Disinclination of the Porte to confer the Hereditary Pachalic on Mehemet
Ali—Departure of the Turkish Commissioners—Their orders—Opposition
of the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian Ministers to the views of
Lord Ponsonby—Lord Palmerston’s opinion of his conduct—Rewards
conferred on the Officers of the Squadron at Acre—News from
England—Approval of the Convention—Instruction of the 15th of
December—Lord Palmerston’s Letter to Lord Ponsonby—Prince Metternich
and Count Nesselrode, in approval of the Convention.
Though the Porte accepted the submission of Mehemet Ali, it was in no
hurry to act, and when it did get in motion, it was far from doing what,
I presume, three out of the four Representatives wished and expected.
The Commissioners did not leave Constantinople till the 6th of January,
and they had no power to confer the hereditary pachalic on Mehemet Ali;
and instead of carrying orders to General Jochmus to suspend
hostilities, they brought orders to demand the arms and guns of
Ibrahim’s army; which demand was supported by Mr. Wood, the emissary of
the Ambassador, and also by General Jochmus[4].
The Austrian Internuncio saw through this intrigue; and on the 7th of
January, in an interview with Rechid Pacha, announced to him that the
four Powers had decided on applying for the hereditary succession for
Mehemet Ali. This produced a correspondence—far too long for me to give
here, but which may be seen in the Government volume of _Levant Papers_.
From this correspondence it appears that the Austrian, Russian, and
Prussian Ministers decided to act without Lord Ponsonby, in consequence
of directions from the Ministers in London, based upon the Convention
they had previously rejected. The English Ambassador does not appear to
have received his instructions till the 10th of January, though they
were dated the 17th of December. I should like to see the reply Lord
Palmerston made to the Ambassador on learning that he had rejected the
Convention; why it is suppressed, is easily accounted for. It ought to
be explained how, on the 7th of January, the Internuncio received his
dispatches which must have passed through the hands of Prince Metternich
at Vienna, whilst the English Ambassador only received his on the 10th.
The delay might have caused great embarrassment, and indeed at such a
critical moment it was not desirable that a disagreement even for three
days should have existed between Lord Ponsonby and the other Ministers.
The Governments of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, as well as their
Ambassadors at Constantinople, saw how things were going on in the East.
They wrote peremptorily to those personages to settle the question; and
Prince Metternich requested Lord Beauvale to state to Lord Palmerston
that, in case the Porte should hesitate to accede to the recommendation
of the Allied Powers to confer the hereditary government on Mehemet Ali,
his court could not be compromised by such hesitation[5].
Lord Beauvale also wrote to Lord Palmerston on the 17th of January[6],
that the Turkish Commissioners going to Alexandria were not empowered to
grant the hereditary pachalic, and in consequence, Austria would
withdraw her support from the Sultan, and would disavow any attack on
Ibrahim Pacha.
Lord Palmerston, in a letter to the Ambassador, of the 26th of
January[7], does not exactly find fault with his Excellency for not
taking Mehemet Ali’s offer as a complete submission, but he tells him
the advice in his Lordship’s instructions of the 15th of October[8]
might have been given. This appears a pretty broad hint, and I suppose
diplomatic etiquette did not admit of any thing stronger.
On the 17th of December despatches were received in Marmorice Bay from
England. The Commander-in-Chief was appointed Governor of Greenwich
Hospital; I was directed to hoist a red broad pennant, and was made a
Commander of the Bath; the Captains commanding ships at Acre were made
Companions; and a large promotion went through all classes of officers
who were fortunately present at the bombardment. On the 27th a new Pacha
arrived from Constantinople on his way to Syria, with orders to send to
Adrianople Izzet Pacha, who had created so much discontent throughout
the country, and to report on the state and condition of Ibrahim’s army.
This Pacha was the bearer of letters of thanks to the Admiral and others
employed in Syria, with the exception of myself, who have never received
any acknowledgment from the Turkish Government up to the present day.
The Admiral strongly recommended this new Pacha to suspend hostilities,
and I also advised him to control General Jochmus, who was a young man
ambitious of military glory, and more likely to make war than peace.
On the 5th of January, 1841, the Megæra arrived from England. I was
aware she must either bring my sentence of acquittal or condemnation,
and having been already denounced by the wise men of the East, I felt it
was not impossible that their opinion might have influenced the judgment
of the Ministers of the West, if unfortunately their protests had
arrived in London before my despatches from Alexandria. I had, however,
taken precautions to prevent this, which fortunately succeeded, and they
were left to their own calm judgment, which decided in my favour.
I had a party dining with me that day, when numerous letters, public and
private, were put into my hand by the officer of the watch. I laid them
on the table, determined not to run the risk of spoiling my dinner by
bad news, and not requiring good to give me an appetite. After the
inward man had been well fortified, I ventured to open a letter from
Lord Minto, which, to my great satisfaction, announced to me that the
Government were satisfied with what I had done, with the exception of
the Guarantee. I received also letters from various members of the
Government, and an official one from the Admiral, inclosing an
instruction from Lord Palmerston to the Admiralty, bearing date Dec. 15,
1840, some extracts from which I subjoin[9]:
“I have to request your Lordships to convey to Commodore Napier the
approval of Her Majesty’s Government of the steps taken by him on this
occasion, though without any instructions to that effect, and upon his
own responsibility, to carry into execution the arrangements
contemplated by the Treaty of the 15th of July, and to put an end to the
contest in the Levant.
“But the instruction given by your Lordships to Sir Robert Stopford in
pursuance of my letter of the 14th of November[10], will have reached
Sir Robert Stopford a few days after he received from Commodore Napier a
report of the result of his negociation at Alexandria; and it is
uncertain whether Sir Robert Stopford will have considered the
instruction of the 14th of November as superseding Commodore Napier’s
arrangement, or whether he will have looked upon Commodore Napier’s
arrangement as superseding that instruction.
“In this state of things, Her Majesty’s Government must postpone a final
communication with respect to the arrangement made by Commodore Napier,
till they learn, as they probably will in a few days’ time, what course
Sir Robert Stopford took upon the receipt of the instruction of the 14th
of November. But there is one part of the Articles signed by Commodore
Napier and Boghos Bey, upon which it is necessary that an instruction
should immediately be sent to Sir Robert Stopford.
“In the first Article, Boghos Bey, on the part of Mehemet Ali, takes two
engagements: the one is to order the Egyptian troops to evacuate Syria;
the other is to restore the Turkish fleet. The first engagement was to
be fulfilled immediately, and was to be conditional only upon the
promise of Commodore Napier that he would, in his capacity of commander
of the British fleet before Alexandria, suspend hostilities against
Alexandria, and every other part of the Egyptian territory. The other
engagement was eventual, and was to be fulfilled as soon as Mehemet Ali
should have received an official notification that the Porte grants him
the hereditary government of Egypt, and that this concession is, and
shall continue to be, under the guarantee of the Four Powers. Now it is
necessary that Sir Robert Stopford should lose no time in making known
to Mehemet Ali that this last demand of his, that the Four Powers should
guarantee to him the grant of the hereditary government of Egypt, if
that grant should be made to him by the Sultan, cannot be complied with.
“That which the Four Powers will do, is to recommend to the Porte to
make the concessions specified in the communication which Sir Robert
Stopford has been instructed to convey to Mehemet Ali.”
A despatch of the same tendency was addressed (Dec. 17) by Viscount
Palmerston to the Ambassador[11], in which he remarks,—
“A doubt may have been felt by your Excellency and your colleagues what
steps you should take in pursuance of the instructions contained in my
despatch of the 15th of October, and in the corresponding instructions
sent from Vienna, Petersburgh, and Berlin; because those instructions,
modified by the subsequent letter to the Admiralty of November 14,
contemplated the unconditional submission of Mehemet Ali to the Sultan,
as a preliminary to the advice to be given to the Porte to reinstate
Mehemet Ali in the Government of Egypt; and, on the contrary, Mehemet
Ali, in the demands which he sets forth in the first Article of the
Agreement, signed on the 27th of November, engages to restore the fleet
only on two conditions,—the one being, that the Sultan should grant him
hereditary tenure in the Government of Egypt,—and the other being, that
such grant on the part of the Sultan should be placed under the
guarantee of the Four Powers.
“It appears to Her Majesty’s Government that the fact that Mehemet Ali
attached the first of these conditions to his restoration of the fleet,
need not prevent the Porte from making to him that concession. For, in
fact, those Articles of Agreement were substantially a complete
surrender on the part of Mehemet Ali; and he was led to suppose, that in
asking for hereditary tenure, he was only asking that which the Porte
was willing to give. But the second condition, namely, the guarantee of
the Four Powers, is one which cannot be complied with; and your
Excellency should, on this point, give to the Porte the same
explanations which Sir Robert Stopford has been instructed, in pursuance
of my letter to the Admiralty of the 15th instant, to give to Mehemet
Ali.
“It has been reported, but upon what authority is not known, that the
Porte was, towards the end of November, but before it had heard of the
submission of Mehemet Ali, disinclined to revoke the decree which had
deprived him of the Government of Egypt. It is not unnatural that such a
feeling should have existed at that time in the mind of the Turkish
Government, but Her Majesty’s Government hope that subsequent events,
and the unanimous advice of the Four Powers, will have removed these
objections on the part of the Porte, and will have led the Porte to
accept the settlement effected by Commodore Napier’s arrangement, or by
the subsequent more ample submission of Mehemet Ali.”
Lord Palmerston’s letter to Lord Ponsonby, acknowledging the receipt of
the Ambassador’s letter announcing the rejection of the Convention, as I
have before said, has never been published; it would be a curious
document, and I dare say will come to light some day or other; but Lord
Palmerston’s despatch to Lord Ponsonby after receiving my despatches, is
clear enough; he tells the Ambassador plainly, that it does not signify
whether Sir Robert Stopford adopted my Convention or his subsequent
instruction of the 14th of November; that the articles of agreement were
substantially a complete surrender on the part of Mehemet Ali; and he
was led to suppose, on asking for the hereditary tenure, he was only
asking that which the Porte was willing to give; but that the guarantee
could not be complied with.
Prince Metternich also agreed with Lord Palmerston, and directed the
Internuncio to co-operate with Lord Ponsonby in carrying out the
instructions of the 17th; and moreover tells Lord Beauvale very plainly
that in case the Porte hesitates to confer the hereditary Pachalic on
Mehemet Ali, his Court will not admit that the Allies could be
compromised by such hesitation. Count Nesselrode also states to Lord
Clanricarde, that it is unfortunate that the Sultan had not been
disposed, or advised, to concede the hereditary government to Mehemet
Ali.
Shortly before this (December 22,) Count Nesselrode wrote to Baron
Brunnow at London, in terms that show his full approval of the
Convention, except the guarantee[12].
“I hasten to reply to the despatch which your Excellency has done me the
honour to address to me under date of the 27th November (9th Dec.), and
the arrival of which was almost immediately preceded by that of the
reports which you entrusted to the Marquis of Clanricarde. Before
entering further into detail upon the principal subject of that
despatch, my first desire, M. le Baron, is to communicate to you the
lively satisfaction with which the Emperor received the happy
intelligence of the submission of Mehemet Ali. The Treaty of London has
at last been executed in spite of all opposition. It has been so to its
fullest extent, and that without having cost the Powers who were parties
to it any compromise, or any concession to be regretted. There is
nothing, even including the armed demonstration with which the British
squadron accompanied its summons at Alexandria, which has not stamped
its result with a character still more favourable to the consideration
of the alliance. Have the goodness, M. le Baron, to offer our sincere
congratulations to Lord Palmerston upon this result, which we consider
as a common triumph of his and of our policy.
“The Eastern Question thus settled, it now remains to record and confirm
the solution thereof by a final transaction in which France should
concur. You have already, in anticipation of this event, been put in
possession of the views and intentions which our august Master
entertains upon this subject. Much more will the Emperor be disposed to
accede to the plan which Lord Palmerston has proposed to you, because it
simplifies still further the transaction which is to be concluded. His
Majesty, then, could not but approve the motive which leads Lord
Palmerston to desire that the details of the special arrangement, by
virtue of which the Sultan shall grant to Mehemet Ali the investiture of
Egypt, should not be embodied in the text of the agreement. Accordingly,
M. le Baron, if the bases of the proposed agreement should be such as
have been stated to you by the Principal Secretary of State, and if the
French Government should decide upon accepting it, the Emperor would
authorize you to concur in it.”
The Count also wrote as follows, under date of 4th January, 1841, to M.
Titow, at Constantinople[13]:—
“I lost no time in laying before the Emperor your despatch of the 28th
of November, in which you reported to us the late events which have
taken place at Alexandria, as well as the determination of the Porte to
refuse its sanction to the arrangement concluded by Commodore Napier.
“It certainly belongs to his Highness alone to determine finally the
extent of the sacrifices which it is expedient for him to make, in order
to secure the pacification of his empire, and that Sovereign ought not
to doubt that the Emperor desires sincerely that that pacification may
be effected upon conditions as little unfavourable as possible to the
Porte.
“But, the more our august Master has at heart the defence of the
interests of the Sultan, the more would His Imperial Majesty consider
himself as failing in the friendship which he bears to his Highness, if
he did not seriously recommend him, at this decisive moment, to consider
with calmness and moderation the present posture of affairs, and to be
on his guard against illusions and hopes which in the end may never be
realized.
“But a few months since, even at the period of the signature of the
Convention of July 15, the Porte could not have hoped in so short a time
to have reduced Mehemet Ali to the powerless state to which he is now
reduced; and it is hardly to be doubted, that it would a little while
ago have granted to him the hereditary succession, if it had been
possible for it by that means to hasten a definitive arrangement, in the
interests of general peace.
“The military operations of the Allies in Syria have, since, been
crowned with the most decided success. Nevertheless, when the Porte in a
moment of irritation, determined to pronounce the deprivation of Mehemet
Ali, the Powers did not hesitate to declare their opinion upon the
subject, and to make known the conditions upon which it appeared to them
that the Sultan should not hesitate to reinstate the Pacha in the
hereditary administration of Egypt.
“It is certainly true that the Porte has never hitherto received an
official communication of the advice which the Allied Powers thought it
their duty to tender to it, but the Porte is perfectly aware of the
nature and tendency of the instructions of the 15th of October, which
have acquired European publicity; it is equally acquainted with the
measures determined upon on the 14th of November in London, and with the
step which Sir Robert Stopford was instructed to take, and the only
object of which was to secure the execution of the preceding
instructions.
“It would now be impossible for the Four Allied Powers to retract their
former declarations. Already the British Cabinet has not hesitated an
instant to declare itself in favour of the advantages which result from
the cessation of hostilities between the Porte and Mehemet Ali; but
while it fully appreciates the object which Commodore Napier had in
view, in undertaking upon his own responsibility to hasten the
submission of the Pacha; while it fully approves of all the conditions
which that officer has imposed upon him; the Cabinet of London has not
thought fit to take upon itself a formal guarantee with respect to the
right of hereditary succession which the Sultan might confer upon
Mehemet Ali.
“We are firmly convinced that the other Powers will readily adhere to
this opinion of England; not one of them will, in fact, take upon itself
a guarantee, which would become as burdensome for those Powers, as it
would be incompatible with His Highness’s rights of Sovereignty.
* * * * *
“The Cabinet of London appears to be more than ever impressed with the
necessity of furthering, by all possible means, the pacification of the
East, and of putting an end to the doubts which the Divan appears to
entertain with respect to the real intentions of the Allies. Have the
goodness then, Sir, to unite with Lord Ponsonby, in holding to the
Ministers of the Porte the language which Lord Palmerston has lately
prescribed to the English Ambassador, and which, we have no doubt, will
be equally supported by the Representatives of Austria and Prussia.”
Nothing could be more gratifying to me than that my first essay at
diplomacy should have received the sanction of the great powers of
Europe, and I presume such a sanction was not very palatable to the
gentlemen who took a different view of Eastern affairs.
Footnote 4:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 274, 276.
Footnote 5:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 151.
Footnote 6:
Ibid., p. 159.
Footnote 7:
Ibid., p. 159.
Footnote 8:
See Vol. I., p. 249.
Footnote 9:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 87.
Footnote 10:
See page 15.
Footnote 11:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 88.
Footnote 12:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 121.
Footnote 13:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 152.