knowledge may be in time past, or time present, or time future; and it
may be in a place near, or in a place distant. And the faculty of
knowledge may be of a capacity to know the object in all these relations
under certain limitations, or under no limitations. The faculty of
knowledge as knowing objects in all relations of time and space, under
certain limitations, is the faculty as given in man. We know objects in
time present, and past, and future; and we know objects both near and
distant; but then our knowledge does not extend to all events in any of
these relations, or in any of these relations to their utmost limit.
The faculty of knowledge as knowing objects in all relations of time and
space, under no limitations, is the faculty under its divine and
infinite form. Under this form it comprehends the present perfectly, and
the past and the future no less than the present--and it reaches through
all space. God's knowledge is an eternal now--an omnipresent here; that
is, all that is possible and actual in eternity and space, is now
perfectly known to him. Indeed God's knowledge ought not to be spoken of
in relation to time and space; it is infinite and absolute knowledge,
from eternity to eternity the same; it is unchangeable, because it is
perfect; it can neither be increased nor diminished.
We have shown before that the perfection of the knowledge does not
settle the mode of causation; that which comes to pass by necessity, and
that which comes to pass contingently, are alike known to God.
CONCLUSION.
I here finish my review of Edwards's System, and his arguments against
the opposite system. I hope I have not thought or written in vain. The
review I have aimed to conduct fairly and honourably, and in supreme
reverence of truth. As to style, I have laboured only for perspicuity,
and where a homely expression has best answered this end, I have not
hesitated to adopt it. The nice graces of rhetoric, as popularly
understood, cannot be attended to in severe reasoning. To amble on a
flowery surface with fancy, when we are mining in the depths of reason,
is manifestly impossible.
The great man with whose work I have been engaged, I honour and admire
for his intellectual might, and love and venerate for a purity and
elevation of spirit, which places him among the most sainted names of
the Christian church. But have I done wrong not to be seduced by his
genius, nor won and commanded by his piety to the belief of his
philosophy? I have not done wrong if that be a false philosophy. When he
leads me to the cross, and speaks to me of salvation, I hear in mute
attention--and one of the old preachers of the martyr age seems to have
re-appeared. But when we take a walk in the academian grove, I view him
in a different character, and here his voice does not sound to me so
sweet as Plato's.
The first part of my undertaking is accomplished. When I again trouble
the public with my lucubrations, I shall appear not as a reviewer, but
in an original work, which in its turn must become the subject of
philosophical criticism.
THE END.
Footnotes
[1] "It is remarkable that the advocates for necessity have adopted a
distinction made use of for other purposes, and forced it into their
service; I mean moral and natural necessity. They say natural or
physical necessity takes away liberty, but moral necessity does not: at
the same time they explain moral necessity so as to make it truly
physical or natural. That is physical necessity which is the
_invincible_ effect of the law of nature, and it is neither less
natural, nor less insurmountable, if it is from the laws of spirit than
it would be if it were from the laws of matter."--(Witherspoon's
Lectures on Divinity, lect. xiii.)
[2] Natural inability, and a want of liberty, are identified in this
usage; for the want of a natural faculty essential to the performance of
an action, and the existence of an impediment or antagonistic force,
which takes from a faculty supposed to exist, the _liberty_ of action,
have the same bearing upon responsibility.
[3] It is but justice to remark here, that the distinction of moral and
natural inability is made by many eminent divines, without intending
anything so futile as that we have above exposed. By moral inability
they do not appear to mean anything which really render the actions
required, impossible; but such an impediment as lies in corrupt
affections, an impediment which may be removed by a self-determination
to the use of means and appliances graciously provided or promised. By
natural ability they mean the possession of all the natural faculties
necessary to the performance of the actions required. In their
representations of this natural ability, they proceed according to a
popular method, rather than a philosophical. They affirm this natural
ability as a fact, the denial of which involves monstrous absurdities,
but they give no psychological view of it. This task I shall impose upon
myself in the subsequent volume. I shall there endeavour to point out
the connexion between the sensitivity and the will, both in a pure and a
corrupt state,--and explain what these natural faculties are, which,
according to the just meaning of these divines, form the ground of
rebuke and persuasion, and constitute responsibility.
[4] "The great argument that men are determined by the strongest
motives, is a mere equivocation, and what logicians call _petitio
principii_. It is impossible even to produce any medium of proof that it
is the strongest motive, except that it has prevailed. It is not the
greatest in itself; nor does it seem to be in all respects the strongest
to the agent; but you say it appears strongest in the meantime. Why?
Because you are determined by it. Alas! you promised to prove that I was
determined by the _strongest motive_, and you have only shown that I had
a _motive_ when I acted. But what has determined you then? Can any
effect be without a cause? I answer--supposing my self-determining power
to exist, it is as real a cause of its proper and distinguishing effect,
as your moral necessity: so that the matter just comes to a stand, and
is but one and the same thing on one side and on the other."
--(Witherspoon's Lectures, lect. xiii.)
[5] Cousin.
[6] Dr. Reid.
[7] Lat. _moralis_, from _mos_,--i. e. custom or ordinary conduct.