THE FIRST BATTLE OF COLENSO.
The battle begins--Bombardment of Fort Wylie--Artillery
pushed forward--The Boers open fire--The guns
abandoned--General Hart's position--The Dublin
Fusiliers attempt to ford the Tugela--Their retirement
ordered--Failure to carry Hlangwane--Advance of
Hildyard's Brigade--General withdrawal ordered--Death
of Lieutenant Roberts--Guns and men captured by
the Boers--Retirement effected in good order--Our
losses--Scarcity of water--Bravery of the Army Medical
Corps--Impressions of an eye-witness--Armistice--A day
of blunders.
[Sidenote: The battle begins.]
Long before day broke the infantry began to move off in huge masses.
The men were in the best and highest of spirits, expecting easy
victory. To this cheerfulness the general opinion of the Staff that
the enemy were on the point of retreating contributed greatly.
Gradually the dense columns opened out into skirmishing order, and the
eagerly-looked-for day began to break, radiant, clear, intensely hot,
over the distant ridges of the Drakensberg.
[Illustration: COMMON AND SHRAPNEL SHELLS.
Fig. 1 shows a "common shell;" on exploding, its fragments are
hurled in all directions, and if charged with a high explosive, such
as lyddite, the mere concussion caused by the release of the gases
will cause death at a considerable distance. Shrapnel shell (Fig. 2)
is filled with metal balls, which, on the explosion of the charge
of powder, B, are flung forward in the face of the enemy. Fig. 3
represents the cartridge, of cordite, used in howitzers. Both shells
are here shown with fuses attached, which may be arranged to fire the
charge either after the lapse of a given number of seconds, or on
impact. The fuse communicates with the charge through the channel, C.]
[Sidenote: Bombardment of Fort Wylie.]
[Sidenote: DEC. 15, 1899.] _Opening of the Battle._]
The crash of the naval 12-pounders, opening fire on Fort Wylie at
4,000 yards, began the battle at 4·45. They fired slowly till the day
grew higher and all preparations were completed, when they poured in
a terrific storm of shells and shrapnel. On their right the 14th and
66th Field Batteries and six naval 12-pounders under Colonel Long
took up the bombardment. There was still no sign of life from the
long, indistinct lines of Boer entrenchments, flickering through the
heat-mist which rose under the burning sun from the parched ground. Far
away and well out of range a few small groups of Boers could be made
out through field-glasses, apparently watching the British artillery
fire. So complete was the silence of the enemy that the conjecture that
the position had been abandoned became almost a conviction.
[Illustration:
[_Photo by the Biograph Company._
GENERAL BULLER WITNESSING THE FIRING OF THE NAVAL GUNS IN THE BATTLE OF
COLENSO.]
[Sidenote: Artillery pushed forward.]
[Sidenote: The Boers open fire.]
[Sidenote: [DEC. 15, 1899.]
At this point, Colonel Long, with the artillery in the centre,
determined to push closer in, where his 15-pounder field guns could
fire with better effect, though he had received orders to keep his two
batteries under cover of Barton's brigade, and only to use the naval
12-pounders at long range. He was, it would seem, fully under the
impression that the enemy had retired, and refused to listen to the
entreaties of one or two junior officers, who dreaded some trick on the
part of the Boers. He was confirmed in this impression by two scouts
whom he sent forward. One rode close up to the river bank; the other
actually set foot on the road bridge without seeing a single enemy.
This was a carefully calculated ruse of the Boers, and it succeeded.
Confidently, Colonel Long directed the 14th and 66th Field Batteries
and six naval guns under Lieutenant James to advance to a point barely
800 yards from the Tugela and 1,200 yards from Fort Wylie, crossing
on the way two dongas. This position was more than a mile in front of
the slowly advancing infantry of Hildyard's brigade. The two batteries
galloped forward, outstripping their infantry escort; the naval guns
followed more slowly, when suddenly a single shot rang out from one of
the hills behind Colenso. It was the signal for the Boers to open fire.
Instantly the whole northern bank of the river broke into flame with a
fearful crackling and spluttering, above which could be heard the loud
and heavy hammering of the Boer 1-pounder automatic guns. A deluge of
projectiles from rifle, cannon, and machine gun descended upon Colonel
Long's artillery. The gunners faced the storm with stubborn heroism,
neither flinching from their work nor showing any undue haste. The
guns were calmly unlimbered, picked up the range, and then opened fire
on Fort Wylie. Two of the naval 12-pounders had crossed the rearmost
donga, but all the oxen dragging these were in a moment killed or
stampeded by the Boer fire, and the sailors had, perhaps luckily for
them, to drag the weapons back to the other four 12-pounders, which
now unlimbered and opened from a position considerably to the rear
of Colonel Long's batteries. The great 4·7's, far behind, gave all
the aid they could in beating down the fire of Fort Wylie. The Boer
works, at this point, were wreathed in one continuous cloud of smoke
from the bursting shells. With the dense green fumes which the lyddite
projectiles scattered as they exploded, it seemed as though the hill
had broken bodily into flame and was being consumed by subterranean
fires. Yet in the midst of this cyclone of death the Boer gunners,
behind their earthworks, worked their guns as steadfastly as the
British gunners. The latter, unhappily, stood in the open space before
Colenso with half-a-mile of smooth open ground behind them--a splendid
target at close range.
[Illustration: No. 5 GUN OF THE 14th BATTERY IN ACTION AT COLENSO.
Two men continued to serve this gun after all their comrades had been
shot down. Finally they also were killed, and the gun was left standing
alone.]
[Illustration: FACING DEATH: THE LAST TWO GUNNERS OF THE 14th BATTERY.]
[Sidenote: DEC. 15, 1899.] Hopeless Situation of the Two Batteries.]
And now on all sides the fight grew furious. Far away on Grobler's
Kloof, and on Red Hill, invisible cannon were booming, while from Red
Hill to Hlangwane invisible marksmen were raining death upon their
assailants. The greatest difficulty with which the British had to
contend was that there was no enemy to be seen, no clear target to fire
at. The dancing blaze of the Boer Mausers was unaccompanied by smoke,
and gave no object for the sights of rifle or field gun. The Boers
themselves lay _perdu_ in deep entrenchments, firing in almost complete
security through loop-holes. Their most advanced position in the scrub
near Colenso, not 300 yards from Colonel Long's guns, was hidden by the
undergrowth.
[Sidenote: The guns abandoned.]
[Sidenote: [DEC. 15, 1899.]
The two British batteries before Colenso were in an utterly hopeless
situation. In a few minutes, most of their horses, two-thirds of their
men, Captains Goldie and Schrieber, and Colonel Long himself, had
fallen dead or wounded. Help was sent for to keep down the enemy's
rifle fire, but help did not come. Colonel Long, shot through the arm
and liver, was urged to abandon the guns, but firmly refused, replying,
"Abandon, be damned! we never abandon guns!" Yet the fury of the
enemy's fire at last drove the survivors back to the nearest donga.
There they remained, from time to time rushing forward, when there came
a lull in the hail of bullets, to re-open fire. The pitiless storm,
however, would always again descend. The diminished detachments caught
by its fury would fall to the ground, swept from their feet by the
blast of death. Yet so long as there was ammunition in the limbers, one
of the twelve pieces continued to fire at intervals, till at last only
two men were left. One bowed his head and suddenly fell forward prone
upon his gun, the other, the last survivor, turned, and disdaining
flight, was walking slowly back as if on parade to the donga in the
rear, when a bullet struck him, and he, too, was numbered among the
lost. Thus did the gunners of the Royal Artillery answer the call of
duty. In the donga behind the guns crouched or lay a few unwounded and
a large number of wounded, among them Colonel Long, now delirious, and
ever repeating in words of agony and admiration, "Ah! my gunners! My
gunners are splendid! Look at them!" Over the donga swept the hail of
lead and shrapnel, and it was death to show the head above it. Behind
it stretched the smooth level slope, devoid of cover, swept by the
enemy's fire, and across this it was almost impossible to send the
much-needed aid.
[Illustration: THE VICKERS-MAXIM 1-POUNDER.
Used by the Boers, and variously called by our men "Pom-pom" and
"Ten-a-penny."]
The naval 12-pounders had, as we have seen, taken up a position 400
yards to the rear of the doomed field batteries. Here, almost without
support, they kept up a steady fire, and, wonderful to relate, lost
only four men wounded. There were many narrow escapes. The little
1-pounder shells from "Pom-Pom," the automatic Maxim, fairly rained
about the guns. Three passed between the legs of Lieutenant Ogilvy,
R.N., while he was watching the effect of his fire through his glasses,
yet did not harm him.
[Sidenote: General Hart's position.]
While these things were happening in the centre, on the left and
right the attack had been equally unsuccessful. On the left General
Hart advanced in column, with two field batteries, toward the drift.
Soon after six the enemy suddenly opened upon the brigade, which was
still marching in close order, with shell and shrapnel. The brunt of
this artillery fire was borne by the Dublin Fusiliers and Connaught
Rangers, who sustained heavy losses. A 45-pounder on Grobler's Kloof,
another of the same calibre on Red Hill, and several smaller guns fired
steadily at them, and the two field batteries seemed unable to effect
much against these weapons. The range was too great, and there was,
moreover, difficulty in locating them. The strident crash of the Maxims
in the enemy's lines was not the least unnerving of the dangers which
had to be faced.
But at length the British troops deployed and advanced in open order,
company by company, in desperate rushes towards the ford. The nearer
they drew the hotter became the enemy's fire, till it was wonderful
to observers that any human being could live in it. And still the
enemy was invisible, and the British troops had nothing to fire at.
Men sobbed with rage at the fact that they were so helpless. The two
field batteries, far too few for the work, could produce no impression
whatever upon the dimly-seen Boer trenches, within which the enemy lay
in almost perfect security, and the Boer guns left them alone, as if in
derision, devoting all their energy to the advancing line of soldiery.
[Illustration: _J. H. Bacon._] [_Sketched from life._
THE CASUALTY LIST AT THE WAR OFFICE.
From the earliest days of the war, drawn, white faces anxiously
examined the lists of killed and wounded posted up at the War Office in
Pall Mall. Perhaps the most moving scenes witnessed here followed the
announcement that the Grenadier Guards--many of them London men--had
been in action and lost heavily at Belmont, November 23.]
[Sidenote: DEC. 15, 1899.] _The Dash Across the River._]
[Sidenote: The Dublin Fusiliers attempt to ford the Tugela.]
At last the Dublin Fusiliers reached the ford and attempted to cross.
But the Boers had dammed the river, and in place of three feet of water
there were seven. Yet, burning with enthusiasm and with determination
to get at their enemies, a number of men plunged boldly in. Several
were carried down by their heavy rifles and cartridges; others were
caught by the barbed wire which the Boers had placed in the stream.
Only a handful reached the other side, climbed the steep bank, and, led
by a colour-sergeant who had been first up the hill at Elandslaagte,
with the words, "Let's make a name for ourselves and die!" doubled
forwards towards a kraal, a little way beyond the river. Among them
was the heroic Bugler Dunne, a mere boy, who on this day displayed the
most devoted valour. In the advance upon the kraal one by one the men
dropped wounded; no one reached it but the sergeant. Alone he could
do nothing; so he turned and fled unharmed, crossed the river, and
regained his battalion.
[Illustration:
_A. Morrow._]
"LET'S MAKE A NAME FOR OURSELVES AND DIE!": DASH OF THE DUBLINS ACROSS
THE TUGELA.]
[Illustration: MAP OF THE BATTLE OF COLENSO.]
[Sidenote: Their retirement ordered.]
[Sidenote: [DEC. 15, 1899.]
[Sidenote: Failure to carry Hlangwane.]
At this point came the order to retire. It was with the utmost
difficulty that the officers could persuade their men to fall back.
The enemy redoubled his fire; the big 45-pounders fired shrapnel and
shell with all possible rapidity; and it was not until the naval
4·7's were able to answer them with lyddite that they were held in
check. To disentangle the Irish Brigade and cover its withdrawal, half
Lyttelton's Brigade came to its help. Then both brigades, as they fell
back, moved to the centre to support the final and desperate effort
of Hildyard to carry the Colenso ford. On the right also the attack
had failed. Dundonald's Brigade was at the base of Hlangwane about 5
a.m., and formed up for the attack. The stiffest work was assigned to
the Colonials, the South African Light Horse climbing the hill straight
towards the top, while the Composite Regiment and Thorneycroft's
Mounted Infantry worked round the spurs of the mountain on their right.
At first no sign of the enemy could be seen. As the roar of battle
rose from Colenso behind, the Light Horse breasted the steep slope.
It seemed as though the hill was as good as won, when a sharp fire
was opened from the summit, and simultaneously Thorneycroft's mounted
men were attacked by a large body of the enemy on their exposed right
flank. Now was the time to send in support from Dundonald's command or
Barton's Brigade, both near at hand; but no support came. Probably the
officers named had not received clear instructions; possibly the whole
attention of the Staff was riveted upon the guns in the centre. Be this
as it may, Thorneycroft was compelled to retire. Heavily outnumbered,
unable to see the enemy, exposed to every shot on the bare slopes of
the mountain, the men fell sullenly back with 136 killed and wounded.
The failure to carry Hlangwane made it practically impossible for the
Army to cross the Tugela.
[Illustration:
[_Photo by S. Cribb._
BUGLER JOHN F. DUNNE
Bugler Dunne, of the Dublin Fusiliers, a lad of only fourteen, insisted
on accompanying the column in the advance on Colenso; and whilst in the
firing line was severely wounded in two places during the attempt to
force the passage of the Tugela. He was invalided home, and recovered
his health on the voyage. When he arrived in England he was received
with the greatest enthusiasm, and became the unwilling object of a
public ovation. He was presented to the Queen at Osborne, and as he had
lost his bugle in the Tugela, Her Majesty gave him a new one, with a
suitable inscription thereon. He is a native of the Isle of Man, and
his father and brother are both in the Army.]
[Illustration:
[_Rudall, Carte & Co._
BUGLE PRESENTED TO BUGLER DUNNE BY HER MAJESTY TO REPLACE ONE LOST AT
COLENSO.]
[Illustration: _F. Dadd, R.I._] [_After Photos, by S. Cribb._
THE CHAIRING OF BUGLER DUNNE AT PORTSMOUTH.]
[Sidenote: Advance of Hildyard's Brigade.]
[Sidenote: DEC. 15, 1899.] _Hildyard's Brigade Ordered Forward._]
In the centre the battle still raged with unabated violence. Indeed,
as our men fell back on the left and right the enemy's fire in this
quarter grew in fury and intensity. The Boers' attention was no longer
diverted, and they were able to concentrate all their strength and
energy to meet Hildyard's assault. To have had any chance of success
it should have been made simultaneously with Hart's onset on the
left. Hart having failed, had it not been for the desperate position
of Colonel Long's guns close to the river and in the very centre of
the enemy's fire, a retreat would without doubt have been the wisest
course. It should have been no part of the British plan to commit
our men to a profitless combat in which they could only be shot down
without effective reply. But though the plight of the twelve guns does
not seem as yet to have been known to the commander-in-chief, he sent
Hildyard forward.
Hildyard's Brigade, led by the Royal West Surreys and the Devons,
in superb array descended the gentle slopes which led down from the
British camp to the village of Colenso. There was no cover of any
kind, and the whole terrain over which they moved was swept at first
by the Boer cannon and automatic guns, and then, as our men drew
nearer, by the far deadlier rifles of the enemy. "With magnificent
hardihood both battalions walked erect," says Mr. Bennet Burleigh,
the _Daily Telegraph_ correspondent. "With death filling the air and
tearing the ground, onward they went, the most superb spectacle of
invincible manhood. Common soldiers in stained, creased khaki uniforms,
homeliest of drab--they were heroes bound to command the admiration
of the world." From the extreme weakness of the British artillery it
was impossible to beat down the fire from the enemy's trenches near
Colenso. No guns were available, for the 14th and 66th Field Batteries
were out of action, and from the lie of the ground the naval weapons,
which alone remained in this portion of the field, were unable to
direct their projectiles upon the enemy. Yet in spite of the fact that
their onset was virtually unsupported the West Surreys forced their way
into the brushwood around Colenso, and even reached the outskirts of
the village. A tremendous roar of firing came up from the hollow; then
the Boers were seen from the naval 4·7 battery to stream out of Colenso
and swarm up the slopes of Fort Wylie. The naval guns, however, lost
their opportunity, since at that distance the swarm of fugitives was
taken for British soldiers assaulting.
[Illustration:
_Photos by G. W. Wilson & Co., Aberdeen._]
THE FALLS OF THE TUGELA.
These two falls are about a couple of miles apart, and lie a little
below Fort Wylie, and quite close to the scene of the great battle.]
[Sidenote: [DEC. 15, 1899.]
At this point, when the troops were in a good position for crossing
the river and assaulting Fort Wylie, General Buller at last heard of
the catastrophe to the two field batteries. It was represented to
him as even worse than it really was, since the six naval 12-pounders
were said to have been silenced with Colonel Long's guns. The terrible
news that the artillery, which he so urgently needed and upon which he
had relied to cover the final rush of the stormers, had been thrown
away may well have staggered the general. Without the support of guns
he considered that Fort Wylie could not be taken. There seemed to be
nothing left but a withdrawal, and a withdrawal was ordered, though the
Colonel of the Surreys begged to be allowed to attempt the rescue of
the lost guns and to be permitted to hold Colenso till nightfall.
While the Surreys were drawing off attention in the direction of
Colenso two companies of Devons had crossed the railway and had gone
to the help of the field guns. They were supported by two companies of
Scots Fusiliers from Barton's brigade. But this half battalion could
effect little or nothing. It was forced to take shelter in the donga
behind the guns, whence it fired steadily at the Boer trenches some
hundreds of yards away.
[Illustration:
_S. T. Dadd._]
BRINGING OUT AN AMMUNITION WAGGON UNDER HEAVY FIRE AT COLENSO.]
To see what could be done, and in response to urgent messages for help
from Colonel Long, about 9·30 General Buller with General Clery and
their Staff rode down to the guns under a terrific fire. "Out of this,
please," he said to the naval 12-pounders which had fought so bravely
and with so much constancy behind the dongas, and these guns were moved
back by the bluejackets, but only with the greatest difficulty. No less
than 32 of the oxen which dragged them had been shot, and the black
drivers had all bolted. An ammunition waggon had perforce to be left
behind for the moment, but even it was not finally abandoned. A heroic
Natal farmer named Pringle went out alone with a team of slow-moving
oxen, deliberately inspanned them under fire, and withdrew the waggon.
It now remained, if possible, to save the twelve field guns, 400 yards
or more to the front in the very vortex of a storm of shot and shell
which broke over them all the more fiercely as the Boers realised what
was purposed.
[Sidenote: DEC. 15, 1899.] _Victoria Cross Heroes._]
[Sidenote: Death of Lieutenant Roberts.]
Into this hell rode Lieutenant Roberts, only son of the Field-Marshal,
an officer of infinite promise, Captain Schofield, and Captain
Congreve. With fresh teams of horses they strove to limber up the guns,
but under the tempest of death men and horses were swiftly swept away.
Roberts fell stricken with five bullets, mortally wounded. Congreve's
tunic was torn to shreds by bullets, and he himself was wounded.
Schofield alone seemed to bear a charmed life, and though six bullets
passed through his clothes he came off without a scratch, and succeeded
in getting away two guns of the 66th Battery. All this while General
Buller had sat cool and determined upon his horse, eating sandwiches
under the terrible fire. He himself was struck by a spent bullet, which
coursed round his ribs without inflicting a serious wound. Captain
Hughes, his staff doctor, was blown to pieces by a shell which burst
amongst the group; Lord Gerard, one of his aide-de-camps, had his horse
shot through the neck; and several of the Natal Police, acting as
escort, had their horses grazed or wounded, and themselves had bullets
through their clothes. Three teams of horses were brought up from the
7th Field Battery under Captain Reed, and plunged into the inferno. One
team was harnessed to an ammunition waggon, but before they could move
were almost all shot, and Reed himself was wounded. There was nothing
for it but to abandon the other ten guns and order a general retreat.
THE FOUR COLENSO ~V.C.'s~.
[Illustration:
[_Photo by Chancellor, Dublin._
THE LATE LIEUT. ROBERTS, ~V.C.~]
[Illustration:
[_Photo by Knight, Aldershot._
CAPT. CONGREVE, ~V.C.~
The Victoria Crosses so gallantly won were presented to Capt. Reed
and Corporal Nurse by General Buller, at Ladysmith, on March 18, at a
special parade of the troops held for the purpose.]
[Illustration:
[_Photo by Chancellor, Dublin._
CAPT. REED, ~V.C.~
Corporal Nurse obtained his Cross for assisting his superior officers
in the attempt to save the guns. Capt. Schofield was not awarded the
decoration solely because he acted under orders.]
[Illustration:
[_Photo by Hawke, Plymouth._
CORPORAL NURSE, ~V.C.~]
[Illustration:
_Edward Read._]
THE BOERS CROSSING THE TUGELA TO CAPTURE THE BRITISH GUNS.]
[Illustration:
[_From the Painting by Therese Schwartze._
OUR GALLANT FOEMAN: THE LATE GENERAL JOUBERT.
Piet Joubert, Commandant-General of the Boer forces, died at Pretoria
on March 27, 1900. He was of Huguenot descent. Sir George White has
spoken of him as "a soldier and a gentleman, a brave and honourable
opponent," and Lord Roberts telegraphed his respectful sympathy to the
family of the distinguished General, "whose personal gallantry was
only surpassed by his humane conduct and chivalrous bearing under all
circumstances." The captive British officers in Pretoria sent wreaths
for his coffin.]
[Sidenote: Guns and men captured by the Boers.]
[Sidenote: [DEC. 15, 1899.]
Even now it would have been possible, in the opinion of some, to
withdraw the British infantry out of range of the Boer rifles and
entrench a force in a position 1,000 yards or so away from the guns,
when any attempt on the part of the enemy to cross the river could
have been defeated. If the naval guns on the crest of the ridge above
Colenso had kept their place and supported this force it would have
been practically impossible for the Boers to get near the guns, and
the weapons could have been withdrawn under cover of night. As it was
the Staff forgot to give orders to the Devons and Scots Fusiliers in
the donga to retire, and the men remained there till evening, when
the Boers boldly crossed the stream, captured the ten guns, and
surrounded the men in the donga, making treacherous use, it is said,
of the white flag. The ten guns had not been in any way disabled, as
the gunners had expected to be able to return and serve them. The
breech-blocks had not been carried off, and it would appear that in
spite of the complaints of shortness of ammunition a large quantity of
British shrapnel and cartridges was taken by the enemy--probably in the
ammunition waggons to the rear of the guns.
[Illustration: No. 1 FIELD HOSPITAL TRAIN AND STAFF.]
[Illustration: THE DISPENSARY AND SURGERY OF THE HOSPITAL TRAIN.]
Only two officers are known to have escaped unhurt from "the donga of
death." These were Captains Herbert and Fitzpatrick. Before they made
their desperate attempt they shook hands with each other and with those
who were left unwounded. Then Captain Herbert dashed out and got away
unwounded, but with his horse shot in the neck. Captain Fitzpatrick
followed at full speed, and he too reached safety. A third officer had
only covered a few yards when a shell burst under him and killed him
and his horse instantly.
[Illustration: INTERIOR OF HOSPITAL TRAIN.]
[Sidenote: Retreat effected in good order.]
[Sidenote: DEC. 15, 1899.] _The British Losses._]
And now in all directions the British troops were falling back from
the field of battle and disaster. It was a scene, says one who was
present, "that can never be forgotten by those who were privileged to
see it. Slowly, steadily, with correct intervals, as if on parade, only
better, our magnificent infantry fell back; no doubling, no bunching
together, they stood within 500 yards of the Boer position. Here was
no romance of war, no charging of battalions amid a storm of cheers,
nothing to brace up the spirits to one glorious effort in which danger
is forgotten; nothing but the stream of bullets and shells. From our
position I could plainly see the thin dust-coloured lines retiring.
Presently, clank, clank from the Maxim-Nordenfelt and a group of men
would fall; again an officer might be seen walking slowly in rear of
his company; you looked again, and a speck of khaki was all that could
be seen. The use of smokeless powder has added greatly to the horrors
of war; this was the strange thing about the battle of Colenso, the
utter absence of smoke, and the clearness with which each incident
could be seen. At last, covered by the Cavalry Brigade and the 7th
Battery, the wearied infantry returned. Twelve hours' fighting in
the burning sun, losses over 1,200--not so bad for our boy soldiers.
Absolutely undefeated, unshaken by what they had passed through, our
magnificent infantry at last could rest."
Not so much with the Commander-in-Chief as with his impetuous
subordinates rested the blame for this disastrous day. The entanglement
of the guns it was which had the greatest part in piling up the British
losses and converting what was almost a success into a humiliating
defeat. Had the British artillery been stronger, even this rash move
might not have proved so calamitous as it ultimately was. Forty guns
might have beaten down the Boer fire, which twelve guns were utterly
unable to check.
[Sidenote: Our losses.]
The total British losses were 132 killed, 765 wounded, and 228 missing
or prisoners; a total of 1,125. The heaviest sufferers were the two
field batteries--the 14th losing 50 and the 66th Battery 42 men, out of
a probable total present in each case of 140 men. The Dublin Fusiliers
lost 218 men out of about 1,000. As the force actually engaged did
not number more than 15,000, when all deductions had been made, the
casualties were a high percentage. The loss in killed was unusually
small, and a very great number of the wounded were only very slightly
injured--for the most part shot in the foot. As to the enemy's losses
it was impossible to speak with any accuracy. Very few Boers were seen
during the fighting, and it would appear that at the outside 200 or 250
were killed and wounded, mainly by the British artillery fire. Thus our
troops suffered heavily without inflicting serious casualties upon the
enemy.
[Illustration:
[_Photo by Major Brazier-Creagh, R.A.M.C._
THE FIELD HOSPITAL TRAIN AT THE BATTLE OF COLENSO.]
[Sidenote: [DEC. 15, 1899.]
It is noteworthy that in the fighting no estimate whatever could be
arrived at as to the Boers' strength. Whether they numbered 10,000,
15,000, or 20,000, no one knew, and no one could even guess. It was
evident that the trenches and the position generally were very strongly
held. The ranges are believed to have been carefully measured, and wire
entanglements had been constructed close to the enemy's works, so that
storming them would have been a matter of exceptional difficulty, even
without the swift and deep river as a further obstacle in their front.
It does not appear that the Boers weakened their force surrounding
Ladysmith during the action. The garrison there probably did not expect
a battle, and so made no move.
[Illustration:
[_Photo by the Biograph Company._
HELIOGRAPHING INTO LADYSMITH.
General Buller was able to keep up communication with Ladysmith,
as Lord Methuen was with Kimberley, by means of the heliograph, an
apparatus for reflecting sunlight in flashes indicating letters and
words.]
As serious as the loss of over a thousand men in the none-too-strong
relief column was the loss of ten guns. This reduced Sir Redvers
Buller's available artillery to the contemptible total of twenty field
pieces. It is wonderful that the Boers made no attempt whatever to
follow up their victory; instead, they seemed perfectly satisfied with
the results that had been obtained. But had they pressed vigorously
upon the British flanks during the retirement, they might have greatly
increased the casualties in our ranks, and, perhaps, have converted
defeat into catastrophe. It is certain that they were strong enough to
do this had they been well directed, and their own mobility was such
that they could have had no fear of any untoward consequences resulting
to themselves from such a course of action.
[Illustration:
[_Photo by the Biograph Company._
A NOVEL FEATURE OF THE BATTLEFIELD: THE BIOGRAPH CAMERA IN OPERATION
DURING THE BATTLE OF COLENSO.]
[Illustration: FIRST AID TO THE WOUNDED: THE ARMY MEDICAL CORPS AT WORK
UNDER A HEAVY FIRE AT COLENSO.]
[Sidenote: DEC. 15, 1899.] _Conduct of the Wounded._]
[Sidenote: Scarcity of water.]
The day was fiercely hot and water was scarce, which greatly increased
the sufferings of the British troops. The wounded, especially, had to
endure terrible agony under the scorching sun, yet the demeanour of
the men was above all praise. None complained; few uttered a groan;
they faced pain with a heroic stoicism. A man who was shot through
the abdomen had a cup of water brought to him by an orderly as he lay
writhing with parched mouth. "Take it to my pal first," he said, "he is
worse hit than me." It was the spirit of Sir Philip Sidney. A drummer
boy of fourteen sat, with his left arm shattered, on the ambulance,
eating a biscuit. Admiring his bravery and endurance, an officer went
up to him and gave him half-a-crown. "Thank you," said the lad, "but
would you mind putting it in my pocket, as I mustn't let go of my
biscuit." Thus were the sublime and the ridiculous blended around those
sorrowful tents to which the stricken painfully pilgrimaged from all
parts of the field. Some limped in as best they could; others were
borne on stretchers; all, as they arrived, were given food.
[Sidenote: Bravery of the Army Medical Corps.]
[Sidenote: [DEC. 15, 1899]
Within the tents the surgeons plied their work of merciful cruelty.
"Each of the three operating tents," says Sir William McCormac,
"contained two operating tables, and as fast as a patient was taken
off the table another took his place. Awaiting their turn, the wounded
were lying outside in rows, which were being continually augmented by
the civilian bearers coming in from the field. As each wounded man
reached the hospital he was served with a hot cup of Bovril, large cans
of which were boiling outside the tents. The way in which the wounded
had been dressed on the field, and each man ticketed with the nature of
his wound, his name, and regiment, was excellent, and was very useful
for identification. This also saved much time at the field hospitals,
because the seriously wounded could be at once discriminated from the
more trivial cases.... The praise of the regimental officers and men in
respect to the way in which the Royal Army Medical Corps had done their
duty under heavy fire was unanimous and unstinted. An officer of the
Devons, wounded in the foot, told me that he managed to get to a hut
near the bank of the river, which was being used as a dressing station.
This hut was continually under heavy fire, and he described the
behaviour of the medical officers as magnificent.... The work performed
in the operating tents was, in my opinion, of great efficiency, the
operations being deliberately carried out with skill and despatch under
the very trying circumstances of intense heat, hurry, and excitement
all round. The Royal Army Medical Corps officers of these hospitals had
started their surgical work about 3 a.m., and when I visited them in
the evening they were still hard at it, having had no food meanwhile
and no time for rest, and the work went on for hours afterwards.
Altogether some 800 patients passed through the field hospitals during
the day. The men showed the utmost pluck and endurance."
[Illustration: THE FATAL TELEGRAM: "KILLED IN ACTION."]
And yet in the midst of the scene of suffering and sorrow one thing
consoles the heart. Why was it that these men faced these frightful
conditions and endured the rain of bullets and shrapnel and shell
splinters? Was it not because of their faith in those unseen things for
which the Christian martyr of old laid down his life? The martyr died
for God; these men were ready to endure all things for duty and for
their country. Of such motives the Englishman rarely speaks. Yet in the
heart of the nation "there is an instinctive recognition that a man's
part is not to shirk the hardships or escape from the sorrows of life."
It was this recognition that had brought thousands of men--"duke's son,
cook's son, son of a belted earl"--of their own free will thousands of
miles across the sea to lay down their lives in the flower of their age.
[Sidenote: Impressions of an eye-witness.]
[Sidenote: DEC. 15, 1899.] _Our Wounded Well-treated by the Boers._]
The impression produced upon spectators by the fight is thus described
by one who was present, not as a correspondent or combatant. "X and
_I_," he writes, "were present through that massacre of our poor brave
troops and volunteers at Colenso on Friday; on the battlefield, within
the lines actually. Shells burst within a thousand yards of us. We
saw the dead and wounded carried away till cart after cart was full
to heartbreaking overflowing. The wonderful artillery practice and
the roar and rattle of rifles, Hotchkiss, Maxims, and cannon, up to
the great earth-rending lyddite death-dealers, kept us in a state of
excited enthusiasm. X had nightmare, as you may imagine, that night,
and details of the scenes we witnessed must have been sickening enough
reading for you. If this was only a 'reconnaissance in force,' what
must a battle be?... I often feel as if I were out of my mind, or in
some dream or other state, for it is all bewildering and stupefying,
and this intense heat in any case grievously affects me. No rain, no
cessation of its suffocating fury night or day. How can the troops
endure it?"
[Illustration: HOSPITAL COOKS PREPARING BEEF-TEA.]
[Illustration: IN A FIELD HOSPITAL ON THE TUGELA RIVER.]
That night the defeated general telegraphed to the Home Government
a brief and manly account of the unlucky day. He neither minimised
nor exaggerated the disaster. He has been censured for opening his
melancholy dispatch with the words, "I regret to report serious
reverse;" but if this was not a "serious reverse" speech has no
meaning. It was a matter of absolute necessity to give the authorities
at home true and exact information as to the situation, that they might
be able to gauge correctly the measures necessary to meet the danger.
Not General Buller for making this report, but the home authorities,
for publishing it, must be blamed, if there is to be any blame.
[Sidenote: Armistice.]
Thus checked, the General next day obtained an armistice for the
purpose of burying the dead and recovering any of the wounded who might
have escaped notice. The dead were found to have been stripped of their
clothes by the Boers, who were short of clothing themselves, though
the wounded near the enemy's lines on the previous day had been very
kindly treated and given water. They were deprived of their arms and
accoutrements, but were allowed by the enemy to be carried off by our
stretcher-bearers and ambulances, only the slightly wounded officers
being detained as prisoners.
[Illustration: THIRSTY SOLDIERS TAKING THEIR TURN AT THE WATER-BARREL.
The scarcity of water is one of the great obstacles to the rapid
movement of troops in South Africa.]
[Sidenote: A day of blunders.]
[Sidenote: [DEC. 15, 1899.]
The enemy throughout fought with great courage and determination,
but it must be remembered that they had the advantage of strong
entrenchments. They displayed particular restraint and coolness in
sitting quiet under a tremendous bombardment, and in allowing General
Buller's men to advance to relatively close quarters before fire was
opened. What is wonderful is that the British Intelligence Department
in the field seems to have known very little of the enemy's disposition
and entrenchments. The day was a day of tragic blunders issuing in
great and unnecessary sacrifice of men. That the loss was not far
heavier is surprising in view of the intensity and volume of the
enemy's fire. The casualty list at least proved that the Boers were not
the marksmen they had been supposed to be.
[Illustration: COLONEL C. J. LONG, R.A.
Obtained his Lieutenancy in 1870; served in the Afghan War of 1878-80,
and in the Soudan under Lord Kitchener in 1897-8 as commandant of the
Egyptian artillery. He was present at the battle of Khartoum, and for
his services on that occasion was mentioned in despatches. Colonel,
September, 1899; in command of the Royal Artillery at Colenso, where
his anxiety to get within effective range of the enemy led to the loss
of ten guns. In that action he was severely wounded.]
[Illustration: IN A BOER LAAGER: COOKS PREPARING A MEAL.]
[Sidenote: Why the attack failed.]
[Sidenote: DEC. 15, 1899.] _Causes which Led to our Defeat._]
As has been pointed out already, General Buller's army was from the
first insufficient--insufficient in numbers, and especially weak in
artillery. In the opinion of most correspondents on the field--an
opinion justified by the final success in February--there could be no
chance of success unless Mount Hlangwane, upon the British right, were
captured. In Boer hands this position gave an excellent sallying-point
whence to direct counter attacks upon the British flank and line of
communications. Judging by the measure of success which a small force
of Colonials obtained in their assault upon this hill, it would have
been possible with greater strength, which was available, to have
carried it. General Barton's brigade, 3,500 strong, was hardly engaged
in the battle, yet, when appealed to for assistance, the general
refused to send it. Mr. Bennet Burleigh, who does not write hastily,
considers that half a battalion put into the fight at this point might
have turned the scale. With Hlangwane in British hands the Colenso
lines would have become untenable for the Boers, and the enemy must
have fallen back upon Pieters. But at Pieters, if they had fought in
December, they would have had to face the great risk of the Ladysmith
garrison breaking in upon their rear. For at that date Sir George
White's army was capable of moving, and had its cavalry and artillery
in fair condition. So that the capture of Hlangwane on December 15
might well have brought with it the immediate relief of Ladysmith.
Again, it is curious that seemingly no one in the British Army was
aware that the Boers had entrenched positions to the south of the
Tugela. Yet their dispositions in the Modder River fight, which had
occurred more than a fortnight previously, so that the Staff had had
full time to acquaint itself with the details, should have led to the
conclusion that it was at least probable there were such entrenchments
to the south of the river.
A third cause of the defeat was the utter untrustworthiness of the maps
of the district, although Natal had for two generations been a British
colony, and though a considerable British garrison had for years been
stationed in Ladysmith.
Next there were the actual mistakes of generals in the field. And here
it should be remembered in extenuation that while the non-combatant of
average intelligence, sitting in an armchair, can often point out after
the event what ought to have been done, and what was done wrongly, such
critics have not to face the storm and excitement of battle, in which
men are only too apt to forget or neglect the teaching of history. It
is a classical saying that the best general is he who makes the fewest
mistakes, and the proverb is itself an admission that mistakes in war
are inevitable.
[Illustration: THE LATE GENERAL DE VILLEBOIS-MAREUIL
Sought out by Dr. Leyds on the outbreak of hostilities, Count de
Villebois-Mareuil, who retired from active service in the French Army
in 1896, hastened to Africa, and set to work to elaborate a plan
of campaign in Natal. He is said to have been responsible for the
disposition of the Boers at Colenso and elsewhere on the Tugela, and
to have been present and active in directing the repulse of Buller's
attack. He was killed in an action near Boshof, in the Orange Free
State, where he and some seventy men were surrounded and killed or
captured by Lord Methuen, April 5, 1900.]
In their management of the battle the Boers had the assistance
and counsel of Colonel de Villebois-Mareuil, a French officer of
distinction, who, at a huge salary, had been enlisted to advise their
generals. But they paid little or no attention to his counsel. At the
time it was supposed that the Boer victory was largely to be attributed
to him. We now know that it was due to the errors of the British War
Office and the mistakes of the British generals.
[Illustration: STARTING ON THE FATAL MARCH: ROYAL IRISH RIFLES MARCHING
FROM BUSHMAN'S HOEK IN PREPARATION FOR THE BATTLE OF STORMBERG.]