SOUAKIM EXPEDITION, 1884.
The defeat of Baker's force, following, as it did, the annihilation of
Hicks' army, created a most painful impression in England.
The situation was this--two armies led by English commanders and
officered in great measure by Englishmen had been successively
destroyed. Of the garrisons of Sinkat and of Tokar, one was known to
have been sacrificed, and the other might share its fate any day.
Besides this, Souakim itself was seriously threatened.
With regard both to Hicks' and Baker's expeditions the Government was
severely attacked both in and out of Parliament.
Of the character of the force which Baker had assembled at Trinkitat,
the British Ministers had full information. Before it started there was
a consensus of opinion that it was foredoomed. The special correspondent
of the "Daily News" telegraphed on February 1st, 1884, that "Baker
Pasha's force is unequal to the task of the relief of Sinkat, and if the
troops whose chiefs have visited our camp prove faithless, Sinkat will
be lost." The "Standard's" correspondent sent telegrams to the same
effect. On February 1st the "St. James's Gazette" said "there was a very
bad chance for Baker Pasha;" while the "Spectator" declared that "the
chances against the success of the expedition were as three to one." The
"Times" did not think Baker Pasha's enterprise a too hopeful one,
considering the class of men of which his force was composed, and added
"that it would be a calamity if the fate of Hicks' expedition were to be
risked again after a warning so recent and solemn." Opinion amongst
military men, both in Egypt and at home, was to the same effect.
And yet Baker, like Hicks, was allowed to lead his rabble on to
destruction. England, it was true, had declared that it took no
responsibility as regards the despatch of Hicks' army; but England at
the time of both disasters was omnipotent in Egypt. The country, bound
hand and foot, was in the hands of the British Government. Under these
circumstances, to permit was to do. The existence of power involved
responsibility. The Government of the Khedive after the events of 1882
was little more than a shadow. England had only to advise, and Egypt to
obey. Nevertheless, the Egyptian Government was permitted to send forth
two wretchedly equipped expeditions, one to Kordofan and another to
Souakim, both almost inevitably doomed to destruction.
The matter was not rendered more pleasant by the reflection that whilst
Baker was sent with an impossible army to perform what, with his force,
was a hopeless task, a British army capable of accomplishing with ease
all that was wanted remained idle in its barracks at Cairo. The
shortsightedness of British policy was shown by the fact that this very
force had after all to be despatched to accomplish what Baker had failed
in. Unfortunately, however, it was destined, like many other operations
recorded in this work, to be too late.
Public opinion had been especially moved by the news of the fall of
Sinkat and the massacre of its brave defenders, and it was felt that an
effort should be made to save, if possible, the garrison of Tokar from a
similar fate. For this purpose it was decided that a British force
should be sent to Souakim.
The force to be employed was to be chiefly drawn from the Army of
Occupation in Egypt, and General Stephenson was instructed by telegraph
to make the necessary preparations. He was informed that the object of
the expedition was to relieve the Tokar garrison if it could hold out,
and, if not, to take any measures necessary for the safety of the Red
Sea ports. He was to select the three best battalions under his command,
and these, with the Royal Irish Fusiliers (then on their way from
India), the York and Lancaster Regiment from Aden, and a battalion of
Marines, were to form an infantry brigade. The garrison of Alexandria
was to be removed to Cairo while the expedition lasted, and orders were
sent to the fleet to hold Alexandria temporarily. The 10th and 19th
Hussars, the Mounted Infantry, and any trustworthy native horsemen at
Souakim, were to constitute the mounted force. The 19th Hussars were to
be mounted with native horses taken from the Egyptian cavalry under Sir
Evelyn Wood. The baggage was to be on the lowest possible scale, as the
troops were to be back in Cairo in three weeks. Tents were to accompany
the force to Souakim or Trinkitat, as the case might be. The greatest
publicity was to be given to the determination to relieve Tokar by
British soldiers.
Messages were despatched to the garrison at Tokar, urging them to hold
out, as relief was on the way, and the expedition was hurrying forward
with all possible speed.
The command of the expedition was given to Major-General Sir Gerald
Graham, who had led the Second Brigade at Tel-el-Kebir. Generals Davis
and Redvers Buller were to accompany him.
Every effort was made to send off the expedition as early as possible.
The troops from Egypt embarked at Suez and proceeded to Souakim and
Trinkitat. Between the 16th and 18th February the 10th and 19th Hussars,
two batteries of Royal Artillery, the 3rd Battalion of the 60th King's
Royal Rifles, the 42nd Royal Highlanders (Black Watch), the 75th Gordon
Highlanders, the 65th York and Lancaster Regiment, the 89th Royal Irish
Fusiliers, the 26th Company of the Royal Engineers, and 100 Mounted
Infantry left for the scene of operations. Detachments of Marines from
the vessels of the Mediterranean Squadron were also told off to
accompany Graham's force.
The reorganized Egyptian Army under Sir Evelyn Wood was anxious to take
part in the expedition, but the British Government had declined to
sanction this, on the ground that the Egyptian army was expressly raised
for the defence of Egypt proper, excluding the Soudan.
General Graham left Suez with his head-quarters on the 18th February and
proceeded to Souakim.
Meanwhile Admiral Hewett had communicated with Osman Digna and warned
him that a British force was going to relieve Tokar, and at the same
time informed him that the English Government wished to avoid useless
bloodshed, and would not interfere with the tribes if they did not
oppose the expedition. Osman Digna replied that he felt himself obliged
to take Tokar, and must, therefore, fight the English, and the
responsibility for any bloodshed, he added, would rest with the latter.
On the 22nd of February an Egyptian soldier, who escaped from Tokar,
stated that the garrison was then going over to the rebels, and that the
commandant was treating for capitulation on the following day. Spies who
arrived subsequently said that they could not approach Tokar owing to
the presence of rebels in the vicinity, and on the 24th, whilst the
British forces were disembarking at Trinkitat, news was received that
Tokar had already fallen.
As to the precise manner in which this was brought about some little
mystery exists, but so far as can be ascertained the circumstances
attending the fall of Tokar appear to have been as follows. The garrison
had for some time been harassed by a continual fire kept up by the Krupp
guns and rifles in the hands of the rebels. The soldiers were despairing
of relief, and the officers more or less disaffected. The bulk of the
inhabitants were in favour of a surrender. According to some accounts,
the Governor for some while resisted their importunities; according to
others, he was only too willing to hand over the town to the besiegers.
In any case, negotiations were on the 19th opened with them through a
merchant in Tokar, who had been imprisoned by the authorities as a
sympathiser with the Mahdi, and who was now despatched as an emissary
to the rebel camp. The surrender was fixed for the next day. The
emissary returned to Tokar the same evening accompanied by 100 rebels,
who were admitted to the town. One officer and a few soldiers still
wanted to fight, but they were over-ruled by the others, who preferred
ceding the town to Mussulmans rather than to Christians. During the
night such soldiers as remained loyal escaped from the town, and several
of them, journeying by night, made their way to Souakim. The next day
the town was finally surrendered.
There seems to have been no valid reason for giving up Tokar, there
being an abundance of provisions, and 45,000 rounds of ball cartridge
left. Although the town had been shelled and exposed to a heavy rifle
fire for five days, the total loss suffered during the bombardment was
only two men killed and twelve wounded out of a garrison of 300 men. The
rebel force numbered less than 1,000.
Some doubt was at first felt as to the correctness of the news of the
surrender of Tokar. In any case the expedition was now at Trinkitat, and
it was resolved not to countermand it.
On the 26th Graham was instructed that, in the event of Tokar having
fallen, the main object would be to protect Souakim. The next day Mr.
Gladstone stated in Parliament that the Cabinet saw no reason to doubt
the accuracy of the report of the fall of Tokar. Notwithstanding this,
it was decided to continue to push on with Graham's expedition.
The real reason for this decision is not altogether clear. Probably the
truth is that the British Government was unwilling that the preparations
which had been made should be in vain. Possibly, also, it was desired
that the army, being on the spot, should strike a blow at Osman Digna
before coming away. From a despatch sent to Graham on the 24th February
it would seem that the objects to be attained by persevering with the
expedition were to march on El-Teb, to protect any fugitives, and to
bury the English dead, after which it was to return by land to Souakim.
These objects it was still in General Graham's power to attain.
On the 26th, after a preliminary reconnaissance by the Hussars and
Mounted Infantry, the Gordon Highlanders and Royal Irish Fusiliers moved
across the lagoon and took possession of Fort Baker. From early morning
the enemy had shown in considerable numbers in the vicinity of the fort,
but as the troops advanced the former fell back. A number also showed in
force on the ridge nearly two miles distant. Upon the cavalry advancing,
they still held their ground and opened fire at long range; but it being
evident that a yet larger force was still behind the ridge, it was not
considered advisable to charge.
The two succeeding days were occupied in transporting a supply of water
and three days' provisions for the whole army.
On the 27th the enemy massed some two miles off, and numbering about
2,000 strong, kept up continuous firing on the English sentries and
outposts. A last effort was now made to treat with the rebels. Major
Harvey, accompanied by Colonel Burnaby, rode with an escort to the
rising ground two miles distant. Here he planted a white flag with a
letter attached to the staff, enjoining the troops to disperse and to
send delegates to Khartoum to consult with General Gordon as to the
settlement of the Soudan provinces. The enemy maintained continuous
firing at the party, but, after it had withdrawn, took the flag and
letter, but left no reply.
On the afternoon of the 28th Graham and the remainder of the force
proceeded to the fort and bivouacked for the night. Each man carried
seventy rounds. No transport was taken.
The two infantry brigades were disposed as follows:--1st Brigade under
General Redvers Buller--2nd Brigade under General Davis. For transport
there were 600 camels, with 350 mules, and 100 camels for ambulance
work. There was also a camel battery of 80 animals and 100 men.