THE EXPEDITION TO THE BALTIC AND BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN.--NELSON RETURNS
TO ENGLAND.
FEBRUARY--JUNE, 1801. AGE, 42.
The trouble between Great Britain and Denmark, which now called Nelson
again to the front, leading to the most difficult of his undertakings,
and, consequently, to the most distinguished of his achievements,
arose about the maritime rights of neutrals and belligerents. The
contention was not new. In 1780 the Baltic States, Russia, Sweden, and
Denmark, being neutrals in the war then raging, had combined to
assert, by arms, if necessary, certain claims advanced by them to
immunity from practices which international law had hitherto
sanctioned, or concerning which it had spoken ambiguously. These
claims Great Britain had rejected, as contrary to her rights and
interests; but, being then greatly outnumbered, she temporized until
the end of the war, which left her in possession of the principles at
stake, although she had forborne to enforce them offensively. The
coalition of the Baltic States, at that time, received the name of the
Armed Neutrality.
From 1793 to 1800 Sweden and Denmark had again succeeded in
maintaining their neutrality, and, as most other maritime states were
at war, their freedom of navigation had thrown into their hands a
large carrying trade. But, while their profit was thus great, it would
be much greater, if their ships could be saved the interruptions to
their voyages arising from the right of belligerents to stop, to
search, and, if necessary, to send into port, a vessel on board which
were found enemy's goods, or articles considered "contraband of war."
The uncertainty hanging round the definitions of the latter phrase
greatly increased the annoyance to neutrals; and serious disputes
existed on certain points, as, for example, whether materials for
shipbuilding, going to an enemy's port, were liable to capture. Great
Britain maintained that they were, the neutrals that they were not;
and, as the Baltic was one of the chief regions from which such
supplies came, a principal line of trade for the Northern States was
much curtailed.
Sweden and Denmark were too weak to support their contention against
the sea-power of Great Britain. Where there is lack of force, there
will always be found the tendency to resort to evasion to accomplish
an end; and Denmark, in 1799, endeavored to secure for her merchant
ships immunity from search by belligerent cruisers--which
International Law has always conceded, and still concedes, to be
within the rights of a belligerent--by sending them on their voyages
in large convoys, protected by ships of war. It was claimed that the
statement of the senior naval officer, that there were not in the
convoy any articles subject to capture, was sufficient; and that the
belligerent would in that case have no right to search. Great Britain
replied that the right of search rested upon longstanding common
consent, and precedent, and that it could not be taken from her
against her will by any process instituted by another state. The
Danish ships of war being instructed to use force against search, two
hostile collisions followed, in one of which several men were killed
and wounded, and the Danish frigate was taken into a British
port--though afterwards released.
The latter of these conflicts occurred in July, 1800. Great Britain
then sent an ambassador to Denmark, backing him with a fleet of nine
ships-of-the-line, with bomb-vessels; and at the end of August a
convention was signed, by which the general subject was referred to
future discussion, but Denmark agreed for the time to discontinue her
convoys. The importance of the subject to Great Britain was twofold.
First, by having the right to seize enemy's property in neutral ships,
she suppressed a great part of the commerce which France could carry
on, thus crippling her financially; and, second, by capturing articles
of shipbuilding as contraband of war, she kept from the French
materials essential to the maintenance of their navy, which their own
country did not produce. British statesmen of all parties maintained
that in these contentions there was at stake, not an empty and
offensive privilege, but a right vital to self-defence, to the
effective maintenance of which the power to search was fundamentally
necessary.
In 1800 the Czar Paul I. had become bitterly hostile to Austria and
Great Britain. This feeling had its origin in the disasters of the
campaign of 1799, and was brought to a climax by the refusal of Great
Britain to yield Malta to him, as Grand Master of the Order, after its
capture from the French in September, 1800. It had been the full
purpose of the British ministry to surrender it, and Nelson, much to
his distaste, had received specific orders to that effect; but,
besides the fact that the Russians had contributed nothing directly to
the reduction of the island, the attitude of the Czar had become so
doubtful, that common prudence forbade putting into the hands of a
probable future enemy the prize so hardly won from a present foe. Paul
had already announced his intention of reviving the Armed Neutrality
of 1780; and when, in November, he learned the fall of Malta, he
seized three hundred British vessels lying in Russian ports, marched
their crews into the interior, and at the same time placed seals on
all British warehoused property,--a measure intended to support his
demand for the restitution of the island to him.
On the 16th of December a treaty was signed at St. Petersburg by
Russia and Sweden, to which Denmark and Prussia promptly adhered,
renewing the Armed Neutrality, for the support of their various
claims. The consenting states bound themselves to maintain their
demands by force, if necessary; but no declaration of war was issued.
Great Britain, in accepting the challenge, equally abstained from acts
which would constitute a state of war; but she armed at once to
shatter the coalition, before it attained coherence in aught but
words. From first to last, until the Armed Neutrality again dissolved,
though there was hard fighting, there was not formal war.
The relation of these occurrences to the life of Nelson will not be
fully understood, unless the general state of Europe be recalled, and
the master hand of Bonaparte be recognized, underlying and controlling
previous changes and present conditions. After the Battle of the Nile,
and up to a year before this, Austria, Russia, and Great Britain had
been united in arms against France; and, in addition to the undisputed
control of the sea by the British Navy, they were pressing in
overpowering numbers upon her eastern frontiers, from the North Sea to
the Mediterranean. Blunders of their own had arrested the full tide of
success, and the return of Bonaparte from Egypt reversed the current.
Russia withdrew in anger, and Austria, beaten upon field after field,
in Italy and Germany, by Bonaparte and Moreau, had finally consented
to peace after the disastrous defeat of Hohenlinden, on the 3d of
December, 1800. Great Britain was left without an ally; and Russia was
added to the list of her active enemies by the skilful political
manipulation of Bonaparte, who played upon the impulses and weaknesses
of the half-mad Czar, releasing with distinguished marks of respect
all Russian prisoners, and offering the vain gift of Malta, the French
garrison of which was even then clutched by the throat in the iron
grip of the British sea-power.
The renewal of the Armed Neutrality was thus, primarily, the work of
Bonaparte. He alone had the keenness to see all the possibilities in
favor of France that were to be found in the immense combination, and
he alone possessed the skill and the power to touch the various
chords, whose concert was necessary to its harmonious action. Although
it was true, as Nelson said, that Paul was the trunk of the
many-limbed tree, it was yet more true that Bonaparte's deft cajoling
of the Czar, and the inducements astutely suggested by him to Prussia,
were the vitalizing forces which animated the two principal parties in
the coalition, in whose wake the weaker states were dragged. Through
the former he hoped to effect a combination of the Baltic navies
against the British; through the latter he looked to exclude Great
Britain from her important commerce with the Continent, which was
carried on mainly by the ports of Prussia, or by those of North
Germany, which she could control. Thus, by the concerted and
simultaneous action of direct weight of arms on the one hand, and of
commercial embarrassment on the other, Bonaparte hoped to overbear the
power of his chief enemy; and here, as on other occasions, both before
and after, Nelson was at once the quickening spirit of the enterprise,
and the direct agent of the blow, which brought down his plans, in
ruins, about his ears.
Relaxing none of her efforts in other quarters of the world, Great
Britain drew together, to confront the new danger, everything in the
home waters that could float, till she had gathered a fleet of twenty
sail-of-the-line, with smaller cruisers in due proportion. "Under the
present impending storm from the north of Europe," wrote St. Vincent,
from his perch above the waters of Torbay, "to enable us to meet such
a host of foes, no ship under my command must have anything done to
her at Plymouth or Portsmouth that can be done at this anchorage." "We
are now arrived at that period," wrote Nelson, "what we have often
heard of, but must now execute--that of fighting for our dear Country;
and I trust that, although we may not be able to subdue our host of
enemies, yet we may make them ashamed of themselves, and prove that
they cannot injure us." "I have only to say," he wrote to Earl
Spencer, who must have rejoiced to see the old spirit flaming again in
undiminished vigor, "what you, my dear Lord, are fully satisfied of,
that the service of my King and Country is the object nearest my
heart; and that a first-rate, or sloop of war, is a matter of perfect
indifference to your most faithful and obliged Nelson."
The "San Josef" being considered too heavy a ship for the Baltic
service, Nelson's flag was shifted on the 12th of February to the "St.
George," a three-decker of lighter draft. Hardy accompanied him as
captain, and on the 17th Nelson received orders to place himself under
the command of Sir Hyde Parker. A few days afterwards, the "St.
George" went to Spithead, where she received on board six hundred
troops, under the command of Colonel William Stewart, to whom we owe
the fullest and most interesting account of the expedition in general,
and of the Battle of Copenhagen in particular, that has been
transmitted by an eye-witness. The ship sailed again on the 2d of
March for Yarmouth, where she arrived on the 6th. The next day Nelson
went to call on the commander-in-chief, who was living on shore, his
flag flying on board a vessel in the roads. "I remember," says Colonel
Stewart, "that Lord Nelson regretted Sir Hyde being on shore. We
breakfasted that morning as usual, soon after six o'clock, for we were
always up before daylight. We went on shore, so as to be at Sir Hyde's
door at eight o'clock, Lord Nelson choosing to be amusingly exact to
that hour, which he considered as a very late one for business."
At this, his first official visit, the commander-in-chief, it is
said, scarcely noticed him, and Nelson, as will be seen, complained
freely of the treatment he at the beginning received. Parker was now
verging on old age, but he had recently married a young wife, who was
in Yarmouth with him, and the two had arranged to give a great ball on
the 13th of March; altogether a bad combination for a military
undertaking. Nelson, who was in haste to get away,--chiefly because of
his sound martial instinct that this was peculiarly a case for
celerity, but partly, also, because of anxiety to get the thing over
and done, and to return to his home comforts,--appears to have
represented matters unofficially to the Admiralty, a step for which
his personal intimacy with St. Vincent and Troubridge afforded easy
opportunity; and an express quickly arrived, ordering the fleet to sea
at once.[22] "The signal is made to prepare to unmoor at twelve
o'clock," wrote Nelson to Troubridge on the 11th. "Now we can have no
desire for staying, for her ladyship is gone, and the _Ball_ for
Friday knocked up by yours and the Earl's unpoliteness, to send
gentlemen to sea instead of dancing with white gloves. I will only
say," he continues, "as yet I know not that we are even going to the
Baltic, except from the newspapers, and at sea I cannot go out of my
ship but with serious inconvenience,"--owing to the loss of his arm.
What was not told him before starting, therefore, could not be told by
mouth till after arrival.
It will be remembered that Sir Hyde Parker had succeeded Hotham in the
chief command of the Mediterranean, for a brief but critical month in
1795,[23] and that Nelson had then complained of his action as regards
the general conduct of the campaign, and specifically for having
reduced to the point of inefficiency the small squadron under Nelson's
own direction, upon which the most important issues hinged. Possibly
Parker had heard this, possibly the notorious disregard of Keith's
orders a few months before influenced him to keep his renowned, but
independent, subordinate at a distance in official matters. It was not
well advised; though probably the great blunderers were the Admiralty,
in sending as second a man who had shown himself so exceptionally and
uniquely capable of supreme command, and so apt to make trouble for
mediocre superiors. If Lord St. Vincent's surmise was correct, Parker,
who was a very respectable officer, had been chosen for his present
place because in possession of all the information acquired during the
last preparation for a Russian war; while Nelson fancied that St.
Vincent himself, as commander of the Channel fleet, had recommended
him, in order to get rid of a second in command who did not carry out
satisfactorily the methods of his superior. If that were so, the
mistake recoiled upon his own head; for, while the appointment was
made by Earl Spencer, St. Vincent succeeded him as First Lord before
the expedition sailed, and the old seaman would much have preferred to
see Nelson at the helm. He was quite sure of the latter, he said, and
should have been in no apprehension if he had been of rank to take the
chief command; but he could not feel so sure about Sir Hyde, as he had
never been tried. Whatever the truth, Lady Malmesbury's comment after
the event was indisputable: "I feel very sorry for Sir Hyde; but no
wise man would ever have gone with Nelson, or over him, as he was sure
to be in the background in every case."
"I declare solemnly," wrote Nelson to Davison four days after
reporting, "that I do not know"--officially, of course--"that I am
going to the Baltic, and much worse than that I could tell you. Sir
Hyde is on board sulky. Stewart tells me, his treatment of me is now
noticed. Dickson came on board to-day to say all were scandalized at
his gross neglect. Burn this letter: then it can never appear, and you
can speak as if your knowledge came from another quarter." That day
the orders came from the Admiralty to go to sea; and the next, March
12, the ships then present sailed,--fifteen ships-of-the-line and two
fifties, besides frigates, sloops of war, brigs, cutters, fireships,
and seven bomb-vessels,--for, if the Danes were obstinate, Copenhagen
was to be bombarded. On the 16th of March Nelson wrote both to Davison
and Lady Hamilton that he as yet knew nothing, except by common
report. "Sir Hyde has not told me officially a thing. I am sorry
enough to be sent on such an expedition, but nothing can, I trust,
degrade, do what they will." His mind was in a condition to see the
worst motives in what befell him. "I know, I see, that I am not to be
supported in the way I ought, but the St. George is beginning to
prepare this day for battle, and she shall be true to herself....
Captain Murray sees, as do every one, what is meant to disgrace me,
but that is impossible. Even the Captain of the Fleet [Parker's Chief
of Staff] sent me word that it was not his doing, for that Sir Hyde
Parker had run his pen through all that could do me credit, or give me
support; but never mind, Nelson will be first if he lives, and you
shall partake of all his glory. So it shall be my study to distinguish
myself, that your heart shall leap for joy when my name is
mentioned."[24]
Enough reached his ears to draw forth unqualified expressions of
dissent from the plans proposed, and equally clear statements as to
what should be done,--all stamped unmistakably with the "Nelson
touch," to use an apt phrase of his own. "Reports say," he tells Lady
Hamilton, "we are to anchor before we get to Cronenburg Castle, that
our minister at Copenhagen may negotiate. What nonsense! How much
better could we negotiate was our fleet off Copenhagen, and the Danish
minister would seriously reflect how he brought the fire of England on
his Master's fleet and capital; but to keep us out of sight is to
seduce Denmark into a war.... If they are the plans of Ministers, they
are weak in the extreme, and very different to what I understood from
Mr. Pitt.[25] If they originate with Sir Hyde, it makes him, in my
mind, as--but never mind, your Nelson's plans are bold and
decisive--all on the great scale. I hate your pen and ink men; a fleet
of British ships of war are the best negotiators in Europe." While the
greatness and decision of his character remain unimpaired, perhaps
even heightened, it will be noticed that self-reliance, never in any
man more justified, has tended to degenerate into boastfulness, and
restlessness under displeasing orders to become suspicion of the
motives prompting them. "They all hate me and treat me ill," he says,
speaking of Spencer's and St. Vincent's administrations. "I cannot, my
dear friend, recall to mind any one real act of kindness, but all of
unkindness." It must, of course, be remembered that, while such
expressions portray faithfully the working of the inner spirit, and
serve, by contrast, to measure the Nelson of 1801 against the Nelson
of 1796, they were addressed to the most intimate of friends, and do
not necessarily imply a corresponding bearing before the eyes of the
world.
An amusing story is told of a shrewd stratagem resorted to by Nelson,
on the passage to the Baltic, to thaw the barrier of frigidity in his
superior, which not only was unpleasant to him personally, as well as
injurious to the interests of the state, but threatened also to
prevent his due share in the planning and execution of the enterprise
in hand, thus diminishing the glory he ever coveted. The narrator,
Lieutenant Layman, was serving on board the "St. George," and happened
to mention, in Nelson's presence, that some years before he had seen
caught a very fine turbot on the Dogger Bank, over which the fleet
must pass on its way.
"This being a mere casual remark, nothing more would have been
thought of it, had not Nelson, after showing great anxiety in his
inquiries when they should be on the Dogger Bank, significantly said
to Mr. Layman, 'Do you think we could catch a turbot?' After a try or
two, a small turbot was caught. Lord Nelson appeared delighted, and
called out, 'Send it to Sir Hyde.' Something being said about the risk
of sending a boat, from the great sea, lowering weather, and its being
dark, his Lordship said with much meaning, 'I know the Chief is fond
of good living, and he shall have the turbot.' That his Lordship was
right appeared by the result, as the boat returned with a note of
compliment and thanks from Parker. The turbot having opened a
communication, the effect was wonderful. At Merton Mr. Layman told
Lord Nelson that a man eminent in the naval profession had said to
him, 'Do tell me how Parker came to take the laurel from his own brow,
and place it on Nelson's?' 'What did you say?' asked Nelson. 'That it
was not a gift,' replied Layman, 'as your Lordship had gained the
victory by a turbot.' 'A turbot!' 'Yes, my lord, I well recollect your
great desire to catch a turbot, and your astonishing many, by
insisting upon its being immediately sent to Sir Hyde, who
condescended to return a civil note; without which opening your
Lordship would not have been consulted in the Cattegat, and without
such intercourse your Lordship would not have got the detached
squadron; without which there would not have been any engagement, and
consequently no victory.' Lord Nelson smilingly said, 'You are
right.'"[26]
On the 19th of March the fleet was collected off the northern point of
Denmark, known as the Skaw. From there the broad channel, called the
Kattegat, extends southward, between Sweden and the northern part of
the Danish peninsula, until it reaches the large Island of Zealand,
upon the eastern shore of which Copenhagen lies. The two principal
entrances into the Baltic are on either side of Zealand. The eastern
one, separating it from Sweden, is called the Sound, that to the west
is known as the Great Belt; each, from the military point of view,
possessed its particular advantages and particular drawbacks. "We are
slow in our motions as ever," wrote Nelson, whose impatient and
decided character would have used the fair wind that was blowing to
enter the Kattegat, and to proceed at once to Copenhagen, "but I hope
all for the best. I have not yet seen Sir Hyde, but I purpose going
this morning; for no attention shall be wanting on my part." The next
day he reports the result of the interview to his friend Davison: "I
staid an hour, and ground out something, but there was not that degree
of openness which I should have shown to my second in command." The
fleet advanced deliberately, a frigate being sent ahead to land the
British envoy, Mr. Vansittart, whose instructions were that only
forty-eight hours were to be allowed the Danes to accept the demands
of Great Britain, and to withdraw from the coalition. The slowness
here, like every other delay, chafed Nelson, whose wish from the
beginning was to proceed at the utmost speed, not merely from the
Skaw, but from England, with whatever ships could be collected; for he
reasoned perfectly accurately upon the safe general principle that
delay favors the defence more than the offence. "I only now long to be
gone," he wrote before leaving Yarmouth; "time is precious, and every
hour makes more resistance; strike quick, and home." It was
particularly true in this case, for Denmark, long used to peace, had
not thought war possible, and every day was precious to her in
restoring and increasing the neglected protection of Copenhagen.
On the evening of March 20 the fleet anchored in the Kattegat,
eighteen miles from Cronenburg Castle and the town of Elsinore, at
which the Sound narrows to three miles. Both shores being hostile,
Parker would not attempt to force the passage until he learned the
result of the British mission to Copenhagen; meanwhile the Danes were
working busily at the blockships and batteries of the city. On the 23d
Mr. Vansittart returned with the terms rejected; and he brought, also,
alarming reports of the state of the batteries at Elsinore and
Copenhagen, which were much stronger than the previous information of
the British Cabinet had shown, proving, as Nelson urged, that each
day's delay increased the enemy's relative power. Sir Hyde called a
council. "Now we are sure of fighting," wrote Nelson to Lady Hamilton.
"I am sent for. When it was a joke I was kept in the background;
to-morrow will I hope be a proud day for England--to have it so, no
exertion shall be wanting from your most attached and affectionate
friend."
He was accompanied to Parker's flagship by Lieutenant Layman, who went
in the boat to steer for him. "On board the London," according to
Layman, "the heads appeared very gloomy. Mr. Vansittart, who arrived
at the same moment Nelson did, said that if the fleet proceeded to
attack, it would be beaten, and the attempt was in danger of being
relinquished. The Captain of the Fleet said to Layman that the Danes
were too strong to attack, and a torpor verging to despondency
prevailed in the councils. While others were dismayed, however, Lord
Nelson questioned those just arrived from Copenhagen not only as to
the force, but as to the position of the enemy. Such interrogatories
he called 'bringing people to the post.' Having learned that the great
strength of the enemy was at the head of the line, supported by the
Crown Battery, his Lordship emphatically observed that to begin the
attack there would be like taking a bull by the horns, and he
therefore suggested the attempt by the tail."[27] In order to avoid
the formidable works at Cronenburg, and yet come up in rear of
Copenhagen, according to this proposition of Nelson's, it was proposed
in the council to go by the Great Belt. That passage is more
intricate, and therefore, from the pilot's point of view, more
hazardous than the Sound. Nelson was not much deterred by the alarming
reports. "Go by the Sound, or by the Belt, or anyhow," he said, "only
lose not an hour."
The minutes of the council have not been transmitted, but it is
evident from Nelson's own letter of the following day, soon to be
quoted in full, and also from one written to him by Mr. Vansittart,
after the latter reached London, that he urged upon Parker, and
prevailed with him, to throw aside the instructions of the Government,
under the changed conditions, and to adopt boldly the plan which,
according to his present knowledge, should seem most certain to crush
Denmark at once. After that, he would shatter the coalition by
immediate steps against Russia. Only such a bold spirit, with the
prestige of a Nelson, can dominate a council of war, or extort
decisive action from a commander-in-chief who calls one. "The
difficulty," wrote Nelson some time afterwards, "was to get our
commander-in-chief to either go past Cronenburg or through the Belt
[that is, by any passage], because, what Sir Hyde thought best, and
what I believe was settled before I came on board the London, was to
stay in the Cattegat, and there wait the time when the whole naval
force of the Baltic might choose to come out and fight--a measure, in
my opinion, disgraceful to our Country. I wanted to get at an enemy as
soon as possible to strike a _home_ stroke, and Paul was the enemy
most vulnerable, and of the greatest consequence for us to humble." So
pressing, daring, and outspoken were his counsels, so freely did he
now, as at former times, advocate setting aside the orders of distant
superiors, that he thought advisable to ask Vansittart, who was to
sail immediately for England, to explain to the Admiralty all the
conditions and reasons, which Vansittart did. St. Vincent, as First
Lord, gave unhesitating approval to what his former lieutenant had
advised.
Nelson's understanding of the situation was, in truth, acute,
profound, and decisive. In the northern combination against Great
Britain, Paul was the trunk, Denmark and Sweden the branches. Could he
get at the trunk and hew it down, the branches fell with it; but
should time and strength first be spent lopping off the branches, the
trunk would remain, and "my power must be weaker when its greatest
strength is required." As things then were, the Russian Navy was
divided, part being in Cronstadt, and a large fraction, twelve
ships-of-the-line, in Revel, an advanced and exposed port, where it
was detained fettered by the winter's ice. Get at that and smite it,
and the Russian Navy is disabled; all falls together. This would be
his own course, if independent. As Parker, however, was obstinately
resolved not to leave Denmark hostile in his rear, Nelson had to bend
to the will of his superior. He did so, without forsaking his own
purpose. As in the diverse objects of his care in the Mediterranean,
where he could not compel, he sought diligently to compass his object
by persuasion, by clear and full explanation of his lofty views, by
stirring appeals to duty and opportunity, striving to impart to
another his own insight, and to arouse in him his own single-minded
and dauntless activity. Conceding, perforce, that Denmark was not to
be left hostile in the rear,--although he indicates that this object
might be attained by masking her power with a detachment, while the
main effort was immediately directed against Revel,--his suggestions
to Parker for reducing Denmark speedily are dominated by the same
conception. Strategic and tactical considerations unite to dictate,
that the fleet, whether it go by the Sound or the Belt, must quickly
reach and hold a position beyond--and therefore in the rear
of--Copenhagen. There it interposed between Denmark and Russia; from
there it approached Copenhagen where its defences were weakest. This
comprehensive exposition went, with Nelson's customary directness,
straight to the root of the matter.
Next day, after returning to his own ship, Nelson drew up the
following paper, which is at once so characteristic of his temperament
and genius, and so lucid and masterly a review of the political and
military conditions, that, contrary to the author's usual practice, it
is given entire. Being devoted to a single subject, and inspired by
the spirit of the writer when in a state of more than usual
exaltation, it possesses a unity of purpose and demonstration,
necessarily absent from most of his letters, in which many and diverse
matters have to be treated.
24th March, 1801.
MY DEAR SIR HYDE,--The conversation we had yesterday has
naturally, from its importance, been the subject of my thoughts;
and the more I have reflected, the more I am confirmed in
opinion, that not a moment should be lost in attacking the
enemy: they will every day and hour be stronger; we never shall
be so good a match for them as at this moment. The only
consideration in my mind is, how to get at them with the least
risk to our ships. By Mr. Vansittart's account, the Danes have
taken every means in their power to prevent our getting to
attack Copenhagen by the passage of the Sound. Cronenburg has
been strengthened, the Crown Islands fortified, on the outermost
of which are twenty guns, pointing mostly downwards, and only
eight hundred yards from very formidable batteries placed under
the Citadel, supported by five Sail of the Line, seven Floating
batteries of fifty guns each, besides Small-craft, Gun-boats,
&c. &c.; and that the Revel Squadron of twelve or fourteen Sail
of the Line are soon expected, as also five Sail of Swedes. It
would appear by what you have told me of your instructions, that
Government took for granted you would find no difficulty in
getting off Copenhagen, and in the event of a failure of
negotiation, you might instantly attack; and that there would be
scarcely a doubt but the Danish Fleet would be destroyed, and
the Capital made so hot that Denmark would listen to reason and
its true interest. By Mr. Vansittart's account, their state of
preparation exceeds what he conceives our Government thought
possible, and that the Danish Government is hostile to us in
the greatest possible degree. Therefore here you are, with
almost the safety, certainly with the honour of England more
intrusted to you, than ever yet fell to the lot of any British
Officer. On your decision depends, whether our Country shall be
degraded in the eyes of Europe, or whether she shall rear her
head higher than ever; again do I repeat, never did our Country
depend so much on the success of any Fleet as on this. How best
to honour our Country and abate the pride of her Enemies, by
defeating their schemes, must be the subject of your deepest
consideration as Commander-in-Chief; and if what I have to offer
can be the least useful in forming your decision, you are most
heartily welcome.
I shall begin with supposing you are determined to enter by the
Passage of the Sound, as there are those who think, if you leave
that passage open, that the Danish Fleet may sail from Copenhagen,
and join the Dutch or French. I own I have no fears on that
subject; for it is not likely that whilst their Capital is menaced
with an attack, 9,000 of her best men should be sent out of the
Kingdom. I suppose that some damage may arise amongst our masts and
yards; yet perhaps there will not be one of them but could be made
serviceable again. You are now about Cronenburg: if the wind be
fair, and you determine to attack the Ships and Crown Islands, you
must expect the natural issue of such a battle--Ships crippled, and
perhaps one or two lost; for the wind which carries you in, will
most probably not bring out a crippled Ship. This mode I call
taking the bull by the horns. It, however, will not prevent the
Revel Ships, or Swedes, from joining the Danes; and to prevent this
from taking effect, is, in my humble opinion, a measure absolutely
necessary--and still to attack Copenhagen. Two modes are in my
view; one to pass Cronenburg, taking the risk of damage, and to
pass up[28] the deepest and straightest Channel above the Middle
Grounds; and coming down the Garbar or King's Channel, to attack
their Floating batteries, &c. &c, as we find it convenient. It must
have the effect of preventing a junction between the Russians,
Swedes, and Danes, and may give us an opportunity of bombarding
Copenhagen. I am also pretty certain that a passage could be found
to the northward of Southolm for all our Ships; perhaps it might be
necessary to warp a short distance in the very narrow part. Should
this mode of attack be ineligible, the passage of the Belt, I have
no doubt, would be accomplished in four or five days, and then the
attack by Draco could be carried into effect, and the junction of
the Russians prevented, with every probability of success against
the Danish Floating batteries. What effect a bombardment might
have, I am not called upon to give an opinion; but think the way
would be cleared for the trial. Supposing us through the Belt with
the wind first westerly, would it not be possible to either go with
the Fleet, or detach ten Ships of three and two decks, with one
Bomb and two Fire-ships, to Revel, to destroy the Russian Squadron
at that place? I do not see the great risk of such a detachment,
and with the remainder to attempt the business at Copenhagen. The
measure may be thought bold, but I am of opinion the boldest
measures are the safest; and our Country demands a most vigorous
exertion of her force, directed with judgment. In supporting you,
my dear Sir Hyde, through the arduous and important task you have
undertaken, no exertion of head or heart shall be wanting from your
most obedient and faithful servant,
NELSON AND BRONTE.
On the 25th the wind was too strong to allow the ships to lift their
anchors. On the 26th the fleet weighed, and proceeded for a few hours
in the direction of the Great Belt, which Parker had decided to
follow. Captain Otway of the "London," Sir Hyde's flagship, chanced to
have local knowledge of that passage, which had not come before the
council, because he was not a member. When he ascertained the
intention, he explained the difficulties and risks to the admiral,
upon which the latter concluded that the batteries of Cronenburg and
Elsinore presented fewer dangers. He accordingly directed the fleet to
return toward the Sound, and sent Otway to tell Nelson he should take
that route. "I don't care a d--n by which passage we go," replied the
latter, "so that we fight them." "Sir Hyde Parker," he wrote the same
day to Lady Hamilton, "has by this time found out the worth of your
Nelson, and that he is a useful sort of man on a pinch; therefore, if
he ever has thought unkindly of me, I freely forgive him. Nelson must
stand among the first, or he must fall." Side by side with such
expressions of dauntless resolve and unfailing self-confidence stand
words of deepest tenderness, their union under one cover typifying
aptly the twin emotions of heroic aspiration and passionate devotion,
which at this time held within him alternate, yet not conflicting,
sway. In the same letter he tells her fondly, "You know I am more
bigoted to your picture--the faithful representation of you I have
with me--than ever a Neapolitan was to St. Januarius, and look upon
you as my guardian angel, and God, I trust, will make you so to me.
His will be done." From the time of leaving he wrote to her
practically every day. "Mr. S. is quite right," he says to her on one
occasion, "that through the medium of your influence is the surest way
to get my interest. It is true, and it will ever be, whilst you hold
your present conduct, for you never ask anything that does not do
honour to your feelings, as the best woman, as far as my knowledge
goes, that ever lived, and it must do me honour the complying with
them."
The fleet anchored again on the evening of the 26th of March, six
miles from Cronenburg, and was there detained three days by head winds
and calms. In this interval, Nelson's general plan of operations
having been adopted, he shifted his flag to a lighter ship, the
"Elephant," seventy-four, commanded by Captain Foley, the same who had
led the fleet inside the French line in Aboukir Bay. On the 30th, the
wind coming fair from northwest, the ships weighed and passed
Cronenburg Castle. It had been expected that the Swedish batteries
would open upon them, but, finding they remained silent, the column
inclined to that side, thus going clear of the Danish guns. "More
powder and shot, I believe, never were thrown away," wrote Nelson,
"for not one shot struck a single ship of the British fleet. Some of
our ships fired; but the Elephant did not return a single shot. I hope
to reserve them for a better occasion."
That afternoon they anchored again, about five miles below Copenhagen.
Parker and Nelson, accompanied by several senior officers, went at
once in a schooner to view the defences of the town. "We soon
perceived," wrote Stewart, "that our delay had been of important
advantage to the enemy, who had lined the northern edge of the shoals
near the Crown batteries, and the front of the harbour and arsenal,
with a formidable flotilla. The Trekroner (Three Crowns) Battery"--a
strong work established on piles, whose position will be
given--"appeared, in particular, to have been strengthened, and all
the buoys of the Northern, and of the King's Channels had been
removed." Nelson, however, was, or feigned to be, less impressed. "I
have just been reconnoitring the Danish line of defence," he wrote to
Lady Hamilton. "It looks formidable to those who are children at war,
but to my judgment, with ten sail-of-the-line I think I can annihilate
them; at all events, I hope to be allowed to try." This is again the
same spirit of the seaman "determined to attack" at Aboukir; the same
resolution as before Bastia, where he kept shut in his own breast the
knowledge of the odds, feeling that to do nothing was as bad as
failure--and worse. A like eagerness does not seem to have prevailed
on board the flagship. Parker had allowed himself to be stiffened to
the fighting-point by the junior he had before disregarded, but that
he looked to the issue with more than doubt may be inferred from the
words of his private secretary, the Rev. Mr. Scott, who afterwards
held the same relation to Nelson. "I fear," he wrote on the day of
the council, "there is a great deal of Quixotism in this business;
there is no getting any positive information of their strength."
Nelson's general plan of attack is set forth in main outlines in the
letter already given, but it is desirable to give a somewhat more
detailed description. It will be seen, by the annexed chart, that
there are before Copenhagen two channels by which the city can be
passed. Between the two lies a shoal, called the Middle Ground. The
inner, known as the King's Channel, lay under the guns of the defences
which had been hurriedly improvised for the present emergency. These
consisted of a line of hulks, mostly mastless, ranged along the inner
side of the King's Channel, close to the flats which bordered it,
flanked at the northern end by the permanent work, called the
Trekroner[29] Battery. Westward of the latter lay, across the mouth of
the harbor proper, two more hulks, and a small squadron consisting of
two ships-of-the-line and a frigate, masted, and in commission. This
division was not seriously engaged, and, as a factor in the battle,
may be disregarded.
The northern part of this defence was decisively the stronger. To
attack there, Nelson called "taking the bull by the horns." The
southern wing was much more exposed. Nor was this all. An advance from
the north must be made with a northerly wind. If unsuccessful, or
even, in case of success, if ships were badly crippled, they could not
return to the north, where the fleet was. On the other hand, attack
from the south presupposed a southerly wind, with which, after an
action, the engaged ships could rejoin the fleet, if they threaded
safely the difficult navigation. In any event there was risk, but none
knew better than Nelson that without risks war is not made. To the
considerations above given he added that, when south of the city, the
British would be interposed between the other Baltic navies and
Denmark. The latter, in that case, could not receive reinforcements,
unless the English squadron were first defeated. He therefore proposed
that ten ships-of-the-line, of the lighter draughts, which he offered
himself to lead, should pass through the outer, or northern channel,
gain the southern flank of the defence, and thence make the principal
attack, while the rest of the fleet supported them by a demonstration
against the northern end. The sagacity of this scheme is best attested
from the enemy himself. "We have been deceived in the plan of attack,"
wrote the historian Niebuhr, then residing in the city; "and," now
that the right wing of the defence is destroyed, "all is at stake."
The nights of the 30th and 31st were employed in surveying the waters,
laying down buoys to replace those removed by the Danes, and in
further reconnoissance of the enemy's position. The artillery officers
who were to supervise the bombardment satisfied themselves that, if
the floating defences south of the Trekroner were destroyed, the
bomb-vessels could be placed in such a position as to shell the city,
without being themselves exposed to undue peril.
Parker gave Nelson twelve ships-of-the-line, two more than he had
asked; a judicious addition, for the main part of the fighting was to
fall to him, and the difficulties of pilotage might, and actually did,
deprive him of several ships. Moreover, while it was proposed that the
vessels remaining with Parker should approach and engage the northern
defences, yet the time of attack depended upon a fair wind for Nelson;
and as that would necessarily be foul for the other body, the
diversion made by it might be, and proved to be, ineffective. Sound
judgment dictated giving Nelson all that could be spared.
On the afternoon of the 31st another council was held, in which
Nelson's plan was finally ratified; he again volunteered his
services, which were accepted and his force detailed. As usual, the
council was prolific in suggestions of danger. Stewart, who seems to
have been present, writes: "During this Council of War, the energy of
Lord Nelson's character was remarked: certain difficulties had been
started by some of the members, relative to each of the three Powers
we should either have to engage, in succession or united, in those
seas. The number of the Russians was, in particular, represented as
formidable. Lord Nelson kept pacing the cabin, mortified at everything
that savoured either of alarm or irresolution. When the above remark
was applied to the Swedes, he sharply observed, 'The more numerous the
better;' and when to the Russians, he repeatedly said, 'So much the
better, I wish they were twice as many, the easier the victory, depend
on it.' He alluded, as he afterwards explained in private, to the
total want of tactique among the Northern fleets; and to his
intention, whenever he should bring either the Swedes or Russians to
action, of attacking the head of their line, and confusing their
movements as much as possible. He used to say, 'Close with a
Frenchman, but out-manoeuvre a Russian.'"
Nelson gave personal supervision to the general work of buoying the
Northern Channel. On the morning of April 1st he made a final
examination of the ground in the frigate "Amazon," commanded by
Captain Riou, who fell in the next day's battle. Returning at about
one in the afternoon, he signalled his division to weigh, and, the
wind favoring, the whole passed without accident, the "Amazon"
leading. By nightfall they were again anchored, south of the Middle
Ground, not over two miles from that end of the Danish line. As the
anchor dropped, Nelson called out emphatically, "I will fight them the
moment I have a fair wind." As there were in all thirty-three ships of
war, they were crowded together, and, being within shelling distance
of the mortars on Amag Island, might have received much harm; but the
Danes were too preoccupied with their yet incomplete defences to note
that the few shells thrown dropped among their enemies.
"On board the Elephant," writes Stewart, who with his soldiers had
followed Nelson from the "St. George," "the night of the 1st of April
was an important one. As soon as the fleet was at anchor, the gallant
Nelson sat down to table with a large party of his comrades in arms.
He was in the highest spirits, and drank to a leading wind and to the
success of the ensuing day. Captains Foley, Hardy, Freemantle, Riou,
Inman, Admiral Graves, his Lordship's second in command, and a few
others to whom he was particularly attached, were of this interesting
party; from which every man separated with feelings of admiration for
their great leader, and with anxious impatience to follow him to the
approaching battle. The signal to prepare for action had been made
early in the evening. All the captains retired to their respective
ships, Riou excepted, who with Lord Nelson and Foley arranged the
Order of Battle, and those instructions that were to be issued to each
ship on the succeeding day. These three officers retired between nine
and ten to the after-cabin, and drew up those Orders that have been
generally published, and which ought to be referred to as the best
proof of the arduous nature of the enterprise in which the fleet was
about to be engaged.
"From the previous fatigue of this day, and of the two preceding, Lord
Nelson was so much exhausted while dictating his instructions, that it
was recommended to him by us all, and, indeed, insisted upon by his
old servant, Allen, who assumed much command on these occasions, that
he should go to his cot. It was placed on the floor, but from it he
still continued to dictate. Captain Hardy returned about eleven. He
had rowed as far as the leading ship of the enemy; sounding round her,
and using a pole when he was apprehensive of being heard. He reported
the practicability of the Channel, and the depth of water up to the
ships of the enemy's line. Had we abided by this report, in lieu of
confiding in our Masters and Pilots, we should have acted better. The
Orders were completed about one o'clock, when half a dozen clerks in
the foremost cabin proceeded to transcribe them. Lord Nelson's
impatience again showed itself; for instead of sleeping undisturbedly,
as he might have done, he was every half hour calling from his cot to
these clerks to hasten their work, for that the wind was becoming
fair: he was constantly receiving a report of this during the night."
It was characteristic of the fortune of the "heaven-born" admiral,
that the wind which had been fair the day before to take him south,
changed by the hour of battle to fair to take him north; but it is
only just to notice also that he himself never trifled with a fair
wind, nor with time.
The Orders for Battle, the process of framing which Stewart narrates,
have been preserved in full;[30] but they require a little study and
analysis to detect Nelson's thought, and their tactical merit, which
in matters of detail is unique among his works. At the Nile and
Trafalgar he contented himself with general plans, to meet cases which
he could only foresee in broad outlines; the method of application he
reserved to the moment of battle, when again he signified the general
direction of the attack, and left the details to his subordinates.
Here at Copenhagen he had been able to study the hostile dispositions.
Consequently, although he could not mark with precision the situations
of the smaller floating batteries, those of the principal blockships
were known, and upon that knowledge lie based very particular
instructions for the position each ship-of-the-line was to occupy. The
smaller British vessels also had specific orders.
Taking the Trekroner as a point of reference for the Danish order,
there were north of it, on the Danish left flank, two blockships.
South of it were seven blockships, with a number of miscellaneous
floating batteries, which raised that wing of the defence to
eighteen--the grand total being therefore twenty. This was also
Nelson's count, except that he put one small vessel on the north wing,
reducing the southern to seventeen--an immaterial difference. South of
the Trekroner, the Danes had disposed their seven blockships--which
were mastless ships-of-the-line--as follows. Two were on the right
flank, supporting each other, two on the left, the three others spaced
between these extremes; the distance from the Trekroner to the
southernmost ship being about a mile and a half. The intervals were
filled with the floating batteries. It will be recognized that the
Danes treated this southern wing as an entity by itself, of which they
strengthened the flanks, relying for the protection of the centre upon
the nearness to shoal water, which would prevent the line being
pierced.
As thus described, the southern wing covered the front of the city
against bombardment. The two northern blockships and the Trekroner did
not conduce materially to that; they protected chiefly the entrance of
the harbor. It was therefore only necessary to reduce the southern
wing; but Nelson preferred to engage at once the whole line of vessels
and the Trekroner. It is difficult entirely to approve this refusal to
concentrate upon a part of the enemy's order,--an advantage to which
Nelson was fully alive,--but it was probably due to underestimating
the value of the Danish gunnery, knowing as he did how long they had
been at peace. He may, also, have hoped something from Parker's
division. Be this as it may, he spread his ships-of-the-line, in the
arrangement he prescribed, from one end to the other of the enemy's
order.
Having done this, however, he adopted measures well calculated to
crush the southern flank speedily, and then to accumulate superior
numbers on the northern. The British were arranged in a column of
attack, and the directions were that the three leading ships should
pass along the hostile line, engaging as they went, until the headmost
reached the fifth Dane, a blockship inferior to itself, abreast which
it was to anchor by the stern, as all the British ships were to do.
Numbers two and three were then to pass number one, and anchor
successively ahead of her, supporting her there against the other
enemy's batteries, while four and five were to anchor astern of her,
engaging the two flank blockships, which would have received already
the full broadsides of the three leading vessels. Nelson hoped that
the two southern Danes, by this concentration of fire upon them, would
be speedily silenced; and their immediate antagonists had orders, when
that was done, to cut their cables and go north, to reinforce the
fight in that quarter. The sooner to attain this end, a frigate and
some smaller vessels were told off to take position across the bows of
the two blockships, and to keep a raking fire upon them.
The dispositions for the other British vessels were more simple. They
were to follow along the outer side of their own engaged ships, each
one anchoring as it cleared the headmost ship already in
action,--number six ahead of number five, number seven of number
six,--so that the twelfth would be abreast the twentieth Dane. One
ship-of-the-line was of course thought equivalent to two or three
floating batteries, if opposed to them in an interval. By this
arrangement, each of the British was covered in its advance, until it
reached its prescribed antagonist as nearly fresh as possible, and the
order of the British column was reversed from end to end.[31] A
division of frigates and fireships, under Captain Riou, was held ready
for any special service. The bomb-vessels were to anchor in the King's
Channel, but well outside the line of battle, from which position
they threw some bombs. Alongside each ship-of-the-line was towed a
flat-boat, intended to carry soldiers in an attempt to storm the
Trekroner, if circumstances favored; and other boats were sent for
that purpose from Parker's division.
These orders were copied, and ready for distribution, by six in the
morning. Nelson, who was already up and had breakfasted, signalled at
seven for all captains, and by eight these had their instructions. The
wind had become so fair that ships anchoring by the stern would lie
perfectly well for using their broadsides at once. At this instant
indecision appeared among the pilots, who were mostly men of only a
little local experience, and that gained in vessels much smaller than
those they were now to conduct. Nelson, reverting afterwards to these
moments, said: "I experienced in the Sound the misery of having the
honour of our Country intrusted to pilots, who have no other thought
than to keep the ship clear of danger, and their own silly heads clear
of shot. At eight in the morning of the 2d of April, not one pilot
would take charge of a ship." There is in these words scarcely fair
allowance for the men's ignorance. At length one of the Masters of the
fleet, a Mr. Brierley, undertook to lead the column, and the signal to
weigh in succession was made. The leading ship got off handsomely, but
difficulties soon arose. Nelson's old "Agamemnon" was so anchored that
she could not weather the Middle Ground; she consequently did not get
into action at all. Two other ships, the "Bellona" and "Russell,"
seventy-fours, grounded on the east side of the Middle Ground, where
they remained fast. Although they could use their guns, and did use
them against those southern ships which Nelson particularly wanted
crushed, the disadvantages of distance, of position, and of general
helplessness, detracted exceedingly from their usefulness. The valid
British force was thus reduced by one-fourth,--to nine vessels.
Nelson's ship, the "Elephant," was following the "Bellona" and
"Russell," and he saw them ground. "His agitation during these moments
was extreme," says an eye-witness. "I shall never forget the
impression it made on me. It was not, however, the agitation of
indecision, but of ardent, animated patriotism panting for glory,
which had appeared within his reach, and was vanishing from his
grasp." He doubtless well knew the thinly veiled reproaches of
rashness, cast by timid counsels upon the daring, which even under
these disadvantages was to cover with confusion their prophecies of
disaster; but, as on many another day, and in that more famous
incident, a few hours later, in this same battle, his tenacious
purpose harbored no side-thought of retreat. "Before you receive
this," he had written to Lady Hamilton, "all will be over with
Denmark,--either your Nelson will be safe, and Sir Hyde Parker a
victor, or he, your own Nelson, will be laid low." The signal to
advance was kept flying, but new dispositions had to be made to meet
the new and adverse conditions.[32] The remaining ships were made to
close to the rear, as they anchored. The "Elephant" had been
originally assigned as antagonist to the biggest Danish ship, the
"Sjaelland," seventy-four; but, the "Bellona" having grounded, she now
dropped into the latter's berth immediately ahead of the "Glatton;"
and Nelson hailed the "Ganges," as she was passing, to place herself
as close as possible ahead of the "Elephant." This movement was
imitated by the "Monarch," which thus got the "Elephant's" position
abreast the "Sjaelland." Here, according to Danish accounts, the
contest stood for some time, until the "Defiance," Graves's flagship,
arriving, anchored ahead of the "Monarch," completing the line of nine
British ships. Captain Riou with his light division engaged the
Trekroner, and the Danish blockship next south of it, which was by him
terribly battered. From this moment, and for some time, to use
subsequent words of Nelson, "Here was no manoeuvring: it was downright
fighting."
Meanwhile Parker's division, which had weighed as agreed, was some
four miles off, beating up against Nelson's fair wind. It had not yet
come into action, and the anxious chief, ever doubtful of the result
of a step into which he had been persuaded, contrary, not, perhaps, to
his will, but certainly to his bent, watched the indecisive progress
of the strife with a mind unoccupied by any fighting of his own. Two
things were evident: that Nelson had met with some mishaps, and that
the Danish resistance was more prolonged and sturdier than he had
argued in the Council that it would be. Parker began to talk about
making the signal to leave off action, and the matter was discussed
between himself, his fleet-captain, and Otway, the captain of the
ship. The latter opposed the idea strongly, and at last, as a stay,
obtained the admiral's authority to go on board the "Elephant" and
learn how things were. He shoved off accordingly, but before he
reached Nelson the signal was made.
Nelson at the moment was walking the quarter-deck of the "Elephant,"
which was anchored on the bow of the Danish flagship "Dannebroge,"
engaging her and some floating batteries ahead of her. At this time,
Stewart says, "Few, if any, of the enemy's heavy ships and praams had
ceased to fire;" and, after mentioning various disappointments that
had befallen the smaller British vessels, besides the failure of three
heavy ships to reach their stations, he continues: "The contest, in
general, although from the relaxed state of the enemy's fire, it
might not have given much room for apprehension as to the result, had
certainly not declared itself in favour of either side. Nelson was
sometimes much animated, and at others heroically fine in his
observations. A shot through the mainmast knocked a few splinters
about us. He observed to me, with a smile, 'It is warm work, and this
day may be the last to any of us at a moment;' and then, stopping
short at the gangway, he used an expression never to be erased from my
memory, and said with emotion, 'but mark you, I would not be elsewhere
for thousands.'
"When the signal, No. 39, was made, the Signal Lieutenant reported it
to him. He continued his walk, and did not appear to take notice of
it. The lieutenant meeting his Lordship at the next turn asked,
'whether he should repeat it?' Lord Nelson answered, 'No, acknowledge
it.'[33] On the officer returning to the poop, his Lordship called
after him, 'Is No. 16 [For Close Action] still hoisted?' The
lieutenant answering in the affirmative, Lord Nelson said, 'Mind you
keep it so.' He now walked the deck considerably agitated, which was
always known by his moving the stump of his right arm. After a turn or
two, he said to me, in a quick manner, 'Do you know what's shown on
board the Commander-in-Chief, No. 39?' On asking him what that meant,
he answered, 'Why, to leave off action.' 'Leave off action!' he
repeated, and then added, with a shrug, 'Now damn me if I do.' He also
observed, I believe, to Captain Foley, 'You know, Foley, I have only
one eye--I have a right to be blind sometimes;' and then with an
archness peculiar to his character, putting the glass to his blind
eye, he exclaimed, 'I really do not see the signal.' This remarkable
signal was, therefore, only acknowledged on board the Elephant, not
repeated. Admiral Graves did the latter, not being able to
distinguish the Elephant's conduct: either by a fortunate accident, or
intentionally, No. 16 was not displaced.
"The squadron of frigates obeyed the signal, and hauled off. That
brave officer, Captain Riou, was killed by a raking shot, when the
Amazon showed her stern to the Trekroner. He was sitting on a gun, was
encouraging his men, and had been wounded in the head by a splinter.
He had expressed himself grieved at being thus obliged to retreat, and
nobly observed, 'What will Nelson think of us?' His clerk was killed
by his side; and by another shot, several of the marines, while
hauling on the main-brace, shared the same fate. Riou then exclaimed,
'Come then, my boys, let us all die together!' The words were scarcely
uttered, when the fatal shot severed him in two. Thus, and in an
instant, was the British service deprived of one of its greatest
ornaments, and society of a character of singular worth, resembling
the heroes of romance." Fortunately for the British, not a
ship-of-the-line budged. Graves had indeed transmitted the order by
repeating it, but as he kept that for close action also flying, and
did not move himself, the line remained entire throughout a period
when the departure of a single ship would have ruined all, and
probably caused its own destruction.
This incident of refusing to see the signal has become as hackneyed as
a popular ballad, and in its superficial aspect, showing Nelson as the
mere fighting man, who, like a plucky dog, could not be dragged off
his antagonist, might well now have been dismissed with the shortest
and most summary mention. Of late years doubt has been cast over the
reality of Nelson's disobedience, for the reason that Otway, whose
mission has already been noted, carried a verbal message that the
order was to be understood as permissive, leaving Nelson the liberty
to obey or not. From Otway's biography, however, it appears that the
signal was hoisted before he reached the "Elephant." Parker's
Secretary, Mr. Scott, has also stated distinctly, that "it was
arranged between the admirals, that, should it appear the ships which
were engaged were suffering too severely, the signal for retreat would
be made, to give Lord Nelson the option of retiring, if he thought
fit."[34]
On the other hand, without affirming positively, it should be said
that Nelson's own impressions do not seem to have agreed with Scott's.
Not only did he say, some hours after the fight, "Well, I have fought
contrary to orders, and I shall perhaps be hanged; never mind, let
them,"--which might pass as a continuation of the quarter-deck drama,
if such it was,--but his account of the matter to Lord Minto is not
consistent with any clear understanding, on his part, that he had such
liberty of action. Nearly a year later, in March, 1802, Minto writes:
"Lord Nelson explained to me a little, on Saturday last, the sort of
blame which had been imputed to Sir Hyde Parker for Copenhagen; in the
first place, for not commanding the attack in person, and in the next
place for making signals to recall the fleet during the action; and
everything would have been lost if these signals had been obeyed." If
Nelson understood that the signal was to be construed as permissive
only, it was extremely ungenerous, and most unlike Nelson, to have
withheld an explanation which extenuated, if it did not excuse, one of
the most dangerous and ill-judged orders that ever was conveyed by
flags; nor is it probable that Parker, if the understanding had been
explicit, would not have insisted with the Admiralty upon the fact,
when he was smarting under the general censure, which had led to talk
of an inquiry. It seems, also, unlikely that Nelson, having such a
contingency in view, would have failed to give explicit instructions
that his ships should not withdraw (as Riou's frigates did) unless he
repeated; nor is it easy to reconcile the agitation noted by Stewart
with a previous arrangement of the kind asserted.
What Parker said was, probably, simply one of those by-remarks, with
which an apprehensive man consoles himself that he reserves a chance
to change his mind. Such provision rarely entered Nelson's head when
embarking upon an enterprise in which "do or die" was the only order
for success. The man who went into the Copenhagen fight with an eye
upon withdrawing from action would have been beaten before he began.
It is upon the clear perception of this truth, and his tenacious grip
of it, that the vast merit of Nelson in this incident depends, and not
upon the disobedience; though never was disobedience more justified,
more imperative, more glorious. To retire, with crippled ships and
mangled crews, through difficult channels, under the guns of the
half-beaten foe, who would renew his strength when he saw the
movement, would be to court destruction,--to convert probable victory
into certain, and perhaps overwhelming, disaster. It was not, however,
only in superiority of judgment or of fighting quality that Nelson in
this one act towered like a giant above his superior; it was in that
supreme moral characteristic which enabled him to shut his eyes to the
perils and doubts surrounding the only path by which he could achieve
success, and save his command from a defeat verging on annihilation.
The pantomime of putting the glass to his blind eye was, however
unintentionally, a profound allegory. There is a time to be blind as
well as a time to see. And if in it there was a little bit of
conscious drama, it was one of those touches that not only provoke the
plaudits of the spectators, but stir and raise their hearts, giving
them both an example of heroic steadfastness, and also the assurance
that there is one standing by upon whom their confidence can repose to
the bitter end,--no small thing in the hour of hard and doubtful
battle. It had its counterpart in the rebuke addressed by him on this
very occasion to a lieutenant, who uttered some desponding words on
the same quarter-deck: "At such a moment, the delivery of a
desponding opinion, unasked, was highly reprehensible, and deserved
much more censure than Captain Foley gave you."
At two o'clock, an hour after the signal was made, the resistance of
the Danes had perceptibly slackened; the greater part of their line,
Stewart says, had ceased to reply. The flagship "Dannebroge" had been
on fire as early as half-past eleven, and the commander-in-chief,
Commodore Fischer, had felt necessary to shift his broad pendant to
the "Holstein," the second ship from the north flank. The "Dannebroge"
continued to fight bravely, losing two hundred and seventy killed and
wounded out of a total of three hundred and thirty-six, but at length
she was driven out of the line in flames, and grounded near the
Trekroner, where she blew up after the action. The "Sjaelland,"
seventy-four, next north of her, was likewise carried out of the line
by her cables being cut; while the "Holstein," and the northernmost
ship of all, the "Indfödsretten," were so shattered, the latter mainly
by Riou's frigates, that Fischer again shifted his flag, this time to
the Trekroner. The two southern flank ships, upon whom the most
concentrated attack was made, had also met with tremendous losses.
Their flags were shot away many times, till at the last, by a Danish
account, no one had time to raise them again, whence the impression
arose amongst the British that these vessels, as well as some others,
fought after having surrendered.
This incident, occurring in several cases, was the immediate cause of
Nelson's taking a step which both then and since has been blamed as an
unjustifiable stratagem. So much of the Danish fire south of the
Trekroner had ceased, that that wing could be looked upon as subdued;
some vessels were helpless, some had their flags down. Between himself
and the Trekroner, Nelson alleged, there was a group of four Danes,
unresisting and unmanageable, across and through which the battery was
firing, and the British replying. Ships which had struck repelled
boats sent to board them, and the batteries on Amag Island also fired
upon those boats, and over the surrendered Danes. That there was some
ground for the complaints made by him appears from the Danish
admission just quoted, as well as from several British statements;
Stewart's being explicit. Nelson accordingly sent a message ashore,
under a flag of truce, to the Crown Prince, who was in general
command, saying that if he were not allowed to take possession of his
prizes, he would have to burn them. The message ran:--
TO THE BROTHERS OF ENGLISHMEN, THE DANES.
Lord Nelson has directions to spare Denmark, when no longer
resisting; but if the firing is continued on the part of
Denmark, Lord Nelson will be obliged to set on fire all the
floating batteries he has taken, without having the power of
saving the brave Danes who have defended them.
NELSON AND BRONTE.
It was in the preparation and despatch of this note that Nelson gave
another illustration, often quoted, of his cool consideration of all
the circumstances surrounding him, and of the politic regard to effect
which he ever observed in his official intercourse with men. It was
written by his own hand, a secretary copying as he wrote. When
finished, the original was put into an envelope, which the secretary
was about to seal with a wafer; but this Nelson would not permit,
directing that taper and wax should be brought. The man sent was
killed before he could return. When this was reported to the admiral,
his only reply was, "Send another messenger;" and he waited until the
wax came, and then saw that particular care was exercised to make a
full and perfect impression of the seal, which bore his own arms.
Stewart said to him, "May I take the liberty of asking why, under so
hot a fire, and after so lamentable an accident, you have attached so
much importance to a circumstance apparently so trifling?" Nelson
replied, "Had I made use of the wafer, it would still have been wet
when presented to the Crown Prince; he would have inferred that the
letter was sent off in a hurry, and that we had some very pressing
reasons for being in a hurry. The wax told no tales."
A flag of truce in a boat asks no cessation of hostilities, except so
far as the boat itself is concerned. As for the message sent, it
simply insisted that the Danes should cease firing; failing which,
Nelson would resort to the perfectly regular, warlike measure of
burning their ships. As the ships were beaten, this might not be
humane; but between it and leaving them under the guns of both
parties, the question of humanity was only one of degree. If Nelson
could extort from the Danes a cessation of hostilities by such a
threat, he had a perfect right to do it, and his claim that what he
demanded was required by humanity, is at least colorable. It must be
observed, however, that he makes no suggestion of truce or
armistice,--he demands that firing shall be discontinued, or he will
resort to certain steps.
The Crown Prince at once sent back his principal aid-de-camp, with a
verbal message, which the latter reduced to writing, as follows:--
"His Royal Highness, the Prince Royal of Denmark, has sent me,
General Adjutant Lindholm, on board to his Britannic Majesty's
Vice-Admiral, the Right Honourable Lord Nelson, to ask the
particular object of sending the flag of truce."
To this Nelson replied in writing:--
"Lord Nelson's object in sending on shore a flag of truce is
humanity; he, therefore, consents that hostilities shall cease
till Lord Nelson can take his prisoners out of the prizes, and
he consents to land all the wounded Danes, and to burn or remove
his prizes."
This message concluded with a complimentary expression of hope that
good relations would be restored between the two nations, whom Nelson
always carefully spoke of as natural friends. It will be observed that
he again alludes only to the flag of truce sent by the boat, and, as
at first he demanded, so now he consents to a cessation of
hostilities, until he can secure his prisoners and remove his prizes.
If he could rightly remove his prizes, which he avowed as part of his
demand, then still more he could his own ships. This part of the
negotiation he took upon himself to settle; for discussion of any
further matters he referred Lindholm to Sir Hyde Parker, and the
Danish officer started for the "London" at the same time that the
English officer pushed off to carry Nelson's second message to the
Crown Prince. The latter had already sent orders to the batteries to
cease firing. The battle then ended, and both sides hoisted flags of
truce.
Nelson at once began to remove his ships, which had sufered more than
in any other battle he had ever fought. That he was fully aware of the
imminent necessity for some of them to withdraw, and of the advantage
the Danes had yielded him by accepting his terms, is indisputable, and
his own opinion was confirmed by that of two of his leading captains,
whom he consulted. This he never denied; but he did deny that he had
used a _ruse de guerre_, or taken unfair advantage of a truce. On the
score of humanity he had consented to a cessation of hostilities,
conditional upon his freedom to take out of the surrendered ships the
unwounded prisoners, and to remove the prizes. If the bargain was more
to his advantage than to that of the Danes--which is a matter of
opinion--it was none the less a bargain, of which he had full right to
reap the benefit. The Danes did not then charge him with taking an
unfair advantage. On the contrary, Lindholm, who was closely cognizant
of all that passed in relation to these negotiations, wrote to him:
"Your Lordship's motives for sending a flag of truce to our
Government can never be misconstrued, and your subsequent conduct has
sufficiently shown that humanity is always the companion of true
valour." The truce that then began was prolonged from day to day till
April 9th. During it both parties went on with their preparations for
war. "These few days," wrote Niebuhr, on the 6th, "have certainly been
employed in repairing the evil [of faulty preparation] as far as
possible." It is clear that the Danes understood, what Nelson's
message specified, a cessation of direct hostilities, not of other
movements. The British during the same days were putting bomb-vessels
in place, a perfectly overt act.
Nelson's success at Copenhagen was secured by address, as it had been
won by force. But it had been thoroughly won. "We cannot deny it,"
wrote Niebuhr, "we are quite beaten. Our line of defence is destroyed.
We cannot do much injury to the enemy, as long as he contents himself
with bombarding the city, docks, and fleet. The worst is the Crown
Batteries can be held no longer." Two or three days later he says
again: "The truce has been prolonged. The remaining half of our
defences are useless, now that the right wing is broken,--a defect
over which I have meditated uselessly many a time since last summer."
The result was due to Nelson's sagacious and emphatic advice as to the
direction and manner of the attack, by which the strong points of the
Danish positions were completely and unexpectedly turned. This plan,
it is credibly stated, he had formed before leaving England, although
he was not formally consulted by Parker until the 23d of March.
Having regard to the general political conditions, and especially to
the great combination of the North at this time directed against Great
Britain, the victory of Copenhagen was second in importance to none
that Nelson ever gained; while in the severity of the resistance, and
in the attendant difficulties to be overcome, the battle itself was
the most critical of all in which he was engaged. So conspicuous were
the energy and sagacity shown by him, that most seamen will agree in
the opinion of Jurien de la Gravière: "They will always be in the eyes
of seamen his fairest title to glory. He alone was capable of
displaying such boldness and perseverance; he alone could confront the
immense difficulties of that enterprise and overcome them."
Notwithstanding this, and notwithstanding that the valor of the
squadron, as manifested in its losses, was never excelled, no medals
were ever issued for the battle, nor were any individual rewards
bestowed, except upon Nelson himself, who was advanced in the peerage
to be a Viscount, and upon his immediate second, Rear-Admiral Graves,
who was made a Knight of the Bath. The cause for this action--it was
not a case of oversight--has never been explained; nor did Nelson
consider the reasons for it, which the Prime Minister advanced to him
in a private interview, at all satisfactory. If it was because a
formal state of war did not exist between Great Britain and Denmark,
the obvious reply of those engaged would be that they had hazarded
their lives, and won an exceptionally hard-fought fight, in obedience
to the orders of their Government. If, on the other hand, the Ministry
felt the difficulty of making an invidious distinction between ships
engaged and those not engaged, as between Nelson's detachment and the
main body under Parker, it can only be said that that was shirking the
duty of a government to reward the deserving, for fear lest those who
had been less fortunate should cry out. The last administration had
not hesitated to draw a line at the Battle of the Nile, even though
the mishap of so great an officer as Troubridge left him on the wrong
side. St. Vincent, positive as he was, had shrunk from distinguishing
by name even Nelson at the battle which had won for himself his title.
This naturally suggests the speculation whether the joint presence of
St. Vincent and Troubridge at the Admiralty was not the cause of this
futility; but nothing can be affirmed.
"First secure the victory, then make the most of it," had been
avowedly Nelson's motto before the Nile. In the Battle of Copenhagen
he had followed much the same rule. After beating the force
immediately opposed to him, he obtained the safe removal of his
detachment from the critical position in which it lay, by the shrewd
use made of the advantage then in his hands. This achieved, and his
ships having rejoined the main body, after various mishaps from
grounding, under the enemy's guns, which emphasized over and over the
adroit presence of mind he had displayed, it next fell to him to make
the most of what the British had so far gained; having regard not
merely to Denmark and Copenhagen, but to the whole question of British
interests involved in the Coalition of the Baltic States. Parker
intrusted to him the direct management of the negotiations, just as he
had given him the immediate command of the fighting.
One circumstance, which completely changed the political complexion of
affairs, was as yet unknown to him. On the night of March 24th the
Czar Paul had been murdered, and with him fell the main motive force
and support of the Armed Neutrality. Ignorant of this fact, Nelson's
one object, the most to be made of the victory, was to get at the
detachment of the Russian fleet--twelve ships--lying in the harbor of
Revel, before the breaking up of the ice allowed it to join the main
body at Cronstadt. The difficulty in the way lay not in Nelson's
hesitation to act instantly, nor in the power of the British fleet to
do so; it lay in the conflicting views and purposes of other persons,
of the Crown Prince and of Parker, the representatives of Denmark and
of Great Britain. Parker was resolved, so Nelson has told us, not to
leave Denmark hostile in his rear, flanking his line of communications
if he proceeded up the Baltic; and Nelson admits, although with his
sagacious daring he would have disregarded, that the batteries which
commanded the shoal ground above Copenhagen might have seriously
interrupted the passage. He was ready to run risks again for the very
adequate object mentioned. On the other hand the Crown Prince, while
recognizing the exposure of Copenhagen, feared to yield even to the
menace of bombardment, lest he should incur the vengeance of the Czar.
It was to find a middle term between these opposing motives that
Nelson's diplomacy was exerted.
On the 3d of April he went ashore to visit the Crown Prince, by whom
he was received with all possible attention. "The populace," says
Stewart, "showed a mixture of admiration, curiosity, and displeasure.
A strong guard secured his safety, and appeared necessary to keep off
the mob, whose rage, although mixed with admiration at his thus
trusting himself amongst them, was naturally to be expected. It
perhaps savored of rashness in him thus early to risk himself among
them; but with him his Country's cause was paramount to all personal
considerations." Nelson himself did not note these threatening
indications. Fond of observation, with vanity easily touched, and
indifferent to danger, he heard only homage in the murmurs about him.
"The people received me as they always have done; and even the stairs
of the palace were crowded, huzzaing, and saying, 'God bless Lord
Nelson.'"
His interview with the Crown Prince was private, only Lindholm being
present. It ranged, according to his private letter to Addington, over
the whole subject of the existing differences with Great Britain, and
the respective interests of the two states. The most important points
to be noticed in this personal discussion, which was preliminary to
the actual negotiation, are, first, Nelson's statement of the cause
for the presence of the British fleet, and, second, the basis of
agreement he proposed. As regards the former, to a question of the
Prince he replied categorically: The fleet is here "to crush a most
formidable and unprovoked Coalition against Great Britain." For the
second, he said that the only foundation, upon which Sir Hyde Parker
could rest his justification for not proceeding to bombardment, would
be the total suspension of the treaties with Russia for a fixed time,
and the free use of Danish ports and supplies by the British fleet.
These two concessions, it will be observed, by neutralizing Denmark,
would remove the threat to British communications, and convert Denmark
into an advanced base of operations for the fleet. Nelson did not have
great hope of success in negotiating, for he observed that fear of
Russia, not desire for war, was controlling the Prince. Therefore, had
he been commander-in-chief, he would at all risks have pushed on to
Revel, and struck the coalition to the heart there. "I make no
scruple," he wrote to St. Vincent after he had procured the armistice,
"in saying that I would have been at Revel fourteen days ago. No man
but those on the spot can tell what I have gone through, and do
suffer. I wanted Sir Hyde to let me at least go and cruise off
Carlscrona, [where the Swedish fleet was,] to prevent the Revel ships
getting in. Think of me, my dear Lord, and if I have deserved well,
let me retire; if ill, for heaven's sake supersede me, for I cannot
exist in this state." Pegasus was indeed shackled.
The truce was continued from day to day, both sides preparing to renew
hostilities, while the negotiators sat. Discussing thus, sword in
hand, Nelson frankly told the other side that he wanted an armistice
for sixteen weeks, to give him time to act against the Russian fleet,
and then to return to Denmark. On the likely supposition that the
latter would not greatly grieve over a Russian disaster, this openness
was probably discreet. In the wrangling that preceded consent, one of
the Danes hinted, in French, at a renewal of hostilities. "Renew
hostilities!" said Nelson, who understood the language, but could not
speak it, "tell him that we are ready at this moment; ready to bombard
this very night." But, while he thus could use on occasion the
haughty language of one at whose back stood a victorious fleet of
twenty ships-of-the-line, "the best negotiators in Europe," to repeat
his own words, his general bearing was eminently conciliatory, as
became one who really longed for peace in the particular instance, and
was alive to the mingled horror and inutility of the next move open to
Great Britain, under Parker's policy,--the bombardment of Copenhagen.
"Whoever may be the respective Ministers who shall sign the peace,"
wrote to him Count Waltersdorff, who with Lindholm conducted the
Danish case and signed the armistice, "I shall always consider your
lordship as the Pacificator of the North, and I am sure that your
heart will be as much flattered by that title, as by any other which
your grateful Country has bestowed upon you."
Had Paul lived, the issue might have been doubtful, and in that case
England might well have rued the choice of a commander-in-chief whose
chief function was to hamstring her greatest seaman; but the Danes
received word of the murder, and on the 9th of April an agreement was
reached. There was to be a cessation of hostilities for fourteen
weeks, during which Denmark suspended her part in the Armed
Neutrality, and would leave her ships of war in the same state of
unpreparedness as they then were. The British fleet was at liberty to
get supplies in all Danish ports. In return, it was merely stipulated
that no attacks should be made on any part of the coast of Denmark
proper. Norway[35] and the Danish colonies were not included, nor was
Holstein. In a letter to Addington, Nelson pointed out that as a
military measure, which it was, the result was that the hands of
Denmark were tied, those of the fleet loosed, its communications
secured, its base of supplies advanced, and last, but far from least,
the timid counsels of its commander-in-chief disconcerted; no excuse
for not advancing being left. Besides, as he said, to extort these
concessions he had nothing in his hand but the threat of bombardment,
which done, "we had done our worst, and not much nearer being
friends." Sir Hyde would not have advanced.
As a military negotiation it is difficult to conceive one more
adroitly managed, more perfectly conducive to the ends in view, or, it
may be added, more clearly explained. The Government, with
extraordinary dulness, replied in that patronizing official tone of
superior wisdom, which is probably one of the most exasperating things
that can be encountered by a man of such insight and action as Nelson
had displayed. "Upon a consideration of all the circumstances, His
Majesty has thought fit to approve." "I am sorry," replied Nelson,
"that the Armistice is only approved under _all_ considerations. Now I
own myself of opinion that every part of the _all_ was to the
advantage of our King and Country." As First Lord of the Admiralty,
old St. Vincent had to transmit this qualified approval; but he wrote
afterwards to Nelson: "Your Lordship's whole conduct, from your first
appointment to this hour, is the subject of our constant admiration.
It does not become me to make comparisons: all agree there is but one
Nelson."
The armistice being signed and ratified, the fleet on the 12th of
April entered the Baltic; the heavy ships having to remove their guns,
in order to cross the "Grounds," between the islands of Amager and
Saltholm. Nelson was left behind in the "St. George," which, for some
reason, was not ready. "My commander-in-chief has left me," he wrote
to Lady Hamilton, "but if there is any work to do, I dare say they
will wait for me. _Nelson will be first_. Who can stop him?" "We have
reports," he says again, "that the Swedish fleet is above the
Shallows, distant five or six leagues. All our fellows are longing to
be at them, and so do I, as great a boy as any of them, for I consider
this as being at school, and going to England as going home for the
holidays, therefore I really long to finish my task." His confidence
in himself and in his fortune was growing apace at this time, as was
both natural and justifiable. "This day, twenty-two years," he writes
soon after, on the 11th of June, "I was made a Post-Captain by Sir
Peter Parker. If you meet him again, say that I shall drink his health
in a bumper, for I do not forget that I owe my present exalted rank to
his partiality, although I feel, if I had even been in an humbler
sphere, that Nelson would have been Nelson still." Although always
reverently thankful to the Almighty for a favorable issue to events,
there does not seem to have been in him any keen consciousness of
personal dependence, such as led Moltke to mark the text, "My strength
is made perfect in weakness."
While thus lying, about twenty-four miles from the main body, a report
came that the Swedish squadron had put to sea. Alarmed lest a battle
might take place in his absence, Nelson jumped into a boat alongside,
and started for a six hours' pull against wind and current to join the
fleet, in haste so great that he refused even to wait for a boat
cloak. "His anxiety lest the fleet should have sailed before he got on
board one of them," tells the officer who was with him, "is beyond all
conception. I will quote some expressions in his own words. It was
extremely cold, and I wished him to put on a great coat of mine which
was in the boat: 'No, I am not cold; my anxiety for my Country will
keep me warm. Do you not think the fleet has sailed?' 'I should
suppose not, my Lord.' 'If they are, we shall follow then to
Carlscrona in the boat, by G--d!'--I merely state this to show how his
thoughts must have been employed. The idea of going in a small boat,
rowing six oars, without a single morsel of anything to eat or drink,
the distance of about fifty leagues, must convince the world that
every other earthly consideration than that of serving his Country,
was totally banished from his thoughts." Such preoccupation with one
idea, and that idea so fine, brings back to us the old Nelson, who
has found himself again amid the storm and stress of danger and of
action, for which he was created.
About midnight he reached the "Elephant," where his flag was again
hoisted; but he did not escape unharmed from the exposure he had too
carelessly undergone. "Since April 15," he wrote several weeks
afterwards to Lady Hamilton, "I have been rapidly in a decline, but am
now, thank God, I firmly believe, past all danger. At that time I
rowed five hours in a bitter cold night. A cold struck me to the
heart. On the 27th I had one of my terrible spasms of heart-stroke,
which had near carried me off, and the severe disappointment of being
kept in a situation where there can be nothing to do before August,
almost killed me. From that time to the end of May I brought up what
every one thought was my lungs, and I was emaciated more than you can
conceive."
The fleet proceeded in a leisurely manner toward Carlscrona, Nelson
chafing and fretting, none the less for his illness, under the
indecision and dilatoriness that continued to characterize Parker's
movements. "My dear friend," he had written to Lady Hamilton, "we are
very lazy. We Mediterranean people are not used to it." "Lord St.
Vincent," he tells his brother, "will either take this late business
up with a very high hand, or he will depress it; but how they will
manage about Sir Hyde I cannot guess. I am afraid much will be said
about him in the public papers; but not a word shall be drawn from me,
for God knows they may make him Lord Copenhagen if they please, it
will not offend me." But now that Denmark has been quieted, he cannot
understand nor tolerate the delay in going to Revel, where the
appearance of the fleet would checkmate, not only Russia, but all the
allied squadrons; for it would occupy an interior and commanding
position between the detachments at Revel, Cronstadt, and Carlscrona,
in force superior to any one of them. "On the 19th of April," he
afterwards wrote bitterly to St. Vincent, "we had eighteen ships of
the line and a fair wind. Count Pahlen [the Russian Cabinet Minister]
came and resided at Revel, evidently to endeavour to prevent any
hostilities against the Russian fleet there, which was, I decidedly
say, at our mercy. Nothing, if it had been right to make the attack,
could have saved one ship of them in two hours after our entering the
bay; and to prevent their destruction, Sir Hyde Parker had a great
latitude for asking for various things for the suspension of his
orders." That is, Parker having the fleet at his mercy could have
exacted terms, just as Nelson himself had exacted them from Denmark
when Copenhagen was laid open; the advantage, indeed, was far greater,
as the destruction of an organized force is a greater military evil
than that of an unarmed town. This letter was written after Nelson had
been to Revel, and seen the conditions on which he based his opinion.
So far from taking this course,--which it may be said would have
conformed to instructions from his Government then on their way, and
issued after knowing Paul's death,--Parker appeared off Carlscrona on
April 20th. Two days afterwards he received a letter from the Russian
minister at Copenhagen, saying that the Emperor had ordered his fleet
to abstain from all hostilities. Parker apparently forgot that he was
first a naval officer, and only incidentally a diplomatist; for,
instead of exacting guarantees which would have insured the military
situation remaining unchanged until definite agreements had been
reached, he returned to Kioge Bay, near Copenhagen, but within the
Shallows, leaving the Revel squadron untrammelled, either by force or
pledge, free to go out when the ice allowed, and to join either the
Swedes or its own main body. Accordingly, it did come out a fortnight
later, went to Cronstadt, and so escaped the British fleet.
While on this cruise towards Carlscrona, Nelson became involved in a
pen-and-ink controversy about Commodore Fischer, who had commanded the
Danish line at the Battle of Copenhagen,--one of two or three rare
occasions which illustrate the vehemence and insolence that could be
aroused in him when his vanity was touched, or when he conceived his
reputation to be assailed. Fischer, in his official report of the
action, had comforted himself and his nation, as most beaten men do,
by dwelling upon--and unquestionably exaggerating--the significance of
certain incidents, either actual, or imagined by the Danes; for
instance, that towards the end of the battle, Nelson's own ship had
fired only single guns, and that two British ships had struck,--the
latter being an error, and the former readily accounted for by the
fact that the "Elephant" then had no enemy within easy range. What
particularly stung Nelson, however, seems to have been the assertion
that the British force was superior, and that his sending a flag of
truce indicated the injury done his squadron. Some of his friends had
thought, erroneously in the opinion of the author, that the flag was
an unjustifiable _ruse de guerre_, which made him specially sensitive
on this point.
His retort, addressed to his Danish friend, Lindholm, was written and
sent in such heat that it is somewhat incoherent in form, and more
full of abuse than of argument, besides involving him in
contradictions. That the British squadron was numerically superior in
guns seems certain; it would have been even culpable, having ships
enough, not to have employed them in any case, and especially when the
attacking force had to come into action amid dangerous shoals, and
against vessels already carefully placed and moored. In his official
report he had stated that the "Bellona" and "Russell" had grounded;
"but although not in the situation assigned them, yet so placed as to
be of great service." In the present dispute he claimed that they
should be left out of the reckoning, and he was at variance with the
Danish accounts as to the effect of Riou's frigates. But such errors,
he afterwards admitted to Lindholm, may creep into any official
report, and to measure credit merely by counting guns is wholly
illusory; for, as he confessed, with exaggerated humility, some months
later, "if any merit attaches itself to me, it was in combating the
dangers of the shallows in defiance of the pilots."
He chose, however, to consider that Fischer's letter had thrown
ridicule upon his character, and he resented it in terms as violent as
he afterwards used of the French admiral, Latouche Tréville, who
asserted that he had retired before a superior force; as though
Nelson, by any flight of imagination, could have been suspected of
over-caution. Fischer had twice shifted his broad pendant--that is,
his own position--in the battle; therefore he was a coward. "In his
letter he states that, after he quitted the Dannebrog, she long
contested the battle. If so, more shame for him to quit so many brave
fellows. _Here_ was no manoeuvring: _it was_ downright fighting, and
it was his duty to have shown an example of firmness becoming the high
trust reposed in him." This was probably a just comment, but not a
fair implication of cowardice. "He went in such a hurry, if he went
before she struck, which but for his own declaration I can hardly
believe, that he forgot to take his broad pendant with him." This
Lindholm showed was a mistake. "He seems to exult that I sent on shore
a flag of truce. Men of his description, if they ever are victorious,
know not the feeling of humanity.... Mr. Fischer's carcase was safe,
and he regarded not the sacred call of humanity." This letter was sent
to Lindholm, to be communicated to the Crown Prince; for, had not
Fischer addressed the latter as an eye-witness, Nelson "would have
treated his official letter with the contempt it deserved." Lindholm
kept it from Fischer, made a temperate reply defending the latter, and
the subject there dropped.
On the 25th of April the fleet was at anchor in Kioge Bay, and there
remained until the 5th of May, when orders arrived relieving Parker,
and placing Nelson in chief command. The latter was utterly dismayed.
Side by side with the unquenchable zeal for glory and for his
Country's service had been running the equally unquenchable passion
for Lady Hamilton; and, with the noble impulses that bore him up in
battle, sickness, and exposure, had mingled soft dreams of flight from
the world, of days spent upon the sunny slopes of Sicily, on his
estate of Bronté, amid scenes closely resembling those associated with
his past delights, and with the life of the woman whom he loved. To
this he several times alludes in the almost daily letters which he
wrote her. But, whether to be realized there or in England, he panted
for the charms of home which he had never known. "I am fixed," he
tells her, "to live a country life, and to have many (I hope) years of
comfort, which God knows, I never yet had--only moments of
happiness,"--a pathetic admission of the price he had paid for the
glory which could not satisfy him, yet which, by the law of his being,
he could not cease to crave. "I wish for happiness to be my reward,
and not titles or money;" and happiness means being with her whom he
repeatedly calls Santa Emma, and his "guardian angel,"--a fond
imagining, the sincerity of which checks the ready smile, but elicits
no tenderness for a delusion too gross for sympathy.
Whatever sacrifices he might be ready to make for his country's
service, he was not willing to give up all he held dear when the real
occasion for his exceptional powers had passed away; and the
assurances that the service absolutely required his presence in the
Baltic made no impression upon him. He knew better. "Had the command
been given me in February," he said, "many lives would have been
saved, and we should have been in a very different situation; but the
wiseheads at home know everything." Now it means expense and
suffering, and nothing to do beyond the powers of an average officer.
"Any other man can as well look about him as Nelson." "Sir Thomas
Troubridge," he complains, after enumerating his grievances, "had the
nonsense to say, now I was a Commander-in-Chief I must be pleased.
Does he take me for a greater fool than I am?" It was indeed shaving
pretty close to insult to send out a man like Nelson as second, when
great work was in hand, and then, after he had done all his superior
had permitted, and there was nothing left to do, to tell him that he
was indispensable; but to be congratulated upon the fact by a Lord of
the Admiralty, which Troubridge then was, was rather too much. He
could not refuse to accept the command, but he demanded his relief in
terms which could not be disregarded. His health, he said, made him
unequal to the service. For three weeks he could not leave his cabin.
"The keen air of the North kills me." "I did not come to the Baltic
with the design of dying a natural death."
Parker had no sooner departed than Nelson made the signal for the
fleet to weigh, and started at once for Revel. He did not know whether
or not the Russian ships were still there, and he felt that the change
of sovereigns probably implied a radical change of policy; but he
understood, also, that the part of a commander-in-chief was to see
that the military situation was maintained, from day to day, as
favorable as possible to his own country. He anticipated, therefore,
by his personal judgment, the instructions of the Cabinet, not to
enter upon hostilities if certain conditions could be obtained, but to
exact of the Russian Government, pending its decision, that the Revel
ships should remain where they were. "My object," he said, writing the
same day he took command, "_was_ to get at Revel before the frost
broke up at Cronstadt, that the twelve sail of the line might be
destroyed. I shall _now_ go there as a friend, _but the two fleets
shall not form a junction_, if not already accomplished, unless my
orders permit it." For the same reason, he wrote to the Swedish
admiral that he had no orders to abstain from hostilities if he met
his fleet at sea. He hoped, therefore, that he would see the wisdom of
remaining in port.
His visit to Revel, consequently, was to wear the external appearance
of a compliment to a sovereign whose friendly intentions were assumed.
To give it that color, he took with him only twelve ships-of-the-line,
leaving the others, with the small vessels of distinctly hostile
character, bombs, fireships, etc., anchored off Bornholm Island, a
Danish possession. The resolution to prevent a junction was contingent
and concealed. On the 12th the squadron arrived in the outer bay of
Revel, and a complimentary letter, announcing the purpose of his
coming, was sent to St. Petersburg. The next day he paid an official
visit to the authorities, when his vanity and love of attention
received fresh gratification. "Except to you, my own friend, I should
not mention it, 'tis so much like vanity; but hundreds come to look at
Nelson, '_that is him, that is him_,' in short, 'tis the same as in
Italy and Germany, and I now feel that a good name is better than
riches, not amongst our great folks in England; but it has its fine
feelings to an honest heart. All the Russians have taken it into their
heads that I am like _Suwaroff, Le jeune Suwaroff_;" thus confirming
the impression made upon Mrs. St. George at Dresden.
On the 16th of May a letter arrived from Count Pahlen, the Russian
minister. The Czar declined to see a compliment in the appearance in
Russian waters of so formidable a force, commanded by a seaman whose
name stood foremost, not merely for professional ability, but for
sudden, resolute, and aggressive action. "Nelson's presence," Niebuhr
had written, "leads us to think, judging of him by his past conduct,
that a furious attack will be made upon our harbor;" and he himself
had recorded with complacency that a Danish officer, visiting the
"London," upon learning that he was with the fleet in the Kattegat,
had said, "Is he here? Then I suppose it is no joke, if he is come."
"The Baltic folks will never fight me, if it is to be avoided." "The
Emperor, my Master," wrote Pahlen, "does not consider this step
compatible with the lively desire manifested by His Britannic Majesty,
to re-establish the good intelligence so long existing between the two
Monarchies. The only guarantee of the loyalty of your intentions that
His Majesty can accept, is the prompt withdrawal of the fleet under
your command, and no negotiation with your Court can take place, so
long as a naval force is in sight of his ports."
Nelson had of course recognized that the game was lost, as soon as he
saw that the Russian fleet was gone. The conditions which had mainly
prompted his visit were changed, and the Russian Government was in a
position to take a high tone, without fear of consequences. "After
such an answer," he wrote indignantly to St. Vincent, "I had no
business here. Time will show; but I do not believe he would have
written such a letter, if the Russian fleet had been in Revel." "Lord
Nelson received the letter a few minutes before dinner-time," wrote
Stewart. "He appeared to be a good deal agitated by it, but said
little, and did not return an immediate reply. During dinner, however,
he left the table, and in less than a quarter of an hour sent for his
secretary to peruse a letter which, in that short absence, he had
composed. The signal for preparing to weigh was immediately made; the
answer above-mentioned was sent on shore; and his Lordship caused the
fleet to weigh, and to stand as far to sea as was safe for that
evening."
Nelson took hold of Pahlen's expression, that he had come "with his
whole fleet" to Revel. Confining himself to that, he pointed out the
mistake the minister had made, for he had brought "not one-seventh of
his fleet in point of numbers." He mentioned also the deference that
he had paid to the Revel authorities. "My conduct, I feel, is so
entirely different to what your Excellency has expressed in your
letter, that I have only to regret, that my desire to pay a marked
attention to His Imperial Majesty has been so entirely misunderstood.
That being the case, I shall sail immediately into the Baltic."
Retiring thus in good order, if defeated, he had the satisfaction of
knowing that it was not his own blunder, but the wretched dilatoriness
of his predecessor, that had made the Czar, instead of the British
admiral, master of the situation.
Stopping for twenty-four hours at Bornholm on the way down, Nelson on
the 24th anchored in Rostock Bay, on the German coast of the Baltic,
and there awaited the relief he confidently expected. He had scarcely
arrived when a second letter from Pahlen overtook him. The minister
expressed his regret for any misunderstanding that had arisen as to
the purpose of his first visit, and continued, "I cannot give your
excellency a more striking proof of the confidence which the Emperor
my Master reposes in you, than by announcing the effect produced by
your letter of the 16th of this month. His Imperial Majesty has
ordered the immediate raising of the embargo placed upon the English
merchant ships." Nelson plumed himself greatly upon this result of his
diplomacy. "Our diplomatic men are so slow. Lord St. Helens told me
that he hoped in a month he should be able to tell me something
decisive. Now, what can take two hours I cannot even guess, but
Ministers must do something for their diamond boxes. I gained the
unconditional release of our ships, which neither Ministers nor Sir
Hyde Parker could accomplish, by showing my fleet. Then they became
alarmed, begged I would go away, or it would be considered as warlike.
On my complying, it pleased the Emperor and his ministers so much,
that the whole of the British shipping were given up." There is
nothing like the point of view; but it must be admitted that Nelson
extricated himself from an unpleasant position with great good temper
and sound judgment.
He remained in his flagship between Rostock and Kioge Bay, until
relieved by Vice-Admiral Pole on the 19th of June. Nothing of official
importance occurred during these three weeks; for the naval part of
the Baltic entanglement was ended, as he had foreseen. A pleasant
picture of his daily life on board the "St. George" at this time has
been preserved for us by Colonel Stewart: "His hour of rising was four
or five o'clock, and of going to rest about ten; breakfast was never
later than six, and generally nearer to five o'clock. A midshipman or
two were always of the party; and I have known him send during the
middle watch[36] to invite the little fellows to breakfast with him,
when relieved. At table with them, he would enter into their boyish
jokes, and be the most youthful of the party. At dinner he invariably
had every officer of the ship in their turn, and was both a polite and
hospitable host. The whole ordinary business of the fleet was
invariably despatched, as it had been by Earl St. Vincent, before
eight o'clock. The great command of time which Lord Nelson thus gave
himself, and the alertness which this example imparted throughout the
fleet, can only be understood by those who witnessed it, or who know
the value of early hours.... He did not again land whilst in the
Baltic; his health was not good, and his mind was not at ease; with
him, mind and health invariably sympathized."
While thus generally pleasant on board ship, he resolutely refused
intercourse with the outside world when not compelled by duty. In this
there appears to have been something self-imposed, in deference to
Lady Hamilton. There are indications that she felt, or feigned, some
jealousy of his relations with others, especially with women,
corresponding to the frenzied agitation he manifested at the
association of her name with that of any other man, and especially
with that of the then Prince of Wales. Whatever her real depth of
attachment to him, her best hope for the future was in his constancy,
and that he would eventually marry her; for Sir William's death could
not be far distant, and matters might otherwise favor the hope that
both he and she cherished. Her approaching widowhood would in fact
leave her, unless her husband's will was exceptionally generous, in a
condition as precarious, her acquired tastes considered, as that from
which her marriage had rescued her; and her uneasiness would naturally
arouse an uncertain and exacting temper, as in the old days at Naples,
when Hamilton could not make up his mind. The condition of Nelson's
health furnished him an excuse for declining all civilities or calls,
even from a reigning prince, on the ground that he was not well enough
to go ashore and return them. Soon after this, however, he was able to
write Lady Hamilton that he was perfectly recovered. "As far as
relates to health, I don't think I ever was stronger or in better
health. It is odd, but after severe illness I feel much better." Thus
he was, when definitely informed that his relief was on the way. "To
find a proper successor," said Lord St. Vincent, when announcing the
fact to him, "your lordship knows is no easy task; for I never saw the
man in our profession, excepting yourself and Troubridge, who
possessed the magic art of infusing the same spirit into others, which
inspired their own actions; exclusive of other talents and habits of
business, not common to naval characters." "I was so overcome
yesterday," wrote Nelson to Lady Hamilton, "with the good and happy
news that came about my going home, that I believe I was in truth
scarcely myself. The thoughts of going do me good, yet all night I was
so restless that I could not sleep. It is nearly calm, therefore
Admiral Pole cannot get on. If he was not to come, I believe it would
kill me. I am ready to start the moment I have talked with him one
hour."
On the 19th of June Nelson left the Baltic in the brig "Kite," and on
the 1st of July landed at Yarmouth.
FOOTNOTES:
[22] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxvii. p. 445.
[23] _Ante_, vol. i. pp. 199-202.
[24] Nelson to Lady Hamilton. Pettigrew, vol. i. pp. 442-444.
[25] Pitt had resigned from office since then.
[26] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxvii. p. 446.
[27] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxvii., art. "Layman."
[28] That is, from north to south. It may be well to notice that to go from
the Kattegat to the Baltic is _up_, although from north to south.
[29] Trekroner, which was then a favorite military name in Denmark, refers
to the three Crowns of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, once united.
[30] They are to be found in Nicolas's "Despatches and Letters of Lord
Nelson," vol. iv. p. 304.
[31] Except numbers 4 and 5, whose stations, as has been said, were abreast
the two southernmost Danes.
[32] The following is the order of the ships in the column of attack, as
originally prescribed:--
1. Edgar, 74. 2. Ardent, 64. 3. Glatton, 54. 4. Isis, 50. 5. Agamemnon, 64.
6. Bellona, 74. 7. Elephant, 74. 8. Ganges, 74. 9. Monarch, 74. 10.
Defiance, 74. 11. Russell, 74. 12. Polyphemus, 64.
[33] To acknowledge a signal is simply to hoist a flag, showing that it has
been seen and understood. To repeat is to hoist the signal yourself, thus
transmitting it as an order to those concerned.
[34] Life of Rev. Dr. A.J. Scott, p. 70
[35] Norway was then attached to the Danish Crown, as now to that of
Sweden.
[36] Midnight to four A.M.