THE GORDON RELIEF EXPEDITION.
Gordon's situation at Khartoum in the meantime may be learned from what
follows.
On the 27th February, 1884, he issued a Proclamation to the inhabitants
of the Soudan, stating that he would be compelled to use severe measures
against those who did not desist from rebellion, and also that "British
troops are now on their way, and in a few days will reach Khartoum."
In a despatch, on the same day, to Sir E. Baring, Gordon said:--
"You must remember that when evacuation is carried out the Mahdi
will come down here, and by agents will not let Egypt be quiet.
Of course my duty is evacuation, and to do the best I can for
establishing a quiet government. The first I hope to accomplish.
The second is a more difficult task, and with care and time can
be accomplished. Remember that once Khartoum belongs to the
Mahdi, the task will be more difficult.
"If you decide on smashing Mahdi, then send up another,
£100,000, and send up 200 infantry troops to Wady Halfa, and an
officer to Dongola under pretence to look out quarters for
troops. Leave Souakim and Massowah alone. I repeat that
evacuation is possible, but you will feel the effect in Egypt
and be forced to enter into a far more serious affair to guard
Egypt."
While Gordon was sending almost daily expressions of his view as to the
only way of carrying out the policy of eventual evacuation, it was
becoming clear to him that he would very soon be cut off from the rest
of Egypt. His first remark on this subject was to express "the
conviction that I shall be caught in Khartoum;" and he wrote:--"Even if
I was mean enough to escape, I have no power to do so." The accuracy of
this forecast was speedily demonstrated. Within a few days
communications with Khartoum were interrupted, and although subsequently
restored for a time, the rising of the riparian tribes rendered the
receipt and despatch of messages exceedingly uncertain. On the 8th of
April, however, Gordon succeeded in getting the following message
through to Sir Evelyn Baring:--
"I have telegraphed to Sir Samuel Baker to make an appeal to
British and American millionaires to give me, £300,000 to engage
Turkish troops from the Sultan and send them here. This will
settle the Soudan and the Mahdi for ever. For my part I think
you will agree with me. I do not see the fun of being caught
here to walk about the streets for years as a dervish with
sandalled feet; not that I will ever be taken alive."
Eight days later he wrote as follows:--
"As far as I can understand, the situation is this--You state
your intention of not sending any relief up here or to Berber. I
consider myself free to act according to circumstances. I shall
hold out here as long as I can, and if I can suppress the
rebellion I shall do so. If I cannot I shall retire to the
Equator."
The complete investment or siege of Khartoum may be considered as having
commenced about this time.
When Gordon first began to perceive that he would get no material help
from his Government, he made several propositions which would, if
adopted, have relieved them from further responsibility. As indicated in
the foregoing telegrams, one was to make an appeal to international
philanthropy, and by employing Turkish troops to smash the Mahdi.
Another was that he should steam up the Nile, and taking Bahr Gazelle
and the Equatorial Province in the name of the King of the Belgians,
join hands with Stanley, or whoever else might represent the King, on
the Congo.
While communications were still maintained, Gordon sent his account of
his first action with the rebels, which showed not only the kind of
enemy he had to deal with, but also the sort of men on whom he had to
depend for the defence of Khartoum. On the 17th of March he described in
the following words an action on the previous day:--
"At eight a.m. on the 16th two steamers started for Halfiyeh.
Bashi-Bazouks and some regulars advanced across plain towards
rebels. At ten a.m. the regulars were in square opposite centre
of rebels' position, and Bashi-Bazouks were extended in their
line to their right. A gun with the regulars then opened fire.
Very soon after this a body of about sixty rebel horsemen
charged down a little to the right of centre of the
Bashi-Bazouks' line. The latter fired a volley, then turned and
fled. The horsemen galloped towards the square, which they
immediately broke. The whole force then retreated slowly towards
the fort with their rifles shouldered. The horsemen continued to
ride along the flanks cutting off stragglers. The men made no
effort to stand, and the gun was abandoned, with sixty-three
rounds and fifteen cases of reserve ammunition. The rebels
advanced, and retreat of our men was so rapid that the Arabs on
foot had no chance of attacking. Pursuit ceased about a mile
from stockade, and the men rallied. We brought in the wounded.
Nothing could be more dismal than seeing these horsemen, and
some men even on camels, pursuing close to troops, who, with
arms shouldered, plodded their way back."
In fact, this fight was a massacre, as the Egyptian soldiers did not
attempt the least resistance. Colonel Stewart, who commanded in person,
was wounded. The two Pashas under him were subsequently convicted of
treachery and shot.
On the 25th of June the garrison heard of the fall of Berber. The news
was brought by the English Consul, Mr. Cuzzi, who was sent in by the
rebels to inform Gordon that the one connecting link between him and the
outer world had fallen into the hands of the Mahdi.
Long before the summer of 1884, it was evident that the position of
Gordon at Khartoum had become so critical that, if he were to be rescued
at all, it could only be by the despatch of a British force. As far back
as April 23rd, Earl Granville telegraphed to Mr. Egerton at Cairo,
instructing him to forward a cypher message to Gordon asking what would
"be the force necessary to secure his _removal_, its amount, character,
the route for access to Khartoum, and time of operation."
Early in May, war preparations were commenced in England, and on the
10th of the month the military authorities in Cairo received
instructions to prepare for the despatch in October of an expedition for
the relief of the Soudanese capital. Twelve thousand camels were ordered
to be purchased and held in readiness for a forward march in the autumn.
On the 16th May a half-battalion of English troops was moved up the Nile
to Wady Halfa. A few weeks later some other positions on the Nile were
occupied by portions of the Army of Occupation. Naval officers were also
sent up the river to examine and report upon the cataracts and other
impediments to navigation. Still it was not till the 5th August that Mr.
Gladstone rose in the House of Commons to move a vote of credit of
£300,000 to enable the Government to undertake operations for the relief
of Gordon, "in case it might be necessary."
The Government policy on the subject of Gordon had been repeatedly
attacked in Parliament. On July the 8th Lord Hartington formally
declared to the House of Commons that it was not the intention of the
Government to despatch an expedition for the relief of Gordon, unless it
was clearly shown that such was the only means by which Gordon and those
dependent on him could be relieved. "We have received," added the
Secretary of State for War, "no information making it desirable that we
should depart from that decision." Urged on, however, by the public
press, and plied day after day with questions in the House of Commons,
the Government at last brought forward the vote of credit. The money was
granted, and the War Office then began to take action.
Lord Wolseley had as early as April 8th pressed the Government on the
subject, and on the 24th July he wrote that he thought no time should be
lost in pushing up a small brigade of 3,000 or 4,000 British troops to
Dongola. He believed that such a force would most probably settle the
whole business, adding, "But you must know that time presses. I believe
that such a force could be sent from England and reach Dongola about
October 15th if the Government is in earnest, and acts at once. Remember
we cannot command things, and all the gold in England will not affect
the rise and fall of the Nile, or the duration of the hot and cold
seasons in Egypt.
"Time is a most important element in this question, and indeed it will
be an indelible disgrace if we allow the most generous, patriotic, and
gallant of our public servants to die of want, or fall into the hands of
a cruel enemy, because we would not hold out our hands to save him.
Dongola can be reached without fighting, and our presence there in force
might secure for us all the objects we wish to obtain."
On the 20th July Gordon sent a message asking where the reinforcements
were, and what was their number. On the 30th he announced, "Retreat is
impossible. I recommend as a route for troops Wady Halfa, but fear it is
too late." On the 31st he expressed himself to Sir Evelyn Baring as
follows:--"You ask me to state cause and intention of staying at
Khartoum. I stay at Khartoum because Arabs have shut us up and will not
let us out."
The views of the British Government as to the rescue of Gordon were
communicated by the Marquis of Hartington to General Stephenson,
commanding the Army of Occupation, on the 8th August. The Government,
the former wrote, were not convinced that it would be impossible for
Gordon to secure the withdrawal from Khartoum, either by the employment
of force or by pacific means, of the Egyptian garrisons, and of such of
the inhabitants as might desire to leave. Nevertheless, he added, "Her
Majesty's Government were of opinion that the time had arrived when some
further measures for obtaining accurate information as to his position,
and, if necessary, for rendering him assistance, should be adopted."
As to what "further measures" were to be adopted considerable difference
of opinion existed amongst the advisers of the Government. It was agreed
that there were but two routes by which Khartoum could be approached by
an expedition, one by way of the Nile, and the other _viâ_ Souakim and
Berber, but which of the two presented the least difficulty was a point
upon which the highest authorities differed.
The first involved sending the force a distance of 1,650 miles from its
base at Cairo, by a river in which were innumerable obstacles in the
shape of cataracts, rocks, and shoals. The expedition would have to
proceed against the stream, thus making progress slow, and in boats,
every one of which would have to be specially constructed for the
purpose.
The second necessitated a march from Souakim to Berber of some 280 miles
over a country furnished only with a few wells, the supply from which
might have to be supplemented by water to be carried by the expedition,
in addition to a journey of 200 miles from Berber to Khartoum.
In the last case there was an almost absolute certainty that the march
would have to be made in the face of an opposing force.
General Stephenson, who may be considered as the highest authority on
the subject, was in Cairo, and therefore in a certain sense on the spot.
He had, moreover, the advantage of conferring with Commander Hammill of
the _Monarch_ and other officers, who had for weeks previously been
engaged on the Nile in examining into the facilities for getting
steamers and boats past the cataracts, and other obstacles in the way of
river navigation. His opinion was strongly adverse to the Nile route,
and in favour of that by Souakim and Berber.
Lord Wolseley, however, basing his calculations on the success of the
Red River Expedition, had formed an opposite opinion to that of General
Stephenson, and Lord Wolseley being all-powerful at the War Office, his
views were adopted by the Government.
On the 15th of August Lord Hartington further explained his views of the
measures to be adopted, insisting that the movement must be made by the
Nile Valley, instead of by the Souakim-Berber route, with the sole and
exclusive object of relieving Gordon, adding, "This renders it essential
that, in framing any plans for the movement of troops south of Wady
Halfa, the possibility of being obliged to advance as far as Khartoum
itself should be included in and form a necessary part of such plans."
His Lordship at the same time declared it to be essentially necessary to
provide for the return of the troops before the end of the winter
season.
Lord Hartington telegraphed to Stephenson to report fully as to what he
proposed, and to state the number of the force and of camels which would
be required. On the 21st General Stephenson telegraphed to Lord
Hartington, with the information asked for, adding, "My own opinion
still is in favour of the Souakim-Berber route:--
"Should this be adopted, Egyptian troops should be sent to New
Dongola, consisting of two battalions, one regiment of cavalry,
one battery of artillery; one English battalion retained at Wady
Halfa; half battalion Egyptian, Korosko; and one English and one
and a half battalions Egyptian at Assouan, leaving about 2,000
Egyptians with Marines available for garrisoning Souakim and
line of communication to Berber."
But Lord Hartington was evidently too much impressed by the arguments of
Lord Wolseley to be inclined for further discussion. On the 22nd August
he wrote:--
"I gather from the telegraphic correspondence which I have had
with you since my despatch of the 15th instant that, in acting
on the instructions communicated to you in my despatch of the
8th instant, you have to this date based your preparations on a
scheme of operations which is substantially that sketched out in
the report of Commander Hammill, dated 4th August. I also learn
from your telegram of the 21st instant that, while it is in your
opinion possible by the means indicated in that report to send
the small force described in my despatch of the 8th to New
Dongola, it would not be practicable by those means to push
forward such a force as would in your opinion be required to
reach Khartoum, and to bring it back within the next winter.
Influenced by this consideration, you state that your opinion is
still, if such an operation should be undertaken, in favour of
the Souakim-Berber route. For the reasons stated in my despatch
of the 8th, I am not now prepared to authorize a movement on
that line."
Then came the intimation that Wolseley was to command the expedition.
"To Lieut.-General Stephenson.
"_War Office_, _August 26, 1884_, Midnight.
"After anxious consideration, Her Majesty's Government have
come to the conclusion that it is unjust to you to ask you to
be responsible for directing an operation which, after full
knowledge of the plan, you consider to be impracticable. They
have, therefore, decided to send Lord Wolseley to take
temporarily the chief command in Egypt. Government highly
appreciate the manner in which you have carried out the
important and difficult duties of your command, and earnestly
hope that you may feel yourself able to remain in Egypt while
Lord Wolseley is there, and assist him with your advice."
In making the choice of routes, the one vital question of time seems to
have been insufficiently considered. Gordon was known to be hard
pressed, and the object should have been for the expedition for his
rescue to arrive at its destination with as little delay as possible.
From Souakim to Berber occupied Hicks Pasha less than three weeks, and
from Berber to Khartoum five or six days more; of course, it is not
pretended that a force so large as Wolseley had under his orders could
march nearly as rapidly as Hicks' small detachment. But it may be
argued that assuming that the route by Souakim was _possible_, and of
this there seems no doubt, the relief expedition, even if it had to
fight its way step by step, must eventually have arrived in much less
time than the many months occupied by Wolseley on the river route.