ADVANCE TO KORTI.
Meanwhile disquieting rumours with regard to Gordon had reached Cairo,
and Sir Evelyn Baring telegraphed to Lord Wolseley on November 3rd,
asking him whether he had any reason to believe that there was any
foundation for the reports which had been current in Cairo for the last
few days, that Khartoum had been taken, and that Gordon was a prisoner.
Lord Wolseley telegraphed from Dongola the same day to the following
effect:--
"Major Kitchener telegraphs to Sir C. Wilson that he has seen a
man named Ibrahim Wad-Beel, who recently came from the Arabs
some distance south. He said all was quiet, and when Gordon
received our messenger, he fired a salute, and held a parade of
troops. A second telegram from Major Kitchener, dated November
3, announces that Haji Abdallah had arrived, and stated that a
man from Shendy reported that the Mahdi came with a strong force
to Omdurman and asked General Gordon to surrender. General
Gordon replied that he would hold Khartoum for years."
The information as to the position of Khartoum up to this date was as
follows:--
On the 8th October a letter had reached Cairo from M. Herbin, the French
Consular Agent at Khartoum. It was as follows:--
"_Khartoum, July 29, 1884._
"We are in a strong position at Khartoum. No need for alarm,
unless it be the want of provisions (in two months our
provisions will be exhausted). There is abundance of
ammunition. The least assistance would enable us to relieve the
town. If at the moment of eating our last biscuit we were to
attempt to retire in a body northwards, the retreat could only
be effected at the cost of immense exertions and dangers (the
means of transport are wanting). Besides this, the people would
rise to a man to pillage the convoy. A few determined men might
attempt to escape southwards to the Equator, but it would be
necessary to abandon most of our soldiers, and all the women
and children. Gordon Pasha has decided that he will share the
fate of the town, and I think it my duty to share that of the
few Frenchmen shut up here. Except for unforeseen
circumstances, you can even now foresee what will happen."
On October 31st Sir E. Baring had received a telegram stating that an
Arab of the Kababish tribe had brought the news that the Mahdi's troops
had attacked Gordon's force at Omdurman opposite Khartoum, a few days
before, but the attack was repulsed. In a telegram dated Debbeh,
November 2nd, a correspondent gave the following additional news:--
"Gordon attacked the rebels at Omdurman with a flotilla of
twelve vessels, including steamers. For eight hours the
engagement lasted. There were 25,000 rebels, and they had four
Krupp guns. One gun burst. They retreated, leaving enormous
numbers of dead behind them. The fugitives retired to Markeat,
but were returning with an additional force."
On the 1st November, Sir E. Baring had received communications from
Gordon to the effect that on the date they were sent off, viz., 13th
July, Khartoum was "all right and could hold out for four months."
The next letter received from Gordon appears to have been the following.
Though dated in August, it was not received till the 23rd November.
It was as follows:--
"_General Gordon to Sir E. Baring._
"_Khartoum, August 5, 1884._
"We are sending up steamers to Senaar, on Blue Nile, to open
route. Arabs have left our vicinity in nearly all directions.
When steamers come back we hope to recapture Berber by
surprise, to place garrison in it, and Stewart and Power will
descend Nile to Dongola and communicate with you. The garrison
of Berber (to which I shall give provisions for three months)
will be the Egyptian troops from this place; and I also shall
make the foreign Consuls go down to Berber. I can look after
security of Berber for two months, after which time I cannot be
longer responsible for it, and you must relieve it from
Dongola, or let the garrison perish and Berber be again taken
by Arabs. You will dislike this arrangement, perhaps, but I
have no option; and it would entail no risks to you, seeing
that Berber will be held during your advance.
"All well here, and troops elated at the result of their recent
victories."
Notwithstanding every effort to get the troops up the river as rapidly
as possible, so many difficulties intervened that the task occupied much
longer than had been anticipated. Early in November Wolseley telegraphed
that, owing to steamers breaking down, difficult coaling, and scarcity
of native labour, he did not expect to concentrate his force at Ambukol,
on the Nile just above Old Dongola, until the end of the year.
The necessity for pushing forward with all possible despatch was made
clear to Wolseley by a letter of much later date, received from Gordon
on the 17th November, saying that he could hold out for forty days with
ease, but that after that time it would be difficult. The following is
an extract:--
"_Khartoum, 4th November, 1884._
"Post came in yesterday from Debbeh, Kitchener, dated 14th
October, cypher letter from Lord Wolseley, 20th September last,
which I cannot decipher, for Colonel Stewart took the cypher
with him. No other communications have been received here since
31st, letter which arrived a week after Stewart's steamer left
this.
"At Metammeh, waiting your orders, are five steamers with nine
guns. We can hold out forty days with ease; after that it will
be difficult. Terrible about loss of steamer. I sent Stewart,
Power, and Herbin down, telling them to give you all
information. With Stewart was the journal of all events from
1st March to the 10th September. The steamer carried a gun and
had a good force on board.
"Since 10th March we have had up to date, exclusive of
Kitchener's 14th October, only two despatches; one, Dongola,
with no date; one from Souakim, 5th May; one of same import,
27th April. I have sent out a crowd of messengers in all
directions during eight months. I should take the road from
Ambukol to Metammeh, where my steamers wait for you. Leontides,
Greek Consul-General, Hanswell, Austrian Consul, all right.
Stewart, Power, and Herbin went down in the _Abbas_. Your
expedition is for relief of garrison, which I failed to
accomplish. I decline to agree that it is for me personally.
You may not know what has passed here. The Arabs camped outside
Khartoum on the 12th March; we attacked them on the 16th March,
got defeated and lost heavily, also a gun. We then from that
date had continual skirmishes with Arabs.
* * * * *
"The soldiers are only half a-month in arrears. We issue paper
money, and also all the cloth in magazines. All the captives
with the Mahdi are well. The nuns, to avoid an Arab marriage,
are ostensibly married to Greeks. Slatin is with Mahdi, and has
all his property, and is well treated; but I hear to-day he is
in chains.
"A mysterious Frenchman[105] is with Mahdi, who came from
Dongola. We have got a decoration made and distributed, with a
grenade in the centre; three classes--gold, silver, pewter.
Kitchener says he has sent letters and got none in reply. I
have sent out during last month at least ten. Steamer with this
leaves to-morrow for Metammeh. Do not let any Egyptian soldiers
come up here; take command of steamers direct, and turn out
Egyptian fellaheen. If capture of steamer with Stewart is
corroborated, tell French Consul-General that Mahdi has the
cypher he gave Herbin. Hassen Effendi, telegraph clerk, was
with Stewart. You should send a party to the place to
investigate affairs and take the steamer."
On the 15th November, Lord Hartington telegraphed to Lord Wolseley to
know how the information in Gordon's letter affected his plans. In
reply, his Lordship, who had gone back to Wady Halfa, to hurry forward
the expedition, stated that Gordon's letter made no change in his plans,
but that it seemed to indicate the almost impossibility of Gordon's
relief without fighting, adding that he, Wolseley, had sent Gordon the
following message:--"Wady Halfa, November 17, 1884. Yours of 4th inst.
received 17th; the first I have had from you. I shall be at Kasr Dongola
in four days."
A few days later an Arab merchant who arrived at Dongola from Khartoum
_viâ_ Shendy and Ambukol, and who had come by the desert route, stated
that both water and fodder were plentiful. This news was confirmed by a
messenger who returned to Dongola from Khartoum on the 19th November.
On the 28th a messenger sent by Gordon arrived at Dongola with a letter
addressed to the Khedive, Nubar Pasha, and Baring, in cypher, and dated
as far back as the 9th September. The letter began:--
"There is money and provisions in Khartoum for four months,
after which we shall be embarrassed."
A telegram from Gordon to Sir E. Baring and Nubar Pasha, undated, but
received 29th November, gave the following details:--
"Seeing now that the Nile is high, and steamers can go as far as
Berber, I have formed an expedition of 2,000 men of the Khartoum
garrison, which will proceed by steamers in order to rescue the
Mudirieh of Berber from the hands of the rebels. After its
recovery this force will remain at Berber with food for two
months only, and if in that time the relieving army does not
reach Berber in order to reinforce it, the Nile will have fallen
and the islands will be dry, and the same result will ensue as
before. Therefore it is to be hoped that the necessary troops
will be sent to seize the Ghesireh of Berber while the Nile is
high; and Stewart is going down in the small steamer, the
_Abbas_, to proceed to Dongola by way of Berber, in order to
communicate (with you) on the Soudan question."
On the 29th November a messenger who had been despatched with a letter
to Gordon, but had been taken prisoner not far from Khartoum, and had
subsequently made his escape, came into camp. He reported that the
Mahdi's troops were suffering from disease, food was very dear, the
Arabs were deserting, but the Kordofan men were faithful to him; that
Gordon sent to the Mahdi, inviting him, if he were the real Mahdi, to
dry up the Nile and cross over; that five hundred regulars recently went
over to Gordon; that the regulars still with the Mahdi were
discontented; that on the 14th he saw an attack made on Khartoum between
the Blue and White Niles; that it was repulsed, and the Mahdi, who was
looking on, was very angry because it had been made without his orders.
Aware that time was of paramount importance, Wolseley, in order to
stimulate his men to exertion, offered a prize of £100 to the battalion
which should make the quickest passage from Sarras to Debbeh, twenty
miles further up the river, a measure which was much criticized by a
portion of the British Press.[106]
Wolseley now gave orders for the formation of a small naval brigade, to
be commanded by Lord Charles Beresford, his naval aide-de-camp.[107]
On the 23rd November, some cases of smallpox having occurred at Dongola,
Sir Herbert Stewart started to select another camping-ground at Debbeh,
a little further up the river.
All the remaining troops destined to take part in the expedition reached
Wady Halfa by the end of November, with the exception of the 1st
battalion of the Cameron Highlanders, which remained at Korosko.
The advance in force from Dongola commenced on the 2nd December, from
which date the troops as they arrived were moved on beyond Debbeh to
Ambukol, where a depôt for supplies had been formed and placed in charge
of Stewart. The head-quarters were established at the latter place on
the 12th December. From Ambukol the force was moved a few miles further
up the river to Korti, a much healthier spot.
Sir Herbert Stewart, with the Mounted Infantry and Guards' Camel Corps,
reached Korti on the 15th December, after a march along the east bank of
the Nile.
Wolseley's arrival at Korti on the 16th was followed by that of the
South Staffordshire Regiment. The last companies of the South
Staffordshire, with part of the Sussex Regiment, reached the front on
the 22nd, and they were speedily followed by other detachments. The
Light Camel Corps, under Colonel M'Calmont, arrived on the 24th, after a
twenty days' march from Wady Halfa, and at the same time the Heavy Camel
Corps came up from Debbeh. General Buller, the Chief of the Staff,
reached the front soon afterwards.
Of the Nile journey Wolseley reported to Lord Hartington, "The English
boats have up to this point fulfilled all my expectations. The men are
in excellent health, fit for any trial of strength, as the result of
constant manual labour."
As a commentary on the above, it may be mentioned that nine out of
sixteen boats which brought up some of the Duke of Cornwall's Regiment
were lost, and the remainder, owing to the slightness of their build,
had to be patched with tin to prevent their sinking--over fifty boats in
all were lost. There can be no doubt as to the "constant manual labour"
mentioned by Lord Wolseley. The men arrived in a deplorable plight, many
of them without either boots or trousers. A more ragged set of soldiers
never arrived at the seat of war. According to one account there was
literally not a sound garment in the whole column, and the men resembled
Falstaff's ragged regiment rather than a body of British troops.
By Christmas Day, a great part of the expeditionary force was
concentrated at Korti.[108]
It now became necessary to decide upon the route to be adopted by the
expeditionary force in order to reach Khartoum. The one important
question to consider was that of time; already the journey up the river
had taken much longer than was expected. The season during which
military operations could be carried on was limited, and if, as had
been intended, the expedition was to return before the hot weather
there was not a day to spare. Moreover, Gordon's latest communications
showed that he was rapidly running short of provisions, and if not
speedily relieved Khartoum must fall.
As a military operation, the route by the Nile offered many advantages,
and had time permitted there is no doubt that Wolseley's whole force
would have gone that way. But the distance to be traversed requiring
months for its accomplishment, rendered it imperative to adopt some
other expedient if Gordon was to be relieved at all. Under these
circumstances, it was determined to divide the expeditionary force into
two columns, one to proceed across the desert to Metammeh, a distance of
185 miles, and thence to Khartoum, and the other to proceed by the river
up the Nile Valley.
Shortly stated, Wolseley's plans for the campaign were as follows:--
1st. By despatching a column across the desert to Metammeh to secure the
shortest passage to Khartoum, and at the same time to hold the wells at
Gakdul and Abu Klea, and to occupy Metammeh whilst communications were
maintained with Gordon.
2nd. By despatching a second column along the Nile Valley to disperse
the rebels around Hamdab, fifty-two miles distant from Korti, to punish
the Monassir tribes for the murder of Colonel Stewart, to leave Berti in
safety, to rid Abu Hamid of the enemy, and to open up the desert route
from thence to Korosko, whence stores and ammunition for an attack on
Berber would be forwarded. Thus covering a great bend of the Nile, the
column would operate on Berber, dislodge the rebels there, and join
hands with the other column on the banks of the Nile at Metammeh.
In a letter to the Secretary at War, Wolseley gives the reasons for
adopting the above plan of operations in the following words:--
"I had always thought it possible that upon arrival here I might
find it necessary to operate beyond this point in two
columns--one continuing up the river in our English-built boats,
while the other pushed rapidly across the desert to Metammeh,
and it was with the view of securing to myself the power of
moving across this desert that I proposed the formation of a
Camel Brigade.
"Any march across this desert with a small column, as an
isolated operation, would be hazardous, and for the purpose of
my mission a most useless undertaking. Such a column would most
probably be able to fight its way into Khartoum; possibly it
might fight its way out again; but it could never bring away
General Gordon and his garrison in safety. Undertaken, however,
under present circumstances, the march of a small force across
this desert presents a very different aspect. The so-called
Mahdi and his supporters are well aware that they have to deal
not only with it, but also with the English army, which they
know is advancing up the Nile on Khartoum by Abu Hamid and
Berber. Upon arrival here I had to decide whether I should keep
all my force together and follow the Nile Valley to Khartoum,
or to divide it into two columns--one following the river,
while the other was pushed rapidly across to Metammeh.
"If I were not restricted by time, the first course would be by
far the most satisfactory, the safest, and would insure the
best results; but I know that General Gordon is pressed by want
of food, and the hot season is not far off, when military
operations in this country are trying to the health of European
soldiers. I therefore decided upon the last-mentioned course."
The first, or Desert column, was placed under the command of Sir Herbert
Stewart, and consisted of men mainly belonging to different sections of
the Camel Corps; a company of the Royal Engineers, part of the 19th
Hussars, and detachments of the Commissariat and Medical Corps. The
force was to be accompanied by 2,000 camels for the purposes of
transport. Sir Charles Wilson was to proceed with Stewart, and to the
former was allotted the task of opening up communication with Gordon
when once the Nile should be struck at Metammeh.
Lord Charles Beresford and a small body of seamen were told off to
accompany the force, to take possession of any of Gordon's steamers
which might be found at Metammeh. A detachment of infantry was to
proceed to Khartoum by the steamers, and Sir Charles Wilson was
empowered on entering Khartoum to march his men through the city to show
the people that British troops were at hand, but he was directed only to
stay long enough to confer with Gordon.
The Nile column was placed under Major-General Earle, and consisted of
the Staffordshire and Duke of Cornwall's Regiments, the Black Watch, the
Gordon Highlanders, a squadron of the 19th Hussars, a battery of
Egyptian Artillery, an Egyptian Camel Corps, and the auxiliary native
troops of the Mudir of Dongola. The whole, with transport, numbered
about 3,000 men.