OF THE LIBERTY OF MAN, AND OF DESTINY

A ball that drives another, a hunting-dog that necessarily and

voluntarily follows a stag, a stag that leaps a great ditch not less

necessarily and voluntarily, a roe that gives birth to another roe,

which will bring a third into the world--these things are not more

irresistibly determined than we are to do all that we do. Let us

remember always how inconsistent and absurd it would be for one set

of things to be arranged and the other not.

Every present event is born of the past, and is father of the future;

otherwise the universe would be quite other than it is, as Leibnitz

has well said, more correct in this than in his pre-established

harmony.[70] The eternal chain can be neither broken nor entangled.

The great being who necessarily sustains it cannot let it hang

uncertainly, nor change it; for he would then no longer be the

necessary and immutable being, the being of beings; he would be

frail, inconstant, capricious; he would belie his nature, and exist

no longer.

Hence, an inevitable destiny is the law of nature, as the whole of

antiquity felt. The dread of depriving man of some false liberty,

robbing virtue of its merit, and relieving crime of its horror, has

at times alarmed tender souls; but as soon as they were enlightened

they returned to this great truth, that all things are enchained and

necessary.

Man is free, we repeat, when he can do what he wills to do; but he is

not free to will; it is impossible that he should will without cause.

If this cause is not infallibly followed by its effect, it is no

cause. It would not be more absurd for a cloud to say to the wind:

“I do not wish to be driven by you.” This truth can never injure

morality. Vice is always vice, as disease is always disease. It will

always be necessary to repress the wicked; if they are determined to

evil, we must reply that they are equally predestined to chastisement.

Let us make these truths clearer.

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