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THE LIFE OF NELSON
THE EMBODIMENT OF THE SEA POWER OF GREAT BRITAIN
BY
CAPTAIN A.T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D.
UNITED STATES NAVY
AUTHOR OF "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783,"
"THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE,"
AND OF A "LIFE OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT"
IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. II.
LONDON
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, & COMPANY, _LIMITED_
1897
CONTENTS OF VOL. II.
CHAPTER XIV.
NELSON TEMPORARILY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.--RELIEVED
BY LORD KEITH.--APPLIES TO RETURN TO ENGLAND ON ACCOUNT OF ILL HEALTH.
AUGUST, 1799--JUNE, 1800.
Nelson left in temporary command
His disposition of the squadron
Made Duke of Bronté in Sicily
His hopes of remaining in command disappointed
His discontent
Energy and tact in exercising command
Affairs in Rome and Naples
Nelson visits Minorca
His anxiety about Malta
Portuguese squadron recalled to Lisbon.--Nelson's action
Characteristics of his intercourse with foreign officials
Urgency with army to support blockade of La Valetta
Partial success in this
Successes on the Continent of the Coalition against France
Subsequent blunders and disasters
Nelson's mortification at Bonaparte's escape to France
The French defeat the Turks at Aboukir
Nelson peremptorily forbids Sidney Smith to allow any French
to leave Egypt
Smith nevertheless countenances the Convention of El Arish
His action disallowed by Keith and Nelson
Nelson's vivid expressions of disapproval
Nelson joins Keith at Leghorn
They visit Palermo and Malta together
Capture of "Le Généreux," 74, by Nelson's division
Nelson's relations with Keith, and bearing towards him
Keith orders Nelson to take personal charge off Malta
Nelson's annoyance and remonstrance
His restiveness under Keith's command
He returns from Malta to Palermo
The "Guillaume Tell," 80, captured in his absence
Displeasure of the Admiralty at his quitting his station
Letters of the First Lord
Nelson's soreness under them
He applies for leave to return to England
CHAPTER XV.
NELSON LEAVES THE MEDITERRANEAN.--THE JOURNEY OVERLAND
THROUGH GERMANY.--ARRIVAL IN ENGLAND.--SEPARATION
FROM LADY NELSON.--HOISTS HIS FLAG IN THE CHANNEL
FLEET, UNDER LORD ST. VINCENT.
JUNE, 1800--JANUARY, 1801.
Nelson escorts the Queen of Naples to Leghorn with two British
ships-of-the-line
Keith's displeasure
Nelson at Leghorn
Austrians defeated at Marengo
Nelson and the Hamiltons leave Leghorn for Ancona
Journey to Trieste and Vienna
Enthusiasm shown towards Nelson by the people
Mention of him and Lady Hamilton by eye-witnesses
Anecdotes of him
His meeting with the Archduke Charles at Prague
Mrs. St. George's account of him at Dresden
Her disparaging mention of Lady Hamilton
Arrival of the party in England
Lady Nelson's attitude at this time
Her letters to Nelson
His reception and conduct in London
Growing estrangement between him and Lady Nelson
Anecdote of his visit to Fonthill
Final breach with Lady Nelson
Her blameless character, and subsequent life
Nelson's testimony to her conduct
Hoists his flag on board the "San Josef" at Plymouth
Birth of the child Horatia
Nelson's care to conceal his relations with Lady Hamilton
CHAPTER XVI.
THE EXPEDITION TO THE BALTIC AND BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN.--NELSON
RETURNS TO ENGLAND.
FEBRUARY--JUNE, 1801.
Origin of the trouble between Great Britain and Denmark
The entrance of the Czar Paul into the quarrel
Renewal of the Armed Neutrality of 1780
Relations of Bonaparte to this event
Nelson joins the fleet under Sir Hyde Parker, at Yarmouth
Relations between him and Parker
Nelson's disapproval of the plans for the expedition
Evident change in his general disposition
Anecdote of Nelson and the turbot
The fleet collected off the Skaw
Parker's slowness and Nelson's impatience
Alarming reports of the Danes' preparations
Nelson's attitude and counsels
Accuracy of his judgment of the conditions
Tact and discretion in his dealings with Parker
His letter to Parker upon the general situation
Parker's indecision
Nelson's plans adopted
The fleet passes the Sound
Detail and discussion of Nelson's plan of operations
His feelings and speech in the Council of War
Nelson's division anchors south of Copenhagen
Nelson on the night before the battle
The Danish dispositions for defence
Nelson's Plan of Attack--Detail and discussion
The Battle of Copenhagen
Parker makes the signal to leave off action
Nelson refuses to repeat it
Discussion of this incident
Incidents of the battle
Nelson addresses a letter to the Crown Prince under a flag of
truce
Characteristic anecdote
Discussion of the sending of the flag of truce
The battle discontinued
Nelson removes his ships
Completeness of his success
Merit of his conduct throughout
He is advanced in the peerage to be a Viscount
No other rewards, or medals, bestowed for this action
Negotiations intrusted to Nelson by Parker
The murder of the Czar Paul
Armistice for fourteen weeks concluded with Denmark
Qualified approval of the British Government
The British fleet enters the Baltic
Nelson's ardor and personal recklessness.--Anecdote
Parker's sluggishness of action.--Nelson's impatience
Russia intimates her purpose to abstain from hostilities
Nelson's controversy with the Danish Commodore Fischer
Parker ordered home, and Nelson left in command
Dissatisfaction of the latter
His longing to return to Lady Hamilton
He insists upon being relieved, on account of his health
He starts at once with the fleet for Revel
Displeasure manifested by the Czar Alexander
Nelson withdraws from Revel to Rostock
The Czar thereupon raises the embargo on British merchant
ships
Nelson's elation over this result of his conduct
Details of his life on board
His avoidance of social relations outside the ship
Relieved by Admiral Pole, and returns to England
CHAPTER XVII.
NELSON COMMANDS THE "SQUADRON ON A PARTICULAR SERVICE,"
FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE COAST OF ENGLAND AGAINST INVASION.--SIGNATURE
OF PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE WITH
FRANCE.
JULY-OCTOBER, 1801.
Nelson's longing for repose
His services immediately required again
His reluctant consent
Bonaparte's threats of invasion
Inadequacy of British preparations for coast-defence
Nature of British apprehensions in 1801
Nelson's Memoranda for the Defence of the Thames
Analysis and discussion of this paper
St. Vincent's sagacious views on national defence
Apparent divergence between him and Nelson
Nelson hoists his flag again
His tact and courtesy towards others
Activity of his movements
Satisfied that there can be no invasion
Boat attack upon the vessels before Boulogne
Its disastrous failure
Nelson's distress
His exasperation at being kept afloat
His alienation from Troubridge
Annoyances of his situation
Death of Commander Parker.--Nelson's grief
His liberality in money matters
Pecuniary embarrassments
Signature of the preliminaries of peace
Nelson's satisfaction at the prospect of release
His indignation at the excessive elation of others
Receives leave of absence and goes home
CHAPTER XVIII.
RELEASE FROM ACTIVE SERVICE DURING THE PEACE OF AMIENS.--HOME
LIFE AT MERTON.--PUBLIC INCIDENTS.
OCTOBER, 1801--MAY, 1803.
Nelson makes his home with the Hamiltons
His letter of final severance to his wife
His relations to his stepson, Josiah Nisbet
Desire to have a home of his own
Lady Hamilton selects Merton for him
The purchase effected, and the Hamiltons reside with him
Position of Sir William and of Lady Hamilton in the house
Differences between them
Minto's account of the household at Merton
Reminiscence of the same by Nelson's nephew
Incident narrated by Lieutenant Layman
Recollections of Nelson by the vicar's daughter
Nelson's strong religious sense of Divine Providence
Takes his place in the House of Lords
His controversy about rewards for the Battle of Copenhagen
His action justified
Nelson's warm and avowed sympathy with his followers
His consistent maintenance of the ground assumed
His interest in public questions
Dissatisfaction with the general conduct of the Admiralty
His sense of neglect
Embarrassment in money matters
Inadequacy of his pension to his services
His doubts as to the continuance of peace
His antagonism to Bonaparte illustrated
Speech in seconding the address to the throne
Designated for the Mediterranean in case of war
Volunteers his services
Hoists his flag in the "Victory," and sails
Breaks in his home-ties during this period
Death of his father
Death of Sir William Hamilton
Hamilton's expressed confidence in Nelson
Relations of Nelson's family to Lady Nelson and to Lady Hamilton
CHAPTER XIX.
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.--THE LONG
WATCH OFF TOULON.--OCCUPATIONS OF A COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.
MAY, 1803--JANUARY, 1805.
Changed political conditions in the Mediterranean
Attitude of the Great Powers
Situation of Spain and Portugal
Policy of the Italian States
Nelson's sense of the importance of the Mediterranean
Bonaparte's policy
The course advocated by Nelson
Accuracy of his general forecast
Impatience to reach his station
Unwilling detention off Ushant
Quits the "Victory," and proceeds in a frigate
Momentary stop in Gibraltar
Arrival at Malta
Extensive correspondence
Policy as regards the Two Sicilies
His impatience with blind observance of orders
Departure from Malta for Toulon
Emotions at the sight of Naples
Opinion on Malta's value to England
Strategic importance of Malta and Gibraltar
Nelson joins the fleet before Toulon
Bad condition of the ships
His skilful administration of the fleet
Difficulty of obtaining supplies
His attitude towards Spain
Importance of Sardinia in Nelson's eyes
The valuable anchorage at Madalena
Station taken by him off Toulon
Fears loss of Sardinia, and serious consequences
Significance of Napoleon's inactivity in the Mediterranean
The winter rendezvous of the fleet.--Number
Seamanlike care of ships and spars
Preserves health of seamen by constant activity
Sanitary conditions of the fleet
His personal health, and anxieties
Fears a break-down
Speculations as to French intentions
Characteristic distrust of Frenchmen
Increasing perplexities
Firmness of his resolution
The French manoeuvre outside Toulon
Nelson's tactical conclusions and arrangements
His care to impart his ideas to his officers
Methods of intercourse with them
Exasperation at a statement of Latouche Tréville
Endeavors to force or to lure the French to sea
Effect of worry upon his mind
His last promotion.--Vice-Admiral of the White
Wearing effect of protracted monotony
Refuses to let Lady Hamilton join him
The daily life on board
Account of Nelson's health and habits
Occupations in business hours
Diplomatic ability and conciliatory temper
Sharp reply to remonstrance about blockades
Difficulties with Algiers
Nelson's diligent pursuit of information
Interest in listening to conversations
Examination of foreign journals and captured letters
Kindliness in intercourse with others
Exercise of official patronage
Protection of British trade
Want of frigates and small cruisers
Collection and protection of convoys
Nelson applies for sick leave
Desire to return to the station afterwards
Leave is granted by the Admiralty
The Mediterranean Station divided
Sir John Orde given the portion west of Gibraltar
Nelson's dissatisfaction and complaints
His change of mind about going home
Learns Cornwallis's order to seize Spanish treasure-ships
Directs captains under his orders not to obey
Letter illustrative of the characteristics of his orders
Adequacy of his measures to the requirements of the case
Determines not to use his leave of absence
Orde arrives off Cadiz
Indications of the French fleet leaving Toulon
Nelson receives word of the seizure of Spanish ships
Promptness of his measures.--Reasons therefor
Rumors of French departure
Annoyances caused Nelson by Orde
The mission of the frigate "Amazon"
Nelson's hope of meeting the French fleet
Opinions on general subjects
Sympathetic insight into Bonaparte's purposes
The French fleet sails from Toulon
CHAPTER XX.
THE ESCAPE AND PURSUIT OF THE TOULON FLEET.--NELSON'S
RETURN TO ENGLAND.
JANUARY-AUGUST, 1805.
Object of Napoleon's combinations in 1805
Details of his plan
Nelson's share in thwarting it
The difficulties of one dealing with Napoleon
Nelson's guiding principle
The sailing of the Toulon fleet
Nelson's movements and perplexities
Goes to Alexandria
Returns to Gulf of Palmas, Sardinia
British disasters in Western Mediterranean
Characteristic letter of Nelson in behalf of an officer
Explanations to the Admiralty about his own course
Makes a round off Toulon and Barcelona to deceive the enemy
Returns to the Gulf of Palmas
The Toulon fleet sails again
Its movements and those of Nelson
Distress and misfortunes of the latter
Learns that the French fleet has passed the Straits
Thoroughness and sagacity of his measures
Continued head winds and distress of mind
The excitement in London
Gloom at the Admiralty
Nelson's constancy against bad fortune
Hears that the French and Spaniards are gone to the West
Indies
Determines to follow them there
Sails in pursuit
Incidents of the voyage
Arrives in Barbadoes
Misled by false information
Rapid measures to retrieve the mis-step
Infers that the enemy have returned to Europe
He starts back immediately for Gibraltar
His judgments rapid, but not precipitate
Strength of his convictions
Relief from the anxiety previously felt
Movements of the allies and of Nelson
Precautions of the latter
His own explanation of his reasons
Discussion of this utterance
Indecisive engagement between the allies and Sir Robert Calder
Alarm in London at the failure of the latter
Nelson's protracted pursuit and mental depression
Reaches the Straits again
Appreciation of his action by others
Exchange of views between Nelson and Collingwood
Movements of Villeneuve, Calder, and Nelson
Nelson's arrival in Gibraltar
Subsequent rapid movements
Learns the news brought by the "Curieux"
Starts at once for the northward
Joins the Channel Fleet off Ushant
Leaves his squadron with Cornwallis, and proceeds to England
Anchors at Spithead
His sympathy with Calder
Tenacity of his opinions
CHAPTER XXI.
NELSON'S LAST STAY IN ENGLAND.
AUGUST 19--SEPTEMBER 15, 1805.
Nelson hauls down his flag and goes to Merton
Interviews with the Admiralty
His one meeting with Wellington
Interview with Lord Castlereagh
Popular demonstrations of affection
Home life at Merton
Presentiments
Intimations of early summons into service
News arrives that the combined fleets are in Cadiz
Determination of the British Government
Nelson's opinion on the License System
His services requested by the Government
Lady Hamilton's part in his decision
It is settled that he return to the Mediterranean
His health and spirits
His insistence upon the need for numbers
Final departure from home
Flag re-hoisted on board the "Victory"
Anecdote of Nelson and the gypsy
CHAPTER XXII.
THE ANTECEDENTS OF TRAFALGAR.
SEPTEMBER--OCTOBER 19, 1805.
Popular demonstrations when Nelson embarked
The passage to Cadiz
Precautions to deceive the enemy
His reception by the officers of the fleet
The "Plan of Attack" of May, 1805
The "Nelson Touch"
Discussion and comparison of these two papers
Comparison between the second and the Battle of Trafalgar, as
fought
Nelson and Sir Robert Calder
Nelson's concession to Calder, and his own comments upon it
His disposition of the fleet before Cadiz
His fear lest the enemy should evade him
Growing presentiments, and cheerful calmness
Anecdote showing his considerateness
Necessity for sending away a detachment
Numbers of the British, and of the allies in Cadiz
Nelson's general intentions, made known to his subordinates
The enemy begins to leave Cadiz
CHAPTER XXIII.
TRAFALGAR.--THE DEATH OF NELSON.
OCTOBER 19-21, 1805.
Numbers and composition of the opposing fleets
Difficulties of the allies in leaving port
Respective movements of the two fleets
Nelson's last letter to Lady Hamilton
His last letter to his child
Events and incidents of October 20
Relative positions of the fleets at midnight
Conditions at daybreak of the 21st
The manoeuvres of the two fleets
Nelson's intercourse with Blackwood on the 21st
He bequeaths Lady Hamilton and Horatia to the care of his
Country
The hostile fleets forming for battle
Nelson's impatience to close the enemy
The anxiety of others for his personal safety
The order of the allies while awaiting attack
Nelson's last prayer as entered in his journal
The origin and development of his famous signal
The battle opens
The "Victory" comes under fire
Nelson bids Blackwood a final farewell
Exposure and loss of life on board the "Victory"
The "Victory" breaks the enemy's line
Her duel with the "Redoutable"
Nelson falls, mortally wounded
The death-scene in the cockpit
The decisive hour of the battle
The second and closing phase of the battle
Nelson's anxiety about Hardy
Hardy's first visit to his death-bed
The final exchange of shots
Hardy's second visit and Nelson's farewell
The last moments
The death of Nelson
The close of the fight
The significance of Nelson's life
The perfect fulfilment of his life's work
INDEX
CHAPTER XIV.
NELSON TEMPORARILY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.--RELIEVED
BY LORD KEITH.--APPLIES TO RETURN TO ENGLAND ON ACCOUNT OF ILL HEALTH.
AUGUST, August 1799--JUNE, 1800. AGE, 41.
Upon Keith's departure, the command in the Mediterranean devolved upon
Nelson, who for some time remained in doubt of the fact, but with his
usual promptitude acted as if all depended upon himself. "I am
venturing certainly out of my line of duty, but as the
commander-in-chief may not even be on the station, I must do the best
which my judgment points out during his temporary absence." Six
sail-of-the-line, under Admiral Duckworth, were sufficient for service
at Gibraltar and Cadiz, if the latter port was deserted. Four of the
line were about Minorca, constantly, though inefficiently, threatened
from the adjacent coasts of Spain. Three were blockading Malta,
conjointly with the Portuguese vessels. Sidney Smith with his division
remained in the Levant. Troubridge was operating with a few ships on
the coast of Italy, against Civita Vecchia, still in the hands of the
French. A small squadron was maintained on the Riviera of Genoa,
disturbing the communications of the French, and keeping touch with
the advance of the Austro-Russians; but it was expected that the
Russian fleet, as was natural and proper, would soon assume the duty
of co-operating with their general, Suwarrow. The smaller British
cruisers were distributed among these various duties. The flagship
"Foudroyant" was at Palermo, whither the King returned from Naples on
the 8th of August, and there the headquarters of the squadron remained
during Nelson's command. Soon after this arrival in Palermo the King
conferred upon him the title of Duke of Bronté, with an estate of the
same name in Sicily, valued at £3,000 per annum. After this the
admiral for a time signed his papers as Bronté Nelson,[1] changed
subsequently to Bronté Nelson of the Nile, and finally settled down to
Nelson and Bronté, which was his form of signature for the last four
years of his life. He placed upon his new estate an annual charge of
£500 in favor of his father for the term of the latter's life.
"Receive this small tribute, my honoured father," he wrote, "as a mark
of gratitude to the best of parents from his most dutiful son."
On the 20th of September he received letters from the Admiralty,
investing him with the chief command, "till the return of Lord Keith
or some other your superior officer." He was not, however, allowed the
appointments of a commander-in-chief, and often complained of the
inadequacy of his staff to the extent of his duties. Nelson naturally
hoped that his long and eminent services in that particular field, and
the conspicuous ability he had shown on so many occasions, would lead
to the station remaining permanently in his hands, and that Lord
Keith, who was now in England, would succeed in due course to the
Channel Fleet, whose commander, Lord Bridport, soon after retired. The
Mediterranean was naturally attributed to a vice-admiral, and one of
some seniority; but Nelson was now a rear-admiral of the Red, the
highest color, not far, therefore, from promotion, and it would not be
an unreasonable conclusion that the same ministry which had been
fortunate enough to choose him for the campaign of the Nile, might now
prefer to entrust to such able and enterprising hands the great
interests of the Mediterranean at large.
It was not, however, to be so. Whether moved only by routine
considerations of rank, as afterwards at Copenhagen, or whether his
relations with the Sicilian Court, his conduct of affairs at Naples,
and his collisions with Keith, had excited doubt of the normal balance
of his mind, the Admiralty decided to send Keith back, and Nelson,
greatly to his mortification, was kept in charge only till the end of
the year. As St. Vincent had always left him practically independent,
he had known no superior since he entered the Straits, except during
Keith's brief period of succession, when leagues of sheltering
distance left him free, as has been seen, to defy orders when not in
accordance with his views; and he found it impossible now to bow his
will to the second place on the very field of his glory. To this
feeling, natural in any man, and doubly so to one of Nelson's quick
susceptibilities, at once stimulated and soothed by the lavish
adulation of the past year, was added personal dislike to his new
superior, aggravated, if not originated, by the clash of judgment over
the relative importance of Naples and Minorca. "I have serious
thoughts of giving up active service," he wrote to Minto; "Greenwich
Hospital seems a fit retreat for me after being _evidently_ thought
unfit to command in the Mediterranean." Complaints of Keith's lack of
consideration then abound, nor does he seem to be conscious that there
was anything in his mode of life, in current rumor, or in his past
relations with his new commander-in-chief, which might make the latter
unwilling to give him the loose rein St. Vincent had done.
From the time that Keith left the Mediterranean in July, 1799, to
Nelson's own departure a year later, there was little to be done in
the naval way except to maintain and press existing advantages, and
wait until the fruit was ready to drop. The absolute supremacy of the
British squadrons, challenged for a moment by the incursion of Admiral
Bruix, had reverted, in even greater degree than before, by the
absence of the Spanish ships which had accompanied him to Brest.
Impeded by their own numbers, and paralyzed by the insufficiency of
the resources of the port, they remained there a huge, inert mass,
whose impotence was only partially understood by the British; a fact
which conduced to prolong Keith's presence in the Channel. The year
under consideration was therefore devoid of stirring events at sea.
In the Mediterranean, it is true, Nelson's unwearying mental energy,
and keen sense of the necessity of seizing opportunity, did not allow
things to lapse into indolence. Whether or not he was well advised to
settle himself at Palermo, aware as he must have been of the actual
temptation, and of the serious injury that scandal was doing to his
reputation, both professional and personal, may admit of doubt. With
numerous detached and minor services carrying on at the same moment,
there was much to be said for the commander-in-chief remaining in a
fixed position, near the centre of affairs; and in his apprehension
everything then revolved about the Kingdom of Naples. There can be no
question, however, that all his faculties were constantly on the
alert; and that his administration of the station until Keith's return
was characterized by the same zeal, sagacity, and politic tact that he
had shown in earlier days. It is admirable to note the patience,
courtesy, and adroit compliment, he brings into play, to kindle, in
those over whom he has no direct control, the ardor for the general
good, and the fearlessness of responsibility, which actuate himself;
and at the same time to observe how severe the strain was upon his
nervous and irritable temper, as betrayed in comments upon these very
persons, made in private letters which he never expected would see the
light.
The points of principal importance were the consolidation of the
royal power in the continental territory of the Two Sicilies, the
reduction of Malta, and the retention of the French army in Egypt in
entire isolation from France. For the first, Nelson entirely failed in
his efforts to induce the King to trust himself again in Naples, as
the Hamiltons and he had expected when they came back to Palermo. "My
situation here is indeed an uncomfortable one," he said to Earl
Spencer; "for plain common sense points out that the King should
return to Naples, but nothing can move him." "Our joint exertions have
been used to get the King to go to Naples," he wrote to Troubridge,
"but of no avail; the Austrians will be there before him." Although
the French had been expelled from all the Neapolitan dominions, the
presence of fifteen hundred in Rome and Civita Vecchia served then as
an excuse. Nelson implored the commander of the British troops at
Minorca to spare twelve hundred of his men, to aid Troubridge on the
Roman coast. "Sir Charles Stuart," he tells him flatteringly, "by his
timely exertion saved this Kingdom [Sicily] from anarchy and
confusion, and perhaps from rebellion. So it is now, my dear Sir, I
trust, in your power (and I have assured the good King and Queen of
your readiness to serve them and the good cause as much as Sir
Charles) to send for the taking possession of Civita Vecchia and Rome;
this done, and with my life, I will answer for the success of the
expedition. All would be quiet and happy; and their Sicilian Majesties
might return to their throne without any alarm from mobs.... I am sure
I need not venture to say more on the subject. Your Excellency's
judgment and heart will point out the necessity of the measure if it
can be accomplished." "Our King would be much gratified that _Britain_
not _Austria_ should reinstate the Pope."
Sir James Erskine, thus importuned, did not see his way to sending the
troops. Naturally, as a soldier, he did not rely as much upon the
navy preventing a landing in his island, as upon his own powers of
resistance after it was effected, and was therefore unwilling to spare
from the latter. The point of view of a seaman was, and is, different.
He complained, too, that Duckworth had taken a great many ships to
Gibraltar. Nelson admits the mistake, and expresses his regret, but no
word of dissatisfaction with Erskine transpires through his evident
disappointment. He only says, "Pardon what I am going to repeat, that
either in Malta or on the Continent, a field of glory is open."
"Minorca," he wrote to Spencer, "I have never yet considered in the
smallest danger, but it has been a misfortune that others have thought
differently from me on that point." Towards the end of September,
Troubridge, without the aid of British troops, but supported by the
arrival of a division sent by Suwarrow, reported the evacuation of
Rome and Civita Vecchia. "How happy you have made us!" wrote Nelson to
him. "My pen will not say what I feel." The King, however, would not
return to Naples, now that this obstacle was withdrawn. "The Queen has
a noble generous disposition," said Nelson two months later.
"Unfortunately the King and her Majesty do not at this moment draw
exactly the same way; therefore, his Majesty will not go at this
moment to Naples, where his presence is much wanted." "We do but waste
our breath," he avowed afterwards.
In the beginning of October, a visit which he had intended making to
Minorca was hastened by a report that thirteen hostile
ships-of-the-line had been seen off Cape Finisterre, and it was
thought they might be destined for the Mediterranean. Nelson hoped to
assemble ten to meet them; but the news proved to be false. He left
Palermo for this trip on the 5th of October, and returned again on the
22d, having remained five days in Port Mahon. The arrangements for the
naval force, depending entirely upon himself, were soon settled; but
he was disappointed in obtaining, as he had hoped to do from a
personal interview with Erskine, a detachment of two thousand troops
for Malta. About that island he was, to use his own words, almost in
despair. For over a year La Valetta had been blockaded by land and
sea. For the latter he could with difficulty find ships; for the
former he could obtain no men to aid the islanders, who, half
starving, dependent for food chiefly upon Sicily, were sustained in
their resistance mainly by hatred of the invaders, and by the tactful
appeals and encouragement of Captain Ball, who lived ashore among
them. The Barbary pirates, by virtue of their war with Naples,
captured many of the vessels laden with supplies, despite Nelson's
passports; while the Sicilian Court, though well disposed, lacked the
energy and the propelling force necessary to compel the collection and
despatch of the needed grain. On one occasion Troubridge or Ball,
desperate at the sight of the famine around them, sent a ship of war
into Girgenti, a Sicilian port, seized, and brought away two
corn-laden vessels. "The measure was strong," said Nelson, but he
refrained from censuring; and, while apologizing to the Government,
added he hoped it "would not again force officers to so unpleasant an
alternative." He feared that in their misery the Maltese would abandon
the struggle, particularly if they got wind of the purpose of Great
Britain to restore the hated Order of Knights, in deference to the
wishes of the Czar. "The moment the French flag is struck," he had
been obliged to write to Ball, "the colours of the Order must be
hoisted and no other; when it was settled otherwise, the orders from
England were not so strong."
About this time came information that several ships were fitting out
at Toulon, with supplies for the besieged. This increased Nelson's
anxieties, and at the same time emphasized the necessity which he had
always urged of using speedier and surer means to reduce the place,
while the undisputed mastery of the sea gave the opportunity. "What
might not Bruix have done, had he done his duty?" was his own comment
upon that recent incursion; and who could tell how soon as great a
force might appear again under an abler man? He turned in every
direction, and was instant in his appeals for aid. He wrote to Acton
that he had positive information that seven ships were loaded in
Toulon. "I therefore beg leave to propose to your Excellency, whether
under our present circumstances, it would not be right for his
Sicilian Majesty to desire that the English garrison at Messina should
instantly go to Malta, for I am clear, that if Malta is relieved, that
our forces got together could not take it, and the commencement of a
new blockade would be useless. All the Barbary cruisers would there
have their rendezvous, and not a vessel of his Sicilian Majesty's
could put to sea." He exhorts the minister also to apply to the
Russians for immediate help at Malta.
At the same time, to augment his embarrassments, orders came from
Lisbon recalling the Portuguese squadron, which formed the larger part
of the sea blockade. Nelson forgot how often he had abused them as
useless, and grappled with that part of the difficulty with
characteristic boldness. He peremptorily forbade the admiral to obey
his orders. "As the reduction of the Island of Malta is of the
greatest consequence to the interests of the allied Powers at war with
France, and the withdrawing of the squadron under your command, at
this time, from the blockade of that island, will be of the most
ruinous consequences to their interests ... you are hereby required
and directed, in consideration of the above circumstances, and
notwithstanding the orders you may have received from your Court to
return to Lisbon, not on any consideration whatsoever to withdraw one
man from that island, which may have been landed from the squadron
under your Excellency's command, or detach one ship down the
Mediterranean, until further orders from me for that purpose." Your
orders, he tells Niza in a private letter, were founded upon the
belief that your presence was no longer necessary; "but the contrary
is the fact--for your services were never more wanted than at this
moment, when every exertion is wanting to get more troops of English
and Russians to Malta." He is evidently thinking of his difference
with Keith; but now he is within the limits of his commission as
Commander-in-chief. Doubting, however, whether his official authority
will prevail with Niza to disobey his recall, he plies him skilfully
with appeals to those sentiments of honor which had received such
illustration in his own noble career. "If you quit your most important
station till I can get" reliefs for you, "depend upon it, your
illustrious Prince will disapprove of (in this instance) your
punctilious execution of orders." "We shall soon get more troops from
Messina and Minorca; and I am not a little anxious for the honour of
Portugal and your Excellency, that you should be present at the
surrender. I hold myself responsible." "You was the first at the
blockade. Your Excellency's conduct has gained you the love and esteem
of Governor Ball, all the British officers and men, and the whole
Maltese people; and give me leave to add the name of Nelson as one of
your warmest admirers, as an officer and a friend."
As he dealt with the Portuguese admiral, so, in due measure, he
conducted his intercourse with all others who came within the scope of
his widely ranging activities. Already more Neapolitan than the King,
to the Russian he became as a Russian, to the Turk as a Turk, all
things to all men, if he could by any means promote the interest of
the Allied cause and save Malta. Amid the diverse and conflicting
motives of a coalition, Nelson played a steady hand, his attention
unified, and his sight cleared, by an unwavering regard to the single
object which he compressed into the words, "Down, down, with the
French!" In that sense, he asserts truthfully enough to each and all
of his correspondents that the advantage of their country and their
monarch is as dear to him as that of Great Britain. He touches with
artful skill upon the evident interests of each nation, appeals to the
officer's sense of the cherished desires of his sovereign, and, while
frankly setting forth the truths necessary to be spoken, as to the
comparative claims upon himself of the various portions of the field,
he insinuates, rather than suggests, what the person immediately
addressed ought to be doing in furtherance of the one great aim.
Withal, despite the uneasiness to which he is constantly a prey on
account of the failures of others, no lack of confidence in the one to
whom he is writing is suffered to appear. Each is not only exhorted
and cheered, but patted on the back with an implied approbation, which
in his own service constituted much of his well-deserved influence. He
is as hearty and generous in his praises to Sir Sidney Smith, whom he
never fully trusted, for his services at Acre, as he is to the valued
friend, and pattern of all naval efficiency, Troubridge. To the
Emperor of Russia he paid the politic attention of sending a detailed
report of all that had been done about Malta, made to him as Grand
Master of the Order,--a delicate and adroit flattery at the moment,
for the Czar then valued himself more as the restorer of an ancient
order of chivalry than as the inheritor of a great Sovereignty; and
his position was further recognized by asking of him the insignia of
the Order for Captain Ball and Lady Hamilton.
This immense load of correspondence and anxiety was additional to the
numerous unrecorded cares and interviews, relating to the routine work
and maintenance of a great squadron, often left bare of resources from
home, and to the support of the destitute population of Malta,--sixty
thousand souls; and all was carried on amid the constant going and
coming of the ambassador's house, kept open to naval officers and
others. This public sort of life and excitement involved considerable
expense, and was little to the taste of either Nelson or Hamilton,
the latter of whom was now approaching his seventieth year; but in it
Lady Hamilton was in all her glory, overwhelmed with compliments, the
victor of the Nile at her feet, and "making a great figure in our
political line," to use her husband's words. "Except to the Court,"
wrote Nelson, replying to a censure from the Admiralty for failing to
send a letter by a certain channel, when he had sent duplicates by two
other conveyances,--"except to the Court, till after eight o'clock at
night I never relax from business. I have had hitherto, the Board
knows, no one emolument--no one advantage of a Commander-in-chief." It
was in reference to this captious rebuff, received when immersed in
cares, that he wrote to Spencer: "Do not, my dear Lord, let the
Admiralty write harshly to me--my generous soul cannot bear it, being
conscious it is entirely unmerited."
While he was striving to gain assistance for the Maltese, he does not
forget to sustain them with hopes, not always too well founded. He
tells Ball he trusts the Messina troops will soon be with him. "You
may depend, in October, I will get 2,000 men on shore at Malta. Niza
is ordered to Lisbon, but I have directed his stay off Malta." He
appeals personally to the British commander at Messina, and to the
Russian minister at Palermo, reminding the latter how dear Malta and
its Order were to his sovereign. "Malta, my dear Sir, is in my
thoughts sleeping or waking." The Portuguese, he tells him, are
ordered home; but, wishing Russian assistance, he does not say that he
has stopped them,--as to which, indeed, he could not feel sure.
The same object pressed upon him while in Port Mahon, and he
succeeded, by his personal enthusiasm, in arousing Erskine's interest
in the matter; but the latter was loaded to the muzzle with
objections. "Sir James," said Nelson to Troubridge, with the amusing
professional prejudice they both entertained, "enters upon the
difficulty of the undertaking in a true soldier way." "I am just come
from Sir James," he wrote to Hamilton on the 13th of October. "He sees
all the difficulty of taking Malta in the clearest point of views, and
therefore it became an arduous task to make him think that with God's
blessing the thing was possible." He has, however, consented to
prepare fifteen hundred men with stores and equipments, but only on
condition that the Russians will also give a thousand,--a further
draft on Nelson's diplomacy,--and a thousand be landed from the
squadron, etc. Besides, there is the further difficulty that a
superior officer is expected from England, and what will he say? And
will Erskine be justified in sending men before his entirely uncertain
arrival? It may be imagined what such proceedings were to Nelson's
nervous, ardent, unhesitating temperament, and they elicited the
characteristic comment, "This has been my first conference. It has
cost me four hours hard labour, and may be upset by a fool." "My heart
is, I assure you, almost broke with this and other things," he wrote
to Spencer. "If the enemy gets supplies in, we may bid adieu to Malta.
This would complete my misery; for I am afraid I take all services too
much to heart. The accomplishing of them is my study, night and day."
"My dear Sir James," he writes to Erskine after returning to Palermo,
"I am in desperation about Malta--we shall lose it, I am afraid, past
redemption. I send you copies of Niza's and Ball's letters, also
General Acton's, so you will see I have not been idle." As it is, Ball
can hardly keep the inhabitants in hope of relief; what then will it
be if the Portuguese withdraw? "If the islanders are forced again to
join the French, we may not find even landing a very easy task, much
less to get again our present advantageous position. I therefore
entreat for the honour of our King, that whether General Fox is
arrived or not, at least the garrison of Messina may be ordered to
hold post in Malta until a sufficient force can be collected to
attack it.... I know well enough of what officers in your situation
can do; the delicacy of your feelings on the near approach of General
Fox I can readily conceive; but the time you know nothing about; this
is a great and important moment, and the only thing to be considered,
_is his Majesty's service to stand still for an instant?_ ... Was the
call for these troops known at home, would they not order them to
proceed when the service near at hand loudly calls for them? _this is
the only thing in my opinion for consideration_. If we lose this
opportunity it will be impossible to recall it." From this desperate
appeal he turns to Ball, with words of encouragement for his
islanders. "We shall soon hear to a certainty of at least 5,000
Russian troops for the service of Malta. Within a month I hope to see
10,000 men in arms against La Valetta. I have sent for Troubridge and
Martin, that I may get a force to relieve Niza. I trust he will not go
till I can get not only a proper force to relieve his ships, but those
of his people who are on shore." "The great order of all," he writes
Erskine three weeks later, "is to destroy the power of the French. Two
regiments for two months would probably, with the assistance of the
Russians, give us Malta, liberate us from an enemy close to our doors,
gratify the Emperor of Russia, protect our Levant trade, relieve a
large squadron of ships from this service, and enable me the better to
afford naval protection to the island of Minorca, and assist our
allies on the northern coast of Italy, and to annoy the enemy on the
coast of France."
Nelson's entreaties and efforts met with success, sufficient at least
to stay the ebbing tide. General Fox arrived in Minorca, gave
permission for the garrison of Messina to go to Malta, and on the 25th
of November Troubridge, bringing this news, arrived off Palermo.
Nelson's haste did not permit the "Culloden" to anchor. Shifting his
flag to a transport, he sent out the "Foudroyant" to meet her, with
orders for both to go to Messina, embark the garrison, and get off
Malta as soon as possible. The "Northumberland," seventy-four, was
also to join off Malta, forming a division to replace the Portuguese
squadron. The latter quitted the blockade in December, Nelson
notifying Niza on the 18th of the month that he no longer considered
him under his command. The Messina troops landed at Malta on the 10th.
The British then had fifteen hundred men on the island, supported by
two thousand Maltese, well disciplined and armed, besides a number of
native irregulars upon whom only partial dependence could be placed.
The Russians never came to take part. They got as far as Messina, but
there received orders to go to Corfu, both ships and men. This was in
pursuance of a change of policy in the Czar, who, being enraged at the
conduct of his allies, particularly of the Austrians, in the late
campaign, intended withdrawing from the Coalition, and was
concentrating troops at Corfu. This revived Nelson's fears for Malta.
"I trust Graham will not think of giving the island to the French by
withdrawing, till he receives orders from General Fox." The troops
remained, but in numbers too small to admit active operations. The
result was left perforce to the slow pressure of blockade; and final
success, insured mainly by Nelson's untiring efforts, was not attained
until after he had left the Mediterranean.
The six months of his independent command, though unmarked by striking
incidents at sea, were crowded with events, important in themselves,
but far more important as pregnant of great and portentous changes in
the political and military conditions of Europe. When Keith passed the
Straits in pursuit of the Franco-Spanish fleet, on the 30th of July,
the forces of the Coalition in Upper Italy were in the full tide of
repeated victories and unchecked success. On that same day the
fortress of Mantua, the siege of which in 1796 had stayed for nine
months the triumphal progress of Bonaparte, was surrendered by the
French, whose armies in the field, driven far to the westward, were
maintaining a difficult position on the crests of the Apennines.
Seeking to descend from there into the fields of Piedmont, they were
met by Suwarrow, and on the 15th of August, at Novi, received once
more a ruinous defeat, in which their commander-in-chief was slain.
At this moment of success, instead of pressing onward to drive the
enemy out of Italy, and possibly to pursue him into France, it was
decided that the Russians should be sent across the Alps into
Switzerland, to take the place of a number of Austrians. The latter,
in turn, were to move farther north, on the lower Rhine, to favor by a
diversion an intended invasion of Holland by a combined force of
Russians and British. This gigantic flank movement and change of plan
resulted most disastrously. In the midst of it the French general
Masséna, commanding in Switzerland, the centre of the great hostile
front which extended from the Mediterranean to the North Sea, made a
vehement and sustained attack upon the Austro-Russians at Zurich, on
the 25th of September. Gaining a complete victory, he drove the enemy
back beyond the point where Suwarrow expected to make his junction.
The veteran marshal, who had left Italy on the 11th of September,
arrived two days after the Battle of Zurich was fought. Isolated in
insufficient numbers from the friends he expected to meet, it was only
after severe hardships and superhuman efforts, extending over ten
days, that he at length, on the 9th of October, reached a place of
safety at Ilanz. Declining further co-operation with the Austrians,
and alleging the need of rest for his troops after their frightful
exposure in the mountains, he withdrew into winter quarters in Bavaria
at the end of the month. Thus Switzerland remained in possession of
the French, inactivity continued in Italy, and the Czar, furious at
the turn events had taken, was rapidly passing into hatred of both
Austria and Great Britain.
On the 9th of October, also, Bonaparte landed in France, after a six
weeks' voyage from Alexandria. The immense consequences involved in
this single event could not then be foreseen; but it none the less
caused mortification and regret to Nelson. It was a cardinal principle
with him, vehemently and frequently uttered, that not a single
Frenchman should be allowed to return from Egypt; and here their
commander-in-chief had passed successfully from end to end of the
station, unseen by any British cruiser. He did not, however, consider
himself at fault, and his judgment may be allowed, although in his own
case. "If I could have had any cruisers, as was my plan, off Cape Bon,
in Africa, and between Corsica and Toulon, Mr. Buonaparte could not
probably have got to France." This he said to Earl Spencer. Elsewhere
he wrote: "I have regretted sincerely the escape of Buonaparte; but
those ships which were destined by me for the two places where he
would certainly have been intercepted, were, from the Admiralty
thinking, doubtless, that the Russians would do something at sea,
obliged to be at Malta, and other services which I thought the Russian
Admiral would have assisted me in--therefore, no blame lies at my
door." He took some comfort in contrasting the stealthy return of the
French general, with the great armada that accompanied his departure.
"No Crusader ever returned with more humility--contrast his going in
L'Orient, &c. &c."
A report that Bonaparte had passed Corsica reached Nelson on October
24th. The same day came despatches from Sir Sidney Smith, narrating a
disastrous defeat sustained by the Turks on the shores of Aboukir Bay.
Smith's period of command in the Levant had been chiefly, and
brilliantly, distinguished by the successful defence of Acre against
Bonaparte. The latter, threatened by simultaneous attacks by the Turks
from Syria and from the sea, had determined to anticipate such a
combination by going himself against the enemy on the land side,
before the weather conditions made it possible to disembark any
formidable body of men on the shores of Egypt. Starting with this
purpose in February, he had proceeded with slight resistance until the
18th of March, when his army appeared before Acre. Smith was then
lying in the roads with two ships-of-the-line. The siege which ensued
lasted for sixty-two days, so great was Bonaparte's pertinacity, and
anxiety to possess the place; and in its course Smith displayed, not
only courage and activity, which had never been doubted, but a degree
of conduct and sound judgment that few expected of him. His division
was fortunate enough to capture the French siege train, which had to
be sent by water, and he very much disturbed the enemy's coastwise
communications, besides contributing materially to the direction of
the defence, to which the Turks, though brave enough, were not
adequate. After several desperate assaults the siege was raised on the
20th of May, and Bonaparte retreated to Egypt, regaining Cairo on the
14th of June.
Following up the success at Acre, a Turkish fleet of thirteen
ships-of-the-line anchored in Aboukir Bay on the 11th of July,
attended by a body of transports carrying troops, variously estimated
at from ten to thirty thousand. Smith with his ships accompanied the
expedition. The Turks landed, and stormed the castle of Aboukir; but
on the 25th Bonaparte, having concentrated his forces rapidly, fell
upon them and totally defeated them. All who had landed were either
killed, driven into the sea and drowned, or taken prisoners; the
commander-in-chief being among the latter. Four weeks later, as is
already known, Bonaparte embarked for France.
It was thus conclusively demonstrated that for the present at least,
and until the French numbers were further diminished by the inevitable
losses of disease and battle, the Turks could not regain control of
Egypt. On the other hand, it was equally evident, and was admitted by
both Bonaparte and his able successor, Kleber, that without
reinforcements, which could not be sent while the British controlled
the sea, the end of the French occupation was only a question of time.
After Bonaparte's departure, Kleber wrote home strongly to this
effect. His letters, being addressed to the Government, fell upon
arrival into Bonaparte's hands; but, with these convictions, he was
ready to enter into an arrangement for the evacuation of the country,
upon condition of being allowed to return freely to Europe.
Such also appears to have been the disposition of the British
representatives in the East. Immediately after taking over the command
in the Levant from Troubridge, Smith gave him, among other papers, a
form of passport which he intended to use, permitting individual
Frenchmen to go to Europe by sea. This Troubridge handed to Nelson,
telling him also that it was Smith's intention to send word into
Alexandria, that all French ships might pass to France. This passport,
adopted after Smith had been to Constantinople, had doubtless the
sanction of the joint minister, his brother, and was signed by himself
both as plenipotentiary and naval officer. Nelson had by this time
been instructed that Smith was under his command, and he at once sent
him an order, couched in the most explicit, positive, and peremptory
terms, which merit especial attention because Smith disobeyed them.
"_As this is in direct opposition to my opinion_, which is, _never to
suffer any one individual Frenchman to quit Egypt_--I must therefore
_strictly charge and command you_,[2] never to give any French ship or
man leave to quit Egypt. And I must also desire that _you will oppose
by every means in your power, any permission which may he attempted to
be given by any foreigner_, Admiral, General, or other person; and you
will acquaint those persons, that I shall not pay the smallest
attention to any such passport after your notification; and _you are
to put my orders in force, not on any pretence to permit a single_
_Frenchman to leave Egypt_." It seems clear from these expressions
that Nelson had gathered, through Troubridge, that it was the policy
of the Sultan and of the British representatives to get the French out
of Egypt at any cost,--to look, in short, to local interests rather
than to the general policy of the Allies. This he was determined to
prevent by instructions so comprehensive, yet so precise, as to leave
no loophole for evasion.
Here matters seem to have rested for a time. Smith could scarcely dare
to disregard such orders at once, and Bonaparte was not yet disposed
openly to confess failure by seeking terms. In the autumn of 1799,
however, the Earl of Elgin went to Constantinople as ambassador,
Spencer Smith dropping to secretary of embassy, and his brother
remaining on the Egyptian coast. Elgin was far from being in accord
with Smith's general line of conduct, which was marked with
presumption and self-sufficiency, and in the end he greatly deplored
the terms "granted to the French, so far beyond our expectation;" but
he shared the belief that to rid Egypt of the French was an end for
which considerable sacrifices should be made, and his correspondence
with Smith expressed this conviction. When prepossessions such as this
exist among a number of men associated with one another, they are apt,
as in the case of Admiral Man consulting with his captains, to result
in some ill-advised step, bearing commonly the stamp of concern for
local interests, and forgetfulness of general considerations. The
upshot in this particular instance was the conclusion of a Convention,
known as that of El Arish, between the Turks and the French, signed on
board Smith's ship on the 24th of January, 1800, by which this army of
veterans was to be permitted to return to France unmolested, and free
at once to take the field against the allies of Turkey and Great
Britain, at the moment when Bonaparte's unrivalled powers of
administration were straining every nerve, to restore the French
forces from the disorganization into which they had fallen, and to
prepare for the spring campaign.
Smith, though present, did not sign this precious paper, which, in a
letter to Hamilton, he called "the gratifying termination of his
labours;" but he had in his hand the orders of his immediate superior,
and temporary commander-in-chief, to notify any "foreigner, general,
or admiral," that the execution of such an agreement would not be
permitted by the British Navy, and it would have been his own duty to
stop any ships attempting to carry it out, until other orders were
received. His powers as joint plenipotentiary having ceased, he was
now simply the naval officer. As it happened, Keith, who by this time
had relieved Nelson, brought out from England clear directions from
the Government not to allow any transaction of this kind; and although
he personally favored the policy of evacuation, feeling perhaps the
inconvenience of detaching ships so far from his centre of operations,
he was not a man to trifle with orders. Rumors of what was going on
had evidently reached him, for on the 8th of January, a fortnight
before the convention was signed, he wrote to Kleber a letter, which
he directed Smith to deliver, thus placing it out of the power of that
very independent officer to leave any mistake as to actual conditions
in the mind of the French general. To the latter he said: "I have
positive orders not to consent to any capitulation with the French
troops, at least unless they lay down their arms, surrender themselves
prisoners of war, and deliver up all the ships and stores of the port
of Alexandria to the Allied Powers." Even in such case they would not
be allowed to leave Egypt until exchanged. Any persons that attempted
to return, pursuant to an arrangement with one of the Allies,
exclusive of the others, as the El-Arish Convention was, would be made
prisoners of war.
Nelson's opinions in this matter had never wavered. As rumors of what
was brewing got about, he wrote to the Earl of Elgin, on the 21st of
December, 1800: "I own my hope yet is, that the Sublime Porte will
never permit a single Frenchman to quit Egypt; and I own myself wicked
enough to wish them all to die in that country they chose to invade.
We have scoundrels of French enough in Europe without them." "I never
would consent to one of them returning to the Continent of Europe
during the war," he tells Spencer Smith. "I wish them to _perish_ in
Egypt, and give a great lesson to the world of the justice of the
Almighty." When Elgin, thinking him still commander-in-chief, sent him
the Convention, he replied formally: "I shall forward the papers to
Lord Keith, who will answer your Excellency. But I cannot help most
sincerely regretting that ever any countenance was given to the Turks
to enter into such a treaty with the French; for I ever held it to be
impossible to permit that army to return to Europe, but as prisoners
of war, and in that case, not to France. And was I commander-in-chief,
even when the thing was done, I should have refused to ratify any
consent or approbation of Sir Sidney Smith, and have wrote to both the
Grand Vizir and the French General, the impossibility of permitting a
vanquished army to be placed by one Ally in a position to attack
another Ally." The last phrase put the facts in a nutshell, and
illustrates well Nelson's power of going straight to the root of a
matter, disregardful of confusing side-issues, of policy or timidity.
To Hamilton he wrote passionately concerning the manifold difficulties
caused to all, except the Turks and the Smiths. "If all the wise heads
had left them to God Almighty, after the bridge was broke, all would
have ended well. For I differ entirely with my commander-in-chief, in
wishing they were permitted to return to France; and, likewise, with
Lord Elgin on the great importance of removing them from Egypt."
"I have wrote to Lord Keith, and home," said Nelson to Sir Sidney
Smith on the 15th of January, "that I did not give credit that it was
possible for you to give any passport for a single Frenchman, much
less the Army, after my positive order of March 18th, 1799." The words
show what reports had already got about of the general trend of
policy, on the part of the Porte and the British representatives; but
the irony of the matter as regards Nelson is, that Smith disobeyed his
orders, as he himself, six months before, had disobeyed Keith's; and
for the same reason, that he on the spot was a better judge of local
conditions and recent developments than one at a distance. To one,
Naples was more important than Minorca, more important than a
half-dozen ships in a possible fleet action; to the other, Egypt was
more important than the presence of sixteen thousand veterans, more or
less, on a European battle-field. It is impossible and bootless, to
weigh the comparative degree of culpability involved in breaches of
orders which cannot be justified. It is perhaps safe to say that while
a subordinate has necessarily a large amount of discretion in the
particular matter intrusted to him, the burden of proof rests wholly
upon him when he presumes to depart from orders affecting the general
field of war, which is the attribute of the commander-in-chief. What
in the former case may be simply an error of judgment, in the latter
becomes a military crime.
On the 16th of January, 1800, Nelson, who some days before had been
notified by Keith of his approach, and directed to place himself under
his command, left Palermo for Leghorn, arriving on the 20th. The
commander-in-chief was already there in the "Queen Charlotte." On the
25th they sailed together for Palermo, and after nine days' stay in
that port went on again for Malta, which they reached on the 15th of
February. No incident of particular interest occurred during these
three weeks, but Nelson's letters to the Hamiltons show that he was
chafing under any act in his superior which could be construed into a
slight. "I feel all, and notwithstanding my desire to be as humble as
the lowest midshipman, perhaps, I cannot submit to be much lower, I am
used to have attention paid me from his superiors." "To say how I miss
your house and company would be saying little; but in truth you and
Sir William have so spoiled me, that I am not happy anywhere else but
with you, nor have I an idea that I ever can be." Keith's comment--the
other point of view--is worth quoting. "Anything absurd coming from
the quarter you mention does not surprise me," he wrote to Paget, who
succeeded Hamilton as minister. "The whole was a scene of fulsome
vanity and absurdity all the _long_ eight days I was at Palermo."[3]
When Keith returned, the capture of Malta, and of the two
ships-of-the-line which had escaped from the Battle of the Nile, were,
by common consent, all that remained to do, in order to round off and
bring to a triumphant conclusion Nelson's Mediterranean career.
Fortune strove hard against his own weakness to add all these jewels
to his crown, but she strove in vain. "We may truly call him a
_heaven_-born Admiral, upon whom fortune smiles wherever he goes." So
wrote Ball to Lady Hamilton, alluding to the first of the favors flung
at his head. "We have been carrying on the blockade of Malta sixteen
months, during which time the enemy never attempted to throw in great
succours. His Lordship arrived off here the day they were within a few
leagues of the island, captured the principal ships, and dispersed the
rest, so that not one has reached the port." It was indeed a
marvellous piece of what men call luck. Nelson had never gone near
Malta since October, 1798, till Keith took him there on the 15th of
February, 1800. The division had no sooner arrived at the island, than
a frigate brought word of a French squadron having been seen off the
west end of Sicily. It was then blowing strong from southeast, and
raining. Keith took his own station off the mouth of the harbor,
placed other ships where he thought best, and signalled Nelson to
chase to windward with three ships-of-the-line, which were afterwards
joined by a fourth, then cruising on the southeast of the island. The
next day the wind shifted to northwest, but it was not until the
morning of the 18th that the enemy were discovered. Guns were then
heard to the northward, by those on board the "Foudroyant," which made
all sail in pursuit, and soon sighted the "Alexander" chasing four
French sail. "Pray God we may get alongside of them," wrote Nelson in
his journal; "the event I leave to Providence. I think if I can take
one 74 by myself, I would retire, and give the staff to more able
hands." "I feel anxious to get up with these ships," he wrote to Lady
Hamilton, "and shall be unhappy not to take them myself, for first my
greatest happiness is to serve my gracious King and Country, and I am
envious only of glory; for if it be a sin to covet glory, I am the
most offending soul alive. _But here I am_ in a heavy sea and thick
fog--Oh, God! the wind subsided--but I trust to Providence I shall
have them. 18th in the evening, I have got her--Le Généreux--thank
God! 12 out of 13, onely the Guillaume Telle remaining; I am after the
others." The enemy's division had consisted of this seventy-four, a
large transport, also captured, and three corvettes which escaped.
An account of Nelson on the quarter-deck on this occasion has been
transmitted by an eye-witness, whose recollections, committed to paper
nearly forty years later, are in many points evidently faulty, but in
the present instance reflect a frame of mind in the great admiral in
perfect keeping with the words last quoted from his own letter. The
writer was then a midshipman of the "Foudroyant;" and the scene as
described opens with a hail from a lieutenant at the masthead, with
his telescope on the chase.
"'Deck there! the stranger is evidently a man of war--she is a
line-of-battle-ship, my lord, and going large on the starboard tack.'
"'Ah! an enemy, Mr. Stains. I pray God it may be Le Généreux. The
signal for a general chase, Sir Ed'ard, (the Nelsonian pronunciation
of Edward,) make the Foudroyant fly!'
"Thus spoke the heroic Nelson; and every exertion that emulation could
inspire was used to crowd the squadron with canvas, the Northumberland
taking the lead, with the flag-ship close on her quarter.
"'This will not do, Sir Ed'ard; it is certainly Le Généreux, and to my
flag-ship she can alone surrender. Sir Ed'ard, we must and shall beat
the Northumberland.'
"'I will do the utmost, my lord; get the engine to work on the
sails--hang butts of water to the stays--pipe the hammocks down, and
each man place shot in them--slack the stays, knock up the wedges, and
give the masts play--start off the water, Mr. James, and pump the
ship.' The Foudroyant is drawing a-head, and at last takes the lead in
the chase. 'The admiral is working his fin, (the stump of his right
arm,) do not cross his hawse, I advise you.'
"The advice was good, for at that moment Nelson opened furiously on
the quarter-master at the conn. 'I'll knock you off your perch, you
rascal, if you are so inattentive.--Sir Ed'ard, send your best
quarter-master to the weather wheel.'
"'A strange sail a-head of the chase!' called the look-out man.
"'Youngster, to the mast-head. What! going without your glass, and be
d----d to you? Let me know what she is immediately.'
"'A sloop of war, or frigate, my lord," shouted the young
signal-midshipman.
"'Demand her number.'
"'The Success, my lord.'
"'Captain Peard; signal to cut off the flying enemy--great odds,
though--thirty-two small guns to eighty large ones.'
"'The Success has hove-to athwart-hawse of the Généreux, and is firing
her larboard broadside. The Frenchman has hoisted his tri-colour, with
a rear-admiral's flag.'
"'Bravo--Success, at her again!'
"'She has wore round, my lord, and firing her starboard broadside. It
has winged her, my lord--her flying kites are flying away all
together.' The enemy is close on the Success, who must receive her
tremendous broadside. The Généreux opens her fire on her little enemy,
and every person stands aghast, afraid of the consequences. The smoke
clears away, and there is the Success, crippled, it is true, but,
bull-dog like, bearing up after the enemy.
"'The signal for the Success to discontinue the action, and come under
my stern,' said Lord Nelson; 'she has done well, for her size. Try a
shot from the lower-deck at her, Sir Ed'ard.'
"'It goes over her.'
"'Beat to quarters, and fire coolly and deliberately at her masts and
yards.'
"Le Généreux at this moment opened her fire on us; and, as a shot
passed through the mizen stay-sail, Lord Nelson, patting one of the
youngsters on the head, asked him jocularly how he relished the music;
and observing something like alarm depicted on his countenance,
consoled him with the information, that Charles XII. ran away from the
first shot he heard, though afterwards he was called 'The Great,' and
deservedly, from his bravery. 'I, therefore,' said Lord Nelson, 'hope
much from you in future.'
"Here the Northumberland opened her fire, and down came the
tri-colored ensign, amidst the thunder of our united cannon."[4]
According to Keith, Nelson "on this occasion, as on all others,
conducted himself with skill, and great address, in comprehending my
signals, which the state of the weather led me greatly to suspect."
Nelson's account to Hamilton was, "By leaving my admiral without
signal, for which _I may be broke_, I took these French villains." "I
have wrote to Lord Spencer," he tells his eldest brother, "and have
sent him my journal, to show that the Généreux was taken by me, and my
plan--that my quitting Lord Keith was at my own risk, and for which,
if I had not succeeded, I might have been broke. The way he went, the
Généreux never could have been taken." In a letter to Lord Minto he
attributed his success to his knowledge of all the local conditions,
acquired by seven years' experience. In his anxiety to make this
instance prove his case, in the previous disobedience to Keith, for
which the Admiralty had censured him, Nelson overreached himself and
certainly fell into an ungenerous action. His vaunt of success by the
road of disobedience rested only on the fact that he had failed to see
Keith's signal. This the latter did not know, and evidently considered
he had complied with its spirit. The signal to chase to windward was
not strained to disobedience in being construed to search a fairly
wide area for the enemy, keeping the rendezvous, which was also the
enemy's destination, to leeward, so as to be readily regained. The
"Queen Charlotte," Keith's flagship, covered the inner line, and,
being a first-rate, was competent to handle any force that could come
out of Toulon. There is a good deal of human nature in this captious
unofficial attack on a superior, whose chief fault, as towards
himself, was that he had been the victim of disobedience; but it is
not pleasant to see in a man so truly great.
The "Généreux" carried the flag of a rear-admiral, who was killed in
the action. Nelson seized the opportunity of further conciliating the
Czar, by sending the sword of this officer to him, as Grand Master of
the Order of Malta. Upon rejoining Keith, he reported in person, as
custom demands. "Lord Keith received my account and myself like a
philosopher (but very unlike you)," he wrote to Hamilton; "it did not,
that I could perceive, cause a pleasing muscle in his face." "Had you
seen the Peer receive me," he wrote to Lady Hamilton the same day, "I
know not what you would have done; but I can guess. But never mind. I
told him that I had made a vow, if I took the Généreux by myself, it
was my intention to strike my flag. To which he made no answer." What
could he very well say, if a man chose to throw away his chances,
especially when that man was a subordinate who a short time before had
flatly refused to obey his orders. Soreness and testiness had full
swing in Nelson at this time; at some fancied neglect, he wrote
Troubridge a letter which reduced that gallant officer to tears.
Between Palermo and Malta Keith had received letters from General
Mélas, commanding the Austrian army in Piedmont, giving the plan of
the approaching campaign, in which, as the Austrians were to besiege
Genoa, and advance to the Riviera, much depended upon naval
co-operation. Rightly judging that to be the quarter calling for the
naval commander-in-chief, he was anxious to get away. On the 24th of
February he issued an order to Nelson to take charge of the blockade,
and "to adopt and prosecute the necessary measures for contributing to
the complete reduction of Malta." Short of the chief command, which he
coveted and grudged, Nelson himself could not have contrived a
position better fitted to crown his work in the Mediterranean. Within
the harbor of La Valetta, concentrating there the two objects that yet
remained to be attained,--- Valetta itself being one,--was the
"Guillaume Tell," the thirteenth ship, which alone was lacking now to
complete the tale of the trophies of the Nile. Yet the fair prospect
of success, inevitable since the capture of the "Généreux" had
destroyed the French hopes of relief, brought to Nelson nothing but
dismay. "My Lord," he replied the same day, "my state of health is
such, that it is impossible I can much longer remain here. Without
some rest, I am gone. I must, therefore, whenever I find the service
will admit of it, request your permission to go to my friends, at
Palermo, for a few weeks, and leave the command here to Commodore
Troubridge. Nothing but absolute necessity obliges me to write this
letter." "I could no more stay fourteen days longer here, than
fourteen years," he said in a private letter to Keith of the same
date.
By the next day he had recognized that even he could not leave at once
the task appointed him, without discredit. "My situation," he then
wrote to Hamilton, "is to me very irksome, but how at this moment to
get rid of it is a great difficulty. The French ships here ["Guillaume
Tell" and others] are preparing for sea; the Brest fleet, Lord Keith
says, may be daily expected, and with all this I am very unwell....
The first moment which offers with credit to myself I shall assuredly
give you my company.... Lord Keith is commander-in-chief, and I have
not been kindly treated." His tried friends, Troubridge and Ball,
realized the false step he was about to take, but they could not
change his purpose. "Remember, my Lord," wrote the former, "the
prospects are rather good at present of reducing this place, and that
William Tell, Diane,[1] and Justice,[5] are the only three ships left
from the Nile fleet. I beseech you hear the entreaties of a sincere
friend, and do not go to Sicily for the present. Cruizing may be
unpleasant. Leave the Foudroyant outside, and hoist your flag in the
Culloden, to carry on operations with the General. Everything shall be
done to make it comfortable and pleasing to you: a month will do all.
If you comply with my request, I shall be happy, as I shall then be
convinced I have not forfeited your friendship." "I dined with his
Lordship yesterday, who is apparently in good health," wrote Ball to
Lady Hamilton, "but he complains of indisposition and the necessity of
repose. I do not think a short stay here will hurt his health,
particularly as his ship is at anchor, and his mind not harassed.
Troubridge and I are extremely anxious that the French ships, and the
French garrison of La Valetta, shall surrender to him. I would not
urge it if I were not convinced that it will ultimately add both to
his honour and happiness."
The fear of his friends that he would lose honor, by not resisting
inclination, is evident--undisguised; but they could not prevail. On
the 4th of March he wrote to Lady Hamilton: "My health is in such a
state, and to say the truth, an uneasy mind at being taught my lesson
like a school boy, that my DETERMINATION is made to leave Malta on the
15th morning of this month, on the first moment after the wind comes
favourable; unless I am SURE that I shall get hold of the French
ships." Keith's directions had been full and explicit on details, and
this Nelson seems to have resented. Among the particular orders was
one that Palermo, being so distant from Malta, should be discontinued
as the rendezvous, and Syracuse substituted for it; Nelson was,
however, at liberty to use Messina or Augusta, both also on the west
coast of Sicily, if he preferred. It will be remembered that Nelson
himself, before he fell under the influence of Naples, had expressed
his intention to make Syracuse the base of his operations. Coming as
this change did, as one of the first acts of a new commander-in-chief,
coinciding with his own former judgment, it readily took the color of
an implied censure upon his prolonged stay at Palermo--an echo of the
increasing scandal that attended it.
On the 10th of March he left Malta for Palermo in the "Foudroyant,"
sending the ship back, however, to take her place in the blockade, and
hoisting his own flag on board a transport. His mind was now rapidly
turning towards a final retirement from the station, a decision which
was accelerated by the capture of the "Guillaume Tell." This
eighty-gun ship started on the night of March 29th to run out from La
Valetta, to relieve the famished garrison from feeding the twelve
hundred men she carried. Fortunately, the "Foudroyant" had resumed her
station off the island; and it was a singular illustration of the good
fortune of the "heaven-born" admiral, to repeat Ball's expression,
that she arrived barely in time, only a few hours before the event,
her absence from which might have resulted in the escape of the enemy,
and a just censure upon Nelson. The French ship was sighted first by a
frigate, the "Penelope," Captain Blackwood, which hung gallantly upon
her quarters, as Nelson in former days had dogged the "Ça Ira" with
the "Agamemnon," until the heavier ships could gather round the
quarry. The "Guillaume Tell," necessarily intent only on escape from
overpowering numbers, could not turn aside to crush the small
antagonist, which one of her broadsides might have swept out of
existence; yet even so, the frigate decided the issue, for she shot
away the main and mizzen topmasts of the French vessel, permitting the
remainder of the British to come up. No ship was ever more gallantly
fought than the "Guillaume Tell;" the scene would have been well
worthy even of Nelson's presence. More could not be said, but Nelson
was not there. She had shaken off the "Penelope" and the "Lion,"
sixty-four, when the "Foudroyant" drew up at six in the morning. "At
half-past six," says the latter's log, "shot away the [French] main
and mizen-masts: saw a man nail the French ensign to the stump of the
mizen-mast. Five minutes past eight, shot away the enemy's foremast.
Ten minutes past eight, all her masts being gone by the board, the
enemy struck his colours, and ceased firing." The last of the fleet in
Aboukir Bay had surrendered to Nelson's ship, but not to Nelson's
flag.
"I am sensible," he wrote from Palermo to Sir Edward Berry, the
captain of the "Foudroyant," "of your kindness in wishing my presence
at the finish of the Egyptian fleet, but I have no cause for sorrow.
The thing could not be better done, and I would not for all the world
rob you of one particle of your well-earned laurels." In the matter of
glory Nelson might well yield much to another, nor miss what he gave;
but there is a fitness in things, and it was not fitting that the
commander of the division should have been away from his post when
such an event was likely to happen. "My task is done, my health is
lost, and the orders of the great Earl St. Vincent are completely
fulfilled." "I have wrote to Lord Keith," he tells Spencer, "for
permission to return to England, when you will see a broken-hearted
man. My spirit cannot submit patiently." But by this time, if the
forbearance of the First Lord was not exhausted, his patience very
nearly was, and a letter had already been sent, which, while couched
in terms of delicate consideration, nevertheless betrayed the profound
disappointment that had succeeded to admiration for services so
eminent, and for a spirit once so indomitable: "To your letter of the
20th of March, all I shall say is, to express my extreme regret that
your health should be such as to oblige you to quit your station off
Malta, at a time when I should suppose there must be the finest
prospect of its reduction. I should be very sorry that you did not
accomplish that business in person, as the Guillaume Tell is your due,
and that ship ought not to strike to any other. If the enemy should
come into the Mediterranean, and whenever they do, it will be
suddenly, I should be much concerned to hear that you learnt of their
arrival in that sea, either on shore or in a transport at Palermo."
A nearer approach to censure was soon to follow. On the 9th of May,
apparently before Nelson's application for leave to return to England
had been received, the Admiralty sent orders to Keith, that if his
health rendered him incapable of doing his duty, he was to be
permitted to return home by sea when opportunity offered, or by land
if he preferred. Earl Spencer wrote him at the same time a private
letter, in which disapprobation was too thinly masked by carefully
chosen words to escape attention: "It is by no means my wish or
intention to call you away from service, but having observed that you
have been under the necessity of quitting your station off Malta, on
account of your health, which I am persuaded you could not have
thought of doing without such necessity, it appeared to me much more
advisable for you to come home at once, than to be obliged to remain
inactive at Palermo, while active service was going on in other parts
of the station. I should still much prefer your remaining to complete
the reduction of Malta, which I flatter myself cannot be very far
distant, and I still look with anxious expectation to the Guillaume
Tell striking to your flag. But if, unfortunately, these agreeable
events are to be prevented, by your having too much exhausted yourself
in the service to be equal to follow them up, I am quite clear, and I
believe I am joined in opinion by all your friends here, that you will
be more likely to recover your health and strength in England than in
an inactive situation at a Foreign Court, however pleasing the respect
and gratitude shown to you for your services may be, and no
testimonies of respect and gratitude from that Court to you can be, I
am convinced, too great for the very essential services you have
rendered it. I trust that you will take in good part what I have
taken the liberty to write to you as a friend."
Both these letters reached Nelson in June, at Leghorn, on his way
home. The underlying censure did not escape him,--"your two letters
gave me much pain," he replied,--but he showed no traces of
self-condemnation, or of regret for the past. Lord Minto, who was now
ambassador at Vienna, wrote thence in March of this year, before the
question of going home was decided: "I have letters from Nelson and
Lady Hamilton. It does not seem clear whether he will go home. I hope
he will not for his own sake, and he will at least, I hope, take Malta
first. He does not seem at all conscious of the sort of discredit he
has fallen into, or the cause of it, for he still writes, not wisely,
about Lady H. and all that. But it is hard to condemn and use ill a
hero, as he is in his own element, for being foolish about a woman who
has art enough to make fools of many wiser than an admiral." Many
years later, immediately after the parting which he did not then know
was the last, Minto said of him, "He is in many points a really great
man, in others a baby." Nelson himself, conscious of the diligence
which he had used in the administration of his wide command and its
varied interests, put out of court all other considerations of
propriety. "I trust you and all my friends will believe," he told
Spencer, "that mine cannot be an inactive life, although it may not
carry all the outward parade of _much ado about nothing_."
Had the Hamiltons remained in Palermo, Nelson would have been forced
to a choice between leaving her and the Mediterranean, or yielding a
submission to orders which to the last he never gave, when fairly out
of signal distance. But the Foreign Office had decided that Sir
William should not return after the leave for which he had applied;
and in the beginning of March it was known at Palermo that his
successor had been appointed. This Nelson also learned, at the latest,
when he came back there on the 16th. To one correspondent he wrote,
on the 28th, "Most probably my health will force me to retire in
April, for I am worn out with fatigue of body and mind," and his
application was sent in on the 6th of the latter month, after news of
the "Guillaume Tell's" capture. On the 22d Hamilton presented his
letters of recall, and on the 24th he and Lady Hamilton, with a party,
embarked on board the "Foudroyant" for a trip to Syracuse and Malta,
from which they all returned to Palermo on the first of June. Against
this renewed departure Troubridge again remonstrated, in words which
showed that he and others saw, in Nelson's determination to abandon
the field, the results of infatuation rather than of illness. "Your
friends, my Lord, absolutely, as far as they dare, insist on your
staying to sign the capitulation. Be on your guard." Keith also wrote
him in generous and unexceptionable terms: "I am very sorry, my dear
Nelson, for the contents of your letter, and I hope you will not be
obliged to go: strictly speaking, I ought to write to the Admiralty
before I let a flag-officer go off the station; particularly as I am
directed to send you, if you like it, to Egypt; but when a man's
health is concerned, there is an end of all, and I will send you the
first frigate I can lay hold of."
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The title of Bronté was assumed in Sicily only, until he received the
consent of George III. to accept it.
[2] The italics to this point are Nelson's; afterwards the author's.
[3] The Paget Papers, London, 1896, vol. i. p. 200.
[4] Nelsonian Reminiscences, by Lieutenant G.S. Parsons. The author has
been able to test Parsons' stories sufficiently to assure himself that they
cannot be quoted to establish historical fact; but such scenes as here
given, or how many glasses of wine Nelson drank at dinner, or that the
writer himself was out of clean shirts, when asked to dine at the admiral's
table, are trivialities which memory retains.
[5] Frigates.