Arnold censured for the Seizure of Goods at Montreal.--Appointed to the
Command of a Fleet on Lake Champlain.--Naval Combat.
It being necessary that General Schuyler should be made acquainted,
as soon as possible, with the present condition of the army, and the
progress of the enemy, General Arnold consented to go forward for that
purpose. His knowledge of all that had passed in Canada, during the last
seven months, enabled him to communicate the requisite intelligence in
a more satisfactory manner than it could be done in writing, and to add
full explanations to the despatches of the commander. He found General
Schuyler in Albany, at which place General Gates arrived in a few days,
proceeding by order of Congress to take command of the northern army.
Meantime General Sullivan retreated to Crown Point. Schuyler, Gates, and
Arnold repaired together to that post.
It was expected that Sir Guy Carleton, as soon as he could provide
water-craft sufficient, would make all haste up the Lake and commence
an attack. A council of general officers was convened, who, after mature
deliberation, resolved to abandon Crown Point, retire to Ticonderoga,
strengthen that post, and make it the principal station of defence. This
measure was thought extraordinary by General Washington and by Congress.
It was looked upon as giving up a position, formidable in itself and by
artificial works, which afforded advantages at least for checking the
enemy, if not for repelling their farther approach. The members of the
council were unanimous; but many of the field-officers partook of the
prevailing sentiment, although on the spot, and signed a remonstrance
against the decision of their superiors. A proceeding so unmilitary,
and so little in accordance with sound discipline, was of course
disregarded, but dissatisfaction and ill feelings were excited on both
sides. Schuyler and Gates defended the resolve of the council in letters
to Washington and Congress, and in the end no one doubted its wisdom.
Crown Point had from circumstances acquired a name in former wars, which
had magnified it in public opinion much beyond its real importance as
a military post. It was moreover impolitic to divide the troops, few in
number compared with those of the enemy, by attempting to fortify and
defend two positions within fifteen miles of each other.
The army was accordingly withdrawn to Ticonderoga, and every preparation
was there begun for meeting the enemy, whenever they should make their
appearance.
While these things were going on, General Arnold brought up another
matter, which scattered new seeds of dissension in the camp. Colonel
Hazen had been his second in command at Montreal, and, from the elements
of Arnold's character, this fact might perhaps lead to a natural
inference, that a quarrel would not be an unlikely event. The
particulars are these. When it became evident that Canada would be
evacuated, Arnold seized goods belonging to merchants in Montreal, which
he said were intended for the public service. Certificates were given
to the owners, who were to be paid according to their invoices by the
United States. In many cases, however, they were taken away in such a
hurry, that there was no time for making out a list of the articles, and
the only form of delivery was the owner's name written on each parcel.
Arnold sent the goods across the country to Chamblee, with the
intention of having them forwarded to St. John's, and thence by water
to Ticonderoga. He instructed Colonel Hazen, who then commanded at
Chamblee, to take charge of them, and prevent their being damaged.
Hazen, either not liking the manner in which the goods had been
obtained, or from personal hostility to Arnold, refused for some time to
meddle with them, and left them exposed to the weather, piled in heaps
on the bank of the river; and at last, when he took them in charge, they
were guarded in so negligent a manner, that the packages were broken
open and many of them plundered.
The owners, not contented to part with their goods upon terms so vague
and uncertain, followed the army to Crown Point. When they found what
ravages had been committed on their property, they presented invoices
and claimed pay for the full amount. The blame fell upon General Arnold,
as the first mover in the business, and he threw it back upon Hazen, who
had refused to obey his order and take care of the goods. The result was
a court-martial, by which Colonel Hazen was tried for disobedience of
orders. While the trial was in progress, the court declined accepting
the testimony of Major Scott, one of Arnold's principal witnesses, on
the ground of his being a party concerned, since he was the agent, who
received the goods at Montreal and conducted them to Chamblee. This
slight was too much for the hot blood of Arnold, and he wrote a
disrespectful letter to the court in the form of a protest. To save
their honor, the court demanded an apology, which was promptly refused
in a tone of insult by their antagonist, with a broad intimation, that
he should be ready at a proper time to give any or all of the gentlemen
of the court satisfaction on that score; or, in other words, the letter
was a sort of challenge to the whole court, either in the corporate or
individual capacity of the members. This was so gross a violation of
military rule, that the court had now no other resort than an appeal to
General Gates, the commander-in-chief. The case presented difficulties
which seemed to embarrass him, as Arnold was much in his favor, and he
had resolved to appoint him to the command of the fleet then preparing
to meet the enemy on the Lake. In short, he dissolved the court-martial,
and thus abetted the conduct of Arnold. In explaining this step to
Congress, he said that he had been obliged to act "dictatorially" when
the court demanded the arrest of General Arnold, adding, "The United
States must not be deprived of that excellent officer's services at
this important moment." Justice might well complain, when policy could
content itself with such a reason for an arbitrary act.
The court passed judgment before they separated, although informally,
and acquitted Colonel Hazen with honor. This was an implied censure upon
Arnold; but, protected as he was by his superior, the affair received
no further investigation. His military popularity sustained him as
an officer, but his character suffered essentially in the public
estimation. It was more than suspected, that his private interest
was chiefly consulted in seizing the goods, and it seems to have been
supposed, that the seizure was upon his own authority. In these respects
it is probable he was too harshly judged. He wrote a letter to
General Schuyler from Montreal, while in the act of taking the goods,
acquainting him with the fact, and adding that he was thus directed by
the commissioners from Congress. He also wrote to General Sullivan from
Chamblee, informing him of the damaged condition in which he found the
packages at that place, and complaining of the disobedience and neglect
of Colonel Hazen. These letters are now extant, and evidently prove,
that he was not practising any secret manouvre in the removal of the
goods, or for retaining them in his own possession.
It must nevertheless be conceded, that his mode of taking the property
without leaving in the owner's hands invoices of the different articles,
and certificates of having received them, could not be justified,
nor could it have been intended by the commissioners. They could mean
nothing more, than such things as would serve to Supply the army either
with provisions or clothing, and these upon a fair security to the
owners; for, by the articles of capitulation entered into with General
Montgomery, the citizens were to be maintained in a free possession
of their goods and effects of every kind, whereas packages containing
silks, and other articles equally inapplicable to the object in view,
were carried off indiscriminately. These circumstances, and his conduct
to the court-martial, produced impressions, which the subsequent
developements of his character contributed nothing to efface or
diminish; and, viewed in the most favorable light, his honesty can be
screened only at the expense of his judgment and delicacy.
I have dwelt the longer on this transaction, because it was the first
important link in the chain of incidents, which led to his final ruin.
Another, somewhat akin to it, occurred nearly at the same time. There
had been a quarrel at Quebec between Arnold and Major Brown, who had
marched to that place with General Montgomery. This enmity had its
origin as early as the capture of Ticonderoga by Ethan Allen, when
Brown was an officer under Colonel Easton, and of course opposed to the
pretensions of Arnold on that occasion. From Quebec letters were
written by Arnold to some of the members of Congress, containing severe
reflections on his conduct, and open charges against him of having
plundered the baggage and property of prisoners taken in Canada. When
these particulars were made known to Brown by his friends, he demanded
from General Wooster, and afterwards from General Thomas, a court of
inquiry; but through the machinations of Arnold he was defeated in his
purpose, till after the evacuation of Canada. He then applied in person
to Congress for redress, and directions were sent to the commander in
the northern department to grant a court of inquiry. Colonel Brown,
for such was now his title, renewed his application to General Gates at
Ticonderoga, but with no better success than before. As in the case of
the court-martial, Gates chose to exercise a dictatorial authority, and
protect his favorite.
Nothing more was done till the end of the campaign, when Colonel Brown
presented his application in another form, demanding an arrest of
General Arnold on a series of charges, in which he was accused of
numerous misdemeanors and criminal acts during the course of his
command. General Gates replied, that he would lay the petition before
Congress. Being thus baffled in his attempts to obtain justice through
the proper channel, Colonel Brown published a narrative of the whole
affair, introducing his charges against Arnold, and commenting upon his
conduct with much severity, and indeed with a warmth that indicated too
great a degree of excited feeling. The result will be seen hereafter. It
is a little remarkable, that, in the midst of all these censures, Arnold
never solicited a court of inquiry on his own part, by which, if they
were unjust and without foundation, he might at once have silenced
his enemies, and which it would be natural to expect under such
circumstances from a man, possessing a quick sense of honor, who was
conscious of his innocence.
As soon as the army had retreated to Crown Point and Ticonderoga,
no time was lost and no efforts were spared in pressing forward
preparations for defence, both by land and water. The British would of
course pursue their way over the Lake, the moment they could construct
or collect at St. John's suitable vessels for the purpose. To baffle
such a movement, or at least to embarrass it as much as possible, it
was extremely important that the marine force should be put on the
most respectable footing, and increased to the utmost limit, which
the resources in hand would admit. Great inconveniences were to be
encountered in effecting this object; few materials for ship-building
were in readiness; shipwrights, carpenters, and many essential articles
for fitting out the vessels were to be obtained from the seaports.
Such was the promptness and energy, however, with which the work was
prosecuted, that by the middle of August a little squadron was prepared
to sail, consisting of one sloop, three schooners, and five gondolas.
The sloop carried twelve guns, one schooner the same number, the others
eight, and the gondolas three each. These vessels rendezvoused at Crown
Point under the the command of Arnold, and before the end of the month
he sailed with his whole armament down the Lake.
By his instructions from General Gates, he was to take his station
at the Isle-aux-TÍtes, where there was a narrow pass in the Lake, and
beyond that point he was ordered in positive terms not to advance. The
order stated, that, as the present operations were designed to be wholly
on the defensive, the business of the fleet was to prevent or repel a
hostile invasion, but not to run any wanton risks or seek an encounter
within the enemy's territory. In all other respects the discretion of
the commander was to be his guide. On his arrival at Windmill Point,
four miles from Isle-aux-TÍtes, he discovered the island to be occupied
by the enemy, numbers of whom were likewise encamped on the shores
of the Lake. This induced him to stop at Windmill Point, and moor his
vessels in a line across the Lake, so as to prevent any of the
enemy's boats from passing * Crown Point. Hence he charges Arnold with
disobedience of orders at the outset, in having gone beyond that place.
But the actual site of Isle-aux-TÍtes was at the lower end of the Lake,
almost in contact with the Canada line, and in the vicinity of what
is now called Rouse's Point. It was intended that the fleet should be
stationed as near the line as prudence would admit, and the orders were
strictly obeyed.--Wilkinson's Memoirs, Vol. I. p. 81.
* General Wilkinson, by mistaking the position of Isle-aux-TÍtes, has
bestowed much unmerited censure upon Arnold. He supposes it to be at a
place called Split Rock, which is but about twenty-five miles from Crown
Point
The decks of his vessels were so low, that he thought it necessary to
erect around them barricades of fascines, which should protect them from
being boarded by superior numbers in small craft. While his men were
on shore cutting fascines, they were attacked by a party of British and
Indians, and before they could reach their boat three were killed
and six wounded. This circumstance proved to him the inexpediency of
remaining in a position, where he was exposed to perpetual annoyance
from the enemy, without having an adequate force to act by land. In a
few days he returned eight or ten miles to Isle-la-Motte, and took a
station more advantageous and secure, as the island was beyond the reach
of an attack from the main land, and his guard-boats would discover any
approach by water.
Small scouting parties were sent down on each side of the Lake, from
whom intelligence was from time to time obtained, but not with such
accuracy as to enable Arnold to judge of the extent of the enemy's naval
preparations at St. John's. Being so well informed, nevertheless, as to
deem it unadvisable to hazard an action in a part of the Lake, where
he would be obliged to engage a superior force in an open encounter, he
withdrew his fleet still farther back, and anchored it in a line between
Valcour Island and the western shore of the Lake.
Since leaving Crown Point his armament had been reinforced, so that it
now consisted of three schooners, two sloops, three galleys and eight
gondolas. Early in the morning of the 11th of October, the guard-boats
gave notice, that the enemy's fleet was in sight, off Cumberland Head,
moving up the Lake. It soon appeared advancing around the southern point
of Valcour Island, and presented a formidable aspect, there being one
ship with three masts, two schooners, a radeau, one gondola, twenty
gunboats, four longboats, and forty-four boats with provisions and
troops. The armed vessels were manned by seven hundred chosen seamen.
Such an array was enough to convince the Americans, that they must rely
mainly on their bravery and the advantages of their position. The wind
was likewise in their favor, as some of the larger vessels could not
beat up sufficiently near to engage in the attack. While the enemy's
fleet was coming round the island, Arnold had ordered his three galleys,
and a schooner called the Royal Savage, to get under way and advance
upon the enemy. On their return to the line the schooner grounded and
was afterwards destroyed, but the men were saved. At half past twelve
the action became general and very warm, the British having brought all
their gunboats and one schooner within musket-shot of the American line.
They kept up a heavy fire of round and grape shot, till five o'clock,
when they withdrew from the contest and joined the ship and schooner,
which a head wind had prevented from coming into action.
During the contest Arnold was on board the Congress galley, which
suffered severely. It received seven shot between wind and water,
was hulled twelve times, the main mast was wounded in two places, the
rigging cut in pieces, and the proportion of killed and wounded was
unusually great. So deficient was the fleet in gunners, that Arnold
himself pointed almost every gun that was fired from his vessel. The
Washington galley was equally shattered; the first lieutenant was
killed, and the captain and master wounded. All the officers of one of
the gondolas, except the captain, were lost; and another gondola sunk
soon after the engagement. The whole number of killed and wounded was
about sixty. The enemy landed a large body of Indians, who kept up an
incessant fire of musketry from the island and the opposite shore, but
without effecting much injury.
A consultation was held by the officers as soon as the engagement was
over; and they agreed, that, considering the exhausted state of their
ammunition, and the great superiority of the enemy's force both in
ships and men, prudence required them to return to Crown Point, and if
possible without risking another attack. The British had anchored
their vessels in a line within a few hundred yards of the Americans,
stretching from the island to the main, apparently to frustrate any such
design. The night was dark, but a favoring breeze blew from the north,
and before morning Arnold had passed with his whole fleet through the
British line entirely undiscovered. This manoeuvre was not less bold in
its execution, than extraordinary in its success. Arnold himself brought
up the rear in his crippled galley, and, before their departure was
known to the enemy, they had ascended the Lake ten or twelve miles to
Schuyler's Island. Here they were obliged to cast anchor for half a day,
in order to stop the leaks and repair their sails. Two of the gondolas
were abandoned and sunk. In the afternoon they set sail again, but the
wind had died away in the morning, and it now sprung up from the south,
equally retarding the pursuit of the enemy and their own progress.
On the morning of the second day the scene was changed. The Congress
and Washington galleys, with four gondolas, had fallen in the rear,
all being too much disabled to sail freely. The advanced ships of the
enemy's fleet, in one of which was General Carleton, were found to
be gaining upon them, under a press of sail, and in a short time were
along-side. After receiving a few broadsides the Washington struck,
having been extremely weakened by the loss of men and injury received in
the first engagement. The whole force of the attack now fell upon Arnold
in the Congress galley. A ship of eighteen guns, a schooner of fourteen,
and another of twelve, poured forth an unceasing fire within musket
shot. The contest was kept up with unparalleled resolution for four
hours, when the galley was reduced almost to a wreck, and was surrounded
by seven sail of the enemy. In this situation Arnold ran the galley
and the four gondolas into a small creek, on the east side of the Lake,
about ten miles from Crown Point; and as soon as they were aground, and
were set on fire, he ordered the marines to leap into the water armed
with muskets, wade to the beach, and station themselves in such a manner
on the bank, as to prevent the approach of the enemy's small boats. He
was the last man, that remained on board, nor did he leave his galley,
till the fire had made such progress, that it could not be extinguished.
The flags were kept flying, and he maintained his attitude of defence
on the shore, till he saw them consumed, and the whole of his flotilla
enveloped in flames. There are few instances on record of more
deliberate courage and gallantry, than were displayed by him from the
beginning to the end of this action.
Being no longer in a condition to oppose the enemy, he proceeded
immediately through the woods with his men to Crown Point, and
fortunately escaped an attack from the Indians, who waylaid the path two
hours after he had passed. The same night he arrived at Ticonderoga. All
his clothes, papers, and baggage had been burnt in the Royal Savage at
Valcour Island. He found at Ticonderoga the remnant of his fleet,
being two schooners, two galleys, one sloop, and one gondola. General
Waterbury, who commanded the Washington galley, and one hundred and ten
prisoners were returned on parole by General Carleton the day after the
last action. The whole American loss in killed and wounded was between
eighty and ninety. The enemy reported theirs to be about forty.
Notwithstanding the signal failure of this enterprise, the valor and
good conduct of the commander and his officers were themes of applause
throughout the country. Arnold's popularity was prodigiously increased
by it; and, although he was disliked in the army, as well from the
spirit of jealousy commonly excited by an aspiring rival, as from the
innate and irredeemable defects of his character, yet with the people
at large these motives, if they existed at all, were swallowed up in an
admiration of those imposing qualities and daring achievements, which
are so apt to captivate the multitude, and which indeed in every stage
of society are found to produce so strong an influence upon the mind.
Some writers have commented on the execution of this enterprise in a
tone of captious criticism, which can by no means be sustained on an
impartial view of the subject. It is perhaps difficult to speak of the
deeds of such a man as Arnold, without remembering the deplorable issue
to which he was finally brought by his folly and wickedness; yet the
historian should never forget, that he commits a crime little less
flagrant in its nature, if inferior in its magnitude, when he allows
himself to be so far moved by his feelings, as to depart from the strict
line of truth and justice, or, by such an obliquity, to lead his readers
to form a false and harsh judgment.
Arnold was sent out to meet the enemy. Whether he should fight or not,
it is true, was left to his discretion. He chose the former and was
beaten, but not till he had maintained a combat for half a day against
a force nearly double his own, and caused the enemy to retire. This fact
is enough to prove, that his position was judiciously chosen, and that
the action on his part was skilfully fought. With consummate address
he then penetrated the enemy's line, and brought off his whole fleet,
shattered and disabled as it was, and succeeded at last in saving six
of his vessels. Let it be supposed, that he had retreated before the
British fleet, and left it to proceed unmolested. What would have
been the consequence? There was a chance, at least, that he would
be overtaken somewhere, and perhaps under circumstances of greater
disadvantage. Even if he had escaped and moored his vessels under the
guns of the fort at Ticonderoga, would the public have been satisfied
with such a measure? Would not murmurs of complaint have been heard,
that such expensive preparations should be made without any effect,
or an attempt to repel the invaders? And would not a corresponding
depression of public enthusiasm and spirit have followed? Whereas the
event, as it turned out, was so gallant a demonstration of the courage
and resolute ardor of the American troops, that it inspired universal
confidence and hope at a very gloomy crisis of the revolution. It
needs only be added, as a guide to a correct historical estimate of the
transaction, that the conduct of Arnold was at the time approved by his
military superiors, by Congress, and by the whole nation.