THE RULE OF ALBUQUERQUE (_continued_)
_His Internal Policy_
The relations of Portugal with Asia were in their origin, and
throughout the reign of King Emmanuel, based on the desire to
monopolise the commerce of the East with Europe. The idea of the
universal conversion of the heathen to Christianity did not develop
itself until the reign of King John III, Emmanuel's eldest son and
successor. The idea of empire preceded that of proselytism, and was
first enunciated by Albuquerque. The three conceptions are all
closely united in the later history of the Portuguese in India, but
they were evolved separately, had separate origins and distinct aims.
The establishment of direct commerce after the voyage of Vasco da
Gama, led inevitably to the imperial notions of Albuquerque. The
history of the Dutch and English power in the East followed the same
lines, and the parallels which can be drawn are numerous and
striking. But the idea of universal conversion to Christianity was a
purely Portuguese and sixteenth-century idea. The Dutch and the {146}
English East India Companies discouraged Christian missionaries; the
Portuguese, on the other hand, in the later days of their ascendancy,
made their whole system of government subservient to the propagation
of the Christian faith. It is not necessary here to draw deductions
from this striking contrast. It is purely a matter of speculation
whether this difference was due to religious causes or to the
idiosyncrasies of the different nations; but the fact remains, and
gives a peculiar interest to the history of the Portuguese in the
East, as connected with the history of the extension of Christianity.
The voyage of Vasco da Gama, as well as the explorations of Prince
Henry the Navigator, was dictated by commercial causes alone.
Incidentally the Portuguese were interested in the discovery of
native Christians on the Malabar coast and of a Christian Empire in
Abyssinia. But it cannot be too strongly insisted upon that the
primary aim of the Portuguese was commercial and not religious. The
idea of empire was forced on the Portuguese by the opposition they
met with in the establishment of their commerce. Vasco da Gama had no
idea of conquering the cities he touched at on the Malabar coast; he
merely wished to open up trade relations. Cabral, who followed him,
gave evidence of his peaceful intentions by sending the first
Portuguese factor, Correa, ashore at Calicut with only a few clerks.
But the murder of Correa and the subsequent attacks on the Portuguese
factories at Cochin {147} and Quilon showed that peaceful trade could
not possibly be established in the then condition of the Malabar
coast. It was necessary to supplement factories by fortresses, and it
is significant that the first fortress built was founded by
Albuquerque during his first voyage to India.
Here Dom Francisco de Almeida wished to stop. He considered it enough
if the Portuguese had a few fortresses to protect their factors, and
commanded the sea to protect their trading ships. Albuquerque went a
step further. He held it to be inadequate for the Portuguese to
possess only fortresses, and argued that they must rule directly over
the cities and islands which were the principal seats of trade. The
history of the Dutch and English in the East shows exactly the same
progression. The merchants of those countries originally desired only
to establish trade. They next found it necessary to build fortresses
to protect their factors or agents. And finally they found it
necessary to build up, much against the will of their employers at
home, the Dutch Empire in Java, Sumatra, and the Spice Islands, and
the English Empire in India. The growth of the latter is traced in
other volumes of this series, in which the progress of the English
from traders to rulers is exhibited.
But the causes which led to the erection of the Dutch and English
empires in Asia differ in one point from those which led to the
establishment of the Portuguese power. The former originated in the
{148} necessity for breaking the Portuguese monopoly of Asiatic
commerce; the latter in the necessity for overthrowing the Muhammadan
monopoly. And it may be noted incidentally that the Portuguese had
the more difficult task. They had to break the Muhammadan connection
with the whole of the East, with Persia and the Spice Islands as well
as with India. Their means were not so adequate as those of the
English and the Dutch, for they had to make the difficult passage
round the Cape of Good Hope with smaller ships, and their appliances
for war were weaker than those of their successors.
Indeed, had not the Portuguese connection with Asia been carried out
by the whole of the royal power of Portugal, it may be doubted
whether it could ever have attained its full development. The Crown
of Portugal kept the trade with the East in its own hands as a royal
monopoly, and was able to despatch great fleets with armies, in some
instances, of 1500 soldiers on board. Whereas the Dutch and English
merchant adventurers were unable to act on such a large scale. The
existence of the Royal monopoly may have, in the end, affected the
Portuguese development in the East prejudicially, but in the
commencement it was absolutely necessary, for the whole strength of
the little kingdom was needed to bear the strain of the continual
despatch of men to Asia.
It has already been said more than once that the Eastern trade with
Europe was in the hands, until {149} the commodities reached the
Levant, of Muhammadan traders. These traders were chiefly of Arab
origin, especially on the Malabar coast, but the Arab immigrants were
supported in nearly every place by native converts to the religion of
Islam. Such Moslem merchants did not try to establish direct rule in
the cities in which they settled. It is an instructive tradition
which makes the Raja Perumal, who ruled over the whole Malabar coast,
retire to Mecca after his conversion to Islam. The Arab traders on
the Indian coasts did not resemble the Muhammadan invaders from the
North-West. Conversion was not with them a main incentive; but, as
the Muhammadan historians show, they took good care that native
Muhammadan converts should not be prejudiced by their change of
religion. The sort of _imperium in imperio_ of the Arab or Mopla
merchants in the Malabar cities is fully described in the
Tohfut-ul-mujahideen, which shows how the Muhammadan communities were
bound together and preserved their independence with regard to the
Hindu sovereigns. Such a situation would have entirely agreed with
the first notions of the Portuguese visitors to India. But the
natural jealousy of the Muhammadan merchants would not permit a new
trading community to spring up side by side with them.
King Emmanuel with great sagacity perceived the true meaning of the
rivalry between the Portuguese and the Muhammadans in the East. He
grasped the fact that he had not to deal with the merchants {150}
alone; he understood that the whole force of Egypt and the Turks
would be arrayed against him. No division of trade could in those
days be expected. He therefore resolved to cut off entirely the
mid-way connection between the Levant and the chief markets of Asia.
For this purpose he directed the building of a fortress in the island
of Socotra; for this purpose he continually urged his commanders to
seize Aden and close the Red Sea to commerce; for this purpose he was
willing to receive ambassadors from the Hindu princes of India, but
would hear of nothing but war against the Muhammadans. His captains
carried out his instructions to the letter. The atrocious acts of
cruelty committed by all of them against Muhammadans may have been in
part due to religious animosity and to their Portuguese origin, but
they were not discouraged by the Portuguese monarch, who was inspired
more by his anxiety to destroy their trade than their faith.
The despatch of the Egyptian fleet, which was defeated by Almeida,
was a proof that King Emmanuel's fears were justified. The internal
wars of the principal Muhammadan rulers alone prevented that fleet
from being followed at once by others still more formidable.
Fortunately for the Portuguese, however, at this very period the
Sultan Selim I of Constantinople was engaged in fierce war with the
Mameluke Sultan of Egypt, and Ismail Shah of Persia was at open issue
with both dynasties. But the necessity for closing the former trade
routes would {151} not have led to the ruin and slaughter of
Muhammadans settled in India itself, had they not systematically
opposed the Portuguese.
Albuquerque, after his first conquest of Goa and after that of
Malacca, showed himself ready to treat the Moslems with clemency. In
both instances that clemency was abused. The Muhammadans of Goa
undoubtedly favoured the advancing army of Yusaf Adil Shah; and the
Muhammadans of Malacca began to plot against the Portuguese supremacy
as soon as it was firmly established. It was for these reasons that
he ordered the indiscriminate slaughter of the Muhammadans of Goa on
his second conquest of that city, and that he directed the execution
of Utemuta Raja at Malacca. It was impossible that the two rival
trading nationalities could co-exist; the one was inevitably led to
destroy the other.
The first means devised for the overthrow of Muhammadan commerce was
the system of licenses. Before Albuquerque's arrival the Portuguese
arrogated to themselves the right of seizing any ship which did not
carry a license granted by the Portuguese authorities. When this
custom had been thoroughly established, it was followed by the
complete prohibition of all licenses to trade with the Red Sea. Even
when such a powerful ruler as the king of Gujarat asked permission to
send ships to Aden, Albuquerque refused, and every vessel carrying
merchandise in that direction was regarded as legitimate prey. The
next step to closing the sea by means of {152} the superiority of the
Portuguese vessels was to build fortresses in spots commanding the
trade routes. This was why Albuquerque laid such weight on the
necessity of building a fortress at Ormuz, and of endeavouring to
capture Aden.
So far the policy of King Emmanuel, of Almeida, and of Albuquerque
agreed. But the latter advanced beyond the notions of his sovereign
and his predecessor in his endeavour to found a Portuguese empire in
the East. His system rested on four main bases. He desired to conquer
certain important points for trading purposes, and to rule them
directly; he desired to colonise the selected districts by
encouraging mixed marriages with the native inhabitants; where he
could not conquer or colonise he desired to build fortresses; and
where this was impracticable he desired to induce the native monarchs
to recognise the supremacy of the king of Portugal and to pay him
tribute. It is not necessary to illustrate Albuquerque's policy on
all these points at greater length than has already been done. His
building of fortresses has been shown in the instances of Calicut,
Malacca, and Ormuz; much has been said of his policy of conquest with
regard to Goa; and his effort to induce native monarchs to become
tributary has been related with regard to the King of Ormuz, the
Zamorin of Calicut, and the Raja of Cochin.
But Albuquerque's policy of colonisation is unique in the history of
the Europeans in India; it has been far-reaching in its results, and
has profoundly {153} influenced the present condition of the
Portuguese in India. His notion of an Eastern empire differed
entirely from that taken in subsequent centuries by the English. He
had no horror of mixed marriages, no dislike of half-castes. On the
contrary, he did all in his power to create a race of half-caste
Portuguese. When Goa was taken for the second time he tried to induce
as many Portuguese as possible to marry native women, and especially
the wives of the Muhammadans he had killed. He presided at these
marriages himself, and gave dowries to couples married as he desired.
The class he particularly encouraged were the artisans, who had been
sent out from Portugal as ship-builders, rope-makers, and workmen in
the arsenals and dockyards. He was also urgent in inducing his
gunners to marry.
His aim in this policy was to form a population which should be at
once loyal to Portugal and satisfied to remain in India for life.
Officers indeed might expect to return to the fatherland, but
Europeans of inferior ranks were too valuable to be allowed to
escape. In all it is narrated that about 450 Portuguese were married
to native women before he left Goa for Malacca. A quaint account of
Albuquerque's colonising policy is given in the _Commentaries_:--
'Those who desired to marry were so numerous, that Affonso de
Albuquerque could hardly grant their requests, for he did not give
permission, except for men of proved character, to marry. But in
order to favour this work, as it was entirely of his own idea, and
also because they {154} were men of good character and had deserved
by their good services that this privilege should be granted to
them, he extended the permission to marry far beyond the powers
which had been assigned by the King Emmanuel, for the women with
whom they married were the daughters of the principal men of the
land. And he granted this favour, among other reasons, in order
that when the Hindus observed what he did for their daughters and
nieces and sisters they might with better willingness turn
Christians; and for this reason he would not suffer any of the
women to be enslaved, but ordered that they should be all taken
away from the masters who had possession of them; and he divided
among the married ones the lands, houses, and cattle and everything
else that there was, to give them a start in life; and if the women
whom he thus gave in marriage asked for the houses which had been
in possession of their fathers or their husbands, he ordered that
these should be so given, and therein they found many jewels and
gold pieces which had been hidden underground and abandoned when
the city was captured.'[1]
[Footnote 1: Albuquerque's _Commentaries_, vol. iii. pp. 41, 42.]
This colonising policy was carried out by Albuquerque both for moral
and political reasons, but it was not approved by all the other
Portuguese officers in India. Some of the Catholic clergy objected,
in spite of his making baptism a preliminary to marriage, and Diogo
Mendes, when Captain of Goa, did all he could to discourage the
married men. Albuquerque dwells at length on this subject in the long
despatch which he wrote to the king on April 1st, 1512, after his
return from Malacca.[2] It was one of his favourite {155} schemes,
and was well suited to the inclinations of the Portuguese people.
Possibly no other nation is so willing to intermarry with alien races
as the Portuguese. In Portugal itself there remain many traces in the
physiognomy of the people of the intermarriage of the original stock
with descendants of the Moors and even of the negro slaves, who were
largely imported; in Brazil, an important division of the population
is descended from mixed marriages between the Portuguese settlers and
the aboriginal tribes; and in India the number of Portuguese
half-castes forms a recognised section of the Christian population.
These men and women resemble natives more than Europeans, and often
appear to have only a very small amount of European blood.
[Footnote 2: _Cartas de Albuquerque_, vol. i. pp. 29-65.]
But however desirous Albuquerque might be to create a body of
Portuguese colonists and half-castes, he knew he could not establish
a complete power in India by this means alone. The proportion of
Europeans must inevitably be small, and some means had to be devised
for governing the natives. This was one of the arguments employed by
the school of Almeida for abandoning Goa. At Cochin, for instance,
the Portuguese authority was only supreme within the limits of the
fortress, and the task of governing the city was left to the Hindu
Raja. But the conquest of the island and city of Goa produced a new
set of conditions, and for the first time a civilised European state
had to provide for the government of Hindus. Albuquerque boldly faced
{156} the difficulty. He declared that the expenses of government
must be met out of revenue, and that the ownership of Goa should not
cause any drain on the king's finances. He did not at first design to
administer the island by Portuguese officials, but resolved to farm
out its revenues to native chiefs.
After the first capture of Goa, Albuquerque selected Timoja; after
the second conquest, Malhar Rao; and when the latter became Raja of
Honawar, he received an offer for the situation from the Raja of the
neighbouring Hindu state of Vengapur. He was informed after the first
conquest that the King of Bijapur had doubled the amount of the taxes
levied by the Hindu Raja of Vijayanagar. A petition was made that the
latter amount should be exacted in future, and Albuquerque consented.
Various sums are given as the value of these taxes, but perhaps the
best and most trustworthy sum is 150,000 xerafins, a sum equivalent
to about 9375 pounds. But at the same time, Albuquerque stated that
if ever the payment of the taxes should fall into arrears the amount
should be raised to that paid to Yusaf Adil Shah.
The particular form of administration adopted by the first European
rulers of an Indian District is of peculiar interest to Englishmen,
who now administer nearly the whole of India. Unfortunately, the
_Commentaries_ give but a very few lines to this subject, and the
contemporary Portuguese historians are practically silent. It will be
as well therefore to give in full the description of the
_Commentaries_.
{157} 'Timoja and the others received, in the name of the people,
the lands, with these conditions that Affonso de Albuquerque laid
down [_this refers to the reduction in the amount of the taxes_];
but it had also to be stipulated that he should appoint over them a
Tanadar, and Hindus to govern them. Affonso de Albuquerque told
them that he would promise not to appoint any Muhammadan to the
office of Tanadar, and that he would give orders that the taxes
should be collected by Portuguese in combination with certain
Hindus of the land to be appointed by Timoja, in order that
everything should be done with the least oppression of the people.
And after having thus arranged the matter for them, Affonso de
Albuquerque commanded that an oath should be administered to them,
according to their heathen manner, that they would account for
these taxes with him or the Governor of India for the time being;
and he ordered that two pacharins should be given to each one, for
it was an ancient custom in the land to give these to these Hindus.
'On the conclusion of this business, Affonso de Albuquerque gave
them permission to return to their houses and to commence the
collection of the taxes, according to the local registers of the
lands. And they desired him to appoint over them certain Tanadars,
who have the same office as our Almoxarifes [_Receivers of the
Customs_], to collect the revenue and to dispense justice amongst
them. In order to content them, Affonso de Albuquerque nominated
Braz Vieira over them as Tanadar of Cintacora, and Gaspar Chanoca
to act as his Secretary, and over all the other offices of Tanadar
he appointed for them as Tanadars a number of honourable men,
servants of the King, in whom he had complete confidence, to
execute justice among them. And he ordered Timoja to appoint to
each of these officers a Hindu clerk, in order to show them the
method to be {158} pursued in collecting the revenue; and to each
Tanadar he told off 200 peons of the country to accompany them and
carry out the instructions of their masters in the collection of
the revenue. And he sent Joao Alvares de Caminha, who was a very
honourable man and possessed great authority, in order to set those
things in action as they should be carried on; and to put them into
working order; and to repose in him a confidence with regard to
other greater matters; and to be his clerk Antonio Fragoso was
appointed; and a Hindu servant of Timoja to show him the
register-books of the lands, how they were held in separate
occupation, in order that there should be no dishonesty. And Joao
Alvares de Caminha managed everything in such a manner that
everybody was well pleased. The Hindus who had fled out of Goa
returned to their original dwelling-places in the land immediately
that they perceived that Affonso de Albuquerque had remitted to
them a moiety of the dues, which they had been accustomed to pay to
the Sabaio (Yusaf Adil Shah), and had appointed natives over them
to govern them.'[3]
[Footnote 3: Albuquerque's _Commentaries_, vol. ii. pp. 125-127.]
It will be seen from the above quotation that the union of revenue
and judicial functions, which is one of the principal features of the
English administration of India, was adopted by Albuquerque in his
settlement of Goa. So also was the co-operation of native with
European officials, while Joao Alvares de Caminha was the first
forerunner of the modern English Collectors of Districts. It will be
observed that the native system of government was adopted, for
mention is made of the land register which would {159} contain the
amount to be paid by each tenant in the form of rent. Albuquerque
carefully maintained the constitution of the village communities, and
shortly after his death, in 1526, a register called the _Foral de
Usos e Costumes_, containing the peculiar usages and customs of the
village communities, was compiled, which served as a guide-book to
subsequent administrators. His use of Hindu clerks in the work of
settlement is also noteworthy; he quickly perceived the adaptability
of the natives, and desired to employ them not only in the collection
of the revenue, but in the management of the Portuguese factories. To
make this possible he understood the necessity of educating the
future clerks in Western customs and languages. He established
schools for the purpose, and in his famous despatch of April 1, 1512,
he begged King Emmanuel to send out from Portugal a competent
schoolmaster for the education of native clerks.[4]
[Footnote 4: _Cartas de Albuquerque_, vol. i. p. 43.]
Albuquerque likewise understood the value of native troops. In his
expedition to the Red Sea he employed 800 native soldiers, who are
stated to have been enlisted from among the inhabitants of 'Kanara
and Malabar.' These men did good service, and were employed in other
important expeditions. It is nowhere stated, however, whether they
were drilled and commanded by European officers. The natives who
served in the second capture of Goa were commanded by Malhar Rao, and
it seems most probable that the {160} contingent in the Red Sea
remained under their native officers.
In one thing only did Albuquerque venture to oppose the customs of
the natives of India. He dared to prohibit in the island of Goa the
practice of _Sati_ or widow-burning, which was not abolished in
British India until the governorship of Lord William Bentinck in
1829. The mention of Albuquerque's abolition of _Sati_ in the
_Commentaries_ is sufficiently quaint to deserve quotation.
'They had a custom that if any Hindu died, the wife had to burn
herself of her own free will; and when she was proceeding to this
self-sacrifice it was with great merrymaking and blowing of music,
saying that she desired to accompany her husband to the other
world. But the wife who would not so burn herself was thrust out
from among the others, and lived by gaining, by means of her body,
support for the maintenance of the pagoda of which she was a
votary. However, when Affonso de Albuquerque took the city of Goa,
he forbad from that time forward, that any more women should be
burned; and although to change one's customs is equal to death
itself, nevertheless they were happy to save their lives, and spoke
very highly of him because he had ordered that there should be no
more burning.'[5]
[Footnote 5: Albuquerque's _Commentaries_, vol. ii. p. 94.]
Albuquerque, like Warren Hastings and other English
governors-general, understood the importance of keeping his employer
in a good temper by looking after his commercial interests. In all
his despatches he always set forth the commercial {161} advantages of
his different conquests, and excused his imperial ideas by defending
them on commercial grounds. Nothing more need be said here on the
general question of the advantages and history of the direct trade
route round the Cape of Good Hope, but some special instances of
Albuquerque's sagacity in commercial matters deserve record. His
establishment of a Portuguese factory at Malacca is a striking
example of his sagacity. He perceived that though the pepper and
ginger which was taken on board in the Malabar ports was grown in
India, the cinnamon purchased there chiefly came from Ceylon, and the
spices from the Malay Peninsula and the Spice Islands. He therefore
took steps to open up a direct trade in cinnamon with Ceylon, and
made his famous expedition to Malacca. By such measures he hoped to
avoid having to pay the middleman's profits for conveying these
commodities to India.
A smaller point also deserves notice. When the Portuguese factory was
established at Cochin certain prices were fixed which had to be paid
in gold to the Raja's officers for the commodities required. This
necessitated a considerable export of bullion from Portugal or else
the forced sale of European goods. When Albuquerque was able to
dictate terms to the new ruler of Calicut, he bargained that the
products of India should be exchanged for merchandise brought from
Portugal, and not sold for ready money. This reform was very
unwelcome to the Portuguese factors and officials, who had hitherto
made large profits by {162} selling the European goods and embezzling
part of the price paid for them.
One interesting proceeding of Albuquerque was his establishment of a
new coinage, both at Goa and at Malacca. After the first capture of
the future capital of Portuguese India, Timoja, whom he had made
governor of the island, came with the principal inhabitants of the
city and begged Albuquerque to strike some new money. The Governor
replied, after holding a council of his captains, that he could not
venture to assume one of the chief prerogatives of royalty without
first obtaining the permission of the King of Portugal. But the need
of a new currency was so urgent that Timoja and the inhabitants made
a fresh petition that, if the Governor would not issue coins of his
own, he would allow those of the King of Bijapur to pass current.
This argument was irresistible, and Albuquerque established a mint
for the coinage of gold, silver, and copper, under the
superintendence of Tristao de Ga. The new money was inaugurated with
an imposing ceremony. A proclamation was issued that the King of
Bijapur's coins should not be kept or passed under severe penalties,
and that whoever had any was to exchange it at the mint for the new
coins. Albuquerque did not invent new measures of value; he adopted
the Hindu values and simply gave Portuguese names to coins which he
minted of the size and weight of those then in circulation in the
country.[6] In Malacca however he {163} appeared as an originator.
The only coins used there were made of pewter or tin; there was no
gold or silver coinage, and trade was carried on by barter. Gold and
silver was brought into the Peninsula from China and Siam, but it was
used as merchandise and not as money. Albuquerque altered this, and
established for the first time a gold and silver currency. But he was
too wise to neglect the original native money. The tin mines of the
peninsula were made crown property, and tin and pewter coins were
struck of the old values. The new currency was inaugurated at Malacca
as it had been at Goa, with a grand ceremony, which is fully
described in the _Commentaries_, in which it is quaintly remarked
that the people especially approved of the distribution among
themselves of the new coins, which were scattered by the Portuguese
officials from the back of an elephant.
[Footnote 6: A valuable monograph on the Portuguese coinage in India
has been published under the title of _Contributions to the Study of
Indo-Portuguese Numismatics_, by J. Gerson da Cunha, Bombay, 1880.]
It is important to grasp the fact that Albuquerque did not commence
the policy of wholesale conversions to Christianity. Franciscan
friars accompanied him to India, as they had accompanied his
predecessors, but their principal duty was to look after the
spiritual welfare of the Portuguese and not to convert the natives.
These friars included men of different types. Some were employed in
political capacities, as for instance, Frei Luis, who was sent as
ambassador to the Raja of Vijayanagar. Some showed themselves men of
the highest character, like Frei Francisco {164} Loureiro, who was
taken prisoner by the King of Gujarat on being wrecked on his coast
with Dom Affonso de Noronha. The worthy priest was allowed to go to
Cochin in order to procure a ransom for himself and his comrades in
captivity. This occurred during Albuquerque's absence in Malacca, and
the Portuguese officials at Cochin refused to furnish the money
required. The friar at once returned to Gujarat to his imprisonment
to the great admiration of the Muhammadan king. Some clerics,
however, did not show themselves worthy of their profession. One in
particular, a Dominican friar, embezzled the property of deceased
Portuguese by declaring that they had signed wills in his favour.[7]
This man was promptly sent back to Portugal in disgrace.
[Footnote 7: _Cartas de Albuquerque_, vol. i. p. 30.]
But though the making of converts did not at once become the
principal occupation of the Catholic clergy in India, some baptisms
on a large scale took place after the capture of Goa. These were
principally of the Muhammadan women, whose husbands had been slain,
and whom Albuquerque gave in marriage to his favourites. His marriage
scheme itself was severely condemned by some of the friars, and but
for his own strong will might have caused a schism. But though he did
not make missionary effort a main aim of his policy, like some of his
successors, Albuquerque was unfeignedly pious. He built churches at
Goa, at Malacca, and in the island of Socotra, and he granted in
these instances {165} the whole of the property which had belonged to
the Muhammadan mosques to the new foundations. The first Portuguese
adventurers in India were too delighted to find Christians at all in
India to have time to examine into the difference of their ritual
from their own. They were overjoyed to find a cross in digging
foundations for a church in Goa. They believed that Christianity
would quickly spread over the East. And the religious persecutions
which mar the later history of the Portuguese in India were not
thought of in the days of the great governor.
The causes of Albuquerque's triumphant progress in Asia may be found
in a consideration of certain special and general reasons as well as
in his own character.
The chief general cause was the weakness and mutual enmity of the
rulers with whom he came in contact. He had not to strive with the
great Mughals; he did not come directly in contact with Ismail Shah,
who favoured instead of opposing him; nor did he have cause to attack
the powerful Emperor of China. The Hindu Zamorin of Calicut, the
Muhammadan Nawab of Diu, the half savage Sultan of Malacca, the Arab
King of Ormuz, were none of them great and powerful monarchs. All had
external as well as internal enemies, and Albuquerque was quick to
perceive and make use of this circumstance. The only great ruler he
came into opposition with was Yusaf Adil Shah of Bijapur, who,
fortunately for the Portuguese, died in 1510. The division of India
into {166} hostile kingdoms was especially favourable to the progress
of the Portuguese. Albuquerque was able to play off Hindu Rajas
against Muhammadan kings: nor were monarchs even of the same faith
necessarily united in bonds of friendship. Thus the Raja of Cochin
was the declared enemy of the Zamorin of Calicut, and the Muhammadan
kings of the Deccan were too busy in fighting over the disruption of
the great Bahmani kingdom to make a general effort against the
new-comers. The existence of local jealousies and rivalries enabled
Albuquerque, like later European rulers of India, to make good the
position of his countrymen.
The special causes of the success of the Portuguese are to be found
in the superiority of their ships, their artillery, and their
soldiers. The Portuguese ships at the beginning of the sixteenth
century, though much smaller than the great galleons which they
afterwards built for the Indian trade, were much more efficient than
the Arab vessels. They had to be both well built and well fitted to
accomplish the long and perilous voyage round the Cape of Good Hope,
whereas the Arab ships were only intended to sail across the Indian
Ocean with the favourable monsoon and then up the quiet waters of the
Red Sea or Persian Gulf. But the Portuguese did not depend on sailing
vessels alone in their maritime battles; they built galleys in
imitation of the native craft, and secured good sailors for them by
offering increased pay.
The excellence of the Portuguese artillery and {167} the skill of the
gunners was another main cause of their victories. The natives,
indeed, understood the use of powder and of cannon; as many as 300
pieces of ordnance were captured at Malacca; but the Portuguese guns
were always better served than those of their opponents. It was
noticed at the siege of Benastarim that one of Rasul Khan's guns did
more damage than the rest, and it was soon discovered that it was
being served by a Portuguese renegade. The arquebuses or clumsy
muskets of the Portuguese also did them good service, though they
cannot be compared to the more efficient arms of precision which came
into use in the next century. Bows and arrows were the chief weapons
on both sides, and the superiority of the Portuguese crossbowmen is
constantly described in different engagements.
But neither ships nor arms would have effected much without brave
hearts. And the Portuguese, in this their heroic period, gave
evidence of a tried and adventurous courage which has seldom been
equalled. Albuquerque's most serious repulse, at Aden, was due not to
the reluctance but to the over impetuosity of his men. Again and
again proofs of conspicuous gallantry were given, and many anecdotes
might be quoted which testify to the bravery of both officers and
men. But the discipline of the Portuguese was not equal to their
courage. The soldiers and sailors were always ready to follow their
officers, but the officers were apt to have ideas of their own with
regard to the duty of obedience. The {168} insubordination of
Albuquerque's captains during his first expedition against Ormuz was
imitated on many other occasions. Even the most severe examples
failed to establish perfect discipline, and it was by no means the
worst of the captains who were the most disobedient. But in spite of
this defect the soldiers and the officers of Albuquerque were worthy
of their leader. They had inherited their warlike disposition from
their fathers; they had been trained to courage and endurance through
centuries of fighting with the Moors both in the Peninsula and in
Morocco; and their hideous cruelty to their conquered foes was as
much a part of their nature as it was typical of the century in which
they lived.
Albuquerque's own character counted for much in his success. He was
comparatively an old man when he took up his governorship, and his
scheme of policy was by that time carefully matured. To that policy
he adhered unflinchingly from the beginning to the end of his career.
His extraordinary tenacity of purpose was one of his most remarkable
characteristics. He swore at the time of his first repulse at Ormuz
that he would return, and he did. He insisted on the capture and
retention of Goa, in spite of many varieties of opposition, and he
gained his point. There can be little doubt that had he survived he
would have succeeded in his cherished ambition of conquering Aden and
closing the Red Sea to the commerce of the East.
With this tenacity of purpose went a wide and {169} remarkable
tolerance. The favourable countenance he showed to the Hindus was due
to his nature as well as to his scheme of policy. With regard even to
the Muhammadans, whom he hated, he could show a certain tolerance
which would not have been found in a crusader. He sent embassies to
Shah Ismail, and the Kings of Gujarat and Bijapur, and was ready to
bear with the Moslems in Malacca and in India, until he grasped the
irreconcilable nature of their enmity to the Portuguese. He possessed
an intuitive knowledge of the best way to deal with Asiatic peoples.
He understood the importance of pomp and ceremony, and the influence
exerted by the possession of the prestige of victory.
Throughout there was something of the grandiose in his nature and his
views. His project of establishing an empire in India naturally
seemed absurd to his contemporaries. And the attempt to realise it
exhausted the Portuguese nation. But the existence of the English
empire in India has shown that Albuquerque's idea was not
impracticable in itself; it was his nation which proved inadequate to
the task. Albuquerque's courage and his cruelty, his piety and his
cunning, were not peculiar to himself; they were shared by other men
of his time and country. But his tenacity of purpose, his broadminded
tolerance, and his statesmanlike views were absolutely unique, and
helped to win for him his proud designation of Affonso de Albuquerque
the Great.
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