"At 6 o'clock my servant brings a light and informs me of the hour,

wind, weather, and course of the ship, when I immediately dress and

generally repair to the deck, the dawn of day at this season and

latitude being apparent at about half or three-quarters of an hour

past six. Breakfast is announced in the Admiral's cabin, where Lord

Nelson, Rear Admiral Murray, (the Captain of the Fleet,) Captain

Hardy, commander of the Victory, the chaplain, secretary, one or two

officers of the ship, and your humble servant assemble and breakfast

on tea, hot rolls, toast, cold tongue, &c, which when finished we

repair upon deck to enjoy the majestic sight of the rising sun

(scarcely ever obscured by clouds in this fine climate) surmounting

the smooth and placid waves of the Mediterranean, which supports the

lofty and tremendous bulwarks of Britain, following in regular train

their admiral in the Victory. Between the hours of 7 and 2 there is

plenty of time for business, study, writing, and exercise, which

different occupations I endeavour to vary in such a manner as to

afford me sufficient employment. At 2 o'clock a band of music plays

till within a quarter of 3, when the drum beats the tune called, 'The

Roast Beef of Old England' to announce the Admiral's dinner, which is

served up exactly at 3 o'clock, and which generally consists of three

courses and a dessert of the choicest fruit [a fact which bespeaks the

frequency of communications with the land], together with three or

four of the best wines, champagne and claret not excepted. If a person

does not feel himself perfectly at his ease it must be his own fault,

such is the urbanity and hospitality which reign here, notwithstanding

the numerous titles, the four orders of Knighthood, worn by Lord

Nelson,[66] and the well earned laurels which he has acquired. Coffee

and liqueurs close the dinner about half-past 4 or 5 o'clock, after

which the company generally walk the deck, where the band of music

plays for nearly an hour.[67] A 6 o'clock tea is announced, when the

company again assemble in the Admiral's cabin, where tea is served up

before 7 o'clock, and, as we are inclined, the party continue to

converse with his lordship, who at this time generally unbends

himself, though he is at all times as free from stiffness and pomp as

a regard to proper dignity will admit, and is very communicative. At 8

o'clock a rummer of punch with cake or biscuit is served up, soon

after which we wish the Admiral a good night (who is generally in bed

before 9 o'clock). Such is the journal of a day at sea in fine or at

least moderate weather, in which this floating castle goes through the

water with the greatest imaginable steadiness."

Another medical officer, who served on board the "Victory" soon after

the writer of the lines just quoted, has transmitted some other

interesting particulars of Nelson's personal habits and health, which

relate to the general period now under narration.

"An opinion has been very generally entertained, that Lord Nelson's

state of health, and supposed infirmities arising from his former

wounds and hard services, precluded the probability of his long

surviving the battle of Trafalgar, had he fortunately escaped the

Enemy's shot: but the writer of this can assert that his Lordship's

health was uniformly good, with the exception of some slight attacks

of indisposition arising from accidental causes; and which never

continued above two or three days, nor confined him in any degree with

respect to either exercise or regimen: and during the last twelve

months of his life, he complained only three times in this way. It is

true, that his Lordship, about the meridian of life, had been subject

to frequent fits of the gout; which disease, however, as well as his

constitutional tendency to it, he totally overcame by abstaining for

the space of nearly two years from animal food, and wine, and all

other fermented drink; confining his diet to vegetables, and commonly

milk and water. And it is also a fact, that early in life, when he

first went to sea, he left off the use of salt, which he then believed

to be the sole cause of scurvy, and never took it afterwards with his

food.

"His Lordship used a great deal of exercise, generally walking on deck

six or seven hours in the day. He always rose early, for the most part

shortly after daybreak. He breakfasted in summer about six, and at

seven in winter: and if not occupied in reading or writing despatches,

or examining into the details of the Fleet, he walked on the

quarter-deck the greater part of the forenoon; going down to his cabin

occasionally to commit to paper such incidents or reflections as

occurred to him during that time, and as might be hereafter useful to

the service of his country. He dined generally about half-past two

o'clock. At his table there were seldom less than eight or nine

persons, consisting of the different Officers of the Ship: and when

the weather and the service permitted, he very often had several of

the Admirals and Captains in the Fleet to dine with him; who were

mostly invited by signal, the rotation of seniority being commonly

observed by his Lordship in these invitations. At dinner he was alike

affable and attentive to every one: he ate very sparingly himself; the

liver and wing of a fowl, and a small plate of macaroni, in general

composing his meal, during which he occasionally took a glass of

champagne. He never exceeded four glasses of wine after dinner, and

seldom drank three; and even those were diluted with either Bristol or

common water.

"Few men subject to the vicissitudes of a Naval life, equalled his

Lordship in an habitual systematic mode of living. He possessed such a

wonderful activity of mind, as even prevented him from taking ordinary

repose, seldom enjoying two hours of uninterrupted sleep; and on

several occasions he did not quit the deck during the whole night. At

these times he took no pains to protect himself from the effects of

wet, or the night air; wearing only a thin great coat: and he has

frequently, after having his clothes wet through with rain, refused to

have them changed, saying that the leather waistcoat which he wore

over his flannel one would secure him from complaint. He seldom wore

boots, and was consequently very liable to have his feet wet. When

this occurred he has often been known to go down to his cabin, throw

off his shoes, and walk on the carpet in his stockings for the purpose

of drying the feet of them. He chose rather to adopt this

uncomfortable expedient, than to give his servants the trouble of

assisting him to put on fresh stockings; which, from his having only

one hand, he could not himself conveniently effect.

"From these circumstances it may be inferred, that though Lord

Nelson's constitution was not of that kind which is generally

denominated strong, yet it was not very susceptible of complaint from

the common occasional causes of disease necessarily attending a Naval

life. The only bodily pain which his Lordship felt in consequence of

his many wounds, was a slight rheumatic affection of the stump of his

amputated arm on any sudden variation in the state of the weather;

which is generally experienced by those who have the misfortune to

lose a limb after the middle age. His Lordship usually predicted an

alteration in the weather with as much certainty from feeling

transient pains in his stump, as he could by his marine barometer;

from the indications of which latter he kept a diary of the

atmospheric changes, which was written with his own hand.

"His Lordship had lost his right eye by a contusion which he received

at the siege of Calvi, in the island of Corsica. The vision of the

other was likewise considerably impaired: he always therefore wore a

green shade over his forehead, to defend this eye from the effect of

strong light; but as he was in the habit of looking much through a

glass while on deck, there is little doubt that had he lived a few

years longer, and continued at sea, he would have lost his sight

totally."[68]

The business hours of the day from seven to two were spent by Nelson

largely with his secretaries. We know from Colonel Stewart that in the

Baltic, where his command was more numerous than in the Mediterranean,

his habit was to get through the ordinary business of the squadron

before eight o'clock; for the rest, the greater part of the detail

work would fall upon the Captain of the Fleet, then Rear-Admiral

George Murray, who would require only general instructions and little

interference for carrying on the laborious internal administration of

the fleet. The admiral's energies were sufficiently taxed in

considering and meeting, so far as his resources would permit, the

numerous and complicated demands for external services in the

different quarters of his wide command--the ingenious effort to induce

two and two to make five, in which so much of the puzzle of life

consists. His position necessarily involved extensive diplomatic

relations. Each British Minister around the shores of the

Mediterranean had his own particular care; the British admiral was in

confidential communication with all, and in every movement had to

consider the consequences, both of what he did and of what he left

undone. It was a day when force ruled, and all the nations of Europe,

whether they wished or not, had to put their chief trust in the sword,

and in those who bore it. Not the least of Nelson's qualifications for

his post was that he possessed intimate knowledge and experience of

political conditions in the Mediterranean, knew the peoples and the

rulers well, and to great sagacity and sound judgment added a temper

at once firm and conciliatory. "He had in a great degree," said a

contemporary who knew him well,[69] "the valuable but rare quality of

conciliating the most opposite tempers, and forwarding the public

service with unanimity amongst men not of themselves disposed to

accord;" and although the remark referred primarily to his conduct in

the naval service, it will readily be seen that this aptitude is

nowhere more useful than in the tangled maze of conflicting national

interests. "My line of conduct," he wrote to Hobart, a year after

taking his command, "in obedience to the spirit of his Majesty's

instructions communicated through your Lordship, has been simply

this,--to conciliate all, to protect all from French rapacity. I have

been honoured with your letter of January 7th, and it has given me

most sincere pleasure that my whole conduct in my command here has

been such as to meet his Majesty's approbation." The new Ministry,

upon assuming office, requested him in the most flattering terms to

continue his direct correspondence on political subjects with them, as

with their predecessors.

Yet, while conciliatory, he could at times be curt and arbitrary

enough. Fault was found with the blockade of Genoa on the ground that

it did not comply with the requirements of international law; the

complaint resting, apparently, on the statement that the blockaders

could not be seen from Genoa. Nelson replied that the proof of evident

danger to vessels seeking to enter or leave, rested on the fact that

captures were made; and it is, on the face of it, absurd to say that

there can be no danger to a vessel seeking to enter a blockaded port,

because the blockading vessels are not visible from the latter. Much

more depends upon their number, disposition, and speed. "From my

knowledge of Genoa and its Gulf," said Nelson, "I assert without fear

of contradiction, that the nearer ships cruise to Genoa, the more

certain is the escape of vessels from that port, or their entrance

into it insured. I am blockading Genoa, according to the orders of the

Admiralty, and in the way I think most proper. Whether modern law or

ancient law makes my mode right, I cannot judge; and surely of the

mode of disposing of a fleet, I must, if I am fit for my post, be a

better judge than any landsman, however learned he may appear. It

would be the act of a fool to tell Europe where I intend to place the

ships, for the purpose of effectually obeying my orders; not a captain

can know it, and their positions will vary, according to the

information I may receive.... I endeavour, as well as I am able, to

obey my orders, without entering into the nice distinctions of

lawyers. I will not further take up your time on a subject which,

without being a lawyer, merely as a man, could have admitted of no

dispute." Along with much truth, there was in this a certain amount of

special pleading, as appeared when he took the further position that,

to intercept ships from Genoa, bound to the Atlantic, there was no

better place than the Gut of Gibraltar. When a definition of

international law is stretched as far as that, it will have little

elastic force left.

A petty, yet harassing, diplomatic difficulty, curiously illustrative

of maritime conditions at that day, ran unsettled through almost the

whole of his command. Malta, under the Knights, had been always at war

with the Barbary Powers; and there was trouble in impressing upon the

rulers of the latter that, when it passed into British hands, its

people and ships were under British protection. Several Maltese

vessels had been taken by Algerine cruisers, and their crews enslaved.

When Nelson came out in 1803, he found pending these cases, and also

the question of compelling, or inducing, the Dey to receive back the

British consul, whom he had expelled with insult. In the absence of a

British representative, the negotiations were intrusted wholly to the

admiral.

Nelson's feelings were strongly excited. He was tenacious of

everything he conceived to touch his country's honor, and long service

in the Mediterranean had made him familiar with the outrages on its

defenceless coasts practised by these barbarians, under the pretence

of war with the weaker states. Even in the remote and impoverished

north of Sardinia, the shepherds near the beaches watched their flocks

with arms beside them, day and night, to repel the attacks of

marauders from the sea. Not only were trading-vessels seized, but

descents were made upon the shore, and the inhabitants swept off into

slavery. Speaking of one such case in 1799, he had said: "My blood

boils that I cannot chastise these pirates. They could not show

themselves in the Mediterranean did not our Country permit. Never let

us talk of the cruelty of the African slave trade, while we permit

such a horrid war." But he knew, both then and afterwards, that Great

Britain, with the great contest on her hands, could not spare the

ships which might be crippled in knocking the barbarians' strongholds

about their ears, and that no British admiral would be sustained in a

course that provoked these pirates to cast aside the fears that

restrained them, and to declare war on British commerce, which, as it

was, he had difficulty to protect. He estimated ten ships-of-the-line

as the force necessary, in case the batteries at Algiers were to be

attacked. Exmouth, twelve years later, with fuller information,

thought and found five to be sufficient.

Nelson's conduct and self-control were sorely tested by the necessity

of temporizing with this petty foe, who reckoned securely on the

embarrassments of Great Britain. He acted with great judgment,

however, holding a high tone, and implying much in the way of menace,

without at any time involving himself in a definite threat, from

which he could not recede without humiliation; careful and precise in

his demands, but never receding from them, or allowing them to be

evaded, when once made; sensible of the difficulties in his way, as

well those raised by his own Government as those dependent upon his

opponent, but equally aware that he held in his hands, if authorized

to use it, the power to suppress the career of depredation, upon which

the Dey relied to support his revenue, and to content his officers.

Personally, he favored a short and summary proceeding, accordant to

his own decided character. The Dey proving immovable when first

summoned, he proposed to the British Government "that on the 28th of

April next, when, if he means to send his cruisers to sea, they will

be out, that, on that day, every ship under my command should have

strict orders (to open on that day) to take, sink, burn, and destroy

every Algerine, and that on that day the port of Algiers should be

declared in a state of blockade. Thus the Dey could get neither

commerce, presents, or plunder; and, although the other Powers may

rejoice at the war with us, yet I am firmly persuaded that it will be

most advantageous to us for the next hundred years." At the same time,

with his usual circumspection, he issued a general direction to all

commanders of convoys to carry their charges well clear of the

Algerine coast, until matters were settled. In the end, the British

Ministry yielded much more than Nelson approved, but, however sorely

against the grain, he carried out all his instructions with scrupulous

subordination. It was only three days before the active campaign began

with the sortie of the French fleet, that he was rejoined by the ship

to whose captain were intrusted the final arrangements with Algiers.

For his diplomatic and naval correspondence, Nelson had two principal

secretaries, public and private, both, awkwardly enough, named Scott;

but the latter, being a clergyman and chaplain of the ship, was

colloquially brevetted Doctor, a distinction which, for convenience,

will be observed when it is necessary to mention him. He had become

known to Nelson while serving in the same capacity with Sir Hyde

Parker, and had been found very useful in the negotiations at

Copenhagen. An accomplished linguist and an omnivorous reader, Dr.

Scott was doubly useful. Upon him devolved the translating of all

despatches and letters, not only from, but to, foreign courts and

officials; for Nelson made a point of sending with all such papers a

copy in the language of the person addressed, and an apology for

failing to do so sometimes appears, on account of his secretary's

absence. The latter was also a man of wide information, acquired, not

as his superior's chiefly was, by mingling among men and dealing with

affairs, but from books; and the admiral, while rightly valuing the

teachings of experience above all, was duly sensible that one's own

experience is susceptible of further extension through that of others,

imparted either by word or pen. Nelson entertained a persuasion, so

Scott has told us, that no man ever put his hand to paper without

having some information or theory to deliver, which he fancied was not

generally known, and that this was worth looking after through all the

encumbering rubbish. For the same reason, besides being naturally

sociable, he liked to draw others into conversation, and to start

subjects for discussion, from which, when fairly under way, he would

withdraw himself into silence and allow the company to do the talking,

both in order to gather ideas that might be useful to himself, and

also to observe character transpiring in conversation. Bourrienne has

told us that Bonaparte took pleasure in provoking similar debates.

Scott himself, a man essentially unpractical, afforded Nelson

amusement as well as interest, and was the object of a good deal of

innocent chaffing. He would, in those after-dinner gatherings which

Gillespie mentions, lead the doctor into arguments on literature,

politics, Spanish and even naval affairs, and would occasionally

provoke from him a lecture on navigation itself, to the great

entertainment of Murray, Hardy, and the other officers present.[70]

"Ah, my dear Doctor!" he would say chaffingly, "give me knowledge

practically acquired--experience! experience! experience! and

practical men!"

Nelson, however, was too big and too broad a man not to know that,

while by doing the same thing, or bearing the same thing, many

times,--by experience, that is,--one acquires a facility not otherwise

communicable, in a novel situation a man is abler to act, the more he

has availed himself of the knowledge and the suggestions of others.

Absorbed with the duties of his station, it was of the first

importance that he should possess every information, and ponder every

idea, small and great, bearing upon its conditions, as well as upon

the general political state of Europe in that period of ominous

waiting, wherein great events were evidently coming to birth. Day

after day, Dr. Scott's biographer tells us, was passed by the two

together, sitting in two black leathern arm-chairs with roomy pockets,

stuffed with papers, written and printed, journals and pamphlets,

gathered from every source--from prizes, from passing neutral vessels,

from cruisers returning from neutral or friendly ports, or picked up

by the doctor himself in the not infrequent trips on which he was

sent, ostensibly for pleasure, but with a keen eye also to the

collection of intelligence. Marked externally by the abstraction of a

book-worm, entirely unpractical and heedless in the common affairs of

life, and subject to an occasional flightiness of action, the result

in part of an injury to his head while in the service, Scott gave

those who saw him going about an impression of guilelessness, which

covered him from the suspicion of having a mission. He had, says his

biographer, "in union with a capacity for very difficult services, a

simplicity that often put him at disadvantage in worldly matters, and

it became a common joke with the Admiral, that 'the doctor would

always want somebody to take care of him.'"

Nelson had everything read to him; first of all, newspapers, which

were sent regularly to the fleet by British agents in various

quarters. Upon them chiefly, and not upon England, he depended for

knowledge of what was happening; in Great Britain itself, as well as

on the Continent. From ten to twelve weeks was no uncommon length of

time for him to be without word from home. "I never hear from

England," he wrote to Elliot in the summer of 1804, "but as we manage

to get the Paris papers regularly through Spain. From ten days to a

fortnight we get them from their date at Paris: therefore we know the

very great events which are passing in Europe--at least as much as the

French people;" a shrewd limitation. These, therefore, together with

Spanish, Italian, and other sheets, it was Scott's daily task to read

aloud to his chief, who found therein not only information but

amusement. He insisted also upon hearing the numerous ephemeral

pamphlets, of which the age was prolific, and which found their way to

him. His quickness in detecting the drift of an author was marvellous.

Two or three pages of a pamphlet were generally sufficient to put him

in complete possession of the writer's object, while nothing was too

trivial for his attention where there existed a possibility of its

contributing a clue to the problems of his command. Not the least

onerous of the doctor's duties was the deciphering of private letters

found in prizes, a channel by which important public interests are

often betrayed. Nelson's quickness to see the bearing and value of an

apparently trifling mention, dropped by the way by a careless pen,

rendered such an exercise of his ingenuity at once a pleasure and a

profit. The public secretary, Mr. Scott, was equally struck with the

alertness and sagacity of his employer's mind. "I have heard much of

Lord Nelson's abilities as an officer and statesman, but the account

of the latter is infinitely short. In my travels through the service I

have met with no character in any degree equal to his Lordship; his

penetration is quick, judgment clear, wisdom great, and his decisions

correct and decided: nor does he in company appear to bear any weight

on his mind." It was with difficulty, after a prolonged session, that

the doctor could at times beg off, and leave, stuffed in the arm-chair

pockets, for another day's work, a dozen or two of such letters,

sealed to Nelson by his imperfect eyesight and inadequate mastery of

other tongues. The arm-chairs, lashed together, formed at times a

couch upon which the admiral "slept those brief slumbers for which he

was remarkable;" in those moments, doubtless, when anxiety about the

enemy's movements did not permit him to go regularly to bed.

In common with all those closely associated with Nelson, Dr. Scott was

particularly struck with the kindliness and cordiality of his bearing

and actions; which is the more to be noted, because no one, probably,

had more occasion to see the movements of irritability, of impatience,

which lay very near the surface, than did his secretaries, through

whom his most vexatious work must be done. That he was vehement to

express annoyance has appeared frequently in these pages. The first

Lord Radstock, who was senior to him in the service, and knew him

well, writing to his son, then a midshipman in the "Victory," is

constant and extreme in his admiration of Nelson; but he gives the

caution to be careful of impressions made upon a chief upon whom

advancement depends. Quick in all his ways, a moment's heedlessness,

possibly misunderstood or misrepresented, may produce lasting injury.

"Lord Nelson is of so hasty a temper, that in spite of all his natural

goodness, I should fear that he would too readily give ear to those

in whom he had placed his confidence. He is a man of strong passions,

and his prejudices are proportionate." "On many occasions," says

another writer, "Lord Nelson evinced an impatience that has been

considered as irreconcileable with magnanimity; but the secret

workings of his soul have not been received into the account or

analysis of character, for we find the same individual, while employed

in watching the French fleet off Toulon, display the most unexampled

patience and forbearance, and never betray the smallest symptom of

inquietude or disappointment."[71] Murray, the Captain of the Fleet,

when first offered his appointment, had hesitated to accept. Upon

Nelson urging him, he gave as his reason that the nature of the duties

often led to disagreements between the admiral and his chief of staff,

and that he was unwilling to risk any diminution of the regard

existing between him and his Lordship; a remark true enough in the

general, but clearly of somewhat special application. Nelson assured

him that, should anything go contrary to his wishes, he would waive

his rank and explain or expostulate with him as his friend, and when,

after two years' service, Murray had to leave the ship, he refused to

replace him,--he would have Murray or none. In truth, such readiness

to flare up must needs be the defect of that quality of promptness,

that instant succession of deed to thought, which was a distinguishing

feature of Nelson's genius and actions. Captain Hillyar more than once

alludes to this trait as characteristic of the fleet, to which its

chief had transmitted his own spirit. "I have had to-day to lament,"

he says, speaking of some trifling disappointment, "the extreme

promptitude with which we all move when near his lordship."

But, while traces of this failing may be detected here and there by

the watchful reader, as Nelson himself gleaned useful indications

amid the rubbishy mass of captured correspondence, there survives,

among the remains left by those in daily contact with him, only the

record of a frank, open bearing, and unfailing active kindness.

"Setting aside his heroism," wrote Dr. Scott after Trafalgar, "when I

think what an affectionate, fascinating little fellow he was, how

dignified and pure his mind, how kind and condescending his manners, I

become stupid with grief for what I have lost." "He is so cheerful and

pleasant," wrote the public secretary, Mr. Scott, "that it is a

happiness to be about his hand." Dr. Gillespie notes "his noble

frankness of manners, freedom from vain formality and pomp (so

necessary to the decoration of empty little great men), which can only

be equalled by the unexampled glory of his naval career, and the

watchful and persevering diligence with which he commands this fleet."

"Nelson was the man to _love_" said Captain Pulteney Malcolm, who knew

intimately both him and Wellington. "I received Captain Leake," Nelson

himself says, speaking of an army officer on a special mission to the

Mediterranean, "with that openness which was necessary to make myself

as well acquainted with him in three days, as others might do in as

many years. I have given him all the knowledge of the men, their

views, &c. &c., as far as I have been able to form a judgment." The

remark is valuable, for it shows that frankness and cordiality were

recognized by him as the wisest and most politic method of dealing

with men. "Our friend, Sir Alexander," he says testily, "is a very

great diplomatic character, and even an admiral must not know what he

is negotiating about. You shall judge, viz., 'The Tunisian envoy is

still here, negotiating. He is a moderate man; and, apparently, the

best disposed of any I ever did business with.' Could even the oldest

diplomatic character be drier? I hate such parade and nonsense."

Captain Hillyar, who commanded one of the frigates that were ever

coming and going, writes in his journal: "If extreme kindness and

attention could render me happy, I have this day experienced both from

our revered and good commander-in-chief. How can I repay his kindness?

By obeying his injunctions 'not to be in a hurry to get married,'[72]

or by a continued perseverance in discharging those duties with

alacrity and honour, which he is more immediately concerned in?" "Lord

Nelson talked a great deal against matrimony yesterday, and I feel

will not trust me at Malta, while we are capable of remaining at sea.

It was all, however, in a good natured way. He is going to charge me

with two of his boys [midshipmen], I am pleased that an opportunity is

offered for showing my gratitude in a small degree for his almost

fatherly kindness. I wish you knew him; if he has failings,

reflections on his virtues cause them to be forgotten, and the mind

dwells with pleasure on a character where bravery, generosity, and

good nature, are joined to a heart that can feel for the woes of

others, and delights in endeavouring to alleviate them." Hillyar was

experiencing what Radstock had remarked: "Gain his esteem, and there

is nothing he will not dash through to put you forward." "Gain his

esteem, and you will have nothing to fear, for I know not a more

honourable man existing, or one who would more readily do you justice

in all respects." "I am well aware," wrote another young captain to

Nelson himself, "of the good construction which your Lordship has ever

been in the habit of putting on circumstances, although wearing the

most unfavourable appearances.... Your Lordship's good opinion

constitutes the summit of my ambition, and the most effective spur to

my endeavours."

Nelson loved to bestow promotion, when deserved, on the spot, to give

a man his spurs, if it might be, on the field of battle; but vacancies

would not always offer at the happy moment. A brother of Hillyar's was

a midshipman in one of two boats, sent to visit a suspicious vessel.

A sudden and staggering fire killed the lieutenant in command,

besides disabling a number of the boats' crews. The men hesitated; but

the lad, left in charge, cheered them on and carried the vessel by

boarding. Although he was but a couple of months over fifteen, Nelson

gave him at once his commission into the vacancy made by the

lieutenant. One very dark night, the "Victory" being under way, a

midshipman, at the imminent risk of his life, leaped into the sea to

save a seaman who had fallen overboard, and otherwise would have been

drowned. Nelson gave him, too, his commission the following morning;

but, seeing the jubilation among the young man's messmates, and

thinking the act might be a dangerous precedent, he leaned over the

poop and said, smiling good-naturedly, "Stop, young gentlemen! Mr.

Flin has done a gallant thing today, and he has done many gallant

things before, for which he has now got his reward. But mind, I'll

have no more making lieutenants for men falling overboard."

The power thus to reward at discretion, and speedily, though liable to

abuse, was, he claimed, essential to the due influence of a

commander-in-chief; his subordinates must feel that it was in his

power to make their future, to distinguish them, and that they were in

so far dependent upon him. Nevertheless, with him as with others,

personal interest had a weight which qualified his argument. The

premature[73] and disastrous promotion of his stepson, at his request,

by St. Vincent, was a practical abuse which in most minds would

outweigh theoretical advantages. Writing to Sir Peter Parker about

this time, he said, "You may be assured I will lose no time in making

your grandson a postcaptain. It is the only opportunity ever offered

me, of showing that my feelings of gratitude to you are as warm and

alive as when you first took me by the hand: I owe all my honours to

you, and I am proud to acknowledge it to all the world." Such

enduring gratitude is charming to see, and tends to show that Nelson

recognized some other reason for Parker's favor to himself than

deference to Suckling's position; but it is scarcely a good working

principle for the distribution of official patronage, although the

younger Parker was a good and gallant officer.

Among the military duties that weighed upon Nelson, not the least was

the protection of British trade. The narrow waters of the

Mediterranean favored the operations of privateers, which did not have

to go far from their ports, and found shelter everywhere; for the

littoral states, in their weakness and insecurity, could but feebly

enforce neutrality either in their continental or insular territories.

In fact, both parties to the war, Great Britain and France, derived

from the infringement of neutrality advantages which checked their

remonstrances, and gave the feebler nations an apt retort, when taken

to task in their painful efforts to preserve an attitude that was

rather double-faced than neutral. If France, on the one hand, was

deriving a considerable revenue from Spanish subsidies, and subsisting

an army corps upon Neapolitan territory, Great Britain, on the other,

could scarcely have maintained her fleet in the Gulf of Lyons, if

unable to get fresh provisions and water from neutral ports; for, save

Gibraltar and Malta, she had none that was her own or allied. Under

these conditions, small privateers, often mere rowboats, but under the

colors of France or the Italian Republic, swarmed in every port and

inlet; in the Adriatic,--a deep, secluded pocket, particularly

favorable to marauding,--in the Ionian Islands, along the Barbary

coast, upon the shores of Spain, and especially in Sicily, whose

central position and extensive seaboard commanded every trade-route

east of the Balearics.

Nelson's correspondence is full of remonstrances addressed to the

various neutral states--including even Austria, whose shore-line on

the Adriatic was extensive--for their toleration of these abuses,

which rested ultimately upon the fear of Bonaparte. He has, also,

constant explanations to make to his own Government, or to British

ministers at the different Courts, of the acts of his cruisers in

destroying the depredators within neutral limits, when found

red-handed. He makes no apologies, but stands firmly by his officers,

who, when right, could always count upon his support in trouble. He

never left a man in the lurch, or damned him with faint approval. "The

protection afforded the enemy's privateers and rowboats in the

different neutral ports of these seas, so contrary to every known law

of neutrality, is extremely destructive of our commerce.... Although

their conduct is infamous, yet their doing wrong is no rule why we

should. There is a general principle which I have laid down for the

regulation of the officers' conduct under my command--which is never

to break the neutrality of any port or place; but never to consider as

neutral any place from whence an attack is allowed to be made. It is

certainly justifiable to attack any vessel in a place from whence she

makes an attack." "I very fully approve every part of Captain ----'s

conduct on the above occasion," he writes to the Admiralty in such a

case.

The supplying of convoys, therefore, was ceaseless, for the

depredations of the marauders were unending. "I am pulled to pieces by

the demands of merchants for convoys," Nelson said; and he recognized

that it must be so, for he entirely disapproved of even a fast-sailing

vessel attempting to make a passage unprotected. "I wrote to the

Admiralty for more cruisers until I was tired," he told Ball, "and

they left off answering those parts of my letters. The late Admiralty

thought I kept too many to the eastward of Sicily; the Smyrna folks

complain of me, so do the Adriatic, so they do between Cape de Gatte

and Gibraltar. If I had the vessels, I do assure you not one of them

should go prize-hunting: that I never have done, I am a poorer man

than the day I was ordered to the Mediterranean command, by upwards of

£1,000; but money I despise except as it is useful, and I expect my

prize money is embarked in the Toulon fleet." "I am distressed for

frigates," was his continual cry. "From Cape St. Vincent to the head

of the Adriatic I have only eight; which, with the service of watching

Toulon, and the necessary frigates with the fleet, are absolutely not

one half enough." For military duties, "frigates are the eyes of a

fleet. I want ten more than I have in order to watch that the French

should not escape me, and ten sloops besides, to do all duties." For

nine stations which ought to be filled, "I have but two frigates;

therefore, my dear Ball, have a little mercy, and do not think I have

neglected the protection of the trade of Malta." This was written soon

after joining the station, and he represents the number as diminishing

as time passed. "It is shameful!" he cries in a moment of intense

anxiety.

In this fewness of cruisers he was forced to keep his vessels

constantly on the go,--to the Levant, to the Adriatic, to Sicily, to

Italy,--scouring the coasts for privateers, gathering merchant ships

by driblets, picking up information, and at the end of the round

returning to Malta with their fractions of the large convoy. When this

was assembled, a frigate or a ship-of-the-line, with one or two

smaller ships of war, sailed with it for Gibraltar at a date fixed,

approximately, months before. Meanwhile, at the latter place a similar

process of collection had been going on from the ports of the western

Mediterranean, and, after the Malta convoy arrived, the whole started

together in charge of a division, composed usually of vessels of war

that had to return to England for repairs.

To arrange and maintain this complicated process, and to dovetail it

with the other necessary cruising duties, having in consideration

which ships should first go home, required careful study and long

foresight--infinite management, in fact. "The going on in the routine

of a station," he tells Ball, who seems to have trod on his toes, "if

interrupted, is like stopping a watch--the whole machine gets wrong.

If the Maidstone takes the convoy, and, when Agincourt arrives, there

is none for her or Thisbe, it puzzles me to know what orders to give

them. If they chace the convoy to Gibraltar, the Maidstone may have

gone on with it to England, and in that case, two ships, unless I

begin to give a new arrangement, will either go home without convoy,

or they must return [to Malta] in contradiction to the Admiralty's

orders to send them home; I am sure you see it in its true point of

view." "I dare not send a frigate home without a convoy," he says

later. "Not an officer in the service bows with more respect to the

orders of the Admiralty than myself," he writes St. Vincent; "but I am

sure you will agree with me, that if I form plans for the sending home

our convoys, and the clearing the different parts of the station from

privateers, and the other services requisite, and that the Admiralty

in some respects makes their arrangements, we must clash." Then he

points out how the Admiralty diverting a ship, unknown to him, has

tumbled over a whole train of services, like a child's row of blocks.

An extremely critical point in the homeward voyage was the first

hundred miles west of Gibraltar; and it was a greater thorn in

Nelson's side, because of a French seventy-four, the "Aigle," which

had succeeded in entering Cadiz just after he got off Toulon. For the

ordinary policing of that locality he assigned a division of three

frigates, under a Captain Gore, who possessed his confidence. "The

enemy's privateers and cruisers," he tells him, "are particularly

destructive to our trade passing the skirts of the station."

Privateering was thus reduced; but when a convoy sailed, he tried

always to have it accompanied through that stage by a ship of size

sufficient to grapple with the "Aigle." For a while, indeed, he placed

there an eighty-gun ship, but the gradual deterioration of his

squadron and the increase of Latouche Tréville's obliged him to recall

her, and at times his anxiety was great; not the less because Gore,

like other frigate captains, entertained the fancy that his three

frigates might contend with a ship-of-the-line. "Your intentions of

attacking that ship with the small squadron under your command are

certainly very laudable; but I do not consider your force by any means

equal to it." The question of two or three small ships against one

large involves more considerations than number and weight of guns.

Unity of direction and thickness of sides--defensive strength, that

is--enter into the problem. As Hawke said, "Big ships take a good deal

of drubbing." Howe's opinion was the same as Nelson's; and Hardy,

Nelson's captain, said, "After what I have seen at Trafalgar, I am

satisfied it would be mere folly, and ought never to succeed."[74]

What Hardy saw at Trafalgar, however, was not frigates against

ships-of-the-line, but vessels of the latter class opposed, smaller

against greater.

It seems singular, with such a weak link in the chain of communication

from the Mediterranean to England, that the Admiralty, on the outbreak

of the war with Spain, in the latter part of 1804, should have divided

Nelson's command at this very point, leaving as a somewhat debatable

ground, for mutual jealousy, that through which valuable interests

must pass, and where they must be transferred. The reason and manner

of this division, impolitic and inopportune as it was, and bitterly as

Nelson resented it, seem to have been misunderstood. Convinced that he

could not endure another winter such as the last, he made a formal

application, about the middle of August, 1804, for permission to go

home for a while. "I consider the state of my health to be such as to

make it absolutely necessary that I should return to England to

re-establish it. Another winter such as the last, I feel myself unable

to stand against. A few months of quiet may enable me to serve again

next spring; and I believe that no officer is more anxious to serve

than myself." In accordance with this last intimation, which speaks

his whole heart, he wrote privately to the First Lord that he would

like to come back in the spring, if his health were restored, as he

believed it would be; and he assured him that his second, Bickerton,

whose rank did not entitle him to the chief command under ordinary

conditions, was perfectly fitted to hold it during his absence--in

short, to keep the place warm for his return.

Nelson knew that the Admiralty was besieged with admirals, many senior

to himself, seeking for employment, and that it would be very

difficult for it to resist the pressure for the vacancy in "my

favourite command," to resume which he was impelled by both his sense

of duty and his love of glory. He wrote therefore to Elliot, and to

the King of the Two Sicilies, in the same sense as he had to Melville,

recalling his well-tried devotion to the interests of that Court,

which a successor might not equally show, and suggesting that his

cause would be strengthened by an application for his return on the

part of the King. The latter consequently intimated to the British

Government that he hoped Lord Nelson would be sent back. He was, in

truth, so much agitated over the prospect of his going, that he

offered him a house in either Palermo or Naples, if he wished to

remain in the South to recruit; an offer which Elliot, equally uneasy,

urged him to accept.

The Government did exactly what was asked. Nelson received permission

to go to England, when he felt it necessary, leaving the command in

the hands of Bickerton; but at the same time the Admiralty had to meet

the rush of claimants for the vacancy, all the more pressing because

rumors were afloat of a Spanish war, which would make the

Mediterranean not only the most important, but, in prize-money, the

most lucrative command. Among the applicants was Sir John Orde, who

had been nursing a technical grievance ever since he had been passed

over, in Nelson's favor, for the command of the detachment with which

the Battle of the Nile was fought. Nelson's leave was issued on the

6th of October, and on the 26th Orde was given a small squadron--five

ships-of-the-line--to blockade Cadiz. Being senior to Nelson, and of

course to Bickerton, he could only have this position by reducing the

latter's station, which had extended to Cape Finisterre. The line

between the two commands was drawn at the Straits' mouth, a rather

vague phrase, but Gibraltar was left with Nelson. Orde thus got the

station for prize-money, and Nelson that for honor, which from youth

until now he most valued. "The arrangement," wrote his friend, Lord

Radstock, "will be a death-stroke to his hopes of the galleons; but as

your chief has ever showed himself to be as great a despiser of riches

as he is a lover of glory, I am fully convinced in my own mind that he

would sooner defeat the French fleet than capture fifty galleons."

Nevertheless, Nelson was sorely aggrieved, and complained bitterly to

his correspondents. "I have learnt not to be surprised at anything;

but the sending an officer to such a point, to take, if it is a

Spanish war, the whole harvest, after all my trials (God knows

unprofitable enough! for I am a much poorer man than when we started

in the Amphion,) seems a little hard: but _patienza_." "He is sent off

Cadiz to reap the golden harvest, as Campbell was to reap my sugar

harvest. It's very odd, two Admiralties to treat me so: surely I have

dreamt that I have 'done the State some service.' But never mind; I am

superior to those who could treat me so." His contempt for money,

however acquired, except as a secondary consideration, remained

unchanged. "I believe I attend more to the French fleet than making

captures; but what I have, I can say as old Haddock said, 'it never

cost a sailor a tear, nor the nation a farthing.' This thought is far

better than prize-money;--not that I despise money--quite the

contrary, I wish I had one hundred thousand pounds this moment." "I am

keeping as many frigates as possible round me," he wrote to his friend

Ball, "for I know the value of them on the day of battle: and compared

with that day, what signifies any prizes they might take?"[75] Nor did

such utterances stand alone. "I hope war with Spain may be avoided,"

he wrote. "I want not riches at such a dreadful price. Peace for our

Country is all I wish to fight for,--I mean, of course, an honourable

one, without which it cannot be a secure one." But his outlays were

very heavy. Besides the £1,800 annually paid to Lady Nelson, he gave

Lady Hamilton £1,200 a year, exclusive of what was spent on the house

and grounds at Merton; and it may be inferred from Dr. Gillespie that

the cost of the cabin mess, beyond the table money allowed by the

Government, was assumed by him. He himself said, early in the cruise,

"Unless we have a Spanish war, I shall live here at a great expense,

although Mr. Chevalier [his steward] takes every care." "God knows, in

my own person, I spend as little money as any man; but you[76] know I

love to give away."

That he was thus sore was most natural; but it was also natural that

the Government should expect, in view of his strong representations

about his health, that the three weeks between the issuing his leave

and Orde's orders would have insured his being on his way home, before

the latter reached his station. Had things fallen out so, it would not

have been Nelson, the exceptional hero of exceptional services, but

Bickerton, a man with no peculiar claims as yet, who would have lost

the prize-money; for Nelson himself had just won a suit against St.

Vincent, which established that the moment a commander-in-chief left

his station, his right lapsed, and that of the next flag-officer

commenced. Nor was the division of the station an unprecedented

measure. It had been extended from the Straits to Cape Finisterre at

the time St. Vincent withdrew from the Mediterranean, in 1796; and in

1802, when Lord Keith asked for additional aids, on account of the

enormous administrative work, the Admiralty made of the request a

pretext for restricting his field to the Mediterranean, a step which

Keith successfully resisted.

Before Nelson received his leave he had begun to change his mind about

going home. This was due, partly, to a slight betterment in his

health, which he at this time mentions; chiefly, it would seem, to the

prospects of a Spanish war. This, by doubling the number of his

enemies and the quarters whence they might come, contributed to the

pleasurable excitement that was always a tonic to his physical frame,

and roused the eager desire for conspicuous action, which was his most

prominent passion. Indications also assured him that the expectation

of the French coming out, in which appearances had so often deceived

him, was now on the point of being realized; that Bonaparte's

projects, whatever they were, were approaching maturity. His "guess,"

founded on the reports before him, was wonderfully penetrative. He did

not see all the way through the French mill-stone, but he saw very

deep into it; his inference, indeed, was one in which intuition and

sagacity bore equal shares. "If the Russians continue increasing their

naval force in this country [that is, in the eastern Mediterranean], I

do not think the French will venture to the eastward; therefore, I

rather expect they will, as the year advances, try to get out of the

straits; and should they accomplish it with 7,000 troops on board, I

am sure we should lose half our West India Islands, for I think they

would go there, and not to Ireland. Whatever may be their destination,

I shall certainly follow, be it even to the East Indies." The last

allusion is interesting, for it shows the wide flight of his

speculations, which had found utterance before in the casual remark

that his ships were provisioned for a voyage to Madras; and, even as a

guess, it struck perilously near one of Bonaparte's purposes. The

splendid decision, formulated so long before the case arose, to follow

wherever they went, held in its womb the germ of the great campaign of

Trafalgar; while in the surmise that the Toulon fleet was bound to the

West Indies, the arrow of conjecture had gone straight to the

bull's-eye.

In this same letter, addressed to General Villettes, at Malta,

formerly his coadjutor at the siege of Bastia, Nelson, in the intimacy

of friendship, reveals what was to him at once the secret of health

and the fulfilment of desire; the congenial atmosphere in which his

being throve, and expanded to fulfil the limits of his genius. "Such a

pursuit would do more, perhaps, towards restoring me to health than

all the doctors; but I fear" (his application for leave having gone

in) "this is reserved for some happier man. Not that I complain; I

have had a good race of glory, but we are never satisfied, although I

hope I am duly thankful for the past; but one cannot help, being at

sea, longing for a little more." "I hope," he had written a few months

earlier to Lord Minto, "some day, very soon, to fulfil the warmest

wishes of my Country and expectations of my friends. I hope you may be

able, at some debate, to say, as your partiality has said before,

'Nelson has done more than he has done before;' I can assure you it

shall be a stimulus to my exertion on the day of battle.... Whatever

happens, I have run a glorious race."

On the 12th of October Nelson received a piece of news which elicited

instantaneously a flash of action, illustrative at once of the

promptness of his decisions and of the briskness of temper that has

been noted already. A letter arrived from Captain Gore, commanding the

detachment outside of the Straits, that two frigates, sent from the

Brest squadron by Admiral Cornwallis, had arrived, with a captain

senior to himself, who had taken him under his orders, and carried two

of Nelson's frigates off Cadiz to intercept the Spanish treasure-fleet

expected there from America. Cornwallis's action had been taken by

orders from England, but no communication to that effect, either from

him or from the Admiralty, reached Nelson at this moment. Astounded by

a measure which could scarcely fail to cause war, and convinced, as he

said, that Spain had no wish to go to war with Great Britain, he gave

himself a night to pause; but early next day he wrote to the

Admiralty, intimating pretty plainly that, if done by its direction,

this was not the way the commander of the Mediterranean fleet should

receive word of so momentous a step taken in his district, while to

Gore he sent emphatic orders to disobey Cornwallis, although the

latter was Nelson's senior. Summing up with admirable lucidity the

facts before him, and thereby proving that the impression under which

Cornwallis's action probably was taken was erroneous, he said: "Unless

you have much weightier reasons than the order of Admiral Cornwallis,

or that you receive orders from the Admiralty, it is my most positive

directions that neither you, or any ship under your orders, do molest

or interrupt in any manner the lawful commerce of Spain, with whom we

are at perfect peace and amity."

It is permissible, because instructive, to note that in this order,

while Nelson amply provides for discretion on the part of his

subordinate, he throws the full weight of his authority on the

difficult horn of a possible dilemma, the act--so momentous to an

officer--of disobedience to a present superior; in this case the

captain sent by Cornwallis. Contrast this with the Government's orders

to the commander of the troops at Malta, when it wished him to send a

garrison to Messina.[77] Instead of saying, "You will send so many

men, _unless_ you think you _cannot_ spare them," its orders ran:

"You will send, _if_ you think you _can_ spare them." Of course, as

Nelson invariably experienced, an officer addressed in the latter

style found always a lion in his path. So his orders to Gore were not,

"Obey, _if_" but "Disobey, _unless_;" and Gore knew, as every man in

the Mediterranean knew by long trial, that, if he disobeyed, he would

have at his back, through thick and thin, the first sea-officer in

Great Britain. But Nelson's orders were always stamped with the

positive, daring, lucid character of his genius and its conceptions;

and so, except in unworthy hands, they were fulfilled in spirit as

well as in letter.

An interesting illustration of this trenchant clearness is to be found

in instructions given to the captain of the "Donegal," an eighty-gun

ship, sent under very critical circumstances to cruise off Cadiz, in

September, 1803. It appears to the author not only characteristic of

Nelson, but a perfect example of the kind of directions a junior would

wish to have in a difficult case, when desirous to carry out the

spirit of his superior's orders. It explains itself.

26th September, 1803.

TO CAPTAIN SIR RICHARD JOHN STRACHAN, BART., H.M. SHIP DONEGAL.

The occurrences which pass every day in Spain forbode, I fancy,

a speedy War with England; therefore it becomes proper for me to

put you on your guard, and advise you how to act under

particular circumstances. By looking at the former line of

conduct on the part of Spain, which she followed just before the

commencement of the last War, we may naturally expect the same

events to happen. The French Admiral Richery was in Cadiz,

blocked up by Admiral Man; on August the 22nd, they came to sea,

attended by the Spanish Fleet, which saw the French safe beyond

St. Vincent, and returned into Cadiz. Admiral Man very properly

did not choose to attack Admiral Richery under such an escort.

This is a prelude to what I must request your strict attention

to; at the same time, I am fully aware that you must be guided,

in some measure, by actual circumstances.

I think it very probable, even before Spain breaks with us,

that they may send a Ship or two of the Line to see L'Aigle

round Cape St. Vincent; and that if you attack her in their

presence, they may attack you; and giving them possession of the

Donegal, would be more than either you or I should wish,

therefore I am certain it must be very comfortable for you to

know my sentiments. From what you hear in Cadiz, you will judge

how far you may venture yourself in company with a Spanish

Squadron; but if you are of opinion that you may trust yourself

near them, keeping certainly out of gun-shot, send your Boat

with a letter to the Spanish Commodore, and desire to know

whether he means to defend the French Ships; and get his answer

in writing, and have it as plain as possible. If it be 'yes,

that he will fire at you if you attack the French under his

protection,' then, if you have force enough, make your attack on

the whole body, and take them all if you can; for I should

consider such an answer as a perfect Declaration of War. If you

are too weak for such an attack, you must desist; but you

certainly are fully authorized to take the Ships of Spain

whenever you meet them. Should the answer be ambiguous, you must

then act as your judgment may direct you, and I am sure that

will be very proper. Only recollect, that it would be much

better to let the French Ships escape, than to run too great a

risk of losing the Donegal, yourself, and the Ship's company.

I am, &c.

NELSON AND BRONTE.

This letter fulfils his own request to the Admiralty: "All I wish and

submit to their Lordships is, that if the business is left to me, my

orders may be decisive."

Later in the same day that Nelson received Gore's letter, the

Admiralty's orders arrived, sent, as despatches too often were, by a

vessel so small and slow that it would seem they counted upon her

insignificance to elude an enemy's notice. The delay served, as has

been said, to give proof of the rapidity of Nelson's action; the

receipt of the orders enabled him also to show how much clearer were

his conceptions of adequacy than those of ordinary men. To stop

treasure-ships, or to embargo merchant-ships, when difficulty was

threatening, was no new idea to the British Government. The latter had

been done with Baltic merchantmen at the time of the Armed Neutrality.

In the case of Spain, it was a measure particularly efficacious, for

the financial solvency and belligerent capacity of that country

depended upon the galleons, which brought to her the tribute of her

colonies; and her relations and dealings with France at this time were

so partial and suspicious as to justify precautions. Evidently,

however, such a step, being avowedly preventive and not offensive,

should be taken in such a way as to avert all chance of possible

disaster. Several Spanish frigates being expected, the British

Government charged four vessels of the same rate with the task of

arresting them. Nelson, the instant he got his orders, detached to the

spot an eighty-gun ship, to which he added four other cruisers,

thinking, as he said in his orders to the captain selected, that "this

is a service of the highest importance, and that an officer of your

rank and experience should be employed therein." With such odds

against him, the Spanish commander would need no military

justification for submission. As it was, he resisted, necessitating a

fight, which under the circumstances was barbarous and brutal, and

ended in one of the Spanish vessels blowing up with several women on

board; a result due wholly to the blundering lack of foresight which

sent a corporal's guard to do the work of a sheriff's posse.

This incident, of the order to arrest the treasure-ships, which was

made general for all vessels of that class, was probably the

determining occasion of Nelson's decision to remain in the

Mediterranean. War with Spain, with consequent increased activity on

the part of France, though not certain, became probable. There was at

that time on board the "Victory" a Dr. Lambton Este, who had gone to

the Mediterranean in a civil capacity, and was on his way home.

Nelson, hoping to return soon himself, asked Este to remain until he

started, and to accompany him in a worn-out seventy-four, the

"Superb," which he was holding for that purpose. It seems that, in

looking forward to the resumption of his command, he expected it would

be the scene of a more wide-spread political activity, especially in

the far East where Este had been employed, and that, for this purpose,

he wished to attach the latter to his person. "There may be more

occupation there for us all, hereafter, than we just now foresee, or

may expect."

In confirmation of this general forecast, we are told by Dr. Scott

that, when the admiral left England before Trafalgar, arrangements had

been made with the Foreign Office for Este with six clerks to be

attached to the flagship, to conduct the diplomatic correspondence.

The fact is doubly interesting. It shows, on the one hand, the

accuracy of Nelson's foresight as to the vast importance the

Mediterranean was about to assume, to meet which he thus was making

provision in a general way; although neither he nor any other man

could have anticipated the extraordinary, complicated snarl of the

political threads in Napoleon's later years. The cares from these, it

may be said in passing, were by Nelson's death devolved upon

Collingwood; who, though a strong man, was killed by them, through

general debility resulting from confinement, and through organic

injury produced by bending over his desk. On the other hand, it cannot

but be grateful to those who admire the hero, to see that Nelson

looked forward to no inglorious ease, but to a life of strenuous work,

as well as, if it might be so, of military honor. Had he lived, we may

hope, the days after Trafalgar would not have been the grave of his

renown.

On the first of November his decision was taken. He sent for Este and

said, "Oh, my good fellow! I have abandoned the idea of going to

England, at present. I shall not go yet, and when I may go is quite

uncertain--must depend upon events, and upon my own precarious health;

at the same time, I am doing you an evident injustice, by detaining

you here so long in uncertainty." Este of course expressed his

willingness to remain while needed, but Nelson interrupted him,

saying, "No, _my_ wish is that you should go,--I am anxious that you

should go, and go without further delay. To tell you the truth, I am

not entirely disinterested. Go home; get confirmed in your

appointment, according to my desire, and return to me as soon

afterwards as you can. Should I retain my command in the

Mediterranean, with the powers already conceded to me, I shall require

your assistance." It seems probable that he was anxious to get some

one home as rapidly as possible, to forestall, if time permitted, a

final recall, which the appointment of a successor would be. "Long

before this time," he had written Lady Hamilton, "I expect, another

admiral is far on his way to supersede me. I should for your sake, and

for many of our friends, have liked an odd hundred thousand pounds [by

a Spanish war]; but, never mind. If they give me the choice of staying

a few months longer, it will be very handsome; and, for the sake of

others, we would give up very much of our own felicity."

The despatches and routine papers were got ready rapidly, and placed

in charge of Este, who sailed for Lisbon, in a sloop-of-war, on the

6th of November, furnished with orders to all officials to expedite

him on his way, and particularly to captains not to communicate with

the ship, because the plague, then raging in Gibraltar, would involve

her, if visited, in the delays of quarantine. On the 18th of November,

off Cape St. Vincent, Este met the "Swiftsure," seventy-four, bringing

Orde out. It has been charged that the latter discourteously delayed

to notify Nelson of his taking over part of the station.[78] It

appears, however, from this encounter, that his letter to that

effect, dated the 17th,[79] though headed "off Cadiz," was actually

prepared before he reached his position there. It was forwarded to

Nelson by the "Anson," whose captain was senior officer of the

division till then blockading the port, whom Orde relieved and sent on

with his despatch. The "Anson" joined Nelson on the 15th of December.

The "Swiftsure," which was also destined to his squadron, did not

reach him until the 25th. It seems, therefore, fair to acquit Orde of

a discourtesy as aimless as it would be reprehensible.

Just before Este's departure Nelson had reconnoitred Toulon. A new

vice-admiral had hoisted his flag in place of Latouche Tréville, who

had died on the 20th of August. "He has given me the slip," wrote

Nelson, who felt himself balked of his vengeance. "The French papers

say he died of walking so often up to the signal-post, upon Sepet, to

watch us: I always pronounced that would be his death." His successor

was Villeneuve, the predestined victim of Trafalgar. "They now amuse

themselves with night-signals," Nelson informed the First Lord; "and

by the quantity of rockets and blue lights they show with every

signal, they plainly mark their position. These gentlemen must soon be

so perfect in theory, that they will come to sea to put their

knowledge into practice. Could I see that day, it would make me

happy." The time was now not far distant. The weariness of waiting was

soon to give way to the anxious fever of doubtful and protracted

pursuit, of prolonged uncertainty and steadfast endurance, through

which he advanced to his final triumph, just as he had to those of the

past.

The seizure of the Spanish treasure-ships, with its lamentable

catastrophe, took place on the 5th of October. Nelson had the news on

the 8th of November, which, extraordinary as it may appear, was before

the fact was known in Madrid. On the 10th of November, when the

British minister received his passports upon his own demand, no word

had reached there. On the 15th, Nelson was informed that a British

vessel had been fired upon by the batteries of Barcelona, which was an

error; but receiving at the same time a letter from the minister,

probably to the effect that he would break off relations on the 10th,

he inferred that war existed, and issued orders for a general seizure

of Spanish vessels of war and commerce throughout the station. This

was done on his own responsibility, but he guarded himself by

stringent provisions against any injury beyond detention being

inflicted; and he alleged, very reasonably, that a commander-in-chief

who never got letters from home less than two months old must act upon

his own motion. "I am completely in the dark. It is now more than two

months since the John Bull [the last despatch boat] sailed." "I have

set the whole Mediterranean to work," he tells Lady Hamilton on the

23d; "and if I had had the spare troops at Malta at my disposal,

Minorca would at this moment have had English colours flying." A

Swedish ship, carrying a Spanish regiment from Barcelona to the latter

island, was among the first captures.

"With respect to my making war upon Spain, and Sir John Orde not

having done it," so he wrote to Elliot, "I believe you will think I

have acted not precipitately, but consistent with the firmness of John

Bull. I can't tell what schemes ministers may have; but when I am

without orders, and unexpected occurrences arise, I shall always act

as I think the honour and glory of my King and Country demand. Upon

the most mature and serious consideration I can give the subject, the

present lays within the compass of a nutshell. Our Ministers demand

certain points to be conceded to them; they, to give a spur, detain

the Spanish treasure. Spain, the moment she hears of it, kicks your

minister out of Madrid; a plain proof they had not acceded to our

propositions. Indeed, Mr. Frere,[80] you will see by his letter, did

not believe it would have a favourable termination, even had not the

frigates been detained. I send your Excellency his letters. I feel I

have done perfectly right. No desire of wealth could influence my

conduct; for I had nothing to take worth two-pence to me. Sir John

Orde was sent, if it was a Spanish war, to take the money; but until

he saw my orders, he did not act. I suppose he was fearful of that

responsibility which I am ever ready to take upon me; and now he is to

wallow in wealth, whilst I am left a beggar. But such things are. I

receive the kindest letters from Lord Melville and the Secretary of

State, but they think the French fleet is prize enough for me." No

wonder Nelson found that diplomatists were slow, measured by himself

as a standard; but what a wonderful instinct it shows in him, that,

with action ever prompt to the verge of precipitancy, he made so few

blunders in deed. There are several errors of fact in his summary of

reasons, but his action was absolutely well-timed--to the very hour.

Meanwhile, and up to the 15th of December, when Orde's letter was

received, no reply had come to his application for leave, and no

intimation of a successor. A fresh complication here arose by the

entire break-down of one of his two junior admirals--Rear-Admiral

Campbell--whose health became so affected that it was necessary to

send him immediately home. He quitted the fleet on the 4th of

December. Nelson rightly felt that he himself could not go, leaving

Bickerton without any assistant. He went further; for, when a rumor

came that Orde was to relieve him, he determined that he would offer

his services to him, as second, until a successor to Campbell should

arrive. As there was friction between himself and Orde, who had,

besides, a not very pleasant official reputation, this intention, to

take a lower place where he had been chief, was not only

self-sacrificing, but extremely magnanimous; it was, however,

disfigured by too much self-consciousness. "I have wrote to Lord

Melville that I should make such an offer, and that I entreated him to

send out a flag-officer as soon as possible, but I dare say Sir John

Orde is too great a man to want my poor services, and that he will

reject them; be that as it may, you will, I am sure, agree with me,

that I shall show my superiority to him by such an offer, and the

world will see what a sacrifice I am ready to make for the service of

my King and Country, for what greater sacrifice could I make, than

serving for a moment under Sir John Orde, and giving up for that

moment the society of all I hold most dear in this world?"

Orde's letter reached Nelson in Pula Roads, in the Gulf of Cagliari,

at the southern extremity of Sardinia; an out-of-the-way position

which probably accounts for much of its delay. He remained there, or

in the Gulf of Palmas, a little to the westward, for about a week, and

on the 19th of December left for his station off Cape San Sebastian.

At the latter place, on Christmas Day, he was joined by the

"Swiftsure," which brought him a great batch of official mail that had

come out with Orde. He thus received at one and the same time his

leave to go home and the Admiralty's order reducing his station.

Unluckily, the latter step, though taken much later than the issuing

of his leave, had become known to him first, through Orde; and the

impression upon his mind remained with that firmness of prejudice

which Radstock had noted in him. He does not appear at any time to

have made allowance for the fact that his command was cut down under a

reasonable impression that he was about to quit it.

Immediately after the "Swiftsure" joined at Rendezvous 97, he took the

fleet off Toulon. The enemy was found to be still in port, but the

rumors of an approaching movement, and of the embarkation of troops,

were becoming more specific. He remained off the harbor for at least

a week, and thence went to Madalena, where he anchored on the 11th of

January, 1805. This was, though he knew it not, the end of the long

watch off Toulon.

Short as the time was, Nelson had already experienced the

inconvenience of a senior admiral, lying, like an enemy, on the flank

of his communications with Great Britain, and dealing as he pleased

with his vessels. One frigate at least had been sent already to

England, without his knowledge and consent. "I have in a former

letter," he tells the First Lord, "stated my opinion freely upon the

stations of Gibraltar and Cadiz being given to the same officer; for

without that is done, our convoys can never be considered safe. There

is also another consideration, why the Officer at Gibraltar should be

under the orders of the Admiral commanding the Mediterranean

fleet--which is, that any admiral independent of that station, takes

all the stores he chooses, or fancies he wants, for the service of his

fleet; thereby placing the fleet in the Gulf of Lyons in great

distress for many articles."

Off Toulon, having a large official mail to make up in reply to that

brought by the "Swiftsure," he thought it both quicker and safer,

under all the conditions of the time, to send it to Lisbon. He

therefore called on board the "Victory" a smart young frigate-captain,

William Parker, a nephew of Lord St. Vincent, gave him orders to take

the despatches to Lisbon, and added, "Sir John Orde takes my frigates

from me, and sends them away in some other direction from what I wish.

I cannot even get my despatches home. You must contrive to get to the

westward and go into Lisbon, and avoid his ships. I have not signed

your orders," alluding to memorandum instructions separate from the

formal orders, "because Sir John Orde is my senior officer; but, if it

should come to a Court Martial, Hardy can swear to my handwriting, and

you shall not be broke. Take your orders, and good bye; and remember,

Parker, if you cannot weather _that fellow_, I shall think you have

not a drop of your old uncle's blood in your veins." The memorandum

directed him to pass Cape Spartel in the night, steering to the

southward and westward to avoid Orde, and ended thus: "Bring-to [stop]

for nothing, if you can help it. Hoist the signal for quarantine, and

that you are charged with dispatches. If you are forced to speak by a

superior officer, show him only my order for not interfering with you;

and unless he is an admiral, superior to me, you will obey my orders

instead of any pretended ones from him, from my superior officer."

Parker executed his commission successfully, but in doing so met with

a curious adventure. Leaving Gibraltar with a north wind, favorable

for his purpose, he passed Spartel as directed, and, the night being

moonlight, saw in the distance Orde's squadron cruising under easy

sail. Unluckily, one of the outlying lookout frigates discovered him,

gave chase, and overtook him. Her captain himself came on board, and

was about to give Parker orders not to proceed to the westward, Orde

jealously objecting to any apparent intrusion upon his domain. Parker

stopped him hastily from speaking on the quarter-deck, within earshot

of others, and took him into the cabin. The stranger had been one of

Nelson's old midshipmen and a favorite; had started with him in the

"Agamemnon," and by him had been made a commander after the Nile.

"Captain Hoste," said Parker, "I believe you owe all your advancement

in the service to my uncle, Lord St. Vincent, and to Lord Nelson. I am

avoiding Sir John Orde's squadron by desire of Lord Nelson; you know

his handwriting; _I must go on_."[81] (Parker being senior to Hoste,

the latter could not detain him by his own authority; and he

understood from this avowal that Orde's orders, if produced, would

become a matter of record, would be disobeyed, and a court-martial

must follow.) "The question of a court-martial would be very

mischievous. Do you not think it would be better if you were not to

meet the 'Amazon' this night?" Captain Hoste, after a little

reflection, left the ship without giving his admiral's orders to

Parker.[82]

Having determined not to leave Bickerton alone, Nelson decided to keep

secret his own leave to return to England. "I am much obliged by their

Lordships' kind compliance with my request, which is absolutely

necessary from the present state of my health," he writes on the 30th

of December; "and I shall avail myself of their Lordships' permission,

the moment another admiral, in the room of Admiral Campbell, joins the

fleet, unless the enemy's fleet should be at sea, when I should not

think of quitting my command until after the battle." "I shall never

quit my post," he tells a friend, "when the French fleet is at sea, as

a commander-in-chief of great celebrity once did,"--a not very

generous fling at St. Vincent. "I would sooner die at my post, than

have such a stigma upon my memory." "Nothing has kept me here," he

writes Elliot, "but the fear for the escape of the French fleet, and

that they should get to either Naples or Sicily in the short days.

Nothing but gratitude to those good Sovereigns could have induced me

to stay one moment after Sir John Orde's extraordinary command, for

his general conduct towards me is not such as I had a right to

expect."

During this last month of monotonous routine, while off Toulon and at

Madalena, he had occasion to express opinions on current general

topics, which found little room in his mind after the French fleet

began to move. There was then a report of a large expedition for

foreign service forming in England, and rumor, as usual, had a

thousand tongues as to its destination. "A blow struck in Europe,"

Nelson wrote to Lord Moira, "would do more towards making us

respected, and of course facilitate a peace, than the possession of

Mexico or Peru,"--a direction towards which the commercial ambitions

of Great Britain had a traditional inclination, fostered by some

military men and statesmen, who foresaw the break-up of the Spanish

colonial system. "Above all, I hope we shall have no buccaneering

expeditions. Such services fritter away our troops and ships, when

they are so much wanted for more important occasions, and are of no

use beyond enriching a few individuals. I know not, if these

sentiments coincide with yours; but as glory, and not money, has

through life been your pursuit, I should rather think that you will

agree with me, that in Europe, and not abroad, is the place for us to

strike a blow." "I like the idea of English troops getting into the

Kingdom of Naples," he tells Elliot at this same time; whence it may

be inferred that that was the quarter he would now, as upon his first

arrival, choose for British effort. "If they are well commanded, I am

sure they will do well. They will have more wants than us sailors."

The expedition, which sailed the following spring, was destined for

the Mediterranean, and reinforced the garrisons of Gibraltar and Malta

to an extent that made the latter a factor to be considered in the

strategy of the inland sea; but when it arrived, Nelson had left the

Mediterranean, not to return.

As regards general politics, Nelson, writing to the Queen of Naples,

took a gloomy view of the future. The Prime Minister of the Two

Sicilies, Sir John Acton, had some time before been forced out of

office and had retired to Palermo, an event produced by the pressure

of French influence, which Nelson regarded now as absolutely dominant

in that kingdom, and menacing to Europe at large. "Never, perhaps, was

Europe more critically situated than at this moment, and never was the

probability of universal Monarchy more nearly being realized, than in

the person of the Corsican. I can see but little difference between

the name of Emperor, King, or Prefect, if they perfectly obey his

despotic orders. Prussia is trying to be destroyed last--Spain is

little better than a province of France--Russia does nothing on the

grand scale. Would to God these great Powers reflected, that the

boldest measures are the safest! They allow small states to fall, and

to serve the enormous power of France, without appearing to reflect

that every kingdom which is annexed to France, makes their own

existence, as independent states, more precarious." How shrewd a

prophecy this was as regards Prussia and Spain, those two countries

were to learn by bitter experience; and remote Russia herself, though

she escaped the last humiliation, saw in the gigantic hosts whose

onset a few years later shook her to her centre, the armed subjects of

the many smaller states, in whose subjugation she had acquiesced

during the period of the Czar's moral subservience to Napoleon.

Nelson's essentially military genius had in political matters a keenly

sensitive intuition of the probable action of his fellow-warrior,

Bonaparte. "Russia's going to war in the way I am sure she will, will

cause the loss of Naples and Sardinia; for that Court will not send

100,000 men into Italy, and less are useless for any grand purpose."

"Your Excellency's summary account of the situation of Naples since

the negotiations with Russia," he wrote to Elliot in October, "are

perfectly clear; but the times are such that kingdoms must not be

played with. So far from Russia assisting Naples, it may involve her,

without the greatest care and circumspection, in total ruin. Naples

must not be hastily involved in war with France. Sicily must be saved.

The Calabrians must be kept from the entrance of French troops. If we

are consulted, we must assist Naples in keeping off the blow as long

as possible." That Napoleon's action would have been as here surmised,

had his purposes then tended towards the Mediterranean instead of the

English Channel, we have his own assertion. "At the solicitation of

your ambassador at St. Petersburg," wrote he to the Queen of Naples,

three months later, referring to the same subject, "ten thousand

Russians have been sent to Corfu.... If it had entered into my plans

to make war upon the King of Naples, I should have done it on the

entrance of the first Russian in Corfu, but I wish for peace with

Naples, with Europe entire, with England even." Napoleon's wishes for

peace, except on the condition of having his own way, are scarcely to

be taken seriously; but his care to keep things quiet in the South

corroborates the other indications of his firm purpose to invade

England. He was too astute to precipitate troubles elsewhere while

that was pending. The appearance of the Russians in Corfu, although

unwise in Nelson's view, relieved his fears for the islands and the

Morea, and enabled him to reduce a little his detachment about the

heel of Italy.

Towards the middle of December Nelson had received information, which

was substantially correct, "from various places, and amongst others,

from the King of Sardinia [then in Gaeta], that the French were

assembling troops near Toulon, and had taken some of the best troops

and a corps of cavalry from the Riviera of Genoa. Every seaman was

pressed and sent to Toulon. On the 16th the Active spoke a vessel from

Marseilles, who reported that seven thousand troops had embarked on

board the French fleet."

It was in Madalena Roads that the long-expected summons came at last.

In the afternoon of January 19, 1805, blowing a heavy gale of wind

from the northwest, the two lookout frigates from off Toulon came in

sight, with the signal flying that the French fleet was at sea. At 3

P.M. they anchored near the "Victory." Three hours later Nelson had

left Madalena forever.

FOOTNOTES:

[59] This sentence refers to the governor; not to Villettes, as the

construction might indicate.

[60] Unfit for sea, and kept at Naples for political reasons.

[61] The Honourable Mr. Waldegrave, afterwards Admiral Lord Eadstock.

[62] Five French ships-of-the-line, returning from the West Indies, had

taken refuge in Ferrol.

[63] Life of Rev. A.J. Scott, p. 124.

[64] Phillimore's Last of Nelson's Captains, p. 122. A portion of this

incident has before been quoted, in another connection (vol. i. p. 355,

note). It is repeated, because again applicable, to illustrate a different

trait of Nelson's character.

[65] The letter of this gentleman, Dr. Gillespie, from which a quotation

has already been made, was published in the London "Times" of October 6,

1894.

[66] This incidental remark may be noted, as bearing upon the statement,

now rejected, that his orders were put on especially for battle.

[67] There is here no mention of smoking; nor has any allusion to it, or to

tobacco, caught the author's eye in Nelson's letters.

[68] Dr. Beatty's Narrative of the Death of Lord Nelson. Nicolas, vol. vii.

p. 259.

[69] Sir William Hotham.

[70] Many of these details are taken with little alteration from the "Life

of Rev. A.J. Scott."

[71] Memoir of Sir Thomas Hardy, in Clarke and M'Arthur's Life of Nelson

vol. iii. p. 234.

[72] Hillyar was then engaged to a lady in Malta.

[73] As Lady Nelson's first marriage was in 1779, Josiah Nisbet could not

have been eighteen when made a commander, in 1797.

[74] Phillimore's "The Last of Nelson's Captains," p. 146.

[75] Flag-officers had a share in all prizes taken by vessels of their

squadrons.

[76] Davison.

[77] _Ante_, p. 192.

[78] Pettigrew, vol. ii. p. 444.

[79] Nicolas, vol. vi. p. 288.

[80] Late British minister to Spain.

[81] Author's italics.

[82] The whole of this account is taken from the Life of Sir William

Parker. Phillimore's Last of Nelson's Captains, pp. 125-129.