EUROPE'S POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION AND PEACE POLICY

No right-thinking person has nowadays any doubt as to the profound

injustice of the Treaty of Versailles and of all the treaties which

derive from it. But this fact is of small importance, inasmuch as it

is not justice or injustice which regulates the relations between

nations, but their interests and sentiments. In the past we have seen

Christian peoples, transplanted in America, maintain the necessity of

slavery, and we have seen, and continue to see every day, methods of

reasoning which, when used by the defeated enemy were declared to be

fallacious and wrong, become in turn, when varied only in form, the

ideas and the customary life of the conquerors in the War--ideas which

then assume the quality of liberal expressions of democracy.

If appeals to the noblest human sentiments are not made in vain (and

no effort of goodness or generosity is ever sterile), the conviction

which is gradually forming itself, even in the least receptive minds,

that the treaties of peace are inapplicable, as harmful to the

conquerors as to the conquered, gains in force. For the treaties are

at one and the same time a menace for the conquerors and a paralysis

of all activity on the part of the conquered, since once the economic

unity of Continental Europe is broken the resultant depression becomes

inevitable.

If many errors have been committed, many errors were inevitable. What

we must try to do now is to limit the consequences of these mistakes

in a changed spirit. To reconstruct where we see only ruins is the

most evident necessity. We must also try to diffuse among the nations

which have won the War together and suffered together the least amount

of diffidence possible. As it is, the United States, Great Britain,

France, Italy, Japan, all go their own way. France has obtained her

maximum of concessions, including those of least use to her, but never

before has the world seen her so alone in her attitude as after the

treaties of Paris.

What is most urgently required at the moment is to change the

prevalent war-mentality which still infects us and overcomes all

generous sentiments, all hopes of unity. The statement that war makes

men better or worse is, perhaps, an exaggerated one. War, which

creates a state of exaltation, hypertrophies all the qualities, all

the tendencies, be they for good or for evil. Ascetic souls, spirits

naturally noble, being disposed toward sacrifice, develop a state

of exaltation and true fervour. How many examples of nobility, of

abnegation, of voluntary martyrdom has not the War given us? But in

persons disposed to evil actions, in rude and violent spirits (and

these are always in the majority), the spirit of violence increases.

This spirit, which among the intellectuals takes the form of arrogance

and concupiscence, and in politics expresses itself in a policy of

conquest, assumes in the crowd the most violent forms of class war,

continuous assaults upon the power of the State, and an unbalanced

desire to gain as much as possible with the least possible work.

Before the War the number of men ready to take the law into their own

hands was relatively small; now there are many such individuals.

The various nations, even those most advanced, cannot boast a moral

progress comparable with their intellectual development. The explosion

of sentiments of violence has created in the period after the War in

most countries an atmosphere which one may call unbreathable. Peoples

accustomed to be dominated and to serve have come to believe that,

having become dominators in their turn, they have the right to use

every kind of violence against their overlords of yesterday. Are not

the injustices of the Poles against the Germans, and those of the

Rumanians against the Magyars, a proof of this state of mind? Even in

the most civilized countries many rules of order and discipline have

gone by the board.

After all the great wars a condition of torpor, of unwillingness to

work, together with a certain rudeness in social relations, has always

been noticed.

The war of 1870 was a little war in comparison with the cataclysm let

loose by the European War. Yet then the conquered country had its

attempt at Bolshevism, which in those days was called the Commune,

and the fall of its political regime. In the conquering country we

witnessed, together with the rapid development of industrial groups, a

quick growth in Socialism and the constitution of great parties like

the Catholic Centre. _Mutatis mutandis_, the same situation has shown

itself after the European War.

What is most urgently necessary, therefore, is to effect a return to

peace sentiments, and in the manifestations of government to abandon

those attitudes which in the peaces of Paris had their roots in hate.

I have tried, as Premier of Italy, as writer, and as politician, to

regulate my actions by this principle. In the first months of 1920 I

gave instructions to Italy's ambassador in Vienna, the Marquis della

Torretta, to arrange a meeting between himself and Chancellor Renner,

head of the Government of Vienna. So the chief of the conquered

country came, together with his Ministers, to greet the head of the

conquering country, and there was no word that could record in any way

the past hatred and the ancient rancour. All the conversation was of

the necessity for reconstruction and for the development of fresh

currents of life and commercial activity. The Government of Italy

helped the Government of Austria in so far as was possible. And in so

acting, I felt I was working better for the greatness of my country

than I could possibly have done by any kind of stolid persecution.

I felt that over and beyond our competition there existed the human

sorrow of nations for whom we must avoid fresh shedding of blood and

fresh wars. Had I not left the Government, it was my intention not

only to continue in this path, but also to intensify my efforts in

this direction.

The banal idea that there exist in Europe two groups of nations, one

of which stands for violence and barbarism--the Germans, the Magyars

and the Bulgarians--while the other group of Anglo-Saxons and Latins

represents civilization, must not continue to be repeated, because not

only is it an outrage on truth but an outrage on honesty.

Always to repeat that the Germans are not adapted for a democratic

regime is neither just nor true. Nor is it true that Germany is an

essentially warlike country, and therefore different from all other

lands. In the last three centuries France and England have fought many

more wars than Germany. One must read the books of the Napoleonic

period to see with what disdain pacificist Germany is referred

to--that country of peasants, waiters and philosophers. It is

sufficient to read the works of German writers, including Treitschke

himself, to perceive for what a long period of time the German lands,

anxious for peace, have considered France as the country always eager

for war and conquest.

Not only am I of the opinion that Germany is a land suited for

democratic institutions, but I believe that after the fall of the

Empire democratic principles have a wider prevalence there than in

any other country of Europe. The resistance offered to the peace of

Versailles--that is, to disorganization--may be claimed as a merit for

the democratic parties, which, if they are loyally assisted by the

States of the Entente, can not only develop themselves but establish a

great and noble democracy.

Germany has accustomed us in history to the most remarkable surprises.

A century and a half ago she was considered as a pacificist nation

without national spirit. She has since then become a warlike country

with the most pronounced national spirit. Early in the seventeenth

century there were in Germany more than one hundred territories and

independent States. There was no true national conscience, and not

even the violence of the Napoleonic wars, a century after, sufficed

to awaken it. What was required was a regular effort of thought, a

sustained programme of action on the part of men like Wolff, Fichte

and Hegel to mould a national conscience. Fifty years earlier no one

would have believed in the possibility of a Germany united and

compact in her national sentiment. Germany passed from the widest

decentralization to the greatest concentration and the intensest

national life. Germany will also be a democratic country if the

violence of her ancient enemies does not drive her into a state of

exaltation which will tend to render minds and spirits favourable to a

return to the old regime.

To arrive at peace we must first of all desire peace. We must no

longer carry on conversations by means of military missions, but by

means of ambassadors and diplomatic representatives.

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