_Of Satan’s chief end in this temptation; his skill in making the
means to sin plausible.—The reasons of that policy, with his art
therein.—Men’s ignorance his advantage.—Of the differences of things
propounded to our use._
The various aims of Satan, and their close dependence one upon another,
having contributed to us their several observations, it remains that
we ask after the main and chief thing that Satan principally intended.
And to make way to this, it must be noted, that in grand temptations
especially, the main design of Satan comprehends these two: the chief
end, and the chief means conducing to that end. About these, some
authors conjecture variously, whose differences we have no great
occasion to mention, seeing the text gives so great a satisfaction in
this matter.
1. For first, The main end of Satan we have not obscurely expressed to
us in these words, ‘If thou be the Son of God,’ which if we compare
with Mat. iii. 17, ‘This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased,’
we shall easily apprehend that here Satan doth but echo to that voice
which came down from heaven; as he did with Eve. God had said, of the
tree in the midst of the garden, ye shall not eat, [Gen. iii. 3.]
Satan, having as it were the sound of this yet in his ears, in a clear
reference to it saith, ‘Yea, hath God said, Ye shall not eat?’ ver.
1. So here is also an evident respect to God’s testimony concerning
Christ, as if he had said, ‘Hath God said thou art his Son? If thou
beest indeed such as he testified, give some proof of it,’ &c. By which
it appears that his design was to undermine this testimony, or some way
or other to defeat it. Neither need it pass for an objection against
this, that Satan doth not directly mention his doubt or distrust, nor
positively suggest to Christ a questioning or misbelief of his sonship,
for it was not suitable to his policy so to lay open his main end. That
must have been expected afterward, as the last in execution, if it had
taken effect, though it were first in intention.
2. Secondly, The chief means by which he would have brought this end
about, may be understood from Christ’s answer to the temptation; for it
cannot but be imagined that Christ knew the bottom of Satan’s policy,
and that his answer must fully confront the means by which Satan
endeavoured to ensnare him. His answer was, ‘Man lives not by bread
alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God.’ If
we can then come to a certain understanding of this scripture, which is
not difficult, we shall evidently know the mind of the temptation, to
which this is a direct answer.
These words are cited out of Deut. viii. 3, which some interpret to
this sense,[390] as if Christ had said, Man hath not only a life of
the body—which is mentioned[391] by bread—to look after, but another
life of the soul, which is of so great concernment, that the bodily
life is to be neglected, rather than that of the soul to be endangered.
This is a truth in itself, but is apparently besides the meaning of
Deut. viii. Neither doth it afford so full and particular an answer as
doubtless Christ intended. But let us consider the text, and we shall
find more in it; for Moses first sets down God’s dealing with Israel
in the wilderness, in that he suffered them to hunger, and took from
them the ordinary means of life, which, as the latter part of the verse
shews, is to be understood of ordinary bread; and then to supply that
want, he fed them by an extraordinary means, such as they had never
heard of before; this was by manna. Next he makes an inference from
this way of God’s proceeding, improving this particular to a general
rule, ‘That he might make thee know that man lives not by bread only,
but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of the Lord doth man
live;’ which is clearly of this import, that man lives not by ordinary
means only, but that God can provide for his life in an extraordinary
way, by appointing anything to that end, through his mighty and
powerful word and good pleasure. So that things never so unusual, or
unfit in themselves for nourishment, will become strengthening to us,
if he shall give out his command. Christ then applying this in this
sense, did, as it were, thus say to Satan, ‘Though I want ordinary
means of life, which is bread, yet I know God can make anything which
he pleaseth to nourish me instead of it. So that I will not cast off
a dependence upon the providence of God in this strait, and without
warrant run to an extraordinary course for supply.’ Hence it is evident
that to bring about his main end, which was to distrust of his relation
to God, he used this means, that by reason of his strait in the failure
of ordinary supply, he should distrust providence, and without warrant
provide for himself. Observe,
_Obs._ 12. _That where Satan carries on a main design and end, he
bestows most of his pains and skill in rendering the means to that end
plausible and taking._ The end is least in mention, and the means in
their fit contrivance takes up most of his art and care. The reasons
whereof are these:—
(1.) First, _The end is apparently bad, so that it would be a
contradiction to his design to mention it_. It is the snare and trap
itself, which his wisdom and policy directs him to cover. His ultimate
end is the destruction of the soul. This he dare not openly avouch
to the vilest of men; he doth not say to them, ‘Destroy your souls,’
‘Bring eternal miseries upon yourselves,’ but only tempts them to that
which will bring this misery upon them; and as for those intermediate
ends, which are the formal acts of sin, he useth also a kind of modesty
in their concealment. He doth not usually say, Go and murder, or,
Commit adultery; but rather puts them upon ways or means that will
bring them up to those iniquities, except that he sometime have to deal
with those that are so hardened in sin, that they make a sport to do
wickedly, and then he can more freely discover his ends to such in the
temptation.
(2.) Secondly, The means to such wicked ends have not only an innate
and natural tendency in themselves, which are apt to sway and bias men
that way, but are also capable _of artificial improvement, to a further
enticement to the evils secretly intended; and these require the art
and skill for the exact suiting and fitting of them_. The end cannot
be reached without the means, and means so ordered, without the aid of
grace, will scarce miss of the end.
(3.) Thirdly, The means are capable of _a varnish and paint_. He can
make a shift to set them off and colour them over, that the proper
drift of them cannot easily be discovered; whereas the ends to
which these lead cannot receive, at least so easily with some, such
fair shows. It is far easier to set off company-keeping, with the
pleasurable pretences of necessity or refreshing divertisement, than to
propound direct drunkenness, the thing to which company-keeping tends,
under such a dress.
_Query._ If it be demanded, How and by what arts he renders the means
so plausible? I shall endeavour a satisfaction to that query, by
shewing the way that Satan took to render the means he made use of in
this temptation, plausible to Christ, which were these:—
[1.] First, He represents it as _a harmless or lawful thing in itself_.
Who can say it had been sinful for the Son of God to have turned stones
into bread, more than to turn water into wine?
[2.] Secondly, He gives the motion a further pretext of _advantage or
goodness_. He insinuated that it might be a useful discovery of his
sonship, and a profitable supply against hunger.
[3.] Thirdly, He seems also to put _a necessity upon it_, that other
ways of help failing, he must be constrained so to do, or to suffer
further want.
[4.] Fourthly, He forgets not to tell him that to do this was but
_suitable to his condition_, and that it was a thing well becoming the
Son of God to do a miracle.
[5.] Fifthly, He doth urge it at the rate of _a duty_, and that being
in hunger and want, it would be a sinful neglect not to do what he
could and might for his preservation.
The same way doth he take in other temptations; in some cases pleading
all, in some most of these things, by which the means conducing
thereunto may seem plausible. If he presents to men occasions of
sinning, he will tell them ordinarily that they may lawfully adventure
upon them, that they are harmless, nay, of advantage, as tending to
the recreating of the spirits and health of the body; yea, that it is
necessary for them to take such a liberty, and that in doing so, they
do but what others do that profess religion. And often he hath such
advantage from the circumstances of the thing, and the inclination
of our heart, that he makes bold to tell us it is no less than duty.
Such did the outrage of Demetrius seem to him, when he considered how
much his livelihood did depend upon the Diana of the Ephesians. Paul’s
zeal made him confident that persecution of Christians was his duty;
neither is there anything which can pretend to any zeal, advantage, or
colourable ground, but presently it takes the denomination of duty.
If any wonder that such poor and shallow pretences are not seen through
by all men, they may know that this happens from a fourfold ignorance:—
(1.) First, _From an ignorance of the thing itself_. How easily may
they be imposed upon, who know not the nature or the usual issues
of things! As children are deluded to put a value upon a useless or
hurtful trifle, so are men deceived and easily imposed upon in what
they do not understand. And for this cause are sinners compared to
birds, who are easily enticed with the bait proposed to their view as
profitable and good for them, because they know not the snare that
lies laid under it. This ignorance causing the mistake mentioned, is
not only a simple ignorance, but also that ignorance which owes its
rise to a wilful and perverse disposition,—for there are some that
are willingly ignorant,—doth often lay those open to a delusion, who,
through prepossession or idleness, will not be at pains to make full
inquiries.
(2.) Secondly, This also comes to pass from _an ignorance of our
spirits_: for while we either engage in the things proposed by Satan
upon the general warranty of a good intention, or that we have no evil
meaning in it, we are kept from a discovery of the intended design.
Hence Paul saw nothing, in his persecuting the church of God, of
what Satan aimed at; or while upon the pretence of a good intention,
our secret corrupt principles do indeed move us underhand to any
undertaking, we are as little apt to see the ends of Satan in what he
propounds to us. Jehu and the disciples, Luke ix. 55, pretending a zeal
for God, but really carried on by their own furious tempers, did as
little as others see what the devil was doing with them.
(3.) Thirdly, The means of a temptation are rendered less suspicious,
from _an ignorance of the circumstances and concomitants that do attend
them_.
(4.) Fourthly, As also from _an ignorance of our own weakness and
inclination_. While we are confident of greater strength to resist
than indeed we have, of a greater averseness than is in us to the evil
suspected, we contemn the danger of the means as below us, and so grow
bold with the occasions of iniquity, as pretending no hazard or danger
to us.
_Applic._ _This may teach us a piece of wisdom in the imitation of the
devil._ We see his malice appears in the bloody and destructive aims or
intendments which he discovers against us, but his skill and cunning
in a suitable disposal and ordering of the means. So should we learn
to employ all our care and watchfulness about those plausible ways or
introductions to sin that Satan puts in our hand; and as his eager
desire of gaining his end makes him industrious about the offering
of means fit to compass it, so our fear of his design and end should
make us jealous of every overture propounded to us. They that from
wilfulness or neglect shall admit the means of evil, cannot expect to
avoid the evil to which they lead, or if they may, unexpectedly, be
rescued from the end, while they use the means,—by grace interposing,
as between the cup and the lip,—it is no thanks to them, and often they
come not off so clear, but that some lameness or other sticks by them.
_Quest._ I may suspect this will be retorted back as an advice scarce
practicable: for if all means leading to sin are to be avoided, then
can we use nothing, but rather, as the apostle saith in another case,
‘we must go out of the world,’ [1 Cor. v. 10,] seeing everything may
lead to evil?
_Ans._ I answer, We are not by any command of God put into any such
strait. Things that are or may be improveable against us, may be used
by us with due care and watchfulness; yet all things are not alike
neither, for we must look upon things under a threefold consideration.
[1.] First, If that which is propounded or laid before us as a means to
sin, be in itself sinful, the refusal of both is an undoubted duty.
[2.] Secondly, We must look upon things under the consideration of
the suspiciousness which they carry with them of a further evil. Some
circumstances, or postures of an opportunity and occasion offered, are
of such a threatening aspect, that they fairly warn us to hold off. To
keep company with a friend may be admitted, when yet that society in a
suspicious place, as tavern or whore-house, is to be avoided.
[3.] Thirdly, We must further consider things as we are free or
engaged to them, and accordingly where there is appearance of danger
or the fear of it, we must keep at a distance, if we are engaged to
such things, either by the obligation of the law of nature, or lawful
calling, or command of God, or unavoidable providence, or relation.
Where these ties are upon us, we cannot avoid the thing or action, but
are the more concerned to take heed of being overreached or overtaken
by them.