_Revolt of Armenia and Acceptance by Arsaces of the Position of a Roman
Feudatory. Character and Issue of Sapor’s Eastern Wars. His negotiations
with Constantius. His Extreme Demands. Circumstances under which he
determines to renew the War. His Preparations. Desertion to him of
Antoninus. Great Invasion of Sapor. Siege of Amida. Sapor’s Severities.
Siege and Capture of Singara; of Bezabde. Attack on Virtu fails.
Aggressive Movement of Constantius. He attacks Bezabde, but fails
Campaign of A.D. 361. Death of Constantius._
Evenerat . . . quasi fatali constellatione . . . ut Constantium
dimicantem cum Persis fortuna semper sequeretur afflictior.--Amm. Marc.
xx. 9, ad fin.
It seems to have been soon after the close of Sapor’s first war with
Constantius that events took place in Armenia which once more replaced
that country under Roman influence. Arsaces, the son of Tiranus, had
been, as we have seen, established as monarch, by Sapor, in the year
A.D. 341, under the notion that, in return for the favor shown him, he
would administer Armenia in the Persian interest. But gratitude is an
unsafe basis for the friendships of monarchs. Arsaces, after a time,
began to chafe against the obligations under which Sapor had laid him,
and to wish, by taking independent action, to show himself a real king,
and not a mere feudatory. He was also, perhaps, tired of aiding Sapor in
his Roman war, and may have found that he suffered more than he gained
by having Rome for an enemy. At any rate, in the interval between A.D.
351 and 359, probably while Sapor was engaged in the far East, Arsaces
sent envoys to Constantinople with a request to Constantius that he
would give him in marriage a member of the Imperial house. Constantius
was charmed with the application made to him, and at once accepted the
proposal. He selected for the proffered honor a certain Olympias, the
daughter of Ablabius, a Praetorian prefect, and lately the betrothed
bride of his own brother, Constans; and sent her to Armenia, where
Arsaces welcomed her, and made her (as it would seem) his chief wife,
provoking thereby the jealousy and aversion of his previous sultana, a
native Armenian, named Pharandzem. The engagement thus entered into led
on, naturally, to the conclusion of a formal alliance between Rome and
Armenia--an alliance which Sapor made fruitless efforts to disturb, and
which continued unimpaired down to the time A.D. 359 when hostilities
once more broke out between Rome and Persia.
Of Sapor’s Eastern wars we have no detailed account. They seem to have
occupied him from A.D. 350 to A.D. 357, and to have been, on the whole,
successful. They were certainly terminated by a peace in the last-named
year--a peace of which it must have been a condition that his late
enemies should lend him aid in the struggle which he was about to renew
with Rome. Who these enemies exactly were, and what exact region they
inhabited, is doubtful. They comprised certainly the Chionites and
Gelani, probably the Euseni and the Vertse. The Chionites are thought to
have been Hiongnu or Huns; and the Euseni are probably the Usiun,
who, as early as B.C. 200, are found among the nomadic hordes pressing
towards the Oxus. The Vertse are wholly unknown. The Gelani should, by
their name, be the inhabitants of Ghilan, or the coast tract south-west
of the Caspian; but this locality seems too remote from the probable
seats of the Chionites and Euseni to be the one intended. The general
scene of the wars was undoubtedly east of the Caspian, either in the
Oxus region, or still further eastward, on the confines of India and
Scythia. The result of the wars, though not a conquest, was an extension
of Persian influence and power. Troublesome enemies were converted into
friends and allies. The loss of a predominating influence over Armenia
was thus compensated, or more than compensated, within a few years, by a
gain of a similar kind in another quarter.
While Sapor was thus engaged in the far East, he received letters
from the officer whom he had left in charge of his western frontier,
informing him that the Romans were anxious to exchange the precarious
truce which Mesopotamia had been allowed to enjoy during the last
five or six years for a more settled and formal peace. Two great Roman
officials, Cassianus, duke of Mesopotamia, and Musonianus, Praetorian
prefect, understanding that Sapor was entangled in a bloody and
difficult war at the eastern extremity of his empire, and knowing that
Constantius was fully occupied with the troubles caused by the inroads
of the barbarians into the more western of the Roman provinces, had
thought that the time was favorable for terminating the provisional
state of affairs in the Mesopotamian region by an actual treaty. They
had accordingly opened negotiations with Tamsapor, satrap of Adiabene,
and suggested to him that he should sound his master on the subject
of making peace with Rome. Tamsapor appears to have misunderstood the
character of these overtures, or to have misrepresented them to Sapor;
in his despatch he made Constantius himself the mover in the matter,
and spoke of him as humbly supplicating the great king to grant him
conditions. It happened that the message reached Sapor just as he had
come to terms with his eastern enemies, and had succeeded in inducing
them to become his allies. He was naturally elated at his success, and
regarded the Roman overture as a simple acknowledgment of weakness.
Accordingly he answered in the most haughty style. His letter, which was
conveyed to the Roman emperor at Sirmium by an ambassador named Narses,
was conceived in the following terms:
“Sapor, king of kings, brother of the sun and moon, and companion of the
stars, sends salutation to his brother, Constantius Caesar. It glads me
to see that thou art at last returned to the right way, and art ready to
do what is just and fair, having learned by experience that inordinate
greed is oft-times punished by defeat and disaster. As then the voice
of truth ought to speak with all openness, and the more illustrious of
mankind should make their words mirror their thoughts, I will briefly
declare to thee what I propose, not forgetting that I have often said
the same things before. Your own authors are witness that the entire
tract within the river Strymon and the borders of Macedon was once held
by my ancestors; if I required you to restore all this, it would not ill
become me (excuse the boast), inasmuch as I excel in virtue and in the
splendor of my achievements the whole line of our ancient monarchs.
But as moderation delights me, and has always been the rule of my
conduct--wherefore from my youth up I have had no occasion to repent of
any action--I will be content to receive Mesopotamia and Armenia, which
was fraudulently extorted from my grandfather. We Persians have never
admitted the principle, which you proclaim with such effrontery, that
success in war is always glorious, whether it be the fruit of courage or
trickery. In conclusion, if you will take the advice of one who speaks
for your good, sacrifice a small tract of territory, one always in
dispute and causing continual bloodshed, in order that you may rule the
remainder securely. Physicians, remember, often cut and burn, and even
amputate portions of the body, that the patient may have the healthy use
of what is left to him; and there are animals which, understanding why
the hunters chase them, deprive themselves of the thing coveted, to live
thenceforth without fear. I warn you, that, if my ambassador returns in
vain, I will take the field against you, so soon as the winter is past,
with all my forces, confiding in my good fortune and in the fairness of
the conditions which I have now offered.”
It must have been a severe blow to Imperial pride to receive such a
letter: and the sense of insult can scarcely have been much mitigated by
the fact that the missive was enveloped in a silken covering, or by the
circumstance that the bearer, Narses, endeavored by his conciliating
manners to atone for his master’s rudeness. Constantius replied,
however, in a dignified and calm tone. “The Roman emperor,” he said,
“victorious by land and sea, saluted his brother, King Sapor. His
lieutenant in Mesopotamia had meant well in opening a negotiation with
a Persian governor; but he had acted without orders, and could not bind
his master. Nevertheless, he (Constantius) would not disclaim what had
been done, since he did not object to a peace, provided it were fair and
honorable. But to ask the master of the whole Roman world to surrender
territories which he had successfully defended when he ruled only over
the provinces of the East was plainly indecent and absurd. He must add
that the employment of threats was futile, and too common an artifice;
more especially as the Persians themselves must know that Rome always
defended herself when attacked, and that, if occasionally she was
vanquished in a battle, yet she never failed to have the advantage in
the event of every war.” Three envoys were entrusted with the delivery
of this reply--Prosper, a count of the empire; Spectatus, a tribune
and notary; and Eustathius, an orator and philosopher, a pupil of
the celebrated Neo-Platonist, Jamblichus, and a friend of St. Basil.
Constantius was most anxious for peace, as a dangerous war threatened
with the Alemanni, one of the most powerful tribes of Germany. He seems
to have hoped that, if the unadorned language of the two statesmen
failed to move Sapor, he might be won over by the persuasive eloquence
of the professor of rhetoric.
But Sapor was bent on war. He had concluded arrangements with the
natives so long his adversaries in the East, by which they had pledged
themselves to join his standard with all their forces in the ensuing
spring. He was well aware of the position of Constantius in the West,
of the internal corruption of his court, and of the perils constantly
threatening him from external enemies. A Roman official of importance,
bearing the once honored name of Antoninus, had recently taken refuge
with him from the claims of pretended creditors, and had been received
into high favor on account of the information which he was able to
communicate with respect to the disposition of the Roman forces and the
condition of their magazines. This individual, ennobled by the royal
authority, and given a place at the royal table, gained great influence
over his new master, whom he stimulated by alternately reproaching him
with his backwardness in the past, and putting before him the prospect
of easy triumphs over Rome in the future. He pointed out that the
emperor, with the bulk of his troops and treasures, was detained in
the regions adjoining the Danube, and that the East was left almost
undefended; he magnified the services which he was himself competent to
render; he exhorted Sapor to bestir himself, and to put confidence
in his good fortune. He recommended that the old plan of sitting down
before walled towns should be given up, and that the Persian monarch,
leaving the strongholds of Mesopotamia in his rear, should press forward
to the Euphrates, pour his troops across it, and overrun the rich
province of Syria, which he would find unguarded, and which had not been
invaded by an enemy for nearly a century. The views of Antoninus were
adopted; but, in practice, they were overruled by the exigencies of the
situation. A Roman army occupied Mesopotamia, and advanced to the
banks of the Tigris. When the Persians in full force crossed the river,
accompanied by Chionite and Albanian allies, they found a considerable
body of troops prepared to resist them. Their opponents did not, indeed
offer battle, but they laid waste the country as the Persians took
possession of it; they destroyed the forage, evacuated the indefensible
towns (which fell, of course, into the enemy’s hands), and fortified
the line of the Euphrates with castles, military engines, and palisades.
Still the programme of Antoninus would probably have been carried out,
had not the swell of the Euphrates exceeded the average, and rendered it
impossible for the Persian troops to ford the river at the usual point
of passage into Syria. On discovering this obstacle, Antoninus suggested
that, by a march to the north-east through a fertile country, the “Upper
Euphrates” might be reached, and easily crossed, before its waters had
attained any considerable volume. Sapor agreed to adopt this suggestion.
He marched from Zeugma across the Mons Masius towards the Upper
Euphrates, defeated the Romans in an important battle near Arnida,
took, by a sudden assault, two castles which defended the town, and then
somewhat hastily resolved that he would attack the place, which he did
not imagine capable of making much resistance.
Amida, now Diarbekr, was situated on the right bank of the Upper Tigris,
in a fertile plain, and was washed along the whole of its western
side by a semi-circular bend of the river. It had been a place of
considerable importance from a very ancient date, and had recently
been much strengthened by Constantius, who had made it an arsenal
for military engines, and had repaired its towers and walls. The town
contained within it a copious fountain of water, which was liable,
however, to acquire a disagreeable odor in the summer time. Seven
legions, of the moderate strength to which legions had been reduced
by Constantine, defended it; and the garrison included also a body of
horse-archers, composed chiefly or entirely of noble foreigners. Sapor
hoped in the first instance to terrify it into submission by his mere
appearance, and boldly rode up to the gates with a small body of his
followers, expecting that they would be opened to him. But the defenders
were more courageous than he had imagined. They received him with a
shower of darts and arrows that were directed specially against his
person, which was conspicuous from its ornaments; and they aimed their
weapons so well that one of them passed through a portion of his dress
and was nearly wounding him. Persuaded by his followers, Sapor upon
this withdrew, and committed the further prosecution of the attack to
Grumbates, the king of the Chionites, who assaulted the walls on the
next day with a body of picked troops, but was repulsed with great loss,
his only son, a youth of great promise, being killed at his side by a
dart from a balista. The death of this prince spread dismay through the
camp, and was followed by a general mourning; but it now became a point
of honor to take the town which had so injured one of the great king’s
royal allies; and Grumbates was promised that Amida should become the
funeral pile of his lost darling.
The town was now regularly invested. Each nation was assigned its place.
The Chionites, burning with the desire to avenge their late defeat, were
on the east; the Vertse on the south; the Albanians, warriors from
the Caspian region, on the north; the Segestans, who were reckoned the
bravest soldiers of all, and who brought into the field a large body
of elephants, held the west. A continuous line of Persians, five
ranks deep, surrounded the entire city, and supported the auxiliary
detachments. The entire besieging army was estimated at a hundred
thousand men; the besieged, including the unarmed multitude, were under
30,000. After the pause of an entire day, the first general attack was
made. Grumbates gave the signal for the assault by hurling a bloody
spear into the space before the walls, after the fashion of a Roman
fetialis. A cloud of darts and arrows from every side followed the
flight of this weapon, and did severe damage to the besieged, who were
at the same time galled with discharges from Roman military engines,
taken by the Persians in some capture of Singara, and now employed
against their former owners. Still a vigorous resistance continued to be
made, and the besiegers, in their exposed positions, suffered even more
than the garrison; so that after two days the attempt to carry the city
by general assault was abandoned, and the slow process of a regular
siege was adopted. Trenches were opened at the usual distance from
the walls, along which the troops advanced under the cover of hurdles
towards the ditch, which they proceeded to fill up in places. Mounds
were then thrown up against the walls; and movable towers were
constructed and brought into play, guarded externally with iron, and
each mounting a balista. It was impossible long to withstand these
various weapons of attack. The hopes of the besieged lay, primarily, in
their receiving relief from without by the advance of an army capable
of engaging their assailants and harassing them or driving them off;
secondarily, in successful sallies, by means of which they might destroy
the enemy’s works and induce him to retire from before the place.
There existed, in the neighborhood of Amida, the elements of a relieving
army, under the command of the new prefect of the East, Sabinianus.
Had this officer possessed an energetic and enterprising character,
he might, without much difficulty, have collected a force of light and
active soldiers, which might have hung upon the rear of the Persians,
intercepted their convoys, cut off their stragglers, and have even made
an occasional dash upon their lines. Such was the course of conduct
recommended by Ursicinus, the second in command, whom Sabinianus had
recently superseded; but the latter was jealous of his subordinate,
and had orders from the Byzantine court to keep him unemployed. He
was himself old and rich, alike disinclined to and unfit for military
enterprise; he therefore absolutely rejected the advice of Ursicinus,
and determined on making no effort. He had positive orders, he said,
from the court to keep on the defensive and not endanger his troops by
engaging them in hazardous adventures. Amida must protect itself, or at
any rate not look to him for succor. Ursicinus chafed terribly, it
is said, against this decision, but was forced to submit to it. His
messengers conveyed the dispiriting intelligence to the devoted city,
which learned thereby that it must rely wholly upon its own exertions.
Nothing now remained but to organize sallies on a large scale and attack
the besieger’s works. Such attempts were made from time to time with
some success; and on one occasion two Gaulish legions, banished to the
East for their adherence to the cause of Magnentius, penetrated, by
night, into the heart of the besieging camp, and brought the person of
the monarch into danger. This peril was, however, escaped; the legions
were repulsed with the loss of a sixth of their number; and nothing was
gained by the audacious enterprise beyond a truce of three days, during
which each side mourned its dead, and sought to repair its losses.
The fate of the doomed city drew on. Pestilence was added to the
calamities which the besieged had to endure. Desertion and treachery
were arrayed against them. One of the natives of Amida, going over to
the Persians, informed them that on the southern side of the city
a neglected staircase led up from the margin of the Tigris through
underground corridors to one of the principal bastions; and under his
guidance seventy archers of the Persian guard, picked men, ascended
the dark passage at dead of night, occupied the tower, and when morning
broke displayed from it a scarlet flag, as a sign to their countrymen
that a portion of the wall was taken. The Persians were upon the alert,
and an instant assault was made. But the garrison, by extraordinary
efforts, succeeded in recapturing the tower before any support reached
its occupants; and then, directing their artillery and missiles against
the assailing columns, inflicted on them tremendous losses, and soon
compelled them to return hastily to the shelter of their camp. The
Verte, who maintained the siege on the south side of the city, were the
chief sufferers in this abortive attempt.
Sapor had now spent seventy days before the place, and had made no
perceptible impression. Autumn was already far advanced, and the
season for military operations would, soon be over. It was necessary,
therefore, either to take the city speedily or to give up the siege and
retire. Under these circumstances Sapor resolved on a last effort. He
had constructed towers of such a height that they overtopped the wall,
and poured their discharges on the defenders from a superior elevation.
He had brought his mounds in places to a level with the ramparts, and
had compelled the garrison to raise countermounds within the walls for
their protection. He now determined on pressing the assault day after
day, until he either carried the town or found all his resources
exhausted. His artillery, his foot, and his elephants were all employed
in turn or together; he allowed the garrison no rest. Not content with
directing the operations, he himself took part in the supreme struggle,
exposing his own person freely to the enemy’s weapons, and losing many
of his attendants. After the contest had lasted three continuous days
from morn to night, fortune at last favored him. One of the inner
mounds, raised by the besieged behind their wall, suddenly gave way,
involving its defenders in its fall, and at the same time filling up
the entire space between the wall and the mound raised outside by the
Persians. A way into the town was thus laid open, and the besiegers
instantly occupied it. It was in vain that the flower of the garrison
threw itself across the path of the entering columns--nothing could
withstand the ardor of the Persian troops. In a little time all
resistance was at an end; those who could quitted the city and fled--the
remainder, whatever their sex, age, or calling, whether armed or
unarmed, were slaughtered like sheep by the conquerors.
Thus fell Amida after a siege of seventy-three days. Sapor, who on other
occasions showed himself not deficient in clemency, was exasperated by
the prolonged resistance and the losses which he had sustained in the
course of it. Thirty thousand of his best soldiers had fallen; the
son of his chief ally had perished; he himself had been brought into
imminent danger. Such audacity on the part of a petty town seemed no
doubt to him to deserve a severe retribution. The place was therefore
given over to the infuriated soldiery, who were allowed to slay and
plunder at their pleasure. Of the captives taken, all belonging to the
five provinces across the Tigris, claimed as his own by Sapor, though
ceded to Rome by his grandfather, were massacred in cold blood. The
Count Elian, and the commanders of the legions who had conducted the
gallant defence, were barbarously crucified. Many other Romans of high
rank were subjected to the indignity of being manacled, and were dragged
into Persia as slaves rather than as prisoners.
The campaign of A.D. 359 terminated with this dearly bought victory. The
season was too far advanced for any fresh enterprise of importance;
and Sapor was probably glad to give his army a rest after the toils
and perils of the last three months. Accordingly he retired across
the Tigris, without leaving (so far as appears) any garrisons in
Mesopotamia, and began preparations for the campaign of A.D. 360. Stores
of all kinds were accumulated during the winter; and, when the spring
came, the indefatigable monarch once more invaded the enemy’s country,
pouring into Mesopotamia an army even more numerous and better appointed
than that which he had led against Amida in the preceding year. His
first object now was to capture Singara, a town of some consequence,
which was, however, defended by only two Roman legions and a certain
number of native soldiers. After a vain attempt to persuade the garrison
to a surrender, the attack was made in the usual way, chiefly by scaling
parties with ladders, and by battering parties which shook the walls
with the ram. The defenders kept the sealers at bay by a constant
discharge of stones and darts from their artillery, arrows from their
bows, and leaden bullets from their slings. They met the assaults of the
ram by attempts to fire the wooden covering which protected it and those
who worked it. For some days these efforts sufficed; but after a while
the besiegers found a weak point in the defences of the place--a tower
so recently built that the mortar in which the stones were laid was
still moist, and which consequently crumbled rapidly before the blows
of a strong and heavy battering-ram, and in a short time fell to the
ground. The Persians poured in through the gap, and were at once masters
of the entire town, which ceased to resist after the catastrophe. This
easy victory allowed Sapor to exhibit the better side of his character;
he forbade the further shedding of blood, and ordered that as many as
possible of the garrisons and citizens should be taken alive. Reviving
a favorite policy of Oriental rulers from very remote times, he
transported these captives to the extreme eastern parts of his empire,
where they might be of the greatest service to him in defending his
frontier against the Scythians and Indians.
It is not really surprising, though the historian of the war regards it
as needing explanation, that no attempt was made to relieve Singara by
the Romans. The siege was short; the place was considered strong; the
nearest point held by a powerful Roman force was Nisibis, which was at
least sixty miles distant from Singara. The neighborhood of Singara was,
moreover, ill supplied with water; and a relieving army would probably
have soon found itself in difficulties. Singara, on the verge of the
desert, was always perilously situated. Rome valued it as an outpost
from which her enemy might be watched, and which might advertise her of
a sudden danger, but could not venture to undertake its defence in case
of an attack in force, and was prepared to hear of its capture with
equanimity.
From Singara Sapor directed his march almost due northwards, and,
leaving Nisibis unassailed upon his left, proceeded to attack the strong
fort known indifferently as Phoenica or Bezabde. This was a position on
the east bank of the Tigris, near the point where that river quits the
mountains and debouches upon the plain; though not on the site, it may
be considered the representative of the modern Jezireh, which commands
the passes from the low country into the Kurdish mountains. Bezabde was
the chief city of the province, called after it Zabdicene, one of the
five ceded by Narses and greatly coveted by his grandson. It was much
valued by Rome, was fortified in places with a double wall, and was
guarded by three legions and a large body of Kurdish archers. Sapor,
having reconnoitred the place, and, with his usual hardihood, exposed
himself to danger in doing so, sent a flag of truce to demand a
surrender, joining with the messengers some prisoners of high rank taken
at Singara, lest the enemy should open fire upon his envoys. The device
was successful; but the garrison proved stanch, and determined on
resisting to the last. Once more all the known resources of attack and
defence were brought into play; and after a long siege, of which the
most important incident was an attempt made by the bishop of the place
to induce Sapor to withdraw, the wall was at last breached, the city
taken, and its defenders indiscriminately massacred. Regarding the
position as one of first-rate importance, Sapor, who had destroyed
Singara, carefully repaired the defences of Bezabde, provisioned it
abundantly, and garrisoned it with some of his best troops. He was well
aware that the Romans would feel keenly the loss of so important a post,
and expected that it would not be long before they made an effort to
recover possession of it.
The winter was now approaching, but the Persian monarch still kept the
field. The capture of Bezabde was followed by that of many other less
important strongholds, which offered little resistance. At last, towards
the close of the year, an attack was made upon a place called Virta,
said to have been a fortress of great strength, and by some moderns
identified with Tekrit, an important city upon the Tigris between
Mosul and Bagdad. Here the career of the conqueror was at last arrested.
Persuasion and force proved alike unavailing to induce or compel a
surrender; and, after wasting the small remainder of the year, and
suffering considerable loss, the Persian monarch reluctantly gave up the
siege, and returned to his own country.
Meanwhile the movements of the Roman emperor had been slow and
uncertain. Distracted between a jealous fear of his cousin Julian’s
proceedings in the West, and a desire of checking the advance of his
rival Sapor in the East, he had left Constantinople in the early spring,
but had journeyed leisurely through Cappadocia and Armenia Minor to
Samosata, whence, after crossing the Euphrates, he had proceeded to
Edessa, and there fixed himself. While in Cappadocia he had summoned to
his presence Arsaces, the tributary king of Armenia, had reminded him
of his engagements, and had endeavored to quicken his gratitude by
bestowing on him liberal presents. At Edessa he employed himself during
the whole of the summer in collecting troops and stores; nor was it till
the autumnal equinox was past that he took the field, and, after weeping
over the smoking ruins of Amida, marched to Bezabde, and, when the
defenders rejected his overtures of peace, formed the siege of the
place. Sapor was, we must suppose, now engaged before Virta, and it is
probable that he thought Bezabde strong enough to defend itself. At any
rate, he made no effort to afford it any relief; and the Roman emperor
was allowed to employ all the resources at his disposal in reiterated
assaults upon the walls. The defence, however, proved stronger than the
attack. Time after time the bold sallies of the besieged destroyed the
Roman works. At last the rainy season set in, and the low ground
outside the town became a glutinous and adhesive marsh. It was no longer
possible to continue the siege; and the disappointed emperor reluctantly
drew off his troops, recrossed the Euphrates, and retired into winter
quarters at Antioch.
The successes of Sapor in the campaigns of A.D. 359 and 360, his
captures of Amida, Singara, and Bezabde, together with the unfortunate
issue of the expedition made by Constantius against the last-named
place, had a tendency to shake the fidelity of the Roman vassal-kings,
Arsaces of Armenia, and Meribanes of Iberia. Constantius, therefore,
during the winter of A.D. 360-1, which he passed at Antioch, sent
emissaries to the courts of these monarchs, and endeavored to secure
their fidelity by loading them with costly presents. His policy seems to
have been so far successful that no revolt of these kingdoms took place;
they did not as yet desert the Romans or make their submission to Sapor.
Their monarchs seem to have simply watched events, prepared to declare
themselves distinctly on the winning side so soon as fortune should
incline unmistakably to one or the other combatant. Meanwhile they
maintained the fiction of a nominal dependence upon Rome.
It might have been expected that the year A.D. 361 would have been a
turning-point in the war, and that, if Rome did not by a great effort
assert herself and recover her prestige, the advance of Persia would
have been marked and rapid. But the actual course of events was far
different. Hesitation and diffidence characterize the movements of
both parties to the contest, and the year is signalized by no important
enterprise on the part of either monarch. Constantius reoccupied Edessa,
and had (we are told) some thoughts of renewing the siege of Bezabde;
actually, however, he did not advance further, but contented himself
with sending a part of his army to watch Sapor, giving them strict
orders not to risk an engagement. Sapor, on his side, began the year
with demonstrations which were taken to mean that he was about to pass
the Euphrates; but in reality he never even brought his troops across
the Tigris, or once set foot in Mesopotamia. After wasting weeks or
months in a futile display of his armed strength upon the eastern bank
of the river, and violently alarming the officers sent by Constantius to
observe his movements, he suddenly, towards autumn, withdrew his troops,
having attempted nothing, and quietly returned to his capital! It is by
no means difficult to understand the motives which actuated Constantius.
He was, month after month, receiving intelligence from the West of steps
taken by Julian which amounted to open rebellion, and challenged him
to engage in civil war. So long as Sapor threatened invasion he did not
like to quit Mesopotamia, lest he might appear to have sacrificed the
interests of his country to his own private quarrels; but he must have
been anxious to return to the seat of empire from the first moment that
intelligence reached him of Julian’s assumption of the imperial name and
dignity; and when Sapor’s retreat was announced he naturally made all
haste to reach his capital. Meanwhile the desire of keeping his army
intact caused him to refrain from any movement which involved the
slightest risk of bringing on a battle, and, in fact, reduced him
to inaction. So much is readily intelligible. But what at this time
withheld Sapor, when he had so grand an opportunity of making an
impression upon Rome--what paralyzed his arm when it might have struck
with such effect it is far from easy to understand, though perhaps
not impossible to conjecture. The historian of the war ascribes his
abstinence to a religious motive, telling us that the auguries were not
favorable for the Persians crossing the Tigris. But there is no other
evidence that the Persians of this period were the slaves of any such
superstition as that noted by Ammianus, nor any probability that a
monarch of Sapor’s force of character would have suffered his military
policy to be affected by omens. We must therefore ascribe the conduct
of the Persian king to some cause not recorded by the historian--same
failure of health, or some peril from internal or external enemies which
called him away from the scene of his recent exploits, just at the time
when his continued presence there was most important. Once before in
his lifetime, an invasion of his eastern provinces had required his
immediate presence, and allowed his adversary to quit Mesopotamia and
march against Magnentius. It is not improbable that a fresh attack of
the same or some other barbarians now again happened opportunely for the
Romans, calling Sapor away, and thus enabling Constantius to turn his
hack upon the East, and set out for Europe in order to meet Julian.
The meeting, however, was not destined to take place. On his way from
Antioch to Constantinople the unfortunate Constantius, anxious and
perhaps over-fatigued, fell sick at Mopsucrene, in Cilicia, and died
there, after a short illness, towards the close of A.D. 361. Julian
the Apostate succeeded peacefully to the empire whereto he was about to
assert his right by force of arms; and Sapor found that the war which
he had provoked with Rome, in reliance upon his adversary’s weakness and
incapacity, had to be carried on with a prince of far greater natural
powers and of much superior military training.