unanimously confirmed, as Brigadier General, to command Kansas troops;
the express understanding being that General Lane's seat in the Senate
shall not be vacated until he accepts his new commission, which he
will not do until the Legislature of Kansas assembles, next month. He
has no idea of doing anything that shall oblige Governor Robinson and
his appointee (Stanton) (cont.)]
at the time this was done and apparently, when apprised of it, made
some objections on the score, not so much of an invasion of his own
prerogative, as of its probable effect upon Hunter. Cameron had his
first consultation with Lane regarding the matter, January second, and
was given by him to understand that everything had been done in strict
accordance with Hunter's own wishes.[152] The practical question of
the relation of Lane's brigade to Hunter's command soon, however,
presented itself in a somewhat different light and its answer required
a more explicit statement from the president than had yet been made.
Lincoln, when appealed to, unhesitatingly repudiated every suggestion
of the idea that it had ever been his intention to give Lane an
independent command or to have Hunter, in any sense, superseded.[153]
The need for sending relief to the southern Indians, which, correctly
interpreted meant, of course, reasserting authority over them and thus
removing a menacing and impending danger from the Kansas border, had
been one of Lane's strongest arguments in gaining his way with the
administration. The larger aspect of his purpose was, however, the one
that appealed to Commissioner Dole, who, as head of the Indian Bureau,
seems fully to have appreciated the responsibility that
[Footnote 151: (cont.) who has been in waiting for several months to
take the place."--_Daily Conservative_, January 1, 1862.
"Rejoicing in Neosho Battalion over report that Lane appointed to
command Kansas troops."--Ibid., January 4, 1862.
"General Lane will soon be here and General Denver called to another
command."--Ibid., January 7, 1862.]
[Footnote 152: Cameron to Hunter, January 3, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 512-513.]
[Footnote 153: Martin F. Conway, the Kansas representative in
Congress, was under no misapprehension as to Lane's true position;
for Lincoln had told him personally that Lane was to be under Hunter
[_Daily Conservative_, February 6, 1862].]
assuredly rested in all honor upon the government, whether conscious
of it or not, to protect its wards in their lives and property. From
the first intimation given him of Lane's desire for a more energetic
procedure, Dole showed a willingness to coöperate; and, as many things
were demanding his personal attention in the West, he so timed a
journey of his own that it might be possible for him to assist in
getting together the Indian contingent that was to form a part of the
"Southern Expedition."[154]
The urgency of the Indian call for help[155] and the
[Footnote 154: Lane's expedition was variously referred to as "the
Southern Expedition," "the Cherokee Expedition," "the great jayhawking
expedition," and by many another name, more or less opprobrious.]
[Footnote 155: Representations of the great need of the Indians for
assistance were made to the government by all sorts of people. Agent
after agent wrote to the Indian Office. The Reverend Evan Jones wrote
repeatedly and on the second of January had sent information, brought
to him at Lawrence by two fugitive Cherokees, of the recent battle in
which the loyalists under Opoethle-yo-ho-la had been worsted, at
the Big Bend of the Arkansas [Indian Office Special Files, no. 201,
_Southern Superintendency_, J 540 of 1862]. In the early winter,
a mixed delegation of Creeks and others had made their way to
Washington, hoping by personal entreaty to obtain succor for their
distressed people, and justice. Hunter had issued a draft for their
individual relief [Ibid., J523 of 1861], and passes from Fort
Leavenworth to Washington [Ibid., C1433 of 1861]. It was not so
easy for them to get passes coming back. Application was made to the
War Department and referred back to the Interior [Ibid., A 434
of 1861]. The estimate, somewhat inaccurately footed up, of the total
expense of the return journey as submitted by agents Cutler and
Carruth was,
"11 R.R. Tickets to Fort Leavenworth by way of New York City
$48 $ 528.00
11 men $2 ea (incidental expenses) 22.00
2 1/2 wks board at Washington $5 137.50
Expenses from Leavenworth to Ind. Nat 50.00
Pay of Tecumseh for taking care of horses 25.00
-------
[Ibid., C 1433 of 1861]. $ 960.50"
Dole had not encouraged the delegation to come on to Washington.
He pleaded lack of funds and the wish that they would wait in Fort
Leavenworth and attend Hunter's inter-tribal council so that they
might go back to their people carrying definite messages of what was
to be done (cont.)]
evident readiness of the government to make answer to that call before
it was quite too late pointed auspiciously to a successful outcome for
Senator Lane's endeavors; but, unfortunately, Major-general Hunter had
not been sufficiently counted with. Hunter had previously shown much
sympathy for the Indians in their distress[156] and also a realization
of the strategic importance
[Footnote 155: (cont.) [Indian Office _Letter Book_, no. 67,
p. 107]. Dole had been forwarned of their intention to appear in
Washington by the following letter:
FORT LEAVENWORTH KAN., Nov. 23rd 1861.
HON WM.P. DOLE, Com. Indian Affs.
Sir: On my arrival in St. Louis I found Gen'l Hunter at the Planters
House and delivered the message to him that you had placed in my hands
for that purpose. He seemed fully satisfied with your letter and has
acted on it accordingly. I recd from Gen'l Hunter a letter for Mr.
Cutler, and others of this place, all of which I have delivered.
Having found Cutler here, he having been ordered by Lane to move the
council from Leroy to Fort Scott. But from some cause (which I have
not learned) he has brought the chiefs all here to the Fort, where
they are now quartered awaiting the arrival of Gen'l Hunter. He has
with him six of the head chiefs of the Creek, Seminole and Cherokee
Nations, and tells me that they are strong for the Union. He also says
that John Ross (Cherokee) is all right but dare not let it be known,
and that he will be here if he can get away from the tribe.
These chiefs all say they want to fight for the Union, and that they
will do so if they can get arms and ammunition. Gen'l Hunter has
ordered me to await his arrival here at which time he will council
with these men, and report to you the result. I think he will be
here on Tuesday or Wednesday. Cutler wants to take the Indians to
Washington, but I advised him not to do so until I could hear from
you. When I met him here he was on his way there.
You had better write to him here as soon as you get this, or you will
see him there pretty soon.
I have nothing more to write now but will write in a day or two.
Yours Truly R.W. DOLE.
P.S. Coffin is at home sick, but will be here soon. Branch is at St.
Joe but would not come over with me, cause, too buissie to attend to
business.
[Indian Office Special Files, no 201, _Southern Superintendency_,
D 410 of 1861].]
[Footnote 156: In part proof of this take his letter to
Adjutant-general Thomas, January 15, 1862.
"On my arrival here in November last I telegraphed for permission to
(cont.)]
of Indian Territory. Some other explanation, therefore, must be found
for the opposition he advanced to Lane's project as soon as it was
brought to his notice. It had been launched without his approval
having been explicitly sought and almost under false pretences.[157]
Then, too, Lane's bumptiousness, after he had accomplished his object,
was naturally very irritating. But, far above every other reason,
personal or professional, that Hunter had for objecting to a command
conducted by Lane was the identical one that Halleck,[158] Robinson,
and many another shared with him, a wholesome repugnance to such
marauding[159] as Lane had permitted his men to indulge in in the
autumn. It was to be feared that Indians under Lane would inevitably
revert to savagery. There would be no one to put any restraint upon
them and their natural instincts would be given free play. Conceivably
then, it was not mere supersensitiveness and pettiness of spirit that
moved General Hunter to take exception to Lane's appointment but
regard for the honor of his profession, perchance, also, a certain
feeling of personal dignity that
[Footnote 156: (cont.) muster a Brigade of Kansas Indians into the
service of the United States, to assist the friendly Creek Indians in
maintaining their loyalty. Had this permission been promptly granted,
I have every reason to believe that the present disastrous state of
affairs, in the Indian country west of Arkansas, could have been
avoided. I now again respectfully repeat my request."--Indian Office
General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862.]
[Footnote 157: To the references given in Abel, _The American Indian
as Slaveholder and Secessionist_, add Thomas to Hunter, January 24,
1862, _Official Records_, vol. viii, 525.]
[Footnote 158: The St. Louis _Republican_ credited Halleck with
characterizing Hunter's command, indiscriminately, as "marauders,
bandits, and outlaws" [_Daily Conservative_, February 7, 1862].
In a letter to Lincoln, January 6, 1862, Halleck said some pretty
plain truths about Lane [_Official Records_, vol. vii, 532-533].
He would probably have had the same objection to the use of
Indians that he had to the use of negroes in warfare [_Daily
Conservative_, May 23, 1862, quoting from the Chicago
_Tribune_].]
[Footnote 159: On marauding by Lane's brigade, see McClellan to
Stanton, February 11, 1862 [_Official Records_, vol. viii,
552-553].]
legitimately resented executive interference with his rights. His
protest had its effect and he was informed that it was entirely within
his prerogative to lead the expedition southward himself. He resolved
to do it. Lane was, for once, outwitted.
The end, however, was not yet. About the middle of January, Stanton
became Secretary of War and soon let it be known that he, too, had
views on the subject of Indian enlistment. As a matter of fact, he
refused to countenance it.[160] The disappointment was the most keen
for Commissioner Dole. Since long before the day when Secretary Smith
had announced[161] to him that the Department of War was contemplating
the employment of four thousand Indians in its service, he had hoped
for some means of rescuing the southern tribes from the Confederate
alliance and now all plans had come to naught. And yet the need
for strenuous action of some sort had never been so great.[162]
Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la and his defeated followers were refugees on the
Verdigris, imploring help to relieve their present
[Footnote 160: Note this series of telegrams [Indian Office Special
Files, no. 201, _Southern Superintendency_, D 576 of 1862]:
"Secretary of War is unwilling to put Indians in the army. Is to
consult with President and settle it today."--SMITH to Dole, February
6, 1862.
"President cant attend to business now. Sickness in the family. No
arrangements can be made now. Make necessary arrangements for relief
of Indians. I will send communication to Congress today."--Same to
Same, February 11, 1862.
"Go on and supply the destitute Indians. Congress will supply the
means. War Department will not organize them."--Same to Same, February
14, 1862.]
[Footnote 161: Smith to Dole, January 3, 1862 [Indian Office Special
Files, no. 201, _Central Superintendency_, I 531 of 1862;
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862, p. 150].]
[Footnote 162: On the second of January, Agent Cutler wired from
Leavenworth to Dole, "Heopothleyohola with four thousand warriors is
in the field and needs help badly. Secession Creeks are deserting him.
Hurry up Lane."--Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, _Southern
Superintendency_, C 1443 of 1862.]
necessities and to enable them to return betimes to their own
country.[163] Moreover, Indians of northern antecedents and sympathies
were exhibiting unwonted enthusiasm for the cause[164] and it seemed
hard to have to repel them. Dole was, nevertheless, compelled to do
it. On the eleventh of February, he countermanded the orders he had
issued to Superintendent Coffin and thus a temporary quietus was put
upon the whole affair of the Indian Expedition.
[Footnote 163: Their plea was expressed most strongly in the course of
an interview which Dole had with representatives of the Loyal Creeks
and Seminoles, Iowas and Delawares, February 1, 1862. Robert Burbank,
the Iowa agent, was there. White Cloud acted as interpreter [_Daily
Conservative_, February 2, 1862].]
[Footnote 164: Some of these had been provoked to a desire for war by
the inroads of Missourians. Weas, Piankeshaws, Peorias, and Miamies,
awaiting the return of Dole from the interior of Kansas, said,
"they were for peace but the Missourians had not left them alone"
[Ibid., February 9, 1862].]
III. THE INDIAN REFUGEES IN SOUTHERN KANSAS
The thing that would most have justified the military employment of
Indians by the United States government, in the winter of 1862, was
the fact that hundreds and thousands of their southern brethren were
then refugees because of their courageous and unswerving devotion to
the American Union. The tale of those refugees, of their wanderings,
their deprivations, their sufferings, and their wrongs, comparable
only to that of the Belgians in the Great European War of 1914, is
one of the saddest to relate, and one of the most disgraceful, in the
history of the War of Secession, in its border phase.
The first in the long procession of refugees were those of the army
of Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la who, after their final defeat by Colonel James
McIntosh in the Battle of Chustenahlah, December 26, 1861, had fled up
the valley of the Verdigris River and had entered Kansas near Walnut
Creek. In scattered lines, with hosts of stragglers, the enfeebled,
the aged, the weary, and the sick, they had crossed the Cherokee Strip
and the Osage Reservation and, heading steadily towards the northeast,
had finally encamped on the outermost edge of the New York Indian
Lands, on Fall River, some sixty odd miles west of Humboldt. Those
lands, never having been accepted as an equivalent for their Wisconsin
holdings by the Iroquois, were not occupied throughout their entire
extent by Indians and only here and there
encroached upon by white intruders, consequently the impoverished
and greatly fatigued travellers encountered no obstacles in settling
themselves down to rest and to wait for a much needed replenishment of
their resources.
Their coming was expected. On their way northward, they had fallen
in, at some stage of the journey, with some buffalo hunters, Sacs and
Foxes of the Mississippi, returning to their reservation, which lay
some distance north of Burlington and chiefly in present Osage County,
Kansas. To them the refugees reported their recent tragic experience.
The Sacs and Foxes were most sympathetic and, after relieving the
necessities of the refugees as best they could, hurried on ahead,
imparting the news, in their turn, to various white people whom they
met. In due course it reached General Denver, still supervising
affairs in Kansas, and William G. Coffin, the southern
superintendent.[165] It was the first time, since his appointment the
spring before, that Coffin had had any prospect of getting in touch
with any considerable number of his charges and he must have welcomed
the chance of now really earning his salary. He ordered all of the
agents under him--and some[166] of them had not previously entered
officially upon their duties--to assemble at Fort Roe, on the
Verdigris, and be prepared to take charge of their
[Footnote 165: These facts were obtained chiefly from a letter, not
strictly accurate as to some of its details, written by Superintendent
Coffin to Dole, January 15, 1862 [Indian Office Special Files, no.
201, _Southern Superintendency_, C 1474 of 1862].]
[Footnote 166: For instance, William P. Davis, who had been appointed
Seminole Agent, despairing of ever reaching his post, had gone into
the army [Dole to John S. Davis of New Albany, Indiana, April 5, 1862,
Indian Office _Letter Book_, no. 68, p. 39]. George C. Snow of
Parke County, Indiana, was appointed in his stead [Dole to Snow,
January 13, 1862, Ibid., no. 67, p. 243].]
several contingents; for the refugees, although chiefly Creeks, were
representative of nearly every one of the non-indigenous tribes of
Indian Territory.
It is not an easy matter to say, with any show of approach to exact
figures, how many the refugees numbered.[167] For weeks and weeks,
they were almost continually coming in and even the very first reports
bear suspicious signs of the exaggeration that became really notorious
as graft and peculation entered more and more into the reckoning.
Apparently, all those who, in ever so slight a degree, handled the
relief funds, except, perhaps, the army men, were interested in
making the numbers appear as large as possible. The larger the need
represented, the larger the sum that might, with propriety, be
demanded and the larger the opportunity for graft. Settlers, traders,
and some government agents were, in this respect, all culpable
together.
There was no possibility of mistake, however, intentional or
otherwise, about the destitution of the refugees. It was inconceivably
horrible. The winter weather of late December and early January had
been most inclement and the Indians had trudged through it, over
snow-covered, rocky, trailless places and desolate prairie, nigh three
hundred miles. When they started out, they were not any too well
provided with clothing; for they had departed in a hurry, and, before
they got to Fall River, not a few of them were absolutely naked. They
had practically no tents, no bed-coverings, and no provisions. Dr.
A.B. Campbell, a surgeon sent out by General Hunter,[168] had reached
them
[Footnote 167: Compare the statistics given in the following:
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1861, p. 151; 1862,
pp. 137, 157; Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, _Southern
Superintendency_, C 1525 of 1862; General Files, _Southern
Superintendency_, C 1602 of 1862.]
[Footnote 168: The army furnished the first relief that reached them.
In its issue (cont.)]
towards the end of January and their condition was then so bad, so
wretched that it was impossible for him to depict it. Prairie grasses
were "their only protection from the snow" upon which they were
lying "and from the wind and weather scraps and rags stretched upon
switches." Ho-go-bo-foh-yah, the second Creek chief, was ill with a
fever and "his tent (to give it that name) was no larger than a small
blanket stretched over a switch ridge pole, two feet from the ground,
and did not reach it by a foot from the ground on either side of
him." Campbell further said that the refugees were greatly in need of
medical assistance. They were suffering "with inflammatory diseases
of the chest, throat, and eyes." Many had "their toes frozen off,"
others, "their feet wounded." But few had "either shoes or moccasins."
Dead horses were lying around in every direction and the sanitary
conditions were so bad that the food was contaminated and the
newly-arriving refugees became sick as soon as they ate.[169]
Other details of their destitution were furnished by Coffin's son
who was acting as his clerk and who was among the first to attempt
alleviation of their misery.[170] As far as relief went, however, the
supply was so out of proportion to the demand that there was never
any time that spring when it could be said that they were fairly
comfortable and their ordinary wants satisfied. Campbell frankly
admitted that he "selected the nakedest of the naked" and doled out to
them the few articles he
[Footnote 168: (cont.) of January 18, 1862, the _Daily
Conservative_ has this to say: "The Kansas Seventh has been ordered
to move to Humboldt, Allen Co. to give relief to Refugees encamped on
Fall River. Lt. Col. Chas. T. Clark, 1st Battalion, Kansas Tenth, is
now at Humboldt and well acquainted with the conditions."]
[Footnote 169: Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862,
pp. 151-152.]
[Footnote 170: O.S. Coffin to William G. Coffin, January 26, 1862,
Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, _Southern Superintendency_,
C 1506 of 1862.]
had. When all was gone, how pitiful it must have been for him to see
the "hundreds of anxious faces" for whom there was nothing! Captain
Turner, from Hunter's commissary department, had similar experiences.
According to him, the refugees were "in want of every necessary of
life." That was his report the eleventh of February.[171] On the
fifteenth of February, the army stopped giving supplies altogether
and the refugees were thrown back entirely upon the extremely limited
resources of the southern superintendency.
Dole[172] had had warning from Hunter[173] that such would have to
be the case and had done his best to be prepared for the emergency.
Secretary Smith authorized expenditure for relief in advance of
congressional appropriation, but that simply increased the moral
obligation to practice economy and, with hundreds of loyal Indians on
the brink of starvation,[174] it was no
[Footnote 171: Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862,
pp. 152-154.]
[Footnote 172: Dole had an interview with the Indians immediately upon
his arrival in Kansas [Moore, _Rebellion Record_, vol. iv, 59-60,
Doc. 21].]
[Footnote 173: Hunter to Dole, February 6, 1862, forwarded by Edward
Wolcott to Mix, February 10, 1862 [Indian Office General Files,
_Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, W 513 and D 576 of 1862;
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862, p. 150].]
[Footnote 174: Agent G.C. Snow reported, February 13, 1862, on the
utter destitution of the Seminoles [Indian Office General
Files, _Seminole_, 1858-1869] and, on the same day, Coffin
[Ibid., _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, C 1526] to
the same effect about the refugees as a whole. They were coming in,
he said, about twenty to sixty a day. The "destitution, misery and
suffering amongst them is beyond the power of any pen to portray, it
must be seen to be realised--there are now here over two thousand men,
women, and children entirely barefooted and more than that number that
have not rags enough to hide their nakedness, many have died and they
are constantly dying. I should think at a rough guess that from 12 to
15 hundred dead Ponies are laying around in the camp and in the river.
On this account so soon as the weather gets a little warm, a removal
of this camp will be indespensable, there are perhaps now two thousand
Ponies living, they are very poor and many of them must die before
grass comes which we expect here from the first to the 10th of March.
We are issuing a little corn to (cont.)]
time for economy. The inadequacy of the Indian service and the
inefficiency of the Federal never showed up more plainly, to the utter
discredit of the nation, than at this period and in this connection.