x - x0 x - x0 x - x1
u = u0 + ------(0, 1) + ------ . ------(0, 1, 2) +
h h 2h
x - x0 x - x1 x - x2
------ . ------ . ------(0, 1, 2, 3) + ... (19),
h 2h 3h
x - x0 x - x0 x - x1
u = u0 + ------(0, 1) + ------ . ------(-1, 0, 1) +
h h 2h
x - x0 x - x1 x - x_(-1)
------ . ------ . ----------(-1, 0, 1, 2) + ... (20).
h 2h 3h
The general principle on which these formulae are constructed, and
which may be used to construct other formulae, is that (i.) we start
with any tabulated value of u, (ii.) we pass to the successive
differences by steps, each of which may be either downwards or
upwards, and (iii.) the new suffix which is introduced at each step
determines the new factor (involving x) for use in the next term. For
any particular value of x, however, all formulae which end with the
same difference of the _r_th order give the same result, provided
tabular differences are used. If, for instance, we go only to first
differences, we have
x - x0 x - x1
u0 + ------(0, 1) = u1 + ------(0, 1)
h h
identically.
13. _Ordinates not Equidistant._--When the successive ordinates in the
graph of u are not equidistant, i.e. when the differences of
successive values of x are not equal, the above principle still
applies, provided the differences are adjusted in a particular way.
Let the values of x for which u is tabulated be a = x0 + [alpha]h, b =
x0 + [beta]h, c = x0 + [gamma]h,... Then the table becomes
+---------------+----------+---------------------------------------------------+
| | | Adjusted Differences |
| x. | u. +-----------------+--------------------------+------+
| | | 1st Diff. | 2nd Diff. | &c. |
+---------------+----------+-----------------+--------------------------+------+
| . | . | . | . | |
| . | . | . | . | |
| . | . | . | . | |
| a = x_[alpha] | u_[alpha]| | | |
| | |([alpha], [beta])| | |
| b = x_[beta] |u_([beta])| |([alpha], [beta], [gamma])| |
| | |([beta], [gamma])| | |
| c = x_[gamma] | u_[gamma]| . | . | |
| . | . | . | . | |
| . | . | . | . | |
| . | . | . | . | |
+---------------+----------+-----------------+--------------------------+------+
In this table, however, ([alpha], [beta]) does not mean u_([beta]) -
u_([alpha]), but u_([beta]) - u_([alpha]) / ([beta] - [alpha]);
([alpha], [beta], [gamma]) means {([beta], [gamma]) - ([alpha],
[beta])} / (1/2)([gamma] - [alpha]); and, generally any quantity
([eta], ... [phi]) in the column headed "rth diff." is obtained by
dividing the difference of the adjoining quantities in the preceding
column by ([phi] - [eta])/r. If the table is formed in this way, we
may apply the principle of S 12 so as to obtain formulae such as
x - a x - a x - b
u = u_[alpha] + ----- . ([alpha], [beta]) + ----- . ----- . ([alpha], [beta], [gamma]) + ... (21),
h h 2h
x - c x - c x - b
u = u_[gamma] + ----- . ([beta], [gamma]) + ----- . ----- . ([alpha], [beta], [gamma]) + ... (22).
h h 2h
The following example illustrates the method, h being taken to be
1 deg.:--
_Example 8._
+--------+------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| x. | u = sin x. | 1st Diff. | 2nd Diff. | 3rd Diff. |
| | | (adjusted). | (adjusted). | (adjusted). |
+--------+------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| | | + | - | - |
| 20 deg.| .3420201 | | | |
| | | 162932 50 | | |
| 22 deg.| .3746066 | | 1125 00 | |
| | | 161245 00 | | 48 75 |
| 23 deg.| .3907311 | | 1222 50 | |
| | | 158800 00 | | 48 30 |
| 26 deg.| .4383711 | | 1303 00 | |
| | | 156194 00 | | 47 49 |
| 27 deg.| .4539905 | | 1445 47 | |
| | | 151857 60 | | 46 00 |
| 32 deg.| .5299193 | | 1583 48 | |
| | | 145523 67 | | |
| 35 deg.| .5735764 | | | |
+--------+------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
To find u for x = 31 deg., we use the values for 26 deg., 27 deg., 32
deg. and 35 deg., and obtain
5 5 4
u = .4383711 00 + ---(156194 00) + --- . ---(-1445 47) +
1 1 2
5 4 -1
--- . --- . ---(-46 00) = .5150380,
1 2 3
which is only wrong in the last figure.
If the values of u occurring in (21) or (22) are u_(alpha), u_(beta),
u_(gamma), ... u_(lambda), corresponding to values a, b, c, ... l of x,
the formula may be more symmetrically written
(x - b) (x - c) ... (x - l) (x - a) (x - c) ... (x - l)
u = ---------------------------u_[alpha] + ---------------------------u_[beta] + ...
(a - b) (a - c) ... (a - l) (b - a) (b - c) ... (b - l)
(x - a) (x - b) (x - c) ...
... + ---------------------------u_[lambda] (23).
(l - a) (l - b) (l - c) ...
This is known as _Lagrange's formula_, but it is said to be due to
Euler. It is not convenient for practical use, since it does not show
how many terms have to be taken in any particular case.
14. _Interpolation from Tables of Double Entry._--When u is a function
of x and y, and is tabulated in terms of x and of y jointly, its
calculation for a pair of values not given in the table may be
effected either directly or by first forming a table of values of u in
terms of y for the particular value of x and then determining u from
this table for the particular value of y. For direct interpolation,
consider that [Delta] represents differencing by changing x into x +
1, and [Delta]' differencing by changing y into y + 1. Then the
formula is
u_(x, y) = (l + Delta)^x (1 + [Delta]')^y u_(0, 0);
and the right-hand side can be developed in whatever form is most
convenient for the particular case.
REFERENCES.--For general formulae, with particular applications, see
the _Text-book of the Institute of Actuaries_, part ii. (1st ed. 1887,
2nd ed. 1902), p. 434; H. L. Rice, _Theory and Practice of
Interpolation_ (1899). Some historical references are given by C. W.
Merrifield, "On Quadratures and Interpolation," _Brit. Assoc. Report_
(1880), p. 321; see also _Encycl. der math. Wiss._ vol. i. pt. 2, pp.
800-819. For J. D. Everett's formula, see _Quar. Jour. Pure and
Applied Maths._, No. 128 (1901), and _Jour. Inst. Actuaries_, vol.
xxxv. (1901), p. 452. As to relative accuracy of different formulae,
see _Proc. Lon. Math. Soc._ (2) vol. iv. p. 320. Examples of
interpolation by means of auxiliary curves will be found in _Jour.
Royal Stat. Soc._ vol. lxiii. pp. 433, 637. See also DIFFERENCES,
CALCULUS OF. (W. F. Sh.)
INTERPRETATION (from Lat. _interpretari_, to expound, explain,
_interpres_, an agent, go-between, interpreter; _inter_, between, and
the root _pret-_, possibly connected with that seen either in Greek
[Greek: phrazein], to speak, or [Greek: prattein], to do), in general,
the action of explaining, or rendering the sense of an obscure form of
words or an unknown tongue into a language comprehended by the person
addressed. In legal use the word "interpretation" is employed in the
sense of ascertaining the meaning of the language of a document, as well
as its relation to facts. It is also applied to acts of parliament, as
pointing out the sense in which particular words used therein are to be
understood. The interpretation of documents and statutes is subject to
definite legal rules, the more important of which will be found in the
articles CONTRACT, STATUTE, WILL, &c.
INTERREGNUM (Lat. _inter_, between, and _regnum_, reign), strictly a
period during which the normal constituted authority is in abeyance, and
government is carried on by a temporary authority specially appointed.
Though originally and specifically confined to the sphere of sovereign
authority, the term is commonly used by analogy in other connexions for
any suspension of authority, during which affairs are carried on by
specially appointed persons. The term originated in Rome during the
regal period when an _interrex_ was appointed (traditionally by the
senate) to carry on the government between the death of one king and the
election of his successor (see ROME: _History_, _ad init._). It was
subsequently used in Republican times of an officer appointed to hold
the _comitia_ for the election of the consuls when for some reason the
retiring consuls had not done so. In the regal period when the senate,
instead of appointing a king, decided to appoint _interreges_, it
divided itself into ten decuries from each of which one senator was
selected. Each of these ten acted as king for five days, and if, at the
end of fifty days, no king had been elected, the rotation was renewed.
It was their duty to nominate a king, whose appointment was then
ratified or refused by the _curiae_. Under the Republic similarly
_interreges_ acted for five days each. When the first consuls were
elected (according to Dionysius iv. 84 and Livy i. 60), Spurius
Lucretius held the comitia as interrex, and from that time down to the
Second Punic War such officers were from time to time appointed.
Thenceforward there is no record of the office till 82 B.C., when the
senate appointed an _interrex_ to hold the _comitia_ which made Sulla
dictator (Appian, _Bell. civ._ i. 98). In 55, 53 and 52 _interreges_ are
again found, the last-mentioned being on the occasion when Pompey was
elected sole consul.
The most noteworthy use of the term "Interregnum" in post-classical
times is that of the Great Interregnum in German history between the
death of Conrad IV. (1254) and the election of Rudolf of Habsburg
(1273). See GERMANY: _History_.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE. The phrase "interstate commerce," as used in the
United States, denotes commerce between the citizens of different states
of the Union. The words "interstate" and "intrastate" are not found in
the constitution nor, until comparatively recently, in decisions of the
courts or in legislative acts (probably being first used officially in
1887 in the Interstate Commerce Act). The constitution of 1789 uses the
phrase "commerce among the states," and the first official decision
interpreting the phrase says that "it may very properly be restricted to
that commerce which concerns more states than one" (Chief Justice
Marshall in _Gibbons_ v. _Ogden_, 9 _Wheaton_ 194). Commerce among the
states is there distinguished from "commerce which is completely
internal, which is carried on between man and man in a state, or between
parts of the same state, and which does not extend to or affect other
states." It was declared (_Lehigh_ case, 145 _U.S._ 192) that commerce
between two persons in the same state is not interstate even when there
is a temporary deviation to the soil of another state; but later
(_Hanley_ case, 187 _U.S._ 617, distinguishing the _Lehigh_ case) it was
declared that as to transportation, such commerce is interstate. The
courts have interpreted commerce to denote not merely a mutual selling
or traffic, but as "a term of the largest import," including intercourse
for the purposes of trade in any and all its forms (_Gibbons_ v.
_Ogden_, 9 _Wheaton_ 194, and _Welton_ v. _Missouri_, 91 _U.S._ 280).
Thus have been included not only the actions of trading, navigation,
transportation, and communication, but also the instruments and agents
employed, including even telegraph messages and, in the extremest cases,
lottery tickets.[1]
The decision of the question where federal control of interstate traffic
ends and state control begins has been one of great practical
difficulty. In general it has been held that whenever a commodity begins
to move as an article of trade from one state to another, commerce in
that commodity between the states has begun. Mere intention to ship
goods does not make them subjects of interstate commerce, but they must
actually be put in motion or committed to the carrier for that purpose
(_Coe_ v. _Errol_, 116 _U.S._ 517). As a practical guide in deciding
when state control should be resumed, the court as early as 1827
(_Brown_ v. _Maryland_) laid down the "original package rule," that the
taxing power of the state should begin when the original package in
which the goods had been imported into the state had been broken up or
sold. The injustice of allowing goods to be held thus, for long periods
escaping local taxation, led to a modification of the rule in 1868
(_Woodruff_ v. _Parkham_, 8 _Wall._ 123), and such goods after reaching
their destination may be taxed as property in common with other
property in the state.[2]
_Reason for Federal Control of Interstate Commerce._--Immediately after
the close of the War of American Independence in 1783 appeared the
separatist tendencies and local jealousies usual in a confederation. The
Congress of the Confederation had no power to levy tariff duties or to
regulate commerce between the states, and the separate states freely and
recklessly exercised their rights in this matter. Though commerce at
that time was comparatively unimportant, the results of this restrictive
policy were most unfortunate. The Annapolis Convention of 1786 was
called by the Virginia legislature to take into consideration the trade
of the United States and to consider how far a uniform system in their
commercial relations might be necessary to the common interests and
their permanent harmony. This conference resulted in the call of the
Philadelphia Convention of 1787, which framed the present Constitution.
Chief Justice Marshall, in one of the early cases on this subject
(_Brown_ v. _Maryland_, 12 _Wheaton_ 419, in 1827), said in words often
since quoted: "It may be doubted whether any of the evils proceeding
from the feebleness of the federal government contributed more to that
great revolution which introduced the present system than the deep and
general conviction that commerce ought to be regulated by Congress."
Every year has increased the importance of the congressional power of
regulating commerce. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
each neighbourhood supplied nearly all its needs by its own industry,
but improving means of transportation and communication have multiplied
the commercial ties between the citizens of the various states. This
change went on slowly until 1830, more rapidly between 1830 and 1860,
and at an ever-hastening pace after the Civil War. Until 1824 no case
involving directly the consideration of this power reached the United
States Supreme Court. From 1824 to 1840 the Supreme Court decided an
average of one-third of a case a year; from 1841 to 1860, an average of
three-fourths of a case; from 1861 to 1870, an average of one case; from
1871 to 1880, an average of nearly six cases; from 1881 to 1890, an
average of more than seven cases; and from 1891 to 1900, an average of
more than ten cases. The decisions have not been entirely uniform, and
there were some decisions too contradictory to be explained by any
ingenuity. The Supreme Court itself has said (_Fargo_ v. _Michigan_, 121
_U.S._ 230) that "it may be admitted that the court has not always
employed the same language, and that all of the judges of the court who
have written opinions for it may not have meant precisely the same
thing." Though in the period just preceding the Civil War the doctrine
of states' rights tended to weaken somewhat the federal power, the broad
outlines of the interpretation by Chief Justice Marshall laid down in
1824 in _Gibbons_ v. _Ogden_ remain to-day almost undimmed.
_Interstate Commerce in the Federal Constitution._--Freedom of trade,
without discrimination, between the citizens of all the states was in
the main ensured by one brief sentence, usually called the "commerce
clause" of the federal constitution:--"The Congress shall have power ...
to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,
and with the Indian tribes" (Art. 1, sec. 8, clause 3). Hardly less
important is the power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other
powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United
States, or in any department or officer thereof" (Art. 1, sec. 8, clause
18). To the same end of freedom of commerce, Congress is limited in that
"no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state," and
"no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue
to the ports of one state over those of another; nor shall vessels
bound to or from one state be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in
another" (Art. 1, sec. 9, clauses 5 and 6). Directly and by implication,
Congress was granted a number of other powers over commerce, in that it
may coin money, establish uniform laws of bankruptcy, establish
post-offices and post roads, regulate weights and measures, exercise
admiralty jurisdiction (now interpreted to extend to all public
waterways accessible to the traffic of more than one state), grant
patents and copyrights, and use the power of taxation to protect,
repress or even destroy the agencies of commerce (e.g. state bank
notes). But these powers can be exercised only in ways which favour and
make free the intercourse among all parts of the nation.
Even if the commerce clause had been omitted from the Constitution, a
large part of its object would have been attained by certain
prohibitions upon the states as follows: "The citizens of each state
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states" (Art. 4, sec. 2). "No state shall, without the consent
of the Congress, lay any impost or duties on imports or exports, except
what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and
the net produce of all duties and impost, laid by any state on imports
or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States,
and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the
Congress" (Art. 1, sec. 10, clause 2). "No state shall, without the
consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage" (Art. 1, sec. 10, clause
3). Thus by threefold measures of precaution was ensured domestic
freedom of trade from every point in the land to its farthest frontiers.
_Negative Working of the Commerce Provisions._--For nearly a hundred
years these provisions were important only in their negative effects of
preventing the states from granting special privileges to their citizens
or taxing unequally the citizens of other states. The decision in 1824
of _Gibbons_ v. _Ogden_ stopped the attempt of the state of New York to
grant the monopoly of steamboat traffic on the waters of that state. Had
the clear and unequivocal opinion in that case been different, local
ingenuity doubtless would have devised a multitude of discriminations.
"The power to tax involves the power to destroy," and ever since the
decision of _McCulloch_ v. _Maryland_ in 1819 it has been held that no
agencies created by the federal government, such as banks or legal
tender notes, are subject to state taxation, and the rule has also been
laid down repeatedly by the Supreme Court (for the first time in 1886)
that no burden can be laid upon the act of taking goods into or out of
the state, of soliciting sales, or of delivering goods even though the
tax is without discrimination as between the state's own citizens and
others; that is, interstate commerce "cannot be taxed at all" (_Robbins_
v. _Shelby County Taxing District_, 120 _U.S._ 489).[3] Federal control
of interstate commerce has been interpreted by the courts to be
exclusive of any control by the states. This is not self-evident in the
clause, "Congress shall have power to regulate commerce among the
several states." Over some other subjects the power of the federal and
state governments is concurrent, the state being able to act until
Congress enacts some conflicting legislation. Although the early
decisions suggested that the power of Congress was exclusive, yet for
nearly a century no positive decision was rendered and no positive
action was taken by Congress. Between 1870 and 1886 the states made
great progress in the regulation of railways on the assumption that
until Congress had acted the states were free to act. The question was
put beyond doubt in a series of decisions establishing the principle
that the non-action of Congress indicates its will that commerce shall
be free and untrammelled and that the states cannot interfere either
through their police power or their taxing power.[4]
_Positive Federal Regulation._--Though the regulation of interstate
commerce up to the Civil War was mainly negative, some positive actions
of the federal government had indirect effects on commerce, as, for
example, the coinage of money, the establishment of post-offices, the
charter of the first and second United States banks, and the charter of
the Pacific Railroad. The power to do these things was conferred by the
Constitution in some cases directly, in other cases by implication in
that any means appropriate to lawful ends might be employed (as in case
of charter of the United States Bank, _McCulloch_ v. _Maryland_). From
1850 to 1862 the federal government had made numerous land grants in aid
of railways, but always to the states, not directly to the corporations,
and it had never until 1862 granted a charter to a railway, canal,
turnpike or transportation company. In 1866 Congress passed an act
authorizing railway companies whose roads were operated by steam to
carry passengers, freight, &c., "on their way from any state to another
state and to receive compensation therefor and to connect with roads of
other states so as to form continuous lines for the transportation of
the same to the place of destination."[5] This act, so vague and general
in its terms, had very little effect, though it has been the occasion of
considerable litigation to determine its influence upon existing police
laws of the states. In 1884 Congress established the Bureau of Animal
Industry for preventing the exportation of diseased cattle and for the
extirpation of disease among domestic animals. This had little
significance at the time for interstate commerce, its purpose being to
meet the objections of foreign countries to the importation of American
meat. In 1887 was passed the Interstate Commerce Act, providing a
national commission to supervise interstate railways. In 1888 was passed
an Arbitration Act, replaced in 1898 by an act which provides that in
case of disputes between common carriers subject to the Interstate
Commerce Act and their employees, conciliation shall be tried, and, in
case this should fail, indicates the methods that may be used for the
voluntary submission of the dispute to a board of arbitration. In 1890
was passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, making illegal every contract and
combination in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states
or with foreign nations. In 1893 a Safety Appliance Act, the
administration of which was put into the hands of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, promoted the safety of employees and travellers,
and required the roads engaged in interstate commerce to equip their
cars and locomotives with automatic couplers and brakes. In 1895 was
prohibited the interstate carriage of condemned carcasses of animals,
and of lottery tickets (see above reference to the interpretation of the
Lottery Act), in 1897 of obscene literature, and in 1900 of game killed
in violation of state laws. In 1901 carriers engaged in interstate
commerce were required to make full reports of all accidents to the
Interstate Commerce Commission. In 1902 was prohibited the interstate
carriage of dairy products falsely labelled or branded as to the state
or territory in which produced, and in 1903 the Secretary of Agriculture
was empowered to establish rules concerning importation and
transportation of live stock. In 1903 the Bureau of Corporations was
established with power to investigate the conduct of corporations
engaged in interstate and foreign commerce, excepting common carriers
subject to the Interstate Commerce Act. In 1903 the Interstate Commerce
Act was amended by the Elkins Act, making much more difficult the
granting of rebates. In 1905 the President was authorized to grant
medals of honour to persons who by their daring save life or prevent
accident on railways. In 1906 the Interstate Commerce Act was amended in
important particulars (specified below). In 1906 were passed pure food
laws, greatly enlarging the duties of the Department of Agriculture in
reference to inspection of foods prepared for interstate commerce.
_The Interstate Commerce Act._--The period of positive action by
Congress in the regulating of interstate commerce practically begins,
therefore, with the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act of February
1887, the outcome of fully seventeen years of agitation and discussion.
The law was modelled in large part upon English acts. It applied to
common carriers wholly by railway, and partly by railway and partly by
water when both are used under a common arrangement for continuous
shipment; forbade unjust discrimination and undue and unreasonable
preference; made it unlawful to charge more for a shorter than for a
longer distance over the same line in the same direction, the shorter
being included within the longer distance (though a carrier might be
freed by the Commission from the working of this provision); and forbade
pooling and division of earnings. The administration of the law was
entrusted to a Commission of five members, appointed by the President.
From this act much was expected, but eighteen years of its operation
gave as net results little more than a greater uniformity of railway
accounting and much better understanding by the public of the nature of
the railway problem. Discrimination and secret rebates continued. The
anti-pooling clause (pretty generally recognized by the well-informed to
be a mistake) prevented open but not secret agreements between carriers,
and probably hastened the movement toward consolidation. The long and
short haul clause was made meaningless by the judicial interpretation
that any competition, even that of other carriers subject to the act,
justified the railway in charging more for a shorter than for a longer
haul. The effectiveness of the Commission was destroyed by the judicial
decision that it had no power to fix rates for the future. Until 1897,
the Commission, when it adjudged a rate unreasonable, usually declared
what rate was reasonable, and directed the carrier to reduce the rate by
a given date to the designated maximum. Of 135 orders made in decisions
rendered in the first ten years of the Commission, 68 prescribed a
maximum rate for the future. In 1897 it was finally decided in the
_Cincinnati Freight Bureau Case_ (167 _U.S._ 479) that Congress had not
conferred upon the Commission the power to prescribe any rate for the
future. The court said that Congress might fix the rate itself or
authorize a sub-tribunal to do so, but that Congress had not yet given
that authority.
The need of further legislation had been felt from the beginning by
many, and after 1903 the agitation became very active. The position
taken by President Roosevelt in his message to Congress in 1904 made the
amendment of the Interstate Commerce Act the principal political issue
before Congress in the sessions of 1905 and of 1906. After the most
remarkable senatorial debates heard at Washington in years, followed
with close interest by the country, a number of amendments became law on
the 29th of June 1906. The act was strengthened to a degree hardly
expected by the most earnest advocates of revision. A number of minor
changes made in the light of experience were: increasing the number of
commissioners to seven and their pay to $10,000; facilitating procedure
and the taking of evidence; requiring thirty days notice of a change of
rates; requiring appeal from the Commission's decision to be taken
within thirty days; empowering the Commission to establish joint rates
and to order switches to be built. The following are generally thought
to be still more important changes: (1) Including within the application
of the act pipe lines (particularly for oil), express and sleeping car
companies, and all the facilities and services in connexion with goods
transported; (2) giving publicity to railway business by empowering the
Commission to prescribe all forms of accounts and to examine the books
at all times, and by forbidding any other accounts or memoranda to be
kept by the companies; and (3) empowering the Commission to prescribe
reasonable maximum rates to take effect within not less than thirty days
and to continue not over two years unless set aside by the courts.
_The Anti-Trust Act of 1890._--The growth of large corporations with
some degree of monopoly power, the so-called trusts, had called forth in
a number of the states anti-trust laws before 1890. When it became
evident that the states were not succeeding in dealing with the problem,
public sentiment found expression in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
approved on the 2nd of July 1890. This act declared illegal and
criminal, punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, every contract in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign
nations. The statute thus changed the common law wherein such contracts
were merely unenforceable but not criminal. This act was at first
construed by the Supreme Court as applying to any contract in restraint
of interstate commerce, whether reasonable or unreasonable
(_Trans-Missouri Freight Association_, 166 _U.S._ 331), but later, in
1905 (_Stock Yards case_, 25 _Supreme Court Reporter_ 276) it was held
that the act did not apply to agreements for the better conduct of
business which incidentally affected interstate commerce.[6] The act has
been interpreted to apply to transportation (_Freight Association case_,
166 _U.S._ 290, and _Northern Securities case_), with results felt even
by some of the advocates of railway regulation to be unfortunate. It
applies to unlawful combinations of manufacturers to divide the
territory and regulate the prices (_Addyston Pipe Trust Case_, 175
_U.S._ 211). In the Sugar Trust case (1895 _U.S._ v. _Knight Co._ 156
_U.S._) it was declared that the statute did not apply to a
manufacturing company which had acquired nearly complete control of the
manufacture of refined sugar by means of the purchase of stock of other
refining companies.
The Attorney-General submitted to the Senate, in June 1906, a statement
of the results of all suits instituted by the Department of Justice
under the anti-trust law, the Interstate Commerce Act and the Elkins
Act, in the period from 1887 to June 1906 inclusive. Thirty-six suits
were still pending; of the 250 which had been disposed of in some manner
186 ended in dismissal, non-prosecution or acquittal, and 64 were
successful in securing in whole or in large part the object of the suit
(in 30 cases conviction, in 34 cases the granting of a petition or an
injunction, &c.). In addition to these results of federal efforts to
regulate industry must be counted the cases in which carriers complied
with the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission without suit; but
even then the total by 1906 was somewhat meagre.
The establishment of the Bureau of Corporations in 1903, and the
considerable extension of the powers of inspection of the Department of
Agriculture are recent changes of which the results cannot yet be fairly
judged. The aim of the Bureau of Corporations is to ensure publicity in
the management of corporations engaged in interstate and foreign
commerce. The first commissioner, Mr James R. Garfield, showed much
activity in pursuing the purposes of the act, and published informing
reports upon the beef trust (1905), and upon the Standard Oil Company
(1906). But the effect and possible extension of federal interference
became from this time burning political questions of far-reaching
importance of too recent a date to be dealt with historically in this
article.
See also the _Annual Reports_ of the Interstate Commerce Commission
since 1887, and decisions; Prentice and Egan, _The Commerce Clause of
the Federal Constitution_ (Chicago, 1898); _Reports_ of the
Commissioner of Corporations on the Beef Industry (1905), on the
Transportation of Petroleum (1906); W. Z. Ripley (ed.). _Trusts, Pools
and Corporations_ (1905), containing leading cases and analyses of the
voluminous "trust" literature; F. N. Judson, _The Law of Interstate
Commerce and its Federal Regulation_ (Chicago, 1905); Beale and Wyman,
_Railroad Rate Regulation_ (Boston, 1906); Frank Hendrick, _The Power
to Regulate Corporations and Commerce_ (New York, 1906), favouring
less of new legislation. (F. A. F.)