persons, in the existence of which, no will of theirs has any concern,
at least at that time; which, whether they are necessary or not with
regard to things in general, yet are necessary to them, and with regard
to any volition of theirs at that time, as they prevent all acts of the
will about the affair." (p. 31.) This particular necessity is absolute
to the individual, because his will has nothing to do with it--whether
it be absolute or not in the general sense, does not affect his case.
"What has been said to show the meaning of terms _necessary_ and
_necessity_, may be sufficient for the explaining of the opposite terms
_impossible_ and _impossibility_. For there is no difference, but only
the latter are negative and the former positive." (ibid.)
_Inability and Unable._
"It has been observed that these terms in their original and common use,
have relation to will and endeavour, as supposable in the case." That is
have relation to the connexion of volition with effects. "But as these
terms are often used by philosophers and divines, especially writers on
controversies about free will, they are used in a quite different and
far more extensive sense, and are applied to many cases wherein no will
or endeavour for the bringing of the thing to pass is or can be
supposed:" e. g. The connexion between volitions and their causes or
motives.
_Contingent and Contingency._
"Any thing is said to be contingent, or to come to pass by chance or
accident, in the original meaning of such words, when its connexion with
its causes or antecedents, according to the established course of
things, is not discerned; and so is what we have no means of foreseeing.
But the word, contingent, is abundantly used in a very different sense;
not for that, whose connexion with the series of things we cannot
discern so as to foresee the event, but for something which has
absolutely no previous ground or reason, with which its existence has
any fixed connexion." (p. 31. 32.)
Contingency and chance Edwards uses as equivalent terms. In common use,
contingency and chance are relative to our knowledge--implying that we
discern no cause. In another use,--the use of a certain philosophical
school,--he affirms that contingency is used to express absolutely no
cause; or, that some events are represented as existing without any
cause or ground of their existence. This will be examined in its proper
place. I am now only stating Edwards's opinions, not discussing them.
Sec. IV. Of the Distinction of natural and moral Necessary and
Inability.
We now return to the question:--Is the connexion between motive and
volition necessary?
The term necessary, in its common or vulgar use, does not relate to this
question, for in that use as we have seen, it refers to the connexion
between volition considered as a cause, and its effects. In this
question, we are considering volition as an effect in relation to its
cause or the motive. If the connexion then of motive and volition be
necessary, it must be necessary in the philosophical or metaphysical
sense of the term. Now this philosophical necessity Edwards does hold to
characterize the connexion of motive and volition. This section opens
with the following distinction of philosophical necessity: "That
necessity which has been explained, consisting in an infallible
connexion of the things signified by the subject and predicate of a
proposition, as intelligent beings are the subjects of it, is
distinguished into _moral_ and _natural_ necessity." He then
appropriates _moral philosophical necessity_ to express the nature of
the connexion between motive and volition: "And sometimes by moral
necessity is meant that necessity of connexion and _consequence_ which
arises from _moral causes_, as the strength of inclination, or motives,
and the connexion which there is in many cases between these, and such
certain volitions and actions. And it is in _this_ sense that I use the
phrase _moral necessity_ in the following discourse." (p. 32.) Natural
_philosophical_ necessity as distinguished from this, he employs to
characterize the connexion between natural causes and phenomena of our
being, as the connexion of external objects with our various sensations,
and the connexion between truth and our assent or belief. (p. 33.)
In employing the term _moral_, however, he does not intend to intimate
that it affects at all the absoluteness of the necessity which it
distinguishes; on the contrary, he affirms that "moral necessity may be
as absolute as natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as
perfectly connected with its moral cause, as a natural necessary effect
is with its natural cause. It must be allowed that there may be such a
thing as a _sure_ and _perfect_ connexion between moral causes and
effects; so this only (i. e. the sure and perfect connexion,) is what I
call by the name of _moral necessity_." (p. 33.)
Nor does he intend "that when a moral habit or motive is so strong that
the act of the will infallibly follows, this is not owing to the _nature
of things!_" But these terms, moral and natural, are convenient to
express a difference which really exists; a difference, however, which
"does not lie so much in the nature of the _connexion_ as in the two
terms _connected_." Indeed, he soon after admits "that choice in _many
cases_ arises from nature, as truly as other events." His sentiment is
plainly this choice lies in the great system and chain of nature as
truly as any other phenomenon, arising from its antecedent and having
its consequents or effects: but we have appropriated nature to express
the chain of causes and effects, which lie without us, and which are
most obvious to us; and choice being, "as it were, a new principle of
motion and action," lying within us, and often interrupting or altering
the external course of nature, seems to demand a peculiar designation.
(p. 34.)
Edwards closes his remarks on moral necessity by justifying his
reduction of motive and volition under philosophical necessity. "It must
be observed, that in what has been explained, as signified by the name
of _moral necessity_, the word _necessity_ is not used according to the
original design and meaning of the word; for, as was observed before,
such terms, _necessary, impossible, irresistible,_ &c. in common speech,
and their most proper sense, are always relative, having reference to
some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavour, that is insufficient.
But no such opposition, or contrary will and endeavour, is supposable in
the case of moral necessity; which is a certainty of the inclination and
will itself; which does not admit of the supposition of a will to oppose
and resist it. For it is absurd to suppose the same individual will to
oppose itself in its present act; or the present choice to be opposite
to, and resisting present choice: as absurd as it is to talk of two
contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time. And therefore
the very case supposed never admits of any trial, whether an opposing or
resisting will can overcome this necessity." (p. 35.)
This passage is clear and full. Common necessity, or necessity in the
original use of the word, refers to the connexion between volition and
its effects; for here an opposition to will is supposable. I may choose
or will to raise a weight; but the gravity opposed to my endeavour
overcomes it, and I find it _impossible_ for me to raise it, and the
weight _necessarily_ remains in its place. In this common use of these
terms, the _impossibility_ and the _necessity_ are _relative_ to my
volition; but in the production of choice itself, or volition, or the
sense of the most agreeable, there is no reference to voluntary
endeavour. Choice is not the cause of itself: it cannot be conceived of
as struggling with itself in its own production. The cause of volition
does not lie within the sphere of volition itself; if any opposition,
therefore, were made to the production of a volition, it could not be
made by a volition. The mind, with given susceptibilities and habits, is
supposed to be placed within the influence of objects and their
circumstances, and the choice takes place in the correlation of the two,
as the sense of the most agreeable. Now choice cannot exist before its
cause, and so there can be no choice in the act of its causation. It
comes into existence, therefore, by no necessity relating to voluntary
endeavour; it comes into existence by a philosophical and absolute
necessity of cause and effect. It is necessary as the falling of a stone
which is thrown into the air; as the freezing or boiling of water at
given temperatures; as sensations of sight, sound, smell, taste, and
feeling, when the organs of sense and the objects of sense are brought
together. The application of the epithet _moral_ to the necessity of
volition, evidently does not alter in the least the character of that
necessity. It is still philosophical and absolute necessity, and as sure
and perfect as natural necessity. This we have seen he expressly admits,
(p. 33;) affirming, (p. 34,) that the difference between a moral and
natural necessity is a mere difference in the "two terms connected," and
not a difference "_in the nature of the connexion_."
_Natural and moral inability._
"What has been said of natural and moral necessity, may serve to explain
what is intended by natural and moral _inability_. We are said to be
_naturally_ unable to do a thing, when we cannot do it if we will,
because what is most commonly called _nature_ does not allow of it, or
because of some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the
will; either in the faculty of the understanding, constitution of body,
or external objects." (p. 35.) We may make a voluntary endeavour to know
something, and may find ourselves _unable_, through a defect of the
understanding. We may make a voluntary effort _to do_ something by the
instrumentality of our hand, and may find ourselves unable through a
defect of the bodily constitution; or external objects may be regarded
as presenting such a counter force as to overcome the force we exert.
This is natural inability; this is all we mean by it. It must be
remarked too, that this is _inability_ not _metaphysically_ or
_philosophically_ considered, and therefore not _absolute_ inability;
but only inability in the common and vulgar acceptation of the term--a
relative inability, relative to volition or choice--an inability to do,
although we will to do.
What is moral inability? "Moral inability consists not in any of these
things; but either in the want of inclination, or the strength of a
contrary inclination, or the want of sufficient motives in view, to
induce and excite the act of will, or the strength of apparent motives
to the contrary. Or both these may be resolved into one; and it may be
said, in one word, that moral inability consists in the opposition or
want of inclination. For when a person is unable to will or choose such
a thing, through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives,
it is the same thing as his being unable through the want of an
inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such
circumstances and under the influence of such views." (bid.)
The inability in this case does not relate to the connexion between
volition and its consequents and effects; _but to the production of the
volition itself_. Now the inability to the production of a volition,
cannot be affirmed of the volition, because it is not yet supposed to
exist, and as an effect cannot be conceived of as producing itself. The
inability, therefore, must belong to the causes of volition, or to the
motive. But motive, as we have seen, lies in the _state of the mind_,
and in the _nature and circumstances of the object;_ and choice or
volition exists when, in the correlation of mind and object, the sense
of the most agreeable is produced. Now what reason can exist, in any
given case, why the volition or sense of the most agreeable is not
produced? Why simply this, that there is not such a correlation of mind
and object as to produce this sense or choice. But wherein lies the
deficiency? We may say generally, that it lies in both mind and
object--that they are not suited to each other. The mind is not _in a
state_ to be agreeably impressed by the object, and the object does not
possess qualities of beauty and agreeableness to the mind. On the part
of the mind, there is either a want of inclination to the object, or a
stronger inclination towards another object: on the part of the object,
there is a want of interesting and agreeable qualities to the
_particular state_ of mind in question, or a _suitableness_ to a
different state of mind: and this constitutes "the want of sufficient
motives in view, to induce and excite the act of will, or the strength
of apparent motives to the contrary." And both these may clearly be
resolved into one, that above mentioned, viz, a want of inclination on
the part of the mind to the object, and a stronger inclination towards
another object; or, as Edwards expresses it, "the opposition or want of
inclination." For a want of inclination to one object, implying a
stronger inclination to another object, expresses that the _state of the
mind_, and the nature and circumstances of the one object, are not
correlated; but that the _state of mind_, and the nature and
circumstances of the other object, are correlated. The first, is a "want
of sufficient motives;" the second, stronger "motives to the contrary."
Moral inability lies entirely out of the sphere of volition; volition,
therefore, cannot produce or relieve it, for this would suppose an
effect to modify its cause, and that too before the effect itself has
any existence. Moral inability is a _metaphysical_ inability: it is the
perfect and fixed impossibility of certain laws and principles of being,
leading to certain volitions; and is contrasted with _physical
inability_, which is the established impossibility of a certain
volition, producing a certain effect. So we may say, that _moral
ability_ is the certain and fixed connexion between certain laws and
principles of being, and volitions; and is contrasted with _natural_
ability, which is the established connexion between certain volitions
and certain effects.
Moral inability, although transcending the sphere of volition, is a
_real inability_. Where it exists, there is the absolute impossibility
of a given volition,--and of course an absolute impossibility of certain
effects coming to pass by that volition. The impossibility of water
freezing above an established temperature, or of boiling below an
established temperature, is no more fixed than the impossibility of
effects coming to pass by a volition, when there is a moral inability of
the volition. The difference between the two cases does not lie "in the
nature of the connexion," but "in the two terms connected."
Edwards gives several instances in illustration of moral inability.
"A woman of great honour and chastity may have a moral inability to
prostitute herself to her slave." (ibid.) There is no correlation
between _the state of her mind_ and _the act_ which forms the object
contemplated,--of course the sense of the most agreeable or choice
cannot take place; and while the state of her mind remains the same, and
the act and its circumstances remain the same, there is, on the
principle of Edwards, an utter inability to the choice, and of course to
the consequents of the choice.
"A child of great love and duty to his parents, may be thus unable to
kill his father." (ibid.) This case is similar to the preceding.
"A very lascivious man, in case of certain opportunities and
temptations, and in the absence of such and such restraints, may be
unable to forbear gratifying his lust." There is here a correlation
between _the state of mind_ and the _object_, in its _nature and
circumstances_,--and of course the sense of the most agreeable or choice
takes place. There is a _moral ability_ to the choice, and a _moral
inability_ to forbear, or to choose the opposite.
"A drunkard, under such and such circumstances, may be unable to forbear
taking strong drink." (ibid.) This is similar to the last.
"A very malicious man may be unable to exert benevolent acts to an
enemy, or to desire his prosperity; yea, some may be so under the power
of a vile disposition, that they may be unable to love those who are
most worthy of their esteem and affection." (ibid.) The _state of mind_
is such,--that is, the disposition or sensitivity, as not to be at all
correlated to the great duty of loving one's neighbour as one's
self,--or to any moral excellency in another: of course the sense of the
most agreeable is not produced; and in this state of mind it is
absolutely impossible that it should be produced. "A strong habit of
virtue, a great esteem of holiness, may cause a moral inability to love
wickedness in general." (p. 36.) "On the other hand, a great degree of
habitual wickedness may lay a man under an inability to love and choose
holiness, and render him _utterly unable_ to love an infinitely Holy
Being, or to choose and cleave to him as the chief good." (ibid.) The
love and choice of holiness is necessarily produced by the correlation
of the mind with holiness; and the love and choice of holiness is
_utterly impossible_ when this correlation does not exist. Where a moral
inability to evil exists, nothing can be more sure and fixed than this
inability. The individual who is the subject of it has absolutely no
power to alter it. If he were to proceed to alter it, he would have to
put forth a volition to this effect; but this would be an evil volition,
and by supposition the individual has no ability to evil volitions.
Where a moral inability to good exists, nothing can be more sure and
fixed than this inability. The individual who is the subject of it, has
absolutely no power to alter it. If he were to proceed to alter it, he
would have to put forth a volition to this effect; but this would be a
good volition, and by supposition the individual has no ability to good
volitions.
_General and habitual, particular and occasional Inability._
The first consists "in a fixed and habitual inclination, or an habitual
and stated defect or want of a certain kind of inclination." (p. 36.)
The second is "an inability of the will or heart to a particular act,
through the strength or defect of present motives, or of inducements
presented to the view of the understanding, _on this occasion_." (ibid.)
An habitual drunkard, and a man habitually sober, on some _particular
occasion_ getting drunk, are instances of general and particular
inability. In the first instance, the _state_ of the man's mind has
become correlated to the object; under all times and circumstances _it
is fixed_. In the second instance, the _state_ of the man's mind is
correlated to the object only when presented on certain occasions and
under certain circumstances. In both instances, however, the choice is
necessary,--"it not being possible, in any case, that the will should at
present go against the motive which has now, all things considered, the
greatest advantage to induce it."
"Will and endeavour against, or diverse from _present_ acts of the will,
are in no case supposable, whether those acts be _occasional_ or
_habitual_; for that would be to suppose the will at present to be
otherwise than at present it is." (ibid.)
The passage which follows deserves particular attention. It may be
brought up under the following question:
Although will cannot be exerted against present acts of the will, yet
can present acts of the will be exerted to produce future acts of the
will, opposed to present habitual or present occasional acts?
"But yet there may be will and endeavour against _future_ acts of the
will, or volitions that are likely to take place, as viewed at a
distance. It is no contradiction, to suppose that the acts of the will
at one time may be against the act of the will at another time; and
there may be desires and endeavours to prevent or excite future acts of
the will; but such desires and endeavours are in many cases rendered
insufficient and vain through fixedness of habit: when the occasion
returns, the strength of habit overcomes and baffles all such
opposition." (p. 37.)
Let us take the instance of the drunkard. The choice or volition to
drink is the fixed correlation of his disposition and the strong drink.
But we may suppose that his disposition can be affected by other objects
likewise: as the consideration of the interest and happiness of his wife
and children, and his own respectability and final happiness. When his
cups are removed, and he has an occasional fit of satiety and loathing,
these considerations may awaken at the time the sense of the most
agreeable, and lead him to avoid the occasions of drunkenness, and to
form resolutions of amendment; but when the appetite and longing for
drink returns, and he comes again in the way of indulgence, then these
considerations, brought fairly into collision with his habits, are
overcome, and drinking, as the most agreeable, asserts its supremacy.
"But it may be comparatively easy to make an alteration with respect to
such future acts as are only _occasional_ and _transient_; because the
occasional or transient cause, if foreseen, may often easily be
prevented or avoided." (ibid.)
In the case of occasional drunkenness, for instance, the habitual
correlation is not of mind and strong drink, but of mind and
considerations of honour, prudence, and virtue. But strong drink being
associated on some occasion with objects which are correlated to the
mind, as hospitality, friendship, or festive celebrations,--may obtain
the mastery; and in this case, the individual being under no temptation
from strong drink in itself considered, and being really affected with
the sense of the most agreeable in relation to objects which are opposed
to drunkenness, may take care that strong drink shall not come again
into circumstances to give it an adventitious advantage. The repetition
of occasional drunkenness would of course by and by produce a change in
the sensitivity, and establish an habitual liking for drink. "On this
account, the moral inability that attends fixed habits, especially
obtains the name of _inability_. And then, as the will may remotely and
indirectly resist itself, and do it in vain, in the case of strong
habits; so reason may resist present acts of the will, and its
resistance be insufficient: and this is more commonly the case, also,
when the acts arise from strong habit." (ibid.)
In every act of the will, the will at the moment is unable to act
otherwise; it is in the strictest sense true, that a man, at the moment
of his acting, must act as he does act; but as we usually characterize
men by the habitual state of their minds, we more especially speak of
moral inability in relation to acts which are known to have no
correlation to this habitual state. This habitual state of the mind, if
it be opposed to reason, overcomes reason; for nothing, not even reason
itself, can be the strongest motive, unless it produce the sense of the
most agreeable; and this it cannot do, where the habitual disposition or
sensitivity is opposed to it.
_Common usage with respect to the phrase_ want of power _or_ inability
_to act in a certain way._