I think the answer is twofold.

1. The higher wages and the greater cost of maintenance of American

officers and crews make it impossible to compete on equal terms with

foreign ships. The scale of living and the scale of pay of American

sailors are fixed by the standard of wages and of living in the United

States, and those are maintained at a high level by the protective

tariff. The moment the American passes beyond the limits of his country

and engages in ocean transportation, he comes into competition with the

lower foreign scale of wages and of living. Mr. Joseph L. Bristow, in

his report upon trade conditions affecting the Panama Railroad, dated

June 14, 1905, gives in detail the cost of operating an American

steamship with a tonnage of approximately thirty-five hundred tons as

compared with the cost of operating a specified German steamship of the

same tonnage, and the differences aggregate $15,315 per annum greater

cost for the American steamship than for the German; that is $4.37 per

ton. He gives also in detail the cost of maintaining another American

steamship with a tonnage of approximately twenty-five hundred tons as

compared with the cost of operating a specified British steamship of the

same tonnage, and the differences aggregate $18,289.68 per annum greater

cost for the American steamship than for the British; that is $7.31 per

ton. It is manifest that if the German steamship were content with a

profit of less than $15,000 per annum, and the British with a profit of

less than $18,000 per annum, the American ships would have to go out of

business.

2. The principal maritime nations of the world, anxious to develop their

trade, to promote their shipbuilding industry, to have at hand

transports and auxiliary cruisers in case of war, are fostering their

steamship lines by the payment of subsidies. England is paying to her

steamship lines between six and seven million dollars a year; it is

estimated that since 1840 she has paid to them between two hundred and

fifty and three hundred millions. The enormous development of her

commerce, her preponderant share of the carrying trade of the world, and

her shipyards crowded with construction orders from every part of the

earth indicate the success of her policy. France is paying about eight

million dollars a year; Italy and Japan, between three and four million

each; Germany, upon the initiative of Bismarck, is building up her trade

with wonderful rapidity by heavy subventions to her steamship lines and

by giving special differential rates of carriage over her railroads for

merchandise shipped by those lines. Spain, Norway, Austria-Hungary,

Canada, all subsidize their own lines. It is estimated that about

$28,000,000 a year are paid by our commercial competitors to their

steamship lines.

Against these advantages of his competitor the American shipowner has to

contend; and it is manifest that the subsidized ship can afford to carry

freight at cost for a period long enough to drive him out of business.

We are living in a world not of natural competition, but of subsidized

competition. State aid to steamship lines is as much a part of the

commercial system of our day as state employment of consuls to promote

business.

It will be observed that both of these disadvantages under which the

American shipowner labors are artificial; they are created by

governmental action--one by our own Government in raising the standard

of wages and living, by the protective tariff; the other by foreign

governments in paying subsidies to their ships for the promotion of

their own trade. For the American shipowner it is not a contest of

intelligence, skill, industry, and thrift against similar qualities in

his competitor; it is a contest against his competitors and his

competitors' governments and his own government also.

Plainly, these disadvantages created by governmental action can be

neutralized only by governmental action, and should be neutralized by

such action.

What action ought our Government to take for the accomplishment of this

just purpose? Three kinds of action have been advocated.

1. A law providing for free ships--that is, permitting Americans to buy

ships in other countries and bring them under the American flag.

Plainly, this would not at all meet the difficulties which I have

described. The only thing it would accomplish would be to overcome the

excess in cost of building a ship in an American shipyard over the cost

of building it in a foreign shipyard; but since all the materials which

enter into an American ship are entirely relieved of duty, the

difference in cost of construction is so slight as to be practically a

negligible quantity, and to afford no substantial obstacle to the

revival of American shipping. The expedient of free ships, therefore,

would be merely to sacrifice our American shipbuilding industry, which

ought to be revived and enlarged with American shipping, and to

sacrifice it without receiving any substantial benefit. It is to be

observed that Germany, France, and Italy all have attempted to build up

their own shipping by adopting the policy of free ships, have failed in

the experiment, have abandoned it, and have adopted in its place the

policy of subsidy.

2. It has been proposed to establish a discriminating tariff duty in

favor of goods imported in American ships--that is to say, to impose

higher duties upon goods imported in foreign ships than are imposed on

goods imported in American ships. We tried that once many years ago and

abandoned it. In its place we have entered into treaties of commerce and

navigation with the principal countries of the world, expressly agreeing

that no such discrimination shall be made between their vessels and

ours. To sweep away all those treaties and enter upon a war of

commercial retaliation and reprisal for the sake of accomplishing

indirectly what can be done directly should not be seriously considered.

3. There remains the third and obvious method: to neutralize the

artificial disadvantages imposed upon American shipping through the

action of our own government and foreign governments by an equivalent

advantage in the form of a subsidy or subvention. In my opinion this is

what should be done; it is the sensible and fair thing to do. It is what

must be done if we would have a revival of our shipping and the desired

development of our foreign trade. We cannot repeal the protective

tariff; no political party dreams of repealing it; we do not wish to

lower the standard of American living or American wages. We should give

back to the shipowner what we take away from him for the purpose of

maintaining that standard; and unless we do give it back we shall

continue to go without ships. How can the expenditure of public money

for the improvement of rivers and harbors to promote trade be justified

upon any grounds which do not also sustain this proposal? Would any one

reverse the policy that granted aid to the Pacific railroads, the

pioneers of our enormous internal commerce, the agencies that built up

the great traffic which has enabled half a dozen other roads to be built

in later years without assistance? Such subventions would not be gifts.

They would be at once compensation for injuries inflicted upon American

shipping by American laws and the consideration for benefits received by

the whole American people--not the shippers or the shipbuilders or the

sailors alone, but by every manufacturer, every miner, every farmer,

every merchant whose prosperity depends upon a market for his products.

The provision for such just compensation should be carefully shaped and

directed so that it will go to individual advantage only so far as the

individual is enabled by it to earn a reasonable profit by building up

the business of the country.

A bill is now pending in Congress which contains such provisions; it has

passed the Senate and is now before the House Committee on Merchant

Marine and Fisheries; it is known as Senate bill No. 529, Fifty-ninth

Congress, First Session. It provides specifically that the

Postmaster-General may pay to American steamships, of specified rates of

speed, carrying mails upon a regular service, compensation not to exceed

the following amounts: For a line from an Atlantic port to Brazil,

monthly, $150,000 a year; for a line from an Atlantic port to Uruguay

and Argentina, monthly, $187,500 a year; for a line from a Gulf port to

Brazil, monthly, $137,500 a year; for a line from each of two Gulf ports

and from New Orleans to Central America and the Isthmus of Panama,

weekly, $75,000 a year; for a line from a Gulf port to Mexico, weekly,

$50,000 a year; for a line from a Pacific coast port to Mexico, Central

America, and the Isthmus of Panama, fortnightly, $120,000 a year. For

these six regular lines a total of $720,000. The payments provided are

no more than enough to give the American ships a fair living chance in

the competition.

There are other wise and reasonable provisions in the bill relating to

trade with the Orient, to tramp steamers, and to a naval reserve, but I

am now concerned with the provisions for trade to the south. The hope of

such a trade lies chiefly in the passage of that bill.

Postmaster-General Cortelyou, in his report for 1905, said:

Congress has authorized the Postmaster-General, by the act

of 1891, to contract with the owners of American steamships

for ocean mail service and has realized the impracticability

of commanding suitable steamships in the interest of the

postal service alone by requiring that such steamers shall

be of a size, class, and equipment which will promote

commerce and become available as auxiliary cruisers of the

navy in case of need. The compensation allowed to such

steamers is found to be wholly inadequate to secure the

proposals contemplated; hence, advertisements from time to

time have failed to develop any bids for much-needed

service. This is especially true in regard to several of the

countries of South America, with which we have cordial

relations and which, for manifest reasons, should have

direct mail connections with us. I refer to Brazil and

countries south of it. Complaints of serious delay to mails

for these countries have become frequent and emphatic,

leading to the suggestion on the part of certain officials

of the government that for the present and until more

satisfactory direct communication can be established,

important mails should be dispatched to South America by way

of European ports and on European steamers, which would not

only involve the United States in the payment of double

transit rates to a foreign country for the dispatch of its

mails to countries of our own hemisphere, but might

seriously embarrass the government in the exchange of

important official and diplomatic correspondence.

The fact that the government claims exclusive control of the

transmission of letter mail throughout its own territory

would seem to imply that it should secure and maintain the

exclusive jurisdiction when necessary, of its mails on the

high seas. The unprecedented expansion of trade and foreign

commerce justifies prompt consideration of an adequate

foreign mail service.

It is difficult to believe, but it is true, that out of this faulty

ocean mail service the government of the United States is making a large

profit. The actual cost to the government last year of the ocean mail

service to foreign countries other than Canada and Mexico was

$2,965,624.21, while the proceeds realized by the government from

postage between the United States and foreign countries other than

Canada and Mexico was $6,008,807.53, leaving the profit to the United

States of $3,043,183.32; that is to say, under existing law the

government of the United States, having assumed the monopoly of carrying

the mails for the people of the country, is making a profit of

$3,000,000 per annum by rendering cheap and inefficient service. Every

dollar of that three millions is made at the expense of the commerce of

the United States. What can be plainer than that the government ought to

expend at least the profits that it gets from the ocean mail service in

making the ocean mail service efficient. One quarter of those profits

would establish all these lines which I have described between the

United States and South and Central America, and give us, besides a good

mail service, enlarged markets for the producers and merchants of the

United States who pay the postage from which the profits come.[12]

In his last message to Congress, President Roosevelt said:

To the spread of our trade in peace and the defense of our

flag in war a great and prosperous merchant marine is

indispensable. We should have ships of our own and seamen of

our own to convey our goods to neutral markets, and in case

of need to reenforce our battle line. It cannot but be a

source of regret and uneasiness to us that the lines of

communication with our sister republics of South America

should be chiefly under foreign control. It is not a good

thing that American merchants and manufacturers should have

to send their goods and letters to South America via Europe

if they wish security and dispatch. Even on the Pacific,

where our ships have held their own better than on the

Atlantic, our merchant flag is now threatened through the

liberal aid bestowed by other governments on their own steam

lines. I ask your earnest consideration of the report with

which the Merchant Marine Commission has followed its long

and careful inquiry.

The bill now pending in the House is a bill framed upon the report of

that Merchant Marine Commission. The question whether it shall become a

law depends upon your Representatives in the House. You have the

judgment of the Postmaster-General, you have the judgment of the

Senate, you have the judgment of the President; if you agree with these

judgments and wish the bill which embodies them to become a law, say so

to your Representatives. Say it to them individually and directly, for

it is your right to advise them and it will be their pleasure to hear

from you what legislation the interests of their constituents demand.

The great body of Congressmen are always sincerely desirous to meet the

just wishes of their constituents and to do what is for the public

interest; but in this great country they are continually assailed by

innumerable expressions of private opinion and by innumerable demands

for the expenditure of public money; they come to discriminate very

clearly between private opinion and public opinion, and between real

public opinion and the manufactured appearance of public opinion; they

know that when there is a real demand for any kind of legislation it

will make itself known to them through a multitude of individual voices.

Resolutions of commercial bodies frequently indicate nothing except that

the proposer of the resolution has a positive opinion and that no one

else has interest enough in the subject to oppose it. Such resolutions

by themselves, therefore, have comparatively little effect; they are

effective only when the support of individual expressions shows that

they really represent a genuine and general opinion.

It is for you and the business men all over the country whom you

represent to show to the Representatives in Congress that the producing

and commercial interests of the country really desire a practical

measure to enlarge the markets and increase the foreign trade of the

United States, by enabling American shipping to overcome the

disadvantages imposed upon it by foreign governments for the benefit of

their trade, and by our government for the benefit of our home industry.

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