_Attitude of Armenia during the War between Sapor and Julian. Sapor’s
Treachery towards Arsaces. Sapor conquers Armenia. He attacks Iberia,
deposes Sauromaces, and sets up a new King. Resistance and Capture of
Artogerassa. Difficulties of Sapor. Division of Iberia between the Roman
and Persian Pretenders. Renewal of Hostilities between Rome and Persia.
Peace made with Valens. Death of Sapor. His Coins._
“Rex Persidis, longaevus ille Sapor, post imperatoris Juliani excessum
et pudendse pacis icta foedera . . . irqectabat Armeniae manum.”--Amm.
Marc, xxvii. 18.
The successful issue of Sapor’s war with Julian and Jovian resulted
in no small degree from the attitude which was assumed by Armenia soon
after Julian commenced his invasion. We have seen that the emperor,
when he set out upon his expedition, regarded Armenia as an ally, and in
forming his plans placed considerable dependence on the contingent which
he expected from Arsaces, the Armenian monarch. It was his intention to
attack Ctesiphon with two separate armies, acting upon two converging
lines. While he himself advanced with his main force by way of the
Euphrates valley and the Nahr-Malcha, he had arranged that his two
generals, Procopius and Sebastian, should unite their troops with those
of the Armenian king, and, after ravaging a fertile district of Media,
make their way towards the great city, through Assyria and Adiabene,
along the left bank of the Tigris. It was a bitter disappointment to him
when, on nearing Ctesiphon, he could see no signs and hear no tidings
of the northern army, from which he had looked for effectual aid at this
crisis of the campaign. We have now to consider how this failure came
about, what circumstances induced that hesitation and delay on the
part of Sebastian and Procopius which had at any rate a large share
in frustrating Julian’s plans and causing the ill-success of his
expedition.
It appears that the Roman generals, in pursuance of the orders given
them, marched across Northern Mesopotamia to the Armenian borders, and
were there joined by an Armenian contingent which Arsaces sent to their
assistance. The allies marched together into Media, and carried fire
and sword through the fruitful district known as Chiliacomus, or “the
district of the Thousand Villages.” They might easily have advanced
further; but the Armenians suddenly and without warning drew off and
fell back towards their own country. According to Moses of Chorene,
their general, Zurseus, was actuated by a religious motive; it seemed
to him monstrous that Armenia, a Christian country, should embrace the
cause of an apostate, and he was prepared to risk offending his own
sovereign rather than lend help to one whom he regarded as the enemy of
his faith. The Roman generals, thus deserted by their allies, differed
as to the proper course to pursue. While one was still desirous of
descending the course of the Tigris, and making at least an attempt to
effect a junction with Julian, the other forbade his soldiers to join in
the march, and insisted on falling back and re-entering Mesopotamia. As
usual in such cases, the difference of opinion resulted in a policy of
inaction. The attempt to join Julian was given up; and the second army,
from which he had hoped so much, played no further part in the campaign
of A.D. 363.
We are told that Julian heard of the defection of the Armenians while
he was still on his way to Ctesiphon, and immediately sent a letter to
Arsacos, complaining of his general’s conduct, and threatening to exact
a heavy retribution on his return from the Persian war, if the offence
of Zurseus were not visited at once with condign punishment. Arsaces was
greatly alarmed at the message; and, though he made no effort to supply
the shortcomings of his officer by leading or sending fresh troops to
Julian’s assistance, yet he hastened to acquit himself of complicity
in the misconduct of Zurseus by executing him, together with his whole
family. Having thus, as he supposed, secured himself against Julian’s
anger, he took no further steps, but indulged his love of ease and his
distaste for the Roman alliance by remaining wholly passive during the
rest of the year.
But though the attitude taken by Armenia was thus, on the whole,
favorable to the Persians,and undoubtedly contributed to Sapor’s
success, he was himself so far from satisfied with the conduct of
Arsaces that he resolved at once to invade his country and endeavor to
strip him of his crown. As Rome had by the recent treaty relinquished
her protectorate over Armenia, and bound herself not to interfere in
any quarrel between the Armenians and the Persians, an opportunity was
afforded for bringing Armenia into subjection which an ambitious monarch
like Sapor was not likely to let slip. He had only to consider whether
he would employ art or violence, or whether he would rather prefer a
judicious admixture of the two. Adopting the last-named course as the
most prudent, he proceeded to intrigue with a portion of the Armenian
satraps, while he made armed incursions on the territories of others,
and so harassed the country that after a while the satraps generally
went over to his side, and represented to Arsaces that no course was
open to him but to make his submission. Having brought matters to this
point, Sapor had only further to persuade Arsaces to surrender himself,
in order to obtain the province which he coveted, almost without
striking a blow. He therefore addressed Arsaces a letter which,
according to the only writer who professes to give its terms, was
expressed as follows:
“Sapor, the offspring of Ormazd, comrade of the sun, king of kings,
sends greeting to his dear brother, Arsaces, king of Armenia, whom he
holds in affectionate remembrance. It has come to our knowledge that
thou hast approved thyself our faithful friend, since not only didst
thou decline to invade Persia with Caesar, but when he took a contingent
from thee thou didst send messengers and withdraw it. Moreover, we have
not forgotten how thou actedst at the first, when thou didst prevent
him from passing through thy territories, as he wished. Our soldiers,
indeed, who quitted their post, sought to cast on thee the blame due to
their own cowardice. But we have not listened to them: their leader we
punished with death, and to thy realm, I swear by Mithra, we have done
no hurt. Arrange matters then so that thou mayest come to us with all
speed, and consult with us concerning our common advantage. Then thou
canst return home.”
Arsaces, on receiving this missive, whatever suspicions he may have
felt, saw no course open to him but to accept the invitation. He
accordingly quitted Armenia and made his way to the court of Sapor,
where he was immediately seized and blinded. He was then fettered with
chains of silver, according to a common practice of the Persians with
prisoners of distinction, and was placed in strict confinement in a
place called “the Castle of Oblivion.”
But the removal of their head did not at once produce the submission
of the people. A national party declared itself under, Pharandzem, the
wife, and Bab (or Para), the son of Arsaces, who threw themselves into
the strong fortress of Artogerassa (Ardakers), and there offered to
Sapor a determined resistance. Sapor committed the siege of this place
to two renegade Armenians, Cylaces and Artabannes, while at the same
time he proceeded to extend his influence beyond the limits of Armenia
into the neighboring country of Iberia, which was closely connected with
Armenia, and for the most part followed its fortunes.
Iberia was at this time under the government of a king bearing the
name of Sauromaces, who had received his investiture from Rome, and was
consequently likely to uphold Roman interests. Sapor invaded Iberia,
drove Sauromaces from his kingdom, and set up a new monarch in the
person of a certain Aspacures, on whose brow he placed the coveted
diadem. He then withdrew to his own country, leaving the complete
subjection of Armenia to be accomplished by his officers, Cylaces and
Artabannes, or, as the Armenian historians call them, Zig and Garen.
Cylaces and Artabannes commenced the siege of Artogerassa, and for a
time pressed it with vigor, while they strongly urged the garrison
to make their submission. But, having entered within the walls to
negotiate, they were won over by the opposite side, and joined in
planning a treacherous attack on the besieging force, which was
surprised at night and compelled to retire. Para took advantage of their
retreat to quit the town and throw himself on the protection of Valens,
the Roman emperor, who permitted him to reside in regal state at
Neocaesarea. Shortly afterwards, however, by the advice of Cylaces and
Artabannes, he returned into Armenia, and was accepted by the patriotic
party as their king, Rome secretly countenancing his proceedings. Under
these circumstances the Persian monarch once more took the field, and,
entering Armenia at the head of a large army, drove Para, with his
counsellors Cylaces and Artabannes, to the mountains, renewed the siege
of Artogerassa, and forced it to submit, captured the queen Pharandzem,
together with the treasure of Arsaces, and finally induced Para to
come to terms, and to send him the heads of the two arch-traitors. The
resistance of Armenia would probably now have ceased, had Rome
been content to see her old enemy so aggrandized, or felt her hands
absolutely tied by the terms of the treaty of Dura.
But the success of Sapor thus far only brought him into greater
difficulties. The Armenians and Iberians, who desired above all things
liberty and independence, were always especially hostile to the power
from which they felt that they had for the time being most to fear. As
Christian nations, they had also at this period an additional ground of
sympathy with Rome, and of aversion from the Persians, who were at once
heathens and intolerant. The patriotic party in both countries was thus
violently opposed to the establishment of Sapor’s authority over them,
and cared little for the artifices by which he sought to make it appear
that they still enjoyed freedom and autonomy. Above all, Rome, being
ruled by monarchs who had had no hand in making the disgraceful peace of
A.D. 363, and who had no strong feeling of honor or religious obligation
in the matter of treaties with barbarians, was preparing herself to fly
in the face of her engagements, and, regarding her own interest as her
highest law, to interfere effectually in order to check the progress of
Persia in North-Western Asia.
Rome’s first open interference was in Ibera. Iberia had perhaps not been
expressly named in the treaty, and support might consequently be
given to the expelled Sauromaces without any clear infraction of its
conditions. The duke Terentius was ordered, therefore, towards the close
of A.D. 370, to enter Iberia with twelve legions and replace upon his
throne the old Roman feudatory. Accordingly he invaded the country from
Lazica, which bordered it upon the north, and found no difficulty in
conquering it as far as the river Cyrus. On the Cyrus, however, he was
met by Aspacures, the king of Sapor’s choice, who made proposals for an
accommodation. Representing himself as really well-inclined to Rome, and
only prevented from declaring himself by the fact that Sapor held his
son as a hostage, he asked Terentius’ consent to a division of Iberia
between himself and his rival, the tract north of the Cyrus being
assigned to the Roman claimant, and that south of the river remaining
under his own government. Terentius, to escape further trouble,
consented to the arrangement; and the double kingdom was established.
The northern and western portions of Iberia were made over to
Sauromaces; the southern and eastern continued to be ruled by Aspacures.
When the Persian king received intelligence of these transactions he was
greatly excited. To him it appeared clear that by the spirit, if not by
the letter, of the treaty of Dura, Rome had relinquished Iberia equally
with Armenia; and he complained bitterly of the division which had been
made of the Iberian territory, not only without his consent, but without
his knowledge. He was no doubt aware that Rome had not really confined
her interference to the region with which she had some excuse for
intermeddling, but had already secretly intervened in Armenia, and was
intending further intervention. The count Arinthseus had been sent with
an army to the Armenian frontier about the same time that Terentius
had invaded Iberia, and had received positive instructions to help
the Armenians if Sapor molested them. It was in vain that the Persian
monarch appealed to the terms of the treaty of Dura--Rome dismissed his
ambassadors with contempt, and made no change in her line of procedure.
Upon this Sapor saw that war was unavoidable; and accordingly he wasted
no more time in embassies, but employed himself during the winter, which
had now begun, in collecting as large a force as he could, in part from
his allies, in part from his own subjects, resolving to take the field
in the spring, and to do his best to punish Rome for her faithlessness.
Rome on her part made ready to resist the invasion which she knew to
be impending. A powerful army was sent to guard the East under count
Trajan, and Vadomair, ex-king of the Alemanni; but so much regard for
the terms of the recent treaty was still felt, or pretended, that the
generals received orders to be careful not to commence hostilities,
but to wait till an attack was made on them. They were not kept long
in expectation. As soon as winter was over, Sapor crossed the frontier
(A.D. 371) with a large force of native cavalry and archers, supported
by numerous auxiliaries, and attacked the Romans near a place called
Vagabanta. The Roman commander gave his troops the order to retire;
and accordingly they fell back under a shower of Persian arrows, until,
several having been wounded, they felt that they could with a good face
declare that the rupture of the peace was the act of the Persians. The
retreat was then exchanged for an advance, and after a brief engagement
the Romans were victorious, and inflicted a severe loss upon their
adversaries. But the success was not followed by results of any
importance. Neither side seems to have been anxious for another general
encounter; and the season for hostilities was occupied by a sort of
guerilla warfare, in which the advantage rested alternately with the
Persians and the Romans. At length, when the summer was ended, the
commanders on either side entered into negotiations; and a truce was
made which allowed Sapor to retire to Ctesiphon, and the Roman emperor,
who was now personally directing the war, to go into winter quarters at
Antioch.
After this the war languished for two or three years. Valens was wholly
deficient in military genius, and was quite content if he could maintain
a certain amount of Roman influence in Armenia and Iberia, while at
the same time he protected the Roman frontier against Persian invasion.
Sapor was advanced in years, and might naturally desire repose, having
been almost constantly engaged in military expeditions since he
reached the age of sixteen. Negotiations seem to have alternated with
hostilities during the interval between A.D. 371 and 376; but they
resulted in nothing, until, in this last-named year, a peace was made,
which gave tranquillity to the East during the remainder of the reign of
Sapor.
The terms upon which this peace was concluded are obscure. It is perhaps
most probable that the two contracting powers agreed to abstain from
further interference with Iberia and Armenia, and to leave those
countries to follow their own inclinations. Armenia seems by the native
accounts to have gravitated towards Rome under these circumstances, and
Iberia is likely to have followed her example. The tie of Christianity
attached these countries to the great power of the West; and, except
under compulsion, they were not likely at this time to tolerate the
yoke of Persia for a day. When Jovian withdrew the Roman protection from
them, they were forced for a while to submit to the power which they
disliked; but no sooner did his successors reverse his policy, and show
themselves ready to uphold the Armenians and Iberians against Persia,
than they naturally reverted to the Roman side, and formed an important
support to the empire against its Eastern rival.
The death of Sapor followed the peace of A.D. 376 within a few years. He
died A.D. 379 or 380, after having reigned seventy years. It is curious
that, although possessing the crown for so long a term, and enjoying a
more brilliant reign than any preceding monarch, he neither left behind
him any inscriptions, nor any sculptured memorials. The only material
evidences that we possess of his reign are his coins, which are
exceedingly numerous. According to Mordtmann, they may be divided into
three classes, corresponding to three periods in his life. The earliest
have on the reverse the fire-altar, with two priests, or guards, looking
towards the altar, and with the flame rising from the altar in the usual
way. The head on the obverse is archaic in type, and very much resembles
that of Sapor I. The crown has attached to it, in many cases, that
“cheek-piece” which is otherwise confined to the first three monarchs of
the line. These coins are the best from an artistic point of view; they
greatly resemble those of the first Sapor, but are distinguishable from
them, first, by the guards looking towards the altar instead of away
from it; and, secondly, by a greater profusion of pearls about the
king’s person. The coins of the second period lack the “cheek-piece,”
and have on the reverse the fire-altar without supporters; they are
inferior as works of art to those of the first period, but much superior
to those of the third. These last, which exhibit a marked degeneracy,
are especially distinguished by having a human head in the middle of the
flames that rise from the altar. Otherwise they much resemble in their
emblems the early coins, only differing from them in being artistically
inferior. The ordinary legends upon the coins are in no respect
remarkable; but occasionally we find the monarch taking the new and
expressive epithet of Toham, “the Strong.” [PLATE XIX., Fig. 1.]
[Illustration: PLATE 19]