IRISH CREDIT NOT SUFFICIENT.

There remains the alternative of the new Irish Parliament financing the

operation. This it must do by means of payment in cash to the selling

shareholders, for reasons which will be hereafter stated, unless it

wishes to start its career by a scheme of spoliation, which would not

merely rob the shareholders (who are mostly Irish), but would destroy

the credit of the Irish Government. Mr. Redmond has recently

acknowledged that a large number of Irish railway shareholders are good

Nationalists; and it is certain that a great portion of the ordinary

stock is held by Irish farmers and traders; and much of the preference

and debenture stocks are also held by Irish charities, convents,

diocesan trustees, and monastic institutions. These persons will expect,

and justly expect, cash on a compulsory purchase, on basis of market

value, or capitalisation of dividend, so as to secure the same return of

interest.

Could the Irish Government borrow £50,000,000, and at what rate? To

borrow at a higher rate than the present return on Irish railway

capital, namely, 3.77 per cent., would be to incur a loss on working the

railways, from the outset, which Irish ratepayers or taxpayers would

have to make up. The net receipts, at the time of the Commission's

Report, were, in round figures, £1,600,000, and thus to borrow

£50,000,000, even at 4 per cent., would mean an annual loss of £300,000

a year, even if there were no sinking fund. A 10_s._ per cent sinking fund

would increase the total annual loss to £550,000.

But, could an Irish Government Guaranteed Railway Stock be issued at 4

per cent.? Would Ireland's credit stand better than that of Hungary,

whose 4 per cent. gold _rentes_ stand at 92, or of the Argentine, which

has to borrow at nearly 5 per cent.? There are grave doubts whether the

large sum required would be subscribed at all, at even 4 1/4 per cent,

or 4 1/2 per cent. basis. It is not likely that English investors would

take up such a loan, seeing that they have consistently fought shy of

Irish investments, and they are not likely to change their views upon

the break up of the Union.

It may be said that the sum required could be raised in Ireland--that

patriotic feeling would stimulate the operation, and the large sum of

money (over £50,000,000), lying on deposit at the Irish banks may be

referred to as available. Patriotism that has not financed the Irish

Parliamentary Party will not be likely to finance a gigantic railway

loan. Nor is the large sum appearing as banking deposits really free

money available for investment. With increase of deposits, the items of

loans and advances in banking accounts have also correspondingly

increased, and they largely balance each other. Not only is the money

deposited by one customer lent to another, and therefore already

utilized, but, to a large extent well known to bankers, the deposits,

_i.e._ the credits to particular accounts, represent money lent to the

persons having these accounts, and are not, in fact, their own free

balances. So also credits in the accounts of one bank, figure as debits

on the balance sheet of another bank. There probably has been in recent

years considerable saving in Ireland, but it is also certain that those

savings have largely gone, and will continue rightly to go in

improvements of farms, which the Land Acts and Land Purchase Acts have

made worth improving for their possessors. Those who have not saved

enough borrow, and the bank advances represent largely the capital

required by farmers and traders. The deposits, therefore, are being well

used, and are not dead money. Divert them to any large extent to another

purpose, and there will probably be a contraction of banking credit,

which Irish farming and industry will be the first to feel.

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