The problems of Imperial defence have become of late years extremely
complex, owing to the rise of a great European naval power, and also to
the predominance of Japan in the Pacific. These two factors, combined
with the invention of the Dreadnought type of ship which is now being
built by other powers whose navies we could formerly afford to ignore,
have rendered our position in the world more precarious, more dependent
upon foreign alliances and _ententes_, and have rendered combination for
defence far more essential. No Home Rule scheme can be judged without
taking into consideration what its effect will be on this situation. It
is proposed to consider it first in the light of the more pressing
European danger, and next to examine how it will affect the wider
problem of the future, namely, the co-operation of all parts of the
British Empire for defence.
But first it is of course necessary to find out what Home Rule means,
and what the internal state of Ireland will be if it passes. On this
point there is at present no certainty. We can dismiss at once Mr.
Redmond's picture of a serenely contented and grateful Ireland, only
desirous of helping her benefactor, and, under a strong and
incorruptible government, engaged in setting its house in order. The
presence of a strong Protestant community, the history of the Roman
Catholic Church in all countries, and the deliberate fostering of
separatist national ideals preclude the possibility of anything but a
prolonged period of unrest, which, on the most favourable hypothesis,
can only cease altogether when the present generation has passed away.
This unrest may take two forms; either civil war, or a condition where
the rousing of old animosities, religious and otherwise, leads to
internal disturbances of all kinds. It is not proposed to deal here with
the consequences involved by the calling in of troops to suppress by
force of arms an insurrectionary movement against the Government of
Ireland. In view of the present state of affairs in Ulster, such an
event seems extremely probable, but the disastrous results of passing
Home Rule in face of it are so patent to all that it is unnecessary to
enlarge upon them here. We have, therefore, to consider a condition of
things in which old mutual hatreds have re-awakened, in which Ireland
will be governed by men who have up till now preached sedition, have
done their best to check recruiting, who have deliberately set up an
ideal of "complete separation" as their ultimate goal, and whose motto
has always been "England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity."
It is conceivable, of course, though it is extremely improbable, that
these aims and ideals may be abjured in course of time, but the gravity
of these risks must be taken into account in examining Ireland's
position in any scheme of national and Imperial defence both now and in
the future.
And in this connection it may be remarked that an almost exact analogy
to the situation which will probably result from this measure may be
seen in the events which preceded the Boer war, and it seems somewhat
remarkable that those who endeavour to justify Home Rule by the supposed
Colonial analogy should overlook a warning so evident and so recent in
the history of our oversea dominions.
A Separatist party in Ireland would be enabled to work for ultimate
independence as did President Kruger, and by the same methods, the same
secret acquisition of arms and implements of war, the same building of
fortresses with a view to a declaration of independence when a suitable
opportunity arrived; and this would be all the more likely to occur if
Ulster were exempted from a Home Rule Parliament. In this case Ulstermen
would occupy exactly the same position as did the Uitlanders from 1895
to 1899. The same arguments for granting independence to Ireland are
used now, the same talk of injustice towards those who are disloyal with
equal disregard of the loyalist section, and the results will be the
same. Would independence have been granted to the Transvaal or Orange
Free State had their use of it been foreseen? Taking the factors in both
cases into account, is there anything to justify the doubt that a
repetition of that situation will occur, with the only difference that
eventual rupture will probably entail the dismemberment of the Empire?
It is universally acknowledged that this country is at present faced
with a more critical European situation than any we have experienced for
a hundred years. It has tied our fleet to home waters, and has induced a
very large and influential section of our people to advocate the
necessity of compulsory military service. Our military organisation is
on the face of it a makeshift, and the makeshift is not even complete,
for in the Territorial Army and the Special Reserve alone there is a
shortage of more than 80,000 men.
Now, our foreign policy of _ententes_ and the needs of our oversea
territories have necessitated a military organisation, the foundation of
which is readiness to undertake an oversea expedition as well as to
provide for home defence. The critical situation in Europe especially
will demand the instant despatch of our Expeditionary Force on the
outbreak of war, in which case there will be left in these islands the
following forces after deducting 10 per cent, for casualties:--
About 55,000 Regulars, of whom 30,000 will be under 20 years of age.
About 30,000 Reservists. These will be required to reinforce the
Expeditionary Force.
About 60,000 Special Reservists. Some 30,000 of these are under 20. This
force is to be used to reinforce the troops abroad.
About 245,000 Territorials. 72,000 of these are under 20.
In all there are some 400,000 men, of whom 130,000 are boys and 60,000
will leave the country soon after war breaks out. This will leave some
210,000 men to provide for the defence of England, Scotland, and
Ireland, supplemented by 130,000 boys. These troops will be deprived of
practically all Regular and even Reserve officers, and will have to
provide for coast defence, for the security of law and order, and for
the numbers required for a central field force. By means of juggling
with figures, by the registration of names in what is called the
National Reserve, but has no organisation or corporate existence, and by
similar means, the seriousness of this situation has been concealed to
some extent, but it is generally recognised as being little short of a
national scandal, and would not be tolerated were it not for the general
ignorance of our people concerning the exigencies of war and their blind
belief in the omnipotence of the navy. This defencelessness has two
dangers: firstly, the chance of a successful raid or invasion. As long
as our navy is not defeated, no invading force of more than 70,000 men
is supposed to be capable of landing. The second danger is that the mere
fear of such an event will prevent the despatch of the Expeditionary
Force and the fulfilment of our oversea obligations.
It must be obvious that in the precarious state of our national defence
anything which renders either of these dangers more probable should be
avoided at all costs. If, for instance, the condition of Ireland should
demand the maintenance of a larger garrison in that country, the whole
of our present organisation for defence falls to pieces. Looking only at
the present foreign situation, and the ever-growing menace of increasing
armaments, if the passing of Home Rule should require the retention of a
single extra soldier in Ireland, it is perfectly certain that nothing
could justify the adoption of such a measure. It is not intended to
convey the impression that there is any fear of Ireland repeating the
history of 1796 and welcoming a foreign invasion, although it is
impossible to ignore the anti-English campaign of agitation, or to say
to what length it will go; but the mere fact of internal dissension in
that country will give an enemy exactly the chance he looks for. Many of
those best qualified to judge are of opinion that Germany is only
waiting to free herself of an embarrassing situation, until one power of
the Triple Entente is for the time being too much occupied to intervene
in a Continental struggle. We have had one warning when, in September,
1911, a railway strike at home coincided with a foreign crisis. Are we
deliberately to take a step which will almost certainly involve us in a
similar dilemma?
This is the more immediate danger, but, apart from this, the strategical
value of Ireland will be profoundly affected by its separation from
England, and this constitutes a grave source of weakness, even if
internal trouble be avoided, and a comparatively loyal government be
installed. Ireland lies directly across all the trade routes by which
nearly all our supplies of food and raw material are brought, and it
covers the principal trade centres of the Midlands and the South of
Scotland. In any attack by an enemy on our commerce, Ireland will become
of supreme importance. There are two stages in every naval war: first,
the engagement between the two navies; second, the blockade or
destruction of the ships of the beaten side. This was the method by
which we fought Napoleon, but even then we could not prevent the enemy's
ships escaping from time to time; and even after we had destroyed their
navy at Trafalgar, the damage to our oversea commerce was enormous.
Nowadays, torpedoes, submarines, and floating mines have rendered
blockade infinitely more precarious, and consequently we have to take
into account the extreme probability, and indeed, certainty, of hostile
cruisers escaping and menacing our oversea supplies. This danger will be
increased tenfold if Germany has been able to defeat France, and use
French, Dutch, and Belgian ports for privateering purposes. In the
second, if not in the first, stage of European war, therefore, the
closest co-operation between the governments of Ireland and England will
be essential. In this case, Queenstown and Lough Swilly will be the
bases for our own protecting cruisers, and on their success will depend
the issues of life and death for our people. As the West of Ireland is
the nearest point in these islands to America, it is probable that
cargoes destined for English ports will reach them _via_ Ireland to
avoid the longer sea-transit. Lord Wolseley has even gone so far as to
minimise the dangers of blockade, because the Irish coast offered such
facilities for blockade-running. It is certain that in our greatest need
Ireland might well prove our salvation, provided we had not absolutely
lost command of the sea, and this advantage a Liberal Government is
prepared to jeopardise for reasons, which, compared with the interests
at stake, are little less than sordid.
But even if Ireland be less directly affected by war than in this case,
and even if its internal condition should give little anxiety, the very
nature of its resources should prevent us taking a step which may
deprive us of them in emergency or, at least, render them less readily
available. Not only do we draw a number of our soldiers from there, out
of all proportion to the quotas provided by the populations of England
and Scotland, but we are absolutely dependent for our mounted branches
on Irish horses. For our supplies in time of stress, for our horses, and
for a great and valuable recruiting area, we shall be forced to rely on
a government whose future is wrapped in the deepest obscurity, and which
at the best is hardly likely to give us enthusiastic support.
Our whole military organisation is becoming more decentralised and more
dependent on voluntary effort; it is devolving more and more upon
Territorial Associations and local bodies of all kinds. We do not
possess the reserves of horses and transport which continental nations
hold ready for use on mobilisation, and, as a substitute, we have had to
fall back on a system of registration which demands care, zeal, and
energy on the part of these civilian bodies. How will an Irish
Government and its officials fulfil a duty which will be distorted by
every Nationalist into an attempt to employ the national resources for
the sole benefit of England?
War is a stern taskmaster, demanding long years of preparation and
combination of effort for one end. The political separation of the two
countries does not alter the fact that they are, in the military sense,
one area of operations and of supply, and, at a time like the present,
when the mutual dependence of all parts of the Empire is gradually being
realised; when the dominions are building navies, and all our
dependencies are co-operating in one scheme of defence for the whole;
when the elaboration of the details of this scheme are the pressing need
of the hour, the dissolution of the Union binding together the very
heart of the Empire, is a strategic mistake, the disastrous significance
of which it is impossible to exaggerate. For it must be remembered that
here is no analogy to a federation of semi-independent provinces as in
Canada, where national defence is equally the interest of the whole.
Ireland has never recognised this community of interest with England.
Quebec, it is true, stands aloof and indifferent to the ideals of the
sister provinces; but there is no bitter religious hatred, no fierce,
anti-national aims fostered by ancient traditions, life-long feuds and
unscrupulous agitation, and every Canadian knows that Quebec would fight
to the last against American aggression, if only to preserve her
religious independence. There is no such bond here--or, at least, the
Irish Nationalist has refused to acknowledge it.
The year 1912 has opened amid signs of unrest and change, the meaning or
the end of which no man can know. In the Far East and the Near East
political and religious systems are disappearing, and chaos is steadily
increasing. In Europe the nations have set out on the march to
Armageddon, and there is no staying the progress of their armaments. In
Great Britain alone the question of preparation for war is shirked on
the plea that it is one for experts, and even soldiers and sailors,
drawn into the political vortex, make light of our necessities,
believing in the hopelessness of ever convincing the people of the truth
until "a white calamity of steel and iron, the bearing of burdens and
the hot rage of insult," fall upon us. It is for this reason that we see
the extraordinary phenomenon of men denying the necessity for becoming
a nation in arms, and yet urging our Government to contract no
friendships abroad, and to interfere on behalf of every petty princedom
oppressed by a powerful neighbour, and every downtrodden subject of some
foreign power. It is these same men who wish to dissolve the Union, and
to impose obligations at home upon an inadequate army which would leave
us powerless abroad. And the longer war delays in coming, the greater
will be the danger when it comes. With the increase in armaments, this
country must undergo a proportionate sacrifice. If compulsory service
should be adopted, it must apply to Ireland as well as the United
Kingdom. But how will an independent government in Dublin view the
compulsory enrolment of the manhood of Ireland, two-thirds of which have
been taught to regard England as the national and hereditary enemy? The
Irish are, above all, a military race. Had we been able to enforce such
service within the Union, whatever temporary opposition it might have
encountered, it might ultimately have proved an indissoluble bond of
friendship.
The future is very dark, and it is all important that we should face it
with open eyes. War cannot long be delayed, and there is too little time
left to put our house in order. Even if Home Rule could be shown to be
an act of justice due to a wronged people who have proved themselves
capable of self-government, even then it could not be justified in the
present crisis abroad. But it is not so. Ulster will fight for the same
cause as did the Northern States of America, and may well show the same
self-sacrifice. It will be civil war in a country peculiarly adapted to
the movements of irregular troops, well acquainted with its features; it
will be accompanied by atrocities which will be remembered for
centuries. And this is the tremendous risk we are deliberately running,
when we only possess six divisions of regular troops to support our
allies on the continent and to safeguard the interests of the whole
British Empire.
It is for the British people to decide whether the thin red line is to
be still thinner in the day of battle, and whether those who should be
fighting side by side shall be embittered and divided, or whether they
will rather believe the words of the greatest naval expert living[69]:
"It is impossible for a military man or a statesman with
appreciation of military conditions, to look at the map and not
perceive that the ambition of the Irish separatists, realised,
would be even more threatening to the national life than the
secession of the South was to that of the American Union."