Narrative of Arnold's Plot communicated by Sir Henry Clinton to the
Ministry.--Arnold in New York.--His Expedition against Virginia and New
London.
After the return of General Robertson and the other Commissioners to New
York, Sir Henry Clinton made still another effort to rescue Major AndrÈ.
He wrote a long letter to Washington, recapitulating the facts
and reasonings already advanced, and claiming the release of his
adjutant-general. He proposed to exchange for him Lieutenant Governor
Gadsden, of South Carolina, who had been taken prisoner, and, with
other persons under similar circumstances, sent to St. Augustine, in
consequence of their having been detected in a correspondence with
General Gates. A statement of particulars was also obtained from Captain
Sutherland, respecting the manner in which AndrÈ came on board the
Vulture, and left it in the boat with Smith.
As neither the letter nor the statement contained any thing new, the
object in writing them probably was to cause delay by protracting the
negotiation. Before they were sent off, however, Major AndrÈ's servant
arrived in New York with the news of his execution; and thus all
intercourse on the subject between the two commanders was closed.
Hitherto no hints of this affair had been transmitted to the ministry;
but, immediately after the catastrophe, a narrative of all the events
was drawn up, signed by Sir Henry Clinton, and despatched to Lord
George Germain. It commenced with the first advances made by Arnold,
and pursued the train of incidents to the end. All the correspondence,
respecting the capture of AndrÈ and the means used for his release, was
interspersed according to the dates of the respective letters.
Conformably to the request of AndrÈ, his commission was sold by Sir
Henry Clinton for the benefit of his mother and sisters. In acquainting
the minister with this transaction, he added; "But I trust your Lordship
will think that Major AndrÈ's misfortune still calls for some further
support to his family; and I beg leave to make it my humble request,
that you will have the goodness to recommend them in the strongest
manner to the King for some beneficial and distinguishing mark of his
Majesty's favor."
The papers were laid before the King by Lord George Germain, who replied
to Sir Henry Clinton as follows.
"His Majesty has read with much concern the very affecting narrative
of Major AndrÈ's capture, and the fatal consequences of that misfortune
related in your letter; and his Majesty was graciously pleased to
express his entire approbation of your having complied with his request
of disposing of his commission for the advantage of his family. And I
have the satisfaction to add, that his Majesty has further extended his
royal bounty to Major AndrÈ's mother, by the grant of a pension, and has
offered to confer the honor of knighthood on his brother, in order to
wipe away all stain from the family, that the ignominy of the death
he was so unjustly put to might be thought to have occasioned. The
beneficence of our gracious sovereign will thereby console the family
for their private misfortune; but the public can never be compensated
for the disappointment of the vast advantages, which must have followed
from the success of your plan, which Major AndrÈ's capture prevented.
Nothing could have been more judiciously concerted; and, from the proof
Mr. Arnold has since given of his sincerity, there is no reason to
doubt it could have failed in its execution, especially as you proposed
conducting it in person."
The generous sentiments and noble conduct of the King, both in regard
to the memory of AndrÈ and the tokens of substantial kindness to his
family, claim and must ever receive the highest applause. But the
countenance shown to Arnold, the approbation of his infamy, and the
distinctions and favors conferred upon him, will be viewed in a much
more questionable light. If policy and military custom extend protection
to a deserter, they can never demand nor even justify caresses to a
traitor.
It was doubtless proper for Sir Henry Clinton to fulfil the promises he
had made, and submit to the sacrifice with as good a grace as he could,
notwithstanding the utter disappointment of all his expectations. He
wrote to the minister; "I have paid to that officer six thousand three
hundred and fifteen pounds sterling, as a compensation for the losses,
which he informs me he has sustained by coming over to us. I make
no doubt, that the expense will be cheerfully submitted to." It was
gratuitous to charge this reward of treachery to the score of losses.
Arnold's creditors were the chief losers by his defection, unless he set
a large price upon the diminution of his rank, being appointed
colonel of a regiment in the British service, with the brevet of
brigadier-general.
Arnold had been but a few days with his new friends, when he published
an Address to the Inhabitants of America, attempting to explain and
vindicate the course he had pursued. Considering the cause he undertook
to defend, it is no wonder that he should say little to the purpose.
Abuse of Congress and of the French alliance was the principal theme
of his discourse. "To the thousands," said he, "who suffer under the
tyranny of the usurpers in the revolted provinces, as well as to the
great multitude who have long wished for its subversion, this instance
of my conduct can want no vindication; and as to that class of men, who
are criminally protracting the war from sinister views, at the expense
of the public interest, I prefer their enmity to their applause. I am
therefore only concerned to explain myself to such of my countrymen, as
want abilities or opportunities to detect the artifices by which they
are duped." Having thus defined the description of persons for whom his
address is intended, he proceeds to his defence.
Conceiving the rights of his country in danger, at the beginning of the
contest, he thought it his duty to take up arms for their protection,
but he aimed only at a redress of grievances. The declaration of
independence was a measure, which at the time he believed precipitate,
although he acquiesced in it; but all the reasons for this measure,
however plausible when it was adopted, were completely removed by the
subsequent proffers of the British government. The refusal to accede to
these terms he ascribed to the tyrannical use of power in Congress, who
studiously avoided submitting them to the people, and resisted every
advance towards a negotiation.
The suspicions excited in his patriotic breast, by these and other
indications of the temper and views of Congress, were more than
confirmed when the treaty with France was ratified. He was shocked to
find his country, by the folly and duplicity of its pretended leaders,
thus tied to its "proud, ancient, and crafty foe, the enemy of the
Protestant faith, who fraudulently avows an affection for the liberties
of mankind, while she holds her native sons in vassalage and chains."
His virtuous spirit could not brook such an enormity. From that hour
he resolved to abandon a cause, sustained by iniquity and controlled
by usurpers, in which he could no longer act with that pure and
disinterested aim for the public good, which had always been the ruling
motive of his conduct. He retained his arms and command only for a
suitable opportunity to surrender them to his King in such a manner,
that he might accomplish an event of decisive importance with the least
effusion of blood.
"With respect to that herd of censurers," said he in conclusion, "whose
enmity to me originates in their hatred to the principles by which I am
now led to devote my life to the reunion of the British empire, as the
best and only means to dry up the streams of misery, that have deluged
this country, they may be assured, that, conscious of the rectitude of
my intentions, I shall treat their malice and calumnies with contempt
and neglect." Such was the tenor of Arnold's Address to his former
fellow citizens of the United States. His next performance was a
Proclamation to the officers and soldiers of the Continental army,
particularly those who had "the real interest of their country at heart,
and who were determined to be no longer the tools and dupes of Congress
and of France." All such he invited to come over to the King's standard,
holding out as a temptation, that they should be clothed, subsisted, and
paid like the other troops in the British service, and receive the value
of any horses, arms, or accoutrements, which they might bring with them.
A bounty of three guineas was offered to every non-commissioned officer
and private. Officers were to obtain rank in proportion to that which
they had formerly held, and to the number of men who should accompany
them. It was expected, that a colonel would bring with him or recruit in
a reasonable time seventy-five men, a major fifty, a captain thirty,
and a lieutenant fifteen. They were moreover to have the inestimable
privilege of fighting for "true American liberty," which had so long
been denied to them by their oppressors.
In its other topics the proclamation was little else than a repetition
of the address. Abusive epithets were profusely applied to Congress and
the French. The soldiers were told, that they had been robbed of their
property, imprisoned, and dragged against their will to the field of
battle; that they were the prey of avarice, the scorn of their enemies,
and the pity of their friends; that America had become a land of widows,
orphans, and beggars; and that no security any longer remained even for
the consolations of that religion, for which their fathers had braved
the ocean, the heathen, and the wilderness. Rising in the climax of
absurdity, he goes on to say; "can you at this day want evidence, that
the funds of your country are exhausted, or that the managers have
applied them to their own private use? In either case you surely can no
longer continue in their service with honor or advantage. Yet you have
hitherto been their supporters in that cruelty, which, with an equal
indifference to yours, as well as the labor and blood of others, is
devouring a country, that, from the moment you quit their colors, will
be redeemed from their tyranny."
By appeals like these were the American soldiers called upon to desert
their country, and rally under the banner of a traitor, who had sought
the ruin of themselves, their friends, and the cause for which they had
long borne arms and often exposed their lives. Such appeals would
appear incredible even from so desperate and degraded a man, had not the
infirmity of his understanding already been proved to be on a level with
the depravity of his heart. The only wonder is, that a measure of such
imbecile malevolence and hopeless folly should be sanctioned by the
British commander, and published from day to day in the gazettes issued
under his authority. How was it possible for him not to perceive, that
the effect would be contrary to his interests and wishes? Who would join
a traitor? Who would deliberately seek disgrace and infamy? And, above
all, who would be cajoled by falsehood and malignity, as undisguised as
they were audacious and wicked?
Well informed as to the actual condition, principles, and feelings of
the American soldiers, and aware that his proclamation would only excite
indignation and disgust, Arnold adopted another expedient to keep his
new friends in good humor, and convince them that in him they had gained
an important acquisition. He represented to Sir Henry Clinton, that the
bounty was much too small, and recommended an increase to ten guineas.
He said the American soldiers were chiefly prevented from deserting, by
the loss they would sustain in forfeiting their arrears of pay, which
had now become large, on account of the poverty of the country and the
wretched state of the American finances. Ten guineas he thought would
dissolve this tie, and bring over as many deserters as could be desired.
As the bounty was prescribed by the government, and Sir Henry had no
authority to allow more than three guineas, Arnold immediately wrote
to the ministry, and laid his proposition before them, supporting it by
such arguments as he could draw from his invention. In replying to Sir
Henry Clinton on the subject, Lord George Germain said he did not think
the amount of the proposed sum an objection to it, considering the vast
importance of increasing the British army by a corresponding diminution
of that under Washington; but he foresaw a very serious evil in the
operation of the scheme, since it would tempt deserters to come over for
the sake of the bounty, who, having pocketed the ten guineas, would find
their way back again as soon as possible to the American camp. To avert
this consequence, the minister suggested, that no more than the usual
sum of three guineas should be paid at first, and the remaining seven
when the regiment, to which the deserter was attached, should be
reduced, or at the end of the war. Officers he thought should be
liberally rewarded, especially if they brought with them the men they
had before commanded.
Many were supposed to be deterred from desertion by the fear of
recapture. To obviate this difficulty, a project was set on foot for
organizing them into regiments to be employed in the West Indies, or
on the Spanish Main. This was favorable to Arnold's views, and it was
approved by the King. No harm could result from it; and nearly the same
benefits would accrue, as if they were engaged immediately under Sir
Henry Clinton, since it would enable him to draw from the West Indies
a corresponding force. But why it should be thought, that an American
soldier would be allured from his home by the bounty of ten guineas and
the almost certain prospect of finding a grave in a tropical climate, is
not apparent. The experiment seems never to have been tried.
In short, there is no evidence that Arnold met with any success in
his attempts to recruit from the American army. A few deserters and
refugees, already within the British lines and not united with any
corps, and particularly officers desirous of place and employment,
nominally constituted his regiment, which was never so far completed as
to be known either for its numbers or exploits.
The sentiments of the British cabinet, in regard to the defection of
Arnold, may be gathered from the minister's first letter to him after
that event.
"I have the pleasure to acquaint you," says Lord George Germain, "that
his Majesty was graciously pleased to express his satisfaction in the
demonstration you have given of the sincerity of your return to your
allegiance, and of your earnest desire to atone for past errors by a
zealous attachment to his royal person and government in future. And
his Majesty has been graciously pleased to command me to signify to Sir
Henry Clinton his royal approbation of the rank he has given you in
the army under his command, and of his having appointed you to raise a
corps.
"The intelligence transmitted in both of your letters shows the
resources of Congress to be nearly exhausted, and their cause
universally sinking, notwithstanding the boasted succors of their ally;
and I am fully persuaded, that, were any disgrace at this time to happen
to Mr. Washington's army, the inhabitants of many of the provinces would
declare their wishes for peace with Great Britain, by returning to their
allegiance; and it is the most distant from the intention of the
King and of Parliament to abridge those liberties essential to their
interests and happiness."
The nature of the intelligence, which afforded so much encouragement to
the minister, is no further indicated. It is enough to know, however,
that it was false and deceptive, and produced a mischievous influence.
Misled by an erroneous impression, thus communicated, of the strength
of the American army, and the condition and temper of the people, and
willing to foster the smallest germ of hope, the ministry relaxed from
exertion, at a moment when the full exercise of all their energies was
most necessary. The man, now their friend and a faithful subject of
the King, but who had been in a high station with the enemy from the
beginning of the war, and a principal actor, they took it for granted
must be well informed; and, strange to tell, they relied on his
veracity. The consequences were severely felt by the British commander,
who, in the bitterness of his disappointment, afterwards complained of
this facility of faith and easy confidence on the part of his superiors.
Arnold made such slow progress in recruiting his regiment, that he
was impatient for more active service. Two months after he joined
the British, he was appointed to the command of an expedition against
Virginia, consisting of sixteen hundred effective troops. General Leslie
had recently sailed from the Chesapeake, with the detachment under his
command, to unite with Lord Cornwallis in the Carolinas. It was thought
important to send another detachment to take his place in the waters
of Virginia, and thus create a diversion in that quarter in, favor of
Cornwallis, and prevent the Virginia troops from marching to the aid of
General Greene.
At the head of this division Arnold sailed from New York about the
middle of December. In addition to his general directions to invade the
country wherever an opportunity presented itself, he was particularly
instructed to establish a post at Portsmouth on Elizabeth River, and
to prepare materials for constructing a number of boats to be used in
Albemarle Sound, and afterwards in the waters of the Chesapeake, when
the season should be too far advanced for acting farther southward.
He was also directed to assemble and arm the loyalists, but not to
encourage any to join him, till there should be the fairest prospect of
protecting them.
Sir Henry Clinton proceeded with more caution than the ministry. He was
not prepared to put implicit trust in a man, who had shown himself such
an adept in the arts of dissimulation, so destitute of principle, and so
regardless of honor. Colonel Dundas and Colonel Simcoe, two officers of
tried ability and experience, and possessing the entire confidence of
their commander, were sent in the expedition; and Arnold was expressly
ordered not to adopt any measure, nor to undertake any important
operation, without first consulting them and obtaining their
approbation.
A violent gale separated the fleet in which the detachment was embarked,
but the scattered vessels united at the capes of the Chesapeake and
entered Hampton Road on the 30th of December; except one armed ship and
three transports, with upwards of four hundred men on board, which did
not arrive till five days later. One half of the cavalry horses were
lost, and several of the large guns were thrown into the sea to prevent
the vessels from foundering.
Without waiting for the arrival of the transports that were missing,
Arnold pushed up James River with his fleet aided by wind and tide, and
immediately found himself in the heart of the country. His effective
force consisted of about twelve hundred men. The burnings and
plunderings, the destruction of public and private property, the ravages
and distresses, which marked all his movements, were consistent with
his character, and such as were to be expected. The inhabitants were not
prepared for so sudden an invasion; the militia could not be rallied in
time to resist it. A small force was assembled under Baron Steuben, on
the south side of James River, but too distant to act efficiently till
it was too late. After striking at every assailable point, Arnold called
his troops back to the ships, descended the river, and took his station
at Portsmouth.
The attempts to defeat and capture him in that post; the spirited and
well conducted enterprise under Lafayette; the French naval armament
sent from Newport, and commanded by M. de Tilly; the more formidable one
under M. Destouches; his rencounter with the fleet of Admiral Graves;
the movements of General Phillips's detachment of British troops; and
the subsequent operations in Virginia; all these are matters of history
and not suited to the present narrative.
Strong hopes were entertained by Washington, that Lafayette in
concert with M. de Tilly would succeed in seizing Arnold, before
any reinforcement could arrive from New York; but these hopes were
disappointed by incidents, that could not have been foreseen or
prevented. After entering Hampton Road, M. de Tilly found the depth of
water in Elizabeth River not sufficient to receive his ships. Arnold
was therefore beyond his reach at Portsmouth; and the detachment of
Lafayette could not act without a naval superiority in the Chesapeake.
Had Arnold been captured, it was the intention of Washington, that he
should be immediately executed; and in his instructions to Lafayette,
he enjoined it upon him to admit no terms of capitulation, which should
screen a traitor from the punishment justly due to his crimes. Several
weeks afterwards, when, upon the death of General Phillips, the command
of the British troops in Virginia devolved temporarily upon Arnold, he
attempted to correspond with Lafayette, and sent an officer to him with
a flag of truce. When Lafayette opened the letter, and saw Arnold's
name at the bottom, he refused to read it, saying to the officer that
he would hold no correspondence whatever with him. Lord Cornwallis told
Lafayette afterwards, that, as soon as he joined the army in Virginia,
he took the first occasion to send Arnold down to Portsmouth, and
expressed disgust at the idea of associating with a person of his
character.
It was during this expedition, that Arnold asked a captain, who had been
taken prisoner, what he thought the Americans would do with him, if he
should fall into their hands. "They will cut off the leg," replied the
officer, "which was wounded when you were fighting for the cause of
liberty, and bury it with the honors of war, and hang the rest of your
body on a gibbet."
While these things were going on, Sir Henry Clinton received a letter
from Lord George Germain, little suited to increase his respect for the
judgment, good sense, or honesty of his new American brigadier. Among
other inventions to please the ministry, Arnold had represented the
facility with which West Point might be taken, if not by a coup de main,
yet by a few days' regular attack, and had proposed a sort of plan for
that object. Lord George Germain expressed some degree of surprise,
that the British commander had not undertaken the business, or at least
mentioned his intention of doing it. "Such is the present state of Great
Britain," said he, "that every possible means must be employed for the
reduction of the rebellion," and he urged a serious consideration of the
subject.
These suggestions, to say the least, were a tacit censure upon Sir Henry
Clinton, for his want either of discernment or enterprise. He felt their
force, and could not entirely conceal his displeasure. In his reply,
however, he proved the folly of the scheme, and the impossibility of
its execution, according to his view of the state of affairs, with
the reduced force then at his command. "As to Major-General Arnold's
opinion," he observed, "I can only say, that, whatever he may have
represented to your Lordship, nothing he has as yet communicated to me
on the subject has convinced me that the rebel posts in the Highlands
can be reduced by 'a few days' regular attack.' But if he convinces me
now, in the present reduction of the rebel army, that such a thing is
practicable, (for to fail would be death to our cause in the present
state of the war,) I shall most likely be induced to make the attempt.
I have therefore required that general officer to send his plan of
operation to me without delay, and to follow or accompany it himself."
This was written on the 5th of April, 1781, and Arnold returned, a
few weeks afterwards, to New York, thus escaping the fate that might
otherwise have awaited him at Yorktown.
How he explained himself to Sir Henry Clinton is not known. We hear
no more of the project against West Point, and Arnold seems to have
remained in idleness during the summer.
Early in September, however, an enterprise was set on foot, which,
from his knowledge of the place of action and other circumstances, he
doubtless originated. At New London were deposited public stores; and
private property to a considerable amount was known to be on board the
vessels in the harbor, feebly defended by Fort Trumbull on one side of
the river, and Fort Griswold on the other. Here was an opportunity, too
tempting to be resisted, for gaining plunder, gratifying a vindictive
spirit, and rendering a service to the cause, which he had espoused,
and in aid of which he had hitherto done so little either to sustain his
military reputation, or mark the value of his dearly bought allegiance.
Departing from the opposite shore of Long Island, with a force adequate
to the undertaking, he crossed the Sound, and landed his troops in two
divisions at the mouth of the river. One division marched towards New
London, took Fort Trumbull, and entered the town. The other, passing up
the east side of the river, ascended the high grounds to Fort Griswold,
which, after a short but sanguinary conflict, was carried at the point
of the bayonet.
The details of these tragical scenes have often been described, and
need not here be recapitulated. New London was reduced to ashes. Several
vessels in the harbor shared the same fate. Others escaped up the
river towards Norwich. The brave Colonel Ledyard, who commanded in Fort
Griswold, was slain by his own sword, when he gave it into the hands of
the officer, who headed the assailing party; and many of his companions
in arms, inhabitants of the little village of Groton, who had assembled
at a moment's warning to defend their homes and their firesides, were
butchered in cold blood after the fort was surrendered.
It has been said, that Arnold, while New London was in flames, stood in
the belfrey of a steeple, and witnessed the conflagration; thus, like
Nero, delighted with the ruin he had caused, the distresses he had
inflicted, the blood of his slaughtered countrymen, the anguish of the
expiring patriot, the widow's tears and the orphan's cries. And what
adds to the enormity is, that he stood almost in sight of the spot where
he drew his first breath; that every object around was associated with
the years of his childhood and youth, and revived those images of the
past, which kindle emotions of tenderness in all but hearts of stone;
that many of the dying, whose groans assailed his ears, and of the
living, whose houses and effects he saw devoured by the flames, were his
early friends, the friends of his father, his mother, his family; and,
in short, that these wanton acts of barbarity were without provocation
on the part of the sufferers, and not less iniquitous in the motives
whence they sprang, than shocking to humanity in themselves.
This was the last exploit of Arnold in his native country. It was indeed
the closing scene of his military and public career. And he had done
enough. Nothing more was necessary to unfold his character in all the
variety of its resources and depth of its depravity, or to convince the
world, that, when a man once abandons himself to his passions, contemns
the counsels of wisdom and virtue, sears his conscience, confounds duty
with selfishness and honor with revenge, the descent is easy and rapid
to that state in which he is the object, not more of the reproach and
scorn of mankind, than of their pity and contempt.