made reasonably perfect for our needs. There are places now in the
classified service which ought to be exempted and others not classified may
properly be included. I shall not hesitate to exempt cases which I think
have been improperly included in the classified service or include those
which in my judgment will best promote the public service. The system has
the approval of the people and it will be my endeavor to uphold and extend
it.
I am forced by the length of this Message to omit many important references
to affairs of the Government with which Congress will have to deal at the
present session. They are fully discussed in the departmental reports, to
all of which I invite your earnest attention.
The estimates of the expenses of the Government by the several Departments
will, I am sure, have your careful scrutiny. While the Congress may not
find it an easy task to reduce the expenses of the Government, it should
not encourage their increase. These expenses will in my judgment admit of a
decrease in many branches of the Government without injury to the public
service. It is a commanding duty to keep the appropriations within the
receipts of the Government, and thus avoid a deficit.
***
State of the Union Address
William McKinley
December 5, 1898
To the Senate and House of Representatives:
Notwithstanding the added burdens rendered necessary by the war, our people
rejoice in a very satisfactory and steadily increasing degree of
prosperity, evidenced by the largest volume of business ever recorded.
Manufacture has been productive, agricultural pursuits have yielded
abundant returns, labor in all fields of industry is better rewarded,
revenue legislation passed by the present Congress has increased the
Treasury's receipts to the amount estimated by its authors, the finances of
the Government have been successfully administered and its credit advanced
to the first rank, while its currency has been maintained at the world's
highest standard. Military service under a common flag and for a righteous
cause has strengthened the national spirit and served to cement more
closely than ever the fraternal bonds between every section of the
country.
A review of the relation of the United States to other powers, always
appropriate, is this year of primary importance in view of the momentous
issues which have arisen, demanding in one instance the ultimate
determination by arms and involving far-reaching consequences which will
require the earnest attention of the Congress.
In my last annual message very full consideration was given to the question
of the duty of the Government of the United States toward Spain and the
Cuban insurrection as being by far the most important problem with which we
were then called upon to deal. The considerations then advanced and the
exposition of the views therein expressed disclosed my sense of the extreme
gravity of the situation. Setting aside as logically unfounded or
practically inadmissible the recognition of the Cuban insurgents as
belligerents, the recognition of the independence of Cuba, neutral
intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the
contestants, intervention in favor of one or the other party, and forcible
annexation of the island, I concluded it was honestly due to our friendly
relations with Spain that she should be given a reasonable chance to
realize her expectations of reform to which she had become irrevocably
committed. Within a few weeks previously she had announced comprehensive
plans which it was confidently asserted would be efficacious to remedy the
evils so deeply affecting our own country, so injurious to the true
interests of the mother country as well as to those of Cuba, and so
repugnant to the universal sentiment of humanity.
The ensuing month brought little sign of real progress toward the
pacification of Cuba. The autonomous administrations set up in the capital
and some of the principal cities appeared not to gain the favor of the
inhabitants nor to be able to extend their influence to the large extent of
territory held by the insurgents, while the military arm, obviously unable
to cope with the still active rebellion, continued many of the most
objectionable and offensive policies of the government that had preceded
it. No tangible relief was afforded the vast numbers of unhappy
reconcentrados, despite the reiterated professions made in that regard and
the amount appropriated by Spain to that end. The proffered expedient of
zones of cultivation proved illusory. Indeed no less practical nor more
delusive promises of succor could well have been tendered to the exhausted
and destitute people, stripped of all that made life and home dear and
herded in a strange region among unsympathetic strangers hardly less
necessitous than themselves.
By the end of December the mortality among them had frightfully increased.
Conservative estimates from Spanish sources placed the deaths among these
distressed people at over 40 per cent from the time General Weyler's decree
of reconcentration was enforced. With the acquiescence of the Spanish
authorities, a scheme was adopted for relief by charitable contributions
raised in this country and distributed, under the direction of the
consul-general and the several consuls, by noble and earnest individual
effort through the organized agencies of the American Red Cross. Thousands
of lives were thus saved, but many thousands more were inaccessible to such
forms of aid.
The war continued on the old footing, without comprehensive plan,
developing only the same spasmodic encounters, barren of strategic result,
that had marked the course of the earlier ten years' rebellion as well as
the present insurrection from its start. No alternative save physical
exhaustion of either combatant, and therewithal the practical ruin of the
island, lay in sight, but how far distant no one could venture to
conjecture.
At this juncture, on the 15th of February last, occurred the destruction of
the battle ship Maine while rightfully lying in the harbor of Havana on a
mission of international courtesy and good will--a catastrophe the
suspicious nature and horror of which stirred the nation's heart
profoundly. It is a striking evidence of the poise and sturdy good sense
distinguishing our national character that this shocking blow, falling upon
a generous people already deeply touched by preceding events in Cuba, did
not move them to an instant desperate resolve to tolerate no longer the
existence of a condition of danger and disorder at our doors that made
possible such a deed, by whomsoever wrought. Yet the instinct of justice
prevailed, and the nation anxiously awaited the result of the searching
investigation at once set on foot. The finding of the naval board of
inquiry established that the origin of the explosion was external, by a
submarine mine, and only halted through lack of positive testimony to fix
the responsibility of its authorship.
All these things carried conviction to the most thoughtful, even before the
finding of the naval court, that a crisis in our relations with Spain and
toward Cuba was at hand. So strong was this belief that it needed but a
brief Executive suggestion to the Congress to receive immediate answer to
the duty of making instant provision for the possible and perhaps speedily
probable emergency of war, and the remarkable, almost unique, spectacle was
presented of a unanimous vote of both Houses, on the 9th of March,
appropriating $50,000,000 "for the national defense and for each and every
purpose connected therewith, to be expended at the discretion of the
President." That this act of prevision came none too soon was disclosed
when the application of the fund was undertaken. Our coasts were
practically undefended. Our Navy needed large provision for increased
ammunition and supplies, and even numbers to cope with any sudden attack
from the navy of Spain, which comprised modern vessels of the highest type
of continental perfection. Our Army also required enlargement of men and
munitions. The details of the hurried preparation for the dreaded
contingency are told in the reports of the Secretaries of War and of the
Navy, and need not be repeated here. It is sufficient to say that the
outbreak of war when it did come found our nation not unprepared to meet
the conflict.
Nor was the apprehension of coming strife confined to our own country. It
was felt by the continental powers, which on April 6, through their
ambassadors and envoys, addressed to the Executive an expression of hope
that humanity and moderation might mark the course of this Government and
people, and that further negotiations would lead to an agreement which,
while securing the maintenance of peace, would afford all necessary
guaranties for the reestablishment of order in Cuba. In responding to that
representation I said I shared the hope the envoys had expressed that peace
might be preserved in a manner to terminate the chronic condition of
disturbance in Cuba, so injurious and menacing to our interests and
tranquillity, as well as shocking to our sentiments of humanity; and while
appreciating the humanitarian and disinterested character of the
communication they had made on behalf of the powers, I stated the
confidence of this Government, for its part, that equal appreciation would
be shown for its own earnest and unselfish endeavors to fulfill a duty to
humanity by ending a situation the indefinite prolongation of which had
become insufferable.
Still animated by the hope of a peaceful solution and obeying the dictates
of duty, no effort was relaxed to bring about a speedy ending of the Cuban
struggle. Negotiations to this object continued actively with the
Government of Spain, looking to the immediate conclusion of a six months'
armistice in Cuba, with a view to effect the recognition of her people's
right to independence. Besides this, the instant revocation of the order of
reconcentration was asked, so that the sufferers, returning to their homes
and aided by united American and Spanish effort, might be put in a way to
support themselves and, by orderly resumption of the well-nigh destroyed
productive energies of the island, contribute to the restoration of its
tranquillity and well-being. Negotiations continued for some little time at
Madrid, resulting in offers by the Spanish Government which could not but
be regarded as inadequate. It was proposed to confide the preparation of
peace to the insular parliament, yet to be convened under the autonomous
decrees of November, 1897, but without impairment in any wise of the
constitutional powers of the Madrid Government, which to that end would
grant an armistice, if solicited by the insurgents, for such time as the
general in chief might see fit to fix. How and with what scope of
discretionary powers the insular parliament was expected to set about the
"preparation" of peace did not appear. If it were to be by negotiation with
the insurgents, the issue seemed to rest on the one side with a body chosen
by a fraction of the electors in the districts under Spanish control, and
on the other with the insurgent population holding the interior country,
unrepresented in the so-called parliament and defiant at the suggestion of
suing for peace.
Grieved and disappointed at this barren outcome of my sincere endeavors to
reach a practicable solution, I felt it my duty to remit the whole question
to the Congress. In the message of April 11, 1898, I announced that with
this last overture in the direction of immediate peace in Cuba and its
disappointing reception by Spain the effort of the Executive was brought to
an end. I again reviewed the alternative courses of action which had been
proposed, concluding that the only one consonant with international policy
and compatible with our firm-set historical traditions was intervention as
a neutral to stop the war and check the hopeless sacrifice of life, even
though that resort involved "hostile constraint upon both the parties to
the contest, as well to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual
settlement." The grounds justifying that step were the interests of
humanity, the duty to protect the life and property of our citizens in
Cuba, the right to check injury to our commerce and people through the
devastation of the island, and, most important, the need of removing at
once and forever the constant menace and the burdens entailed upon our
Government by the uncertainties and perils of the situation caused by the
unendurable disturbance in Cuba. I said: The long trial has proved that the
object for which Spain has waged the war can not be attained. The fire of
insurrection may flame or may smolder with varying seasons, but it has not
been and it is plain that it can not be extinguished by present methods.
The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer be
endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in
the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests which
give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must
stop. In view of all this the Congress was asked to authorize and empower
the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of
hostilities between Spain and the people of Cuba and to secure in the
island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining
order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and
tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and for
the accomplishment of those ends to use the military and naval forces of
the United States as might be necessary, with added authority to continue
generous relief to the starving people of Cuba.
The response of the Congress, after nine days of earnest deliberation,
during which the almost unanimous sentiment of your body was developed on
every point save as to the expediency of coupling the proposed action with
a formal recognition of the Republic of Cuba as the true and lawful
government of that island--a proposition which failed of adoption--the
Congress, after conference, on the 19th of April, by a vote of 42 to 35 in
the Senate and 311 to 6 in the House of Representatives, passed the
memorable joint resolution declaring--
First. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be,
free and independent.
Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the
Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of
Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba
and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.
Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is,
directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the
United States and to call into the actual service of the United States the
militia of the several States to such extent as may be necessary to carry
these resolutions into effect.
Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said
island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination
when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island
to its people. This resolution was approved by the Executive on the next
day, April 20. A copy was at once communicated to the Spanish minister at
this capital, who forthwith announced that his continuance in Washington
had thereby become impossible, and asked for his passports, which were
given him. He thereupon withdrew from Washington, leaving the protection of
Spanish interests in the United States to the French ambassador and the
Austro-Hungarian minister. Simultaneously with its communication to the
Spanish minister here, General Woodford, the American minister at Madrid,
was telegraphed confirmation of the text of the joint resolution and
directed to communicate it to the Government of Spain with the formal
demand that it at once relinquish its authority and government in the
island of Cuba and withdraw its forces therefrom, coupling this demand with
announcement of the intentions of this Government as to the future of the
island, in conformity with the fourth clause of the resolution, and giving
Spain until noon of April 23 to reply.
That demand, although, as above shown, officially made known to the Spanish
envoy here, was not delivered at Madrid. After the instruction reached
General Woodford on the morning of April 21, but before he could present
it, the Spanish minister of state notified him that upon the President's
approval of the joint resolution the Madrid Government, regarding the act
as "equivalent to an evident declaration of war," had ordered its minister
in Washington to withdraw, thereby breaking off diplomatic relations
between the two countries and ceasing all official communication between
their respective representatives. General Woodford thereupon demanded his
passports and quitted Madrid the same day.
Spain having thus denied the demand of the United States and initiated that
complete form of rupture of relations which attends a state of war, the
executive powers authorized by the resolution were at once used by me to
meet the enlarged contingency of actual war between sovereign states. On
April 22 I proclaimed a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including
ports on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and the port of
Cienfuegos, on the south coast of Cuba, and on the 23d I called for
volunteers to execute the purpose of the resolution. By my message of April
25 the Congress was informed of the situation, and I recommended formal
declaration of the existence of a state of war between the United States
and Spain. The Congress accordingly voted on the same day the act approved
April 25, 1898, declaring the existence of such war from and including the
21st day of April, and reenacted the provision of the resolution of April
20 directing the President to use all the armed forces of the nation to
carry that act into effect. Due notification of the existence of war as
aforesaid was given April 25 by telegraph to all the governments with which
the United States maintain relations, in order that their neutrality might
be assured during the war. The various governments responded with
proclamations of neutrality, each after its own methods. It is not among
the least gratifying incidents of the struggle that the obligations of
neutrality were impartially discharged by all, often under delicate and
difficult circumstances.
In further fulfillment of international duty I issued, April 26, 1893, a
proclamation announcing the treatment proposed to be accorded to vessels
and their cargoes as to blockade, contraband, the exercise of the right of
search, and the immunity of neutral flags and neutral goods under enemy's
flag. A similar proclamation was made by the Spanish Government. In the
conduct of hostilities the rules of the Declaration of Paris, including
abstention from resort to privateering, have accordingly been observed by
both belligerents, although neither was a party to that declaration.
Our country thus, after an interval of half a century of peace with all
nations, found itself engaged in deadly conflict with a foreign enemy.
Every nerve was strained to meet the emergency. The response to the initial
call for 125,000 volunteers was instant and complete, as was also the
result of the second call, of May 25, for 75,000 additional volunteers. The
ranks of the Regular Army were increased to the limits provided by the act
of April 26, 1898.
The enlisted force of the Navy on the 15th day of August, when it reached
its maximum, numbered 24,123 men and apprentices. One hundred and three
vessels were added to the Navy by purchase, 1 was presented to the
Government, 1 leased, and the 4 vessels of the International Navigation
Company--the St. Paul, St. Louis, New York, and Paris--were chartered. In
addition to these the revenue cutters and lighthouse tenders were turned
over to the Navy Department and became temporarily a part of the auxiliary
Navy.
The maximum effective fighting force of the Navy during the war, separated
into classes, was as follows:
Four battle ships of the first class, 1 battle ship of the second class, 2
armored cruisers, 6 coast-defense monitors, 1 armored ram, 12 protected
cruisers, 3 unprotected cruisers, 18 gunboats, 1 dynamite cruiser, 11
torpedo boats; vessels of the old Navy, including monitors, 14. Auxiliary
Navy: 11 auxiliary cruisers, 28 converted yachts, 27 converted tugs, 19
converted colliers, 15 revenue cutters, 4 light-house tenders, and 19
miscellaneous vessels.
Much alarm was felt along our entire Atlantic seaboard lest some attack
might be made by the enemy. Every precaution was taken to prevent possible
injury to our great cities lying along the coast. Temporary garrisons were
provided, drawn from the State militia; infantry and light batteries were
drawn from the volunteer force. About 12,000 troops were thus employed. The
coast signal service was established for observing the approach of an
enemy's ships to the coast of the United States, and the Life-Saving and
Light-House services cooperated, which enabled the Navy Department to have
all portions of the Atlantic coast, from Maine to Texas, under
observation.
The auxiliary Navy was created under the authority of Congress and was
officered and manned by the Naval Militia of the several States. This
organization patrolled the coast and performed the duty of a second line of
defense. Under the direction of the Chief of Engineers submarine mines were
placed at the most exposed points. Before the outbreak of the war permanent
mining casemates and cable galleries had been constructed at nearly all
important harbors. Most of the torpedo material was not to be found in the
market, and had to be specially manufactured. Under date of April 19
district officers were directed to take all preliminary measures short of
the actual attaching of the loaded mines to the cables, and on April 22
telegraphic orders were issued to place the loaded mines in position.
The aggregate number of mines placed was 1,535, at the principal harbors
from Maine to California. Preparations were also made for the planting of
mines at certain other harbors, but owing to the early destruction of the
Spanish fleet these mines were not placed.
The Signal Corps was promptly organized, and performed service of the most
difficult and important character. Its operations during the war covered
the electrical connection of all coast fortifications, the establishment of
telephonic and telegraphic facilities for the camps at Manila, Santiago,
and in Puerto Rico. There were constructed 300 miles of line at ten great
camps, thus facilitating military movements from those points in a manner
heretofore unknown in military administration. Field telegraph lines were
established and maintained under the enemy's fire at Manila, and later the
Manila-Hongkong cable was reopened.
In Puerto Rico cable communications were opened over a discontinued route,
and on land the headquarters of the commanding officer was kept in
telegraphic or telephonic communication with the division commanders on
four different lines of operations.
There was placed in Cuban waters a completely outfitted cable ship, with
war cables and cable gear, suitable both for the destruction of
communications belonging to the enemy and the establishment of our own. Two
ocean cables were destroyed under the enemy's batteries at Santiago. The
day previous to the landing of General Shafter's corps, at Caimanera,
within 20 miles of the landing place, cable communications were established
and a cable station opened giving direct communication with the Government
at Washington. This service was invaluable to the Executive in directing
the operations of the Army and Navy. With a total force of over 1,300, the
loss was by disease in camp and field, officers and men included, only 5.