The Standard Oil Inquiry

“It was a bad year for the trusts,” wrote Edward Sherwood Meade,

Professor of finance in the University of Pennsylvania, at the close of

1907. In support of his comment, Prof. Meade cited the $29,000,000 fine

levied against the Standard Oil, of Indiana, by Judge K. M. Landis,

and the proceedings instituted to dissolve the Oil and Tobacco trusts.

As is well known, Judge Grosscup, of the United States Circuit Court

of Appeals, reversed Judge Landis on technicalities and the Company

was saved from the imposition of the fine through what was universally

execrated as a gross miscarriage of justice. Attorney-General Bonaparte

at the time expressed himself freely in demanding of Congress the

enactment of “a more comprehensive law permitting appeals by the

Government in criminal cases,” instead of the present statutes which

“give to the wealthy defendants in such cases an unfair advantage.”

So 1907 was not such a bad year for the Standard Oil,—but a most

profitable one, as the favor extended it in the Indiana suit enabled

the stock of the Company to soar to nearly 700 forthwith.

The proceedings in the latter part of 1908 by the Government to

dissolve the Standard Oil are the most important ever instituted

against this odious monopoly. It is almost incredible that, after 20

years of immunity, John D. Rockefeller should be forced to “show cause”

why he should no longer be allowed to pursue his taciturn, undisputed

spoliations. Frank B. Kellog, champion “trust-buster” has charge of the

investigations which thus far have presented something the appearance

of opera bouffe. The figures juggled with are so enormous, and the

“forgetfulness” of Rockefeller, Archbold and other testifiers such

conspicuous examples of humorous insolence, that the public mind is

unprepared to hope for a satisfactory outcome to the investigation.

The present administration has but a couple of months more in which to

make its denunciations against the Standard Oil effective, after years

of apparently righteous wrath and no one is greatly to be blamed for

adopting a cynical attitude as to the expected result.

* * * * *

It _has_ been a bad year, this closing 1908, for the Tobacco folk. The

victory of the tobacco growers of the Burley district of Kentucky early

in December over the American Tobacco Company proves what a determined

stand may accomplish on the part of the producer, without entering the

Courts at all. It is safe to say that this Christmas will have been one

of the happiest ever spent by the farmers of Kentucky, among whom some

$20,000,000 will be circulating for tobacco grown and held over, some

of it, for nearly two years. It will make for a peace and good-will in

very truth, for the “night-riding” is considered at an end.

* * * * *

Capitulation to the tobacco growers of a limited section, however,

is the least of the American Tobacco Company’s troubles just now,

it having been declared, in suit brought by the government for its

dissolution, to be a “combination in restraint of trade” which is

amenable to the provisions of the Sherman Act of July 2, 1890. Appeal

from this decision is being taken to the Supreme Court and upon the

result of this “last resort” will hinge all that is vital in reference

to the ability of the government to control the various kinds of

industrial combinations engaged in inter-state traffic.

Judge Lacombe, in voicing the majority opinion of his Court,

observes that: “By insensible degrees, under the operation of many

causes, business, manufacturing and trading alike, has more and more

developed a tendency towards larger aggregations of capital and more

extensive combinations of individual enterprise. It is contended

that, under existing conditions, in that way only can production be

increased and cheapened, stability in reasonable prices secured and

industrial progress assured. But every aggregation of individuals

or of corporations, formerly independent, immediately upon its

formation terminates an existing competition; whether or not some

other competition may subsequently arise. The Act, as above construed,

prohibits every contract or combination in restraint of competition.

What benefits have come from this combination, or from others

complained of, it is not material to inquire, nor need subsequent

business methods be considered, nor the effects on production or

prices.”

[Illustration: Washington _Herald_]

Judge Noyes, who agreed with Judge Lacombe, says, in addition: “It

is of much importance to many people at the present time whether the

defendants have entered into an unlawful combination. It is OF THE MOST

MOMENTOUS IMPORTANCE TO ALL THE PEOPLE FOR ALL THE TIME WHETHER THE

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT HAS POWER TO REACH INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS DEALING

ACROSS STATE LINES.”

In his dissenting opinion, Judge Ward took the position that the

purposes of the defendants “should not be made to depend upon

occasional illegal or oppressive acts, but must be collected on their

conduct as a whole.” That they strove “to increase their business and

that their great success is a natural growth resulting from industry,

intelligence and economy, doubtless largely helped by the volume of

business and the great capital at command.”

What view will the Supreme Court take? That “restraint of trade” _is_

“restraint of trade” or that that it is _not_ “restraint of trade”

if only a few laws are broken, only a few competitors hurt and if

defendants are not suffering for want of money?

Watson's Jeffersonian Magazine, (Vol. III, No. 1), January, 1909 · 第 24 / 60 题