COLESBERG AND THE WEST.
General French's position--Engagements near Arundel and
Rensburg--The Boers fall back on Colesberg--British
camp moved to Rensburg--Fighting round Coles
Kop--French's mobility--Loss of a commissariat
train--Both sides reinforced--General Schœman
repulsed--Death of Major Harvey--Boers driven
back--Disaster to the Suffolks--Occupation of
Slingersfontein--Guns and supplies hauled up
Coles Kop--Small actions near Colesberg--Boer
attack near Slingersfontein--Guarding the railway
junctions--Gradual withdrawal of British forces--A
ride for life--Accuracy of Australian shooting--Coles
Kop and Slingersfontein evacuated--British retire to
Arundel--Seizure of German steamers--Lord Roberts
conciliates the Colonials--Reorganisation of
transport--Roberts' and Kitchener leave Capetown--Lord
Methuen keeps the enemy busy--Demonstrations towards
Koodoesberg Drift--Roberts in camp--Preparations for
the great blow--Composition of the Grand Army.
[Illustration: NEW SOUTH WALES LANCERS WITH GENERAL FRENCH.]
[Sidenote: General French's position.]
[Sidenote: DEC. 11-13, 1899.] _Fighting on Extended Lines._]
Throughout December skirmishing continued in the Colesberg district of
Cape Colony between General French's small army and the Boer commandos
which had marched into the Colony in November by way of Norvals Pont,
with the object of menacing or breaking Lord Methuen's communications
with the sea. In Chapter VII. we left General French with just under
3,000 men, including the garrisons at Naauwpoort and Hanover Road;
his headquarters on December 8 at Tweedale, twenty-six miles south of
Colesberg Junction; and his outposts eighteen miles further north, near
Rensburg. He had available for action against the Boers a wing of the
Berkshires, the 6th Dragoon Guards, O and R Horse Artillery Batteries,
a troop of New South Wales Lancers, the New Zealand Mounted Infantry,
some companies of regular mounted infantry, and a few colonial scouts.
The strength of the Boers was ascertained by reconnaissance to be
about 2,000, and to deal with such a force more men were required. On
December 8 and 9, the 10th Hussars and 6th Dragoons were sent forward
to him from Capetown, and these were followed a day or two later by a
squadron of the 2nd Dragoons, who were, however, shortly afterwards
withdrawn and despatched north. General French, whose tactics were
ceaselessly to harass the enemy, but not to allow himself to be drawn
into a serious action before his strength was adequate, lost no time
in making use of his reinforcements. On the 11th a reconnaissance was
directed to Vaal Kop, a high ridge close to Rensburg, which was held by
the enemy. For the first time the Horse Artillery came into action in
South Africa, a section of R Battery shelling Vaal Kop and inflicting
some loss upon the Boers. They abandoned the hill, which was at once
seized and held by the British.
[Illustration:
[_Copyright 1900 by Underwood & Underwood._
LUXURIES FROM HOME.
Arrival in camp of a consignment of tobacco, cigarettes, and other
luxuries.]
[Illustration:
[_Photo by R. C. E. Nisson._
COLONEL PORTER TAKING HIS EARLY MORNING COFFEE.]
[Sidenote: Engagements near Arundel and Rensburg.]
Upon December 13 the Boers made an attempt to dislodge General French.
Early in the morning some 1,800 of them were seen to be advancing
towards Arundel in three parties. They drove in the British pickets,
but, as soon as their intentions were perceived, Colonel Porter marched
out with 1,000 cavalry and four guns of the Horse Artillery. The enemy
brought up two guns, which, however, could do nothing against our Horse
Artillery. They were shelled and driven back. Later in the day the
British horsemen found the Boers in some force at Kuilfontein Farm,
a little to the west of Rensburg, and ejected them by the summary
process of artillery fire. The enemy lost no less than forty killed
and wounded on this day; the British losses, including some casualties
in a patrol skirmish on the day before, were only nine wounded and
missing. All through the 13th, Vaal Kop was resolutely held by a tiny
British garrison of 100 men and two guns. The fighting was remarkable
for the enormous extent of country covered by the forces engaged. The
Boers fought on a front of fully fourteen miles; the British, with a
yet smaller strength of men, extended over an even longer line. The
mobility of the cavalry and Horse Artillery proved to be such that the
Boers were filled with uneasiness. They summoned reinforcements, which
were at once despatched from the Free State.
[Illustration: ARUNDEL CAMP FROM THE HILLS TO THE NORTH.]
[Illustration: MAP OF THE ACTIONS AROUND COLESBERG.]
[Sidenote: [DEC. 14-20, 1899.]
[Sidenote: The Boers fall back on Colesberg.]
[Sidenote: DEC. 30, 1899.] _Movements around Colesberg._]
On the days which followed, the Boers concentrated so serious a fire
upon Vaal Kop that the detachment holding the hill had to abandon it
on the 16th. Two days later General French made a reconnaissance with
the O Battery and the New Zealanders to the east of Rensburg, and came
under an unexpected fire, but, fortunately, without suffering much,
though the New Zealanders lost two men. The Boers were found to have
mounted a heavy position gun at Taaiboschlaagte, a ridge a little to
the east of Rensburg, whence they harassed the British force with
shells at a range of 7,000 yards. For ten days no further progress
was reported on the part of the British arms, though the Boers were
steadily annoyed by "sniping" and fire from the Horse Artillery guns.
But on December 27, General French noted signs that the enemy meditated
retirement. Waggons were seen proceeding towards Colesberg, and,
reinforcements having joined him in the shape of the 1st Yorkshires
and half a battalion of the 1st Suffolks, he was able to press their
flanks more vigorously. Finally, on the 29th, the Boers evacuated their
positions at Rensburg, and fell back to Colesberg. Their position at
that point protected the railway, which runs by Norvals Pont to the
Free State, and the road bridge, which spans the Orange River at
Botha's Drift. There was good water, whereas the country near Rensburg
was almost waterless, a fact which seriously hampered General French in
his operations.
[Illustration: MAXIM WITH GALLOPING CARRIAGE COMING INTO ACTION.]
[Sidenote: British camp moved to Rensburg. Fighting round Coles Kop.]
[Sidenote: [DEC. 30, 1899-JAN. 4, 1900.]
[Sidenote: French's mobility.]
On December 30, the General pushed forward, reconnoitred the Boer
positions, and seized a kopje known as Porter's Hill, 2,000 yards from
the curve of the =⋃=-shaped line of kopjes which nearly surrounds
Colesberg, and a little north of Rensburg. Here several of the Horse
Artillery 12-pounders were placed in position; at the same time
the British camp was moved forward from Arundel, where it had been
established on December 18, to Rensburg. On the night of the 31st,
Maeder's Farm, just under Coles Kop, was seized. A few hours later,
early in the morning of January 1, the Berkshires, under the personal
command of General French, rushed a strong kopje, to the east of Coles
Kop and about a mile from the line of rocky hills held by the Boers.
A strong picket of the enemy was surprised and driven back in great
confusion. When daylight came, under a heavy fire, the British cavalry,
with the object of turning the Boer flank, pushed up to the topmost
extremity of the Boer =⋃=, and the artillery opened a vigorous fire on
the western arm of the =⋃=. The Boers replied at once with 15-pounders
and "Pom-Poms." While a sharp cannonade was proceeding in this quarter,
Colonel Porter, from Porter's Hill, attempted to gain a lodgment on the
curve of the =⋃=; the New Zealanders, who made the attempt, displayed
the utmost gallantry, but were too few to achieve any result. Owing to
some slackness on the part of the cavalry on the British left, who, in
spite of repeated orders from General French, failed to push forward
and occupy a detached kopje commanding the roads both to Botha's Bridge
and to Norvals Pont, the day's fighting yielded no solid result. Had
General French's instructions been carried out, the Boer retreat would
have been threatened and Colesberg rendered untenable. The ineffectual
moves of the cavalry only served to draw the enemy's attention to
the importance of the position. Late in the day the enemy delivered
a counter stroke against the British right, but this was skilfully
defeated by the 6th Dragoon Guards. In this action both armies--neither
of which exceeded 3,000 men--fought and manœuvred over a front of
twenty miles. Under these novel conditions General French again showed
remarkable skill in adapting his tactics to those of the enemy. Indeed,
his procedure puzzled and alarmed the Boers, who had never met this
kind of British general before or felt the mobility of cavalry. The
British losses were three killed and a few wounded.
[Illustration:
[_Copyright 1900 by Underwood & Underwood._
SHOEING AN ARGENTINE HORSE AT THE REMOUNT DEPOT, NAAUWPOORT.]
[Illustration:
[_Copyright 1900 by Underwood & Underwood._
BAKING BREAD IN THE FIELD OVENS OF THE R.A.S.C. AT NAAUWPOORT.]
[Illustration:
[_Copyright 1900 by Underwood & Underwood._
TRANSPORT WAGGONS FOR THE FRONT, NAAUWPOORT.]
[Sidenote: Loss of a commissariat train.]
[Sidenote: Both sides reinforced.]
[Sidenote: JAN. 4, 1900.] _Boer Attempt to Outflank._]
Three days were spent in securing the ground which had been won.
Opposite the kopje that the cavalry had failed to seize, at the
northern extremity of the Boer position, 400 of the Suffolks were
forthwith entrenched. An unfortunate accident, however, marred our
success. A commissariat train standing in the station at Rensburg broke
loose, ran down the incline towards Colesberg Junction, and when half
way to that point, left the rails. 22,000 rations thus fell into the
enemy's hands. An attempt was made by a company of Suffolks to recover
the supplies, but the Boers opened so hot an artillery fire that the
British had to withdraw. As General French reported that with slight
reinforcements he could drive the enemy from Colesberg, yet more troops
were sent him--the Household Cavalry Regiment, the other half of the
1st Suffolks, the 1st Essex, and the 20th Field Battery. But, as the
Boers were simultaneously reinforced, these troops could not turn the
scale.
[Illustration:
_Photo by R. C. E. Nisson._]
COLESBERG FROM COLES KOP.]
[Illustration:
_Walker & Cockerell sc._
MAP OF THE COUNTRY BETWEEN ARUNDEL AND NORVALS PONT.
The district in which General French kept the Boers occupied whilst
Lord Roberts developed his plans for the relief of Kimberley and the
capture of Cronje.]
[Sidenote: General Schœman repulsed.]
[Sidenote: [JAN. 4-5, 1900.]
[Sidenote: Death of Major Harvey.]
[Sidenote: Boers driven back.]
Early on January 4, the Boers under General Schœman made a sudden
attempt to get round the British left. They pushed out in the darkness,
unperceived by our cavalry, and seized a group of kopjes to the rear
of the Suffolks. But when once there they found themselves in a trap.
The ground around the kopjes was level and coverless; the 10th Hussars
with two guns of O Battery opened on their rear, while a squadron of
the 6th Dragoons with the other four guns of the Battery attacked them
in front. So hot was the fire that about 500 of the Boers decided that
it was time for them to quit. They dashed off across the plain towards
Colesberg, shelled by the Horse Artillery, and hotly pursued by the
Hussars and Dragoons. A small party, however, took up a position upon
a low, boulder-covered hill, whence they opened a fire, which checked
the Hussars. Colonel Fisher dismounted his men at once, and boldly
carried the hill by rushes on foot, in which operation Major Harvey
fell, gallantly leading his men. His sad death is thus described by one
of his privates:--"I shall never forget our old Major Harvey. He said:
'Come along, my squadron; there are a few Boers just round the corner,'
and we went to shift them. We could only go about a dozen at a time,
and the old Major led us. He got shot in the mouth, but was able to
say: 'Never mind me, men; let them have it!' But he got two more shots
in the head, and dropped dead. Just then we had to lie down, hundreds
of bullets dropping around us." The 6th Dragoons got home with their
lances.[3] There still remained 200 of the enemy on the hill, who could
not be made to move, although a heavy shell fire was directed upon
them. On this, the mounted infantry were sent in to clear them out. The
infantry pushed in so as to threaten the Boer retreat, when another
hundred of the enemy bolted. As the soldiers neared the foot of the
kopjes the remnant also hurriedly retired, but could not all get away;
twenty-one were captured, and the enemy's total casualties in killed
and wounded were placed by General French at ninety. The British loss
was only six killed and fifteen wounded.
[3] The front rank of Dragoons carry lances.
[Illustration:
[_Photo by. Elliott & Fry._
LIEUT.-COL. WATSON.
Killed while leading the 1st Suffolks at Rensburg.]
[Illustration:
[_Photo by Knight, Aldershot._
MAJOR HARVEY.
Of the 10th Hussars, killed at Rensburg.]
[Sidenote: Disaster to the Suffolks.]
On the 5th, the Boer lines were shelled and a careful examination was
made of the grassy kopje at the north-western extremity, known as
Grassy or Suffolk Hill. It was this kopje which the cavalry had failed
to seize on January 1. Colonel Watson, of the Suffolks, was anxious to
make a night attack upon this eminence, and on the evening of the 5th
was informed by General French that he might attempt it, only he was
to give the General notice, so that the artillery and cavalry could
co-operate. Orders were issued to the gunners to be ready to fire upon
Grassy Hill. Nothing more was received from Colonel Watson at the
British headquarters, but about 2 a.m. of the 6th, heavy firing was
heard in the direction of the kopje, and presently the news arrived
that the attack, delivered by four companies of Suffolks, had been
ignominiously repulsed.
[Illustration: TIRED OF THE WAR.
A group of Boer prisoners taken near Naauwpoort who seemed glad to be
captured.]
[Sidenote: JAN. 5-6, 1900.] _Attack on Grassy Hill._]
What actually happened was thus portrayed by survivors. "We were
awakened about midnight and ordered to prepare to march," was the
story of Private Alexander, one of the wounded prisoners. "Instead
of boots we were to wear our slippers, so as to make as little noise
as possible. There were eight companies of us, commanded by Colonel
Watson. Well, we marched for five miles over broken country, stumbling
most of the way, and stopped when we reached the foot of a certain
kopje. It was then about two in the morning; there was no moon, and
consequently it was quite dark. We advanced a little way up the kopje,
when the Boers opened a deadly fire. They could not have seen us, but
it was quite evident that they had heard us. It was too warm for anyone
to live long, and we heard Colonel Watson call for a trumpeter, who was
to be asked, we thought, to sound the order to retire. At that time
our men were scattered around the kopje in extended order, and the
sound of a man's voice would not have reached them all. There was no
bugler to be found. 'A' and 'H' Company were then ordered to advance,
and when near the firing line we were told to fix bayonets and prepare
to charge. But the charge was interrupted by a deep ditch between us
and the Boer position, and we were obliged to fling ourselves to the
ground. Both companies returned the Boers' fire, but it was impossible
to stand against the shower of bullets which assailed us. 'A' and 'H'
mustered about 200 men, and everyone was either killed or wounded or
was compelled to surrender. The other companies managed to retire.
Captain Brett, of 'A' Company, was wounded in the left shoulder, and he
is now a prisoner at Pretoria. Captain Brown, of 'H,' was struck in the
chest, and I hear has since died. Lieutenant Carey, of 'A,' was shot,
and never moved afterwards."
[Illustration: SIGNALLING ON THE TOP OF COLES KOP.]
[Sidenote: [JAN. 6-7, 1900.]
Even more graphic is the story of another man who escaped. "We were
paraded about 1·30 a.m. on the 6th, under Lieutenant-Colonel Watson and
ten other officers. We had orders not to fire a single shot, and if
we were fired on to take no notice, but keep straight on and make no
noise. We then started on the advance on Red Hill, which was about a
mile and a half away from our camp. When we were about half way there,
we were halted and ordered to fix bayonets and carry the hill at the
point of the bayonet. Soon after starting again we heard a kind of
call from a bird (but I believe it was a signal call), and we saw two
lights on our right, yet no notice was taken of them. We kept on until
about twenty paces from the top of the hill. All this time we were in
close column. Colonel Watson called the officers round him, and they
were in front of the column when a signal shot was fired by one of the
Boer sentries and we lay down flat. About two or three minutes after
the first shot was fired, we heard running of feet, and thought it was
our own men, but all at once the top of the hill seemed in flames,
and the bullets were flying all round us. Still we lay there waiting
for the order to charge, but it never came. After lying under fire
for about ten minutes, the Colonel gave the order to retire, and the
men on the left retired. Major Graham, on the right, gave his men the
order to charge--which they did, at a very serious cost. Major Graham
himself was shot through the left arm, and the bullet penetrated his
side and came out under his right lung. The Colonel was killed, his
head being almost blown off by the explosive bullets the Boers were
using. The adjutant was also killed by the Colonel's side." It does
not appear to be the fact that any officer gave the order to retire,
and General French's dry comment may be near the truth--that success
would have been obtained, though not without loss, "had the majority
of the men not been seized with panic and retired." The losses in this
disastrous little affair were heavy; 28 were killed, 24 wounded, and
113 "missing," 34 of whom were wounded prisoners in the enemy's hands.
The Boers acknowledged a loss of 8 killed and 12 wounded, and this was
probably about the truth. General French had his whole force under
arms, but would not permit any attempt to retrieve the reverse, judging
wisely that it would only result in a further loss of lives, which at
this juncture was specially to be avoided.
[Illustration: EXPANDING BULLETS.
These have often been spoken of as "explosive bullets," and sometimes
as "man-stopping," or "soft-nosed bullets." When they penetrate the
body they spread out or "mushroom," assuming some such form as that
indicated in the illustration in the corner, inflicting terrible
wounds, and leaving a gaping hole at the point of exit. A shows the
origin of the Dum-dum bullet, which is so called because it was first
made at the Arsenal of Dum-dum in India. The nickel coating of the
bullet is filed away at the top to allow the lead to expand. B is the
British regulation Dum-dum, now prohibited, and C is a section of the
same. D is the soft-nosed expanding bullet, of which hundreds were
found in the Boer trenches at Paardeberg and elsewhere.]
[Illustration: BEGINNING THE ASCENT OF COLES KOP.
Taking guns to the top of the hill, 800 feet high. This photograph
gives some idea of the difficult character of the ground over which the
men had to drag their guns by hand labour.]
[Sidenote: Occupation of Slingersfontein.]
[Sidenote: JAN. 11-15, 1900.] _Artillery on Coles Kop._]
On January 7, General French with a squadron of Household Cavalry
pushed out a reconnaissance to the east and examined a position near
Slingersfontein. The enemy opened a long range fire, and succeeded in
cutting off and capturing Captain Ricardo with four troopers. Two days
later, Slingersfontein was occupied by Colonel Porter with a force of
600 men and four guns, after a brush with the enemy in which the New
Zealanders distinguished themselves. To cover the movement the rest
of the artillery shelled the enemy's lines. From his new position,
Colonel Porter could see all that was going on in the Boer rear,
and noted the arrival of large reinforcements from Magersfontein
and Ladysmith. General French, in fact, was acting as a magnet and
attracting the enemy's forces. The Boers opposed to him were now about
4,000 or 5,000 strong, and in the course of the next few days were yet
further strengthened to 6,000 or 7,000. On his part, General French was
reinforced by half the 1st Welsh Regiment and the 4th Field Battery,
and was promised a part of the Sixth Division, now beginning to reach
South Africa.
[Illustration: _C. H. Taffs._] [_After a sketch by F. Villiers._
THE WIRE HOIST USED FOR DRAGGING AMMUNITION AND SUPPLIES UP COLES KOP.]
[Sidenote: Guns and supplies hauled up Coles Kop.]
On January 11th, by great efforts, Major Butcher, commanding the 4th
Field Battery, succeeded in hauling two 15-pounders to the top of
Coles Kop. Five hawsers were used, and in four hours the work was
accomplished and the weapons were ready to open fire. Some days later,
as the conveyance of food, water, and ammunition to the summit was
found extremely laborious in consequence of the precipitous nature
of the hill, the engineers rigged up a wire hoist, which proved
invaluable. Bridging wire, which bears a strain of 2,000 lbs., was
employed for this purpose. On the same day, General French with
Colonel Porter's cavalry made a vigorous attempt to reach the enemy's
rear from Slingersfontein. Major Hunter Weston with a section of
mounted engineers and a troop of cavalry was directed to pass round
their flank and destroy the Norvals Pont railway. As, however, strong
Boer reinforcements rode up from Norvals Pont, it was impossible to
accomplish this, and the Boers were able to extend their left flank
so as to threaten General French in his turn. Not caring to risk a
decisive action, he fell back to Slingersfontein. On the 12th, the guns
on Coles Kop suddenly opened on the Boer laagers, causing the enemy the
utmost annoyance and some loss. All their camps had to be moved, but
it was not possible to shell the town of Colesberg itself, as there
were many British sympathisers and prisoners in it, a fact of which the
Boers were not slow to avail themselves.
[Sidenote: [JAN. 15-16, 1900.]
[Sidenote: Boer attack near Slingersfontein.]
On the 14th 400 men with two guns were pushed out from the British left
towards Colesberg Road bridge, which was shelled at long range, but not
destroyed. The enemy endeavoured to intercept the retreat, without,
however, any success. On the following day the Boers made a determined
attack upon the extreme British right near Slingersfontein, where was
a high steep kopje held by one company each of the 1st Yorkshires and
New Zealanders. During the night the enemy worked round unobserved to
both the east and west sides of the hill; a particularly strong party
established itself among the rocks at the foot of the western slope,
which was very steep. With daylight the attack from the east was
openly developed, and from all quarters the Boers poured in a heavy
fire on the men holding the hill. While the attention of our outpost
was thus occupied, the Boers to the west crept up and actually got
among the Yorkshires before their presence was detected. Captain Orr,
commanding the outpost, was wounded, the sergeant-major was killed,
and the Yorkshires were left without leaders or guidance. At this most
critical moment, Captain Madocks, of the Royal Artillery, who was doing
duty with the New Zealanders, saved the day. Calling upon his gallant
Colonials to follow him, he dashed to the western face of the hill,
ordered the Yorkshires to fix bayonets, and charged at their head,
followed by four New Zealanders, of whom the two on either side of him
were instantly shot dead by the enemy. Madocks himself grappled a huge
Boer, clad in a frock coat, who was urging on his men, and killed him.
Several more of the Boers were shot or bayoneted; the rest fled in
complete confusion, leaving no less than twenty-one dead behind them.
As usual the Boers pretended that they had "one man wounded," though
the corpses were seen and counted by our soldiers. The British loss
was eight killed, five wounded, and two missing; among the killed was
the gallant son of Mr. Gourlay, a member of the Legislative Council of
New Zealand. The Boers were estimated to have had at least fifty men
wounded.
[Illustration: CAPTAIN ORR (in centre) AND OFFICERS OF THE NEW
ZEALANDERS ON NEW ZEALAND HILL, COLESBERG.]
[Illustration:
[_Copyright 1900 by Underwood & Underwood._
NEW ZEALAND AMBULANCE AT WORK AFTER THE ACTION AT NEW ZEALAND HILL.]
[Illustration: _W. Small._] [_From a sketch by G. D. Giles._
NEW ZEALANDERS TO THE RESCUE: SAVING A PICKET OF THE YORKSHIRE REGIMENT
NEAR SLINGERSFONTEIN.
On January 15 a picket of the Yorkshire Regiment, about forty strong,
with thirty New Zealand Mounted Rifles were holding the spur of a
hill, since called New Zealand Hill, near Slingersfontein, when some
Boers suddenly attacked the Yorkshires at the extremity of the steep
spur. Their officer and sergeant were struck down, and the men would
have been lost had not Captain Madocks with some New Zealanders made a
sudden onslaught, rallied the Yorkshires, and routed the Boers.]
[Sidenote: [JAN. 16-22, 1900.]
On January 16 there was another skirmish with the Boers near
Slingersfontein. A patrol of twenty-five Australian Mounted Infantry
and New South Wales Lancers under Lieutenant Dowling left that
position to reconnoitre northwards to Norvals Pont. On its return the
patrol was ambushed at a watering place six miles north of Colonel
Porter's camp, and the men killed, wounded, or captured, with the
exception of three, who got away and returned with the sad news to
camp. The Australians made a desperate stand before surrendering,
and inflicted some loss upon the Boers. But the affair showed the
complete knowledge of every British movement obtained by the enemy,
no doubt through the many Boer sympathisers within the British lines.
On the 18th, strong reinforcements from the Sixth Division reached
General French. The 1st Royal Irish and 2nd Worcestershire, speedily
followed by the 2nd Wiltshire, all of which battalions were included
in Major-General Clements' Brigade, arrived, and with them two
5-inch howitzers. Thus strengthened, General French was able yet
further to prolong his line. Strong outposts were established at
Kleinfontein, some miles to the north-east of Slingersfontein, and at
Rhenosterfontein, not far from Norvals Pont station. The enemy, alarmed
for their communications, called up yet more reinforcements, and it
was estimated that at this date their force was about 9,000 strong,
while General French had now under his command near Colesberg almost as
many combatants. His perpetual worrying of the Boers was thus serving
two purposes--preventing them from doing any mischief in Cape Colony,
and compelling them to weaken their forces elsewhere. The front held
by the Boers at this date was thirty miles, and that of the British
thirty-eight miles: but by means of field telephones and telegraphs in
our lines reinforcements could promptly be called up to any threatened
point.
[Illustration: NEW ZEALAND OFFICERS WATCHING AN ENGAGEMENT NEAR
COLESBERG.
The gallant Captain Madocks in the centre.]
[Sidenote: Small actions near Colesberg.]
On January 19 and 20 the howitzers shelled the Boer camps and Grassy
Hill, but, so far as could be seen, without much effect. On the 19th,
Lieutenant De Crespigny with two troopers of the Household Cavalry
came under heavy fire, and had to ride for their lives. One of the
men had his horse shot under him, when De Crespigny gallantly rode
back to his rescue and brought him off. On the 25th, General French
directed a vigorous reconnaissance against the Boer right, which had
not of late been much disturbed. With 3,000 infantry and cavalry, and a
battery each of Horse and Field Artillery, he moved up to Rietfontein
Plessis, on the Colesberg bridge road, while the rest of his troops
demonstrated all along the enemy's line. He succeeded in reaching a
point from which, with sharp fighting, he had every chance of getting
on the enemy's lines of communication, but, as the Boers were in force
and Lord Roberts's orders to avoid anything like a general action were
peremptory, the movement was not pressed. On the other flank, General
Clements shelled the Boers, who replied with their 40-pounder, killing
the General's orderly at the first shot.
[Illustration: CAPTAIN MADOCKS (left) AND LIEUTENANT HUGHES (right).
Survivors of the Boer attack at Slingersfontein.]
Two days after this affair four Englishmen, who had been "commandeered"
by the Free State authorities, deserted from the enemy. They brought
information that the Boers were about 5,000 strong in Colesberg, with
another force at Norvals Pont, and stated that the enemy had eight
guns, in addition to two of the captured British 15-pounders, which the
Boer gunners did not understand, and could not use effectively.
[Sidenote: JAN. 22-FEB. 8, 1900.] _French quits Colesberg._]
[Sidenote: Guarding the railway junctions.]
[Sidenote: Gradual withdrawal of British forces.]
General French had not only to watch Colesberg; he had also to think of
the railway junctions to his left and right rear at De Aar and Rosmead,
and to endeavour to reach a hand to General Gatacre. The arrival of
more and more British troops relieved him of much of his anxiety for
his extreme right. The Thirteenth Brigade of the Sixth Division was
now at hand, and, under General Kelly-Kenny, pushed along the railway
from Rosmead Junction towards Stormberg, halting at Thebus on the
26th, and opening up communication with General Gatacre, by way of the
mountain roads. After these operations a comparative calm followed
during the last days of January and the first week of February. Quietly
the British forces at Colesberg and Thebus were reduced, the greater
part of the cavalry, much of the infantry, and all the Horse Artillery
being moved north to Modder River, in readiness for the great advance
into the Free State. The Boers at Colesberg, now under the command of
General De Wet, a Free Stater, who had graduated at Cambridge, do not
appear to have promptly seized the situation, or ascertained that they
were only confronted by a skeleton force under General Clements. But on
February 8, receiving information from a traitorous farmer, they began
to show more activity. On this day there was a sharp interchange of
artillery fire. A "Pom-Pom" on Horseshoe Kopje, which had caused great
annoyance, was shelled by the howitzers; one of the lyddite projectiles
burst just by the gun, and flung one of the Boer gunners no less
than 100 yards through the air. On the 9th, a reconnoitring party of
Australians, fifty strong, moved out on the right, and was engaged by a
party of 400 Boers, who lay hidden in some kopjes. With the Australians
were two correspondents, Mr. Hales and Mr. Lambie, who had a thrilling
experience, thus described by Mr. Hales:--
[Illustration:
_F. J. Waugh._]
CAPTAIN MADOCKS GRAPPLING WITH THE BOER LEADER.]
[Sidenote: [FEB. 8, 1900.]
[Sidenote: A ride for life.]
"We had drifted a few hundred yards behind the advance party," he
writes, "but were a good distance in front of the rear guard, when a
number of horsemen made a dash from the kopjes, which we were skirting,
and the rifles began to speak. There was no time for poetry, it was a
case of 'sit tight and ride hard,' or surrender and be made prisoners.
Lambie shouted to me: 'Let's make a dash, Hales,' and we made it. The
Boers were very close to us before we knew anything concerning their
presence. Some of them were behind us, and some extended along the
edge of the kopjes by which we had to pass to get to the British line
in front; all of them were galloping in on us, shooting as they rode,
and shouting to us to surrender, and had we been wise men, we should
have thrown up our hands, for it was almost hopeless to try and ride
through the rain of lead that whistled around us. It was no wonder that
we were hit, the wonder to me is that we were not filled with lead,
for some of the bullets came so close to me that I think I should know
them again if I met them in a shop window. We were racing by this time;
Lambie's big chestnut mare had gained a length on my little veldt pony,
and we were not more than 100 yards away from the Mauser rifles that
had closed in on us from the kopjes. A voice called in good English:
'Throw up your hands, you d---- fools.' But the galloping fever was on
us both, and we only crouched lower on our horses' backs, and rode all
the harder, for even a barn-yard fowl loves liberty.
[Illustration:
[_Photo by Elliott & Fry._
GENERAL CLEMENTS.
Ralph Arthur Penrhyn Clements, D.S.O., A.D.C., commanding the 12th
Brigade, South Africa Field Force, is the son of the late Rev. J.
Clements, sub-dean of Lincoln Cathedral. He was educated at Rossall;
Lieut. 24th Foot (afterwards called South Wales Borderers), 1874;
Captain, 1880; Major, 1886; Lieut.-Colonel, 1887; Colonel, 1896;
Aide-de-Camp to the Queen, 1896; served in Kaffir and Zulu wars, 1879,
and in Burmah, where he gained the D.S.O., 1885-89.]
"All at once I saw my comrade throw up his hands with a spasmodic
gesture. He rose in his stirrups, and fairly bounded high out of his
saddle, and as he spun round in the air I saw the red blood on the
white face, and I knew that death had come to him sudden and sharp.
Again the rifles spoke, and the lead was closer to me than ever a
friend sticks in time of trouble, and I knew in my heart that the next
few strides would settle things. The black pony was galloping gamely
under my weight. Would he carry me safely out of that line of fire or
would he fail me? Suddenly something touched me on the right temple;
it was not like a blow, it was not a shock; for half a second I was
conscious. I knew I was hit; knew that the reins had fallen from my
nerveless hands; knew that I was lying down upon my horse's back, with
my head hanging below his throat. Then all the world went out in one
mad whirl. Earth and heaven seemed to meet as if by magic. My horse
seemed to rise with me, not to fall, and then--chaos."
[Illustration:
_Ivester Lloyd._]
A RACE FOR LIFE.
Two newspaper correspondents risk their lives in an attempt to escape
capture.]
[Sidenote: FEB. 8-12, 1900.] _Fine Work done by the Australians._]
[Sidenote: Accuracy of Australian shooting.]
[Sidenote: Coles Kop and Slingersfontein evacuated.]
[Sidenote: [FEB. 12-15, 1900.]
[Sidenote: British retire to Arundel.]
The Australians showed great steadiness and courage. A small party
under Captain Cameron dismounted and covered the retreat of the others
with a rapid and accurate fire. "They shot like lightning, not volley
after volley straight in front of them, as do regular soldiers," said
a Boer afterwards, "but every man picked his man and shot to kill.
We dared not face them." The Boers endeavoured to work round them
and cut them off, but at the right moment the colonials made a dash,
mounted their horses, and rode off under a hail of bullets, with only
one man slightly wounded. There can be no doubt that their skill in
taking cover saved them from heavy loss, if not from annihilation.
About a dozen Boers are said to have been killed. Mr. Hales was taken
prisoner, but was afterwards released by the enemy. He had been only
stunned by a fall from his horse. Another reconnoitring party of twenty
Australians under Captain Moor had a precisely similar experience on
this same day near Slingersfontein. They were surrounded on a kopje,
and the Boers called to them to surrender. They replied by shouts of
defiance, telling the enemy that "Australia is here to stay," and by
their steady fire kept the burghers at bay. Meantime, Sergeant Edwards
and two troopers ran the gauntlet of the enemy's rifles, and brought
news to the nearest camp that the Australians would hold out till
dusk. The 6th Dragoons were sent out to support them, and succeeded in
getting them away with one killed and three wounded. On this same day
the Boers began to drive in the British left, seizing Bastard's Nek,
placing a 40-pounder in position there, and menacing the position at
Coles Kop. On the 10th several British patrols were cut up, and Boer
parties appeared on the road between Rensburg and Slingersfontein. The
position was becoming untenable, and General Clements was hard put to
it to hold his own. On the 12th the Boers vigorously attacked all along
the line, and our troops were compelled hastily to abandon Coles Kop,
sending down the two guns from the top. The half battalions of the
Berkshires and Wiltshires were compelled to fall back upon Maeder's
Farm, suffering considerable losses, the Wiltshires alone losing
thirteen men. The 6th Dragoons and Australians covered the retirement
in this quarter, and prevented the Boers, who came on in great
numbers, from doing much damage. On the British right a determined
attack was delivered by the enemy upon Slingersfontein, supported
by the "Pom-Pom" and some field guns. They assaulted the kopjes on
this flank, which were held by three companies of Worcesters under
Captain Hovell, and, though their onset was repulsed, the Worcesters
lost heavily, no less than fifteen men being killed and twenty-nine
wounded. Severe punishment was, however, inflicted upon the Boers. The
Bedfordshires and Royal Irish were also engaged, and were driven back
on Slingersfontein. The Boers were seen to be moving their 40-pounder
into a position whence it could shell the British camp, whereupon a
further retirement was at once ordered. Under cover of darkness the
troops evacuated Slingersfontein and concentrated at Rensburg. Even
this point could not be long held, and on the 14th General Clements had
once more to retreat to Arundel, after severe fighting. An "unfortunate
occurrence" marked the retirement. Two companies of Wiltshires, who
were on outpost duty near Rensburg, did not receive the order to
evacuate their position and fall back with the rest of the troops, and
remained behind. On the morning of the 15th they were surrounded on
some kopjes and attacked by the Boers in overwhelming force. Escape
was impossible; General Clements was too weak to give them any help or
extricate them, even if he had known of their situation, and, after
a brave resistance, in which 12 officers and men were killed and 45
wounded, 103 unwounded men laid down their arms. They had suffered
terribly from thirst before they surrendered. The Boers claimed that
their own losses were only the now invariable "two killed and four
wounded."
[Illustration:
[_Copyright 1900 by Underwood & Underwood._
MAKING GAS FOR WAR BALLOONS AT SLINGERSFONTEIN.]
[Illustration:
[_Copyright 1900 by Underwood & Underwood._
SHOEMAKERS OF THE 1st ROYAL IRISH REGIMENT IN THE CAMP AT
SLINGERSFONTEIN.]
[Sidenote: DEC. 30, 1899-JAN. 10, 1900.] _Difficulties with Germany._]
Thus General Clements with about 3,000 men had been dislodged in a few
days, defeated, and driven back to the point from which, two months
before, General French had started. Yet he had none the less rendered
good service by keeping a large force of Boers occupied in operations
which brought them no substantial success, at the very time when they
should have been hurrying north to save Cronje. After the 15th the
Boers seem to have discovered that they were confronted only by a
skeleton force and to have at last realised their mistake. But it was
already too late; the 150 miles from Arundel to Paardeberg could not
be covered in time to effect a junction with General Cronje, and that
gallant burgher had to be left to his doom. Meantime General Clements
was reinforced, and in view of the weakening of the Boers in his front,
was no longer in serious danger.
[Illustration:
_Photo by R. C. E. Nisson._]
FIELD ARTILLERY ON COLES KOP.
A 15-pounder of the 4th Field Battery under Lieutenant Maine firing
from the top of the hill.]
[Sidenote: Seizure of German steamers.]
While these things were happening in Colesberg and at the front, grave
political difficulties had arisen at home over the seizure of the
German steamers _Herzog_, _Bundesrath_, and _General_, on the charge
of carrying contraband to Delagoa Bay. The _Bundesrath_ was brought
into Durban as prize to the British cruiser _Magicienne_ on December
30. On being chased she had changed the position of her cargo, an act
which was certainly calculated to give rise to grave suspicions. A
search of nine days' duration at Durban, however, failed to disclose
any contraband in her hold, and the German Government in the most
peremptory manner demanded her immediate release. It insisted that
Delagoa Bay being a neutral port, German ships could carry what
they liked to that place, though it also gave an assurance from the
steamers' owners that there was no contraband on board. Before a
definite answer had been returned to its demand, the _General_ was
stopped and searched at Aden, on January 4, and the _Herzog_, on
January 6, was brought into Durban as prize of the cruiser _Thetis_.
At this news German public opinion, which had all through the war
been bitterly hostile to England, was thoroughly aroused, and the
German Government took action which savoured of open unfriendliness,
demanding the immediate release of all three vessels and the payment of
compensation. Yet it was notorious that the three ships were crowded
with foreigners, enlisted in Europe by the Transvaal secret agents, and
proceeding to the front to take part in the war. The German Government
had made use of British troubles at an earlier period to obtain Samoa,
and now employed its dispute with England as an argument for a greater
German Navy--to be used, it was hinted, in the not remote future
against England.
[Sidenote: [JAN. 1900.]
[Sidenote: Lord Roberts conciliates the Colonials.]
On January 10 Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener had reached Capetown.
Their first step was to do all that was possible to stimulate the
enrolment of Colonial troops. Almost immediately after landing Lord
Roberts visited Rosebank Camp, where the South African Light Horse had
their quarters. One regiment had already been raised and sent to the
front in Natal, and now two more were added, known as Roberts' and
Kitchener's Horse respectively. Furthermore, Lord Roberts appointed
a distinguished Colonial officer, Colonel Brabant, who had great
experience in South African war, a Major-General, and proposed that he
should command a division composed entirely of Cape Colonials. This
action roused general enthusiasm. Hitherto the British officers of the
army had looked askance at the Colonial and pronounced his methods
irregular. Indeed, so much friction had arisen between the Colonial
levies and the British staff that many of the Colonials were anxious to
leave the ranks, in which their only rewards were constant snubbings
from the military authorities. Lord Roberts by his exquisite tact put a
stop to all this. He chose for his own bodyguard these very Colonials
as a sign that he appreciated their services. He soothed the ruffled
susceptibilities of all, and sent everyone back to his place with
the feeling that the new Commander-in-Chief was a man of exceptional
detachment from his environment--free from all prejudices and from all
traces of red-tape, absolutely just and impartial. And what was more,
he charmed as well as soothed. It was said of the great Chatham that no
one left his presence without feeling himself a nobler and a stronger
man. The same was true of Lord Roberts.
[Illustration:
[_Photo by R. C. E. Nisson._
THE WRECK OF A HAPPY HOME.
A disconsolate war correspondent amidst the ruins of his tent after
a thunderstorm. The photograph illustrates how readily the dry and
parched veldt is transformed into a swamp.]
In all, the troops placed in the field from first to last by Cape
Colony amounted to about 18,000 men, distributed in the following
regiments:--
Duke of Edinburgh's Rifles 1,189
Cape Garrison Artillery 566
Capetown Highlanders 464
Port Elizabeth Guards 518
East London Rifles 673
Grahamstown Rifles 560
Kimberley Regiment 800
Capetown United Rifles and Cape Police 1,000
South African Light Horse 600
Brabant's Horse: 1st Regiment 600
" " 2nd Regiment 600
" " 3rd Regiment about 400
Roberts' Horse 600
Kitchener's Horse 600
Railway Pioneers 1,200
Bayly's Mounted Rifles 450
Nesbitt's Horse 400
Orpen's Horse 300
Kimberley Light Horse and other Irregulars at Kimberley 3,200
Griqualand Mounted Rifles 1,200
Cape Mounted Rifles 492
Kaffrarian Mounted Rifles 540
Queenstown Mounted Rifles 200
Frontier Mounted Rifles 145
[Sidenote: JAN.-FEB. 1900.] _Reorganisation of the Army and the
Transport._]
Even this list is not complete and exhaustive, though it is fuller
than many which have appeared. Of these troops some were employed in
guarding Capetown itself, where a supposed plot on the part of Boer
sympathisers to seize the town on the first day of the new year,
had caused great uneasiness; others were placed on the lines of
communication; and about 3,000 were slowly concentrated in the east of
Cape Colony, where, under General Brabant--a man almost as loved and
trusted as Lord Roberts himself, and proved by after events to be a
bold and skilful General, never beaten in the field--they were to take
part in the new campaign as soon as Lord Roberts gave the signal for
the great forward move. Had the Colonials only been listened to at the
outset, many defeats and much dishonour would have been avoided. For,
from the first, they had preached the necessity of fighting the Boers
with mounted men. They now, under the wise Lord Roberts, were given a
full share of hard work and glory, and became a source of real terror
to the Boers, who never were comfortable when they were about.
[Illustration: DR. BURNS ATTENDING A WOUNDED NEW ZEALANDER.]
[Illustration: NEW ZEALANDERS BURYING THEIR DEAD COMRADES.]
[Sidenote: Reorganisation of transports.]
[Sidenote: [JAN.-FEB. 1900.]
While Lord Roberts was organising troops and rearranging the
distribution of the forces in South Africa, while day by day
battalions, and batteries, and squadrons poured in from England, the
rough material with which to build the edifice of the new campaign,
Lord Kitchener on his part was busy with the transport and discipline
of the army. Rumour has it that he impounded some score of gay young
officers whom he found at Capetown with leave from the front, and set
them to drive quills in his quartermaster's department. This did not
make him beloved, but it proved he was determined that all should do
their duty. He ruthlessly cut down the allowance of transport, took
away from the regiments their regimental waggons, and organised a
separate and distinct transport service. He found that the train of
waggons had been much scattered, and one of his first acts was to
recall about 400 teams and vehicles from Queenstown in the east of the
Colony. The work of organisation and preparation to which he devoted
his time was neither glorious nor particularly interesting, but it was
necessary if the army was to be able to move away from the railways,
and he accomplished it with success, even if after events did not prove
all his innovations to have been judicious.
[Illustration: PREPARING FOR THE GREAT CAMPAIGN.
Lord Roberts in his travelling headquarters waggon. The photograph
was taken while the Field-Marshal was in the midst of the work of
reorganisation.]
[Sidenote: FEB. 6, 1900.] _Preparations at Capetown Completed._]
[Sidenote: Roberts and Kitchener leave Capetown.]
Till the time came for striking, and striking hard, Lord Roberts'
instructions to his commanders in the western field of war were to
abstain from anything calculated to bring about a decisive battle;
30,000 men were already at sea or arriving in Cape Colony--among
them the Sixth and Seventh Divisions, the City Imperial Volunteers,
several Militia battalions, the first detachments of Yeomanry, and a
large number of Australian and Canadian Mounted Rifles. Of the troops
already on the spot, a considerable number were being converted into
mounted infantry. Thus week after week passed in the most strenuous
activity, till at last, on February 6, the Commander-in-Chief and
his Chief-of-the-Staff stole off surreptitiously--for there were
many thousands of Boer sympathisers in the Colony, and attempts to
derail and wreck trains were of almost daily occurrence--to the
far-away Modder River Camp, whence the great movement was to begin.
To deceive would-be assassins, of whom, unfortunately, there were
many in the Colony, a special train with fifty armed men on board was
ostentatiously despatched. Lord Roberts, however, did not travel in it;
instead, he boarded the ordinary train outside Capetown, and in this
manner began his journey to the north.
[Illustration:
[_Photo by Lloyd, Pembridge Square._
BRIGADIER-GENERAL BRABANT.
Is about sixty years of age. He entered the 2nd Derby Militia as Ensign
in 1855, but went abroad and joined the Cape Rifles a year later, rose
to the rank of Captain, and retired in 1870. He was elected, in 1873,
member of the Legislative Assembly for East London; Field-Commandant of
Colonial (Cape) Forces, 1878; Col. of Cape Yeomanry, 1879; served in
the Basuto War and was created C.M.G. in 1880; Brigadier-General, 1899.
[Sidenote: [DEC. 13, 1899-JAN. 3, 1900.]
At Modder River there had been inactivity since the disastrous day
of Magersfontein--inactivity broken only by reconnaissances and
demonstrations. As far back as December 13, a reconnaissance had
been directed from Orange River Station to Zoutpan's Drift, some
miles to the east of the great] bridge by which the railway from
De Aar to Modder River crosses the Orange River. Seventy men of the
mounted infantry and of Rimington's Guides were sent out under Captain
Bradshaw; at Ramah, a farm just upon the Free State frontier, they
were surprised by the enemy in some force, and lost four killed and
eight wounded, including Captain Bradshaw, killed. The Boers, after
inflicting this loss, fell back.
[Illustration: DEPARTURE OF THE SECOND QUEENSLAND CONTINGENT FROM
BRISBANE.
The first contingents supplied by the Colonies were sent off with wild
enthusiasm by the great crowds which witnessed their departure. A more
sober, but not less impressive, loyalty marked the departure of later
contingents. War had, even to the man in the street, become a dread
reality.]
[Illustration: ON THE WATCH: AN OUTPOST AT MODDER RIVER, AFTER THE
BATTLE OF MAGERSFONTEIN.]
[Sidenote: Lord Methuen keeps the enemy busy.]
[Sidenote: JAN. 8-FEB. 4, 1900.] _Minor Movements from Modder River
Camp._]
Meantime Lord Methuen at Modder River shelled the enemy almost daily
with his 4·7 naval guns and howitzers. More than once the Boers at
night, evidently in constant dread of attack, opened suddenly a
terrific rifle and Maxim fire. On December 31 a small composite force
under Colonel Pilcher was despatched from Belmont to attack a laager
of rebels at Sunnyside, near the little village of Douglas, to the
north-west of Belmont. The force was remarkable in that it was made up
of Canadians, Australians, and Imperial troops, including as it did the
Toronto company of Canadians, 100 strong, 200 Queenslanders, 40 mounted
infantry of the Munster Fusiliers, and 200 of the Duke of Cornwall's
Light Infantry, with two guns of the Horse Artillery. Great precautions
were taken to prevent the enemy gaining any knowledge of the intended
move. No one was allowed to leave the British camp for some time
before the march began, and all natives were shut up and their names
repeatedly called. Early in the morning of January 1, the force was
close to the enemy's camp. The rebels were in complete ignorance of its
approach; and the camp was asleep when the British guns suddenly opened
fire. The Queenslanders and Canadians at once worked in splendid style
towards the astonished Boers, making every use of cover. The great bulk
of the enemy bolted when the burghers found their flanks threatened;
a few, however, were cut off by the British advance and raised the
white flag; forty-three prisoners and the rebel laager fell into our
hands. From Sunnyside the column marched to Douglas and re-hoisted the
British flag there, but on January 3 had to retreat, taking with it all
the loyal inhabitants, and to return to Belmont. Against this small
success had to be placed the loss of Kuruman, where 120 of the Cape
Police and native half-breeds had for months defied the Boers, holding
out in the school-house.
On January 8 an important reconnaissance was made into the Free State.
From Modder River moved the 9th and 12th Lancers, a force of mounted
infantry, and a section of G Horse Artillery Battery; from Enslin a
squadron of the 2nd Dragoons, with detachments of mounted infantry,
and from Belmont the Australians and Canadians. The Boers were seen to
be in strength at Jacobsdal, but there were none of them to the south
of the Riet. About the same time Zoutpan's Drift was occupied, and a
British post permanently established in the enemy's territory.
[Illustration:
_A. C. Ball._]
THE RETREAT FROM DOUGLAS.
The Canadians carried the children of the loyalists and kept up the
spirits of the whole party by singing.]
On January 16 Lord Methuen made a demonstration against Magersfontein,
where the Boer works had of late been considerably extended and
strengthened. His object was to draw the enemy away from Kimberley,
and also to ascertain to what extent they had weakened their force by
detachments sent to Colesberg and Ladysmith. A bombardment of the Boer
works speedily brought the burghers up in force from Jacobsdal, and it
was found that their lines were well held.
[Sidenote: Demonstrations towards Koodoesberg Drift.]
[Sidenote: [FEB. 5-9, 1900.]
On January 26 General Macdonald arrived and took over the command of
the Highlanders, from whom he had a tremendous reception. To deceive
the Boers and draw off their attention from the British right, where
Lord Roberts intended to deliver his serious blow, a demonstration to
the left was ordered. Accordingly, on February 4, General Macdonald,
with the Highland Brigade and the 62nd Field Battery, moved to
Koodoesberg Drift, an important crossing of the Modder, sixteen miles
to the west of Modder River Camp; at the same time General Broadwood
with Roberts' Horse, the mounted infantry, and a battery of Horse
Artillery, advanced to Sunnyside, the scene of Colonel Pilcher's
victory. General Macdonald, after a terrible march in scorching heat,
found Koodoesberg Drift deserted, and entrenched himself there on both
sides of the river, on the 5th. Next day, towards evening, a commando
of Boers approached and skirmishing began. The enemy was reinforced,
and, seeing a chance of cutting them off, General Macdonald sent for
cavalry on the morning of the 7th. Skirmishing went on all day, and the
British suffered some loss from the enemy's fire, amongst the killed
being the famous golfer, Lieutenant Tait. Four regiments of cavalry
with two horse batteries, under General Babington, arrived in the
evening of the 7th; but the Boers were not to be caught, and made off
at dark. As the object of the demonstration had been fully attained,
the whole force was then ordered back to Modder River Camp. The British
casualties were eight killed and thirty-nine wounded.
[Illustration:
[_From a sketch by Fred Villiers._
COLONEL PILCHER'S COLONIALS DRAWING THE ENEMY'S FIRE BY PLACING THEIR
HATS WITHIN VIEW.]
[Sidenote: Roberts in camp.]
On February 9 Lord Roberts arrived at Modder River, and was received
with an enthusiasm that knew no bounds. His first act was to review the
Highlanders just returned from Koodoesberg Drift, and congratulate them
upon their steady behaviour. He told them that stiff work lay before
them, and yet, striking the note of hopefulness, he added that success
was certain. His speech had the best effect. Next day a redistribution
of the troops took place, and a new Division, the Ninth, was formed of
the battalions which had reinforced Lord Methuen from the time when
he began his advance from Orange River; General Sir H. Colvile was
appointed to command it, and General Pole Carew was transferred from
the Ninth Brigade to the Guards' Brigade to take General Colvile's
place. All was now ready for the great forward move.
General Kelly-Kenny with a brigade of the Sixth Division, General
French with a large force of cavalry and infantry from Colesberg,
and the whole Seventh Division recently landed from England had
concentrated at Modder River Camp. As the plain grew white with the
tents of 35,000 combatants, Cronje's advisers, watching, grew more and
more uneasy. "They will turn your flank" was day by day the warning
of Major Albrecht. But Cronje had a firm belief that no British force
would ever be able to leave the railway, and a flanking movement on
Lord Roberts' part was impossible unless this was done.
[Sidenote: FEB. 10, 1900.] _Roberts Ready to Strike._]
[Sidenote: Preparations for the great blow.]
In striking from Modder River instead of Colesberg and Norvals Pont,
Lord Roberts had two objects. He wished to begin his campaign with
a tremendous blow--and such the destruction of Cronje would prove.
He would also be saved the delay which must inevitably be caused by
bridging so wide a river as the Orange. If all went well he might
be able to turn rapidly upon the Colesberg Boers after settling with
Cronje. Whatever happened, he was certain of relieving Kimberley, which
the Boers were now shelling with a great 6-inch gun.
[Illustration:
[_Photo by Robinson, Dublin._
LIEUT.-COLONEL T. D. PILCHER.
(Of the Bedfordshire Regiment), commanding Mounted Infantry.]
[Illustration: LIEUT. TAIT.
Amateur golf champion. Killed at Koodoesberg.]
Since the losses had not entirely been made good by drafts, the
strength of Lord Roberts' army, as it stood ready to strike on February
10, may be estimated at 26,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, 3,500 mounted
infantry, and about 120 guns, including the 6-inch howitzers of the
siege train. It was by far the largest and the best organised wholly
British force that had ever taken the field. Australians, Canadians,
and Ceylon planters were among the mounted infantry; Afrikanders, among
the Cape volunteers; but the great majority came from within the limits
of the British Isles.
[Sidenote: Composition of the Grand Army.]
Lord Roberts' army was composed of four infantry divisions and one of
cavalry, as follows:--
FIRST DIVISION.
LIEUT.-GENERAL LORD METHUEN.
1ST (POLE-CAREW'S) BRIGADE. 9TH (DOUGLAS'S) BRIGADE.
3rd Grenadier Guards. 1st Northumberland Fusiliers.
1st Coldstream Guards. 1st Loyal North Lancashire.
2nd Coldstream Guards. 2nd Northamptonshire.
1st Scots Guards. 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry.
83rd, 84th, and 85th Field Batteries.
SIXTH DIVISION.
LIEUT.-GENERAL KELLY-KENNY.
18TH (STEPHENSON'S) BRIGADE. 13TH (KNOX'S) BRIGADE.
1st Essex. 2nd East Kent.
1st Yorkshire. 1st Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
1st Welsh. 1st West Riding.
2nd Royal Warwick. 2nd Gloucester.
76th, 81st, and 82nd Field Batteries.
SEVENTH DIVISION.
LIEUT.-GENERAL TUCKER.
14TH (CHERMSIDE'S) BRIGADE. 15TH (WAVELL'S) BRIGADE.
2nd Norfolk. 2nd Cheshire.
2nd Lincoln. 1st East Lancashire.
1st King's Own Scottish Borderers. 2nd South Wales Borderers.
2nd Hants. 2nd North Stafford.
18th, 62nd, and 75th c
3RD (MACDONALD'S) HIGHLAND BRIGADE. 19TH (SMITH-DORRIEN'S) BRIGADE.
1st Argyll and Sutherland. 1st Gordon Highlanders.
1st Highland Light Infantry. 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
2nd Seaforth Highlanders. 2nd Shropshire Light Infantry.
2nd Royal Highlanders. Canadian Regiment.
CAVALRY DIVISION.
LIEUT.-GENERAL FRENCH.
1ST (PORTER'S) BRIGADE. 2ND (BROADWOOD'S) BRIGADE. 3RD (GORDON'S) BRIGADE.
6th Dragoon Guards. 10th Hussars. 16th Lancers.
6th Dragoons. 12th Lancers. 9th Lancers.
2nd Dragoons. Household Cavalry. Roberts' Horse.
G, O, P, Q, R, T, and U Horse Artillery Batteries.
MOUNTED INFANTRY.
HANNAY'S BRIGADE.
RIDLEY'S BRIGADE.
CORPS TROOPS.
City Imperial Volunteers (Mounted Infantry).
Kitchener's Horse.
Rimington's Scouts.
38th Field, 65th Howitzer Battery.
Siege train (including four 6-inch howitzers).
Four 4·7-inch naval guns; four 12-pounders.
That night of the 10th the search-light in the British camp answered
the message of Kimberley with the glad words--"We are coming."
[Illustration: _W. S. Small._] [_From a sketch by G. D. Giles._
CLEARING THE ROAD TO KIMBERLEY: THE BRITISH CAVALRY CHARGING AT KLIP
DRIFT.]