[1] _On the Effects of Selection_, by Emory McClintock (New York,
1892), p. 94.
[2] As a result of investigation into the affairs of various American
insurance companies in 1905 by a committee appointed by the state
legislature of New York, a new law regulating life insurance down to
the minutest details was passed in 1906 (ch. 326). The surrender
value of a policy is to be the amount of insurance which the reserve,
computed on the 4(1/2)% mortality table, standing to its credit, will
purchase as a single premium. Other important features of the
legislation are that no New York company may hold a contingency
reserve beyond a fixed proportion of the net value of its policies;
the limiting of types of policies permitted, the defining of the
nature of investments permitted, and provisions for state
supervision, valuation, and annual division of profits.
[3] An important addition to the marine insurance law of the United
Kingdom was made by the Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies) Act
1909, which made void policies taken out by persons uninterested in
ships or cargo, who only gain by the loss of the vessel. Such
policies are known as "policies proof of interest." (P. P. I.).
[4] Lord Mansfield expressed it: "The warranty in a contract of
insurance is a condition or a contingency, and unless that be
performed there is no contract" (_Hibbert_ v. _Pigou_, _apud_
Marshall, 3rd ed., p. 375).
INTAGLIO (an Ital. word, from _intagliare_, to incise, cut into), a form
of engraving or carving, in which the pattern or design is sunk below
the surface of the material thus treated, opposed to "cameo" or
"relievo"--carving or engraving where the design is raised. Intaglio is
thus applied to incised gems, as cameo (q.v.) to gems cut in relief (see
GEMS).
INTELLECT (Lat. _intellectus_, from _intelligere_, to understand), the
general term for the mind in reference to its capacity for knowing or
understanding. It is very vaguely used in common language. A man is
described as "intellectual" generally because he is occupied with theory
and principles rather than with practice, often with the further
implication that his theories are concerned mainly with abstract
matters: he is aloof from the world, and especially is a man of training
and culture who cares little for the ordinary pleasures of sense.
"Intellect" is thus distinguished from "intelligence" by the field of
its operations, "intelligence" being used in the practical sphere for
readiness to grasp a situation. (The employment of the word as a synonym
for "news" is mere journalese; such phrases as "Intelligence Department"
in connexion with newspapers and public offices are more justifiable.)
In philosophy the "intellect" is contrasted with the senses and the
will; it sifts and combines sense-given data, which otherwise would be
only momentary, lasting practically only as long as the stimuli
continued to operate. It thus includes the cognitive processes, and is
the source of all real knowledge. Various attempts have been made to
narrow the use of the term, e.g. to the higher regions of knowledge
entirely above the region of sense (so Kant), or to conceptual
processes; but no agreement has been reached. "Intellection" (i.e. the
process as opposed to the capacity) has similarly been narrowed (e.g. by
Professor James Ward) to the sphere of concepts; other writers, however,
give it a much wider meaning. "Intellectualism" is a term given to any
system which emphasizes the cognitive function; thus aesthetic
intellectualism is that view of aesthetics which subordinates the
sensual gratification or the delight in purely formal beauty to what may
be called the ideal content.
INTELLIGENCE IN ANIMALS.[1] Professor G. J. Romanes, in his work on
_Animal Intelligence_ (1881), used the term "intelligence" as synonymous
with "reason," and defined it as follows: "Reason or intelligence is the
faculty which is concerned in the intentional adaptation of means to
ends. It therefore implies the conscious knowledge of the relation
between means employed and ends attained, and may be exercised in
adaptation to circumstances novel alike to the experience of the
individual and that of the species." There is here some ambiguity as to
the exact psychological significance of the words "intentional
adaptation" and of the phrase "conscious knowledge of the relation
between the means employed and the ends attained." A chick a day or two
old learns to leave untouched nauseous caterpillars, and Romanes would
certainly have regarded this as a case of intelligent profiting by
experience; but how far there is intentional adaptation and whether the
chick has conscious knowledge of the relation of means to ends, is
doubtful, and, to say the least of it, open to discussion. St George
Mivart, the acute dialectical opponent of Romanes, denied that animals
are capable of the exercise of reason or intelligence. He urged that
according to traditional views reason should denote and include all
intellectual perception, whether it be direct and intuitive or indirect
and inferential (_sensu stricto_), and contended that under neither head
are to be included the sensuous perceptions and merely practical
inferences of animals. Wasmann, who argues on similar grounds, regards
such behaviour as that of the chicken as instinctive in the wider sense
(see INSTINCT) and not intelligent; man alone, he contends, is
intelligent, that is to say has the power of perceiving the relations of
concepts to each other, and of drawing conclusions therefrom. It is
clear that the discussion largely turns on the definition of terms; but
more than this lies behind it. Both Mivart and Wasmann are emphatic in
their assertions that instinctive modes of behaviour in the wider sense
or the sensuous perceptions and practical inferences of animals differ
fundamentally in kind from the rational or intelligent conduct of human
folk, and that by no conceivable process of evolution could the one pass
upwards into the other.
Psychological definition.
Wasmann regards the inclusion of those activities which result from
sense-experience under the term "intelligence" as pseudo-psychological.
To modern psychologists of standing we must therefore turn. Under the
heading "Intellect or Intelligence," in the _Dictionary of Philosophy and
Psychology_, G. F. Stout and J. Mark Baldwin say: "There is a tendency to
apply the term intellect more especially to the capacity for conceptual
thinking. This does not hold in the same degree of the connected word
intelligence. We speak freely of 'animal intelligence,' but the phrase
'animal intellect' is unusual. However, the restriction of the term to
conceptual process is by no means so fixed and definite as to justify us
in including it in the definition." With respect to the word intellection
again: "There is a tendency to restrict the term to conceptual thinking.
Ward does so definitely and consistently. Croom-Robertson, on the other
hand, gives the word the widest possible application, making it cover all
forms of cognitive process. On the whole, if the term is to be employed
at all, Robertson's usage appears preferable, as corresponding better to
the generality of the words intellect and intelligence." It does not seem
to be pseudo-psychological, therefore, to apply the term intelligence to
the capacity, unquestionably possessed by animals, of profiting by
sensory experience. The present writer has suggested that the term may be
conveniently restricted to the capacity of guiding behaviour through
perceptual process, reserving the terms intellect and reason for the
so-called faculties which involve conceptual process. There are, however,
advantages, as Stout and Baldwin contend, in employing the word in a
somewhat wide and general sense. It is probably best for strictly
psychological purposes to define somewhat strictly perceptual and
conceptual (or ideational) process and to leave to intelligence the
comparative freedom of a word to be used in general literature and
therein defined by its context. It may be helpful, however, to place in
tabular form the different uses above indicated:--
_Perceptual Process._ _Conceptual Process._
1. Instinct (wider sense). Intelligence (e.g. Wasmann).
2. Sense-perception Intelligence (e.g. Mivart).
\_______ _______/
\/
3. Intelligence (e.g. Stout and Baldwin).
4. Intelligence. Intellect and Reason
(e.g. Lloyd Morgan).
From this table it may be seen at a glance that, with such divergence of
usage, the application of the word "intelligent" to any given case of
animal behaviour has in itself little psychological significance. If the
psychological status of the animal is to be seriously discussed, the
question to be answered is this: Are the observed activities explainable
in terms of perceptual process only, or do they demand also a
supplementary exercise of conceptual process? Granting that they are
intelligent in the broad acceptation of the word, are they only
perceptually intelligent or also conceptually intelligent?
Perceptual process.
Conceptual process.
It would require more space than is at our command to make the
distinction which is drawn by those who use these terms clear and
distinct; but enough may perhaps be said to enable the general reader to
grasp the salient points. It will be convenient to take a concrete case.
A chick in the performance of its truly instinctive activities pecks at
all sorts of small objects. In doing so it gains a certain amount of
initial experience. Very soon it may be observed that some grubs and
caterpillars are seized with avidity whenever occasion offers; while
others are after a few trials let alone. Broadly speaking, we have here
intelligent selection and rejection. Psychologically interpreted what is
believed to take place is somewhat as follows. Each grub or caterpillar
affords a visual impression or sensation. This as such is just a
presentation to sight and nothing more. But in virtue of previous
experience it suggests what was formerly presented to consciousness in
that experience. It has meaning. An impression which carries meaning
begotten of previous experience is raised to the level of a percept; and
behaviour which is influenced and guided by such percepts, that is to
say by impressions _and_ the meaning for behaviour they suggest, is the
outcome of perceptual process. If a dog learns to open a gate by lifting
the latch, this may be due to perceptual process. Through previous
experience the sight of the latch may suggest meaning for practical
behaviour. His action may be simply due to the fact that the visual
presentation has been directly associated with the appropriate bodily
activities, and now by suggestion reinstates like activities; he may
not, though on the other hand he may, exercise conceptual thought. Let
us suppose that the chick which selects certain caterpillars and rejects
others does form concepts. What does this imply from the standpoint of
psychology? Stout and Baldwin define conception as the "cognition of a
universal as distinguished from the particulars which it unifies. The
universal apprehended in this way is called a concept." If then the
chick apprehends the universal "good-for-eating" as exemplified in the
particular maggot, and the maggot as a concrete case of the abstract and
universal "good-for-eating," it has a capacity for conceptual thought.
"There is one point in our definition," say Stout and Baldwin, "which
requires to be specially emphasized. Conception is the cognition of a
universal as distinguished from the particulars which it unifies. The
words "as distinguished from" are of essential importance. The mere
presence of a universal element in cognition does not constitute a
concept. Otherwise all cognition would be conceptual. The simplest
perception includes a universal.... The universal must be apprehended in
antithesis to the particulars which it unifies." The general, or in
technical phraseology, the universal characteristic "good-for-eating" is
present in all that the chick practically finds to be edible; but the
chick may just eat the nice caterpillars without thinking for a moment
of edibility.
Their value.
Few would dream of contending that the chick a few days old is capable
of conceptual thought. Naive perceptual process pretty obviously
suffices for an explanation of the behaviour of the little bird. But so
too, it may be said, does it suffice for the explanation of much of the
practical behaviour of men. If a great number of the actions of animals
are only perceptually intelligent, so too are a great number of the
actions of men and women. This is unquestionably the case; and it serves
to bring out the distinction in value which may be assigned to the
percept and the concept respectively. The value of the percept is for
simple direct practical behaviour; the value of the concept is for the
elaboration of systematic knowledge. Any given impression may have
meaning for behaviour in a given situation which is like that which has
previously developed in a certain manner; but it may also have
significance for the interpretation of such situations in a conceptual
scheme of thought. The sight of the sage-blossom may have meaning for
the bee which has sucked the sweets contained in such flowers; the sight
of the bee in this situation may have significance for scientific
interpretation as an example of the fertilization of flowers by insects.
The bee may be only perceptually intelligent; the man who observes its
action may or may not be conceptually intelligent.
A good deal of human behaviour may be interpreted in terms of perceptual
intelligence, and a far larger proportion of animal behaviour may be so
interpreted. But some human conduct cannot be explained save as the
outcome of conceptual intelligence. The question is, whether any
carefully observed and well-authenticated cases of animal procedure are
inexplicable in the absence of conceptual thought, and if so what
concepts are necessarily involved? It is now conceded that the mere
collection of anecdotes which result from casual as opposed to
systematic observation can afford no satisfactory basis for an answer to
this question. A solution can only be obtained by well-planned
observations conducted by those who have an adequate psychological
training. Even under these conditions a criterion of the presence or
absence of conceptual factors is needed; and such a criterion is not
easy to formulate or to apply.
Development of concept.
If we institute inquiries with a view to ascertaining how the conceptual
factor originates, it appears to be the result of analysis and
abstraction, and to be reached by a process of comparison which becomes
intentional and deliberate. If, for example, in educational procedure,
we seek to assist children in forming concepts of colour, shape and
material, we place before them a number of objects, some round, some
square, some triangular; some red, some yellow, some blue; some made of
paper, some of wood, some of flannel. Any given object is both red and
square and made of flannel, blue and round and made of wood, and so on.
We teach the child to group the objects, to put all the blues, yellows
and reds together irrespective of shape or material; then all the
rounds, squares and triangles together; then all which are made of like
material. We thus help the children to grasp that though shape, colour
and material are combined in each object, yet for the immediate purpose
in hand one matters and the others do not matter. That which does matter
is abstracted from the rest. The child has to analyse his experience and
fix his attention on some given factor therein. He has to compare the
objects intentionally, that is, for a definite end. He reaches, for
example, the concept "blue" and realizes that the word may be applied to
a number of particular objects differing in other respects, and that
each is an example of what he understands by the word blue. Whether he
could reach the concept without words is a question on which opinions
differ.
Are animals conceptually intelligent?
Locke held that animals are incapable of the abstraction which is
implied in such procedure. Dr Stout considers that observation of their
behaviour shows little if any evidence of intentional comparison. And it
is open to discussion whether they are able to analyse the situations
opened up by their perceptual behaviour. The matter cannot be fully
considered here. It must suffice if enough has been said to show the
nature of the distinction between perceptual and conceptual process.
An example may, however, be given of the kind of observation which,
since it was carefully planned and carried out, is of evidential value.
Dr Alexander Hill's fox terrier was "taught" to open the side door of a
large box by lifting a projecting latch. When the door swung open he was
never allowed to find anything in the box, but was given a piece of
biscuit from the hand. Then a warm chop-bone was put inside the box,
which was placed in a courtyard so that the dog would pass it when no
one was near, though he could be watched from the window. Details of the
terrier's behaviour are given by Dr Hill in _Nature_ (lxvii. 558, April
1903). The net result was that the dog failed to apply at once his quite
familiar experience of lifting the latch in the usual way. Here two
situations were presented; first the box with people around and a piece
of biscuit to be obtained from one of them by lifting the latch;
secondly the box with no one near and a redolent chop-bone inside. To us
it is obvious enough that the lifted latch is the key to the development
of both situations; we analyse them so as to get the essential factor
which matters. The dog apparently did not do so. He seemingly was
incapable of this modest amount of analysis and abstraction.