FASHODA.
On the 7th September a surprising and unlooked-for incident occurred.
One of Gordon's old steamers, the _Tewfikeyeh_, which had been sent by
the Khalifa up the White Nile, unexpectedly returned to Omdurman, only
to find that the place had changed hands.
On being boarded she at once surrendered to the Sirdar. Her captain
reported that on reaching Fashoda he had been fired on by a party of
white men, and in support of his statement produced some nickel-plated
bullets, of small calibre, and evidently of European manufacture.
There was no doubt that a European expedition of some kind had arrived
at Fashoda, and opinions only differed as to its nationality and object.
The Sirdar's first step was to order all the newspaper correspondents
back to Cairo.
At 6 a.m. on the 10th he left Omdurman in the postal steamer _Dal_. The
gunboats _Sultan_, _Nazir_, and _Fatteh_, all towing barges, accompanied
him. Later on he was joined by the _Abu Klea_. He took with him an
Egyptian field battery, one company of the Camerons, and also the 11th
and 13th, Soudanese Battalions. The river was at its height and very
full. Steaming with all possible speed against the stream, the flotilla
on the morning of the 15th reached a point called Renkh, 310 miles south
of Khartoum. Here they found the Khalifa's steamer _Safiyeh_ (the vessel
employed in the rescue of Sir Charles Wilson in 1885) and eleven large
nuggers with a party of Dervishes, who, it appeared, were awaiting
reinforcements from Omdurman to renew an attack which they had already
made on the white men established at Fashoda.
The vessels were lying on the east bank of the river close to a Dervish
camp. The Dervishes resisted for a while and fired on the Sirdar's
fleet. The gunboats returned the fire, one of the shells bursting in the
_Tewfikeyeh's_ boiler and disabling her. The enemy's fire was soon
silenced, and a party of the 11th Soudanese then landed and cleared the
Dervish camp.
The steamer and the nuggers having been captured, the flotilla went on
its way about noon. The river here continued very wide, with much
vegetation on its banks, where crocodiles and hippopotami were seen in
numbers.
On the 18th a stop was made for the night ten miles below Fashoda, and a
letter from the Sirdar informed the commandant of the post which was
reported as being established there of the approach of the steamers.
Next morning, when the vessels were about five miles from Fashoda, a
rowing boat flying a French flag was seen approaching. It contained one
of the officers under the orders of Captain (afterwards Major) Marchand,
the commander of a French exploring expedition, which it turned out had
occupied Fashoda since the 10th July.
As Fashoda was neared the French flag was seen in the middle of the
native village, and near the old Egyptian fort the Captain's force,
consisting of eight officers and 120 Senegalese armed with repeating
rifles, and some Shilluks with native spears, was drawn up. On the
steamers making fast, Marchand went on board the _Dal_ to visit the
Sirdar, and remained in conference with him three quarters of an hour.
The Sirdar declared that the presence of a French force was an
infringement of the rights of Egypt and of the British Government, and
protested against the occupation of Fashoda and the hoisting of the
French flag. Marchand stated, in reply, that he was acting under the
orders of the French Government, and that without instructions it would
be impossible for him to withdraw. He admitted that, in the face of a
superior force, he was not prepared to resist the hoisting of the
Egyptian flag.
When the conference was over the steamers proceeded some 300 yards up
stream and landed the Sirdar's troops. The Egyptian flag was then
hoisted about 500 yards from the French flag, on a ruined bastion of the
fortifications, and saluted with all ceremony by the gunboats.
Marchand's force, which had been attacked by the Dervishes on the 25th
August, was in great want of ammunition and supplies, and the Captain,
in expectation of a further attack, had sent his steamer south to bring
up reinforcements.
Leaving the 11th Soudanese with two guns and the steamer Nazir, the
remainder of the force re-embarked and proceeded south to Sobat, where
they arrived on the 22nd, hoisted the Egyptian flag, and established a
second post. The _Abu Klea_ remained with part of the 13th Soudanese
Battalion, and the other steamers then proceeded down the Nile to
Omdurman without further adventure.
On the Sirdar's arrival, he at once communicated to the Foreign Office
the result of his mission.
Although want of space renders it impossible to deal fully with the
diplomatic incident to which the French occupation of Fashoda gave rise,
a few particulars may, nevertheless, be given.
In the beginning of 1898, a Cairo telegram coming through Paris
announced, somewhat prematurely, that a French expedition, under Captain
Marchand, had arrived at Fashoda, and letters from his officers and men,
written on their journey, expressed their anxiety to reach the Upper
Nile before the British, and "to display the French flag between
Khartoum and Gondokoro."
Although little notice was taken at the time of these announcements and
aspirations, the knowledge of the Marchand expedition was undoubtedly
one of the causes which determined the British Government to hasten the
advance on Khartoum.
What subsequently occurred seems to have been in great measure foreseen
by Lord Salisbury, who appears to have anticipated that difficulties
might arise, not only with regard to France, but with Abyssinia as
well.
In a despatch dated the 2nd August, 1898, communicating to Lord Cromer
the views of the British Government as to the line of action to be taken
after the occupation of Khartoum, the British Premier stated that the
Sirdar was authorized to send two flotillas, one up the White and the
other up the Blue Nile. The flotilla up the White Nile was to be
commanded by the Sirdar as far as Fashoda, and the officer in command of
the Blue Nile flotilla was to go as far as the foot of the cataract
commencing about Rosiéres. Should he before reaching that encounter any
Abyssinian outposts, he was to halt and await further instructions. The
despatch added that, "in dealing with any French or Abyssinian
authorities who might be encountered, nothing should be said or done
which would in any way imply a recognition by the British Government of
a title to possession on behalf of France or Abyssinia to any portion of
the Nile Valley."
It was scarcely to be expected that at the moment when the
Anglo-Egyptian operations, undertaken mainly with the object of
restoring her lost provinces to Egypt, had been crowned with success,
England could acquiesce in the occupation of any portion of them by a
foreign Power, and frequent exchanges of views took place between the
British and French Governments.
The British Government asked for the withdrawal of Marchand, whom the
French Minister had termed an "emissary of civilization." This demand
the French Government was disinclined to agree to.
The French contention was that the country bordering the White Nile,
though formerly belonging to Egypt, had by abandonment become _res
nullius_, and that the French had as much right to a position on the
Nile as the Germans or the Belgians.
The British case was that the valley of the Nile still belonged to
Egypt, although her title had been rendered dormant by the successes of
the Mahdi; further, that whatever title the latter might have acquired
passed on the 2nd September by right of conquest to the British and
Egyptian Governments.
Lord Salisbury declared on the 9th September that Her Majesty's
Government did not consider that this right was open to argument.
Nevertheless, the discussions on the subject, to which the Foreign
Office declined to give the name of "negotiations," continued for two
whole months, and were marked throughout by great firmness on the part
of the British Cabinet.
Lord Salisbury, besides being backed by the British nation generally,
was supported by the leading men amongst the Opposition, including Lord
Rosebery, who, in the middle of October, made a speech in which the
following passage occurred:--
"Great Britain has been conciliatory, and her conciliatory
disposition has been widely misunderstood. If the nations of the
world are under the impression that the ancient spirit of Great
Britain is dead, or that her resources are weakened, or her
population less determined than ever it was to maintain the
rights and honour of its flag, they make a mistake which can
only end in a disastrous conflagration."
Simultaneously quiet but effective steps were taken to put the defences
of the United Kingdom in order, and to prepare the fleet for any
emergency.
In the end the French Government, seeing that England was in earnest,
made up its mind to retire from an untenable position. The good news was
appropriately communicated to the nation by Lord Salisbury on November
4th at the Lord Mayor's dinner to the Sirdar, and gave general
satisfaction.
Shortly after, Marchand and his force returned to France, and an
incident which had seriously threatened the good relations existing
between England and France came to an end.
Whilst the Sirdar was making his excursion to Fashoda, General Hunter,
accompanied by a small force, proceeded up the Blue Nile. Here he met no
Abyssinian Marchand disguised as an "envoy of civilization," and
returned without having encountered any serious opposition from the
tribes along the river.
Notwithstanding the blow suffered by the Mahdist cause at Omdurman,
there was still some fighting to be done in another quarter. This time
the scene of operations was in the neighbourhood of Gedaref, about 130
miles south-west of Kassala and 180 from the Blue Nile. This place had,
previously to the fall of Omdurman, been held by an emir called Ahmed
Fedil with upwards of 5,000 men.
Ahmed, with the object of assisting the Khalifa, had withdrawn the
greater part of his force from Gedaref, and on the 7th September,
Colonel Parsons started from Kassala with 1,300 men composed of the
16th Egyptian Battalion and some irregulars to dislodge the garrison
remaining at Gedaref.
On the 22nd Parsons arrived in front of the place, and, after defeating
some 3,000 Dervishes, succeeded in occupying it. The fight was severe,
the Egyptian losses being no less than thirty-seven killed and
fifty-seven wounded. Meanwhile Ahmed Fedil, who had failed to reach
Omdurman, was making his way back towards Gedaref, where, on the 28th,
he turned up with 3,500 men. He made a determined assault on the town,
but his Dervishes were defeated by Parsons with heavy loss. On the 1st
October they withdrew to some distance, and the Egyptian force not being
strong enough to pursue, occupied themselves in strengthening their
defences.
General Rundle was then sent up the river to Parsons' assistance. Rundle
reached Abu Harras, on the Blue Nile, whence Colonel Collinson, with the
12th Battalion, started across the desert and joined Parsons just in
time to see Fedil's forces in full retreat in the direction of the
river. At Rosiéres they found Colonel Lewis, who had been for several
weeks on the look-out to intercept Fedil's crossing. A severe fight
ensued between the Dervishes and the 10th Battalion under Lewis, aided
by some of the gunboats told off to patrol the river. Many of Fedil's
force were killed and many more surrendered. Out of Lewis's 400
soldiers, no fewer than 159 were either killed or wounded. The enemy
were utterly routed, but Fedil succeeded in crossing the river with a
few of his followers. Several days later he passed over the White Nile
and joined the Khalifa in Kordofan.
The action at Rosiéres was the last fight of the campaign of 1898 which
the Sirdar had so successfully carried on against the Mahdists.
If there is one thing more remarkable than another in the campaign, it
is the excellent administration by the Sirdar of the force under his
command. The construction of the railway, the management of the
commissariat, the slow, sure, and irresistible advance, and the
avoidance of accidents or reverses--all these constituted a triumph of
administration. The manner in which the transport of the largest force
ever sent into the Soudan under civilized conditions was effected will
bear comparison with any campaign in modern times.
Another important feature was the comparatively small cost. According to
Lord Cromer's report of the 26th February, 1899, the total expense from
the spring of 1896, when the expedition to Dongola was decided upon,
till the close of the operations in the Soudan, was only £E2,354,354.
This included the construction of no less than 760 miles of railway at a
cost of £E1,181,372, of 2,000 miles of telegraphs at a cost of £E21,825,
and the building of six gunboats at an expense of £E154,934, thus
leaving the military expenditure only £E996,223.
Whilst giving Lord Kitchener the fullest credit for the success
achieved, it would be unjust not to refer to the powerful and steady
support which in his task he received throughout from England's
representative in Egypt, Lord Cromer, who, happily combining in himself
the qualities of a soldier and a diplomat, was in a position to give
most valuable advice in either capacity.[178]