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PUBLICATIONS
OF THE
NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY
VOL. XXIX.
FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS
1530-1816
EDITED
WITH ELUCIDATIONS FROM CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES
BY
JULIAN S. CORBETT, LL.M.
PRINTED FOR THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY
MDCCCCV
THE COUNCIL
OF THE
NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY
1904-1905
* * * * *
PATRON
H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES, K.G., K.T., K.P.
PRESIDENT
EARL SPENCER, K.G.
VICE-PRESIDENTS
BRIDGE, ADMIRAL SIR CYPRIAN | PROTHERO, G.W.,
A.G., G.C.B. | LL.D.
HAWKESBURY, LORD. | YORKE, SIR HENRY, K.C.B.
COUNCILLORS
ATKINSON, C.T. | KIPLING, RUDYARD.
BATTENBURG, PRINCE LOUIS OF, | LORAINE, REAR-ADMIRAL SIR
G.C.B. | LAMBTON, BART.
BEAUMONT, VICE-ADMIRAL SIR | LYALL, SIR ALFRED C., G.C.I.E.
LEWIS, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. | MARKHAM, SIR CLEMENTS R.,
CLARKE, COL. SIR GEORGE S., | K.C.B., F.R.S.
K.C.M.G. | MARSDEN, R.G.
CORBETT, JULIAN S. | NEWBOLT, HENRY.
DESART, THE EARL OF, K.C.B. | PARR, REAR-ADMIRAL A.C.
DRURY, VICE-ADMIRAL SIR | SLADE, CAPTAIN EDMOND J.W.,
CHARLES, K.C.S.I. | R.N.
FIRTH, PROFESSOR G.H., LL.D. | TANNER, J.R.
GINSBURG, B.W., LL.D. | THURSFIELD, J.R.
GODLEY, SIR ARTHUR, K.C.B. | TRACEY, ADMIRAL SIR RICHARD,
HAMILTON, ADMIRAL SIR R. | K.C.B.
VESEY, G.C.B. | WATTS, PHILIP, D.SC., F.R.S.
SECRETARY
PROFESSOR J.K. LAUGHTON, D.Litt., King's College, London, W.C.
TREASURER
W. GRAHAM GREENE, C.B., Admiralty, S.W.
The COUNCIL of the NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY wish it to be distinctly
understood that they are not answerable for any opinions or
observations that may appear in the Society's publications; For these
the responsibility rests entirely with the Editors of the several
works.
PREFACE
The inaccessibility of the official Fighting Instructions from time to
time issued to the fleet has long been a recognised stumbling-block to
students of naval history. Only a few copies of them were generally
known to exist; fewer still could readily be consulted by the public,
and of these the best known had been wrongly dated. The discovery
therefore of a number of seventeenth century Instructions amongst the
Earl of Dartmouth's papers, which he had generously placed at the
disposal of the Society, seemed to encourage an attempt to make
something like a complete collection. The result, such as it is, is
now offered to the Society. It is by no means exhaustive. Some sets of
Instructions seem to be lost beyond recall; but, on the other hand, a
good deal of hitherto barren ground has been filled, and it is hoped
that the collection may be of some assistance for a fresh study of the
principles which underlie the development of naval tactics.
It is of course as documents in the history of tactics that the
Fighting Instructions have the greatest practical value, and with this
aspect of them in view I have done my best to illustrate their
genesis, intention, and significance by extracts from contemporary
authorities. Without such illustration the Instructions would be but
barren food, neither nutritive nor easily digested. The embodiment of
this illustrative matter has to some extent involved a departure from
the ordinary form of the Society's publications. Instead of a general
introduction, a series of introductory notes to each group of
Instructions has been adopted, which it is feared will appear to bear
an excessive proportion to the Instructions themselves. There seemed,
however, no other means of dealing with the illustrative matter in a
consecutive way. The extracts from admirals' despatches and
contemporary treatises, and the remarks of officers and officials
concerned with the preparation or the execution of the Instructions,
were for the most part too fragmentary to be treated as separate
documents, or too long or otherwise unsuitable for foot-notes. The
only adequate way therefore was to embody them in Introductory Notes,
and this it is hoped will be found to justify their bulk.
A special apology is, however, due for the Introductory Note on
Nelson's memoranda. For this I can only plead their great importance,
and the amount of illustrative matter that exists from the pens of
Nelson's officers and opponents. For no other naval battle have we so
much invaluable comment from men of the highest capacity who were
present. The living interest of it all is unsurpassed, and I have
therefore been tempted to include all that came to hand, encouraged by
the belief that the fullest material for the study of Nelson's tactics
at the battle of Trafalgar could not be out of place in a volume
issued by the Society in the centenary year.
As to the general results, perhaps the most striking feature which the
collection brings out is that sailing tactics was a purely English
art. The idea that we borrowed originally from the Dutch is no longer
tenable. The Dutch themselves do not even claim the invention of the
line. Indeed in no foreign authority, either Dutch, French or Spanish,
have I been able to discover a claim to the invention of any device in
sailing tactics that had permanent value. Even the famous tactical
school which was established in France at the close of the Seven
Years' War, and by which the French service so brilliantly profited in
the War of American Independence, was worked on the old lines of
Hoste's treatise. Morogues' _Tactique Navale_ was its text-book,
and his own teaching was but a scientific and intelligent elaboration
of a system from which the British service under the impulse of Anson,
Hawke, and Boscawen was already shaking itself free.
Much of the old learning which the volume contains is of course of
little more than antiquarian interest, but the bulk of it in the
opinion of those best able to judge should be found of living value.
All systems of tactics must rest ultimately on the dominant weapon in
use, and throughout the sailing period the dominant weapon was, as
now, the gun. In face of so fundamental a resemblance no tactician
can afford to ignore the sailing system merely because the method of
propulsion and the nature of the material have changed. It is not the
principles of tactics that such changes affect, but merely the method
of applying them.
Of even higher present value is the process of thought, the line of
argument by which the old tacticians arrived at their conclusions good
and bad. In studying the long series of Instructions we are able to
detach certain attitudes of mind which led to the atrophy of
principles essentially good, and others which pushed the system
forward on healthy lines and flung off obsolete restraints. In an art
so shifting and amorphous as naval tactics, the difference between
health and disease must always lie in a certain vitality of mind with
which it must be approached and practised. It is only in the history
of tactics, under all conditions of weapons, movement and material,
that the conditions of that vitality can be studied.
For a civilian to approach the elucidation of such points without
professional assistance would be the height of temerity, and my thanks
therefore are particularly due for advice and encouragement to Admiral
Sir Cyprian Bridge, Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Custance, Rear-Admiral
H.S.H. Prince Louis of Battenberg, and to Captain Slade, Captain of
the Royal Naval College. To Sir Reginald Custance and Professor
Laughton I am under a special obligation, for not only have they been
kind enough to read the proofs of the work, but they have been
indefatigable in offering suggestions, the one from his high
professional knowledge and the other from his unrivalled learning in
naval history. Any value indeed the work may be found to possess must
in a large measure be attributed to them. Nor can I omit to mention
the valuable assistance which I have received from Mr. Ferdinand Brand
and Captain Garbett, R.N., in unearthing forgotten material in the
Libraries of the Admiralty and the United Service Institution.
I have also the pleasure of expressing my obligations to the Earl of
Dartmouth, the Earl of St. Germans, and Vice-Admiral Sir Charles
Knowles, Bart., for the use of the documents in their possession, as
well as to many others whose benefits to the Society will be found
duly noted in the body of the work.
CONTENTS
PART I.--EARLY TUDOR PERIOD
1. INTRODUCTORY. ALONSO DE CHAVES ON SAILING TACTICS 3
Espejo de Navegantes, _circa_ 1530 6
2. INTRODUCTORY. AUDLEY'S FLEET ORDERS, _circa_ 1530 14
Orders to be used by the King's Majesty's Navy by the Sea 15
3. INTRODUCTORY. THE ADOPTION OF SPANISH TACTICS BY HENRY VIII 18
Lord Lisle, 1545, No. 1 20
" " No. 2 23
PART II.--ELIZABETHAN AND JACOBEAN
INTRODUCTORY. THE ELIZABETHAN ORIGIN OF RALEGH'S INSTRUCTIONS 27
Sir Walter Ralegh, 1617 36
PART III.--CAROLINGIAN
1. INTRODUCTORY. THE ATTEMPT TO APPLY LAND FORMATIONS
TO THE FLEET 49
Lord Wimbledon, 1625. No. 1 52
" " No. 2 61
" " No. 3 63
2. INTRODUCTORY. THE SHIP-MONEY FLEETS, _circa_ 1635 73
The Earl of Lindsey, 1635 77
PART IV.--THE FIRST DUTCH WAR
1. INTRODUCTORY. ENGLISH AND DUTCH ORDERS ON THE
EVE OF THE WAR, 1648-53 81
Parliamentary Orders, 1648 87
Supplementary Instructions, _circa_ 1650 88
Marten Tromp, 1652 91
2. INTRODUCTORY. ORDERS ISSUED DURING THE WAR, 1653 and 1654 92
Commonwealth Orders, 1653 99
PART V.--THE SECOND DUTCH WAR
1. INTRODUCTORY. ORDERS OF THE RESTORATION 107
The Earl of Sandwich, 1665 108
2. INTRODUCTORY. MONCK, PRINCE RUPERT, AND THE DUKE OF YORK 110
The Duke of York, 1665 122
His Additional Instructions, 1665 126
His Supplementary Order 128
Prince Rupert, 1666 129
PART VI.--THE THIRD DUTCH WAR TO THE REVOLUTION
1. INTRODUCTORY. PROGRESS OF TACTICS DURING THE WAR 133
The Duke of York, 1672 146
His Supplementary Orders, 1672 148
The Duke of York, 1672-3 149
Final form of the Duke of York's Orders, 1673, with additions
and observations subsequently made 152
2. INTRODUCTORY. MEDITERRANEAN ORDERS, 1678 164
Sir John Narbrough, 1678 165
3. INTRODUCTORY. THE LAST STUART ORDERS 168
Lord Dartmouth, 1688 170
PART VII.--WILLIAM III. AND ANNE
1. INTRODUCTORY. LORD TORRINGTON, TOURVILLE, AND HOSTE 175
Admiral Edward Russell, 1691 188
2. INTRODUCTORY. THE PERMANENT INSTRUCTIONS, 1703-1783 195
Sir George Rooke, 1703 197
PART VIII.--ADDITIONAL FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
INTRODUCTORY, ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS 203
Admiral Vernon, _circa_ 1740 214
Lord Anson, _circa_ 1747 216
Sir Edward Hawke, 1756 317
Admiral Boscawen, 1759 219
Sir George Rodney, 1782 225
Lord Hood's Additions, 1783 228
PART IX.--THE LAST PHASE
1. INTRODUCTORY. THE NEW SIGNAL BOOK INSTRUCTIONS 233
Lord Howe, 1782 239
2. INTRODUCTORY. THE SIGNAL BOOKS OF THE GREAT WAR 252
Lord Howe's Explanatory Instructions, 1799 268
3. INTRODUCTORY. NELSON'S TACTICAL MEMORANDA 280
The Toulon Memorandum, 1803 313
The Trafalgar Memorandum, 1805 316
4. INTRODUCTORY. INSTRUCTIONS AFTER TRAFALGAR 321
Admiral Gambier, 1807 327
Lord Collingwood, 1808-1810 328
Sir Alexander Cochrane, 1805-14 330
5. INTRODUCTORY, THE SIGNAL BOOK OF 1816 335
The Instructions of 1816 342
APPENDIX. 'FURTHER PARTICULARS OF THE TRAFALGAR FIGHT' 351
INDEX 359
PART 1
EARLY TUDOR PERIOD
I. ALONSO DE CHAVES, _circa_ 1530
II. SIR THOMAS AUDLEY, 1530
III. LORD LISLE, 1545
ALONSO DE CHAVES ON SAILING TACTICS
INTRODUCTORY
The following extract from the _Espejo de Navegantes_, or
_Seamen's Glass_, of Alonso de Chaves serves to show the
development which naval tactics had reached at the dawn of the sailing
epoch. The treatise was apparently never published. It was discovered
by Captain Fernandez Duro, the well-known historian of the Spanish
navy, amongst the manuscripts in the library of the Academy of History
at Madrid. The exact date of its production is not known; but Alonso
de Chaves was one of a group of naval writers and experts who
flourished at the court of the Emperor Charles V in the first half of
the sixteenth century.[1] He was known to Hakluyt, who mentions him in
connection with his own cherished idea of getting a lectureship in
navigation established in London. 'And that it may appear,' he writes
in dedicating the second edition of his _Voyages_ to the lord
admiral, 'that this is no vain fancy nor device of mine it may please
your lordship to understand that the late Emperor Charles the
Fifth ... established not only a Pilot-Major for the examination of such
as sought to take charge of ships in that voyage' (_i.e._ to the
Indies), 'but also founded a notable lecture of the Art of Navigation
which is read to this day in the Contractation House at Seville. The
Readers of the Lecture have not only carefully taught and instructed
the Spanish mariners by word of mouth, but also have published sundry
exact and worthy treatises concerning marine causes for the direction
and encouragement of posterity. The learned works of three of which
Readers, namely of Alonso de Chaves, of Hieronymus de Chaves, and of
Roderigo Zamorano, came long ago very happily to my hands, together
with the straight and severe examining of all such Masters as desire
to take charge for the West Indies.' Since therefore De Chaves was an
official lecturer to the Contractation House, the Admiralty of the
Indies, we may take it that he speaks with full authority of the
current naval thought of the time. That he represented a somewhat
advanced school seems clear from the pains he takes in his treatise to
defend his opinions against the old idea which still prevailed, that
only galleys and oared craft could be marshalled in regular
order. 'Some may say,' he writes, 'that at sea it is not possible to
order ships and tactics in this way, nor to arrange beforehand so
nicely for coming to the attack or bringing succour just when wanted,
and that therefore there is no need to labour an order of battle since
order cannot be kept. To such I answer that the same objection binds
the enemy, and that with equal arms he who has taken up the best
formation and order will be victor, because it is not possible so to
break up an order with wind and sea as that he who is more without
order shall not be worse broken up and the sooner defeated. For ships
at sea are as war-horses on land, since admitting they are not very
nimble at turning at any pace, nevertheless a regular formation
increases their power. Moreover, at sea, so long as there be no storm,
there will be nothing to hinder the using of any of the orders with
which we have dealt, and if there be a storm the same terror will
strike the one side as the other; for the storm is enough for all to
war with, and in fighting it they will have peace with one another.'
At first sight it would seem that De Chaves in this argument takes no
account of superiority of seamanship--the factor which was destined to
turn the scale against Spain upon the sea. But the following passage
with which he concludes shows that he regarded seamanship as the
controlling factor in every case. 'And if,' he argues, 'they say that
the enemy will take the same thought and care as I, I answer that when
both be equal in numbers and arms, then in such case he who shall be
more dexterous and have more spirit and fortitude he will conquer, the
which he will not do, although he have more and better arms and as
much spirit as he will, if he be wanting in good order and
counsel. Just as happens in fencing, that the weaker man if he be more
dexterous gives more and better hits than the other who does not
understand the beats nor knows them, although he be the stronger. And
the same holds good with any army whatsoever on land, and it has been
seen that the smaller by their good order have defeated the stronger.'
From the work in question Captain Fernandez Duro gives four sections
or chapters in Appendix 12 to the first volume of his history,[2]
namely, 1. 'Of war or battle at sea,' relating to single ship
actions. 2. 'The form of a battle and the method of fighting,'
relating to armament, fire discipline, boarding and the like. 3. 'Of a
battle of one fleet against another.' 4. 'Battle.' In the last two
sections is contained the earliest known attempt to formulate a
definite fighting formation and tactical system for sailing fleets,
and it is from these that the following extracts have been translated.
It will be noted that in the root-idea of coming as quickly as
possible to close quarters, and in relying mainly on end-on fire, the
proposed system is still quite mediæval and founded mainly upon
galley tactics. But a new and advanced note is struck in the author's
insistence on the captain-general's keeping out of action as long as
possible, instead of leading the attack in the time-honoured way. We
should also remark the differentiation of types, for all of which a
duty was provided in action. This was also a survival of galley
warfare, and rapidly disappeared with the advance of the sailing
man-of-war, never to be revived, unless perhaps it be returning in the
immediate future, and we are to see torpedo craft of the latest
devising taking the place and function of the _barcas_, with
their axes and augers, and armoured cruisers those of the _naos de
succurro_.
_ESPEJO DE NAVEGANTES,
circa_ 1530.
[+Fernandez Duro, Armada Española i. App. 12+.]
_Chapter III.--Of a Battle between One Fleet and Another_.
[_Extract_.]
... When the time for battle is at hand the captain-general should
order the whole fleet to come together that he may set them in order,
since a regular order is no less necessary in a fleet of ships for
giving battle to another fleet than it is in an army of soldiers for
giving battle to another army.
Thus, as in an army, the men-at-arms form by themselves in one quarter
to make and meet charges, and the light horse in another quarter to
support, pursue, and harass[3] so in a fleet, the captain-general
ought to order the strongest and largest ships to form in one quarter
to attack, grapple, board and break-up the enemy, and the lesser and
weaker ships in another quarter apart, with their artillery and
munitions to harass, pursue, and give chase to the enemy if he flies,
and to come to the rescue wherever there is most need.
The captain-general should form a detachment of his smaller and
lighter vessels, to the extent of one-fourth part of his whole fleet,
and order them to take station on either side of the main body. I mean
that they should always keep as a separate body on the flanks of the
main body, so that they can see what happens on one side and on the
other.
He should admonish and direct every one of the ships that she shall
endeavour to grapple with the enemy in such a way that she shall not
get between two of them so as to be boarded and engaged on both sides
at once.[4]
* * * * *
Having directed and set in order all the aforesaid matters, the
captain-general should then marshal the other three-quarters of the
fleet that remain in the following manner.
He should consider his position and the direction of the wind, and how
to get the advantage of it with his fleet.
Then he should consider the order in which the enemy is formed,
whether they come in a close body or in line ahead,[5] and whether
they are disposed in square bodies or in a single line,[6] and whether
the great ships are in the centre or on the flanks, and in what
station is the flagship; and all the other considerations which are
essential to the case he should take in hand.
By all means he should do his best that his fleet shall have the
weather-gage; for if there was no other advantage he will always keep
free from being blinded by the smoke of the guns, so as to be able to
see one to another; and for the enemy it will be the contrary, because
the smoke and fire of our fleet and of their own will keep driving
upon them, and blinding them in such a manner that they will not be
able to see one another, and they will fight among themselves from not
being able to recognise each other.
Everything being now ready, if the enemy have made squadrons of their
fleet we should act in the same manner in ours, placing always the
greater ships in one body as a vanguard to grapple first and receive
the first shock; and the captain-general should be stationed in the
centre squadron, so that he may see those which go before and those
which follow.
Each of the squadrons ought to sail in line abreast,[7] so that all
can see the enemy and use their guns without getting in each other's
way, and they must not sail in file one behind the other, because
thence would come great trouble, as only the leading ships could
fight. In any case a ship is not so nimble as a man to be able to face
about and do what is best.[8]
The rearguard should be the ships that I have called the supports,
which are to be the fourth part of the fleet, and the lightest and
best sailers; but they must not move in rear of the fleet, because
they would not see well what is passing so as to give timely succour,
and therefore they ought always to keep an offing on that side or
flank of the fleet where the flagship is, or on both sides if they are
many; and if they are in one body they should work to station
themselves to windward for the reasons aforesaid.
And if the fleet of the enemy shall come on in one body in line
abreast,[9] ours should do the same, placing the largest and strongest
ships in the centre and the lightest on the flanks of the battle,
seeing that those which are in the centre always receive greater
injury because necessarily they have to fight on both sides.
And if the enemy bring their fleet into the form of a lance-head or
triangle, then ours ought to form in two lines [_alas_], keeping
the advanced extremities furthest apart and closing in the rear, so as
to take the enemy between them and engage them on both fronts, placing
the largest ships in the rear and the lightest at the advanced points,
seeing that they can most quickly tack in upon the enemy opposed to
them.
And if the enemy approach formed in two lines [_alas_], ours
ought to do the same, placing always the greatest ships over against
the greatest of the enemy, and being always on the look-out to take
the enemy between them; and on no account must ours penetrate into the
midst of the enemy's formation [_batalla_], because arms and
smoke will envelope them on every side and there will be no way of
relieving them.
The captain-general having now arrayed his whole fleet in one of the
aforesaid orders according as it seems best to him for giving battle,
and everything being ready for battle, all shall bear in mind the
signals he shall have appointed with flag or shot or topsail, that all
may know at what time to attack or board or come to rescue or retreat,
or give chase. The which signals all must understand and remember what
they are to do when such signals are made, and likewise the armed
boats shall take the same care and remember what they ought to do, and
perform their duty.[10]
_Chapter IV.--Battle_
Then the flagship shall bid a trumpet sound, and at that signal all
shall move in their aforesaid order; and as they come into range they
shall commence to play their most powerful artillery, taking care that
the first shots do not miss, for, as I have said, when the first shots
hit, inasmuch as they are the largest, they strike great dread and
terror into the enemy; for seeing how great hurt they suffer, they
think how much greater it will be at close range and so mayhap they
will not want to fight, but strike and surrender or fly, so as not to
come to close quarters.
Having so begun firing, they shall always first play the largest guns,
which are on the side or board towards the enemy, and likewise they
shall move over from the other side those guns which have wheeled
carriages to run on the upper part of the deck and poop.[11] And then
when nearer they should use the smaller ones, and by no means should
they fire them at first, for afar off they will do no hurt, and
besides the enemy will know there is dearth of good artillery and will
take better heart to make or abide an attack. And after having come to
closer quarters then they ought to play the lighter artillery. And so
soon as they come to board or grapple all the other kinds of arms
shall be used, of which I have spoken more particularly: first,
missiles, such as harpoons [_dardos_] and stones, hand-guns
[_escopetas_] and cross-bows, and then the fire-balls aforesaid,
as well from the tops as from the castles, and at the same time the
calthrops, linstocks, stink-balls [_pildoras_], grenades, and the
scorpions for the sails and rigging. At this moment they should sound
all the trumpets, and with a lusty cheer from every ship at once they
should grapple and fight with every kind of weapon, those with staffed
scythes or shear-hooks cutting the enemy's rigging, and the others
with the fire instruments [_trompas y bocas de fuego_] raining
fire down on the enemy's rigging and crew.
The captain-general should encourage all in the battle, and because he
cannot be heard with his voice he should bid the signal for action to
be made with his trumpet or flag or with his topsail.
And he should keep a look-out in every direction in readiness, when he
sees any of his ships in danger, to order the ships of reserve to give
succour, if by chance they have not seen it, or else himself to bear
in with his own ship.
The flagship should take great care not to grapple another, for then
he could not see what is passing in the battle nor control it. And
besides his own side in coming to help and support him might find
themselves out of action; or peradventure if any accident befell him,
the rest of the fleet would be left without guidance and would not
have care to succour one another, but so far as they were able would
fly or take their own course. Accordingly the captain-general should
never be of the first who are to grapple nor should he enter into the
press, so that he may watch the fighting and bring succour where it is
most needed.
The ships of support in like manner should have care to keep somewhat
apart and not to grapple till they see where they should first bring
succour. The more they keep clear the more will they have opportunity
of either standing off and using their guns, or of coming to close
range with their other firearms. Moreover, if any ship of the enemy
takes to flight, they will be able to give chase or get athwart her
hawse, and will be able to watch and give succour wherever the
captain-general signals.
The boats in like manner should not close in till they see the ships
grappled, and then they should come up on the opposite side in the
manner stated above, and carry out their special duties as occasion
arises either with their bases,[12] of which each shall carry its own,
and with their harquebuses, or else by getting close in and wedging up
the rudders, or cutting them and their gear away, or by leaping in
upon the enemy, if they can climb in without being seen, or from
outside by setting fire to them, or scuttling them with augers.[13]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Fernandez Duro, _De algunas obras desconocidas de Cosmografia y de
Namgaaon, &c._ Reprinted from the _Revista de Navegacion y Comercio_.
Madrid, 1894-5.
[2] _Armada Española desde la union de los Reines de Castilla y de
Aragon_.
[3] _Entrar y salir_--lit. 'to go in and come out,' a technical military
expression used of light cavalry. It seems generally to signify short
sudden attacks on weak points.
[4] Here follow directions for telling off a fourth of the largest boats
in the fleet for certain duties which are sufficiently explained in the
section on 'Battle' below.
[5] _Unos en pos de otros á la hila_--lit. one behind the other in file.
[6] _En escuadrones ó en ala_. In military diction these words meant
'deep formation' and 'single line.' Here probably _ala_ means line
abreast. See next note.
[7] _Cado uno de los escuadrones debe ir en ala_. Here _escuadrone_ must
mean 'squadron' in the modern sense of a division, and from the context
_ala_ can mean nothing but 'line abreast,' 'line ahead' being strictly
forbidden.
[8] This, of course, refers to fire tactics ashore. The meaning is that
a ship, when she has delivered her fire, cannot retire by countermarch
and leave her next in file to deliver its fire in turn. The whole
system, it will be seen, is based on end-on fire, as a preparation for
boarding and small-arm fighting.
[9] _Viniere toda junta puesta in ala_.
[10] This sentence in the original is incomplete, running on into the
next chapter. For clearness the construction has been altered in the
translation.
[11] This remarkable evolution is a little obscure. The Spanish has '_y
moviendo asimismo los otros del otro bordo, aquellos que tienen sus
carretones que andan per cima de cubierta y toldo_.'
[12] _Versos_, breech-loading pieces of the secondary armament of ships,
and for aiming boats. Bases were of the high penetration or 'culverin'
type.
[13] _Dando barrenos_. This curious duty of the armed boats he has more
fully explained in the section on single ship actions, as follows: 'The
ships being grappled, the boat ready equipped should put off to the
enemy's ship under her poop, and get fast hold of her, and first cut
away her rudder, or at least jam it with half a dozen wedges in such
wise that it cannot steer or move, and if there is a chance for more,
without being seen, bore half a dozen auger holes below the water-line,
so that the ship founders.'
The rest of the chapter is concerned with the treatment of the dead and
wounded, pursuit of the enemy when victory is won, and the refitting of
the fleet.
AUDLEY'S FLEET ORDERS,
_circa_ 1530
INTRODUCTORY
The instructions drawn up by Thomas Audley by order of Henry VIII may
be taken as the last word in England of the purely mediæval time,
before the development of gunnery, and particularly of broadside fire,
had sown the seeds of more modern tactics. They were almost certainly
drafted from long-established precedents, for Audley was a lawyer.
The document is undated, but since Audley is mentioned without any
rank or title, it was probably before November 1531, when he became
serjeant-at-law and king's serjeant, and certainly before May 1632
when he was knighted. It was at this time that Henry VIII was plunging
into his Reformation policy, and had every reason to be prepared for
complications abroad, and particularly with Spain, which was then the
leading naval Power.
The last two articles, increasing the authority of the council of war,
were probably insisted on, as Mr. Oppenheim has pointed out in view
of Sir Edward Howard's attempts on French ports in 1512 and 1513, the
last of which ended in disaster.[1]
FOOTNOTE:
[1] _Administration of the Royal Navy_, p. 63.
_ORDERS TO BE USED BY THE KING'S MAJESTY'S NAVY BY THE SEA_.
[+Brit. Mus. Harleian MSS. 309, fol. 42, et seq.+[1]]
[_Extract_.]
If they meet with the enemy the admiral must apply to get the wind of
the enemy by all the means he can, for that is the advantage. No
private captain should board the admiral enemy but the admiral of the
English, except he cannot come to the enemy's, as the matter may so
fall out without they both the one seek the other. And if they chase
the enemy let them that chase shoot no ordnance till he be ready to
board him, for that will let[2] his ship's way.
Let every ship match equally as near as they can, and leave some
pinnaces at liberty to help the overmatched. And one small ship when
they shall join battle [is] to be attending on the admiral to relieve
him, for the overcoming of the admiral is a great discouragement of
the rest of the other side.
In case you board your enemy enter not till you see the smoke gone and
then shoot off[3] all your pieces, your port-pieces, the pieces of
hail-shot, [and] cross-bow shot to beat his cage deck, and if you see
his deck well ridden[4] then enter with your best men, but first win
his tops in any wise if it be possible. In case you see there come
rescue bulge[5] the enemy ship [but] first take heed your own men be
retired, [and] take the captain with certain of the best with him, the
rest [to be] committed to the sea, for else they will turn upon you to
your confusion.
The admiral ought to have this order before he joins battle with the
enemy, that all his ships shall bear a flag in their mizen-tops, and
himself one in the foremast beside the mainmast, that everyone may
know his own fleet by that token. If he see a hard match with the
enemy and be to leeward, then to gather his fleet together and seem to
flee, and flee indeed for this purpose till the enemy draw within
gunshot. And when the enemy doth shoot then [he shall] shoot again,
and make all the smoke he can to the intent the enemy shall not see
the ships, and [then] suddenly hale up his tackle aboard,[6] and have
the wind of the enemy. And by this policy it is possible to win the
weather-gage of the enemy, and then he hath a great advantage, and
this may well be done if it be well foreseen beforehand, and every
captain and master made privy to it beforehand at whatsoever time such
disadvantage shall happen.
The admiral shall not take in hand any exploit to land or enter into
any harbour enemy with the king's ships, but[7] he call a council and
make the captains privy to his device and the best masters in the
fleet or pilots, known to be skilful men on that coast or place where
he intendeth to do his exploit, and by good advice. Otherwise the
fault ought to be laid on the admiral if anything should happen but
well.[8]
And if he did an exploit without assent of the captains and [it]
proved well, the king ought to put him out of his room for purposing a
matter of such charge of his own brain, whereby the whole fleet might
fall into the hands of the enemy to the destruction of the king's
people.[29]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] _A Book of Orders for the War both by Land and Sea, written by
Thomas Audley at the command of King Henry VIII.
[2] _I.e._ hinder.
[3] MS. 'the shot of.' The whole MS. has evidently been very carelessly
copied and is full of small blunders, which have been corrected in the
text above. 'Board' till comparatively recent times meant to close with
a ship. 'Enter' was our modern 'board.'
[4] 'Ridden' = 'cleared.'
[5] 'Bulge' = 'scuttle.' A ship was said to bulge herself when she ran
aground and filled.
[6] The passage should probably read 'hale or haul his tacks aboard.'
[7] _I.e._ 'without,' 'unless.'
[8] It was under this old rule that Boroughs lodged his protest against
Drake's entering Cadiz in 1587.
[9] The rest of the articles relate to discipline, internal order of
ships, and securing prize cargoes.
THE ADOPTION OF SPANISH TACTICS BY HENRY VIII
INTRODUCTORY
These two sets of orders were drawn up by the lord high admiral in
rapid succession in August 1545, during the second stage of Henry
VIII's last war with France. In the previous month D'Annibault, the
French admiral, had been compelled to abandon his attempt on
Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight, and retire to recruit upon his own
coast; and Lord Lisle was about to go out and endeavour to bring him
to action.
The orders, it will be seen, are a distinct advance on those of 1530,
and betray strongly the influence of Spanish ideas as formulated, by
De Chaves. So striking indeed is the resemblance in many points; that
we perhaps may trace it to Henry's recent alliance with Charles V. The
main difference was that Henry's 'wings' were composed of oared craft,
and to form them of sufficient strength he had had some of the newest
and smartest 'galliasses,' or 'galleys'--that is, his vessels
specially built for men-of-war--fitted with oars. The reason for this
was that the French fleet was a mixed one, the sailing division having
been reinforced by a squadron of galleys from the Mediterranean. The
elaborate attempts to combine the two types tactically--a problem
which the Italian admirals had hitherto found insoluble--points to an
advanced study of the naval art that is entirely characteristic of
Henry VIII.
The main idea of the first order is of a vanguard in three ranks,
formed of the most powerful hired merchant ships and the king's own
galleons and great ships, and supported by a strong rearguard of
smaller armed merchantmen, and by two oared wings on either flank
composed of royal and private vessels combined. The vanguard was to be
marshalled with its three ranks so adjusted that its general form was
that of a blunt wedge. In the first rank come eight of the large
merchantmen, mainly Hanseatic vessels; in the second, ten of the royal
navy and one private vessel; in the third, nineteen second-rate
merchantmen. The tactical aim is clearly that the heavy Hanseatic
ships should, as De Chaves says, receive the first shock and break up
the enemy's formation for the royal ships, while the third rank are in
position to support. The wings, which were specially told off to keep
the galleys in check, correspond to the reserve of De Chaves, and the
importance attached to them is seen in the fact that they contained
all the king's galleons of the latest type.
In the second set of instructions, issued on August 10, this order was
considerably modified. The fleet had been increased by the arrival of
some of the west-country ships, and a new order of battle was drawn up
which is printed in the _State Papers, Henry VIII_ (Old Series),
i. 810. The formation, though still retaining the blunt wedge design,
was simplified. We have now a vanguard of 24 ships, a 'battaill' or
main body of 40 ships, and one 'wing' of 40 oared 'galliasses,
shallops and boats of war.' The 'wing' however, was still capable of
acting in two divisions, for, unlike the vanguard and 'battaill,' it
had a vice-admiral as well as an admiral.
_LORD LISLE, No._ 1, 1545.
[+Le Fleming MSS. No. 2+.][1]
_The Order of Battle_.[2]
THE VANGUARD.
These be the ships appointed for the first rank of the vanguard:
In primis:
The Great Argosy.
The Samson Lubeck.
The Johannes Lubeck.
The Trinity of Dantzig.
The Mary of Hamburg.
The Pellican.
The Morion [of Dantzig].
The 'Sepiar' of Dantzig.
= 8.
The second rank of the vanguard:
The Harry Grace à Dieu.
The Venetian.
The Peter Pomegranate.
The Mathew Gonson.
The Pansy.
The Great Galley.
The Sweepstake.
The Minion.
The Swallow.
The New Bark.
The Saul 'Argaly.'
= 12 (_sic_).
The third rank of the vanguard:
The 'Berste Denar.'
The Falcon Lively.
The Harry Bristol.
The Trinity Smith.
The Margaret of Bristol.
The Trinity Reniger.
The Mary James.
The Pilgrim of Dartmouth.
The Mary Gorge of Rye.
The Thomas Tipkins.
The Gorges Brigges.
The Anne Lively.
= 12.
The John Evangelist.
The Thomas Modell.
The Lartycke [or 'Lartigoe'].
The Christopher Bennet.
The Mary Fortune.
The Mary Marten.
The Trinity Bristol.
= 7.
THE OARED WINGS.
Galleys and ships of the right wing:
The Great Mistress of England.
The Salamander.
The Jennet.
The Lion.
The Greyhound.
The Thomas Greenwich.
The Lesser Pinnace.
The Hind.
The Harry.
The Galley Subtle.
Two boats of Rye.
= 12.
Galleys and ships of the left wing:
The Anne Gallant.
The Unicorn.
The Falcon.
The Dragon.
The Sacre.
The Merlin.
The Rae.
The Reniger pinnace.
The Foyst.
Two boats of Rye.
= 11.
_The Fighting Instructions_.
_Item_. It is to be considered that the ranks must keep such
order in sailing that none impeach another. Wherefore it is requisite
that every of the said ranks keep right way with another, and take
such regard to the observing of the same that no ship pass his fellows
forward nor backward nor slack anything, but [keep] as they were in
one line, and that there may be half a cable length between every of
the ships.
_Item_. The first rank shall make sail straight to the front of
the battle and shall pass through them, and so shall make a short
return to the midwards as they may, and they [are] to have a special
regard to the course of the second rank; which two ranks is appointed
to lay aboard the principal ships of the enemy, every man choosing[3]
his mate as they may, reserving the admiral for my lord admiral.
_Item_. That every ship of the first rank shall bear a flag of
St. George's cross upon the fore topmast for the space of the fight,
which upon the king's determination shall be on Monday, the 10th of
August, _anno_ 1545.[4]
And every ship appointed to the middle rank shall for the space of the
fight bear a flag of St. George's cross upon her mainmast.
And every ship of the third rank shall bear a like flag upon his
mizen[5] mast top, and every of the said wings shall have in their
tops a flag of St. George.
_Item_. The victuallers shall follow the third rank and shall
bear in their tops their flags. Also that neither of the said wings
shall further enter into fight; but, having advantage as near
anigh[6] as they can of the wind, shall give succour as they shall
see occasion, and shall not give care to any of the small vessels to
weaken our force. There be, besides the said ships mentioned, to be
joined to the foresaid battle fifty sail of western ships, and whereof
be seven great hulks of 888 ton apiece, and there is also the number
of 1,200 of soldiers beside mariners in all the said ships.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] A similar list of ships is in a MS. in the Cambridge University
Library.
[2] This paper gives the order of the wings and vanguard only. The fifty
west-country ships that were presumably to form the rearguard had not
yet joined.
[3] MS. 'closing.'
[4] The fleets did not get contact till August 15.
[5] MS. 'messel.'
[6] MS. 'a snare a nye.' The passage is clearly corrupt. Perhaps it
should read 'neither of the said wings shall further enter into the
fight but as nigh as they can keeping advantage of the wind [_i.e._
without losing the weather-gage of any part of the enemy's fleet] but
shall give succour,' &c.
_LORD LISLE, No. 2._
[+Record Office, State Papers, Henry VIII.+]
_The Order for the said Fleet taken by the Lord Admiral the 10th day
of August, 1545_.[1]
1. First, it is to be considered that every of the captains with the
said ships appointed by this order to the vanward, battle and wing
shall ride at anchor according as they be appointed to sail by the
said order; and no ship of any of the said wards or wing shall presume
to come to an anchor before the admiral of the said ward.
2. _Item_, that every captain of the said wards or wing shall be
in everything ordered by the admiral of the same.
3. _Item_, when we shall see a convenient time to fight with the
enemies our vanward shall make with their vanward if they have any;
and if they be in one company, our vanward, taking the advantage of
the wind, shall set upon their foremost rank, bringing them out of
order; and our vice-admiral shall seek to board their vice-admiral,
and every captain shall choose his equal as near as he may.
4. _Item_, the admiral of the wing shall be always in the wind
with his whole company; and when we shall join with the enemies he
shall keep still the advantage of the wind, to the intent he with his
company may the better beat off the galleys from the great ships.[2]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The articles are preceded, like the first ones, by a list of ships
or 'battle order,' showing an organisation into a vanward, main body
(battle), and one wing of oared craft. See Introductory Note, p. 19.
[2] Of the remaining seven articles, five relate to distinguishing
squadronal flags and lights as in the earlier instructions, and the last
one to the Watchword of the night. It is to be 'God save King Henry,'
and the answer, 'And long to reign over us.'