O.

[Footnote 1: [to please]]

[Footnote 2: Addison's MS. described in the note to No. 411 shows, by

corrections in his handwriting of four or five lines in this piece of

Latin verse, that he was himself its author. Thus in the last line he

had begun with Scintillat solitis, altered that to Ostentat solitas,

struck out that also, and written, as above, Explicat ad solem.]

* * * * *

No. 413. Tuesday, June 24, 1712. Addison.

'--Causa latet, vis est notissima--'

Ovid.

Though in Yesterday's Paper we considered how every thing that is Great,

New, or Beautiful, is apt to affect the Imagination with Pleasure, we

must own that it is impossible for us to assign the necessary Cause of

this Pleasure, because we know neither the Nature of an Idea, nor the

Substance of a Human Soul, which might help us to discover the

Conformity or Disagreeableness of the one to the other; and therefore,

for want of such a Light, all that we can do in Speculations of this

kind is to reflect on those Operations of the Soul that are most

agreeable, and to range under their proper Heads, what is pleasing or

displeasing to the Mind, without being able to trace out the several

necessary and efficient Causes from whence the Pleasure or Displeasure

arises.

Final Causes lye more bare and open to our Observation, as there are

often a great Variety that belong to the same Effect; and these, tho'

they are not altogether so satisfactory, are generally more useful than

the other, as they give us greater Occasion of admiring the Goodness and

Wisdom of the first Contriver.

One of the Final Causes of our Delight, in any thing that is great, may

be this. The Supreme Author of our Being has so formed the Soul of Man,

that nothing but himself can be its last, adequate, and proper

Happiness. Because, therefore, a great Part of our Happiness must arise

from the Contemplation of his Being, that he might give our Souls a just

Relish of such a Contemplation, he has made them naturally delight in

the Apprehension of what is Great or Unlimited. Our Admiration, which is

a very pleasing Motion of the Mind, immediately rises at the

Consideration of any Object that takes up a great deal of Room in the

Fancy, and by Consequence, will improve into the highest Pitch of

Astonishment and Devotion when we contemplate his Nature, that is

neither circumscribed by Time nor Place, nor to be comprehended by the

largest Capacity of a Created Being.

He has annexed a secret Pleasure to the Idea of any thing that is new or

uncommon, that he might encourage us in the Pursuit after Knowledge, and

engage us to search into the Wonders of his Creation; for every new Idea

brings such a Pleasure along with it, as rewards any Pains we have taken

in its Acquisition, and consequently serves as a Motive to put us upon

fresh Discoveries.

He has made every thing that is beautiful in our own Species pleasant,

that all Creatures might be tempted to multiply their Kind, and fill the

World with Inhabitants; for 'tis very remarkable that where-ever Nature

is crost in the Production of a Monster (the Result of any unnatural

Mixture) the Breed is incapable of propagating its Likeness, and of

founding a new Order of Creatures; so that unless all Animals were

allured by the Beauty of their own Species, Generation would be at an

End, and the Earth unpeopled.

In the last Place, he has made every thing that is beautiful in all

other Objects pleasant, or rather has made so many Objects appear

beautiful, that he might render the whole Creation more gay and

delightful. He has given almost every thing about us the Power of

raising an agreeable Idea in the Imagination: So that it is impossible

for us to behold his Works with Coldness or Indifference, and to survey

so many Beauties without a secret Satisfaction and Complacency. Things

would make but a poor Appearance to the Eye, if we saw them only in

their proper Figures and Motions: And what Reason can we assign for

their exciting in us many of those Ideas which are different from any

thing that exists in the Objects themselves, (for such are Light and

Colours) were it not to add Supernumerary Ornaments to the Universe, and

make it more agreeable to the Imagination? We are every where

entertained with pleasing Shows and Apparitions, we discover Imaginary

Glories in the Heavens, and in the Earth, and see some of this Visionary

Beauty poured out upon the whole Creation; but what a rough unsightly

Sketch of Nature should we be entertained with, did all her Colouring

disappear, and the several Distinctions of Light and Shade vanish? In

short, our Souls are at present delightfully lost and bewildered in a

pleasing Delusion, and we walk about like the enchanted Hero of a

Romance, who sees beautiful Castles, Woods and Meadows; and at the same

time hears the warbling of Birds, and the purling of Streams; but upon

the finishing of some secret Spell, the fantastick Scene breaks up, and

the disconsolate Knight finds himself on a barren Heath, or in a

solitary Desart. It is not improbable that something like this may be

the State of the Soul after its first Separation, in respect of the

Images it will receive from Matter; tho indeed the Ideas of Colours are

so pleasing and beautiful in the Imagination, that it is possible the

Soul will not be deprived of them, but perhaps find them excited by some

other Occasional Cause, as they are at present by the different

Impressions of the subtle Matter on the Organ of Sight.

I have here supposed that my Reader is acquainted with that great Modern

Discovery, which is at present universally acknowledged by all the

Enquirers into Natural Philosophy: Namely, that Light and Colours, as

apprehended by the Imagination, are only Ideas in the Mind, and not

Qualities that have any Existence in Matter. As this is a Truth which

has been proved incontestably by many Modern Philosophers, and is indeed

one of the finest Speculations in that Science, if the English Reader

would see the Notion explained at large, he may find it in the Eighth

Chapter of the second Book of Mr. Lock's Essay on Human Understanding.

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