have already said, this Limitation is the Cause of those different
Modes of Thinking, which for distinction sake we call Faith, Science
and Opinion. For in this present and imperfect State in which we know
not any thing by Intuition, or immediate except a few first Principles
which we call Self-evident, the most of our Knowlege is acquir’d by
Reasoning and Deduction: And these three Modes of Understanding,
Faith, Science and Opinion are no otherwise distinguish’d, than by the
different degrees of Clearness and Evidence in the Premises from whence
the Conclusion is drawn.
Knowlege in a proper and restricted Sense and as appropriated to
Science, signifies that clear Perception which is follow’d by a firm
assent to Conclusions rightly drawn from Premises of which we have
clear and distinct Ideas. Which Premises or Principles must be so clear
and Evident, that supposing us reasonable Creatures, and free from
Prejudices and Passions, (which for the time they predominate as good
as deprive us of our Reason) we cannot withhold our assent from them
without manifest violence to our Reason.
But if the Nature of the thing be such as that it admits of no
undoubted Premises to argue from, or at least we don’t at present
know of any, or that the Conclusion does not so necessarily follow as
to give a perfect satisfaction to the Mind and to free it from all
hesitation, that which we think of it is then call’d Opinion.
Again, If the Medium we make use of to prove the Proposition be
Authority, the Conclusion which we draw from it is said to be Believ’d;
This is what we call Faith, and when the Authority is GOD’s a Divine
Faith.
Moral Certainty is a Species of Knowlege whose Proofs are of a
compounded Nature, in part resembling those which belong to Science,
and partly those of Faith. We do not make the whole Process our
selves, but depend on another for the _immediate_ Proof, but we our
selves deduce the _Mediate_ from Circumstances and Principles as
Certain and almost as Evident as those of Science, and which lead us
to the immediate Proofs and make it unreasonable to doubt of ’em.
Indeed we not seldom deceive our selves in this matter, by inclining
alternately to both extremes. Sometimes we reject Truths which are
Morally Certain as Conjectural and Probable only, because they have
not a Physical and Mathematical Certainty, which they are incapable
of. At another time we embrace the slightest Conjectures and any thing
that looks with Probability, as moral Certainties and real Verities,
if Fancy, Passion or Interest recommend them; so ready are we to be
determin’d by these rather than by solid Reason.
In this enumeration of the several ways of Knowing. I have not
reckon’d the Senses, in regard that we’re more properly said to be
_Conscious_ of than to _Know_ such things as we perceive by Sensation.
And also because that Light which we suppose to be let into our Ideas
by our Senses is indeed very dim and fallacious, and not to be relied
on till it has past the Test of Reason; neither do I think there’s any
Mode of Knowlege which mayn’t be reduc’d to those already mentioned.
Now tho there’s a great difference between Opinion and Science, true
Science being immutable but Opinion variable and uncertain, yet there
is not such a difference between Faith and Science as is usually
suppos’d. The difference consists not in the Certainty but in the
way of Proof; the Objects of Faith are as Rationally and as Firmly
Prov’d as the Objects of Science, tho by another way. As Science
Demonstrates things that are _Seen_, so Faith is the Evidence of such
as are _Not Seen_. And he who rejects the Evidence of Faith in such
things as belong to its Cognizance, is as unreasonable as he who denies
Propositions in Geometry that are prov’d with Mathematical exactness.
There’s nothing true which is not in it self demonstrable, or which
we should not pronounce to be true had we a Clear and Intuitive View
of it. But as was said above we see very few things by Intuition,
neither are we furnish’d with Mediums to make the Process our selves
in Demonstrating all Truths, and therefore there are some Truths which
we must either be totally ignorant of, or else receive them on the
Testimony of another Person, to whose Understanding they are clear and
manifest tho not to ours. And if this Person be one who can neither be
Deceiv’d nor Deceive, we’re as certain of those Conclusions which we
prove by his Authority, as we’re of those we demonstrate by our own
Reason; nay more Certain, by how much his Reason is more Comprehensive
and Infallible than our own.
Science is the following the Process our Selves upon Clear and Evident
Principles; Faith is a Dependance on the Credit of another, in such
matters as are out of our View. And when we have very good Reason to
submit to the Testimony of the Person we Believe, Faith is as Firm, and
those Truths it discovers to us as truly Intelligible, and as strongly
Prov’d in their kind as Science.
In a word, as every Sense so every Capacity of the Understanding has
its proper Object. The Objects of Science are things within our View,
of which we may have Clear and Distinct Ideas, and nothing shou’d be
determin’d here without Clearness and Evidence. To be able to repeat
any Persons _Dogma_ without forming a Distinct Idea of it our selves,
is not to Know but to Remember; and to have a Confuse Indeterminate
Idea is to Conjecture not to Understand.
The Objects of Faith are as Certain and as truly Intelligible in
themselves as those of Science, as has been said already, only we
become persuaded of the Truth of them by another Method, we do not
_See_ them so clearly and distinctly as to be unable to disbelieve
them. Faith has a mixture of the Will that it may be rewardable, for
who will thank us for giving our Assent where it was impossible to
withhold it? Faith then may be said to be a sort of Knowlege capable of
Reward, and Men are Infidels not for want of Conviction, but thro an
_Unwillingness_ to Believe.
But as it is a fault to Believe in matters of Science, where we
may expect Demonstration and Evidence, so it is a reproach to our
Understanding and a proof of our Disingenuity, to require that sort
of Process peculiar to Science, for the Confirmation of such Truths
as are not the proper Objects of it. It is as ridiculous as to reject
Musick, because we cannot Tast or Smell it, or to deny there is such a
thing as Beauty because we do not hear it. He who wou’d See with his
Ears and Hear with his Eyes may indeed set up in _Bedlam_ for a Man of
an extraordinary reach, a Sagacious Person who won’t be impos’d on, one
who must have more Authentick proofs than his dull Fore-fathers were
content with. But Men of dry Reason and a moderate Genius, I suppose
will think Nature has done very well in allotting to each Sense its
proper employment, and such as these will as readily acknowlege that
it is as Honourable for the Soul to Believe what is truly the Object
of Faith, as it is for her to Know what is really the Object of her
Knowlege. And were we not strangely perverse we shou’d not scruple
Divine Authority when we daily submit to Human. Whoever has not seen
_Paris_ has nothing but Human Authority to assure him there is such a
place, and yet he wou’d be laugh’d at as ridiculous who shou’d call it
in question, tho he may as well in this as in another Case pretend that
his Informers have designs to serve, intend to impose on him and mock
his Credulity. Nay how many of us daily make that a matter of Faith
which indeed belongs to Science, by adhering blindly to the Dictates of
some famous Philosopher in Physical Truths, the Principles of which we
have as much right to examine, and to make deductions from ’em as he
had?
To sum up all: We may know enough for all the purposes of Life, enough
to busie this active Faculty of Thinking, to employ and entertain the
spare Intervals of Time and to keep us from Rust and Idleness, but we
must not pretend to fathom all Depths with our short Line, we shou’d
be Wise unto Sobriety, and reckon that we know very little if we go
about to make our _Own_ Reason the Standard of all Truth. It is very
certain that nothing is True but what is conformable to Reason, that
is to the Divine Reason of which ours is but a short faint Ray, and
it is as certain that there are many Truths which Human Reason cannot
Comprehend. Therefore to be throughly sensible of the Capacity of the
Mind, to discern precisely its Bounds and Limits and to direct our
Studies and Inquiries accordingly, to Know what is to be Known, and
to Believe what is to be Believ’d is the property of a Wise Person.
To be content with too little Knowlege, or to aspire to over-much is
equally a fault, to make that use of our Understandings which GOD has
Fitted and Design’d them for is the Medium which we ought to take. For
the difference between a Plow-man and a Doctor does not seem to me
to consist in this, That the Business of the one is to search after
Knowlege, and that the other has nothing to do with it. No, whoever has
a Rational Soul ought surely to employ it about some Truth or other,
to procure for it right Ideas, that its Judgments may be true tho
its Knowlege be not very extensive. But herein lies the difference,
that tho Truth is the Object of every Individual Understanding, yet
all are not equally enlarg’d nor able to comprehend so much; and they
whose Capacities and Circumstances of Living do not fit ’em for it,
lie not under that obligation of extending their view which Persons of
a larger reach and greater leisure do. There is indeed often times a
mistake in this matter, People who are not fit will be puzling their
heads to little purpose, and those who are prove Slothful and decline
the trouble; and thus it will be if we do not throughly understand our
selves, but suffer Pride or Ease to make the estimate.
§. II. It is therefore very fit that after we have consider’d the
Capacity of the Understanding in general, we shou’d descend to the view
of our own particular, observing the bent and turn of our own Minds,
which way our Genius lies and to what it is most inclin’d. I see no
reason why there may not be as great a variety in Minds as there is
in Faces, that the Soul as well as the Body may not have something in
it to distinguish it, not only from all other Intelligent Natures but
even from those of its own kind. There are different proportions in
Faces which recommend them to some Eyes sooner than to others, and tho
_All_ Truth is amiable to a Reasonable Mind, and proper to employ it,
yet why may there not be some particular Truths, more agreeable to each
individual Understanding than others are? Variety gives Beauty to the
Material World and why not to the Intellectual? We can discern the
different Abilities which the Wise Author of all things has endow’d
us with, the different Circumstances in which he has plac’d us in
reference to this World and the Concerns of an Animal Life, that so
we may be mutually useful, and that since each single Person is too
limited and confin’d to attend to many, much less to all things, we
may receive from each other a reciprocal advantage, and why may we not
think he has done the like in respect of Truth? that since it is too
much for one, our united Strength shou’d be employ’d in the search of
her. Especially since the Divine Being who contains in himself all
Reality and Truth is Infinite in Perfection, and therefore shou’d be
Infinitely Ador’d and Lov’d; and If Creatures are by their being so
uncapable of rendering to their Incomprehensible Creator an Adoration
and Love that’s worthy of him, it is but decorous that they shou’d
however do as much as they can. All that variety of sublime Truths of
Beautiful and Wondrous Objects which surround us, are nothing else but
a various display of his unbounded Excellencies, and why shou’d any of
’em pass unobserv’d? Why shou’d not every individual Understanding be
in a more especial manner fitted for and employ’d in the disquisition
of some particular Truth and Beauty? ’Tis true after all our researches
we can no more sufficiently Know GOD than we can worthily Love him,
and are as much unable to find out all his Works as we are his Nature,
yet this shou’d only prompt us to exert _All_ our Powers and to do our
best, since even _that_ were too little cou’d we possibly do more. We
can never offer to him so much Praise as he deserves, and therefore it
is but fit that he shou’d have _All_ that Mankind can possibly render
him. He is indeed immutable in his own Nature, but those discoveries
we daily make of his Operations will always afford us somewhat New and
Surprizing, for this All-glorious Sun the Author of Life and Light is
as inexhaustible a Source of Truth as he is of Joy and Happiness.
If then we are convinc’d that there’s some peculiar Task allotted
us, our next business will be to enquire what it is. To know our own
Strength and neither to over not underrate our selves is one of the
most material points of Wisdom, and which indeed we are most commonly
ignorant of, else we shou’d not reach at all, how unable soever we are
to attain it, nor make so many successless attempts and be forc’d to
come off with that pitiful Apology, _I was mistaken, I did not think
it_. But we can scarce duly estimate our Understandings till we have
regulated our Wills, reform’d Self-love and a train of immortified
Passions, which it is not our Business to speak of here, we shall have
occasion to do’t hereafter. Let it suffice that we remark a frequent
Error which these engage us in, that is, an aptness to lessen the Human
Mind, to detract from its Grandeur and abridge its Powers when we
consider it in General, and as great a forwardness when we look on our
selves to extend our Abilities beyond their bounds. Are we conscious
of a Defect? the shallowness of Human Reason at large must bear the
blame, we Harangue very excellently on the Ignorance and Vanity of
Mankind, and it were well if we rested there, and wou’d forbear to
murmur even at our Creator himself for allowing us so scanty a Portion.
But if Reason has shone out, dispelling those Clouds which Eclips’d the
bright face of Truth, we arrogate all to our selves. _My_ Discovery,
_My_ Hypothesis, the Strength and Clearness of _My_ Reasonings, rather
than the Truth are what we wou’d expose to view; ’tis that we Idolize
our selves and wou’d have every one Admire and Celebrate. And yet all
this is no more perhaps than another has done before us, or at least
might have done with our Opportunities and Advantages. The reverse of
this procedure wou’d become us better, and it were more Glorious as
well as more Just to ascribe the Excellencies of the Mind to Human
Nature in the Lump and to take the Weaknesses to our selves. By this
we shou’d both avoid Sloth, (the best use we can make of our Ignorance
and Infirmity being first to be humbled for, and then sedulously to
endeavour their Amendment) and likewise secure our Industry from the
Mixtures of Pride and Envy. By looking on our own Acquisitions as a
general Treasure, in which the Whole have a Right, we shou’d pretend
to no more than a share; and considering our selves as Parts of the
same Whole, we should expect to find our own account in th’ Improvement
of every part of it, which wou’d restrain us from being puft up with
the Contemplation of our Own, and from repining at our Neighbours
Excellencies. For let Reason shine forth where it may, as we can’t
engross, so neither can we be excluded from sharing in the Benefit,
unless we wilfully exclude our selves; every one being the better for
True Worth and Good Sense, except the little Soul’d Enviers of ’em.
To help us to the Knowledge of our own Capacities the Informations
of our Friends, nay even of our Enemies may be useful. The former if
Wise and True will direct us to the same Course to which our Genius
Points, and the latter will industriously endeavour to divert us from
it, and we can’t be too careful that these don’t disguise themselves
under the specious appearance of the former, to do us an ill-turn the
more effectually. For it is not seldom seen that such as pretend great
Concern for us, will press us on to such Studies or Ways of Living as
inwardly they know we are unfit for, thereby to gratify their Secret
Envy, by diverting us from that to which our Genius disposes, and in
which therefore they have reason to suppose we wou’d be Excellent. But
tho we may make use of the Opinions of both, yet if we will be Sincere
and Ingenuous we cannot have a more faithful Director than our own
heart. He who gave us these Dispositions will excite us to the Use and
Improvement of ’em; and unless we drive him from us by our Impurity,
or thro negligence and want of Attention let slip his secret Whispers,
this Master within us will lay most in our view such Lessons as he
wou’d have us take. Our care then must be to open our Eyes to that Beam
of Light which does in a more especial manner break in upon us, to fix
them steadily, and to examine accurately those notices which are most
vividly represented to us, and to lay out our Thoughts and Time in the
Cultivation of ’em. It may be our Humor won’t be gratified, nor our
Interest serv’d by such a Method. Other Business or Amusements put on
a finer Garb, and come attended with more Charms and Grandeur, these
recommend us to the World make us Belov’d and Illustrious in it: Whilst
the followers of Truth are despis’d and look’d askew on, as fantastick
Speculatists, unsociable Thinkers, who pretend to see farther than
their Neighbours, to rectifie what Custom has establish’d, and are so
Unmannerly as to Think and Talk out of the Common way. He who speaks
Truth makes a Satyr on the greatest part of Mankind, and they are not
over apt to forgive him, he contradicts the vogue of the Times, is so
hardy as to lay open Mens darling Errors, to draw a lively Picture of
their most secret Corruptions, a Representation which they cannot bear.
Their Gall is touch’d proportionably as their Wounds are more deeply
search’d into, altho it be only in order to a Cure. They therefore who
Love Truth shall be Hated by the Most, who tho they openly pretend to
Honour, yet secretly Malign her, because she reproaches them. And as
a plausible Life is not often a very Religious one, which made the
best Judge pronounce a Wo on those whom all Men shall speak well of,
so neither is the most Just and Illuminated Understanding the most
admir’d and trusted to, but a plausible Speaker, as well as a plausible
Liver, commonly bears away the Bell. If then we consult our Passions
and Vanity we shall go near to determine amiss, and make that use of
our Intellectuals which Fancy or Interest pushes us on to, not which
Nature has fitted us for. Hence it is that those who might have done
very well in some Studies and Employments, make but bungling work when
they apply themselves to others. We go on apace when the Wind and Tide
are on our side, but it costs us much Labour, and we make little speed,
when we Row against both.
And as a due Consideration of our Particular Capacity wou’d put us
right in our own Studies, so wou’d it keep us from clashing with our
Neighbours, whom we many times Contend with not so much out of a Love
to Truth, as thro a humor of Contradiction, or because we think this
the best way to shew our Parts, and by this tryal of Skill to exalt
our selves above them. But is there no better way to discover our
Penetration, and to try our Strength, than by a Malicious and Litigious
Opposition? The field of Truth is large, and after all the Discoveries
that have been made by those who have gone before, there will still
be untroden Paths, which they who have the Courage and Skill may beat
out and beautify. If then instead of Jostling and Disputing with our
Fellow Travellers, of bending all the force of our Wit to Contradict
and Oppose those advances which they make, we wou’d well understand,
duly Employ and kindly Communicate our Peculiar Talent, how much more
Service might we do our Lord, how much more useful might we be to one
another? What vast Discoveries wou’d be made in the wide Ocean of
Truth? How many Moral Irregularities wou’d be observ’d and rectify’d?
We shou’d be restrain’d from aspiring to things above our reach, move
regularly in our own Sphere, not abuse those good Parts which were
given us for Common Benefit, to the Destruction of our selves and
others, be in a fair way to discern the Defects of our Mind and to
proceed to the Cure of ’em.
§. III. We have already exprest our thoughts concerning the Capacity
and Perfection of the Understanding, and what has been said if duly
consider’d, is sufficient to bring every particular Person acquainted
with their own defects. But because they who need Amendment most, are
commonly least dispos’d to make such reflections as are necessary to
procure it, we will spend a few Pages in considering for them, and in
observing the most usual defects of the Thinking Faculty.
If we are of their Opinion who say that the Understanding is only
Passive, and that Judgment belongs to the Will, I see not any Defect
the former can have, besides Narrowness and a disability to extend
it self to many things, which is indeed incident to all Creatures,
the brightest Intelligence in the highest Order of Angels is thus
defective, as well as the meanest Mortal, tho in a less degree. Nor
ought it to be complain’d of, since ’tis Natural and Necessary, we may
as well desire to be Gods as desire to Know all things. Some sort of
Ignorance therefore, or Non perception we cannot help; a Finite Mind,
suppose it as large as you please, can never extend it self to Infinite
Truths. But no doubt it is in our Power to remedy a great deal more
than we do, and probably a larger Range is allowed us than the most
Active and Enlightned Understanding has hitherto reach’d. Ignorance
then can’t be avoided but Error may, we cannot Judge of things of which
we have no Idea, but we can suspend our Judgment about those of which
we have, till clearness and evidence oblige us to pass it. Indeed in
strictness of Speech the Will and not the Understanding is blameable
when we Think amiss, since the latter opposes not the Ends for which
GOD made it, but readily extends it self as far as it can, receiving
such Impressions as are made on it; ’tis the former that directs it to
such Objects, that fills up its Capacity with such Ideas as are foreign
to its Business and of no use to it, or which does not at least oppose
the incursions of Material things, and deface as much as it is able
those impressions which Sensible Objects leave in the Imagination.
But since it is not material to the present Design, whether Judgment
belongs to the Understanding or Will, we shall not nicely distinguish
how each of ’em is employ’d in acquiring Knowledge, but treat of ’em
both together in this Chapter, allotted to the Service of the Studious,
who when they are put in the way may by their own Meditations and
Experience, rectifie the mistakes and supply the Omissions we happen to
be guilty of.