
waiting and ready to furnish all the boats and vessels that they could
command, and to render every aid in their power in the embarkation,
while those on the other were drawn up in battle array, rank behind
rank, glittering with weapons, marshaled so as to guard every place of
landing, and lining with pikes the whole extent of the shore, while
the peaks of their tents, in vast numbers, with banners among them
floating in the air, were to be seen in the distance behind them. All
this time, the three hundred horsemen which Cornelius had dispatched
were slowly and cautiously making their way up the river from the
Roman encampment below.
After contemplating the scene presented to his view at the river for
some time in silence, Hannibal commenced his preparations for crossing
the stream. He collected first all the boats of every kind which
could be obtained among the Gauls who lived along the bank of the
river. These, however, only served for a beginning, and so he next got
together all the workmen and all the tools which the country could
furnish, for several miles around, and went to work constructing more.
The Gauls of that region had a custom of making boats of the trunks of
large trees. The tree, being felled and cut to the proper length, was
hollowed out with hatchets and adzes, and then, being turned bottom
upward, the outside was shaped in such a manner as to make it glide
easily through the water. So convenient is this mode of making boats,
that it is practiced, in cases where sufficiently large trees are
found, to the present day. Such boats are now called canoes.
There were plenty of large trees on the banks of the Rhone. Hannibal's
soldiers watched the Gauls at their work, in making boats of them,
until they learned the art themselves. Some first assisted their new
allies in the easier portions of the operation, and then began to fell
large trees and make the boats themselves. Others, who had less skill
or more impetuosity chose not to wait for the slow process of
hollowing the wood, and they, accordingly, would fell the trees upon
the shore, cut the trunks of equal lengths, place them side by side in
the water, and bolt or bind them together so as to form a raft. The
form and fashion of their craft was of no consequence, they said, as
it was for one passage only. Any thing would answer, if it would only
float and bear its burden over.
In the mean time, the enemy upon the opposite shore looked on, but
they could do nothing to impede these operations. If they had had
artillery, such as is in use at the present day, they could have fired
across the river, and have blown the boats and rafts to pieces with
balls and shells as fast as the Gauls and Carthaginians could build
them. In fact, the workmen could not have built them under such a
cannonading; but the enemy, in this case, had nothing but spears, and
arrows, and stones, to be thrown either by the hand, or by engines far
too weak to send them with any effect across such a stream. They had
to look on quietly, therefore, and allow these great and formidable
preparations for an attack upon them to go on without interruption.
Their only hope was to overwhelm the army with their missiles, and
prevent their landing, when they should reach the bank at last in
their attempt to cross the stream.
If an army is crossing a river without any enemy to oppose them, a
moderate number of boats will serve, as a part of the army can be
transported at a time, and the whole gradually transferred from one
bank to the other by repeated trips of the same conveyances. But when
there is an enemy to encounter at the landing, it is necessary to
provide the means of carrying over a very large force at a time; for
if a small division were to go over first alone, it would only throw
itself, weak and defenseless, into the hands of the enemy. Hannibal,
therefore, waited until he had boats, rafts, and floats enough
constructed to carry over a force all together sufficiently numerous
and powerful to attack the enemy with a prospect of success.
The Romans, as we have already remarked, say that Hannibal was
cunning. He certainly was not disposed, like Alexander, to trust in
his battles to simple superiority of bravery and force, but was always
contriving some stratagem to increase the chances of victory. He did
so in this case. He kept up for many days a prodigious parade and
bustle of building boats and rafts in sight of his enemy, as if his
sole reliance was on the multitude of men that he could pour across
the river at a single transportation, and he thus kept their
attention closely riveted upon these preparations. All this time,
however, he had another plan in course of execution. He had sent a
strong body of troops secretly up the river, with orders to make their
way stealthily through the forests, and cross the stream some few
miles above. This force was intended to move back from the river, as
soon as it should cross the stream, and come down upon the enemy in
the rear, so as to attack and harass them there at the same time that
Hannibal was crossing with the main body of the army. If they
succeeded in crossing the river safely, they were to build a fire in
the woods, on the other side, in order that the column of smoke which
should ascend from it might serve as a signal of their success to
Hannibal.
This detachment was commanded by an officer named Hanno--of course a
very different man from Hannibal's great enemy of that name in
Carthage. Hanno set out in the night, moving back from the river, in
commencing his march, so as to be entirely out of sight from the Gauls
on the other side. He had some guides, belonging to the country, who
promised to show him a convenient place for crossing. The party went
up the river about twenty-five miles. Here they found a place where
the water spread to a greater width, and where the current was less
rapid, and the water not so deep. They got to this place in silence
and secrecy, their enemies below not having suspected any such design.
As they had, therefore, nobody to oppose them, they could cross much
more easily than the main army below. They made some rafts for
carrying over those of the men that could not swim, and such munitions
of war as would be injured by the wet. The rest of the men waded till
they reached the channel, and then swam, supporting themselves in part
by their bucklers, which they placed beneath their bodies in the
water. Thus they all crossed in safety. They paused a day, to dry
their clothes and to rest, and then moved cautiously down the river
until they were near enough to Hannibal's position to allow their
signal to be seen. The fire was then built, and they gazed with
exultation upon the column of smoke which ascended from it high into
the air.
Hannibal saw the signal, and now immediately prepared to cross with
his army. The horsemen embarked in boats, holding their horses by
lines, with a view of leading them into the water so that they might
swim in company with the boats. Other horses, bridled and accoutered,
were put into large flat-bottomed boats, to be taken across dry, in
order that they might be all ready for service at the instant of
landing. The most vigorous and efficient portion of the army were, of
course, selected for the first passage, while all those who, for any
cause, were weak or disabled, remained behind, with the stores and
munitions of war, to be transported afterward, when the first passage
should have been effected. All this time the enemy, on the opposite
shore, were getting their ranks in array, and making every thing ready
for a furious assault upon the invaders the moment they should
approach the land.
There was something like silence and order during the period while the
men were embarking and pushing out from the land, but as they advanced
into the current, the loud commands, and shouts, and outcries
increased more and more, and the rapidity of the current and of the
eddies by which the boats and rafts were hurried down the stream, or
whirled against each other, soon produced a terrific scene of tumult
and confusion. As soon as the first boats approached the land, the
Gauls assembled to oppose them rushed down upon them with showers of
missiles, and with those unearthly yells which barbarous warriors
always raise in going into battle, as a means both of exciting
themselves and of terrifying their enemy. Hannibal's officers urged
the boats on, and endeavored, with as much coolness and deliberation
as possible, to effect a landing. It is perhaps doubtful how the
contest would have ended, had it not been for the detachment under
Hanno, which now came suddenly into action. While the Gauls were in
the height of their excitement, in attempting to drive back the
Carthaginians from the bank, they were thunderstruck at hearing the
shouts and cries of an enemy behind them, and, on looking around, they
saw the troops of Hanno pouring down upon them from the thickets with
terrible impetuosity and force. It is very difficult for an army to
fight both in front and in the rear at the same time. The Gauls, after
a brief struggle, abandoned the attempt any longer to oppose
Hannibal's landing. They fled down the river and back into the
interior, leaving Hanno in secure possession of the bank while
Hannibal and his forces came up at their leisure out of the water,
finding friends instead of enemies to receive them.
The remainder of the army, together with the stores and munitions of
war, were next to be transported, and this was accomplished with
little difficulty now that there was no enemy to disturb their
operations. There was one part of the force, however, which occasioned
some trouble and delay. It was a body of elephants which formed a part
of the army. How to get these unwieldy animals across so broad and
rapid a river was a question of no little difficulty. There are
various accounts of the manner in which Hannibal accomplished the
object, from which it would seem that different methods were employed.
One mode was as follows: the keeper of the elephants selected one more
spirited and passionate in disposition than the rest, and contrived to
teaze and torment him so as to make him angry. The elephant advanced
toward his keeper with his trunk raised to take vengeance. The keeper
fled; the elephant pursued him, the other elephants of the herd
following, as is the habit of the animal on such occasions. The keeper
ran into the water as if to elude his pursuer, while the elephant and
a large part of the herd pressed on after him. The man swam into the
channel, and the elephants, before they could check themselves, found
that they were beyond their depth. Some swam on after the keeper, and
crossed the river, where they were easily secured. Others, terrified,
abandoned themselves to the current, and were floated down, struggling
helplessly as they went, until at last they grounded upon shallows or
points of land, whence they gained the shore again, some on one side
of the stream and some on the other.
This plan was thus only partially successful, and Hannibal devised a
more effectual method for the remainder of the troop. He built an
immensely large raft, floated it up to the shore, fastened it there
securely, and covered it with earth, turf, and bushes, so as to make
it resemble a projection of the land. He then caused a second raft to
be constructed of the same size, and this he brought up to the outer
edge of the other, fastened it there by a temporary connection, and
covered and concealed it as he had done the first. The first of these
rafts extended two hundred feet from the shore, and was fifty feet
broad. The other, that is, the outer one, was only a little smaller.
The soldiers then contrived to allure and drive the elephants over
these rafts to the outer one, the animals imagining that they had not
left the land. The two rafts were then disconnected from each other,
and the outer one began to move with its bulky passengers over the
water, towed by a number of boats which had previously been attached
to its outer edge.
As soon as the elephants perceived the motion, they were alarmed, and
began immediately to look anxiously this way and that, and to crowd
toward the edges of the raft which was conveying them away. They found
themselves hemmed in by water on every side, and were terrified and
thrown into confusion. Some were crowded off into the river, and were
drifted down till they landed below. The rest soon became calm, and
allowed themselves to be quietly ferried across the stream, when they
found that all hope of escape and resistance were equally vain.
[Illustration: THE ELEPHANTS CROSSING THE RHONE.]
In the mean time, while these events were occurring, the troop of
three hundred, which Scipio had sent up the river to see what tidings
he could learn of the Carthaginians, were slowly making their way
toward the point where Hannibal was crossing; and it happened that
Hannibal had sent down a troop of _five_ hundred, when he first
reached the river, to see if they could learn any tidings of the
Romans. Neither of the armies had any idea how near they were to
the other. The two detachments met suddenly and unexpectedly on the
way. They were sent to explore, and not to fight; but as they were
nearly equally matched, each was ambitious of the glory of capturing
the others and carrying them prisoners to their camp. They fought a
long and bloody battle. A great number were killed, and in about the
same proportion on either side. The Romans say _they_ conquered. We do
not know what the Carthaginians said, but as both parties retreated
from the field and went back to their respective camps, it is safe to
infer that neither could boast of a very decisive victory.