FROM THE NILE TO THE ATBARA.
At the beginning of the year 1898, the position of the opposing forces
was somewhat as follows:--The Khalifa's principal army, numbering
upwards of 40,000 men, remained concentrated at Omdurman. Mahmoud, who
had by this time been joined by Osman Digna, was still holding Metammeh
with a force which had been increased to 20,000 men.
The Egyptian army was occupying Berber, with its most advanced post at
Ed Damer. Abu Hamid, Merawi, Dongola, and all the other various
positions along the line of communication down the river, were also held
by Egyptian troops. Military posts had been established between Berber
and Souakim, and Kassala was garrisoned by an Egyptian battalion and the
"friendlies" taken over from the Italians. Progress had been made with
the railway communications. The Egyptian line from Cairo had been
extended to Luxor, and the military line across the desert from Wady
Halfa had been brought forward from Abu Hamid to Abu Dis, or nearly a
third of the distance to Berber.
On the last day of the previous year, the Intelligence Department learnt
that Mahmoud, pressed, it was said, by the Khalifa, either to advance
and destroy the Egyptians, or to fall back upon Omdurman, contemplated
moving down the Nile on Berber. The 10,000 highly trained Egyptian
soldiers, whom the Sirdar was able to put in the field, being deemed
insufficiently strong to meet Mahmoud's undisciplined savages, a brigade
of British troops was telegraphed for. In reply, Sir Francis Grenfell,
commanding the Army of Occupation, gave orders on the 2nd January for
the 1st Battalion of the Warwickshire Regiment, from Alexandria, and the
1st Battalions of the Lincolnshire and the Cameron Highlanders, from
Cairo, to proceed up the river at once. The Seaforth Highlanders were
also ordered to Egypt, from Malta. No time was lost in sending forward
the reinforcements, and before the end of the month they had reached
Wady Halfa, with the exception of the Seaforths, which it was intended
to station, in the first instance, at Assouan. Major-General Gatacre, an
officer who had seen much service in Burmah, was despatched from
Aldershot to take command of the British brigade.
Whilst the British troops were finding their way to the front, the Nile
Valley railway from Kermeh was being utilized for the purpose of
bringing down as many of the Egyptian soldiers as could be spared from
the Dongola district to Wady Halfa, whence they were rapidly transported
across the desert by the military railway to Abu Hamid, and thence to
Abu Dis.[161]
To give warning of Mahmoud's advance, the gunboats made frequent
reconnaissances to Shendy and Metammeh, and parties of "friendlies" also
patrolled the river banks above Ed-Damer, and the adjacent desert. The
Dervishes, on their part, were not wholly inactive, and occasionally
indulged in a little raiding, as opportunities offered.
On the 10th February, Mahmoud, probably considering that if he were to
advance at all, he should do so before the Egyptian force was
strengthened by the arrival of the British soldiers, commenced to move
his army across the Nile to Shendy preparatory to marching them to
attack Berber. The Dervishes having only a few native boats and some
hurriedly constructed rafts as a means of transport, the crossing
occupied an entire fortnight. During this period, Commander Keppel, with
two gunboats, steamed to Metammeh, and on one occasion dispersed with
his Maxims a party of riflemen stationed to cover the crossing. No
serious attempt, however, was made to oppose the movement of Mahmoud's
force across the river, and by the 25th February the operation was
completed. Apparently a great opportunity was thus lost. With the
absolute command of the river which the Egyptians possessed in the
gunboat flotilla, nothing would have been easier than to have taken
advantage of the moment when Mahmoud's army was divided into two
sections by the Nile, to fall upon and destroy each section separately.
That something of the kind was not attempted has been explained on the
supposition that it formed part of the Sirdar's strategy to encourage
Mahmoud to leave his fortified position at Metammeh, and attack the
Egyptians on open ground.
Thanks to the facilities afforded by the railway, Gatacre's British
brigade was, by this time, getting well forward. In the middle of
February, the Warwicks, Lincolns, and Camerons were all assembled at Abu
Dis, where they went into camp for some weeks. During this period,
everything was done to get the men into good condition by means of route
marching and field exercises. Following the precedent established by
Lord Wolseley in previous campaigns, the most rigid abstinence in the
matter of alcohol was enforced, even the use of the harmless and
comforting beer being forbidden.[162] The result was that the men were
in excellent condition, and, as Gatacre in one of his addresses to the
soldiers told them, "there was an almost total absence of crime, and, he
might say, of drunkenness also," the latter observation provoking roars
of laughter.
The brigade was armed with the Lee-Metford magazine rifle. This weapon,
though possessing great range and penetrating power, had, by reason of
its small diameter (·303), the disadvantage of making so small a hole as
to render it more than doubtful if it would be effectual in stopping the
headlong rush which forms the principal feature of a Dervish attack. To
remedy this defect, the tips of the bullets were scooped out at the
pointed end to the depth of about half an inch. Experiments showed that
a bullet treated in this manner expands like an umbrella on striking an
object, and thus makes a sufficiently large hole for the purpose
required. Whilst in camp at Abu Dis, details from each regiment were
told off to conduct this operation, and over a million of bullets were
subjected to this treatment. The result was that a thoroughly effective
missile, appropriately named a "man-stopper," was created.
Curiously enough, at the moment when General Gatacre was preparing his
dum-dum bullets for use against the Dervishes General Kitchener decided
to discontinue the use of the dumb-dumb missiles which he had been
employing against the correspondents of the press. These weapons, which
were equally "man-stoppers," were in the form of general orders by which
correspondents were forbidden to go beyond that ever-changing point
known as "rail head." As "rail head" was necessarily always somewhat in
the rear of the operations, the prohibition was considered a great
hardship, as it curtailed the power of the correspondents to send the
earliest intelligence of what was going on at the front. A great
agitation was made in the English journals at the time, and before
further operations were proceeded with the Sirdar modified the
restrictions within certain reasonable limits. The prohibition
thenceforth extended only to going out on reconnaissances, to going near
the Sirdar, not in itself a serious privation considering the past
friction between him and the pressmen, and to standing in front of the
firing line during general actions. This last, however, was, according
to one writer, Mr. G. W. Steevens, the author of "With Kitchener to
Khartoum," not strictly insisted upon.
Space does not allow of entering into the merits of the controversy on
the subject of the relations between newspaper correspondents and
military authorities. At the same time it may be observed that a general
who puts unnecessary obstacles in the way of the press, or exercises too
rigid a censorship, always lays himself open to the remark that, like
Cæsar, he prefers to write his own "Commentaries."
On the 25th February, when Mahmoud had completed his crossing to the
east bank, General Gatacre received orders to proceed at once with his
brigade to Berber. The orders reached him after the troops had been out
all day exercising in the desert. Nevertheless, tents were at once
struck, and the same evening the advance began. As far as "rail head,"
now at Sheriek, the men were transported by train, after which they
proceeded on foot, and marching partly by night and partly by day, on
the 2nd March they reached Berber, where, in the absence of the Sirdar
at Wady Halfa, General Hunter had his head-quarters with two Egyptian
brigades.
[Illustration: MAP OF THE NILE and ATBARA]
On the British soldiers reaching Berber, the Soudanese battalions turned
out in force, and gave Gatacre's men an enthusiastic reception. The next
day the Egyptian massed bands played the new arrivals well on their way
to their camp at Debeker, ten miles south of Berber.
The only things which gave out during the march were the regulation
boots. Whether from inferior workmanship, or the effect of climate, the
stitching failed, and the soles came off in great numbers. Two hundred
of the men fell out from footsores, and many of the remainder had to
tramp along to their destination barefooted.
On the 10th March the Sirdar arrived at Debeker, and inspected the
troops, which, two days later, moved camp into a healthier spot at
Darmali.
On the 13th news was received that Mahmoud, leaving a garrison at Ben
Naga in charge of his stores, had quitted Shendy the day before, and,
after engaging Keppel's gunboats en route, had descended the Nile as far
as Aliab, midway between Shendy and Berber.
All doubts as to his intentions being now at rest, a general advance of
the Sirdar's army was ordered to be made to Kenur, a deserted village
about ten miles north of the Atbara. One Egyptian battalion was left to
guard the store depôt at Berber, and a half battalion was placed in
charge of the railway, by this time advanced to Geneinetti, twenty miles
north of Berber.
The British troops at Darmali, on getting orders, at once set out, and
marching amid intense heat and over trying ground, reached Kenur on the
night of the 15th. On the following day they were joined by the
Seaforths, which had been sent forward from Wady Halfa to Geneinetti by
rail and thence by steamer. The Egyptian troops had been advancing
meanwhile, and, with the exception of Lewis's brigade, the entire
Anglo-Egyptian force was concentrated at Kenur on the 16th.
On the 19th March, Mahmoud with his whole army quitted Aliab, and
started across the desert in an easterly direction towards the river
Atbara. His intention was known to be to ford the river near a place
called Hudi and then, after turning the Sirdar's left, to operate
against Berber from the desert.
On the intelligence being received, it was determined to intercept, if
possible, the Dervish forces, and the 20th saw the Anglo-Egyptian army
on the march to Hudi, where, on its arrival, it was joined by the 3rd
(Lewis's) Brigade, which had just come from Fort Atbara, a strongly
fortified post at the confluence of the Nile and Atbara rivers.
The total force with the Sirdar now amounted to about 13,000 men. It was
composed of four infantry brigades, 800 cavalry, and four batteries of
artillery with ten Maxims.
The British brigade, under Major-General Gatacre, consisted of the 1st
Battalions of the following regiments: The Warwickshire (Colonel
Quayle-Jones), Lincolnshire (Colonel Verner), Camerons (Colonel Money),
and the Seaforth Highlanders (Colonel Murray). The Egyptian brigades
were the 1st, under Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, formed by the 8th, 12th,
13th, and 14th Battalions; the 2nd, under Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald,
consisting of the 2nd, 9th, 10th, and 11th Battalions; and the 3rd,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis, composed of the 3rd, 4th, 7th, and 15th
Battalions. To each of the four brigades an Egyptian battery of
artillery was attached. The mounted troops consisted of eight squadrons
of Egyptian cavalry, with Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Broadwood.
The Atbara at Hudi was at this season a narrow stream of clear water
flowing slowly down a sandy valley, about a quarter of a mile wide, with
steep banks covered with bush and Halfa grass. From Hudi the cavalry,
with some Maxims under Colonel Broadwood, went forward to search for the
enemy, whilst the remainder of the troops, after forming a zeriba from
the surrounding mimosa bushes, bivouacked for the night. Each man lay
down on the bare ground fully dressed with his arms and equipments
beside him. The night, passed in the open air, was bitterly cold, and
the dust permeated everything.
On the same day (the 20th) that the Sirdar's army encamped at Hudi, on
the north side of the Atbara, Mahmoud and his followers crossed the
river from the south side near Nakhila, some thirty miles further up.
Here he established himself, and commenced intrenching his position.
On the 21st, the Sirdar's troops marched further up the Atbara,
eventually halting at a spot marked in the maps "Ras-el-Hudi," where
they were destined to remain for several days. The Sirdar thus placed
his force directly between the Dervish leader and Berber, effectually
frustrating the intended move in that direction. There were no houses,
huts, or habitations at Ras-el-Hudi, which derives its name from its
geographical position, the Arabic word "Ras" meaning "head." It was a
pretty spot, green and fertile at this time of the year.
The Atbara here no longer flowed, but was represented only by a series
of isolated pools of water, in which fish and an occasional crocodile
were to be seen. A zeriba was at once made, and the camp generally put
in a state of defence.[163]
Whilst the main body of the Sirdar's force was advancing, the Egyptian
cavalry under Colonel Broadwood, with the Horse Artillery and Maxims,
pushed on as far as Abadar on the 22nd, and here the enemy were found in
force. They consisted principally of Baggara horsemen, who charged with
great gallantry a squadron of cavalry, under Captain the Hon. C. Baring,
who had to fall back upon his supports.
Mahmoud's position having been by this time pretty well ascertained, a
force consisting of a squadron of cavalry, with a battalion of infantry
and Maxims in support, was sent on the following day, under the command
of Major Collinson, to tempt the Dervish leader to come out. When the
party had advanced about six miles in the direction of the enemy's camp,
the cavalry met and opened fire upon a force of 300 or 400 Baggara
horsemen who attempted to surround them. The cavalry, however, managed
to get away, and fell back upon the infantry now formed up in square,
which, with rifle and Maxim fire, eventually forced the Baggara to
withdraw. The party then returned to the camp.
As already stated, Mahmoud had left a garrison close to Shendy, to
enable him to keep up his communications with Omdurman, and as a guard
for his depôt. On the 25th March, the Sirdar detached one of his
battalions, and sent it by Commander Keppel's steamers to take the
position, capture the stores, and destroy Shendy. The expedition steamed
past the last-named place to the depôt at Horh Ben Naga, and, on the
following morning, disembarked the soldiers, who, encountering little
resistance, drove out the Baggara garrison of 700 men, with a loss of
150 killed, seized the stores, and captured a large number of prisoners,
including 650 women and children. Shendy was found to be in ruins. Such
men as it contained gave themselves up. The forts were destroyed, and
the place set fire to. The gunboats pursued the fugitives up to the foot
of the Sixth Cataract, and then returned and re-embarked the soldiers,
together with the booty, consisting of great quantities of grain,
camels, donkeys, arms, and ammunition.
A reconnaissance made on the 30th March showed that Mahmoud occupied a
strongly intrenched position, surrounded by brushwood, at Nakheila, on
the north bank of the river, now quite dry, with his front towards the
desert, and protected by a thorn zeriba running from his left, at right
angles to the river, away to his extreme right. Deserters, who now came
in daily, reported that Mahmoud was in great straits for food, his men
existing principally on the nuts of the dôm palm, on cooked cabbage
palms, and such other vegetables as could be found in the bush. Most of
his warriors were disaffected, and were only prevented by strong
measures from deserting _en masse_.
The Dervish chief was in a dilemma whilst the Sirdar was in front of
him; the projected move on Berber was impossible. On the other hand, the
reports received of the strength of the Anglo-Egyptian force convinced
him that to move out into the open and attack would be simply to court
destruction. To leave the shelter of his intrenchments, and retire on
Omdurman, was not only a hazardous operation, but one which must result
in the demoralization and desertion of his followers. Even if he
succeeded in reaching Omdurman, Mahmoud may well have had misgivings as
to the nature of the reception that he would meet with at the hands of
the Khalifa. Under these circumstances, he decided that there was
nothing for it but to remain where he was, and trust to the strength of
his position to repel any attack the Sirdar might make.
This was not at all what the Sirdar wished for. It would have suited him
much better to be attacked in the open desert, where his superior rifle
and artillery fire would give him an immense advantage, than to have to
attack Mahmoud in his zeriba in the bush, amid endless intrenchments and
unknown obstructions. On the other hand, it was clear that something
must be done. The Anglo-Egyptian force could not sit down for ever
watching Mahmoud at a distance of only twenty miles. The difficulty of
supplying 13,000 men by camel transport only was immense. The British
troops, too, were beginning to suffer from the heat, inferior food, and
inadequate shelter, and dysentery and enteric fever began to break out.
Realizing all this, the Sirdar determined on a general advance, and on
the 4th of April struck his camp at Ras-el-Hudi, and moved up the river
to Abadar. Though this as a camping place much resembled the last, the
troops, who had got tired of Ras-el-Hudi, with its endless sand storms
and discomforts, rejoiced at the change, and the more so because it
appeared to indicate fighting.
On the 5th, a final effort to draw Mahmoud was made. At daybreak General
Hunter went out with eight squadrons of cavalry, eight Maxims, and a
battery of horse artillery. When about 1,000 yards from the front of the
enemy's position, the troops halted, and Hunter, with a few of his
officers, went forward to obtain a nearer view.
The Dervishes showed themselves in no mood to be trifled with, and soon
gave Hunter as much fighting as he wanted, for, at 9 a.m., two large
bodies of Baggara horsemen came out of the bush right and left from the
enemy's zeriba, and directed their efforts to getting round the flanks
of the cavalry, whilst a third party fiercely charged them in front.
Hunter, to avoid being cut off, had to gallop back to the main body, now
engaged in repelling the attack.
In this they were assisted by the guns and Maxims on the left of the
cavalry, and after a sharp struggle, in which the officers had to use
their swords and revolvers, the Dervish onslaught was repulsed. A large
body of footmen then streamed forth from Mahmoud's zeriba, and Hunter's
force found it necessary to retreat to avoid being surrounded. As the
cavalry fell back their retiring movement was covered by the Maxims,
which continued firing, and practically saved the situation. The Dervish
horsemen still followed, and pressed the rear and flanks of the
retreating Egyptians, who more than once had to turn and charge to
lessen the pressure. When this had been effected, the retreat was
continued more deliberately, two squadrons from time to time
dismounting, and with their carbines keeping the foe in check, whilst
other squadrons took up a position one or two hundred yards in the
rear. At last, about 10 a.m., a combined charge of cavalry, headed by
Colonel Broadwood, drove back the assailants, and both the opposing
forces withdrew at 1 p.m. The Egyptian troops, without being further
molested, got back to camp, where, the sound of the cannonading having
been heard, the army had turned out ready for action.
The Egyptian loss in the fight was not heavy, being only eight men
killed and fourteen wounded. The Dervish loss was put as high as 200.
This, however, was only an estimate, as the retreating Egyptians did not
stop to count the slain. At the same time, as the Maxims fired 6,000
rounds, it seems only reasonable to suppose that someone was hit.
Although the engagement on the 5th showed that Mahmoud meant fighting,
it indicated that, so far as related to moving his army out into the
open to be destroyed, he was still a "conscientious objector," and, with
a view to attacking him in his position, the forward movement of the
Sirdar's army was resumed on the 6th April, when the troops brought up
at the deserted village of Umdabbia, seven and a half miles from the
Dervish camp. Here they remained for two days, whilst the final
preparations for the attack were made.
At 5 p.m. on the 7th, after the stores and all superfluous baggage had
been left in camp in charge of a half battalion of Egyptian infantry,
the rest of the troops marched out into the desert. They moved in
echelon, with the British brigade in front. Behind them was Macdonald's
brigade; then came Lewis's brigade and the Camel Corps, Maxwell's
brigade bringing up the rear. The route selected was parallel to the
river, and over broken ground and desert sand. Although when night fell
there was a bright moon, the sand, driven by a strong wind, obscured the
view a good deal, and frequent halts had to be made to preserve the
formation. When, after marching for three hours, a spot called Mutrus,
three miles distant from the enemy, was reached, a halt was ordered, and
the men, lying down in the desert, rested.