THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGNS.
THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGNS
1882 TO 1885.
_NEW AND REVISED EDITION,
CONTINUED TO DECEMBER, 1899._
BY
CHARLES ROYLE,
Late of the Royal Navy,
Barrister-at-Law, Judge of the Egyptian Court of Appeal.
ILLUSTRATED BY MAPS AND PLANS.
LONDON
HURST AND BLACKETT, LIMITED
13, GREAT MARLBOROUGH STREET
1900.
_ALL RIGHTS RESERVED_
PREFACE.
In the new and revised Edition of "THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGNS," the history
of the military operations in Egypt has been brought down to the present
time, so as to include all the recent fighting in the Soudan. This has
been accompanied by a slight alteration in the title of the Book, as
well as by the elimination of such details contained in the original
work as are no longer of general interest. The space thus gained has
been utilized for the purpose of bringing before the reader the chief
events of a military character which have occurred in the interval which
has elapsed since the Book first appeared.
It has been the object of the Author to make the work in its present
form a complete narrative of the rise and fall of the Arabist and
Mahdist movements, as well as a history of England's intervention in
Egypt, this last a subject on which many persons entertain somewhat
vague and indistinct ideas.
C. R.
CAIRO,
December, 1899.
CONTENTS.
CHAP. PAGE.
I. EGYPTIAN FINANCE 1
II. ISMAIL PASHA 7
III. THE MILITARY MOVEMENT 12
IV. TRIUMPH OF THE ARMY 17
V. FOREIGN INTERVENTION 23
VI. CRITICAL POSITION 32
VII. THE RIOTS AT ALEXANDRIA 44
VIII. THE ALEXANDRIA BOMBARDMENT 60
IX. OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOMBARDMENT 75
X. THE DAY AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT 85
XI. ALEXANDRIA DURING THE BOMBARDMENT 90
XII. EVENTS ON SHORE 98
XIII. THE SITUATION 106
XIV. MILITARY OPERATIONS 114
XV. THE CONFERENCE 120
XVI. THE PORTE AND THE POWERS 127
XVII. WOLSELEY'S MOVE TO THE CANAL 131
XVIII. DE LESSEPS AND THE CANAL 137
XIX. SEIZURE OF THE SUEZ CANAL 144
XX. TEL-EL-MAHUTA TO MAHSAMEH 153
XXI. KASSASSIN 159
XXII. TEL-EL-KEBIR 168
XXIII. CAPTURE OF CAIRO AND COLLAPSE OF THE
REBELLION 180
XXIV. ENGLAND AND THE PORTE 193
XXV. RESTORATION OF TEWFIK AND EXILE OF ARABI 198
XXVI. THE SOUDAN AND THE MAHDI 210
XXVII. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FUTURE 220
XXVIII. OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MAHDI 232
XXIX. THE DESTRUCTION OF HICKS' ARMY 243
XXX. ABANDONMENT OF THE SOUDAN: OSMAN DIGNA 250
XXXI. BAKER'S DEFEAT AT EL TEB 259
XXXII. GORDON'S MISSION 267
XXXIII. SOUAKIM EXPEDITION 272
XXXIV. GRAHAM'S VICTORY AT EL TEB 277
XXXV. GRAHAM'S VICTORY AT TAMAAI 290
XXXVI. THE GORDON RELIEF EXPEDITION 309
XXXVII. PROGRESS TO DONGOLA 315
XXXVIII. ADVANCE TO KORTI 325
XXXIX. STEWART'S DESERT MARCH 333
XL. THE BATTLE OF ABU KLEA 341
XLI. THE ADVANCE ON METAMMEH 347
XLII. GORDON'S JOURNALS 355
XLIII. WILSON'S VOYAGE TO KHARTOUM 361
XLIV. THE FALL OF KHARTOUM 371
XLV. THE RETREAT FROM GUBAT 386
XLVI. THE NILE COLUMN 393
XLVII. WOLSELEY AND THE PROSECUTION OF THE
CAMPAIGN 401
XLVIII. THE SOUAKIM EXPEDITION OF 1885 408
XLIX. THE ATTACK ON McNEILL'S ZERIBA 416
L. GRAHAM'S ADVANCE AND WITHDRAWAL FROM THE
EASTERN SOUDAN 430
LI. EVACUATION 437
LII. CONTINUATION 443
LIII. THE MAHDIST INVASION 447
LIV. FINANCE, THE SUEZ CANAL, AND THE ARMY OF
OCCUPATION 453
LV. THE EASTERN SOUDAN 459
LVI. THE NILE FRONTIER 466
LVII. WAD-EN-NEJUMI AND COLLAPSE OF THE INVASION 474
LVIII. THE EASTERN SOUDAN AGAIN 486
LIX. IN LOWER EGYPT 494
LX. THE DONGOLA EXPEDITION 501
LXI. THE RECONQUEST OF DONGOLA 512
LXII. THE ADVANCE TO BERBER 519
LXIII. ON THE RIVER--KASSALA 524
LXIV. FROM THE NILE TO THE ATBARA 530
LXV. THE BATTLE OF THE ATBARA 541
LXVI. THE ADVANCE ON OMDURMAN 551
LXVII. THE BATTLE OF OMDURMAN 559
LXVIII. THE CAPTURE OF OMDURMAN 574
LXIX. FASHODA 584
LXX. DESTRUCTION OF THE KHALIFA 590
CONCLUSION 595
THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGNS.
CHAPTER I.
EGYPTIAN FINANCE.
Towards the close of the year 1875, Ismail Pasha, then Khedive of Egypt,
had about got to the end of his resources. His liabilities on loans,
contracted either in his own name or in that of his Government, amounted
to £55,332,609; in addition to this there was a "Floating Debt" of
£21,334,960--and £1,000,000--due for the expenses of the war with
Abyssinia. The Treasury Bills were being daily protested, the salaries
of the Government officials were in arrear, and everything pointed to
impending bankruptcy.
This was the situation when Ismail sold to the British Government the
shares in the Suez Canal Company which he had inherited from his
predecessor, Said Pasha.[1]
By the transaction, which was due to the genius of the late Lord
Beaconsfield, England made an excellent investment of capital. She also
acquired an important interest in the great maritime highway to India,
and indirectly in Egypt herself.
Attentive observers regarded what had taken place as only a prelude to a
more intimate connection of England with Egyptian affairs, and the
financial mission of Mr. Cave, an important Treasury official,
undertaken about the same period, naturally strengthened this
impression, notwithstanding Lord Derby's declaration that sending the
mission to Egypt "was not to be taken to imply any desire on the part of
Her Majesty's Government to interfere in the internal affairs of that
country."
There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the Foreign Secretary in
the matter. The policy of Lord Beaconsfield's Cabinet, as well as that
of Mr. Gladstone, which succeeded it, was originally one of
non-intervention, and it was only the force of circumstances which led
to its modification. England's first wish was that no Power should
interfere in Egypt; her second, that in the event of interference
becoming necessary, England should not be left out in the cold. When
this is borne in mind, the attitude which Her Majesty's Ministers from
time to time assumed in regard to Egyptian affairs becomes comparatively
intelligible.
In confirmation of the preceding, the reader will observe that, although
one of the causes which eventually led to England's action in the valley
of the Nile was her mixing herself up with questions of Egyptian
finance, all attempts to induce her to move in this direction met for a
long time with failure.
When Mr. Cave's report, and, later on, that of Messrs. Goschen and
Joubert, revealed the embarrassed condition of the country, and the
necessity for the adoption of the financial scheme set forth in the
Decrees of May and November, 1876, Her Majesty's Government declined to
take any part in the arrangement. They even refused to nominate the
Englishmen who were to fill the various posts created by the Decrees.
The French, Italian and Austrian members of the Commission of the Public
Debt were nominated by their respective Governments as early as May,
1876, but their British colleague up to the end of the year remained
unappointed. France, on the other hand, throughout the whole of the
negotiations, appears to have been singularly ready to come to the
front, and when in December, 1876, the Duke Decazes, the French Minister
of Foreign Affairs, was asked to nominate one of the Controllers of
Finance, he declared "that he felt no difficulty whatever on the
subject." Lord Derby, however, persisted in his policy of abstention,
and eventually the Khedive was under the necessity of himself appointing
the Englishmen required.
At last the financial scheme came into operation, and, combined with
other reforms, for some time seemed likely to secure to Egypt and her
creditors a fair share of the blessings intended. This, however, was not
destined to last. As early as June, 1877, it became evident that the
revenues set apart to meet the Interest and Sinking Fund of the Public
Debt were insufficient. In fact, the estimates on which the Decrees were
founded proved simply fallacious--a deficit of no less than £820,000
appeared in the revenues assigned to the service of the Unified Debt,
and of £200,000 on those set apart for the Privileged Debt. Moreover,
there was strong reason to suppose that considerable portions of the
receipts were being secretly diverted from their legitimate channel by
Ismail and his agents.
At the same period serious difficulty arose in satisfying the judgments
obtained against the Government in the newly-established Mixed
Tribunals. These courts, having been instituted by treaties with the
Powers, partook largely of an international character, and when the
European creditors, on issuing execution, found that it was resisted by
force, they sought the aid of their respective Consuls-General.
The Honourable H. C. Vivian, then British Consul-General in Cairo, a
diplomatist who took a prominent part in this stage of Egypt's history,
had, as England's representative, to remonstrate with the Khedive. The
advice which Mr. Vivian gave, that the amounts of these judgments should
be paid, was excellent, but, under the circumstances, about as practical
as if he had counselled His Highness to take steps to secure an annual
high Nile.
Early in 1878, when things were going from bad to worse, Mr. Vivian
wrote that the whole government of the country was thrown out of gear by
financial mismanagement, and that affairs were becoming so entangled as
to challenge the interference of foreign Governments. This very sensible
opinion was backed up by M. Waddington, who had become French Minister
of Foreign Affairs, and who, addressing Lord Derby on the financial and
political situation, made the significant observation that if England
and France did not exert themselves at once, the matter would slip out
of their hands. This suggestion, pointing obviously to the probable
intervention of other Powers, was not without effect, and the British
Foreign Secretary in reply went a little further than he had yet done,
and stated that "Her Majesty's Government would be happy to co-operate
with that of France in any useful measure not inconsistent with the
Khedive's independent administration of Egypt."
This was followed by Mr. Vivian pressing upon the Khedive the necessity
for "a thorough and exhaustive inquiry into the finances of the
country."
This constituted a fresh departure in the policy of England with regard
to the Egyptian question, and, as will be seen, ultimately led to that
complete interference in Egyptian affairs which the British Cabinet had
so much desired to avoid.
Of course, Ismail had to yield, and the famous Commission of Inquiry
instituted by the Decree of 30th March, 1878, assembled in Cairo under
the presidency of Mr. (afterwards Sir C.) Rivers Wilson, and revealed
the most startling facts relating to the finances of Egypt. The
Commission had no easy task before it, and it only attained its object
through the dogged resolution of its chairman, backed by the moral
support of the representatives of the Powers.
At the outset, the late Cherif Pasha, the Khedive's Minister of Foreign
Affairs and of Justice, refused point-blank to obey the Decree, and
submit to be personally examined by the Commission.
As Cherif was a statesman who will be frequently referred to in the
following pages, it may be opportune to briefly describe him. He was
then about sixty years of age, and, like most of those who have held the
highest posts in Egypt, of Circassian origin. He was amongst the
favoured individuals who had been sent to France by Mehemet Ali to be
educated. He gradually passed through nearly every post in the State
with that facility which is so frequently seen in Egypt, where a man is
one day a station-master on the railway, the next a Judge in the
Tribunals, and eventually a Master of Ceremonies, or a Cabinet Minister.
Cherif had pleasing manners, spoke French fluently, and was in every
respect a gentleman. A Mahomedan by religion, he was, from an early
period in Ismail's reign, a prominent character in Egyptian history. He
soon became a rival of Nubar Pasha (referred to further on), and he and
Nubar alternated as the Khedive's Prime Ministers for many years.
Of a naturally indolent character, Cherif always represented the
_laissez aller_ side of Egyptian politics. With an excellent temper, and
a supremely apathetic disposition, he was always willing to accept
almost any proposition, provided it did not entail upon him any personal
exertion, or interfere with his favourite pastime, a game of billiards.
Cherif's notion in refusing to appear before the Commission was of a
two-fold character. Educated with Oriental ideas, and accustomed to
regard Europeans with suspicion, it is not unlikely that he resented the
appointment of the Commission as an unwarrantable intrusion on the part
of the Western Powers.
"Here," thought he, "were a number of people coming to make disagreeable
inquiries, and to ask indiscreet questions. Others might answer them;
he, for his part, could not, and for two reasons: first, because he
couldn't if he would; and second, because he wouldn't if he could. Was
he, at his time of life, to be asked to give reasons for all he had
done? It was ridiculous; all the world knew that he had no reasons."[2]
Probably, also, Cherif had his own motives for not wishing to afford too
much information. Though enjoying a deservedly high reputation for
honesty, he belonged to what must be regarded as the "privileged class"
in the country. For years this class had benefited by certain partial
immunities from taxation, and these advantages the work of the
Commission threatened to do away with. Further, Cherif's love of ease
and comfort, and absence of energy, indisposed him to give himself
unnecessary trouble about anything in particular. Be this as it may,
Cherif, though expressing his readiness to reply in writing to any
communications which the Commission might address to him, declined to do
more.
The Decree, however, provided that every functionary of State should be
bound to appear before the Commission. This might have placed a less
astute Minister in a dilemma. Cherif at once evaded the difficulty by
resigning office, rightly calculating on again returning to power when
the Commission should have become a thing of the past. Riaz Pasha, then
second Vice-President of the Commission, succeeded Cherif as Minister,
and the inquiry proceeded without him.[3]
It will not have escaped notice that in authorizing Rivers Wilson, who
held a high post in the Office of the National Debt, to sit on the
Commission, and in granting him leave of absence for the purpose, the
British Government had allowed itself to advance one stage further in
its Egyptian policy. The significance of the event was only partially
disguised by Lord Derby's cautious intimation that "the employé of the
British Government was not to be considered as invested with any
official character."
In April of the same year, whilst the Commission was still sitting, it
became evident that there would be a deficit of £1,200,000 in the amount
required to pay the May coupon of the Unified Debt. Further influences
were brought to bear, and Mr. Vivian was instructed to join the French
Consul-General in urging upon the Khedive the necessity of finding the
requisite funds at whatever cost to himself. Ismail pointed out that
this could only be done by ruinous sacrifices, which he promised should
nevertheless be made if it was insisted on. The representatives of
England and France remained firm, and the bondholders got their money.
By what means this was accomplished it is needless to inquire. Rumours
of frightful pressure being put on the unfortunate fellaheen, of forced
loans and other desperate expedients, were prevalent in Cairo, and were
probably only too well founded. It is said that even the jewellery of
the ladies of Ismail's harem was requisitioned in order to make up the
sum required.
Meanwhile the inquiry proceeded.
It would require too much space to give at length the details of the
report which the Commission presented. Suffice it to say that it showed
confusion and irregularity everywhere. Taxes were collected in the most
arbitrary and oppressive manner, and at the most unfavourable periods of
the year. The land tenures were so arranged that the wealthier
proprietors evaded a great portion of the land tax, and the _corvée_, or
system of forced labour, was applied in a way which was ruinous to the
country. Further, the Khedive and his family had amassed, at the expense
of the State, colossal properties, amounting, in fact, to as much as
one-fifth of the whole cultivable land of Egypt, and this property the
Commission declared ought to be given up. On every side the most
flagrant abuses were shown to prevail. In conclusion, it was found that
the arrangements made by the Financial Decrees of 1876 could not
possibly be adhered to, and that a fresh liquidation was inevitable.
Ismail, after every effort to make better terms for himself, yielded to
Rivers Wilson's requisitions, and accepted the conclusions of the
Commission. He acquiesced with as good grace as he could in making over
to the State the landed property of himself and family. He went even
further, and in August, 1878, approved the formation of a Cabinet under
the presidency of Nubar Pasha, with Rivers Wilson as Minister of
Finance and M. de Blignières (the French member of the Commission of the
Public Debt) as Minister of Public Works. At the same time, as if to
show Europe that he had seriously entered on the path of reform, the
Khedive proclaimed his intention to renounce personal rule and become a
Constitutional sovereign, governing only through his Council of
Ministers.
CHAPTER II.
ISMAIL PASHA.
Any history of Egyptian affairs at the time of the events referred to in
the present chapter would be incomplete without a sketch of Ismail Pasha
himself. He was then forty-six years of age, short in stature, and
heavily and squarely built. He was corpulent in figure, of dark
complexion, and wore a reddish brown beard closely clipped. With one eye
startlingly bright and the other habitually almost closed, he gave one
the idea of a man of more than ordinary intelligence.
Speaking French fluently, and possessed of a peculiarly fascinating
manner, Ismail exercised an almost mesmeric influence on those who came
in contact with him. His business capacity was unbounded, and not the
smallest detail, from the purchase of a coal cargo to the sale of a
year's crop of sugar, was carried out without his personal direction. He
was entitled to the denomination of Merchant Prince more than any one
who ever bore the title, combining the two characters profitably for a
long time, but in attempting to add to them that of a financier also he
ended by wrecking his country.
The three great passions of Ismail were, his ambition to render Egypt
independent of the Porte, his desire to accumulate landed property, and
his mania for building palaces. His prodigality was unbounded, and as a
result the indebtedness of Egypt was raised in fifteen years from
£3,292,000, at which his predecessor left it, to over £90,000,000 at the
time now referred to.
To do Ismail justice, it must be admitted that a large part of this
money was spent in the construction of railways, canals, and other
improvements, and in beautifying Cairo, which it was his aim to convert
into a sort of Oriental Paris. But after allowing for all this, and for
the two millions sterling spent in the _fêtes_ which attended the
opening of the Suez Canal, there is still a large balance left
unaccounted for.
One of the great defects of Ismail's character was his absolute
insincerity. When his reckless administration had brought his country to
the brink of ruin, he instituted the system of financial control set
forth in the Decrees of 1876. It must not be supposed that he ever meant
that the system should be carried into effect, or at most that it should
be more than a temporary expedient. When he promulgated reforms and
enlisted a number of Europeans in his service, did he intend that the
reforms should become realities, or that the European officials should
exercise the functions nominally intrusted to them? Not for an instant.
All that he desired was to throw dust in the eyes of Europe. For a while
he succeeded, but it was not to last. After a time it dawned on the
Powers that they were being played with, and from that moment Ismail's
downfall was assured.
In nominally transforming himself into a Constitutional ruler, Ismail
was only following out his habitual policy. The change, at any rate,
looked well on paper. It would, he expected, possess a further
advantage--Ismail, by his personal rule, had brought Egypt to the brink
of ruin, and by posing as a Constitutional Sovereign, he hoped to
transfer his responsibility to his ministers.
The nomination of Rivers Wilson to the post of Egyptian Minister of
Finance was so unprecedented an event that it required all the care of
the Marquis of Salisbury, who had now succeeded Lord Derby, to attenuate
its political importance. To save appearances it was arranged that Her
Majesty's Ministers should do nothing more than give their consent to
the appointment.
As a consequence of the installation of Constitutional government, with
European Ministers in the Cabinet, the English and French Controllers
were deemed unnecessary, and the Dual Control was declared suspended. On
the adoption of the new order of things, a hint was given to the Khedive
that Her Majesty's Government relied on his steady support being given
to the new Cabinet, and that the position of himself and his Dynasty
might become seriously compromised in the event of a contrary course
being adopted.
It would have been well for the Khedive had he taken the advice given.
Unfortunately, he was too much steeped in Eastern intrigue, and too fond
of the authority which he had nominally surrendered, to bend to the new
order of things.[4]
The earliest symptom of this was the military outbreak which took place
in Cairo on the 18th February, 1879, when 400 officers and 2,000
discharged soldiers mobbed Nubar Pasha and the European members of his
Cabinet at the Ministry of Finance. The ostensible grievance was the
non-payment of their salaries; the real one was the reduction in the
army, a measure which had been forced on the Khedive by his new
advisers. Both Nubar and Wilson were actually assaulted, and the cry of
"Death to the Christians" was raised. What further events might have
taken place it is hard to say, but, all at once, Ismail personally
appeared on the scene, and as if by magic order was restored.
Everything tended to show that Ismail himself had arranged this little
comedy; but be this as it may, he speedily took advantage of it to
inform the Consuls-General that the new state of things was a failure,
and that he could no longer retain his position without either power or
authority. Finally he declared that unless a change were made he would
not be answerable for the consequences. This was followed by the
resignation of his Prime Minister, Nubar, and the despatch of British
and French vessels of war to Alexandria.
The progress made in the direction of British interference in Egyptian
affairs will not fail to strike the reader.
Ismail's motive in bringing about the military disturbance of the 18th
February was to demonstrate, in the same manner as Arabi Pasha did later
on, that he was the only real power in the country. In doing this,
however, he played a dangerous game, and one which shortly after cost
him his vice-regal throne.
For the moment, a _modus vivendi_ was found in the appointment of his
son Prince Tewfik (afterwards Khedive) as Prime Minister, _vice_ Nubar,
and the Western Powers accepted the solution, at the same time giving
Ismail another warning, namely, that any further disturbance would be
regarded as the result of his action, and the consequences to him would
be very serious.
The financial difficulties of the country now became so grave, that a
Decree suspending payment of the interest of the Debt was issued at the
end of March, by the advice of the Ministers. Then Ismail all at once
turned round and declared that the measure was unnecessary, and proposed
a financial scheme of his own. How far this could be reconciled with his
declaration that he was a Constitutional ruler is not clear. This event
was followed by the arbitrary dismissal of his Ministers and the
formation of a purely native Cabinet under Cherif Pasha. So secretly had
the change been brought about, that the former Ministers only discovered
it when, on going to their offices, they found their places already
occupied by their successors.
This veritable _coup d'état_ placed the English and French
representatives in a position of some difficulty. On the one hand, the
right of the Khedive to change his Ministers, even under the reformed
regime, could not be contested; on the other, the change was of so
radical a nature, and so much opposed to the moral obligations which he
had contracted with the Western Powers, that it could hardly be
permitted. The two Consuls-General therefore waited on the Khedive, and
plainly told him that the precipitate dismissal of Ministers whose
services he had solicited from the Governments of England and France
constituted an act of grave discourtesy, and warned him of the necessity
of adopting the course which they recommended to him. Ismail had by this
time become so used to warnings of this character, that the intimation
produced but little effect. On the contrary, he at once ordered the army
to be increased to 60,000 men, and followed this up by a Decree of the
22nd April, 1879, reducing the interest of the Debt, and otherwise
modifying the arrangements made by the Financial Decrees of 1876.
It was scarcely to be expected that Ismail's action, conceived in
defiance of all Europe, would be tolerated, but it might, nevertheless,
but for another circumstance, namely, the continued non-payment of the
sums due on the judgments of the Tribunals. Both England and France
addressed strong representations to the Porte on the subject. Though
anxious that Ismail should be taken to task, neither Power was prepared
to go so far as to demand his deposition. At length the hands of both
were forced by a statesman who had more will and less hesitation,
namely, Prince Bismarck. He plainly intimated that if England and France
did not demand Ismail's removal, Germany would. This decided the matter,
and the two Powers, seeing the danger of the matter being taken out of
their hands, summoned up sufficient resolution to apply to the Sultan
for the removal of the man who had so long trifled with them.
Meanwhile intrigues of all kinds had been going on at Constantinople.
Ismail was privately sounded on the subject, and was given his choice,
either to abdicate or to be deposed. He was reluctant to come to any
decision, and in this he was strengthened by the information which he
received from his agent, Ibraim Pasha, at Constantinople. The latter,
from time to time, misled his unfortunate principal. When things looked
at their very worst, Ibraim repeatedly assured Ismail that if only
sufficient money were transmitted to Stamboul, everything would yet be
made right. Animated by this hope, the deluded Khedive sent fabulous
sums to the Sultan, up to the moment when the latter threw him over. It
is not, therefore, to be wondered at, that, when the storm actually
burst, and the news of his deposition arrived, he was simply
thunderstruck. At four in the morning of the 25th June, 1879, the
English and French Consuls-General sought out Cherif Pasha, and made him
accompany them to the Palace, and after some difficulty succeeded in
finding Ismail. They then communicated to him despatches from
Constantinople, and insisted on his abdication as the only means of
saving his Dynasty. Ismail at first refused point-blank, but later on,
he qualified his refusal by stating that he would only yield to a formal
order from the Porte itself.
The _dénouement_ was not far off, for, only a few hours later, a
telegram arrived, addressed to "Ismail Pasha, late Khedive of Egypt,"
informing him that the Sultan had deposed him, and nominated his son
Tewfik in his place.
There was nothing for the fallen ruler to do but to bow to the
inevitable, although he did not acquiesce with good grace. He showed
himself most _exigeant_ as to the conditions on which he would consent
to leave Egypt. He wished for a large sum in ready money. He wanted
Smyrna selected as his place of residence. He wished to take with him
all his followers, including a harem of at least three hundred women. He
also demanded that an Egyptian steamer should be placed at his disposal.
In fact, he asked so many things that the Consuls-General were at their
wits' end to know what to do. The great object was to get rid of him at
any price, and he was, in effect, told that he could have almost
anything he wanted if he would only go at once.
Eventually the parties came to terms, Ismail was given the money he
demanded, he was allowed to choose Naples in place of Smyrna as a
residence, and at the end of the month, accompanied by seventy ladies of
his harem, he quitted Alexandria in the Khedivial yacht "_Maharoussa_"
under a royal salute from the batteries and ships of war.[5]
CHAPTER III.
THE MILITARY MOVEMENT.
No sooner was Egypt rid of Ismail Pasha, than the Firman of investiture
of Tewfik was solemnly read at the Citadel in Cairo with great state and
ceremony.
The Powers having insisted on the restoration of the Control, Major
Baring (afterwards Lord Cromer) and M. de Blignières were appointed
Controllers-General by the English and French Governments respectively,
on the 4th September. Riaz Pasha, on the 23rd, became Prime Minister.
Riaz is a statesman who has played an important part in Egypt for many
years, and is therefore deserving of a passing notice. He is of
Circassian family and of Hebrew extraction, possesses a strong will,
tenacious perseverance, and business-like habits, and he has always been
remarkable for his independence. Riaz is a master of detail, and has all
the ins and outs of Egyptian administration at his fingers' ends, and he
was, therefore, all the more fitted for taking public affairs in hand at
this period. His experience as President of the Council of Ministers in
past times rendered his services especially valuable. Gifted with
natural foresight, he was shrewd enough to see that, when the Control
was re-established, England and France seriously intended to take
Egyptian affairs in hand, and he accepted the situation accordingly.
This led him to work cordially with the Controllers, with the happy
result that, during the two years that his Ministry lasted, Egypt
attained an unprecedented degree of prosperity.
In April, 1880, what was styled the Commission of Liquidation was
appointed, and under its advice the Public Debt was subjected to various
modifications, and other financial changes were made, including a
reduction of taxation and other reforms.
How long this pleasant state of things would have lasted it is
impossible to say, had not trouble arisen in another direction, and the
military revolt under Arabi supervened and upset all previous
calculations.
In order to understand the nature and causes of this movement, it is
necessary to know something of the Egyptian military organization at the
time referred to. The army, which had achieved such great things under
Mehemet Ali, had gradually declined under his successors, and when
Ismail came to power was represented by a total force of 10,000 fighting
men. Ismail raised the number to 45,000, but the Firman of Tewfik's
investiture limiting the number to 18,000, the force had to be reduced
to that number. The soldiers were all brought into the ranks by the
system of conscription. Those recruited from the Soudan were men
possessed of considerable endurance and warlike qualities, but those
taken from the other districts, that is, the ordinary fellah or
agricultural class, had no taste for war. This is not to be wondered at
when the character and habits of the latter are considered. The Egyptian
fellah is a type in himself. Possessed of no national pride or patriotic
aspirations, he cares nothing about politics, and still less for
fighting. All that he asks is to be let alone, to till in peace and
quietness his little plot of land on the banks of his beloved Nile. Do
not vex him too much with forced labour, or tax him beyond his means,
and he remains peaceful and fairly law-abiding from the moment of his
birth till the day comes for him to be carried out to the little
cemetery, the white tombs of which brighten the borders of the desert.
In the preceding observations the Egyptian soldier is spoken of as he
was at the period under consideration. What he is capable of becoming,
when placed under English officers, and properly trained under humane
and just treatment, subsequent events will show.
Amongst the soldiers at the time of the occurrence of Arabi's outbreak
there was a fair amount of subordination, and but little jealousy
prevailed. Amongst the officers, however, the state of things was
entirely different. The majority of them were of Egyptian or fellah
origin, whilst the others were of Turkish or Circassian extraction. The
latter, as belonging to the same race as the reigning family, naturally
constituted the dominant caste; when there was a campaign in the Soudan,
or any other unpleasant duty to be taken in hand, the fellah officers
were selected for it. When, on the other hand, it was a question of
taking duty in Cairo or Alexandria, the Circassians were employed.
Naturally, a good deal of jealousy was thus created, though, as long as
Ismail was in power, it was not openly manifested, and discipline was
maintained, except where it answered that ruler's purpose (as in the
case of the demonstration against Nubar and Rivers Wilson) that it
should be otherwise. With the young and inexperienced Tewfik, however,
things were different--a spirit of insubordination developed itself, and
the two sets of officers entered upon a struggle for the mastery.
Among the prominent fellah officers was a certain Ali Fehmi, who was a
favourite of the Khedive, and in command of the Guards at the Palace. In
this capacity he was frequently called on to convey orders to Osman
Pasha Rifki, the Minister of War. Osman was a Circassian, and felt hurt
at receiving orders from a fellah officer. By what means the change was
effected is uncertain, but eventually Ali fell into disfavour, and
became one of a group of discontented officers belonging to the same
class. There were two others, Abdel-el-Al, and Ahmed Arabi,
subsequently known as Arabi Pasha. These three, afterwards known as "The
Colonels," were joined by Mahmoud Sami Pasha, a politician, and, thus
associated, they formed the leaders of what began to be known as "The
National Party."
As Arabi forms one of the chief actors in the events which followed,
some details relating to him may not be out of place here.
In person, Arabi was a big, burly specimen of the fellah type--his
features were large and prominent, and his face, though stern, had a
good-natured expression. He was born about the year 1840, in the
Province of Charkieh, in Lower Egypt. His father was a fellah possessing
a few acres of land, and working it himself. Arabi was one of four sons,
and he got such education as could be afforded by the village school. In
due time he was drafted by conscription into the army, and became an
officer. At Said Pasha's death he was a captain, and one of the officers
of the Guard at the Palace at Cairo. He was once rather boisterous under
the Palace windows, and Ismail Pasha, exclaiming that he was more noisy
than the big drum, and less useful, ordered him to be removed and to
receive punishment.
This was his first grievance against Ismail, and it induced Arabi to
join a secret society of native officers. The objects which this society
proposed to itself were the abolition of the invidious favouritism shown
to Circassian officers, and the deposition of Ismail, the sovereign.
War broke out between Egypt and Abyssinia; Arabi was in charge of the
transports at Massowah, and a charge of corruption being made against
him, he fell into disgrace. This fact strengthened his dislike to
Ismail, and, with time lying idle on his hands, he took to attending
lectures at the religious university, known as the Mosque El Azhar, in
Cairo, where he acquired a certain degree of eloquence superior to that
of most persons in his position. After a time, Ismail, always working to
increase the army, allowed him to join a regiment, and he resumed his
connection with the secret society, and soon became the head of it.
One of its members informed the Khedive of the aims and intentions of
the society, upon which Ismail sent for some of the chiefs, and Arabi
and his confederates waited on him. They went as his enemies in fear
and trembling, and left as his friends; seventy native officers were, in
one day, made lieutenant-colonels, including Arabi and his companions.
Arabi, in addition, received the high honour of having one of the
Khedivial slaves as his wife.
When the question of the deposition of Ismail came to the front, Arabi
took a formal oath to defend him with his life, but this did not prevent
him, forty-eight hours after, going to do obeisance to Tewfik as the new
Khedive of Egypt. The latter let it be known that there was a tacit
amnesty for the past, and made Arabi a full colonel.
Of Arabi's mental gifts it is impossible to form a high estimate.
Ignorant of any language but his own, his forte seemed to be the
enunciating of any number of quotations from the Koran, quite regardless
of their relevancy. He had, however, original ideas at times, and must
be credited, at all events, with the quality of sincerity. To Europeans
and European influences he was strongly opposed. On one occasion he
presided at a meeting of natives assembled for the purpose of founding a
free school at Zag-a-zig. He pointed out the changes which European
civilization had wrought in Egypt, and observed that, "before the native
was brought in contact with Europe, he was content to ride on a donkey,
to wear a blue gown, and to drink water, whereas now he must drive in a
carriage, wear a Stambouli coat, and drink champagne. Europeans," he
said, "are ahead of us, but why? Is it because they are stronger,
better, or more enduring than we? No; it is only because they are better
taught. Let us, then, be educated, and the boasted supremacy of the
Christians will disappear." The result of this appeal was a large
subscription, and the school was established.
Mahmoud Sami Pasha, unlike his associates, was not a fellah, but of
Turkish descent. He was a man of consummate cunning, and of great
personal ambition; basing his calculations on the power of the military
movement, and not believing in the disposition of the English and French
to resist it, he proposed to use the simple-minded Arabi and his friends
as a means of bringing himself into power.
The crisis was brought about by agitators among the fellaheen officers,
who objected to a proposed reduction of the army; petitions on the
subject were presented, not only to the Minister of War, but to the
Khedive himself, setting forth all their grievances, and demanding that
an Egyptian should be appointed Minister of War. Osman Rifki, the actual
Minister of War, could not brook this, and at a Cabinet Council, at
which Mahmoud Sami was present, it was decided to put the three
ringleaders, Ali Fehmi, Abdel-el-Al, and Arabi, under arrest.
According to Arabi, a steamer was in readiness to take the prisoners
away, and iron boxes were prepared in which they were to be placed and
dropped into the Nile, but of this there is no proof beyond his
statement. Mahmoud Sami took care to warn "the Colonels" of what was
going to happen, and it was arranged that if they did not by a certain
time return from Kasr-el-Nil Barracks, to which they were summoned, the
soldiers of their respective regiments should march down and liberate
them.
It turned out exactly as provided for. On arriving at the barracks on
the 1st February, 1881, "the Colonels" found themselves before a
court-martial, but hardly had the proceedings begun before a turbulent
crowd of soldiery broke in, upset the tables and chairs, ill-treated the
members of the court, and carried off the prisoners in triumph to the
Palace. Here the three colonels interviewed the Khedive, and demanded
the substitution of Mahmoud Sami for Osman Rifki as Minister of War, an
increase of the army to 18,000 men, and the establishment of a new
system of promotion, which should exclude favouritism to the Circassian
officers.
Tewfik having no force wherewith to resist, yielded all that was asked
of him, and there the matter for the time ended.
CHAPTER IV.
TRIUMPH OF THE ARMY.
Matters progressed for some time pretty quietly after the events
referred to in the previous chapter, but in July, 1881, two incidents
occurred which were followed by important results.
A native artilleryman was run over and killed in the streets of
Alexandria. His comrades bore the dead body to the Palace and forced an
entrance in defiance of the orders of their officers. They were tried,
and the ringleaders were condemned to severe sentences. Next, nineteen
Circassian officers brought charges against the colonel of their
regiment, Abdel-el-Al, already mentioned. The charges were inquired into
and found to be unfounded, whereupon the nineteen officers were removed
from the active list of the army, but were restored subsequently by
order of the Khedive.
These measures gave great umbrage to "the Colonels," who believed that
the order was given with a view to encourage the insubordination of the
officers towards them; and a letter was written by "the Colonels" to the
Minister of War, contrasting the leniency shown towards the nineteen
officers with the severity towards the soldiers in the case of the
artilleryman.
The Khedive by this time had become completely dissatisfied with his new
Minister of War, and alarmed at the bearing of "the Colonels." He
determined to see if energetic measures would not be successful, and
appointed his brother-in-law, Daoud Pasha, a Circassian, to the Ministry
of War, in the place of Mahmoud Sami. Measures were at the same time
taken for getting the disaffected regiments out of Cairo.
These steps were viewed with the greatest possible dissatisfaction by
Arabi and his colleagues. Not only so, but they began to entertain
considerable fear for their own personal safety. A story had got abroad
that the Khedive had obtained a secret "Fetwah," or Decree, from the
Sheikh-el-Islam, condemning them to death for high treason. There was no
foundation for the story, but it was currently believed. Under these
circumstances, all the chief officers signed a declaration of loyalty to
the Khedive and his Government. Their next step was to organize the
demonstration of the 9th September, 1881.
The immediate origin of the disturbance was the order given by the
Minister of War for the removal from Cairo to Alexandria of the regiment
of which Arabi was the Colonel.
On the 9th September the Minister of War received a communication from
Arabi, informing him that the troops in Cairo were going at half-past
three in the afternoon to the Palace of Abdin to obtain from the Khedive
the dismissal of the Ministry, the convocation of the National Assembly,
and the increase of the army to 18,000 men.
When the terms of Arabi's communication were laid before the Khedive at
his palace at Koobah, none of the Ministers were present. In the absence
of the British Consul-General, Tewfik consulted the British Controller,
Mr. (afterwards Sir Auckland) Colvin, who invited the Khedive to take
the initiative himself.
Two regiments were said to be faithful. Colvin advised the Khedive to
summon them to Abdin Square with all the military police available, to
place himself at their head, and when Arabi arrived to arrest him.
Colvin accompanied the Khedive to the Abdin Barracks, where the first
regiment of the Guard turned out and made the warmest protestations of
loyalty. The same thing occurred with the soldiers at the Citadel,
though it was ascertained that the troops there had, previously to the
Khedive's arrival, been signalling to Arabi's regiment at Abbassieh. The
Khedive then announced his intention of driving to the Abbassieh
Barracks, some three miles distant. It was already past the time fixed
for the demonstration, and Colvin urged him instead to proceed at once
to Abdin, taking with him the Citadel regiment. Tewfik, however,
wavered. Either he desired to assure himself of the support of more of
his soldiers, or more probably he desired to put off the critical moment
as long as possible. He persisted in driving to Abbassieh. It was a long
drive, and when he arrived there he found that Arabi had marched with
his regiment to Cairo. The opportunity sought of anticipating his
movements was, therefore, lost. The carriages were turned round, and on
entering Cairo took a long _détour_, and arrived at Abdin Palace by a
side door. The Khedive at first desired to enter the Palace, but, on
Colvin's entreaty, consented to come out into the square. They went
together, followed by half-a-dozen native and European officers. The
place was filled with soldiers, some 4,000 in number, with thirty guns
placed in position.
The Khedive advanced firmly towards a little group of officers and men
(some of whom were mounted) in the centre. Colvin said to him, "When
Arabi presents himself, tell him to give up his sword and follow you.
Then go the round of the regiments, address each separately, and give
them the 'order to disperse.'" The soldiers all this time were standing
in easy attitudes, chatting, laughing, rolling up cigarettes, and eating
pistachio nuts, looking, in fact, as little like desperate mutineers as
could well be imagined. They apparently were there in obedience only to
orders, and, without being either loyal or disloyal, might almost be
regarded as disinterested spectators.
Arabi approached on horseback: the Khedive called out to him to
dismount. He did so, and came forward on foot with several others, and a
guard with fixed bayonets, and saluted. As he advanced, Colvin said to
the Khedive, "Now is your moment, give the word!" He replied, "We are
between four fires. We shall be killed." Colvin said, "Have courage!"
Tewfik again wavered, he turned for counsel to a native officer at his
side, and repeated, "What can I do? We are between four fires." He then
told Arabi to sheathe his sword. Arabi did so at once, his hand
trembling so with nervousness that he could scarcely get the weapon back
into its scabbard. The moment was lost. Instead of following Colvin's
advice, and arresting Arabi on the spot, a step which would at once have
put an end to the whole disturbance, the Khedive then walked towards him
and commenced to parley.
He demanded what was the meaning of the demonstration. Arabi replied by
enumerating his demands, adding that the army had come there on behalf
of the people to enforce them, and would not retire until they were
conceded. The Khedive addressed Colvin, and said, "You hear what he
says?" Colvin answered that it was not befitting for the sovereign to
discuss questions of this kind with colonels, and suggested his retiring
to the Palace, leaving others to speak to the military leaders. The
Khedive did so, and Colvin remained for about an hour, explaining to
them the gravity of the situation for themselves, and urging them to
withdraw the troops whilst there was yet time.
At this moment Mr. (afterwards Sir Charles) Cookson, Acting British
Consul-General, arrived, and Colvin left the continuation of the
negotiations to Her Majesty's representative. The latter pointed out to
Arabi the risk which he and those with him incurred by the menacing
attitude they had assumed. He told him that if they persisted in
assuming the government of the country, the army must be prepared to
meet the united forces of the Sublime Porte and of the European Powers,
both of whom were too much interested in the welfare and tranquillity of
Egypt to allow the country to descend through a military government to
anarchy. Arabi answered that the army was there to secure the liberties
of the Egyptian people. Cookson replied that the Khedive and Europe
could not recognize a mere military revolt as the expression of the will
of the people, and added that even now, if the troops were withdrawn,
any representations presented in the proper manner would be attended to,
and he would guarantee Arabi's personal safety and that of his
associates.
Arabi, though civil, firmly refused to take the course proposed. He
insisted on the adoption of the three points demanded. Cookson then
communicated the result of the interview to the Khedive, adding that he
was convinced that the only concession to which any real importance was
attached was the dismissal of the Ministry. His Highness, after a
conference with Riaz Pasha, consented to this, on the understanding that
the other points demanded should be in suspense until the Porte could be
communicated with.
Arabi accepted these terms, insisting only that no member of the
Khedive's family should be included in the new Cabinet, and that the
Minister of War should not be a Circassian. On these conditions Arabi
promised to withdraw the troops. This, however, was not effected until
an order had been signed announcing the dismissal of the Ministry and
the nomination of Cherif Pasha as the new Premier.
After this, Arabi entered the Palace and made his submission to the
Khedive, and the soldiers, with their bands playing and amid loud cheers
for the "Effendina" (Sovereign), retired to their barracks. By eight
o'clock all was over, and Cairo, which had been much excited, had
relapsed into its ordinary tranquillity.
With regard to the outbreak--the third, it will be remarked, of its
kind--it was on a larger scale than any previously organized, and was,
as events showed, correspondingly more successful. The rebellious troops
were, indeed, quieted, as on former occasions, but only by concessions
which went far to place the whole government of the country under
irregular military control.
With regard to the attitude assumed by the Khedive on the occasion,
considerable allowance must be made. Tewfik in the life-time of his
father had never, or at all events until the latest period of Ismail's
reign, been allowed to come to the front. He was, therefore, the less
fitted for dealing with a crisis of so formidable a character as that
of the 9th September. Born of one of Ismail's female slaves in the year
1853, Tewfik was never a favourite with his father, and when his
brothers were sent to Europe to be educated, he himself was kept in
Cairo and lived in quiet obscurity. Whilst they were made much of, both
at home and abroad, Tewfik remained quietly cultivating his farm at
Koobah.[6]
The difference in developing the character and dispositions of the
Princes was natural enough, and yet the late ruler of Egypt was in many
respects in no way inferior to the other members of his family. He
possessed a remarkable degree of intelligence, and although a strict
Mahomedan he was the husband of only one wife, to whom he was devotedly
attached. Determined to avoid, in bringing up his children, the error
perpetrated towards himself, he sent his sons to Europe to be educated.
In appearance he somewhat resembled his father, being short and inclined
to stoutness.
Unlike Ismail, however, Tewfik was wanting in energy and determination.
With either Ismail, or his grandfather, Mehemet Ali, the demonstration
of the 9th September would have been impossible. With Ismail--supposing
such an event could have taken place--the end would not have been far
off. The fate of Ismail Pasha Saddyk, Minister of Finance, known as the
"Mofettish," sufficiently shows the means by which Arabi would have been
disposed of.[7]
With Mehemet Ali the procedure would have been yet more summary. The
report of a pistol would have been heard, and Arabi would have rolled
lifeless on the square of Abdin. A volley of musketry would have
dispersed his followers, and the incident would have been closed.
Tewfik, with his genial kindly disposition, was not the man to adopt
either of the above expedients, and, as has been seen, Arabi triumphed.
CHAPTER V.
FOREIGN INTERVENTION.
Difficulty was at first experienced in getting Cherif Pasha to undertake
the formation of a Ministry. His idea was that it was inconsistent with
a due regard for his own reputation for him to pose before the world as
the accomplice of the mutinous soldiery, and at one time, after an
interview with Arabi, Cherif positively declined. Meanwhile, meetings of
the officers were held in which the most violent appeared to have the
upper hand, and the belief that they had nothing to fear from Turkish
intervention emboldened them to reject an ultimatum of Cherif, which was
that, on condition of his undertaking the government, and guaranteeing
the safety of the leaders, they should withdraw their regiments to
certain posts assigned to them.
Public opinion, more particularly amongst the Europeans, became much
alarmed, and the Khedive declared himself ready to yield everything in
order to save public security.
On the 13th September, however, things took an unexpected turn for the
better. Arabi, at the suggestion of Mahmoud Sami, who hoped to render
Cherif impossible, and to get himself nominated in his place, summoned
to Cairo the members of the Chamber of Notables. Cherif had acquired a
good deal of popularity among the class to which the Notables belonged,
and at their first meeting he found arguments to induce them to adopt a
tone hostile to Arabi and his friends, whom they told to attend to the
army, and mind their own business. The Notables went even further, and
signed an address to Cherif entreating him to form a Ministry, and
giving their personal guarantee that if he consented, the army should
yield absolute submission to his orders. Arabi, it will be remembered,
had all along professed to act on behalf of the Egyptian people, and the
attitude of the Notables was a severe check to him, or rather to Mahmoud
Sami, who was pulling the wires. This last individual, seeing that the
Notables were playing into the hand of Cherif, at once declared himself
the partisan of the latter and of the Chamber, and as a consequence Sami
was reappointed Minister of War in the Cabinet which Cherif was
eventually persuaded to form.
On the 14th of September the new Ministry was gazetted, and steps were
taken for the dispersal of the disaffected regiments in the provinces.
On the 6th of October Arabi and his regiment left Cairo for the military
station of El Ouady, in the Delta. Before he left he was received by the
Khedive, whom he assured of his respect and entire devotion. When one
remembers how often Arabi had gone through this ceremony, one can hardly
help thinking that Tewfik must, by this time, have begun to get a little
tired of it. Before leaving, Arabi made speeches to the troops, in
which he exhorted them "to remain united, and to draw even more tightly,
if possible, those bonds of fraternity of which they had already given
such striking examples." Finally, after pointing out--it must be
presumed by way of a joke--that obedience in a soldier was the first of
virtues, he declared that as long as he possessed a drop of blood, or a
living breath, both should belong to his beloved sovereign.
Meanwhile the elections for the Chamber of Notables, which had been
convoked by the Khedive for the 23rd of December, were proceeding. The
Chamber was called together under an old law of Ismail's time, made in
1866, under which the Notables possessed but very limited functions.
They were, in fact, simply a consultative body, with power only to
discuss such matters as might be brought before them by the advisers of
the Government.
There is no doubt that, apart from the military movement, there was a
widespread feeling of discontent in the country at this time. Ismail's
merciless exactions, and the pressure of foreign money-lenders, had
given rise to a desire to limit the power of the Khedive, and, above
all, to abolish the Anglo-French Control, which was considered as ruling
the country simply for the benefit of the foreign bondholders. The
Control was further hated by the large landowners, because the law of
liquidation (with which the Controllers in the minds of the people were
associated) had in a measure sacrificed their claims for compensation in
respect of the cancelling of a forced loan known as the "Moukabeleh,"
and it was still more detested by the Pashas and native officials,
because it interfered with the reckless squandering of public money, and
the many opportunities for corruption by which they had so long
benefited.
In addition to this, there was a great deal of irritation at the
increasing number of highly paid European officials which the reformed
regime inaugurated in the latter days of Ismail involved. The people
began to suspect that what was occurring was only part of a plan for
handing the country over to Europeans. The examples lately set by
England with regard to Cyprus, and by France in Tunis, were, it must be
owned, but little calculated to inspire confidence in the political
morality of either of these two Powers.
The prevailing irritation was kept alive by the native press, which
began to indulge in the most violent abuse of Europeans. The army, too,
continued to show signs of insubordination in many ways. To add to the
difficulties of the situation, the colonels of the regiments which had
been expressly sent away into the provinces had acquired the
inconvenient habit of coming back to the capital, and joining in the
many intrigues on foot.
Next followed a demand by the Minister of War for an augmentation of the
War Budget, in order to increase the army to the maximum allowed by the
Sultan's Firman.
Under these circumstances the Chamber of Notables assembled on the 25th
of December, 1881.
The earliest trouble arose from the demand of the Notables that the law
under which they were assembled should be modified so as to give them
power to vote the Budget so far as it related to such of the revenues as
were not assigned to the Public Debt.
The claim of the Chamber, though plausible enough at first sight, was
really, if granted, calculated to infringe all the international
arrangements for the Debt. It was obvious that if the Chamber had the
power and chose to vote an extravagant Budget so far as related to the
_unassigned_ revenues, the administration of the country could not be
carried on, national bankruptcy might ensue, and the collection of the
assigned revenues would become impossible.
The Chamber, however, not only refused to give way on the question of
the Budget, but it demanded that the law should be further amended by
giving the Notables other privileges, namely, the right to control the
acts of public functionaries, to initiate legislation, and to hold the
Ministers responsible to the Chamber. By getting the Notables to make
these demands, which he knew could not be accepted, Mahmoud Sami's
object was to bring about a crisis which could only end in the downfall
of Cherif's Cabinet. He had already persuaded Cherif to make Arabi
Sub-Minister of War, under the pretext of securing him on the side of
the Ministry, and so neutralizing the influence which the army was
exercising over the Chamber. In reality the appointment only afforded
Mahmoud Sami and Arabi increased facilities for intriguing against
Cherif. The result was soon seen.
The amendments to the law giving the Chamber increased power were
inadmissible on many grounds. Were there no other objection, there was
the insurmountable one that the Sultan had already refused a
Constitution to other parts of his dominions, and would certainly oppose
its being granted to Egypt. To put it shortly, the amendments after
being submitted to the English and French Governments were declared
unacceptable.
This at once brought about a crisis, and the Chamber, on the 2nd
February, sent a deputation to the Khedive to require him to summon a
new Ministry.
At this period it was reported to the English and French Governments
that activity was being displayed in putting all the coast
fortifications in an efficient state, and that the strength of the army
was being augmented under the provisions of the new War Budget.
These circumstances, taken in conjunction with the political events
above recorded, led the English and French Governments to conclude that
if the Khedive was to be maintained in power, the time was coming for
them to think about doing something in Egypt. On the 20th of January,
1882, Sir Edward Malet wrote that "armed intervention had become
necessary if the refusal to allow the Chamber to vote the Budget was to
be agreed to, and yet it was impossible to do otherwise, as the measure
only formed part of a complete scheme of revolution." As far back as
December, 1881, M. Gambetta, then at the head of the French Ministry,
had suggested that England and France should take "joint action in Egypt
to strengthen the authority of the Khedive, and to cut short intrigues
at Constantinople, as well as to make the Porte feel that any undue
interference on its part would not be tolerated."
This proposal shortly after resulted in the famous Joint Note
communicated by the English and the French representatives to the
Khedive in Cairo, on the 8th January, 1882. The document was to the
effect that the English and French Governments considered the
maintenance of His Highness upon the throne in the terms laid down by
the Sultan's Firmans, and officially recognized by the two Governments,
as alone able to guarantee for the present and the future good order and
prosperity in Egypt, in which England and France were equally
interested. It continued to say that "the two Governments, being closely
associated in the resolve to guard by their united efforts against all
cause of complication, internal or external, which might menace the
order of things established in Egypt, did not doubt that the assurance
publicly given of their intention in this respect would tend to divert
the dangers to which the Government of the Khedive might be exposed, and
which would certainly find England and France united to oppose them."
The parentage of the Joint Note is attributable to the French
Government, which, up to this time, seemed bent on retaining the lead
which it had from the first taken in regard to Egyptian affairs. The
wording of the document had been altered more than once to suit the late
Lord Granville, then Foreign Secretary, who appears to have been not
quite sure how far he was getting out of his depth in regard to Egyptian
matters.
It was under the influence of some such misgiving that Lord Lyons, the
British Ambassador in Paris, was instructed on the 6th January, 1882, in
communicating to the French Government England's assent to the Note, to
make the reservation that she must not be considered as thereby
committing herself to _any particular mode of action_, if action should
be found necessary. In reply, M. Gambetta, by a despatch dated the
following day, stated that he observed with pleasure "that the only
reservation of the Government of the Queen was as to the _mode of
action_ to be employed, and that this was a reservation in which he
participated."
When one sees how, later on, when action became necessary, the attitude
of the two countries became reversed, the extreme reluctance of the
English Government to move at this time seems curious enough, especially
when it is contrasted with the continued readiness of France to come
forward in the interval. The explanation is that M. Gambetta, with his
clear statesman-like intellect, foreseeing that some sort of
intervention would become necessary, was determined that it should be
limited to that of England and France to the exclusion of Turkey, and so
long as he remained in power boldly shaped his policy with that object.
The English Government, on the other hand, had throughout no real
settled policy with regard to Egypt. Their first idea was to have no
intervention at all; they hoped that things would mend of themselves.
When they found that this was not likely to be the case, the idea of a
Turkish intervention found favour. France, however, was resolutely
opposed to this, and to allow the latter Power to take isolated action,
as indeed she appeared disposed to do if thwarted, was open to serious
objections. To avoid such a catastrophe the English Government found
themselves under the necessity of following, for the time being, the
masterly lead of M. Gambetta. However this may have been, England, by
taking part in the Joint Note, assumed a definite position relative to
Egypt, and, throwing off all hesitation as to "interference with the
internal affairs of the country," pledged herself jointly with France to
support the Khedive against all enemies from within or without.
The first to take offence at the Joint Note was naturally enough the
Sultan, who caused Lord Granville to be informed that the Porte
considered that sending the Khedive any such communication except
through itself was highly improper. The Sultan added that, "To protect
the immunities granted to Egypt, and to preserve the order and
prosperity of that province, was the sincere wish and interest of the
Porte, whose efforts had till then always been directed to that end, and
that there were no circumstances in Egypt which could serve as a motive
for any foreign assurances of the kind made." Finally, the Turkish
Ambassador requested that the two Powers would give an explanation of
what they meant. At the same time the Sultan sent a Circular to the
other Powers, protesting against the action of England and France.
Lord Granville now began to doubt whether he had not gone a little too
far, and drafted an answer to the Porte of an apologetic character. The
tone of the proposed reply was somewhat of the kind that a schoolboy
taken to task for an act of impertinence towards his master might be
expected to give. Substantially, it was that the two Powers did not
mean anything at all.
The despatch, as originally drafted, began by disclaiming any doubt
whatever as to the sovereignty of the Sultan over Egypt. It proceeded to
declare that there was no change in the policy of Her Majesty's
Government, which was as anxious as ever for the continuance of the
sovereignty of the Porte, and for the maintenance of the liberties and
administrative independence secured to Egypt by the Sultan's Firmans.
Having paid the Porte these little compliments, the despatch disclaimed
all ambitious views with regard to the country (of which, by the way,
the Sultan had been careful never to accuse the two Powers), but said
that they could never be indifferent to events which might plunge Egypt
into anarchy, and that it was only with a view to warding off such a
catastrophe that Her Majesty's Government thought it advisable, in
conjunction with the French Government, to forward a declaration showing
the accord of the two in carrying out the policy described. The despatch
finally pointed out that the form of the Note was not a new one, and
that similar declarations had been on special occasions made to the
Khedive without calling forth any remonstrance from the Porte.
Gambetta, however, viewed the matter in a different spirit. Having once
gone forward he was not disposed to draw back. He had, moreover, the
interests of the large body of French bondholders to protect. He at
first objected that no explanation of the Joint Note at all was
necessary, and that any attempt to explain it would only tend to
encourage the military party. Seeing, however, that Lord Granville was
determined to send some reply, Gambetta insisted on certain
modifications in the despatch. Amongst them he suggested that the
assertion of the Porte, that there were no circumstances that could
justify the steps taken by England and France, should be answered, and
proposed that it should be pointed out, first, that the authority of the
Khedive had been modified and diminished; second, that the Chamber of
Notables had arrogated to itself the right of interfering with matters
expressly exempted from its jurisdiction by the Khedive's Decree; and
third, that the Chamber had aimed at setting aside arrangements to which
Egypt was bound by international engagements with England and France.
Lord Granville once more yielded to what he had begun to recognize as
the superior mind of the French statesman, and Gambetta's amendments
were agreed to.
It was not until the 2nd February, however, that the reply to the
Porte's remonstrance was actually sent off.
In the meantime the Gambetta Ministry had fallen, and from this moment
dates a marked change in the attitude of the French Republic with regard
to Egypt. M. de Freycinet, the successor to Gambetta, though agreeing to
the amended reply to the Porte, cautiously inquired what meaning was to
be attached to the reservation as to "taking action" made by Her
Majesty's Government in assenting to the original Note.
Lord Granville, no longer under the influence of Gambetta, and
apparently anxious to recede as far as possible from the somewhat bold
position which he had been induced to adopt, answered, contrary to the
plain words in which the reservation had been expressed, that Her
Majesty's Government reserved to themselves the right to determine, not
merely the _particular mode of action_ to be adopted in Egypt, but
whether any action at all was necessary.
De Freycinet, who, it must be admitted, was equally glad to back out,
then plainly declared that he was disinclined to any armed intervention
in Egypt, whether by France and England together, or by either
separately. This announcement must have been a surprise to the British
Government, which, after being led by France into sending the Joint
Note, now began to discover that in the event of its becoming necessary
to take any steps to carry it into effect, England could no longer count
on her as an ally.
Under these circumstances, and feeling that the time when action would
have to be taken might not be far off, Lord Granville addressed a
Circular to the other Powers, requesting them to enter upon an exchange
of views as to the best mode of dealing with the Egyptian Question.
The effect of the Joint Note upon the Porte has been stated. It only
remains to consider its effect upon the Khedive and the Notables. The
Khedive received the assurances of protection given by England and
France gratefully enough. It was not so, however, with his Ministers,
who, on the Note being communicated on the 8th January, wanted, like the
Sultan, to know what it meant. Sir Edward Malet, in reply, assured them
that the Note was merely intended to convey to the Khedive the
assurance of the friendship of the Powers, and that in point of fact it
did not really mean much.
It is obvious that to produce any good effect on the Chamber and the
National Party it was necessary that the Note should have been backed by
the display of force, and this unfortunately was just what was wanting.
In short, England and France launched their threat without being
prepared to follow it up by immediate action. It created great
indignation on the part of the military leaders and in the Chamber;
Arabi declared point-blank that any intervention on the part of England
and France was inadmissible. Later on, when it was seen that the two
Powers were not really to act, but, on the contrary, were busy doing all
they could to attenuate the step they had taken, the feeling of
indignation gave way to one of contempt, very natural under the
circumstances.
Amongst those who misled the chiefs of the National Party none were so
conspicuous as two Englishmen, namely, the late Sir William Gregory, an
ex-Colonial Governor, and Mr. Wilfred S. Blunt. Both these gentlemen
had, whilst spending some months in Egypt, conceived a violent sympathy
for the National movement. They had witnessed during their stay in the
country numerous instances of misrule and oppression, and they regarded
Arabi and his friends as the leaders of a genuine popular effort to
secure political liberty and good government.
In addition to the assurances which they received from Sir William
Gregory and Mr. Blunt, the leaders of the National Party were led to
believe, and as has been seen not without reason, that England and
France were not really agreed to do anything, much less to take any
decisive step in the way of intervention; that the two Powers were
jealous of each other, and that the Joint Note might be safely
disregarded. The Arabists further clung to the hope that even were
France and England allied, the other Powers would prevent their
interference, and the protests which four of them, namely, Germany,
Austria, Russia, and Italy, made at the time against any foreign
interference in Egypt without their consent, certainly tended to confirm
this view.
This was the condition of affairs on the 2nd February, when, as already
stated, the deputation from the Chamber requested the Khedive to summon
a new Ministry. Tewfik had by this time become thoroughly alarmed. The
tonic effect produced by the Joint Note had quite gone off, and he was
beginning to doubt how far he could rely on support from England and
France. He realized that by placing himself under the tutelage of the
Western Powers he was injuring himself with the Porte, and he had daily
proofs afforded him of his growing unpopularity with his subjects. Under
these circumstances he saw nothing for it but to yield. At the
suggestion of the Chamber, the intriguer Mahmoud Sami was directed to
form a new Ministry, which he lost no time in doing, in conjunction with
his confederate Arabi, who now filled the important post of Minister of
War.
CHAPTER VI.
CRITICAL POSITION.
Although the Ministry of Mahmoud Sami was forced upon the Khedive, the
position of the latter was at the time so hopeless that one must not be
surprised at his endeavouring to make the best of it and put a good face
upon the matter. Accordingly, on the 4th of February, 1882, Tewfik, in
true Oriental style, wrote to his new Premier that, in accepting the
task of forming a Cabinet, he had given a fresh proof of his devotion
and patriotism, and the letter ended by approving of the programme which
the new Premier had drawn up.
The programme in question referred to the arrangements for the Public
Debt, including the Control. It spoke of the necessity for judicial and
other reforms, and then passed on to the burning question of the Chamber
of Notables, and stated that the first act of the Ministry would be to
obtain sanction for the proposed law for the Chamber. This law, it was
stated, would respect all rights and obligations, whether private or
international, and would wisely determine the responsibility of
Ministers towards the Chamber as well as the discussion of laws.
Mahmoud Sami's programme elicited from the English and French
Controllers a memorandum, in which they very sensibly observed that it
mattered very little whether or not the intention of attacking the
Control was asserted, as by the very force of circumstances it became
ineffectual when the Controllers found themselves no longer in the
presence of the Khedive and of Ministers freely appointed by him, but of
a Chamber and an army. It added that the Chamber, under the influence of
certain military chiefs, did not hesitate to claim rights incompatible
with the social condition of the country; it had gone so far as to
compel the Khedive to change the Ministry which had his confidence, and,
under pressure of certain officers, to impose on him the late Minister
of War as Prime Minister, and concluded with the significant words: "The
Khedive's power no longer exists."
After this it is not surprising that the Controllers resigned office.
Sir Auckland Colvin was requested by the British Government to remain at
his post and maintain "an attitude of passive observation." His French
colleague was replaced by M. Brédif. There is no doubt that the
Controllers' view of the situation was only too just. With Arabi as
Minister of War, and his co-conspirator, Mahmoud Sami, President of the
Council the country was simply under a military dictatorship.
Meanwhile, the reserves of the Artillery were called in and distributed
amongst the coast fortifications, recruiting in the provinces was being
actively carried on, ninety Krupp guns were ordered from Europe, and
Arabi was created a Pasha by the Sultan.
The National Party had now become complete masters of the situation.
Notwithstanding this, a collision might for some little time have been
averted but for an incident which occurred shortly after.
The differences between the Circassians and the native-born Egyptians in
the army have been already touched upon. One peculiarity of the Arab
race is a revengeful disposition. Arabi and his friends had, as already
stated, met with rough usage at the hands of the Circassian party. Hence
it followed that the first idea of the former on getting into power was
to avenge themselves on their old enemies. This was carried out by the
wholesale arrest of fifty Circassian officers, and of Osman Pasha Rifki,
former Minister of War, on a charge of conspiracy to assassinate Arabi.
It was also alleged that the plot comprised the deposition of the
Khedive and the restoration of Ismail Pasha.
The prisoners were tried in secret by a court martial appointed by the
military leaders, and, of course, found guilty. They were, it is said,
subjected to torture to induce them to confess, and persons of
respectability testified that they heard at night shrieks of pain coming
from the place where the prisoners were confined. The sentence passed on
forty of them, including Osman, was that of exile for life to the
remotest limits of the Soudan. This was equivalent to a sentence of
death as regards most of the prisoners.
It was necessary that the sentences should be confirmed by Decree of the
Khedive, and he consulted Sir Edward Malet as to the course to be taken.
The story of the plot was, there is reason to believe, purely imaginary.
With some little hesitation, and after conferring with the diplomatic
agents of the Powers, the Khedive boldly determined to exercise his
prerogative without reference to his Ministers, and signed a Decree
commuting the sentences to simple banishment from Egypt, without loss of
rank and honours.
This was a defiance of Mahmoud Sami, to which he was not disposed to
submit. On the 10th May, the Khedive summoned the Consuls-General, and
informed them that the President of the Council had insisted that this
Decree should be changed by condemning the prisoners to be struck off
the strength of the army, and had threatened that his refusal would be
followed by a general massacre of foreigners. The significance of this
threat coming from Mahmoud Sami, the Minister who was in power when just
a month later--namely, on the 11th June--a massacre of foreigners _did_
take place in Alexandria, will probably be remarked.
The Chamber of Notables had ceased to sit on the 26th March, when the
session closed; but Mahmoud Sami now announced that since the Khedive
and his Ministers could not agree, and as it was impossible for the
Ministry to resign, they had determined themselves to convoke the
Chamber, and to lay the case before it, and that he did not intend to
hold any further communication with the Khedive until the difference
between them had been decided by the Chamber. He added that in the
meantime the Ministry would answer for the public safety.
The alarm in Cairo now began to be general. It was open warfare between
the Khedive, and his Ministry supported by the army. The National Party
made no secret of their intention to depose the Khedive as soon as the
Chamber assembled.
The Notables, when the day for assembly arrived, began to show a
disinclination to support the National Party. They had commenced to
realize that they had already gone further than they had intended, and
also that they were being merely used as tools by Arabi and his
colleagues.
At first they refused to meet at all, on the ground that they had not
been convoked by the Khedive, but only by the Ministry. They were,
however, induced to assemble, and on the 13th May they met at the house
of Sultan Pasha, the President of the Chamber. Here Mahmoud Sami read an
indictment against the Khedive, charging him principally with not
governing through his Ministers, and with compromising the liberties of
Egypt. On the 14th the Ministers were so little sure of the support of
the Notables, that Mahmoud Sami and Arabi went to the Palace, and, in
the names of themselves and their colleagues, offered to resign if the
Khedive would guarantee public order. His Highness answered, that such a
condition was a most unusual one, and that it would be the business of
the Ministry to see that public order was not troubled; he added that
the only persons likely to cause trouble were Arabi and his associates.
On the 15th, the English and French Consuls-General gave notice to Arabi
that if there was a disturbance of public order, he would find Europe
and Turkey, as well as England and France, against him, but that if, on
the other hand, he remained loyal to the Khedive, his acts and person
would be favourably regarded.
Arabi, in reply, stated that he would guarantee order only as long as he
remained Minister, except that in the event of a fleet arriving he could
not answer for the public safety. The same day the two Consuls-General
announced to the Khedive that an Anglo-French fleet was hourly expected
at Alexandria. This was followed by the Ministers going in a body to the
Palace and making a complete submission to the Khedive.
A reconciliation of the Khedive with his Ministers was accepted by the
former only on the earnest representations of the Notables and the
Consuls-General, in order that tranquillity might not be disturbed, the
idea was to keep the Ministry in office as a temporary measure, in order
that there might be some one to treat with when the fleets should
arrive.
Notwithstanding the improved aspect of affairs, the alarm in Cairo
continued, and crowds of people daily left the city. To allay the panic,
Mahmoud Sami and Arabi declared that they would guarantee the
preservation of order on the arrival of the fleets.
On the 19th and 20th of May the much-talked-of "fleets" arrived at
Alexandria. They consisted only of the British ironclad _Invincible_
with two gunboats, and the French ironclad _La Gallisonière_, also
accompanied by two gun-vessels. The remainder of the allied squadron was
left at Suda Bay, in the island of Crete.
The despatch of the English and French ships to Alexandria by two
Powers, each professing to be "disinclined to armed intervention in
Egypt," was so important a step that it may be interesting to go back a
little to consider the means by which it was brought about. Lord
Granville, immediately after the Abdin demonstration of the 9th
September, had intimated to the French Government as his idea of a
remedy for the military insubordination prevailing the sending of a
Turkish General to Egypt. M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, objected that this might lead to further steps, and
possibly to the permanent occupation of the country by Turkish troops.
The French Minister expressed himself in favour of a "joint military
control," consisting of an English and a French General, to restore
discipline in the Egyptian Army. Nothing was done to carry out either
suggestion.
In March, 1882, when the struggle between the Khedive and the Chamber
was at its height, Lord Granville suggested that England and France
should send two "technical advisers" to assist the representatives of
the two Powers in settling the details of the financial matters then
pending. The proposal was so ludicrously absurd under existing
circumstances, that it says much for the politeness of the French
Minister that he took the trouble to give a serious reply. He objected
that the measure would give offence to the other Powers, as an attempt
on the part of England and France to effect a separate settlement of
Egyptian affairs, and also that it would tend to lower the
Consuls-General in their own eyes and in those of the Egyptians.
Again baffled, Lord Granville, in April, 1882, could think of nothing
better than that the Sultan should be asked "to send a General with full
powers to restore discipline in the Egyptian Army, with the
understanding that he was not to exercise those powers in any way
without the concurrence of an English and a French General, who would be
associated with him."
This proposal also fell through, the French Government objecting that
the sending of a Turkish General at all would tend sooner or later to
the sending of Turkish troops, which was not desirable.
The despatch of a Turkish Commissioner of some kind continued to be
talked about, when, on the 7th May, 1882, Sir Edward Malet wrote to the
Foreign Office that the Khedive's Ministers would certainly resist by
force the arrival of any Commissioner from Turkey. After this, Lord
Granville was for a time forced to abandon his favourite hobby of
Turkish intervention. Sir Edward Malet's despatch contained the
following significant passage:--
"I believe that some complication of an acute nature must
supervene before any satisfactory solution of the Egyptian
question can be attained, and that it would be wiser to hasten
it than to endeavour to retard it, because the longer
misgovernment lasts the more difficult it is to remedy the evils
which it has caused."
This very sensible opinion had its effect, for, on the 11th May, Lord
Granville was so far able to make up his mind as to say that the English
Government were willing to send two ironclads to Alexandria to protect
European residents. This announcement, however, was only made after the
idea had been suggested by the French Minister. Even at this period,
Lord Granville could not help referring regretfully to his original idea
of sending the three Generals (an expedient about as hopeful as sending
three flower-pots with water to extinguish a fire), and in reply to M.
de Freycinet, his Lordship said that he could still think of nothing
better.
The French Government, in agreeing to the despatch of the Anglo-French
fleet, appeared resolved to abandon the cautious attitude which it had
assumed on M. de Freycinet taking office. The French Premier, on the
11th May, informed the Chamber of Deputies that in its Egyptian policy
the Ministry had two objects, first, to preserve "the preponderating
influence of France in Egypt"; and, second, to maintain the independence
of Egypt, as established by the Firmans; and added that the means which
would be employed to carry out this policy would be an intimate alliance
with England.
M. de Freycinet, on the 12th May, informed Her Majesty's Ambassador in
Paris, that as the Khedive had been acting under the advice of England
and France, the French Government considered it the bounden duty of the
two Powers to support His Highness _as far as circumstances would
allow_, and that France would co-operate loyally and without _arrière
pensée_ with England in that sense. M. de Freycinet, with some sense of
humour, added that sending the three Generals would be inopportune.
On the 13th the English Government notified their concurrence in the
views of France with regard to the Khedive, and welcomed the
co-operation of the French Government. Lord Granville, at the same time,
expressed the readiness of himself and his colleagues to defer to the
objections raised to the mission of the three Generals.
It now became known that the Notables were assembling in Cairo, and that
the Ministry of Mahmoud Sami was about to propose the deposition of the
Khedive. It was also reported that Mahmoud Sami proposed to declare
himself "Governor-General of Egypt by the national will."
These alarming reports caused the preparations for the departure of the
ships to be hastened, and, at the same time, with a view to keep the
ground clear, the two Western Powers sent an intimation to the Porte
desiring it to abstain for the moment from all intervention in Egypt.
The instructions to the British Admiral were as follows:--
"Communicate with the British Consul-General on arrival at
Alexandria, and in concert with him propose to co-operate with
naval forces of France to support the Khedive and protect
British subjects and Europeans, _landing a force, if required_,
for latter object, such force not to leave protection of ships'
guns without instructions from home."
The French Admiral's instructions were somewhat different, and tend to
show that the two Powers were not completely agreed as to the means to
be employed to support Tewfik. His instructions were in these words:--
"On arrival at Alexandria communicate with the Consul-General,
who will, if necessary, indicate to you what you will have to do
to give a _moral_ support to the Khedive. You will abstain,
until you have contrary instructions, from any material act of
war, unless you are attacked or have to protect the safety of
Europeans."
The British and French Consuls-General, on the arrival of the fleets,
advised the Khedive to take advantage of the favourable opportunity to
dismiss the existing Ministry, and to form a new Cabinet under Cherif
Pasha, or any other person inspiring confidence. Negotiations were
simultaneously opened with Arabi in order to induce him, with the other
rebel leaders, to retire from the country, in return for which they were
to be guaranteed their property, rank, and pay.
None of these plans succeeded. The Khedive recognized the futility of
dismissing a Ministry that insisted on remaining in power. Mahmoud Sami
replied that the Ministry would not retire so long as the squadrons were
kept at Alexandria, and Arabi declared that he must refuse either to
retire from his position, or to leave the country.
On the 25th May, the representatives of England and France handed to
Mahmoud Sami, as President of the Council of Ministers, an ultimatum in
the form of a Dual Note, demanding the retirement of Arabi from the
country, the withdrawal of "the Colonels" into the interior, and the
resignation of Sami's Ministry. The Note added that the two Governments
would, if necessary, insist on the fulfilment of these conditions.
The Ministers, on receipt of the "Dual Note," waited on the Khedive to
ask his opinion as to the answer that should be given, and His Highness
distinctly told them that he accepted its conditions. They urged a
reference to the Porte, on which the Khedive told them that it was an
internal question, and that it was strange that they, who had complained
that he had failed to uphold the privileges of Egypt, should suggest
such a course. On the 26th the Ministers resigned, alleging as a reason
that the Khedive, in accepting the conditions of England and France, had
acquiesced in foreign interference in Egypt.
The Khedive promptly accepted the resignation of the Ministry, and sent
for Cherif Pasha to form a new Cabinet. Cherif refused on the ground
that no Government was possible while the military chiefs remained.
On the 27th an event occurred in Alexandria which tended to bring
matters still more to a crisis. The officers of the regiments and the
police force in that city held a secret meeting, and telegraphed to the
Khedive direct that they would not accept the resignation of Arabi, and
gave the Khedive twelve hours to reply, after which the officers
declared that they would not be responsible for public tranquillity.
On receipt of this message, the Khedive summoned to his presence the
chief personages of State, the principal members of the Chamber, and the
head officers of the Cairo garrison, and placed the situation before
them.
Toulba Pasha, one of Arabi's strongest supporters, interrupted the
Khedive in his speech, and stated that the army absolutely rejected the
Dual Note, and awaited the decision of the Porte, which was the only
authority they recognized. On the same day Arabi, at the head of a
hundred officers, met the chief persons of Cairo and the Notables, and
demanded the deposition of the Khedive, threatening death to the
recalcitrant. Nevertheless almost all present, excepting the officers,
persisted in supporting their sovereign. Arabi and the officers demanded
of the Khedive a decree reinstating Arabi as Minister of War. Amongst
those present, Sultan Pasha and some of the Notables warned the Khedive
of what had taken place, and told him his life was not safe unless he
reinstated Arabi. The Khedive consulted the English and French
Consuls-General, who advised him not to comply.
In the afternoon of the same day, a deputation consisting of the Coptic
Patriarch, the Chief Rabbi, the Notables, and others, waited on the
Khedive, begging him to reinstate Arabi, adding, that though he might be
ready to sacrifice his own life, he ought not to sacrifice theirs, and
that Arabi had threatened them all with death if they did not obtain the
Khedive's assent to his reappointment. In his perplexity, the Khedive,
in order to prevent bloodshed, yielded, and issued a memorandum stating
that at the repeated requests of the population, and with the desire of
maintaining order and the tranquillity of the country, he reinstated
Arabi.
Although one may be disposed to blame Tewfik for his conduct on this
occasion, it must be owned that his position at the moment was a
critical one. The despatch of the fleets on which he had been led to
rely had turned out a ridiculous fiasco. Instead of ten vessels, there
were only two accompanied by four gunboats, and no troops for landing.
The lamentable weakness of the demonstration only excited the ridicule
of the military party. It was beyond doubt that the guard at the Palace
had been doubled, and that orders had been given to the sentries not to
allow Tewfik to leave the Palace unless the deputation received a
favourable reply, and to fire on him if he insisted on going out. All
the outlets of the Palace were carefully watched, and a mob was
collected for the purpose of rushing into the Palace and ill-treating
him, if the prayer of the deputation were refused. It was also announced
that there was to be a military demonstration at five in the afternoon,
and that it was the intention of the army to depose the Khedive. Under
these circumstances, and seeing how little material aid he had from
England and France, it is not surprising that he yielded.
One of the first acts of Arabi on resuming office was to publish a
declaration that now he had been reinstated, he guaranteed the security
of the life and property of all the inhabitants of Egypt irrespective of
nationality or religion. This assurance was not made before it was
required.
For several days past a feeling of uneasiness had prevailed, especially
in Alexandria; when the military and police in that city made their
demand for Arabi's reinstatement, Mr. Cookson, the British Consul, asked
the Governor, Omar Pasha Loutfi, if he could answer for the safety of
Europeans. He replied that he had exhausted every effort to calm the
officers and soldiers, but had entirely failed, and that he could not
answer for their conduct, although he saw no reason to apprehend any
disturbance.
In the prevailing state of things, the Consul thought it his duty to
confer with Admiral Seymour as to the best means of protecting British
subjects in case of a general attack upon Europeans, and was informed
that the Admiral was not prepared to land any force, although he would
protect the embarkation of women and children and others who might seek
refuge on board ships in the harbour. The Admiral sent an officer with
the Consul, and a spot for embarkation was selected.
This arrangement was communicated to the British residents at a meeting
held at the Consulate the same day (the 28th).
The European population now became seriously alarmed, and on the 29th a
memorial was drawn up by the British residents, calling upon Her
Majesty's Government to provide efficient means for the protection of
their lives. It pointed out that--
"During the twenty-four hours, from the 26th to the 27th,
Alexandria was in continual danger of being stormed by the
soldiery, who, it was reported, actually had cartridges served
out to them to be used against Europeans." "There was," it said,
"every reason to believe that the perils which had come without
warning would recur again, and against them," it continued,
"Europeans were absolutely defenceless. They had not even the
means of flight, as in order to reach the ships in harbour they
would have to run the gauntlet through the streets. The small
squadron in port could only silence the forts, and when these
forts were disabled, then would commence a period of great
danger for Europeans, who would be at the mercy of soldiers
exasperated by defeat, whilst the English Admiral could not risk
his men ashore, as his whole available force for those
operations did not exceed 300 men." The memorial concluded by
stating that "every day's delay increased the dangerous temper
of the soldiery and their growing defiance of discipline."
Mr. Cookson at once telegraphed the contents of the memorial to the
Foreign Office, where it was carefully placed amongst the archives.
The history of events has now been brought down to the 29th May, on
which date Admiral Seymour reported that the Egyptians were raising
earthworks opposite his flagship, the _Invincible_, then lying in the
inner harbour at Alexandria, and suggested that his squadron should be
strengthened by the despatch of three of the ships of war which had been
left at Suda Bay.
In a later telegram he added that when the earthworks were armed, the
position of the unarmoured vessels of his squadron would be untenable,
if fired on without warning. In reply, the Admiral was directed to
arrange with the French Admiral to dispose the ironclads so as to
silence the batteries if they opened fire.
On the 30th May, the British ironclad _Monarch_, and two gun-vessels,
the _Cygnet_ and the _Coquette_, as well as three French vessels of
war--the _Alma_, the _Thétis_ and the _Hirondelle_--were ordered from
Suda Bay to Alexandria, where they arrived between the 2nd and 5th June.
The rest of the British Squadron in Suda Bay were directed to cruise off
the coast of Egypt, and to communicate with Alexandria for orders from
time to time.
Arabi, on being applied to on the subject of the earthworks, answered
that repairs only were being effected, and refused to order them to be
discontinued. It was useless to remonstrate with the Khedive, whose
orders that all warlike preparations should be stopped had already been
disregarded. The Sultan was therefore appealed to, and he sent an order
to Arabi to desist from further armament. Arabi gave the necessary
instructions, and the new works, on which two guns were already mounted,
were discontinued.
The Khedive, on his part, applied to the Sultan, and requested that an
Imperial Commissioner should be sent to Egypt. On the 3rd June it was
known that Dervish Pasha, a Marshal of the Ottoman Empire, had left
Constantinople for Alexandria as special Envoy from the Sultan, and his
arrival was awaited with anxiety by both the Khedive and the Arabists.
The following observations, taken from one of the highest authorities on
Egyptian matters,[8] throw a light on Dervish Pasha's mission.
"The Sultan's aim naturally was not to reinforce, but to
counteract Anglo-French influence in Egypt. By accepting his
intervention England and France confessed themselves worsted,
and opened the door for a host of intrigues. His Majesty was not
slow to take advantage of the opportunity and tried to play a
complicated double game. Dervish Pasha, the First Commissioner,
was instructed to support the Khedive, and if possible
intimidate the leaders of the military party, while Ahmet Essad,
the Second Commissioner, was instructed to conciliate Arabi and
his friends, and assure them that they had in the Sultan a sure
friend and ally. The Third Commissioner's duty was to act as a
spy on his two colleagues, and he in his turn was closely
watched by a secretary, who sent secret reports direct to
Constantinople."
On Dervish's arrival in Cairo, on the 7th of June, he was greeted by the
acclamations of a mob of the lowest class of natives, who shouted before
his carriage the praises of Arabi, and denounced the Christians.
"Dervish was known before his arrival to be accessible to
Egyptian arguments, and there can be no doubt that they were
boldly asked for and liberally given. Upon his arrival he showed
marked favour to the Arabi party. Then he had a long interview
with the Khedive, and then his conduct suddenly became very
satisfactory to the Palace. Mahmoud Sami had arranged that the
petitions from all the provinces should be brought to the
Commissioner by deputation. Dervish received them graciously,
placed the petitions in a pile on the divan, begged the
deputation to consider all grievances settled by his arrival,
and dismissed them. The Ministers came next. Mahmoud Sami
entered with effusion, and introduced his colleagues. Dervish
remained seated, continued his conversation with his secretary,
and then made a casual remark to Sami on the beautiful situation
of the Palace of Ghezireh. The Ministers looked dumfounded, but
Dervish, continuing his conversation, begged his secretary to
repeat to him the story of the massacre of the Mamelukes by
Mehemet Ali at the Citadel,[9] which he could see from the
window where he sat. When the suggestive story was completed,
the Envoy, with one of his pleasantest smiles, remarked to
Arabi, 'The one man who escaped was a lucky dog,' and with a
remark on the weather dismissed them."[10]
After this slap in the face the Ministers left, feeling that there was
no alternative between complete submission to the Khedive and absolute
defiance of the Sultan.
Before two days elapsed, events occurred at Alexandria which
demonstrated that Arabi was the only power in Egypt, and brought Dervish
to his feet as a suppliant.
What those events were, will be recorded in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VII.
THE RIOTS AT ALEXANDRIA.
For some days previous to Sunday, the 11th June, 1882, the demeanour of
the natives towards the European population of Alexandria had been
growing more and more unfriendly; and there were many indications that
some disturbance, the precise nature of which no one was able to
discover, was impending.
The forenoon of the 11th passed off quietly enough and without any
unaccustomed incident, and the European population attended the churches
and places of worship as usual.
Between two and three in the afternoon the tranquillity of the town was
disturbed by shouts and yells from some two thousand natives, who were
suddenly seen swarming up the Rue des Soeurs, the Rue Mahmoudieh, and
the adjacent streets, crying, "Death to the Christians!" Others came
soon after from the Attarin and the Ras-el-Tin quarters; and the riot,
which appears to have broken out in three places almost at the same
time, became general.
The crowd rushed on, striking with their "naboots" all the Europeans
whom they could meet, knocking them down and trampling them under foot.
Shots were fired; the soldiers and police interfered; but, in most
instances, only with the object of making the butchery more complete.
Many Europeans, flying for refuge to the police stations, were there
slaughtered in cold blood. Shops and houses were broken into and
pillaged, and for four and a half hours, until the soldiers arrived on
the scene, the usually quiet and prosperous city of Alexandria
experienced a fair share of the horrors of war.
The signal for the massacre was a feigned Arab funeral procession, in
which natives marched wearing green turbans, and which passed between 10
a.m. and noon through the main streets of Alexandria.[11]
The next thing which occurred was a disturbance which broke out about 1
p.m. between Europeans and natives in the neighbourhood of a
coffee-house called the "Café Crystal," in the Rue des Soeurs.
Of the precise origin of the riot it is difficult to speak with
certainty. It has been stated that it originated in a dispute between a
Maltese and a native coachman or donkey-boy, in which the Maltese, being
beaten with a stick, retaliated with his knife, and, according to one
account, killed his adversary. Another version is that two natives
attempted to break into the shop of a Maltese with whom they had
previously quarrelled, and were violently resisted by the owner. Both
accounts are involved in doubt, and the better opinion is that whatever
may have been the origin of the alleged quarrel, it was only a pretext
for what was to ensue. Anyhow, about the time last mentioned, Mr.
Cookson, the British Consul, was summoned by the local police to assist
in quelling a disturbance between Maltese and natives in the quarter of
the Caracol Labban, a police-station in the Rue des Soeurs. He found
there the Governor and Sub-Prefect of Police, and, after waiting more
than an hour, under the impression that they had succeeded in calming
the excitement, Mr. Cookson returned to the Consulate. This was not,
however, until he had been struck by one of the stones which were flying
about.
About 3 p.m. he found a messenger, purporting to come from the Governor,
to summon him with all the other Consuls to a meeting at the same
Caracol as before.
There is good reason to believe that no such request was ever made by
Omar Pasha Loutfi, and that the messages sent were part of a
preconceived scheme to decoy the Consuls into the streets, where they
would be in the power of the mob. It is a singular thing that there were
considerable intervals of time between the delivery of the messages, not
warranted by the positions of the different Consulates, as if the
intention was for the Consuls to arrive separately. Mr. Cookson,
accompanied only by a janissary in uniform, drove immediately towards
the Caracol. He found marks of recent conflict in the streets and groups
of excited natives moving about. On approaching within about ninety
yards of the Caracol, at a place where four roads met, he was first
assailed with stones and then felled to the ground with a blow from a
"naboot." When the Consul recovered consciousness, he was lying in the
street surrounded by a crowd, one or two members of which, including a
native officer, were trying to protect him, whilst others were striking
at him. Fortunately he was able to escape with his life to the Caracol,
where he remained till about 4 p.m., when he was brought by a circuitous
route to the Consulate.[12]
It has been stated that the inaction of the police at the different
Caracols was due to the fact that the day previous all the officers and
sub-officers in charge had been convoked, and told that the men were to
remain at their posts under any circumstances, without interfering even
in the event of an outbreak happening.
Almost at the same time and place, the other members of the Consular
body, as they arrived on the scene, were similarly attacked.
All this time the Governor was at the door of the Caracol, giving orders
to the mustaphazin (military police) to disperse the mob, though his
orders were never executed. In fact, the mustaphazin were quite beyond
his control, and at times openly cursed and reviled him when he tried to
interfere on behalf of the Europeans.
Whilst the fighting went on, the Arabs, the police, and the soldiers
occupied their time in breaking open and plundering the shops and houses
on the line of route, tearing down doors and shutters, and using the
materials as well as the legs of tables and chairs as weapons of
offence.
The rioting gradually extended up the Rue des Soeurs, towards the
Place Mehemet Ali (the great square), the Europeans here and there
firing at times from the terraces and balconies of the houses, and the
soldiers and the mob replying with firearms and stones.
At an early period of the fray, one of the mustaphazin was killed by a
shot from a house, and his body being taken to an adjoining Caracol, his
comrades became so exasperated, that they butchered every European who
sought refuge there.
In the streets, the conduct of the mustaphazin was almost equally bad.
When they did interfere, they did so in a half-hearted, indifferent
manner. In the great majority of cases, where they did not join in the
killing themselves, they encouraged their countrymen to do so. There is
reason to believe that the mustaphazin did a large proportion of the
killing, as they were armed with sword-bayonets. The natives, on the
other hand, had in most cases only heavy sticks, with which they stunned
and bruised their victims.
A considerable number of Bedouins were observed amongst the mob, which
emerged from the Rue des Soeurs by the side streets leading into the
adjoining quarters. The Bedouins were armed with their long guns, with
which they shot down passing Europeans. One of a group of Bedouins,
stationed opposite the European hospital to intercept the fugitives, was
seen to shoot a man who was running past, and crouching down, in the
hope of escaping observation.
About 4 p.m. a second mob came down from a different part of the town
known as the Attarin quarter, and similar fighting went on, the natives
attacking every European who came in their path. Amongst other victims
was a little boy five years old, apparently a Maltese, who was killed
with a naboot in front of the Austrian Post Office.
At half-past five, the portion of the Rue des Soeurs where the
disturbance began was almost deserted, the ground being strewn with
_débris_ of wood and glass, and the windows shattered, many of them by
bullets. Further up, and opposite the Lazarist College, in the same
street, but nearer the Place Mehemet Ali, the crowd from the Attarin
quarter mingled with the other mob were continuing the work of
destruction. They hunted down every European they saw; one they fell
upon and killed with sticks and pieces of wood at the very door of the
college itself. All this while the mustaphazin, some thirty or forty in
number, in front of the college, were observed firing off their rifles
without any apparent motive. The street at this part was now filled with
rioters. A number of Europeans found refuge at the college, the doors of
which were bolted and barred by the inmates. From the terrace above
these were able to look down on the work of destruction.
About 5.30 a European in black clothes, and apparently of good social
position, covered with blood and with his trousers torn to rags, was
seen running backwards and forwards, as if distracted. Just as he
reached the corner of the Rue des Soeurs, a point guarded by two
mustaphazin, a band of natives armed with sticks emerged from the
street, rushed at once on him and beat him on the head. The two
mustaphazin not only did not prevent the Arabs from ill-treating their
victim, but, on the contrary, were seen to seize the wretched man by the
arm, and laughing, thrust him into the midst of the band which was
assailing him. Whether he subsequently escaped or not is unknown. One of
these mustaphazin being remonstrated with, candidly replied, "We are
ordered to do it."
In one spot in the Rue des Soeurs the bodies of three Europeans were
found lying in a heap. One had a bullet-hole in the head, another was
stabbed through the chest, and another with his skull fractured was
lying on his face with his shoes and stockings stripped off.
The mob now turned their attention to indiscriminate pillage. The shops
in the square itself were broken into and the kiosks wrecked. Next,
crowds of looters were observed going back in the direction of Gabari,
laden with goods from the neighbouring shops. These the mustaphazin
allowed to pass without opposition; indeed, several of their own number
were themselves carrying the stolen goods. Soldiers were seen to take
from Europeans, whose lives they spared, their watches and such
valuables as they had about them.
In the Strada Nuova both police and soldiers were observed encouraging
the mob to break open shops, and each time this was done the police and
soldiers entered first, and had the first choice.
In another quarter two native policemen were observed attacking even a
native, who was carrying gold articles and a quantity of money, when a
mounted soldier appeared on the scene, and he and the policemen shared
the plunder between them, leaving the thief to go empty away. In their
selection of objects of plunder the mob were far from particular. One
soldier was seen walking down the street with a glass chandelier on his
head. Another was seen riding down the street on a toy horse. The
tobacco shops suffered more severely than any others; wherever one of
these was seen, it was invariably broken into and the contents
distributed among the crowd. Wearing apparel, also, was in great
request, and one of the native officers was observed sitting on the
pavement exchanging the trousers he was wearing for a new pair stolen
from a neighbouring shop. In the few cases where a native had not
succeeded in obtaining any plunder for himself, he invariably turned to
one of his more fortunate comrades and helped himself to his stock. One
man who was carrying off some dozens of slippers was stopped by no less
than three of his fellow-countrymen, who made him wait whilst they
selected those which fitted them best.
Whilst this was occurring similar scenes of violence were being
perpetrated in another part of the town, namely, in the streets leading
from the Place Mehemet Ali to the Marina and to Ras-el-Tin.
On that Sunday a considerable number of Europeans had been to visit the
ships in the harbour. On their return, between 4 and 5 p.m., they found
the Marina Street, Frank Street, and the adjoining thoroughfares in the
possession of a mob armed with naboots. What happened may be learned
from the case of an English missionary, Mr. H. P. Ribton, one of the
victims. Ribton, accompanied by his little daughter and two friends,
was amongst those who had been afloat in the afternoon. On landing from
the ships they found the city gate, leading from the Marina into the
town, closed; but they were allowed to pass through by a door in the
police-office. The shops were shut, and the streets were filled with
soldiers. Ribton and party were in the rear of some other Europeans who
had landed with them. Suddenly the police called out in Arabic, "Quick!
quick!" and all the Europeans commenced running. In a moment or two
those in front wheeled round, crying that the mob were coming. Mr.
Ribton and his friends turned at the same time, but the police with
fixed bayonets drove them back, and in an instant they found themselves
face to face with the mob, who had already overwhelmed the Europeans in
front.
The mob consisted of the lowest class of Arabs in the city; they were
armed, like the rest, with clubs, with which they beat their victims to
death. As soon as the latter fell the Arabs dragged them out to the back
streets, stripped their bodies and flung them into the sea.
The missionary and his two male companions in vain attempted to shield
his daughter from the blows. Though Ribton himself was twice felled to
the ground he again staggered to his feet, attempting to save his
daughter. The third time he fell he rose no more, and when afterwards
his body was found his head was so battered as to be unrecognizable.[13]
Ribton's two friends were killed by his side. His daughter was seized by
a native soldier, who, throwing her across his shoulders, carried her
off to the Arab quarter. Here she was rescued by a friendly Sheikh, who
had heard her screams, and who kept her in his house till nightfall,
when he sent her home disguised in native clothes.
Some of the most atrocious acts of violence were perpetrated in
immediate proximity to the Zaptieh, where is situated the Prefecture of
Police. Here soldiers and mob, mixed together, pursued the Europeans who
were passing on their way to the Marina in the hope of escaping to the
ships. Whenever a European appeared in sight the mob cried out in
Arabic, "Oh, Moslems! Kill him! Kill the Christian!"
The master of a Greek merchant ship was forced by the police to descend
from his carriage, and bayoneted on the spot. A French subject, who was
being pursued by the mob, applied to a soldier for protection. The
latter responded by taking deliberate aim at him with his rifle and
bringing him to the ground. A mustaphazin was seen holding a young man
from behind, whilst a soldier shot him dead; his body was then
maltreated and thrown into the sea.
A man on guard at the Zaptieh, or chief police office, was seen to shoot
down a European who was running away from the mob, who speedily battered
him to death.
Some officers of H.M.S. _Superb_, Lieutenants Saule and Dyrssen, Dr.
Joyce and Mr. Pibworth, engineer, about 6 p.m., seeing the mob rushing
towards them, attempted to obtain shelter at the Caracol Midan. The man
on duty refused to admit them. They then ran to the Danish Consulate
close by, where they were offered an asylum by the Consul. As their ship
was going to sea at 7 p.m., the officers were unwilling to stop, and,
taking advantage of a carriage which had been secured, they proceeded
towards the Marina by Frank Street. When about half-way down they found
themselves in the centre of the mob, who, howling and shouting, seized
the horses' heads and commenced striking the officers with their sticks;
several brandished knives, and one of them stabbed Mr. Pibworth,
wounding him mortally, and attempted to stab the others. They then
jumped from the carriage and managed to run through the crowd, receiving
several blows in doing so. Mr. Pibworth was removed to the police
station, where he died half-an-hour afterwards. A fireman of the S.S.
_Tanjore_, who was in a carriage with five of his companions, also on
his way to the harbour, was stopped about 4 p.m. by the mob in the open
piece of ground near the Zaptieh, and ordered to alight. They were then
surrounded and beaten by the natives, some of the party receiving wounds
from the swords of the mustaphazin drawn up there. The party tried their
best to escape, but the fireman was dragged by the arm into the Zaptieh.
Two minutes later he saw one of his companions brought in by a soldier.
Almost at the same moment the guard on duty at the gate drew his sword
and struck the man twice, splitting his skull with the first stroke, and
severing his head from his body with the second. The fireman was
detained for three hours, and, according to his statement, all who were
brought in during that time were slaughtered.
Witnesses living near the Zaptieh spoke of the cries and groans which
came from the building at this period, and another witness has stated
that from a window opposite he counted no less than thirteen bodies of
Europeans being dragged out and taken down a side street towards the
sea.[14]
The rioting in the Rue des Soeurs, near the Caracol, was at its height
at 4.30 p.m., and that in Frank Street about 5.30 or 6, when the two
mobs of rioters marched on until they united in the great square or
Place Mehemet Ali.
The brutality of the mob extended even to the Arab children. One of them
was seen to go up to the dead body of a European and fire off a toy-gun
at his head, and the shoe-blacking boys in the Place Mehemet Ali were
observed to beat out the brains of the wounded who lay groaning on the
pavement.
Whilst this was going on, the troops, to the number of about 7,000,
remained at the different barracks under arms, waiting instructions to
act. The Governor, about four in the afternoon, had asked the Military
Commandant of the town to place at his disposal a battalion of the
regiment at Ras-el-Tin; but the messenger returned, saying the colonel
required an order in writing before he could move. The Governor then
sent the written order demanded, and also despatched an order to the
colonel of the regiment at Rosetta Gate to send a battalion of his
troops into the town without delay. He also, to prevent the disorder
spreading to the Place Mehemet Ali and the Place de l'Eglise, ordered a
company of mustaphazin to each of those places.
The mustaphazin, this time, obeyed, but the soldiers still remained
drawn up at the barracks. In spite of the Governor's request, they
refused to march without an order from the Minister of War. Much
valuable time was thus wasted.
Now came Arabi's opportunity. Arabi, it will be remembered, had, a few
days before, been treated by Dervish Pasha as an ignoble rebel against
the Sultan, and made to feel his inferiority. When the news of the riot
was telegraphed to Cairo the great Envoy himself was sent to fetch
Arabi, and had, almost on his knees, to beg him to intervene. Arabi
consented, and the desired despatch was sent by telegraph from Cairo,
and a little after 6 p.m. the soldiers began to march. As they advanced,
the mob gradually fell back, and then dispersed as if by magic; and the
tramping, shouting, and yelling suddenly ceased, and there was silence
in the streets save for the groans of the wounded.
The behaviour of the troops was strictly in accordance with discipline.
They had their orders to put an end to the disturbance, and they did so.
One of them being asked if the massacre was finished, naively replied,
"Yes; the order has come to cease striking."
In the course of the afternoon, hundreds of Europeans rushed for
protection to the different Consulates, where they remained with the
gates closed and guarded. Every moment increased the number of
fugitives. The British Consulate was literally crammed with officers,
civilians, ladies and children.
Telephonic communication was open with Admiral Seymour on board the
_Helicon_. The Admiral had himself been on shore that afternoon, and
narrowly escaped the rioters. His movements at this critical moment were
marked by great indecision. His first idea appears to have been to land
an armed force for the protection of the Europeans, for at 5.32 p.m. the
_Helicon_ made the general signal to the fleet, "Prepare to land armed
boats." This order, however, was annulled five minutes later. The
captains of the English men-of-war were then signalled to assemble on
board the Flag-ship, when, after consultation, it was decided, as the
only course open, to send boats round to the Eastern Harbour under cover
of the guns of H.M.S. _Superb_, to be in readiness to embark those who
had taken refuge in the Consulate; and boats were sent to the Arsenal
and other landing-places to bring off the officers who remained on
shore.
It had been arranged that the _Superb_ was to take up a position off the
Eastern Harbour, near the European quarter, and to have a force of
seamen and marines ready for immediate service on shore, sending her
boats as near as possible to the beach, with a view to the removal from
the town of all the women and children whom they might be able to find.
The landing party, to be used only in case of need, was, on a signal
being made, to clear the streets leading to the English Consulate.
Between 8 and 9 p.m. the Governor, to whom the arrangements were
communicated, begged that the boats might not be sent, as their
appearance would, in his opinion, excite the troops beyond control. He
also stated that the disturbance had now been suppressed, and that he
could guarantee the safety of everybody. Under these circumstances, it
was decided that the instructions to the _Superb_ should be
countermanded. This, however, appears not to have been communicated to
that vessel.
The night passed off badly enough at the Consulate, which was crowded
with terrified fugitives. There were, however, no serious alarms until
about 11.30, when an event happened which might have brought about a
catastrophe.
One of the _Superb's_ armed boats, mistaking a bright light on the shore
for the signal arranged in the event of the boats being required to
land, answered the supposed signal with a blue light, and thus disclosed
her position near the shore, hitherto concealed by the darkness. In an
instant the bugles sounded the alarm, there was a call to arms all over
the town, and a rush made by the troops towards the beach, showing that
the Governor's fears were well founded, and that had the boats touched
the shore, the troops, already much excited, would have been quite
beyond the control of their officers. There was not a moment to be lost.
A peremptory order was sent from the Consulate to the officer in charge
of the boats to withdraw out of sight, and the soldiers, seeing no signs
of a landing, retired to their posts.
The rest of the night passed quietly and without incident. The
population mostly remained indoors, and detachments of soldiers with
fixed bayonets guarded the various Consulates and stationed themselves
at the corners of all the principal streets. But for these
circumstances, and for the broken _débris_ from the wrecked shops and
houses, there was little to indicate that anything unusual had taken
place.
There are no means of arriving accurately at the numbers killed on the
11th June, but they have been estimated, by competent persons, at one
hundred and fifty Europeans, besides natives.[15] Many of the latter are
known to have been carried off to the houses at nightfall and then
secretly buried. The European doctors who visited the hospitals on the
following day found forty-nine bodies--forty-four of which were
Europeans. Thirty-seven were so battered as to be unrecognizable.
Seventy-one persons were also found wounded; of these, thirty-six were
Europeans, two Turks, and thirty-three natives. Of those killed or
wounded, some had received stabs on their bodies, but the majority had
their injuries inflicted by naboots. One witness speaks to having seen
several cartloads of bodies thrown, at night, into the sea near the
Western Harbour, and it is quite possible that many were so disposed of.
In a fluctuating population, such as that of Alexandria, it is obvious
that many persons might disappear and never be inquired for.
The Governor, on the 12th, visited the sacked and looted quarters of the
town, and took note of the houses injured. He also arrested and
imprisoned between two and three hundred natives who had taken part in
the riot of the previous day.
On the same day, the women and children, who had taken refuge at the
British Consulate, embarked under an escort provided by the Governor.
Thousands of other Europeans of all nationalities also went afloat, and
during the whole day the streets were blocked with fugitives. At first
these were cursed and spat upon by the natives as they passed, but later
on they were allowed to go by unmolested.
In Cairo a meeting was held at which the Khedive, Dervish Pasha, the
Ministers, and the Consuls-General were present. This was to obtain a
reply to a demand of the Consular body that measures should be taken to
insure the safety of Europeans. Arabi promptly undertook to stop all
inflammatory preaching, and to obey all orders given him by the Khedive.
The Khedive engaged himself to issue orders immediately with the object
of restoring public tranquillity. Dervish Pasha, on his part, consented
to accept joint responsibility with Arabi for the execution of the
orders of the Khedive.
It was then decided to increase the number of patrols and to reinforce
the police stations by troops. Yacoub Pasha Sami, Under-Secretary of
War, was sent from Cairo with two regiments of infantry and some
artillery. Guards with their arms were placed at the corners of the
streets, and at night they lay down on the ground in the Place Mehemet
Ali and other open spaces. In the course of the day a proclamation was
issued by the Consular body to the Europeans, pointing out that the
disorder had been suppressed by the army, and that its chiefs guaranteed
public tranquillity. It further called upon the European population to
remain in their dwellings, and to abstain from carrying firearms. The
effect of the proclamation in reassuring the inhabitants was simply nil,
and many persons who might otherwise have remained on shore betook
themselves to the ships.
On the 13th the Khedive and Dervish Pasha arrived from Cairo. Their
reception was anything but enthusiastic.
Alexandria remained quiet, the streets being still patrolled by soldiers
night and day. The general flight of Europeans continued. The number
seeking refuge on board the ironclads was so great that the ships would
have been useless in the event of their having to act. Three hundred
were on board the _Invincible_, the same number on board the _Monarch_,
and all the smaller men-of-war were similarly crowded. On the Admiral's
representation, merchant-steamers were chartered by the British
Government, and employed to take the refugees to Malta; one of the
Poste-Khedive steamers was, subsequently, taken up as a temporary
refuge, and some hundreds of persons were placed on board. Other
steamers were thronged with passengers leaving for Cyprus,
Constantinople, and other places; fabulous prices were charged the
fugitives by the boatmen who took them off to the various vessels.
A Commission of Inquiry was next instituted by the Egyptian Government,
with a view to discover the authors of the events of the 11th June. The
President of the Commission, oddly enough, was Omar Pasha Loutfi,
Governor of Alexandria, the official who was responsible for the
maintenance of order on the day in question, and who was therefore
himself, to some extent, on his trial. The Commission assembled, and
evidence was taken from the wounded and others. An English barrister
attended as the delegate of the British Consulate. Before the inquiry
had proceeded far it developed into mutual recriminations, and a pretext
was afforded to the Egyptian Government for bringing counter charges
against Europeans. Eventually such determined opposition was raised by
the Egyptian members to the institution of a satisfactory inquiry that
the British delegate had to be withdrawn, and the Commission collapsed.
On the 20th of June a new Ministry under Ragheb Pasha, an old and infirm
statesman, was formed. In this, as before, Arabi figured as Minister of
War. The men forming the Cabinet were not such, however, as to inspire
confidence. Many of them were pronounced Arabists, and the rest were
about fair specimens of the usual Egyptian Minister.
Arabi, who had come to Alexandria at this time, now made a point of
showing himself a good deal in public, driving out every evening,
sometimes in the same carriage with the Khedive, and always attended by
a cavalry escort. On these occasions great crowds of natives assembled,
and showed unmistakably the interest they took in the _de facto_ ruler
of Egypt.
That Arabi and the Sultan were in accord at this time is unquestionable.
But if any doubt existed it was removed by the fact that on the 25th
June the Sultan decorated with the Grand Cordon of the Medjidieh the man
who had plunged his country into anarchy. The Order was presented by the
Khedive personally, who (Arabi declares) expressed his satisfaction and
gratitude for his faithful services and attention to duty.
The attitude of Tewfik, on this as on other occasions, appears at first
sight inexplicable. It is only to be accounted for on the hypothesis
that His Highness, having just reason to doubt how far he could
calculate on the sincerity of England and France, or on receiving help
from them, was unwilling to cut himself altogether adrift from the
National Party.
It is due to Arabi to say that during the period which elapsed between
the day of the massacre and the subsequent bombardment perfect order was
maintained in Alexandria. It was not so in the interior, however, and on
the 26th June it was reported that ten Greeks and three Jews were
massacred at Benha, an important town in the Delta. In other provincial
towns, Europeans were openly insulted by the natives, and soon began to
join the fugitives to Europe. At Rosetta and Damietta, things grew so
threatening that even the European lighthouse-keepers had to be
withdrawn, and their duties confided to natives.
At Alexandria, the British Consul, disabled by the wounds which he
received on the 11th June, had to leave for Europe. The Vice-Consul,
incapacitated by age, and suffering from the shock brought about by
recent events, had also to depart. Most of the Consular clerks and
employés likewise found it necessary to quit their posts, and Sir Edward
Malet, overtaken at a critical moment by severe illness, had to betake
himself to Europe. In this emergency, Mr. Cartwright was called upon to
discharge the duties of Consul-General, assisted by the knowledge and
local experience of Sir Auckland Colvin.
On the 29th June, Mr. Cartwright wrote to Lord Granville as follows:--
"The exodus of Europeans and the preparations for flight, after
seeming temporarily to have abated, continue with increased
vigour. The hotels are closing; the shipping agents have
transferred their offices to the neighbourhood of the port; and
the banks which still remain open are preparing to transfer
their staff to the ships. It is impossible to describe the
collapse and ruin which have overtaken the country.... A large
number of respectable natives are leaving. The departure of
Turkish families is taking larger proportions, while 200
destitute Jews and Rayahs have been sent away at the expense of
the Government itself."
Thrown out of employment by the exodus of Europeans, the greatest
distress prevailed, and it was estimated that nearly 30,000 persons were
left destitute in Alexandria alone.
Thus matters went on, until the measures taken by the Government in
adding to the armament of the forts led to actual hostilities. On the
part of the Europeans, a sort of stunned feeling prevailed; there was,
with a few exceptions, absolute panic. On the side of the natives, there
was a vague feeling of disquietude. They realized that they had
irretrievably committed themselves, and imagined that the day of
retribution was drawing nigh.
Ships of war continued to arrive from all parts, until a squadron of
twenty-six vessels belonging to the navies of England, France, Italy,
Austria, Russia, the United States, Spain, Greece, and Turkey, lay off
Alexandria.
Meanwhile, the crowd of fugitives continued to embark. The French and
Greek Governments sent transports to remove their subjects _en masse_,
and ships laden with British refugees left for Malta as fast as the
vessels could fill up. Europeans arrived from Cairo and the interior,
and the trains were thronged with passengers, many of whom rode on the
roofs and steps of the railway carriages. As many as 4,000 arrived on
one day, the 15th.
Alexandria, at this period, presented a curious spectacle. Beyond the
business of transporting the fugitives, there was nothing else done. The
shops were shut, and the doors barred and padlocked. The banks were
occupied in putting up iron shutters, and blocking up their windows. The
few business firms which remained hired steamers in the harbour and
removed their books and effects on board, so as to be ready for any
eventuality. The streets in the European quarter presented a deserted
appearance, the Arab soldiers being almost the only persons seen about.
In Cairo things were but little better, the whole of the foreign
population had taken flight, together with most of the well-to-do
natives.[16]
The events of the 11th June created a profound sensation in England.
That a large number of unoffending Europeans, living in a civilized or
quasi-civilized country, should have been without provocation suddenly
attacked and slaughtered, was bad enough. But that this should have
occurred at a moment when eight British ships of war, and nine others
belonging to other Powers, were there, for the avowed purpose of
protecting European life and property, was worse still.
The opportunity was not lost upon the Opposition. Indignation meetings
were held throughout the United Kingdom, in which the conduct of Mr.
Gladstone's Administration was denounced in the strongest terms. Lord
Salisbury, as the leader of the Opposition in the House of Lords, was
particularly vehement in his condemnation of a policy which had resulted
in British subjects being "butchered under the very guns of the fleet,
which had never budged an inch to save them."
On board the vessels of the British fleet, a similar feeling of
indignation prevailed. When the bodies of the officer and seamen
massacred were on the 13th June taken out to sea for burial, officers
and men alike clamoured for revenge. It was felt that an insult had been
offered to the British flag, which ought to be avenged.
Public feeling at home became fully aroused, and Her Majesty's
Government caused it to be intimated that it was their intention to
demand reparation for the loss of life and property which had occurred.
To strengthen the Mediterranean fleet, the Channel Squadron, consisting
of the _Minotaur_, _Achilles_, _Agincourt_, _Northumberland_ and
_Sultan_, was despatched to Malta on the 15th, and placed under the
temporary command of Admiral Seymour. More energetic measures still were
in contemplation, but it was deemed unwise to decide upon them until the
great body of Europeans should have had time to clear out of Egypt.
CHAPTER VIII.
THE ALEXANDRIA BOMBARDMENT.
On the 1st of July, 1882, matters had become so threatening that the
Consular archives and such of the staff as remained were removed on
board a Peninsular and Oriental steamer, chartered as a place of refuge
for the British subjects whose duties compelled them to remain in Egypt.
The same day Admiral Seymour telegraphed that there were upwards of
10,000 men in the forts and barracks of Alexandria, and that Arabi hoped
to get the allied fleets into a trap by sinking stone barges at the
harbour mouth.
On the 3rd, Seymour received the following instructions:--
"Prevent any attempt to bar channel into port. If work is
resumed on earthworks or fresh guns mounted, inform Military
Commander that you have orders to prevent it; and if not
immediately discontinued destroy earthworks and silence
batteries if they open fire."
On the 4th, Dervish Pasha made a final attempt to get rid of Arabi and
his party by diplomacy. The Turkish Envoy invited the Minister of War to
go to Constantinople "to live with the Sultan and other friends." Arabi,
to his credit, refused to desert his followers, and replied that the
people would not suffer him to leave, and that as they were attached to
him he could not abandon them.
The same day a telegram was sent to the Admiral as follows:--
"Acquaint Military Governor that any attempt to bar the channel
will be considered as a hostile act, which will be treated
accordingly. Concert with Consul-General as to notice to
Europeans if occasion arises. Before taking any hostile step,
invite co-operation of French Admiral; but you are not to
postpone acting on your instructions because French decline to
join."
The Admiral replied:--
"Two additional guns placed in Pharos Castle last night. Parapet
facing sea-wall was also strengthened. Consul-General would
prefer I postponed operations until Thursday morning to allow
time for people to quit Cairo. No change in the works bearing on
the harbour. French Admiral has asked for orders."
Seymour had now taken steps for strengthening the fleet, by ordering the
ironclad _Sultan_ from Malta. He had also received intelligence that two
battalions had been ordered to Cyprus from Malta in ships of the Channel
Squadron. He had, moreover, in concert with the Acting Consul-General,
succeeded in getting nearly the whole of the European residents out of
the country. It only remained to see how far, in the event of action
becoming necessary, he could count on the support of the Power which had
joined England in presenting the celebrated Joint Note.
On the question being put to M. de Freycinet by Lord Lyons, the French
Foreign Minister replied that his Government had decided "not to
instruct Admiral Conrad to associate himself with the English Admiral in
stopping by force the erection of batteries or the placing of guns at
Alexandria." The reasons given were, that such a step would be an act of
war, which could not be resorted to without the consent of the
Legislature, and that if the Government applied to the Chamber for
sanction, they did not feel sure of obtaining it.
On the 6th, the French Ambassador called on Lord Granville and informed
him, that in the event of a bombardment taking place, the French ships
would go to Port Saïd.
On the same day, Admiral Seymour, finding that the warlike preparations
on shore were continuing, wrote to the Military Commandant of
Alexandria, that unless such proceedings were discontinued, it would
become his duty to open fire on the works in course of construction.
The following reply was received:--
"_To the Admiral of the British Fleet._
"MY FRIEND ENGLISH ADMIRAL,
"I had the honour to receive your letter of the 6th July, in
which you state that you had been informed that two guns had
been mounted and that other works are going on on the
sea-shore, and in reply I assure you that these assertions are
unfounded, and that this information is like the intimation
given to you about the blocking up of the entrance to the
harbour, of the falseness of which you were convinced. I rely
on your feelings of humanity, and beg you to accept my
respects.
"(Signed) TOULBA,
"Commandant of Forces."
The Khedive during this period retained great self-possession. He
realized perfectly the difficulties of his position, and sent for Sir
Auckland Colvin, to whom he explained that should a bombardment be
resolved upon he was determined to remain faithful to Egypt. He could
not, he said, desert those who had stood by him during the crisis, nor
could he, merely to secure his personal safety, abandon Egypt when
attacked by a foreign Power. In the event of a bombardment taking place,
His Highness announced his intention of retiring to a palace on the
Mahmoudieh Canal, and added that the more rapidly the affair was
conducted, the less danger there would be for himself personally.
On the 9th, Admiral Seymour telegraphed to the Admiralty that "there was
no doubt about the armament. Guns were being mounted in Fort Silsileh.
He should give foreign consuls notice at daylight to-morrow, and
commence action twenty-four hours after, unless forts on the isthmus and
those commanding the entrance to the harbour were surrendered."
The information upon which Seymour proposed to act was partly a
declaration made by Lieutenant Dorrien, of the _Invincible_, and which
(omitting immaterial parts) was as follows:--
"On the morning of the 9th day of July, 1882, at about 7.30
a.m., I drove through the Rosetta Gate, and ... reached the old
quarantine station, where I ... proceeded on foot to the fort
marked on Admiralty Chart 'Tabia-el-Silsileh,' and when within
fifty yards of the said fort I observed inside two working
parties of Arabs about 200 strong, under the superintendence of
soldiers, parbuckling two smooth-bore guns--apparently
32-pounders--towards their respective carriages and slides,
which were facing in the direction of the harbour, and which
seemed to have been lately placed ready for their reception."
On the 10th, the Admiralty telegraphed to the Admiral directing him to
substitute for the word "surrendered" the words "temporarily surrendered
for the purposes of disarmament."
The same day, the Admiral sent his ultimatum to the Military Commandant,
in the terms following:--
"I have the honour to inform your Excellency that as hostile
preparations, evidently directed against the squadron under my
command, were in progress during yesterday at Forts Pharos and
Silsileh, I shall carry out the intention expressed to you in my
letter of the 6th instant, at sunrise to-morrow, the 11th
instant, unless previous to that hour you shall have temporarily
surrendered to me, for the purpose of disarming, the batteries
on the isthmus of Ras-el-Tin and the southern shore of the
harbour of Alexandria."
The actual danger to Admiral Seymour's ships from the Egyptian
preparations was at this time simply nil, and even were it otherwise he
had only to make a slight change in the position of his vessels to place
them completely out of harm's way. At the same time, the bombardment
which he threatened, had, after the events of the 11th of June, become,
in a certain sense, a necessity, if only to restore European prestige in
Egypt: moreover, it formed the first step towards shattering the power
of Arabi and his army, which was now, to a great extent, concentrated in
Alexandria.
In hurrying on the bombardment, the Admiral was probably influenced not
a little by the desire to allay the growing impatience of the officers
and men under his command. Ever since the murder of an officer and two
men of the fleet, on the day of the riot, a good deal of dissatisfaction
was expressed at the continued inaction of the naval force, not only by
the seamen, but by the officers as well.
It was foreseen that the arrival of British troops was only a question
of days, and the bluejackets naturally desired that, as what had taken
place was an insult to the fleet, to the fleet should be given the work
of avenging it. They were unwilling, as they put it, that they should be
employed merely "to carry Sir Garnet Wolseley's baggage on shore."
The Admiral himself, whilst sharing these sentiments, may not
unnaturally have had in his mind the fact that the Channel Squadron,
under Admiral Dowell, was on its way to share in the honours of the day.
On the receipt of Admiral Seymour's ultimatum, a Cabinet Council was
held at Ras-el-Tin, presided over by the Khedive in person. It was
decided to send a deputation to the Admiral, to inform him that no new
guns were being mounted in the forts, and to tell him that he was at
liberty to send one of his officers, if he desired to test the truth of
this statement. The deputation came back with the answer that the
Admiral insisted on the disarmament of the forts.
The Council again met in the afternoon, and decided that the Silsileh
Fort and Fort Pharos, and the guns placed in them on the _Eastern_
Harbour, could not constitute any threat towards the vessels which were
in the _Western_ Harbour, and that the President of the Council should
write to the Admiral in the terms of the despatch mentioned below. It
was at the same time resolved that in the event of the Admiral
persisting in opening fire, the forts should not answer until the fifth
shot, when they were to reply.
"_Alexandria, July 10th, 1882._
"ADMIRAL,
"As I had the honour to promise in the conversation I had with
you this morning, I have submitted to His Highness the Khedive,
in a meeting of the Ministers and principal dignitaries of the
State, the conditions contained in the letter you were good
enough to address this morning to the Commandant of the place,
according to the terms of which you will put into execution
to-morrow, the 11th instant, at daybreak, the intentions
expressed in your letter of the 6th instant to the Commandant
of the place, if before that time the batteries on the isthmus
of Ras-el-Tin and the southern shore of the port of Alexandria
are not temporarily surrendered to you, to be disarmed.
"I regret to announce to you that the Government of His
Highness does not consider this proposition as acceptable. It
does not in the least desire to alter its good relations with
Great Britain, but it cannot perceive that it has taken any
measures which can be regarded as a menace to the English fleet
by works, by the mounting of new guns, or by other military
preparations.
"Nevertheless, as a proof of our spirit of conciliation, and of
our desire, to a certain extent, to accede to your demands, we
are disposed to dismount three guns in the batteries you have
mentioned, either separated or together.
"If in spite of this offer you persist in opening fire, the
Government reserves its freedom of action and leaves with you
the responsibility of this act of aggression."[17]
The previous day the Acting British Consul-General visited the Khedive
and urged his removal to Ramleh, a suburb about four miles to the east
of Alexandria. On the 10th Sir Auckland Colvin called to say farewell to
His Highness, and used every argument to induce him to embark in one of
the British vessels, but in vain. Tewfik remained firm, and announced
his intention of standing by his country.
At seven in the evening all the Consuls-General were warned to withdraw
their subjects. The acting British Consul-General and Sir Auckland
Colvin embarked on board the _Monarch_, and the few remaining British
residents betook themselves to the P. & O. s.s. _Tanjore_.[18]
In the course of the day all the merchant vessels in the harbour left,
and these were followed by the foreign men-of-war. One by one the latter
steamed slowly out, and as they passed the British flag-ship her band
struck up the different national airs. The last ship to leave was the
Austrian frigate _Landon_, and when darkness closed in, the English
ships of war were alone in the harbour of Alexandria.
At 9.20 p.m. the Admiral, in the _Invincible_, with the _Monarch_ in
company, weighed anchor, and steamed to a position outside the harbour.
All lights were extinguished, and perfect silence was maintained as the
ships cautiously felt their way through the water. At 10.10 both vessels
came to an anchor off Mex, where their consort, the _Penelope_, was
already lying.
In the meantime, all the ships, including the larger ironclads _Sultan_,
_ Superb_, _Temeraire_, _Alexandra_, and _Inflexible_, which were lying
in the offing, had struck their upper masts, sent down top-gallant and
royal yards, and got everything ready for action. In this state they
remained for the night.
In order to give the reader an idea of the comparative strength of the
opposing forces, it is necessary, in the first place, to give a short
description of the fortifications of Alexandria and their armaments.
Alexandria is situated on a strip of land between the Mediterranean and
Lake Mareotis; a considerable portion of the town stands on a
promontory, which, jutting out from the rest towards the north-west, is
bounded on the north-east by the new or Eastern Harbour, and on the
south-west by the old or Western Harbour.
The fortifications, which were intended to protect the city from an
attack, not only by sea, but also from the direction of Lake Mareotis,
are said to have been planned in Paris, and executed under the direction
of French engineers. The whole of the works were originally well built,
but had fallen much out of repair.
The material used was a soft limestone but little calculated to
withstand modern artillery. The parapets were of sand, covered with a
thin coating of cement. The scarps and counterscarps were reveted with
stonework. The rifled guns, without exception, fired through embrasures,
and nearly all the smooth-bore guns fired over parapets.
The buildings were none of them bomb-proof; nor, except in the case of
Fort Pharos, were there any casemated or covered batteries. The forts on
the sea face of Alexandria may be summed up as follows:--
West of Alexandria--Forts Marabout, Adjemi, and Marza-el-Kanat.
South-west of Alexandria--Citadel of Mex, Old Fort of Mex, and Mex
Lines.
South of Alexandria--Forts Kamaria, Omuk Kubebe, Saleh Aga, and a small
battery between the two last named works.
North of Alexandria--Lighthouse or Ras-el-Tin Fort, Lines of Ras-el-Tin
(including the Hospital Battery), Fort Adda, Fort Pharos, and Fort
Silsileh.
Of the above, Fort Adjemi took no part in the subsequent bombardment.
The British squadron consisted of the ironclads _Alexandra_, _Superb_,
_Sultan_, _Temeraire_, _Inflexible_, _Monarch_, _Invincible_, and
Penelope, the torpedo-vessel _Hecla_, the despatch boat _Helicon_, the
gun-vessels _Condor_ and _Bittern_, and the gunboats _Beacon_, _Cygnet_,
and _Decoy_. The battleships, with the exception of the _Invincible_ and
_Penelope_, were the most powerful then in the British navy. Their size
and armament may be briefly summarized:--
The _Alexandra_, Captain C. F. Hotham, 9,490 tons, 8,610 h.p., 674 men,
2 11-inch 25-ton and 10 10-inch 18-ton guns.
The _Superb_, Captain Thomas Le Hunt-Ward, 9,170 tons, 6,580 h.p., 620
men, 8 18-ton and 4 12-1/2-ton guns.
The _Sultan_, Captain W. J. Hunt Grubbe, 9,290 tons, 7,720 h.p., 620
men, 8 18-ton and 4 12-1/2-ton guns.
The _Temeraire_, Captain H. F. Nicholson, 8,450 tons, 7,520 h.p., 530
men, 4 25-ton and 4 18-ton guns.
The _Inflexible_, Captain John Fisher, 11,407 tons, 8,010 h.p., 440 men,
4 80-ton guns (in two turrets).
The _Monarch_, Captain Henry Fairfax, 8,320 tons, 7,840 h.p., 530 men, 4
25-ton, 2 9-inch 12-ton and 1 7-inch 6-1/2-ton guns.
The _Invincible_, Captain R. H. Molyneux, 6,010 tons, 4,830 h.p., 480
men, 10 9-inch 12-ton and 4 64-pounder guns.
The _Penelope_, Captain St. G. D. A. Irvine, 4,390 tons, 4,700 h.p., 230
men, 8 8-inch 9-ton and 3 40-pounder guns.
The _Hecla_, torpedo vessel, 6,400 tons, 1,760 h.p., 251 men, and 6
guns.
The _Helicon_, despatch vessel, 1,000 tons, carrying 2 20-pounder guns.
The _Condor_ and _Bittern_, gun-vessels, 805 tons, 100 men, 1 7-inch and
2 40-pounder guns each.
The _Beacon_, gunboat, 603 tons, 80 men, 1 7-inch and 1 64-pounder gun.
The _Cygnet_ and _Decoy_, gunboats, 455 and 430 tons, 60 men, 2
64-pounder and 2 20-pounder guns each.
In addition to the armament above given, the eight ironclads each
carried from six to eight 20-pounder rifled breech-loading guns, and,
with the exception of the _Penelope_, from eight to twelve machine guns.
There were also 880 supernumerary seamen and marines on board the fleet,
making the total force 5,728 men.
The relative strength of the opposing forces may be seen from the
following tables:--
The ordnance _mounted_ in the forts was as follows:--
-----------------+----------+-------------+----------+-------
Fort or Battery. | R. Guns. | S. B. Guns. | Mortars. | Total.
-----------------+----------+-------------+----------+-------
Fort Silsileh | 2 | 3 | 1 | 6
" Pharos | 8 | 37 | 4 | 49
" Adda | 5 | 14 | 5 | 24
Ras-el-Tin Lines | 9 | 30 | 10 | 49
Lighthouse Fort, | | | |
or Ras-el-Tin | 6 | 28 | 3 | 37
Fort Saleh Aga | ... | 12 | ... | 12
Battery | ... | 4 | ... | 4
Fort Omuk Kubebe | 2 | 16 | 2 | 20
" Kamaria | ... | 5 | 1 | 6
Mex Sea Lines | ... | 24 | ... | 24
" Fort | 5 | 9 | 5 | 19
Fort Marabout | 3 | 8 | ... | 11
+----------+-------------+----------+-------
TOTAL | 40 | 190 | 31 | 261
-----------------+----------+-------------+----------+-------
The guns on board the ironclads are shewn in the following table:--
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
RIFLED GUNS.
-----------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-------
SHIPS. | in. | in. | in. | in. | in. | in. | in. | pr. | pr. | Total.
| 16 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 64 | 40 |
-----------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-------
Alexandra | | | 2 | 10 | | | | | | 12
Inflexible | 4 | | | | | | | | | 4
Superb | | | 16 | | | | | | 16 |
Sultan | | | | 8 | 4 | | | | | 12
Temeraire | | | 4 | 4 | | | | | | 8
Invincible | | | | | 10 | | | 4 | | 14
Monarch | | 4 | | | 2 | | 1 | | | 7
Penelope | | | | | | 8 | | | 3 | 11
-----------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-------
TOTAL | 4 | 4 | 6 | 38 | 16 | 8 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 84
-----------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-------
This does not include the six to eight 20-pounder guns and eight to
twelve machine guns carried by each vessel.
Admiral Seymour's plan for the bombardment comprised two separate
attacks: one by the _Sultan_, _Superb_, _Alexandra_, _Inflexible_, and
_Temeraire_ from outside the breakwater, the other by the _Invincible_,
_Monarch_, and _Penelope_ inside the reefs.
The three first-mentioned vessels, supported by the fire from the after
turret of the _Inflexible_, which was anchored off the Corvette Pass,
were directed to destroy the batteries on the Ras-el-Tin peninsula, and
then to move to the eastward and attack Forts Pharos and Silsileh. The
_Invincible_, _Monarch_, and _Penelope_, aided by the fire from the
_Inflexible's_ forward turret and by the _Temeraire_, which took up a
position off the Boghas Pass, were ordered to open fire on the guns in
the Mex Lines. The gun-vessels and gunboats were directed to remain
outside until a favourable opportunity should offer for moving in to the
attack on Mex.
At 7 a.m. the Admiral, whose flag was flying from the _Invincible_,
signalled to the _Alexandra_ to fire a shell into the recently armed
works on Ras-el-Tin, known as the Hospital Battery, and followed this by
a general signal to the fleet, "Attack the enemy's batteries." Upon this
immediate action began between all the ships, in the positions assigned
to them, and the whole of the forts commanding the entrance to the
harbour.
A steady cannonade was maintained both by the attacking and defending
forces, and for the next few hours the roar of the guns and the shrieks
of passing shot and shell were alone audible. The spectacle as seen from
the offing was imposing in the extreme. On the one side were the most
powerful ships of modern times, all in fighting trim, with upper masts
and yards struck, some slowly steaming ahead, others at anchor, but all
pouring deadly broadsides into the Egyptian batteries. On the other were
the forts, standing out bright and clear in the sunshine, vomiting forth
volleys of fire and smoke in the direction of the attacking squadron.
The weather was fine and the sea smooth, both of which circumstances
were to the advantage of the attacking force. On the other hand, the
wind and sun were in the enemy's favour, and the smoke, which rose like
a thick wall, at times prevented those on board the ships seeing the
result of their fire.
At 9.40 the _Sultan_, _Superb_, and _Alexandra_, of the outside
squadron, which had previously been under way and turning in succession
at a range of about 1,500 yards, came to an anchor off the Lighthouse
Fort. The batteries had proved stronger than had been anticipated, and
the Egyptian gunners were making very good practice. The firing of the
ships at the same time was less effective than could be wished. Under
these circumstances, and to obtain the exact range, the three ships
adopted a stationary position, and from this moment their fire steadily
improved.
A little after 10 o'clock the harem buildings of Ras-el-Tin Palace were
set on fire and partly destroyed by a shell.
At 10.30 the _Alexandra_ had one of her heavy guns dismounted and
rendered unserviceable. Shortly after the _Inflexible_ weighed anchor
and joined the _Sultan_, _Superb_, and _Alexandra_, and by 12.30 p.m.
the combined fire of the four ships had nearly silenced all the guns in
the Ras-el-Tin Forts. It should be mentioned that, in addition to
helping these three vessels, the _Inflexible_ had at the same time been
engaging the Mex Forts, and doing great execution with her 80-ton guns.
The remaining vessel of the outside squadron, the _Temeraire_, was
meanwhile supporting the attack of the inside squadron on the Mex
batteries at a range of from 3,500 to 4,000 yards, and making great
havoc with her guns. Unfortunately, in taking up her position, she had
got too close to the shoal water of the Boghas Pass, and in swinging
round had grounded on the reef. The gunboat _Condor_ promptly went to
the assistance of the huge ironclad, and eventually the ship was got off
without injury.
Although the batteries at Ras-el-Tin had, as above stated, practically
ceased firing, some heavy guns in Fort Adda still kept up a desultory
cannonade.
At 12.30 p.m. the _Sultan_ signalled to the _Inflexible_, whose work was
now finished both at Ras-el-Tin and Mex, "Adda and Pharos are the only
ones not silenced, all our filled shell are expended, and if you are
going that way, one or two shells from your heavy guns would do much
good, if you don't mind." At 12.35 the _Sultan_ added, "Please silence
Adda as well." The _Inflexible_ then stood across to Fort Adda, and at
12.40 opened fire. Shortly after, the _Temeraire_ was signalled, "Assist
_Inflexible_ in destroying Pharos and Silsileh." The _Temeraire_ then
weighed and steamed over to the position indicated, and assisted in
shelling both forts.
About 1.30 p.m. a lucky shell from the _Superb_, whose practice was very
good, blew up the magazine of Fort Adda. The explosion was terrific, and
huge pieces of _débris_ were thrown into the air, whilst a dense cloud
of smoke for some seconds hid the works from view. The fort at once
ceased firing, and when the smoke cleared away it was seen that the
garrison had retreated from the blackened ruins.
As early as 1.30, the ships were beginning to run short of ammunition,
and the _Sultan_ signalled to the _Alexandra_, "How many filled shell
have you?" and received the answer "Twenty." At one o'clock the
_Alexandra_ signalled that she had only thirty common shell left, and
was answered by the _Sultan_ that she had none at all, and that the
_Alexandra_ had better use common shell as the _Sultan_ was doing.
At 1.35, with the exception of the Hospital Fort, where one rifled gun
continued firing, all the batteries from Fort Adda westward being
silenced, the _Superb_ signalled the fact to the _Sultan_, and suggested
getting under way. The _Sultan_ replied in the affirmative, adding, "Can
you touch up Pharos? _Temeraire_ now on her way to assist _Inflexible_
at Pharos. I have no shell filled, nor has _Alexandra_." The _Superb_
accordingly proceeded towards Fort Pharos and opened fire.
At 2.0 the _Sultan_ signalled to the _Inflexible_, which was engaging
the Hospital Battery and Fort Pharos, "Proceed to Pharillon" (Silsileh).
At 2.55 a shot from the Hospital Battery struck the _Inflexible_ aloft,
carrying away the slings of the mainyard.
At 5 the Hospital Battery fired its last shot.
At 5.10 the _Inflexible_ proceeded across to engage Fort Silsileh, all
the other forts from Ras-el-Tin eastward having been silenced.
At 5.15 the general signal, "Cease firing," was made, followed at 6.5
by, "Anchor in same position as last night."
While the off-shore squadron was thus occupied, the other division of
the fleet under the Admiral's immediate command was not idle. The
_Invincible_ at anchor, with the _Monarch_ and _Penelope_ under weigh
inside the reefs, assisted by the _Inflexible_ and _Temeraire_, in the
Corvette and Boghas Channels, were engaging from a distance of 1,300 to
1,500 yards the batteries and lines of Mex, also the Forts of
Marza-el-Kanat and Omuk Kubebe at various ranges. The enemy replied
briskly both from rifled and smooth bore guns. At 8.45 one of the
_Monarch's_ shells exploded the powder magazine at Marza-el-Kanat. At
8.27 the Admiral signalled to her, "Close nearer the forts, keeping as
close to them as possible." By 9 a.m. the enemy's guns, except four at
Fort Mex, were silenced. These four nevertheless gave considerable
trouble to the ships, for it was difficult to hit upon their exact
position, placed as they were almost on a level with the water, and only
dimly and occasionally seen through the smoke.
About an hour before this Lord Charles Beresford, in the _Condor_,
stationed as repeating ship, saw that the 10-inch rifled guns in Fort
Marabout were playing with great accuracy, at a range of 4,200 yards,
upon the ships engaged off Fort Mex, the shots falling only from 10 to
30 yards short. Steaming within range of his 7-inch gun, he chose with
great skill a position, 1,200 yards off, upon which the enemy's guns
could not be brought to bear, and engaged the fort single-handed for two
hours. The _Condor's_ excellent practice soon checked the fire from Fort
Marabout, and elicited from the Admiral, who sent the other gunboats to
his aid, the signal, "Well done, _Condor_." It is satisfactory to be
able to add that during this operation no casualties occurred on any of
the vessels engaged.[19]
At 10.35 the flag-ship signalled to the _Monarch_, "Steam close in to
the batteries we have silenced and drop a few shells into them at close
range." This was followed by, "Go as close to forts as water will
permit." The _Monarch_ then steamed in shore and poured in a tremendous
fire from all her guns. At 11.30, there being no return fire, she, as
well as the _Invincible_, ceased firing.
At 11.40, the gunboats having returned from Marabout, the _Monarch_,
which remained under way, was signalled to support them in an attempt to
destroy the Mex works, but ordered not to fire unless fired upon. All
the gunboats were at the same time signalled to close in to the
batteries, and, remaining under way, to destroy their rifled guns. The
_Condor_, ten minutes after, signalled that she had only twenty-one
shells for each gun left, and received the order to cease firing. The
gunboats, supported by the _Monarch_, continued to fire on the works.
At 11.58, the _Monarch_ observing soldiers running back into the
batteries, permission was given her to reopen fire.
Permission was also given to the _Penelope_ to fire at the rifled guns
in the batteries with her 40-pounders. At 12.20 p.m. the _Monarch_
ceased firing, signalling that she had driven about 200 soldiers out of
the works. At 12.50 p.m. the _Penelope_ was ordered to get under way,
and taking advantage of her light draught, to try to dismount the guns
at Mex. She then weighed and proceeded in towards Mex Fort, firing at
intervals. At 1.10 the windmills in the neighbourhood of the forts were
seen to be full of soldiers, and the _Monarch_ was ordered to open fire
on them with her light guns.
About 2 p.m. the Admiral, seeing that the gunners of the western battery
of Mex had abandoned their guns, and that the supports had probably
retired also, landed a party, under cover of the gun-vessels and
gunboats, who destroyed with gun-cotton two 10-inch rifled guns, and
spiked six smooth-bore guns in the right hand battery. The party
returned without a casualty beyond the loss of one of their boats, which
got capsized on the rocks, on an alarm (happily unfounded) being raised
that some soldiers were approaching to attack the little force.
At 3.25 the _Penelope_ signalled to the Admiral that Fort Kamaria had
its guns manned, though, from her inshore position, the ship's guns
would not bear on them. The Admiral, in consequence, directed the
_Penelope_ to change her position and open fire on the fort. About the
same time soldiers were observed transporting light guns into one of the
Mex batteries, and the _Monarch_ was signalled to attack again. Both
vessels promptly responded, and, steaming into position, poured in a
devastating fire on the points indicated. At 5.30, there being no reply
from the enemy, the inside squadron ceased firing. This concluded the
operations of the day.
The casualties on board the ships were but slight, amounting only to
five killed and twenty-eight wounded--a fact to be attributed partly to
the protection afforded by the armour plating of the ships principally
engaged, and partly to the inaccurate fire of the enemy's batteries.[20]
A courageous act was reported from the _Alexandra_. In the course of the
bombardment a lighted shell from one of the Egyptian batteries fell on
the main deck of the vessel. Mr. Israel Harding, gunner, rushed for the
missile all burning as it was, and immersed it in a bucket of water.[21]
The Egyptians, it must be allowed, were overmatched both in the size and
number of the guns brought into action, but the way in which they
responded to the heavy fire was marvellous. When the _Inflexible's_
1,700 lb. projectiles struck the scarp of the Lighthouse Fort
immediately underneath an embrasure they threw up a cloud of dust and
fragments of stone as high as the Lighthouse itself. To the looker-on,
it seemed impossible to live under such a fire, yet after a few minutes
the dust would clear away, and the gun's crew would pluckily send
another shell back at their huge opponent.
The Egyptian forces were under the immediate command of Toulba Pasha.
From the best sources of information accessible, it is gathered that the
defences contained no less than 2,000 artillerymen, and of infantry and
civilian volunteers there was no lack.
The disposition of these troops has not been accurately ascertained, but
it is known that Mex was commanded by an adjutant-major, who had with
him one captain, three lieutenants, and 150 men. Of this small number
one lieutenant was mortally wounded, 50 men were killed, and 48 wounded.
Fort Omuk Kubebe, as already mentioned, was subjected to the
_Inflexible's_ fire during the forenoon. Its garrison consisted of 75
artillerymen, aided by a considerable number of native volunteers.
Eighteen of these were wounded. In all, along the southern or inside
line, from Saleh Aga to Marabout, 65 men were killed, and from 150 to
200 wounded.
In the northern line of defences at Ras-el-Tin, and also in Fort Adda,
at least 50 men are believed to have been killed and 150 wounded, but
the record is very vague. Stray pieces of shell are reported by the
chief of police to have killed and wounded between 150 and 200 citizens,
but this statement must be accepted for what it is worth.[22]
It is only fair to the other side to give the Egyptian narrative of the
bombardment. The account published in the Arab paper _El Taif_, in
Cairo, was as follows:
"WAR NEWS.--On Tuesday, 25 Shaban, 1299, at twelve o'clock in
the morning (July 11th, 7 a.m.). The English opened fire on the
forts of Alexandria, and we returned the fire. At 10 a.m. an
ironclad foundered off Fort Adda. At noon two vessels were sunk
between Fort Pharos and Fort Adjemi. At 1.30 p.m. a wooden
man-of-war of eight guns was sunk.
"At 5 p.m. the large ironclad was struck by a shell from Fort
Pharos, the battery was injured, and a white flag was
immediately hoisted by her as a signal to cease firing at her,
whereupon the firing ceased on both sides, having lasted for
ten hours without cessation. Some of the walls of the forts
were destroyed, but they were repaired during the night. The
shots and shells discharged from the two sides amounted to
about 6,000, and this is the first time that so large a number
of missiles has been discharged in so short a time.
"At 11 a.m. on Wednesday the English ships again opened fire
and were replied to by the forts, but after a short time the
firing ceased on both sides, and a deputation came from Admiral
Seymour and made propositions to Toulba Pasha, which he could
not accept.
* * * * *
"No soldiers ever stood so firmly to their posts under a heavy
fire as did the Egyptians under the fire of twenty-eight ships
during ten hours.
* * * * *
"At 9 a.m. on Thursday an English man-of-war was seen to put a
small screw in place of the larger one which she had been
using, and it was then known that her screw had been carried
away by a shot from the forts. On examining other ships it was
observed that eight had been severely battered on their sides,
and that one had lost her funnel."
CHAPTER IX.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOMBARDMENT.
The bombardment of the forts of Alexandria was an occurrence of such
importance, and so rare are bombardments in recent naval annals, that a
few general observations will probably not be without interest.
The most obvious mode of attack on fortifications would be for the ships
to form in line ahead and steam past the batteries, each ship delivering
her fire in succession as her guns would bear. Having thus passed the
line of defence, the ships would turn and repeat the process with the
other broadside. By manoeuvring in this manner, the forts (which have
the advantage of a fixed gun-carriage), would labour under the
disadvantage of having a moving target to fire at. On this principle for
two and a-half hours the bombardment of the forts from Ras-el-Tin to
Pharos was conducted by the _Sultan_, _Superb_, and _Alexandra_. From
the fact that at 9.40 a.m. this mode of attack was changed for one which
consisted in the systematic concentration of fire on individual forts,
from ships more or less stationary, it may be concluded that the former
plan was found faulty.
It is submitted that the best principle in practice is the consecutive
silencing of individual batteries, and not a general, and so to speak
collective, bombardment. In support of this principle it may be
mentioned that from the time of the adoption of the second plan the fire
of the ships improved very much in accuracy. This also had the further
advantage of being accompanied by a simultaneous diminution in the
accuracy of the fire of the enemy: as is shown by the circumstance that
the majority of the hits received by the _Sultan_, _Superb_, and
_Alexandra_ were sustained before 9.40--the time when these vessels
came to an anchor and adopted the concentration principle.
That the fire of the ships would improve as soon as the vessels became
stationary is intelligible enough, and is accounted for by the exact
range being then attainable, but that the enemy should have made worse
practice against a fixed than against a moving target appears a little
difficult to understand. The naval officers engaged have, with some
sense of humour, suggested that the vessels in manoeuvring from time
to time steamed across the line of the Egyptian fire and so got struck.
The explanation, however, is probably to be found in the increased state
of demoralization of the artillerymen as soon as the ships anchored and
made more accurate practice.
In the inshore squadron the flag-ship _Invincible_ was anchored for the
most part 1,300 yards from Mex, and was kept broadside to the wind on
one side, and to the batteries on the other, by a kedge carried out to
windward. The _Monarch_ and _Penelope_ remained under way, passing and
repassing the forts. The _Penelope_ adopted the plan of steaming out
three-quarters of a mile towards the reef, and then drifting towards the
shore broadside on until within about 700 yards, whilst the _Monarch_
kept more way on, moving in a line parallel with the shore. The fire
from these two ships was throughout less effective than that from the
_Invincible_, which was at anchor.
The range at which the fleet generally engaged seems to have been
needlessly great. The outside squadron could have got to within 1,000
yards of the Lighthouse Fort and 800 yards abreast of the Ras-el-Tin
lines, to within 500 yards of Fort Adda and 200 yards of Fort Pharos,
whilst the inshore division could easily have got within 400 yards of
all the batteries in the neighbourhood of Mex. It can hardly be doubted
that the boldness of this move would have been rewarded by the more
speedy and extensive dismounting of the guns, which was confessedly the
chief object of the attack, and would have allowed the machine guns in
the vessels' tops to be used with greater effect.
It must be remembered that the target in each case was the muzzle of a
gun, a mere pin's head at the distance at which the ships were engaged,
and that a successful hit meant either good luck or phenomenally good
shooting. This hammering away at long range was tolerably successful,
but the length of the action was a disappointment to those who expected
short work to be made of the Egyptians, while, as has been seen, it
drained the stock of ammunition to a dangerously low ebb.
The enormous disproportion between the damage sustained by the ships and
batteries respectively may be accounted for, partly by the inferior
construction of the works, and partly also by the inferior practice of
the gunners by whom they were manned. There were other faults in the
defence. For example: the batteries were so placed as to be unable,
except at Fort Pharos, to support one another; there was no bomb-proof
cover; there was too small a stock of ammunition in readiness; and the
men who should have been employed as reliefs for manning the rifled guns
wasted their efforts with the smooth bores, which were practically
useless.
With regard to the fire of the fleet generally, a variety of opinions
has been expressed. One authority states that, with the exception of the
_Inflexible_ and _Temeraire_, the English gunners did not greatly
distinguish themselves. Many of the shells of the _Monarch_,
_Inflexible_, and _Superb_ fell short.[23] The fire also was said to
have been too slow, thus giving the enemy's artillerists time to recover
themselves. The fire of the _Inflexible_ was stated to have been
particularly disappointing in this respect. That of the _Alexandra_ was
much more rapid than that of the others, as her much greater expenditure
of ammunition shows.
A naval officer of experience has expressed the opinion that,
considering the nature of the works attacked, an old line-of-battle
ship, with her numerous though much smaller guns, would have been more
effective than the modern ships which took part in the bombardment. If
one considers the great size and weight of the majority of the
projectiles used, as well as the capacity of the shell and the
consequent amount of their bursting charges, one can hardly fail to be
astonished at the small effect produced on the sand parapets, especially
when it is remembered that the latter were in many cases, according to
modern theory, too weak to afford any real protection. It is a fact, and
one on which too much stress cannot be laid, that in only one instance
was any one of the parapets pierced by a shell from the fleet, and that
Fort Mex was the only battery which could not have been sufficiently
repaired during the night to resume the action on the following day. One
remarkable feature of the fire from the fleet was the enormous number of
shells which failed to explode, and this has never been satisfactorily
accounted for.
The expenditure of ammunition by the squadron appears from the following
table:--
(A) Common.
(B) Palliser.
(C) Shrapnel.
(D) Segment.
(E) Empty Shell.
(F) Shot.
(G) Case.
(H) TOTAL.[24]
(I) Martini-Henry.
(J) Nordenfeldt.
(K) Gatling.
(L) Rockets.
-----------+----+---+----+---+---+---+---++-----++------+------+-----+---
SHIP. | (A)|(B)| (C)|(D)|(E)|(F)|(G)|| (H) || (I) | (J) | (K) |(L)
-----------+----+---+----+---+---+---+---++-----++------+------+-----+---
Alexandra | 379| 23| 1| | | 4| || 407 || | 4000 | 340|
Superb | 257| 83| 25| 34| | 12| || 411 || | 1161 | 880|
Sultan | 247| 24| 3| 44| 10| 10| || 338 || | 1800 | 2000|
Penelope | 241| | 45| 32| | 62| || 380 || 5000 | 1672 | |
Monarch | 227| 5| 129| | | 6| || 367 || 1800 | 3440 | 2680| 21
Temeraire | 139| 70| 13| 6| | | || 228 || | 160 | |
Invincible | 221| | 25| | 2| 2| || 250 || 2000 | 2000 | 1000|
Inflexible | 139| 21| 11| 37| | | || 208 || | 2000 | |
Beacon | 21| | | 1| 61| 18| || 101 || 320 | | | 3
Condor | 162| | 8| | 31| | || 201 || 1000 | | 200| 13
Bittern | 66| 7| 1| | | 12| 3 || 89 || | | |
Cygnet | 72| | | | 71| | || 143 || | | |
Decoy | 69| | | | | | || 69 || 40 | | |
Helicon | 6| | | | | | || 6 || | | |
+----+---+----+---+---+---+---++-----++------+------+-----+---
TOTAL |2246|233| 261|154|175|126| 3 ||3198 ||10,160|16,233| 7100| 37
-----------+----+---+----+---+---+---+---++-----++------+------+-----+---
The hits received by the fleet were as follows:--
_Alexandra._ Twenty-four shot and shell penetrated the ship above the
armour-plating. Several shot and shell struck the armour; of these, some
made indentations on the plates from five inches to one inch in depth.
The foremost funnel was struck in three places. The total number of hits
was about sixty.
_Sultan._ Number of hits, twenty-seven, of which two struck the armour,
denting two plates, and starting one. One shot went through the after
funnel. The holes made in the side were as follows:--One sixteen inches
by twelve inches; another fifteen inches in diameter; and a third
fourteen inches in diameter. A hole sixteen inches by ten was made
through the mainmast.
_Superb._ Fourteen hits, of which seven were on the hull, and seven on
the upper works and spars. A 10-inch shell struck the port side, and,
bursting, tore a hole in the side ten feet by four feet, within three
feet of the water-line. The armour-plating on the port side was struck
by two shells, of which one indented the armour three inches, and the
other burst, starting a plate, and breaking fourteen rivet-heads. Some
of the rigging was shot away, and a hole twelve inches in diameter was
made in the foremast. Two other holes in the side were as follows:--One
ten inches in diameter, four feet above the water-line; the other twelve
inches in diameter (made by a 10-inch shot), five feet above the
water-line.
_Penelope._ Eight hits, of which three were on the armour, making little
or no indentation. Of the others, one passed through the after embrasure
on the starboard side; another hit the starboard quarter gallery; the
third struck a 9-pounder gun, carried off the sight and damaged the
carriage; the fourth hit the mainyard, port side; and the fifth struck
the muzzle of one of the 8-inch guns, then broke up and destroyed the
transom plate of the carriage. The gun and carriage were put out of
action.
_Invincible._ Eleven hits, six of which passed through the side. A large
dent was made in the armour by a shot which also started a plate.
_Inflexible._ About six hits altogether. One shot struck the unarmoured
part of the hull, and, penetrating, damaged the bollards and did other
injury. Other shots damaged the upper-works, but the armour-plating was
not struck.
The _Monarch_, _Temeraire_, _Hecla_, and gunboats received no hits at
all.
With regard to the effects of the bombardment on the various forts, it
is proposed to give a short account, taking them in the same order in
which they were first presented to the reader.[25]
1. _Fort Marabout._--A small store was burnt. There were several hits on
the scarp, but none of the guns were in any way injured.
2. _Fort Adjemi._--Uninjured.
3. _Marza-el-Kanat._--No injury was done to the fort, but a store of
gun-cotton was exploded.
4. The citadel of Mex had several breaches made in the works, but no
guns were dismounted.
5. _Old Fort of Mex._--Parapets were uninjured, but the buildings in the
rear were almost swept away. A small store in front of magazine was
levelled to the ground. The large store was riddled with shot, but the
magazine was untouched. The barracks were much damaged. The fort was
found to contain many fragments of shell, and the loss of life among the
defenders was probably considerable. The damage to the guns was as
follows:--A 10-inch Armstrong gun was struck in the second coil by a
shell which cut a groove of an oval shape in the metal; the coil was
shaken out of place and cracked, but the gun was left serviceable. A
9-inch Armstrong gun was struck by a shell, and received an oval graze
1·25 inch in depth. In the right portion of the battery, a 10-inch S.B.
and two 8-inch Armstrong guns were struck by shrapnel bullets, and the
fifth gun from the left, an 8-inch Armstrong, was struck on the coil by
a shell. The blow dismounted gun, carriage and slide. The metal of the
gun was ripped off for eighteen inches, and the trunnion ring was also
started by the force of the blow. The remaining guns (36-pounders) were
uninjured.
_Left Flank Battery._--Left gun(10-inch S.B.). This gun was hit on the
right of the carriage by a splinter, the gun was uninjured. No.3 gun
(10-inch S.B.).--This was hit by a shell on the muzzle, gun uninjured.
6. The Mex Lines, armed with S.B. guns, were not fought, and the works
escaped injury.
7. _Fort Kamaria_ was not much injured. A 10-inch S.B. gun was
dismounted by a shell.
In view of the tremendous fire to which Fort Mex was subjected,
and the comparatively short range at which all the ships except
the _Temeraire_ engaged it, it is almost impossible to believe
that not a single gun here was disabled or dismounted during the
action proper. The 8-inch gun which was dismounted was bowled
over by the _Penelope_ long after the fort had ceased firing,
and from a distance stated to be about 300 yards. The successful
shot was the thirtieth of this series, and was aimed by the
gunnery lieutenant.
"This fort was the only one which could not have resumed action
on the following day, in consequence of the injury done by the
landing-party by exploding gun-cotton and spiking the
guns."[26]
8. _Omuk Kubebe._--The effects of the bombardment were considerable,
though they were due less to the number of hits than to the size and
weight of the 16-inch shells which caused most of the injuries. The
effect of three of these shells from the _Inflexible_ was worthy of
note. One shell having burst on the top of the scarp made an almost
practicable breach. Two others, within a few feet of each other, hit the
parapet, 24 feet thick, and almost pierced it. They appear to have
struck the exterior slope, and having cut a trough in the parapet about
11 feet in width, burst after penetrating 17 feet, and formed craters 16
feet in diameter, and 5 feet and 4 feet 6 inches in depth, respectively.
With regard to the ordnance, the only damage was the destruction of a
36-pounder S.B. gun.
9. _Saleh Aga._--One 10-inch and one 6·5 S.B. gun were dismounted, and
one of the 6·5-inch S.B. guns was destroyed, though not dismounted.
10. The adjoining battery received only slight injuries.
11. _Lighthouse Fort, or Fort Ras-el-Tin._--The barracks to the north of
the fort were riddled with shell, and in many parts left in ruins. The
parapets on the west side were so scored with shell that it was
difficult to estimate the number of hits, but at no point had they been
pierced. The scarp also suffered severely, both at the bastions and on
the curtain; and the right face of the bastion was much marked by
shrapnel bullets. On the west front the parapet showed about
twenty-three hits, and the scarp twenty-four; two stores were burnt, and
the rifled-shell store was riddled with shell. The Lighthouse itself was
hit by several shells, and the buildings round its base were reduced to
ruins. Right gun (9-inch).--This gun was sent back to the end of the
slide, and breaking the ties was tilted up on its breech with the
muzzle in the air. Left gun (9-inch).--This was struck by two shells,
and gun and carriage were both destroyed. The former was hit on the
trunnion ring, which had been partially carried away, the carriage was
in pieces, and the brackets were torn off and broken. The gun was thrown
about twelve feet to the rear and crushed several of the gunners, ten
bodies having been found beneath it. In the left bastion, a 10-inch
Armstrong gun was hit on the muzzle, but the tube was not damaged. The
sockets of the levers were broken by use, the tackle shot away, and the
shot-crane broken and useless. A 9-inch gun was run back and tilted up
on the breech in the same manner as the 9-inch gun in the right bastion.
An 8-inch gun was struck in reverse by shells. The gun and carriage were
capsized on the left side, but uninjured. One truck of the slide was cut
away. The Lighthouse Fort suffered more severely than either Pharos or
Adda, since there was not one of the rifled guns which could bear on the
fleet left fit for service.
12. _The Lines of Ras-el-Tin._--(Left or Harem Battery.) The effects of
the bombardment on the fort were small, but the loss of life must have
been considerable, as many shells burst in it. The rear face of the
tower was in ruins. Right gun (8-inch Armstrong).--A 9-inch Palliser
shell struck the lower side of the gun and burst on the breast of the
carriage with the following results: the gun beyond being indented for a
distance of 8 inches in length was uninjured, but had been thrown about
10 feet from its original position. Both brackets of the carriage were
torn away. The entire carriage was a wreck. Centre gun (8-inch
Armstrong).--The right-front truck of the carriage was broken, and the
gun was struck by a splinter on the chase. The gun and the carriage,
however, suffered no serious injury, though the left bracket of the
latter was pierced by a splinter. The centre battery in the interior was
almost uninjured, though the parapet was deeply scored in all directions
by shells. The embrasure of the left gun (9-inch) was choked up by the
ruins of the cheeks, whilst the revetment on each side of the neck was
swept away. The condition of the guns was as follows:--10-inch Armstrong
gun.--The right-front truck of the carriage was carried away, and the
buffers of the slide were much damaged by the recoil of the gun. 9-inch
Armstrong gun.--The gun and carriage were uninjured except that the
lever of the elevating gear was bent, and the holdfast was rising off
the pin. 9-inch left gun.--This was hit on the left trunnion by a shell
which tore off the cap square, and also by a second shell, on the right
bracket six inches in the rear of the trunnion. The gun and carriage
were, however, practically uninjured. This battery in the early reports
of the bombardment was miscalled the Moncrieff Battery, but there was in
it no gun mounted on that system. The Moncrieff gun, 180 yards to the
westward, was hit on the left side by a splinter of a shell, and a bolt
in the rear of the left bracket was also cut out by a Nordenfeldt
bullet. Beyond this it was unhurt, and remained perfectly serviceable.
_The Hospital Battery._--The effects of the bombardment here were
overwhelming. The entire gun portions were so entirely destroyed that
it was difficult to discover where the original crest had been.
The injuries to the guns were as follows:--Right gun (7-inch
Armstrong).--The cheeks of the embrasure were driven in on the gun, and
the trucks were jammed, otherwise the gun and carriage were uninjured.
The former was, however, scored with forty-nine hits from a 10-inch
shrapnel shell, the greatest depth of any hit being 5 inches. Left gun
(7-inch Armstrong).--A shell burst under the front racer on the left
side of this gun, tore it up and bent it into a vertical plane, twisting
the truck and forcing it off the racer. The slide was also jammed by the
ruins of the revetment. The gun-carriage and slide were otherwise
uninjured, and were left fit for service.[27]
13. _Fort Adda._--The barracks and stores, especially on the east side
of the fort, were very much injured, but the batteries were not
materially damaged. The only shell which entered, that on the southern
half of the western side, blew up the magazine. The loss of life from
the explosion was probably very great, and the entire space between the
magazine and the gate was covered with stones, timber, and broken shell.
The injury to the guns was as follows:--A 10-inch S.B. gun was
dismounted by a shell which threw the gun and carriage to a distance of
about 15 feet from the slide. Another 10-inch S.B. gun was similarly
dismounted, whilst a third was struck on the left side of the platform
by a shell which had previously cut off the cascabel of the second gun
to the left; the beams of the platform were completely shattered, and
the gun with its carriage was overturned and wrecked.
14. _Fort Pharos._--The west tower and front were breached in many
places; the minaret was partly knocked down, and the whole of the west
front of the keep, with its two turrets, were in ruins. The south-east
corners of the fort were also much shattered by the shells which passed
over the west front. The stores and barracks suffered severely, and the
destruction of so much masonry must have added considerably to the moral
effect of the fire of the ships. With regard to the sea front, the
parapet was hit in several places (seven in all), but only in three
cases did a shell enter the battery. The corners of the traverse to the
right of the 8-inch Armstrong guns were carried away by two shells; a
third shell pierced the sole of the embrasure of the 10-inch Armstrong
gun, and threw the large granite block which formed the sill on to the
platform of the gun, so the gun might be said to be out of action. Of
the S.B. guns, one heavy 10-inch on the west tower was dismounted, by a
16-inch shell from the _Inflexible_, one 10-inch gun on the west front
was capsized and put out of action, and it is not unlikely that another,
with its carriage, fell into the crater formed by a shell.
On the rear face, a 36-pounder, having been hit on the cascabel by a
chance shell, was thrown completely over the parapet, and left standing
on its muzzle at a distance of 30 feet from its original position.
Another gun was also unserviceable, owing to the partial destruction of
its carriage by a shell. But it was in the casemates below that the fire
of the ships inflicted the greatest injury. The front wall of the
casemates, which is faced with masonry two feet in thickness, was in
many places torn away under the stress of fire, leaving only six feet of
rubble as a protection to the guns. Through the latter the heavy shells
pierced with ease. The results were as follows:--Under west tower,
casemate penetrated, gun not disabled. In casemates Nos. 1 to 12, just
one half of the guns were disabled. Of the casemates on the right sea
front, No. 17 was the only one in which there was no gun hit. The loss
of life in the casemates must have been out of all proportion to the
effect produced by the feeble guns (six 5-inch S.B.) mounted within.
On the scarp of casemates Nos. 1 to 12 there were about 13 hits, of
which seven pierced the wall.
15. _Fort Silsileh._--The fire does not appear to have in any way
injured the guns or stores of this fort, though fragments of at least
two shells lay around the rifled guns.
The total number of guns dismounted was, four M.L.R. guns, sixteen S.B.
guns, and one mortar.
The forts at Alexandria generally were badly knocked about, but the more
modern parapets were not seriously injured. If the bombardment were
directed against the forts in their defensive capacity, it must be
pronounced a failure. If its object were the dismounting of the rifled
guns, it must be conceded that such results as attended the work of
either the inside squadron (where only one gun of this type was
seriously affected), or even of the outside squadron (where less than
half of the guns were permanently disabled), do not justify the verdict
of success.
In the wider sense, however, of having driven the Egyptian gunners from
their batteries and having silenced the forts, the fleet was
unquestionably victorious.
CHAPTER X.
THE DAY AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT.
The following day, the 12th July, when it was proposed to renew the
bombardment, there was dull gloomy weather off Alexandria, with a haze
hanging over the city. There had been a strong breeze from the sea
during the previous night, and it was still blowing fresh from the
N.N.W., causing the ironclads forming the outside squadron to roll
somewhat.
The gunboat _Beacon_ at daylight collected the bodies of the men
belonging to the fleet, killed the previous day, and buried them at sea.
The _Humber_ storeship appeared in sight, and working parties were sent
to her for ammunition.
At 9 a.m. the _Inflexible_ and _Temeraire_ were sent to reconnoitre the
batteries from Eunostos Point on Ras-el-Tin, to Fort Pharos.
At 10.15 the _Temeraire_ reported that the Hospital Battery was
prepared, that two large rifled guns were ready with guns' crews about
them, and that numbers of men under arms were in the barracks and
covered way. The _Inflexible_ at the same time signalled that a large
body of men, armed with rifles, was in the rear of the Hospital
earthworks. In reply, the _Sultan_ signalled to the _Inflexible_ and
_Temeraire_, "Close, and open fire with shell." At 10.40 the two ships,
having taken up position, fired twelve shells, to which there was no
reply, and the men were observed leaving the batteries.
At 10.48 flags of truce were displayed at the Lighthouse Battery and at
Fort Adda. At the same time, a boat bearing a white flag came out
towards the _Inflexible_. This being noticed, the vessels were ordered
to cease firing. The boat then returned to the shore without
communicating.
At 11 the Admiral signalled to the _Penelope_ and _Sultan_, "Weather
having moderated, Admiral intends to attack Marabout and Adjemi;
approach with _Sultan_, _Alexandra_, _Temeraire_, and _Superb_. I will
send gunboat to summon enemy to surrender."
At 11.10 the _Bittern_ was sent with a flag of truce to communicate with
the Egyptian authorities.
At 11.30 the squadron was reinforced by the arrival of the ironclad
_Achilles_, belonging to the Channel Fleet.
At 2.50 p.m. the _Bittern_ returned, and signalled, "Negotiations have
failed, have informed authorities you will engage batteries at 3.30
precisely." At 3.40 the _Bittern_ hauled down her flag of truce, and it
was reported that the flag of truce at Ras-el-Tin was also taken down,
though this was subsequently found not to have been the case.
At 3.50, the Egyptian flag at Marabout having been hauled down, the
vessels there were recalled, and the Admiral signalled to the _Sultan_,
"Engage batteries off Pharos and Ras-el-Tin with your squadron." At the
same time the _Invincible_ fired a shot into the Mex Forts, but got no
reply.
At 4.40 a general signal was made to the ships to "take up position for
engaging batteries, anchoring as convenient;" and at 5 the _Alexandra_,
_Temeraire_, _Achilles_, _Superb_, and _Sultan_ weighed anchor, and
proceeded in line towards Fort Pharos. None of the ships, however,
opened fire, as the flag of truce at Ras-el-Tin was seen to be still
flying.
At 5.40 the _Helicon_ was sent into harbour with a flag of truce. The
instructions of the officer in command were to inform the authorities
that if they wished to treat with the Admiral they could do so by
returning in the _Helicon_, and that if they did not do so, no more
flags of truce would be respected.
At 5.50 the signal was made for the squadron to anchor for the night.
The _Helicon_, pursuant to orders, steamed up the harbour and lay off
the Arsenal wall, whilst the officer in command went on board the
Khedive's yacht _Maharoussa_, expecting to find some one to treat with,
but not a person was on board. After waiting half an hour, he signalled
that he had been unable to find any of the authorities to communicate
with, and returned at 8.20 p.m.
As early as four in the afternoon a part of the town had been observed
to be on fire, and the conflagration soon after was seen to spread
rapidly.
During the night the fires on shore continued to extend, and it became
evident that it was the richest part of Alexandria, the European
quarter, which was in flames.
The spectacle as viewed from the ships was grand, but awful in
character. The sky on the land side was lighted up with a fierce red
glare, and columns of smoke covered the city and surrounding country.
The Admiral's first idea was to send a landing-party to save the town.
He, however, hesitated on account of the risk to his men. Eventually, to
discover the state of things on shore, he landed a party of fifteen men
from the _Invincible_. The streets were found completely deserted, and
all was silent save for the roar and crackle of the flames and the sound
of falling beams and walls. The party returned at three a.m. on the
13th.
Daylight revealed the town still wrapped in flames, and an immense cloud
of smoke hung over its whole extent.
At 5.40 a.m. the _Invincible_, _Monarch_, and _Penelope_ left their
anchorage off Mex, and steamed into the outer harbour, with the _Beacon_
and _Bittern_ in company. At 5.50 the _Helicon_, which had again gone in
to pick up refugees, embarked and brought 170 of them for distribution
amongst the ships outside. They were of all classes and nationalities,
and included several women and children. They had passed through the
streets unmolested, and reported Alexandria deserted, and that all the
troops had left the previous day, after setting fire to the town. It
was believed that part of the soldiers had gone to Rosetta, and part to
Damanhour. The _Helicon_ reported that there were a great many more
refugees, women and children, inside the mole waiting for an opportunity
to come off.
In the meantime the Admiral held a consultation with some of the
captains and officers under his command as to what was best to be done.
On the one hand, there was the certainty that unless some step should be
taken, a great part, if not the whole, of Alexandria would be destroyed.
On the other, it was uncertain how far Arabi's troops had retired, and
one report was that they were massed to the number of 9,000 outside the
town, no further off than Moharrem Bey Gate. The number of men that
could be landed without disabling the ships was not large. The Admiral
found it difficult to decide. Already he must have begun to realize the
error he had committed in opening fire with such precipitation. The
Channel Fleet (of which, as already stated, the _Achilles_ had arrived)
were known to be on their way from Malta, as well as the _Orontes_,
troop-ship, with troops from Gibraltar. The _Tamar_, too, with 1,000
marines, was at Malta. The ships of the Channel Fleet alone could have
furnished a contingent of 1,800 men in addition to those whom Admiral
Seymour could have disembarked from his own squadron.
The bombardment, so long delayed, might well have been retarded for the
short period necessary to enable the reinforcements to arrive. What had
occurred was not altogether unforeseen. Arabi had, before the
bombardment, declared that if the ships opened fire he would burn the
European quarter; and the fulfilment of his threat would have not only
gratified his thirst for revenge, but would have also covered the
retreat of his forces.
At last a landing was resolved on, and at 8.35 a.m. the general signal
was made, "Prepare to land marines," followed ten minutes later by the
order, "Prepare to land brigade of seamen." The _Helicon_, _Bittern_ and
_Beacon_ were despatched to the outside squadron to bring in as many men
as possible, whilst the _Condor_ and _Cygnet_ were told off to take the
seamen and marines from the inshore vessels. At 9.5 the _Alexandra_ was
detached to reconnoitre off Rosetta Gate, and the remaining vessels of
the outside squadron were directed to take stations for bombarding, in
case the landing should be resisted.
At 10.30 the landing-party left the ships. The force consisted of four
hundred men, including all the marines of the squadron; it was led by
Commander Hammill, of the _Monarch_, and had with it a Gatling gun.
The _Invincible_, at the same time, sent ashore and spiked the guns at
Fort Saleh Aga, and the other vessels landed men to destroy the guns in
the Lighthouse Fort at Ras-el-Tin.
Whilst Commander Hammill's force was disembarking, large bodies of
soldiers were seen moving towards Fort Silsileh, apparently accompanied
by field-pieces, and the _Sultan_, _Temeraire_, and _Achilles_ were
ordered to watch that point, and to bombard if necessary.
In the intervals between carrying out the above-mentioned operations,
the larger ships were engaged in recruiting their exhausted stock of
ammunition from the store-ship _Humber_. In this matter a most
unexpected difficulty arose. Through some unpardonable blunder the ship
had been despatched from Malta without a single filled common shell on
board, and actually without powder to fill the empty shells she had
brought with her. Further than this, she had brought no fuzes, and as
the vessels of war had no reserves of powder, they would, had
hostilities been resumed, have been speedily reduced to a state of
comparative impotence.
In the course of the day, anxiety being felt for the safety of the
Khedive, the _Condor_ was sent to cruise off the Palace at Ramleh.
Further parties of men were landed in the town, making the total force
disembarked about 800 men. They took with them a day's provisions,
Gatling guns, and ammunition.
At 3.25 p.m. the _Temeraire_ signalled that great activity was observed
about Ramleh Palace, and that Dervish Pasha was supposed to be there.
At 4.43 the _Temeraire_, having reported that Fort Pharos did not appear
to be entirely deserted, had permission given her to send a party to
spike the guns there.
At 5 the _Bittern_ was directed to take a guard of fifty marines to the
Palace of Ras-el-Tin, for the protection of the Khedive, who was
expected from Ramleh.
What had been taking place on shore in the meantime is reserved for
another chapter.
CHAPTER XI.
ALEXANDRIA DURING THE BOMBARDMENT.
After the preceding narrative of events from a naval point of view, it
may be convenient to relate what was taking place at the time in
Alexandria itself.
During the whole of the night preceding the 11th July, the native
population had been leaving the town in crowds, some in carts and others
on foot, the women crying and uttering loud lamentations. Towards
daylight the movement slackened. From three a.m. troops were marching
through on their way to Ras-el-Tin; at five the last detachment passed.
The morning dawned on the city without a cloud in the heavens. There was
a gentle breeze from the north-west, all was quiet as the early sun
gilded the tops of the domes and minarets of the various mosques, and
lighted up the acacia trees of the Place Mehemet Ali and the Place de
l'Eglise. In the streets the soldiers, who had passed the night on the
door-steps of the houses, on the marble benches of the square, or on the
ground, slowly roused themselves, and, yawning, looked about them in a
somnolent way. The streets were being watered as usual, the "bowabs," or
door-keepers, were tranquilly smoking their cigarettes at the
house-doors, and the Arab women were going about selling milk as if
nothing unusual were about to happen. With the exception of these few
indications of life, the streets were deserted. The military posts were
relieved at six o'clock, as usual each soldier carrying a linen pouch
full of cartridges.
The clock of the church of St. Catherine struck seven, and before the
sound had died away, the thundering boom of the first gun from the fleet
startled the city, and the few civilians who were about sought refuge in
their dwellings. The Egyptian soldiers remained at their posts.
Then came a solemn silence which lasted some minutes, after which the
bombardment, with all its horrors, began. The English ships were seen in
the distance vomiting volumes of fire and smoke, whilst the forts in
their turn thundered forth a reply. The scene was of the grandest
description, and a few seconds later the shrieks of the projectiles as
they flew overhead mingled with the boom of the cannon, which echoed
and re-echoed on all sides. The report from the huge 80-ton guns of the
_Inflexible_ was easily distinguishable above the general roar.
At a little before eight a shell fell in the Arab quarter, behind the
Ramleh railway station, causing a panic, which forced many of the
inhabitants into the forts close by.
Arabi, who had from an early hour stationed himself at the Ministry of
Marine in the Arsenal, finding the missiles from the fleet falling
thickly there, left with Toulba Pasha and an escort of cavalry, and at
eight o'clock drove to the fortifications behind Fort Kom-el-Dyk, where
he remained till four p.m.
By nine o'clock the streets were totally deserted except by the
soldiers. The cannonade slackened, and sounds of rejoicing came from
some of the native cafés, where it was reported that two ironclads were
sunk and five were disabled.
At about the same time a shell fell on the terrace of a house alongside
the Palace Menasce in the Rosetta Road, and another burst over the
German Consulate. The discharges averaged about two per minute. The
soldiers now commenced to send patrols to the houses of such Europeans
as were ashore, to prevent any attempt at signalling to the English
squadron.
The number of Europeans ashore at this period amounted to about 1,500.
Of these some 100 were at the College of the Frères, a great number in
the Greek Church, and in the Greek and European Hospitals. The German
Hospital at Moharrem Bey also sheltered a large number of nurses,
invalids, and refugees. The Anglo-Egyptian Bank, in the Rue Cherif
Pasha, was held by a determined party of about twenty (subsequently
increased to eighty-two). The Danish Consul-General had fortified the
Danish Consulate, where a large number of people, including many women
and children, found a refuge.
There were other Europeans, mostly of the poorest class, hidden away in
their dwellings in various parts of the town, and to all these the
movements of the patrols naturally occasioned serious disquietude.
Early in the forenoon, an Egyptian officer mounted the roof of the
Crédit Lyonnais Bank, and commenced cutting away the telephone wires.
Shortly afterwards a gang of native boys in the same street began
pulling down all the wires they could reach, raising at the same time
the wildest shouts.
At nine, a shell fell in some stables in the Rue Copt, and for a quarter
of an hour the neighbourhood was enveloped in a cloud of dust. At ten, a
shell fell in the Franciscan Convent, where a number of persons were
assembled, but, as it did not burst, did no injury beyond destroying one
or two of the walls.
Shortly afterwards a shell fell into a house in the Rue Cherif Pasha,
making a large hole. Another pierced the wall of the Jewish Synagogue.
Another hit the Zaptieh, and a fourth struck a house in Frank Street. As
the missiles fell, the soldiers sought shelter in the doorways of the
houses, but did not entirely desert their posts.
At eleven o'clock, the natives spread a report that only three ironclads
remained afloat, and great rejoicings took place in the Arab cafés.
Half-an-hour later, an officer and a detachment of soldiers stationed
themselves opposite the Anglo-Egyptian Bank, and insisted on mounting to
the roof to satisfy themselves that there was no signalling going on.
They also went to the central Telephone Office and to the Telegraph
Offices and cut the wires. At the office of the Eastern Telegraph
Company, they found one of the employés, a French subject, who had
refused to go afloat, and murdered him on the spot.
At this period, isolated firing from a westerly direction was all that
was heard; otherwise the silence of death prevailed throughout the town.
At half-past twelve, two shells, one following the other in quick
succession, struck the Khedivial Schools, in the Rosetta Road, and,
bursting, destroyed the south-western angle of the building.
Soon after the cannonading commenced, a number of empty carts and drays
was seen going towards the Marina. During the forenoon, these began to
return laden with dead artillerymen. The first load passed up soon after
ten in the morning, the bodies being stripped and tied in with ropes. A
little later, the wounded began to arrive in great numbers, some in
carriages and some in carts, many of the men showing ghastly wounds.
Crowds of women followed them, uttering cries of distress and
lamentations.[28]
At one p.m. a crowd of native children carrying a green flag passed down
the Rue Cherif Pasha beating petroleum tins and calling on God and the
Prophet. During the day many of the houses in which Europeans were seen
on the terraces or roofs, watching the bombardment, were surrounded by
soldiers, who, under the pretext that the inmates were signalling to the
fleet, forced them to descend and accompany them to the police-stations.
Eight or ten Europeans were dragged from their dwellings and set upon in
the streets by the mob. As soon as they fell into the power of the
latter, they were forced along by soldiers towards the Moharrem Bey
Gate, and struck with the butt ends of rifles, and received blows from
naboots. As they passed along they were subjected to every species of
ill-usage. On their arrival, covered with blood and in a wretched
condition, fresh troubles awaited them. They were cast indiscriminately
into cells with natives, and endured the vilest usage.
A mob of natives in the course of the day broke into the German
Hospital, where there were many European refugees as well as the
patients. The inmates ran for the cellars, where the invalids had
already been placed for safety. The Secretary of the German Consulate
was the last to flee, and as a final effort he fired a shot from his
revolver. The effect on the crowd was magical. They drew back, and
contented themselves with demanding that the flag which was flying over
the hospital, and which they imagined was being used for signalling to
the fleet, should be given up to them. This was acceded to, and they
then dispersed.
The Danish Consulate was surrounded by soldiers and a mob of Arabs, who
required the Consul to haul down the flag flying over the house. This he
courageously refused to do, and whilst the dispute was at its height,
three Arabs were killed by shells almost at his door, and the rest fled.
At three, the fire of the ships, which had in the meantime slackened,
was resumed with great vigour. One shell burst at Moharrem Bey Gate, and
killed two officers and six men of the police.
According to Arabi's statement, he received during the day several
messages from the Khedive, congratulating him on the behaviour of the
troops. Shortly after four o'clock Arabi left the town in a carriage
with an escort of soldiers, taking the route by the Rosetta Gate.
About this time the _Inflexible_ and _Temeraire_ were observed to
approach Fort Pharos and reopen fire on the batteries there, and a great
number of their shells were seen to strike the rocks, raising clouds of
_débris_, and bounding in repeated ricochets over the face of the water.
Towards five o'clock the picturesque mosque in the fort fell, burying in
its ruins a number of the wounded who had taken refuge behind the walls.
The two ships at the same time pitched a few shells at Fort Silsileh.
The firing continued, at intervals, until past five o'clock, when it
ceased altogether.
As soon as the cannonade was over, the exodus of natives from the town
recommenced, and the streets were again filled. The desire of all was to
escape from the town as soon as possible. Along the banks of the
Mahmoudieh Canal, and the line of the railway to Cairo, was one vast
stream of fugitives, which only ceased as night fell.
Then a great stillness came over Alexandria.
The night was calm. The gas was not lighted, and the city, plunged in
darkness, resembled a vast necropolis. The only sounds heard from time
to time were the plaintive howlings of forsaken dogs. A few fugitives
ventured into the streets, and encountered only the sentries and
patrols.
On the morning of the 12th, the movement of the natives recommenced. All
those who had remained in the Ras-el-Tin and other quarters endeavoured
to get out of the town with their luggage and effects. It was rumoured
that the bombardment was to recommence, and the terror of the people was
indescribable. The trains from Moharrem Bey Station were thronged with
fugitives, who not only rode inside, but on the roof, the steps, and
even the buffers of the carriages.
In the Place Mehemet Ali a regiment of infantry were scattered about,
the men, with arms piled, seated or lying on the ground, tranquilly
smoking their cigarettes. A few of the bowabs were seen going to the
bazaars and returning to the houses with small stores of meat and other
provisions. Amongst the Europeans, the greatest anxiety prevailed, and
every one was asking when the disembarkation would begin. The soldiers
on duty became more and more threatening, and the supplies of
provisions began to run short. Gangs of disorderly natives from time to
time appeared and made violent demonstrations in front of such houses as
were known to shelter Europeans.
From early morning, bands of natives ran through the streets with
soldiers at their head, looking for any Europeans who might be
concealed. At a little before eleven the cannonade recommenced, and a
dozen reports were heard coming from the westward. There was then a
silence, and all wondered what next would happen.
As soon as the cannonade ceased, the troops at Moharrem Bey and Rosetta
Gates precipitated themselves into the streets, calling on the natives
to flee, as the dogs of Christians were going to disembark and massacre
the Mussulmans. The news soon after spread that the convicts in the
Arsenal had been let loose, and were going to pillage and fire the town.
An hour later, part of the garrison left the town by the Rosetta Gate,
taking the road to Ramleh. The first of them marched in fours in fairly
good order, and were followed by 1,500 more who passed in gradually
increasing disorder, until they became confused with the rabble of
fugitives who crowded the roads.
At one o'clock the soldiers in the street received the order to eat
their midday meal, and, each opening his haversack, set to work with an
appetite indicating hours of abstinence. When the men had finished their
repast, mounted mustaphazin and officers, amongst whom was Soleyman
Sami, appeared, and gave hurried orders to the soldiers at the various
posts. It appears that these orders were for them to abandon the town,
and retire outside. The military at once formed at certain given points,
such as the Place Mehemet Ali, the Place de l'Eglise, and the Place de
la Mosque d'Attarin, and shortly after the evacuation commenced the
greater part of the soldiers proceeded to the Mahmoudieh Canal.[29] Then
arose a general cry of "Death to the Christians!" People were heard
hammering at the doors and windows of the houses. This was followed by
the sound of falling shutters, and the crash of broken glass. Infuriated
crowds appeared on the scene, armed with heavy sticks, with which they
carried on the work of destroying and plundering the shops and
dwellings. The soldiers, too, broke from the ranks and joined in the
looting, and with the butt-ends of their rifles assisted in forcing open
doors and windows.
Continuous lines of soldiers and civilians staggered past laden with
plunder. In a short time the streets were literally blocked by the mob.
The order was given to the natives to quit the town, and from two p.m. a
constant stream of fugitives flowed out of the Rosetta and Moharrem Bey
Gates. When outside the town, they were met by Bedouins, who, in many
cases, fought with them for the spoil. One eye-witness stated that a
common handkerchief changed hands in this way no less than three times
whilst he was looking on. Not only furniture, looking-glasses, and such
things, were carried off, but horses and carriages as well. The
soldiers, in many instances, undressed themselves and wrapped round
their bodies all sorts of rich stuffs, such as silks and satins. Some
brought gilt chairs and sofas with them, but, finding the articles too
cumbersome, broke them to pieces, and tore off the velvet coverings,
leaving the remainder in the road.
The large open space between the water-works and the European cemeteries
was crowded by a huge mob of pillagers, fighting and struggling amongst
themselves for the plunder. Those who could get away with their spoils
took them either by the road to Ramleh, or by that leading to the
Mahmoudieh Canal.
The wildest disorder prevailed, and amongst the fugitives were Turkish
women and children of good position from the different harems. On
arriving at the gates of the town the women were attacked by the mob and
outraged. The marauders, in their haste to get possession of the
jewellery which the women were wearing, even cut their ears and wrists,
and to silence their cries stunned them with blows from their sticks.
Soon afterwards several soldiers were seen returning to the town,
apparently to share in the pillage, and struggling to force their way
through the gates against the stream of pillagers and fugitives going
the other way. Many of those coming out encumbered with heavy loads were
upset in the _mélée_, and several of the soldiers, finding it impossible
to re-enter the town, contented themselves with joining the Bedouins in
seizing the loot of the fugitives.
About four p.m. volumes of smoke, accompanied by the crackling of
flames, were observed in the neighbourhood of the British Consulate.
These indications increased every instant, and as the sun went down the
whole sky became lighted up with a lurid glare. This was accompanied by
the shouts and cries of Europeans, who were either burned out or dragged
from their dwellings by natives, who, with sticks and knives in their
hands, spared few whom they met. A small number found refuge in the
houses as yet untouched by the fire and guarded by Europeans, but most
of the rest fell victims. Amongst those who humanely opened their doors
to the fugitives was the Danish Consul, who sheltered no less than 150.
It was a night to be remembered. From the terraces of the houses the
flames were observed extending in the direction of the Rue Cherif Pasha.
The French Consulate, the Okella Nuova, and other parts of the Place
Mehemet Ali, were already wrapped in flames.
During the night nothing was heard but the crackling of the flames,
mingled with the cries of the incendiaries and the occasional fall of a
heavy building. The volumes of smoke filled the air with the most
nauseating vapours. In some cases, cotton soaked in petroleum and set on
fire was thrown into the houses, whilst in others tins of paraffin were
poured over the furniture and ignited. Where ingress to the dwellings
could not be obtained, bedding soaked with petroleum was piled up on the
outside and fired. On every side the smell of petroleum was
distinguishable.
The night passed without slumber for those on shore, and on the morning
of the 13th Alexandria presented the appearance of a vast bonfire. The
Europeans who remained on shore saw the flames gradually closing in on
them. The pillagers and assassins had disappeared, but the atmosphere
had become unbearable. There was further a fear that the Arabs, seeing
that no force was being landed, might return to complete the work of
massacre.
All hope of a disembarkation appeared as remote as ever. Two of the
ironclads had indeed been seen to approach Fort Pharos and send their
boats ashore, and for a moment it was thought help was coming. The idea
was a vain one. The landing was only for the purpose of spiking the
Egyptian cannon, and this having been accomplished, the ships steamed
away.
The courageous garrison of the Anglo-Egyptian Bank, seeing there was no
help to be expected, resolved to make a sortie, and early in the morning
they all sallied forth together, the women and children were put in the
middle of the troop, and thus they marched towards the Marina. On their
way they were joined by others in the same condition as themselves. They
passed, without encountering any opposition, over masses of burning and
smouldering ruins. They broke open the gates at the Marina, and seizing
some native boats rowed out to H.M.S. _Helicon_.
The Danish Consul and his party still held out, but the situation
becoming worse and worse, at three in the afternoon, they, too, quitted
their stronghold, and having secured the attendance of a European police
officer, marched to the shore, having more than once to go out of their
course to avoid the falling houses. On reaching the Custom-House Quay,
they met the landing party under Commander Hammill. The fugitives passed
the night in safety on board an Egyptian steamer in the harbour, and
were next day taken off to the vessels outside.
CHAPTER XII.
EVENTS ON SHORE.
On the day of the bombardment the Khedive was at his Palace at Ramleh,
abandoned by all but a few faithful followers.
His Highness was kept badly posted up as to the progress of the
bombardment, and amongst those who came and went with despatches were a
number of spies, who, from time to time, went off to Arabi to inform him
of what was passing at the Palace.
At 8.30 a.m. an aide-de-camp arrived with the news that a considerable
number of the Egyptian gunners were killed, and that several guns had
been dismounted. On the part of the commandant he begged the Khedive to
order reinforcements to be sent. The greatest excitement reigned. There
were no artillerymen available, so the Minister of War was directed to
despatch a force of infantry.
In the course of the forenoon news was brought that the forts were
offering a stout resistance, and that serious damage was being inflicted
on the English fleet. But later, in the afternoon, it became known that
the forts were destroyed, and incapable of offering further opposition.
No further accounts arriving, the Khedive sent for Arabi, about seven
o'clock in the evening. Arabi came from Alexandria, where he had been
during the bombardment, and on his arrival told the Khedive that the
forts were destroyed, and that it was no longer possible to defend them.
"We must," he added, "either have recourse to other measures, or else
come to terms with the Admiral." After some consultation, and more or
less vehement discussion, it was decided that Toulba Pasha should be
sent to the Admiral to confer.
On the morning of the 12th July about 500 Bedouin Arabs appeared before
the Palace with the intention (as they said) of assuring the Khedive of
their fidelity, and with offers of assistance in case of need; but after
a slight demonstration of loyalty they retired.
Shortly after mid-day Toulba returned and announced that the Admiral had
said that, unless he was allowed peaceably to land his men at three
points on the coast, he would recommence the bombardment at two o'clock.
To this demand Toulba said he had objected, as it gave him no time to
obtain instructions, but that the Admiral had refused to allow further
delay. A hurried consultation took place, and it was decided to send
Toulba Pasha to the Admiral to tell him that Egypt had no power to
authorize the landing of foreign troops on her shores without the
consent of the Porte.
Toulba proceeded as far as the Arsenal, and, it being after two o'clock,
the time fixed for recommencing the bombardment, he became alarmed at
the signs of pillage and destruction he saw around him and refused to go
any farther.
Shortly after his departure the Ramleh Palace was surrounded by cavalry
and infantry, about 400 men in all; the first thought was of the loyal
Bedouins, who had been there in the morning and declared their fidelity;
but it was soon discovered that Arabi's people had distributed £2,000
amongst these and other loyalists to secure their absence; that the
force was a hostile one, and that the Khedive was left helpless with his
handful of attendants. Panic spread in the Palace, and the numerous
domestics were beside themselves with fear. The Khedive showed complete
calmness and self-possession, and, sending to the commander of the
troops, inquired what he wanted. He replied that his orders were to
guard the Palace.
The Khedive then sent Sultan Pasha to Arabi to ask the meaning of this
proceeding. Arabi was at Rosetta Gate when Sultan Pasha arrived with the
message from the Khedive.
After some time Toulba Pasha reappeared at the Palace with some of the
Ministers, who endeavoured to explain that the surrounding of the Palace
was a mistake, and that the officer in command should be punished. The
situation remained unchanged until seven o'clock, when it was observed
that the cavalry were preparing to depart--orders, it appeared, having
been given that all troops should follow Arabi. One officer, however,
remained behind with about 250 men.
A General Council was called at the Palace, and it was determined to
inform Admiral Seymour of the situation, and, if possible, get the
Khedive within reach of the fleet. This state of uncertainty and anxiety
continued till the next morning, when the officer left in charge of the
250 men came to His Highness and declared himself to be loyal to the
Khedive. The Khedive made him a firm and impressive speech. The other
officers of his company were called up, and all swore loyalty and
devotion, and kissed His Highness's hand. A distribution of decorations
followed, and confidence was restored.
Zohrab Bey[30] was then sent to inform the Admiral that the Khedive
wished to return to Ras-el-Tin, and at once returned with the news that
the Admiral had sent a guard to assist him.
Tewfik then started for Ras-el-Tin Palace, and in driving into the town
had to make a _détour_ so as to enter by the Moharrem Bey Gate. He was
escorted by sixty or seventy cavalry, and preceded by a group of
outriders carrying white flags on the points of their sabres. He had to
pass _en route_ numerous bands of pillagers and incendiaries, and on
reaching the Palace was received by Admiral Seymour and a force of
marines.
In the meantime Commander Hammill's party of 250 bluejackets and 150
marines had landed without opposition. They reached the Palace of
Ras-el-Tin at 10 30 a.m., seized the western end of the Peninsula,
occupied the Arsenal, and threw out a line of sentries north and south
extending from shore to shore. At 12.30 p.m. a small party of marines
and a Gatling's crew from the _Monarch_ pushed on towards the town and
guarded the streets in the immediate neighbourhood, making prisoners of
natives who were seen looting inside the gates, and firing upon those
more remote. In Frank Street they found every shop looted and burnt. The
looters retreated before them, and dropped their plunder.[31]
The streets were strewn with the most miscellaneous articles--broken
clock-cases, empty jewel-boxes, and fragments of all kinds. Every now
and then the party had to run up a side street to avoid the fall of a
house or wall. Bodies of Europeans, stripped and mutilated, were seen in
the Place Mehemet Ali, in an advanced state of putrefaction.[32]
The work of incendiarism was still going on, and even the women were
seen setting fire to houses with petroleum. The fires had occasioned
enormous damage in the European quarter, where not a street was passable
for any distance, all being more or less blocked by the smoking ruins of
the fallen houses. Walls were still tumbling down, and the hot air was
opaque with lime-dust and smoke.
The scenes on every side were appalling. The parts of Alexandria which
were found to have been destroyed, or which were destroyed in the next
two days, included not only the Grand Square, or Place Mehemet Ali, but
all the streets leading from it to the sea, the Rue Cherif Pasha and the
Rue Tewfik Pasha, with the adjoining streets. In the square itself the
kiosques were destroyed; the statue of Mehemet Ali on horseback in the
centre alone remained untouched. One side of the Place de l'Eglise, one
side of the Rue de la Mosque d'Attarin, a portion of the Boulevards de
Ramleh and de Rosette, and the whole of the northern portion of the Rue
de la Bourse, were also consumed. In addition to these, most of the
houses in the following thoroughfares were destroyed: Rue Osman Pasha,
Rue de l'Attarin, Rue des Soeurs, Rue de l'Enchere, and Rue du
Prophete Daniel. The French and Austrian post offices were burned,
together with the Hôtel d'Europe and the Messageries Hôtel;[33] also the
English, French, Greek, Portuguese, and Brazilian Consulates, the Mont
de Piété, and one police-station.
Such of the European dwellings as were not burnt were looted from top to
bottom; articles of furniture not easily removed were wantonly injured
or destroyed. Several of the native houses and shops also suffered in
the general looting carried on. Almost the only European dwellings
untouched were the few in which Europeans were known to have remained.
The English Church was struck by a shell, but not otherwise injured; the
German, the Coptic, the Catholic, and the Israelitish churches were also
uninjured, except that the last-named received one shell. The theatres,
the banks, and the tribunals escaped injury.[34]
It must be borne in mind that all this destruction was the work, not of
the ships, but of the native population. The aim of the vessels,
directed solely on the forts, had been so true that the damage done to
the town by the half-dozen or so shells which struck it was
insignificant, and, with the exception of the harem buildings at
Ras-el-Tin, the British missiles did not create a single conflagration.
At the same time it is difficult to hold Admiral Seymour quite blameless
in the matter. So great was the demoralization of the Egyptians that had
the Admiral, on his own initiative, landed but a few hundred of the
5,880 men on board his ships on the morning of the 12th, they could
easily have occupied the town and averted the catastrophe.
Curiously enough, after the mischief was done, the Admiralty on the 13th
sent a telegram directly authorizing "a landing of seamen and marines
for police purposes, to restore order."
During the afternoon and evening the marines of the _Superb_,
_Inflexible_, _Temeraire_, _Achilles_, and _Sultan_ were added to the
forces on shore. Captain Fisher, of the _Inflexible_, took command of
the whole force, and the patrolling of the city was begun. A company of
Royal Marine artillerymen, armed as infantry, marched through the
European and the Arab quarters of Alexandria. They shot some natives
caught in the act of setting fire to houses, and also three of the
native police, who were pillaging a house after having maltreated the
Berberine door-keeper.
The _Inflexible_, _Temeraire_, and _Achilles_ were stationed off Ramleh
to command the land approaches to Alexandria from the southward and
westward.
On the 14th the _Penelope_, with Admiral Hoskins, left for Port Saïd.
Of the events of the 14th, Admiral Seymour says, "Employed during the
whole of the day landing as many men as we could spare from the
squadron, and by evening we had occupied the most important positions."
Alexandria being a walled town, the distribution of the force at Captain
Fisher's disposal had to be governed by this fact, and was practically
as follows:--At the Ramleh station were marines from the _Monarch_. At
the Rosetta Gate were marines from the _Temeraire_. At the Moharrem Bey
Gate were marines from the _Alexandra_. At Fort Kom-el-Dyk Gate were
marines from the _Sultan_. At Pompey's Pillar Gate were marines from the
_Superb_. At the Gabari Caracol Gate were marines from the _Achilles_.
At the Gabari railway station were marines and bluejackets from the
_Alexandra_. At the Zaptieh and Arsenal were marines from the
_Invincible_. As the streets were gradually explored the bodies of many
Europeans were discovered; others were found floating in the harbour.
The corpses found in the streets were buried as quickly as possible.
During this time the town was still being fired and looted in places.
On the 15th the _Minotaur_ arrived with Admiral Dowell, in command of
the Channel Squadron, and a brigade of seamen and marines from her was
at once disembarked. Fort Napoleon was occupied by gunners from the
fleet. Fort Kom-el-Dyk, which it was reported had been mined, was also
occupied by bluejackets. A party of men from the _Alexandra_ destroyed
the guns at Fort Silsileh with gun-cotton.[35]
The German, American, and Greek ships of war landed men to assist in
restoring order. Lord Charles Beresford was appointed Chief of Police,
and persons found pillaging or setting fire to houses were brought
before him and summarily dealt with. Those guilty of pillaging were
flogged, and incendiaries were sentenced to be shot. The American
marines rendered much service in promptly disposing of incendiaries, and
in blowing up houses with gunpowder to check the conflagration.
In consequence of a rumour that Arabi intended to attack the town, a
large number of bluejackets and marines, with Gatling guns, were landed,
each ship reinforcing its detachment on shore.
As a fact, Arabi was busy entrenching himself at Kafr Dowar, and had no
more thought of attacking the British forces than they had of making an
onslaught on him. This, however, was not known to the British Admiral,
who at eleven p.m. telegraphed to the Admiralty as follows:--"Arabi
Pasha reported to be advancing on Alexandria. I have telegraphed to Port
Saïd to intercept ships from Cyprus, and ordered them to call here on
their way back."
On the 15th the Khedive summoned Arabi to Alexandria, which was a little
like "calling up spirits from the vasty deep;" and Arabi telegraphed
from Kafr Dowar, by way of response, that "His Highness would be glad to
hear that recruits were coming in to assist him to fight the English."
At the Khedive's suggestion the Admiral, on the 16th, despatched two
ships to command Aboukir in case Arabi should attempt to cut the dyke
there and let in the sea.
The same day it was found necessary to re-embark the Greek marines who
had been landed to restore order, without, however, being very
successful. The Americans and the others, excepting the Germans,
likewise re-embarked. The Germans remained on shore some days later, and
were most useful.
On the 16th fresh fires broke out in the town, and a party of Bedouins,
150 strong, appeared at Gabari Gate, bent upon looting. They succeeded
in capturing a donkey, when they were fired on by a midshipman of the
_Alexandra_ and twelve seamen, and two of their number were killed.
On the 17th further reinforcements arrived. The _Tamar_ arrived with
1,000 marines from Cyprus. The _Agincourt_ and _Northumberland_
(ironclads) arrived from Port Saïd with the 38th (South Staffordshire)
Regiment, 860 strong, and a battalion of the 60th Rifles, 1,700 in all.
The _Salamis_, with General Sir Archibald Alison and staff, also
arrived, and the General assumed the command of the land forces, now
numbering 3,686 men.
On the same day, Commander Maude, of the _Temeraire_, rode out to within
300 yards of Arabi's position at Kafr Dowar. At Millaha Junction,
Commander Maude found several human bodies lying about in various stages
of decomposition. There were signs of loot in all directions, and the
bodies were evidently those of looters who had in their turn been robbed
by the soldiers.
The rebel camp was reported to consist of 6,000 men, with six batteries
of rifled guns, one battery of Gatlings, and 300 marine artillery,
besides Bedouins. They were intrenching themselves behind earthworks on
the line of railway.
The Khedive now announced that Arabi had been suspended from his
functions as Minister of War. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in
communicating to the Admiral the dismissal of Arabi, stated that "the
publication of the Decree was deferred for fear of seeing reproduced in
Cairo and other towns the disorder which had taken place in Alexandria."
On the 18th, the troopship _Orontes_ arrived from Malta, but through
some unaccountable blundering of the authorities, she came without a
single soldier.
By this time order was beginning to be re-established in Alexandria; the
fires, too, had either burnt themselves out or been extinguished. The
Egyptian Post Office was reopened in the town, and the work of clearing
the streets was proceeded with rapidly. For this purpose many natives
and others out of employment were utilized.
The first day's work in street-clearing was marked by the first public
execution. A negro, who had been caught setting fire to some houses,
was, after a court-martial, tied to a tree in the Place Mehemet Ali, and
shot by a party of sailors. The people too began to return to the town.
These, however, required to be watched, as they were almost to a man
Arabists, and ready to resume the work of incendiarism and plunder on
the first opportunity. Looters were still to be found lurking in odd
corners, notably in the Minet-el-Bassel quarter, where there were stores
containing sugar and grain.
The sanitary condition of the town now began to give rise to
apprehension. Disagreeable odours, indicating the presence of dead
bodies, were perceived proceeding from many of the houses. These were,
no doubt, the victims of the pillagers, left to lie where they fell.
On the 18th the land defence of the city was definitely assumed by the
army, assisted at the Rosetta Gate by marines from the ships, and
elsewhere by the bluejackets with their Gatling guns.
At this period it was found that the supply of provisions in Alexandria
was running short, and steps had to be considered for stopping the
return of the European fugitives.
CHAPTER XIII.
THE SITUATION.
On the 19th July, Dervish Pasha, the Sultan's Envoy, whose pacifying
mission to Egypt had so signally failed, left Alexandria for
Constantinople.
On the 20th a proclamation was issued by Admiral Seymour, with the
permission of the Khedive. It announced that "Orders had been given to
officers commanding patrols to shoot any person taken in the act of
incendiarism; that any person taken in the act of pillage would be sent
to the Zaptieh to be tried and punished; that any person taken a second
time for the same offence would be shot; and that no person would be
allowed to enter or leave the town after sunset."
On the 23rd three natives and one Greek were shot for incendiarism.
It may be interesting to know how things were going on in the interior.
Omar Pasha Loutfi, Governor of Alexandria, returning from Cairo,
reported that he had seen Europeans massacred, and their houses
pillaged, at Damanhour, Tantah, and Mehalleh. The Governor also stated
that he had seen a European and his wife murdered at the Tookh Station,
half-an-hour distant by rail from Cairo.
According to an inquiry made by the Prefect of Police at Tantah, the
number of Europeans murdered, and subsequently buried, in that town,
amounted to fifty-one, and there were about an equal number massacred
and thrown into the canal. At Kafr Zayat, six persons were killed. Ten
Greeks and three Jews were murdered at Benha. Disturbances also occurred
at Zag-a-zig, but no persons were killed there, although one was
wounded. At Galioub, a family was taken out of the railway train, put
under the carriages, and crushed by the wheels. The inspector of the
"Cadastre" at Mehalleh Kebir reported that fifteen Europeans were killed
there. At Kafr Dowar also some Europeans were massacred. The exact
number is not known. Five Europeans were killed at Mehalla-Abou-Ali.
In Cairo, Omar Loutfi found that the greatest excitement and panic
prevailed. The Prefects of Menoufieh and Garbieh, and the Mudir (or
Governor) of Galioubieh, were imprisoned in the Citadel for obeying the
Khedive.
A general Council had been summoned at the Ministry of the Interior to
consider the question of continuing the military preparations. It was
attended by about a hundred Pashas, Ulemas, and merchants. After a
number of violent speeches against the Khedive, the Coptic Patriarch
remarked that the assembly had as yet heard only one side of the
question, viz., that of Arabi, and that before coming to any decision it
was necessary to hear the Khedive's side as well. The views of the
Coptic Patriarch were adopted by the majority of the assembly, which
proceeded to nominate a delegation.
The delegation consisted of Ali Pasha Moubarek (a former Minister) and
five others, who were directed to proceed to Alexandria to see the
Khedive, and ask His Highness what truth there was in the charges of the
Arabists; they were also directed to ascertain whether all the Ministers
were really in prison, as had been stated.
As regards the rebel military preparations, Mahmoud Pasha Sami had been
appointed Commander-in-Chief of the army corps stationed in the
neighbourhood of the Suez Canal. Arabi demanded that one-sixth of the
male population of every province should be sent to Kafr Dowar. All old
soldiers of every description were called upon to serve again, and
horses and provisions were everywhere requisitioned for the army.
"Arabi's chief strength," wrote Mr. Cartwright, the Acting British
Consul-General, "lay in his unscrupulous and barbarous mode of warfare."
At the moment, there was such a terrible dread among the officials at
the Palace of what might happen to their property in Cairo and
elsewhere, that the Khedive's action was paralyzed, and His Highness was
deterred from denouncing Arabi as a rebel by his unwillingness to incur
the consequences of Arabi's retaliation. At an interview with the
Khedive, Mr. Cartwright endeavoured to represent to him the moral effect
which such a denunciation would produce, and the encouragement it would
afford to those who remained faithful to His Highness.
On the 22nd the Khedive published a Decree dismissing Arabi from his
post of Minister of War, and proclaiming him a rebel. Omar Loutfi was
appointed in his place. The reasons for Arabi's dismissal as set forth
in the Decree were the insufficient resistance offered to the British
Fleet, the loss of 400 guns, allowing the English to land without
resistance, the retreat to Kafr Dowar, and his disobedience in not
coming to the Khedive when summoned.
Considering the relations existing between the Khedive and the British
forces at this time, the Decree, issued at a period when Tewfik was no
longer under any sort of coercion, is as curious a specimen of an
Oriental document as generally comes to light. The proclamation itself
may be regarded as a reply to one issued by Arabi against the Khedive,
and transmitted to the Governors of the various provinces in Egypt.
On the 26th, Arabi telegraphed to the Sultan protesting his fidelity to
the Khalifate, and saying, "That being provoked into a war, he was in
possession of all that was necessary to overcome his enemies, thanks to
the Divine assistance." He added, "That he did not believe that, as the
enemies of his country and religion asserted, he would find Ottoman
troops on his path, which would place him under the cruel necessity of
treating as enemies his brethren in the faith."
Ali Pasha Moubarek succeeded in reaching Alexandria. He reported that at
Kafr Dowar large numbers of soldiers were flocking to Arabi from the
villages, arms were being distributed to all comers, and a total force
of 30,000 men had been got together. Raouf Pasha, however, who came from
the camp a few days later, gave the number of Arabi's men as only
15,000, and related that much sickness prevailed amongst them.
On the 3rd August the official journal of Cairo published the decision
of a great National Council of the week before, to the effect that--
"In consequence of the occupation of Alexandria by foreign
troops, of the presence of the English squadron in Egyptian
waters, and finally of the attitude taken up by Arabi Pasha for
the purpose of repulsing the enemy, Arabi Pasha was to be upheld
as Minister of War and Marine, intrusted with the general
command of the Egyptian army, and full authority in all that
concerned military operations, and that the orders of the
Khedive and his Ministers would be null and void."
The document bore the signatures of the three Princes Ibrahim, Ahmed,
and Kamil (cousins of the Khedive), of the Sheikh of the El Azhar
Mosque, of the Grand Cadi of Egypt, of the Coptic Patriarch, of the
Grand Cadi of Cairo, besides those of the Ulemas and Judges, and in fact
all the notabilities left in Cairo.
On the 19th July, at the request of the Foreign Office, additional
troops were ordered to Malta and Cyprus to bring up the forces there to
15,000 men; and the next day the British Cabinet had so far realized the
gravity of the situation as to decide on the despatch of an English
expedition to Egypt, with or without the consent of the Powers.
The vote of credit for the expedition, £2,300,000, was asked in
Parliament on the 24th July, Mr. Gladstone carefully explaining that the
country "_was not at war_."
The Scots Guards sailed for Alexandria on the 30th July, the head of a
column of ships and regiments which from that time until the occupation
of the Suez Canal on the 20th August never ceased to stream towards its
ultimate point of destination.
The force was originally fixed at 21,200 men, composed as
follows:--Cavalry, 2,400; infantry, 13,400; artillery, 1,700; hospital
and other non-combatant services, 3,700, with a reserve of 3,100, to
sail at a later period. The entire force was to be under the command of
General Sir Garnet Wolseley, G.C.B., with General Sir John Adye, K.C.B.,
as second in command, and Lieutenant-Generals G. H. Willis, C.B., and
Sir E. B. Hamley as divisional commanders.
One hundred men of the 24th Middlesex (Post Office) Volunteers were
chosen to accompany the forces and take charge of the postal
arrangements during the campaign.[36]
Sir Garnet Wolseley's instructions were to take command of the army
ordered for service in Egypt in support of the authority of the Khedive
to suppress a military revolt in that country. He was told that Her
Majesty's Government did not wish to fetter his discretion as to the
particular military operations which might be necessary, but that the
main object of the expedition was to re-establish the power of the
Khedive. He was empowered, after successful operations against Arabi and
those in arms against the Khedive, to enter into any military convention
which the circumstances might warrant, but to make no arrangements
involving a political settlement.
In despatching the British expedition, Mr. Gladstone's Government made a
final plunge in the direction which they had from the first wished to
avoid. No one can say that their intervention came too soon.
The Khedive on the 19th had sent for Sir Auckland Colvin, who was the
right-hand man of the Acting British Consul-General, and begged him to
urge Her Majesty's Government to take further action without delay. He
pointed out that it was most necessary, as Arabi's power had become so
great as to spread terror and consternation in the minds of all the
natives. His possession of the country, and especially of Cairo, His
Highness added, left at his mercy the families and property of all who
remained loyal to the Khedive. His Highness concluded by saying he
should be glad to receive an intimation as to the steps which were
contemplated. Those steps, as has been seen, culminated in the despatch
of the British expedition.
The means by which the British Government was gradually induced to adopt
a resolute attitude in regard to Egypt, and the degrees by which it
arrived at a decision, will appear later on.
The general feeling of uneasiness at Alexandria was augmented by Omar
Loutfi's report. It was further known that Arabi's forces were daily
increasing, and scouts ascertained that his outposts had been advanced
in the direction of the town. Repeated rumours of intended attacks from
time to time prevailed, and scarcely a night passed without an alarm of
one kind or another.
The British authorities now began to employ themselves seriously in
looking to the defences of the town, and on the 20th Major Ardagh and
the engineers proceeded to repair the drawbridges, to mend the walls at
Kom-el-Dyk, to mount guns at Rosetta Gate, to secure the railway
station, and to place Gatlings in position. Three 9-pounder rifled guns
were mounted in Fort Kom-el-Dyk, as part of the permanent defences of
the city, and manned by bluejackets from the fleet.
On the 19th, a brisk wind fanned the embers of some of the ruins into
flames, which occupied the fire brigade several hours to subdue.
The water supply of Alexandria at this time began to be a source of
anxiety. The supply to the town comes from the Mahmoudieh Canal, which
joins the Rosetta branch of the Nile at Atfeh, forty-five miles distant.
The canal itself adjoins the position taken by Arabi at Kafr Dowar.
Throughout the bombardment, and subsequently, the town had been
abundantly supplied by the efforts of Mr. J. E. Cornish, the manager.
When, previous to the bombardment, all his countrymen, and the great
mass of Europeans, sought safety afloat, he refused to desert his post.
He contrived an elaborate system of defence for the water-works. It
comprised an arrangement for throwing jets of steam at any possible band
of assailants, as well as a line of dynamite bombs, capable of being
exploded by means of electricity. The upper part of the engine house was
also converted into a kind of arsenal, into which he and his men could
retire as a last resort, and where rifles and ammunition were in
readiness. During the bombardment, the works happily escaped injury.
Subsequently, from the roof of the engine house, Mr. Cornish and his
companions (nine Europeans in all) watched the progress of the
bombardment, until the shot and shell which whistled overhead from the
vessels firing at Fort Pharos compelled them to descend. Meanwhile, the
pumps were kept going as in ordinary times. When, on the afternoon of
the 12th, the mob of rioters left the town, the majority of them passed
a few yards from the works, and indulged in curses and execrations at
the "Christian dogs" within. With humane forethought, two large jars of
water were placed in front of the gate and kept supplied from within.
Thousands of thirsty natives, coming from the dust and smoke of the
town, stopped to drink, and, after cursing the manager heartily, passed
on. To whatever cause it may be attributed, no attack was made on the
works, and their courageous director survived to receive the
congratulations of the Khedive and of his own countrymen.[37]
Arabi's position at Kafr Dowar placed the water supply of Alexandria at
his mercy, and he was not long in taking advantage of the circumstance.
On the 21st July, the water in the Mahmoudieh Canal was observed to be
rapidly falling. Arabi had made a dam, at a point called Kinje Osman,
between Kafr Dowar and Alexandria, by which all further flow from the
Nile was stopped. Assuming that his operations were limited to this, the
great quantity of water in the Alexandria end of the canal insured a
supply for about twelve days. It was rumoured, however, that he had
broken the banks of the canal on the Alexandria side. This would, of
course, have soon cut off the supply altogether, and have caused much
suffering among the population, beside forcing the troops to rely on the
distilled water from the ships. In view of the emergency, Admiral
Seymour appointed a Commission to sit every day to consider the measures
to be adopted. Steps were taken to stop all the steam-engines and
"Sakeah" (or water-wheels) taking water from the canal for irrigation
purposes, arrangements were made for clearing out and filling the old
Roman water-cisterns, and H.M.S. _Supply_ was ordered from Malta with
the necessary apparatus for distilling water in large quantities.
On the 21st, Arabi caused salt water to be let into the Mahmoudieh
Canal, by cutting the dam separating it from Lake Mareotis, thereby
considerably aggravating the difficulty of the water supply.
A rumour was started that the Khedive's Palace at Ramleh had been looted
by the English soldiery. Major Ardagh was instructed to hold a searching
inquiry, the result of which was that the report was found to be utterly
without foundation. The soldiers, individually, were searched, and no
loot was discovered. The Palace had, indeed, been looted to a large
extent, as might have been expected from the fact that, from the time of
its evacuation till the 24th, it was wholly unguarded.[38]
CHAPTER XIV.
MILITARY OPERATIONS.
On the 21st July Sir Archibald Alison moved two regiments of infantry
and a squadron of mounted men out to Ramleh in the direction of Arabi's
intrenchments. They went as far as Water-Works Hill, a commanding
position from which a good view of the Egyptian lines at Kafr Dowar
could be obtained.
On the morning of the 22nd a force of 250 men of the Rifles was pushed
forward beyond Millaha Junction, on the Cairo Railway, to blow up the
line. They met Arabi's cavalry and exchanged shots with them. The
Egyptians fled, leaving two dead on the field. Having finished the work
intrusted to them, the Rifles then withdrew. A strong patrol was the
same day sent to Ramleh.
On the 24th, the troopship _Malabar_ having arrived the previous day
from Gibraltar and Malta with the 46th (Duke of Cornwall's Light
Infantry) Regiment, a wing of the 35th, and a Battery of Artillery, in
all 1,108 men, Sir Archibald Alison, at 3 a.m., sent mounted infantry to
the position intended to be occupied in front of the Ramleh Barracks.
The General followed by the train of the Alexandria and Ramleh Railway
with the 60th Rifles, two 7-pounder naval guns, and some sappers. On
arriving he found the ridge running from the Palace to the Mahmoudieh
Canal occupied by the mounted infantry, and at once took possession of
the water-works tower on the ridge, a strongly defensible building, and
established outposts at the railway bridge, and at the front of the
canal bend. Shortly after the British troops were in position a small
force of Arabi's cavalry, followed by infantry, advanced towards the
railway bridge, across the canal, within 400 yards of the Rifles. After
exchanging shots for some time, the cavalry retired rapidly on the
Mahmoudieh Canal. The enemy's advance then became more decided. A
considerable force of cavalry with two horse-artillery guns pushed on
rapidly, the guns coming briskly into action. The infantry followed, and
the movements of a considerable body of troops were observed on the
high ground behind. A fight ensued which lasted about an hour, several
of the enemy being observed to drop. The attack, however, was not pushed
home, and the firing gradually ceased. There were no casualties on the
English side.
Ramleh was from this day occupied and held by the British forces. The
work of fortifying it was begun at once, and prosecuted with vigour, for
the force opposed to the English far outnumbered the latter at all
times, and the need of the moment was to hold on until the army corps
under General Wolseley could be collected and transported to Alexandria.
It may be here mentioned that Ramleh is not a village or town, but a
species of summer resort for the European residents of Alexandria, who
have built houses and villas upon the sandy neck of land lying between
Lakes Mareotis and Aboukir on the one hand, and the Mediterranean on the
other. The houses are distributed over a length of some miles, and are
mostly surrounded by high walled inclosures, with, in many cases,
luxuriant gardens. Between these scattered country villas the sand lay
everywhere ankle-deep. There was an occasional pretence of a road, but,
generally speaking, communication between any two points was in the
straightest possible line, and over the sand. To supply the needed
transit to and from the city, a private company has constructed the
Alexandria and Ramleh Railway, which has no connection, material or
otherwise, with the Government lines. An incidental advantage due to the
military occupation of Ramleh was the protection enjoyed by the Ramleh
Railway, and by the owners of property in this quarter.
The water-works at Ramleh contain the pumping engines which deliver the
fresh water for distribution from the Mahmoudieh Canal to the tower and
reservoir just behind them on higher ground. These two points, the
water-works and the tower, were the centre of the defence. A strong
detachment was always maintained at the former, whilst the head-quarters
were established at the latter. An elevation immediately in rear of the
tower was strengthened, a trench dug, and a number of guns, viz., five
breech-loading 40 pounders and two 12-pounders, were mounted on the 26th
by seamen from the fleet. A magazine was also sunk, and working parties
ran a shelter trench along the crest of the rising ground, and this was
gradually converted into a musketry parapet four and a half feet high.
In this work places were arranged for the guns, the platforms being of
railway sleepers and the parapets reveted with sand-bags and timber.
Small musketry redoubts were thrown up upon the flanks of the position.
To the east and west were intrenched infantry camps. Two 9-pounders of
the Naval Detachment were mounted in the adjoining earthwork. The
extreme eastern picket was placed in a fortified house, a mile and a
half distant. Its object was to serve as a feeler in the direction of
Aboukir. The Egyptians could advance from Kinje Osman either by the road
on the canal bank or by the railway embankment. The outpost on the
former line was called "Dead Horse Picket;" on the latter no regular
picket was maintained beyond the iron railway bridge over the Mahmoudieh
Canal, although vedettes were thrown out in the direction of Millaha
Junction.
As a barrier against a movement along the southern branch of the railway
(that coming from the Gabari Station), a strong force was established at
the Villa Antoniadis on the canal. Inside the entrance to the villa
garden was a semi-circular breastwork facing the villa, and reaching
across the gateway. Two B.L.R. 40-pounder guns were permanently mounted.
These commanded the approach along the railway embankment. Other
stockades were built across the road to protect the rear, and temporary
bridges were built across the canal. The walls of a deserted Arab
village on the other side were loopholed and otherwise defended.
The general defence profited by the presence of the Mahmoudieh Canal,
with its high banks, and by the railway embankment, which stretched from
the Antoniadis garden towards Ramleh. For night-work an electric light
was placed on the roof of a house at Fleming Station, on the Ramleh
Railway, so as to illuminate the approaches from Aboukir and Kafr Dowar.
An ingenious device for reconnoitring was at this time adopted, in
fitting out an armour-clad train in which to make reconnaissances
towards Arabi's lines. One of the Government locomotives was armed under
the direction of Captain Fisher, of the _Inflexible_, with a 40-pounder
gun, and fitted with boiler plates, iron rails, and bags of cotton to
protect the vital parts. This, accompanied by two or three open
carriages filled with bluejackets, rendered considerable service. It was
frequently brought into action, and whilst able to considerably harass
the enemy's forces at Kafr Dowar, never sustained any injury in return.
At this time, Mr. Dudley de Chair, midshipman of the _Alexandra_, was
captured and taken to Arabi's lines. He had been ordered to proceed with
despatches from Alexandria to the British post at Ramleh, following the
line of rail. Unfortunately, he went by the wrong line and found himself
at Mandara, some miles beyond his destination, where, meeting some
natives, he inquired his way, and they undertook to direct him to the
British lines, but taking advantage of his ignorance of the locality,
they led him to an Arab outpost, where he was made prisoner.[39]
On the 31st July, some Bedouins, who had been pillaging the neighbouring
houses, attacked the night pickets at Ramleh with considerable energy,
but were beaten off. In one of these skirmishes, what was taken to be
the figure of a Bedouin was seen under the palm trees. A whole volley
was fired at the supposed enemy, which proved to be only a pump. When
examined closely the next morning the pump was found not to have
received a single bullet.
On the following night, the Bedouins returned and attacked a picket of
the 60th Rifles, posted at the extreme limit of the British position on
the Mahmoudieh Canal. The picket, uncertain of the strength of the
attacking force, fired a single volley and fell back on the
pumping-station, a mile distant. Reinforcements were sent, and the
position was reoccupied.[40]
On the 5th August, the first serious engagement of the campaign took
place, when Sir Archibald Alison, being desirous of ascertaining the
enemy's true position and strength, made a reconnaissance towards Kinje
Osman. A half battalion of the Duke of Cornwall's Regiment and a half
battalion of the 38th (South Staffordshire) Regiment, 800 in all, with
one 9-pounder gun and the mounted infantry, numbering 80, were told off
to advance along the east bank of the Mahmoudieh Canal.[41] Six
companies of the 60th Rifles, about 500 strong, with one 9-pounder gun,
formed the centre, and were to advance along the west bank. These
constituted the left attack. They were to follow the line of the canal
till they reached a house in a grove of trees towards the point where
the Cairo Railway approaches nearest to the canal. Along the line of
rail a battalion of marines, 1,000 in number, was to come up by train to
Millaha Junction, preceded by the armoured train carrying one
40-pounder, two 9-pounder guns, a Nordenfeldt, and two Gatlings, this
formed the right attack. The train was to stop at Millaha Junction. The
marines were ordered to descend there and advance by the railway line,
accompanied by the two 9-pounders and covered by the fire of the
40-pounder from the train.
The ground beyond Millaha Junction between the canal and railway was
occupied by native houses and gardens, and traversed in all directions
by small irrigating canals or ditches. Here were the Egyptian outposts,
the point of attack. It was a place admitting of very thorough defence,
and it gained in practical value by the fact that the attack was divided
by the Mahmoudieh Canal into two parts, which could only pass from one
side to the other with great difficulty and at considerable risk. An
enemy on the alert might have routed the extreme left column before any
assistance could have been rendered by the right.
The left column commenced its advance from the Ramleh out-picket station
at 4.45 p.m., moving by both banks of the canal. It soon came into
action with the enemy, who were strongly posted in a group of palm trees
on the eastern side, and a strong defensible house and gardens on the
western side, of the canal. The Egyptian fire was very inaccurate, most
of their bullets passing harmlessly overhead. Both positions were
carried, though not without the loss of Lieutenant Howard Vyse, of the
Rifles, who was killed.
The enemy then took up another position half a mile in the rear of the
first upon the east bank of the canal, amongst high crops and houses,
and behind the irregular banks of the canal. From this position also
they were driven back.
General Alison accompanied the right column himself. The marines and
9-pounder guns, dragged by bluejackets, were placed to the west and
under cover of the railway embankment, and moved forward as rapidly as
possible, and quite out of sight of the enemy engaged with the left
column, with a view to cutting off their retreat. After a time this
movement was perceived, and the enemy opened fire with artillery on the
right column. General Alison pushed on as rapidly as possible to the
spot where the railway approaches nearest to the Mahmoudieh Canal. He
then opened fire with musketry from the railway embankment upon the
enemy lining the banks of the canal. The two 9-pounders were dragged on
to the embankment and came into action against the enemy's guns, the
40-pounder from the train firing overhead against the point where the
enemy were beginning to appear. Fixing his right upon both sides of the
embankment, Alison then threw forward two companies to carry a house
near the canal, and followed up this movement by throwing some four
companies still more to his left on the banks of and across the canal.
The left column, it appears, had orders to seize a certain white house
on the canal, but its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Thackwell, of the
38th, mistook the first white house reached for the one intended. In
consequence, the left of the marines was uncovered and the substantial
benefits of the fight lost. Had the two wings joined many prisoners
would have been secured, and two guns, if not more, been captured.
Signals were made to the left wing to advance, but the smoke of the
battle and the failing light prevented their being understood. As it
was, Sir Archibald succeeded in taking up a position forming a diagonal
line across both the canal and the railway, the enemy falling back
slowly before him. The fire of their 7-pounder and 9-pounder guns was
soon got under by the fire of the English bluejackets. Desirous of
inducing the Egyptians to develop their full power before withdrawing,
the General held his position for about three-quarters of an hour, until
dusk was drawing on. The order to retire was then given. The movement
was carried out with the most perfect regularity and precision by the
marine battalion under Colonel Tuson, and the men fell back by alternate
companies with the regularity of a field-day. Every attempt of the enemy
to advance was crushed by the excellent practice of the 40-pounder and
9-pounder naval guns under Commander Henderson. The right column was
quickly _entrained_ at the junction, and slowly steamed back to
Alexandria; at the same time the left column withdrew along the banks of
the canal to the Ramleh lines unmolested.
The British loss in the engagement was one officer and three men killed
and twenty-seven men wounded. The Egyptian loss was given by a deserter
who, four days later, made his way from Arabi's camp to Alexandria, as
three officers and seventy-six men killed, and a large number wounded.
According to the prisoners' statements, which had to be received with
some caution, the Egyptian force engaged was 2,000 strong.
The Egyptians next erected earthworks at Mandara, between Ramleh and
Aboukir. They, however, overlooked the fact that the place was
accessible from the sea, and the _Superb_ having been sent round,
shelled them out without difficulty.
CHAPTER XV.
THE CONFERENCE.
It is now necessary to go back a little, to consider the diplomatic
steps taken by the Powers in view of the crisis in Egypt.
On receiving the news of the bombardment, the Sublime Porte was so
impressed with the gravity of the situation that a Council sat
continuously for twenty-four hours at the Palace, and separated without
arriving at any conclusion.
On the 15th July, however, the Sultan's advisers had so far recovered
themselves that the Turkish Ambassador was instructed to protest, and to
demand of the English Government the withdrawal of the forces landed in
Egypt.
In reply Lord Dufferin stated that the bombardment was an act of
self-defence, and that the seamen and marines were landed for the
purpose of restoring order, and with no view to a permanent occupation.
"They were, and continued to be, necessary for the defence of the
Khedive," said his Lordship, "in the absence of all steps by the Sultan
to maintain his own authority and that of His Highness." Lord Dufferin
concluded by observing that "Her Majesty's Government were desirous to
maintain the Sovereignty of the Sultan over Egypt, but that if His
Majesty took no steps to vindicate his authority, and objected to the
provisional measures taken by England and the other Powers, it would be
difficult to find arguments for the continuance of the existing
arrangement." In order to understand what were "the provisional
measures" referred to, it is necessary to consider the proceedings of
the Constantinople Conference, which had in the meantime assembled.
When, in May, France and England had at length agreed to send their
vessels of war to Alexandria, it was at Lord Granville's suggestion
proposed that if it was found advisable that troops should be landed,
Turkish troops should be called for, but France objected and the
proposal dropped.
When the Khedive and his Ministry became reconciled the Porte addressed
a circular to its representatives abroad, arguing that the Egyptian
Ministry having submitted to the Khedive, the crisis no longer existed,
and the naval demonstration was unnecessary. Lord Dufferin was
instructed to calm the apprehensions of the Sultan as to the character
and objects of the naval demonstration. He succeeded so well that Said
Pasha stated that His Majesty was willing to discuss with the Western
Powers any arrangements that they might suggest for the maintenance of
the _status quo_ in Egypt, upon the understanding that the presence of
the fleets should be restricted to the shortest possible period.
When Admiral Seymour complained of earthworks being thrown up alongside
his ships, the French Government on the 30th May proposed an immediate
Conference on Egyptian affairs. This proposal was accepted by Lord
Granville, and invitations to the Conference were issued the same day.
Considerable delay ensued in regard to the meeting of the Conference,
owing to the opposition of Turkey, which refused to join, and persisted
in maintaining that the mission of Dervish Pasha having effected a
satisfactory settlement, there was really nothing left to discuss.
Eventually the Conference met on the 23rd June at Constantinople,
without the participation of the Porte.
The Powers were represented by the different Ambassadors at
Constantinople, and Lord Granville, in the apparent desire to tie the
hands of the British Government as much as possible, irrespective of
future eventualities, succeeded in getting all the Powers represented to
sign a self-denying protocol, by which each engaged "not to seek, in any
arrangement which might be made in consequence of the concerted action
for the regulation of the affairs of Egypt, any territorial advantage,
nor any concession of any exclusive privilege, nor any commercial
advantage other than those which any other nation might equally obtain."
On the 27th June, the position of Admiral Seymour with regard to the
forts in course of being armed by Arabi being explained to the
Conference, it was agreed that so long as the Conference lasted the
Powers should abstain from isolated action in Egypt, with the
reservation of _force majeure_, such as the necessity for protecting the
lives of their subjects.
On the 30th the Conference met again, when the critical situation in
Egypt was dwelt upon, and the English representative explained that
under the words _force majeure_ he should include any sudden change or
catastrophe which menaced British interests.
Notwithstanding the pressure put upon the Sultan at this time to induce
him to send a force to Egypt, he still hesitated. His anxiety seemed to
be to avoid doing anything himself, and at the same time to prevent
intervention by any one else. He reminded the English Ambassador that at
his request the Porte had ordered the Egyptians to discontinue the
fortifications at Alexandria, and in return asked that the warlike
preparations of the British fleet should be stopped.
On the 6th of July, the Conference met again and agreed on the terms of
an "Identic Note" to be addressed to the Porte, fixing the conditions on
which the Porte should be invited to send Turkish troops to Egypt as a
provisional measure to restore order.
On the 8th the Sultan's Minister of Foreign Affairs begged the English
Ambassador from considerations of humanity to enjoin Admiral Seymour not
to do anything precipitate at Alexandria. Lord Dufferin curtly replied
that "the Egyptian authorities had the matter completely in their own
hands. They had only to do what was required of them, and not a shot
would be fired." Lord Dufferin added the question, "Why was the Sultan
not there with his troops to keep them in order?"
On the 9th the Porte was so far alarmed at what was going on at
Alexandria as to send a despatch to Musurus Pasha, in London, pointing
out that Admiral Seymour's statements respecting the Alexandria
armaments were denied by the Egyptian authorities, and begging that the
British Admiral might be directed to adopt a line of action more in
conformity with the peaceful and conciliatory feelings which animated
the Ottoman Government and the Court of St. James.
On the 10th Lord Dufferin intimated to the Porte that it was the
intention of Admiral Seymour to open fire upon the batteries of
Alexandria unless there was a temporary surrender of the forts for the
purpose of disarmament. The Sultan replied that he would send a
categorical answer on the following day. At the same time he requested
that the bombardment might be delayed.
Said Pasha called on Lord Dufferin in the middle of the night (2 a.m. on
the morning of the 11th), urging him to send a telegram to the British
Government to order the bombardment to be arrested. The British
Ambassador transmitted the message. It arrived too late. The bombardment
had already taken place. As Lord Dufferin, in a letter to Said Pasha in
the course of the following day, observed, "When such grave issues were
at stake, it was unwise to run things so fine."
On the 12th the Sultan's Minister informed his Lordship that the
bombardment having added to the gravity of the situation, he was not in
a position to make any communication, but that the Council were still
deliberating as to the course to be pursued. This was the Council
referred to at the beginning of the present chapter, which sat for
twenty-four hours, and decided nothing.
On the 15th Said Pasha asked if an intimation to the Powers of the
Sultan's intention to go to Egypt would be well received. Lord Dufferin
said in reply that at one time he was certainly of that opinion, and
that even then it might not be too late, provided His Majesty would
authorize a Commissioner to enter the Conference.
On the same day all the Powers represented at the Conference presented
the Identic Note to the Porte, inviting it to send troops to Egypt to
assist the Khedive to re-establish order.
The Sultan, on receiving the Note, observed that if the Imperial
Government had not up to the present decided on its own initiative to
send troops, it was because it was convinced that measures of force
could be dispensed with. He also announced that his Government now
consented to take part in the Conference.
On the 16th July Lord Lyons was instructed to inform M. de Freycinet
that, in view of the uncertainty which prevailed as to the movements of
Arabi and his forces, Her Majesty's Government had telegraphed to the
British Admiral at Port Saïd, authorizing him to concert with the French
Admiral for the protection of the Suez Canal, and to act in the event of
sudden danger. In reply, the French Minister stated that the French
Admiral would be instructed to concert measures with the English Admiral
for the protection of the Canal, but that the French Government could
not, without the sanction of the Chambers, authorize him to act.
On the 17th appearances became still more threatening. The Admiralty
received a despatch from Admiral Hoskins reporting the arrival at Port
Saïd of Ali Pasha Fehmi,[42] whom Arabi had nominated Governor-General
of the Suez Canal. This was followed by another, announcing that Arabi
had called upon all Mussulmans to rise. Lord Granville thereupon urged
the French Government to give their Admiral full discretion by telegraph
in view of any emergency. In reply, M. de Freycinet informed the British
Minister that he regretted very much to be unable to comply.
On the 19th the news from Egypt assumed a yet more serious character,
and Lord Dufferin was instructed to inform the Sultan that after the
delay which had occurred he could only hope to recover the confidence of
Her Majesty's Government by the immediate issue of a Proclamation in
favour of the Khedive, and denouncing Arabi as a rebel.
Whatever might have been the Sultan's views with regard to Arabi, he was
not at the time disposed to comply with the Ambassador's request.
Accordingly, His Majesty said that the issue of such a Proclamation as
was suggested might not be a bad thing, and then turned the conversation
to some other subject.
The same day news came of the blocking of the Mahmoudieh Canal, of the
issue of proclamations against the Khedive by Arabi, and of the military
preparations being made by him.
At a meeting of the Conference, the English and French Ambassadors
presented proposals relative to the measures to be adopted _for the
protection_ of the _Suez Canal_, and asked the Conference to designate
the Powers who should be charged, in case of need, to take the measures
specially necessary for the purpose. The four other representatives
reserved to themselves the right of referring the matter to their
respective Governments.
On the 20th July Her Majesty's Government ordered the despatch of the
expedition to Egypt.
On the 21st the Austrian Government declined to join in giving to other
Powers the _mandat_ proposed for the defence of the Canal.
On the 22nd Lord Granville made the following proposal to the French
Government:--
1. Unless the Porte sends an acceptance of a kind immediately available,
the English and French representatives should be instructed to say to
the other Ambassadors that England and France can no longer rely upon
Turkish intervention; and as they consider immediate action necessary to
_prevent further loss of life and continuance of anarchy_, they intend,
unless the Conference has any other plan, to devise with a third Power,
if possible, military means for procuring a solution.
2. To ask Italy to be that third Power.
3. To consult immediately upon the division of labour.
4. The Suez Canal may be included in the general scheme of allied
action.[43]
M. de Freycinet, in reply, cautiously stated that the French Government
understood that the measures to be taken by them for the protection of
the Canal would not extend to any expedition into the interior of the
country, but would be limited to naval operations, and to the occupation
of certain points on the Canal itself; _and that although they would not
object to an expedition by England into the interior of Egypt_, they
could not themselves take part in any such expedition. He added that
before giving an official answer he must bring the matter before the
Council of Ministers.
The German Chargé d'Affaires stated to Lord Dufferin and the French
Ambassador, in very positive terms, that the northern Governments would
never agree to a mandate, that it would be better for England to go
forward at once by herself, and that every one admitted that the reserve
made under the term _force majeure_ would cover anything that she might
be obliged to do in Egypt.
On the 23rd July the Sultan determined to allow Said Pasha and Assim
Pasha to represent him at the Conference. At the meeting, the following
day, the two Ottoman delegates took their seats, and the other delegates
having given the Turkish representatives to understand that a formal
answer was expected to the Identic Note of the 15th July, the Turkish
Minister declared that "he accepted in principle the despatch of Ottoman
troops to Egypt."
This statement, made at the eleventh hour, was not without its effect on
the different great Powers. As a fact, with the exception of England,
and possibly France, none of them desired to meddle either directly or
indirectly in Egyptian matters, and they were glad of the pretext to let
England settle Egypt alone.
The Austrian Government notified that, "in case the Sultan refused to
send his troops to Egypt, Austria would be even less disposed to join in
asking other Governments to act as European _mandataires_, for the
general maintenance of order, than to do so for the protection of the
Suez Canal."
On the 24th July Italy was invited to co-operate with England and France
in the steps to be taken for the protection of the Canal. The Italian
Minister, M. Mancini, thanked Her Majesty's Government for the proof of
confidence and friendship afforded by their invitation to her, but
thought that at the moment when Turkey had accepted all the conditions
of a Note to which England and Italy were parties, it would be a
contradiction for those two Powers to enter into engagements as to
another form of intervention.
On the 25th M. de Freycinet, being pressed for a formal answer to the
proposal made for the joint military intervention, answered that for the
moment the French Government could not go beyond the projected
co-operation for the protection of the Suez Canal.
On the 24th a Bill was brought into the Chamber of Deputies to enable
the French Government to carry into effect arrangements with England for
a joint protection of the Canal. The amount asked for was 9,410,000
francs. The result was a most stormy debate, which was adjourned amid
much excitement.
CHAPTER XVI.
THE PORTE AND THE POWERS.
On the 26th July Said Pasha formally announced that the Sublime Porte,
resolved to give effect to its incontestable Sovereign rights over
Egypt, had decided to send immediately a sufficient number of troops.
This was communicated to the Conference at its sitting the same day.
Said Pasha admitted, on being pressed, that the despatch of the troops
could only be the result of an understanding arrived at between the
Powers. The British and French Ambassadors then made the following
declaration:--"France and England have communicated to the Conference
their views, which have also been communicated to the different
Cabinets, and their proposals having encountered no objections, the two
Powers are at present agreed that in the present state of affairs they
are ready, if necessity arises, to employ themselves _in the protection
of the Suez Canal_, either alone, or with the addition of any Power
which is willing to assist."
At a meeting on the 27th, the representatives of the Porte communicated
a declaration to the effect that having again informed the members of
the Conference that the Imperial Government was on the point of sending
troops to Egypt, the Government earnestly hoped that, in face of this
determination, the existing foreign occupation of that country would be
abandoned as soon as the Ottoman troops should arrive at Alexandria.
In reply, Lord Dufferin was instructed to say that Her Majesty's
Government could neither withdraw their troops, nor relax their
preparations; adding that the arrival and co-operation of Turkish forces
in Egypt would be accepted by England, provided the character in which
they came was satisfactorily defined beforehand.
At this period, it must be borne in mind that the British expeditionary
forces had already started, and the Ministry of Mr. Gladstone had now no
desire to have the Turkish troops, for which they had previously
professed so much anxiety. It was, however, necessary to keep up
appearances, and to find from time to time plausible pretexts to prevent
the Sultan from carrying out his determination.
In effecting the desired object Lord Dufferin, as will be seen, found
means to throw such difficulties in the way as to prevent the despatch
of a Turkish army to Egypt.
The views of Germany were also at the same time communicated to Lord
Granville, and were stated to him as being that the Sultan had the first
claim to exercise the proposed protection. In the event of his being
unwilling or unable to do so, the Powers interested in the Canal would
be justified in acting themselves. If those Powers had the intention of
protecting their own interests in the Canal, Germany could not take upon
herself any responsibility for the measures to be taken for this
purpose. Finally Austria, Russia, and Italy adopted the same view as
Germany.
On the 28th the adjourned debate on the vote of 9,410,000 francs for the
despatch of French troops to Egypt for the protection of the Canal took
place in the French Chamber of Deputies. The force, it was explained,
was to be 8,000 men and two gunboats. The Ministers pointed out that all
that was intended was to occupy one or two points of the Canal. France
would be charged with the surveillance of the Canal between Port Saïd
and Ismailia, and England of the part between Ismailia and Suez.
The vote was violently opposed, and in the end rejected by a majority of
341 against the Government. The debate was wound up by a remarkable
speech from M. Clemenceau, who said,--"Messieurs, la conclusion de ce
qui se passe en ce moment est celle-ci, l'Europe est couverte de
soldats, tout le monde attend, toutes les Puissances se réservent leur
liberté pour l'avenir; réservez la liberté d'action de la France."
Lord Granville, seeing that all hope of French co-operation was gone,
intimated to M. de Freycinet that, although Her Majesty's Government
accepted the co-operation of Turkey, it would nevertheless proceed with
its own measures. "That then," said the French Minister, "is
_intervention à deux_."
On the 1st August Lord Dufferin informed the Turkish Minister, in reply
to his request that the British expedition should be countermanded, that
it was useless for him to base any of his calculations on the
supposition either that the troops would be countermanded, or that the
British _corps d'armée_ would leave Egypt until order had been
completely re-established.
The Minister said with reference to the Proclamation against Arabi, that
he thought it would be advisable to defer it until after the Turkish
troops were landed.
Lord Dufferin answered that if the Proclamation was not previously
issued, no Turkish troops would be allowed to land in Egypt. The
Ambassador said, "If the Sultan desired to co-operate with England it
was necessary he should first clearly define the attitude he intended to
assume towards Arabi and the rebellious faction."
On the same day the Ottoman plenipotentiaries delivered to the other
members of the Conference the reasons for the Porte not issuing the
desired Proclamation declaring Arabi a rebel. The principal passage was
as follows:--"It is, therefore, quite natural to suppose that a
Proclamation which would accuse a subject of His Imperial Majesty the
Sultan, who, at a moment when he showed fidelity and devotion to his
sovereign, was the object of distinctions, would derive its force from
the immediate presence of the material factor, the absence of which at
the time of its publication would render its provisions barren."
Orders were sent to the English Admiral that, until the Porte should
have entered into an agreement with Her Majesty's Government for the
issue of a Proclamation by the Sultan in support of Tewfik Pasha, and
denouncing Arabi as a rebel, and should have signed a Military
Convention for the co-operation of the Turkish troops, no Turkish
troops could be allowed to land in Egypt.
On the 5th Lord Dufferin formally notified this to the Ottoman
delegates, and Said Pasha intimated that he fully understood the grave
nature of the communication.
On the 2nd two large Turkish transports started at night from
Constantinople for Salonica with stores, provisions, and details of
troops. Two other steamers left the same night, one for Smyrna, the
other for the Dardanelles. On the 3rd other transports, with soldiers on
board, left also at night, and two more transports commenced taking on
board stores, ammunition, &c. On the 5th two transports with men and
stores left the Golden Horn for Suda Bay, in Crete. A third was to leave
the same evening. It became known that Dervish Pasha was to command the
force, taking four other generals with him. They were to leave in the
_Izzedin_ for Salonica. The fleet was to rendezvous either at Rhodes or
Suda Bay.
In consequence of the foregoing, Admiral Seymour was instructed, if any
vessel with Turkish troops appeared at Port Saïd, Alexandria, or
elsewhere, to request the officer in command, with the utmost courtesy,
to proceed to Crete or some other place, and apply to the Turkish
Government for further instructions, as Seymour was precluded from
inviting them to land in Egypt. He was further instructed to prevent
their landing if they declined to comply with his advice.
On the 7th the Ottoman delegates made the following declaration to the
Conference: "The Sublime Porte accepts the invitation for a military
intervention in Egypt made to it by the Identic Note of the 15th July,
as well as the clauses and conditions contained therein."
On the 8th Said Pasha informed Lord Dufferin that the Sublime Porte was
disposed to issue the Proclamation against Arabi, and that he, the
Minister, was authorized to negotiate the Military Convention.
He also stated that, by reason of the importance of the events in Egypt,
the Ottoman troops would leave on the 10th.
Lord Dufferin, on the 9th August, informed the Sultan's Government that
before any other step was taken the British Government adhered to the
necessity for the issue of a properly-worded Proclamation. On the 9th
the draft of the proposed Proclamation was sent to Lord Dufferin for
approval.
On the 15th Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived at Alexandria.
At the meeting of the Conference on the 14th of August, the
representatives of the Powers having expressed their opinion that the
moment had come to suspend the labours of the Conference, the Ottoman
delegates, apparently still anxious to be on the opposition side, stated
that they did not share in this opinion, and reserved the right of
informing the others of the date of the next meeting.
On the 16th August, Lord Dufferin was informed, with reference to the
negotiations for the Military Convention, that Her Majesty's Government
would have no objection to a part of the Turkish troops being landed at
Damietta or Rosetta, should the Turkish Government desire it.
On the next day the Turkish Government, instead of accepting at once the
Military Convention, began to make efforts to get it laid before the
Conference. These failed, however, thanks to Lord Dufferin, who
contended that the engagement was one between England and Turkey alone.
The foregoing brings the narrative of events down to the eve of Sir
Garnet Wolseley's sailing for the Canal.
CHAPTER XVII.
WOLSELEY'S MOVE TO THE CANAL.
On the 7th August the Khedive issued a Proclamation against Arabi and
the rebels generally.
The same day the Khedive addressed a letter to the President of the
Council of Ministers, announcing his intention to indemnify the
sufferers by the recent events.
At this period the European population was flocking back to Alexandria
in such numbers that Mr. Cartwright, the British Consul-General, deemed
it necessary to make strong representations on the subject to the
representatives in Egypt of the several Powers. A system of examination
of passports was now established, and people of suspicious character, or
who were unable to show that they had some employment, or other means
of subsistence, were forced by the authorities to re-embark.
Alexandria was now fast filling with British troops, and fresh
detachments were disembarking daily. On the 10th August, Sir John Adye,
Chief of the Staff, arrived at Alexandria with the Duke of Connaught.
The whole of the Brigade of Guards arrived two days later, and
astonished the people by their size and martial appearance as they
marched through the town to Ramleh. The Duke of Connaught rode at their
head. Egypt in the present generation had never seen such soldiers
before, and loud were the expressions of admiration on all sides. The
stalwart pipers particularly impressed the natives.
The brigade consisted of the 2nd battalions of the Grenadier and
Coldstream Guards, and the 1st battalion of the Scots Guards. The force
was encamped on a piece of desert land at Ramleh, near the sea, between
the stations of Bulkeley and Fleming on the Ramleh Railway.
Sir Garnet Wolseley reached Egypt on the 15th in the _Calabria_. He had
made the voyage by sea on account of his health.
Major-General Sir Evelyn Wood arrived the same day. Transports were
coming in rapidly, and everything pointed to an immediate advance upon
Kinje Osman and Kafr Dowar. The following is a list of the principal
officers in the expeditionary force:--
General-Commanding-in-Chief: Sir Garnet J. Wolseley.
Chief of the Staff: General Sir John Adye.
Officer Commanding Royal Artillery: Brigadier-General W. H. Goodenough.
Officer Commanding Royal Engineers: Brigadier-General C. B. P. N. H.
Nugent.
Command of Base and Lines of Communication: Major-General W. Earle.
1st Division: Lieutenant-General G. H. S. Willis.
1st Brigade: Major-General H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught.
2nd Brigade: Major-General G. Graham.
2nd Division: Lieutenant-General Sir E. B. Hamley.
3rd Brigade: Major-General Sir Archibald Alison.
4th Brigade: Major-General Sir H. Evelyn Wood.
Garrison of Alexandria: Major-General G. B. Harman. Cavalry Division:
Major-General Drury-Lowe.
Sir Garnet Wolseley lost but little time after landing. He made a hasty
inspection of the position at Ramleh, and gave his orders.
On the 18th August the Guards Division, the Household Cavalry, the 60th
Rifles, and the 46th Regiment marched in from Ramleh and commenced
embarking, the troops of the Second Division taking their places at
Ramleh. The Manchester Regiment landed and took over police duty in the
town, relieving the Berkshire Regiment, which joined General Wood's
Division at Ramleh.
At 11.15 a.m. the greater part of the British force was embarking. The
troops selected were the First Division under General Willis. Several
transports the same day steamed out of harbour and anchored off the
Boghaz Pass. The following day, the 19th, the transports, escorted by
the ironclads _Alexandra_, _Inflexible_, _Minotaur_, _Superb_, and
_Temeraire_, steamed away in a stately procession to the eastward. Both
Sir Garnet Wolseley and Admiral Seymour accompanied the force.
It was given out that Aboukir was to be the place of attack, and at 3.30
p.m., on arriving off the bay, the ships, with the exception of the
_Alexandra_, _Euphrates_, _Rhosina_, and _Nerissa_, which pushed on to
Port Saïd, anchored in regular lines according to a prearranged plan,
the men-of-war being nearest the shore. The ironclads struck their
topmasts, and made other preparations for an attack. Every facility had
been given to newspaper correspondents to obtain such details as might
prudently be made public without exciting too much suspicion of a _ruse
de guerre_. It succeeded perfectly. Not only the Europeans, but the
enemy, were completely deceived. The gunners in the forts at Aboukir
stood to their guns, expecting every moment the fleet would open fire.
After dark the troopships moved off to the east, followed later on by
the men-of-war. When day broke the whole fleet had disappeared.
As rapidly as possible the fleet steamed for Port Saïd. The transports
_Rhosina_ and _Nerissa_ had singularly bad luck, the last two breaking
down _en route_. The delay was not serious, for their escort the
_Alexandra_ towed the _Nerissa_ at the rate of twelve knots an hour,
whilst the _Euphrates_ helped the _Rhosina_.
The next morning the whole fleet arrived at Port Saïd, when they found
the entire Maritime Canal in the hands of the British Navy.
It may now be convenient to refer to what had in the meantime been
taking place on the Canal.
On the 9th July, Mr. J. E. Wallis, the British Consul at Port Saïd,
received instructions to warn British subjects to embark. Next morning a
large number of Europeans took refuge in vessels in the harbour. A
report was spread of troops being ordered from Damietta, and some alarm
prevailing, the Governor issued a circular assuring everybody that there
was no danger.
On the 11th, whilst the bombardment was going on at Alexandria, the Port
Saïd refugees remained on board ship. The town was quiet and orderly.
The British despatch vessel _Iris_ acted as guardship during this
period. The Egyptian corvette _Sakha_ had arrived from Alexandria a day
or two previous to the bombardment. Her captain was an Arabist of the
most pronounced type. Immediately after her arrival telegraphic
information reached the authorities and the Canal Company's officials
that the _Sakha_ had a considerable quantity of dynamite on board,
intended to be used against vessels entering the Canal. The _Iris_,
which had taken up a berth inside the harbour, shifted berth, and her
commander, Captain Seymour, moored his ship opposite the _Sakha_, the
better to watch her movements. A great noise was observed on board the
Egyptian vessel at night, the men moving up and down as if transporting
heavy cases. The next morning Captain Seymour called on her captain, and
on inquiring the reason of the commotion, was informed that the men were
"practising." Captain Seymour replied that, considering the troubled
state of the country, practising at such an unusual hour was calculated
to create an alarm on shore, and expressed a hope that it would be
discontinued. "I am the only master on board my own ship," was the
Egyptian Commander's reply. "In that case," Captain Seymour replied, "I
shall be under the painful necessity of either seizing your ship or of
sinking her." From that moment no further night exercise was indulged
in, and hostilities were avoided, though both ships remained with their
guns pointed at each other. The commander of the _Iris_ took the further
precaution of placing a torpedo in a position which would enable him to
blow up the Egyptian vessel at any moment. After this, nothing of
importance occurred for some days.
The naval force at Port Saïd was strengthened by the arrival of the
_Penelope_--the flagship of Admiral Hoskins--and the _Monarch_,
_Agincourt_, and _Achilles_.
On the 13th July the British Government notified that British merchant
ships might go through the Canal if clear. On the 14th British gunboats
commenced to convoy vessels. On the 15th the French Government
authorized their gunboats to be employed on similar service. This was
followed by the like arrangements on the part of Germany and Italy.
The English ironclad _Orion_, Captain R. O. B. Fitz-Roy, arrived from
Alexandria, _en route_ to Ismailia, on the 26th, and at once attempted
to enter the Canal. Several objections were made by the Canal Company to
her doing so. More than once she got under way, and was stopped under
various pretexts. The last objection was that the _Coquette_ being
already in Lake Timsah, there was no room for another vessel of war.
Eventually, having embarked 142 officers and men from the _Agincourt_,
the _Orion_ entered the Canal, ostensibly bound for Suez, and at 3 p.m.
on the 27th she reached Lake Timsah. Captain Fitz-Roy took his ship out
of the hands of the pilot, and anchored her about 800 yards from the
town of Ismailia.
On the 28th the Governor and Sub-Governor of Port Saïd, fearing that
their lives were in danger from the military party, took refuge on board
the P. and O. s.s. _Poonah_. The town of Port Saïd was, in consequence,
left completely in the hands of the supporters of Arabi. Nevertheless,
though considerable anxiety prevailed, no outbreak took place.
On the 29th the German gunboat _Move_ was ordered to take part in the
patrolling of the Canal.
On the 31st July Admiral Hoskins telegraphed that the French Admiral at
Port Saïd was ordered to suspend action, and the French ironclad
_Thétis_ was to leave Ismailia. Rigid neutrality was to be observed.
On the 3rd August Admiral Hoskins was directed for the present to
confine his operations on the Suez Canal to maintaining the _status
quo_, and not to land except for the protection of British subjects, or
in the event of any attempt being made to block the Canal, as to which
he was allowed discretion. This reservation, he was informed, was only
temporary, and was contingent upon future military requirements.
On the 5th the ships of war off Port Saïd comprised the _Penelope_,
_Agincourt_, _Monarch_, and _Northumberland_ armoured ships, the
_Tourmaline_ and _Carysfort_ sloops, and the _Ready_ and Beacon
gun-vessels. The _Don_ and _Dee_, river gunboats, arrived a day or two
later.
What had been taking place at Suez was reported in a letter from Mr.
West, the British Consul, to Lord Granville, from which the following
are extracts:--
"The whole of the British residents, with one or two exceptions,
had taken refuge afloat, and were living in discomfort on board
boats, barges, and lighters in the open roadstead. Her Majesty's
ship _Euryalus_ arrived on the 29th.
"Admiral Sir William Hewett, who, on the 2nd August, had under
his command in the Suez Roads the following ships of Her
Majesty's fleet, viz., the _Euryalus_, _Eclipse_, _Ruby_,
_Dragon_, _Mosquito_, and _Beacon_, then decided to act, and I
went on shore with a Proclamation to be delivered to the Acting
Governor, informing him that the place had been occupied by
British forces, which occupation was effected without
opposition or resistance on the part of the native soldiers.
The town was then occupied by the marines and bluejackets,
about 500 men in all. The few native soldiers in the place got
away in the train that was about to leave Suez with more
fugitives. The Governor's dwelling and public offices were
guarded by marines; the Victoria Hospital, and commanding
positions in the environs of Suez, were also held by the
British forces."
To return to Ismailia, where, as above stated, the _Orion_ had arrived
on the 27th July. The place was found perfectly tranquil, but the
telegraph being in the hands of Arabi's people, Captain Fitz-Roy could
get no news or telegrams. The _Coquette_ was anchored, by Captain
Fitz-Roy's orders, off the lock-gates of the Fresh Water Canal, with
orders to report everything going in and coming out. By this means
information was obtained that Arabi was receiving daily several
boat-loads of coal. On the 29th H.M.S. _Carysfort_ arrived from Port
Saïd. Lake Timsah was patrolled at night by a steam-launch with an armed
crew, which moved about twice in every watch. The _Orion's_ electric
light was also used during the first and middle watches of the night,
and turned on the Arab guardhouse outside Ismailia.
On the 2nd August Egyptian troops, estimated at about 800, arrived at
Nefiché Junction, and encamped outside the railway station. From the
6th, torpedo and picket-boats were employed to keep up communication
with Suez and Port Saïd. The guns of the different vessels were cleared
for action every night, and the marines and small-arms men kept in
readiness to land.
On the 16th the Egyptian force at Nefiché was largely reinforced.
Several refugees came off to the ships.
On the 19th, with a view to assist in the contemplated landing, the
compass-bearing and distance of the camp at Nefiché were taken during
the day from the masthead of the _Carysfort_, and one of the _Orion's_
25-ton guns was laid accordingly. To secure sufficient elevation to
carry the projectile over the intervening sand-hills, the vessel's port
boilers were emptied and shot removed, so as to give the ship a strong
list to starboard. The same night the crews of the vessels were mustered
at 8 o'clock in working dress, with ammunition and provisions all ready
for landing.
The foregoing narrative brings the history of events down to the eve of
the British forces taking possession of the Canal.
CHAPTER XVIII.
DE LESSEPS AND THE CANAL.
The history having now been brought to the period when the Suez Canal
was occupied by the British forces, it may be interesting to refer to
the attitude assumed by M. Ferdinand de Lesseps, the President of the
Canal Company, and to show how his communications with the rebel leaders
led the latter to postpone until too late the steps resolved on for the
destruction of the Canal.
De Lesseps from the first opposed any interference with the Canal by the
British forces. The earliest indication of his views was afforded
immediately before the Alexandria bombardment. When that operation was
impending, Admiral Seymour warned British ships not to enter the Canal
in case of hostilities. In consequence of this warning eleven ships were
stopped at Port Saïd and Suez on the 10th July. M. Victor de Lesseps,
the Company's agent at Ismailia, thereupon protested against what he
termed "this violation of the neutrality of the Canal."
On the same day, M. de Lesseps, then in Paris, communicated to the
British Ambassador there, and to all the other representatives of the
Powers, a copy of the telegraphic instructions which had on the 8th July
been sent to the agent of the Company at Ismailia. Their effect was that
any action or warlike demonstration in the Canal was forbidden, and that
"its neutrality had been proclaimed by the Firman of Concession, and had
been recognized and acted upon during the two last wars between France
and Germany and Russia and Turkey."
A very slight examination of the question will suffice to show that the
Canal had absolutely nothing of the neutral character so persistently
claimed for it by M. de Lesseps at this time and during the subsequent
operations.
Its claim to neutrality was based solely on a clause in the Concession,
in which the Canal was declared by the Sultan to be "a neutral highway
for the ships of all nations." This clause, inserted apparently to
indicate the peaceful and industrial character of the enterprise, was an
expression of intention no doubt binding upon the parties to the
Concession, but upon no one else. This, it is obvious, was a totally
different matter from construing it, as De Lesseps sought to do, as
laying down for the rest of the world a law under which, for all time
and all circumstances, the Canal should be considered as outside the
range of belligerent operations. No one can contend that the ruler of a
country, by a mere _à priori_ declaration of his own, can confer the
quality of neutrality upon any particular part of his territory
irrespective of future eventualities. This is a matter where the rights
of other States come in. Whether a country is or is not neutral is a
matter which, on war breaking out, has to be determined by the
application of certain well-known principles of International Law, and
does not depend upon the mere declaration of the ruler, unless followed
by a strict observance of neutrality.
Assuming that, as was practically the case, England was at war with the
_de facto_ ruler of Egypt, which was Arabi, any declaration that the
Sultan might choose to make that this or that portion of Egyptian
territory should be considered as neutral, and therefore exempt from
warlike operations, would clearly be illusory.
The most that could be done towards the so-called neutralization of the
Canal was subsequently effected in December, 1888, when, by an
agreement between Egypt and the principal Powers, it was arranged that
(subject to certain reservations made by Great Britain) no hostilities
on the part of any of the contracting Powers should take place in the
Canal, nor, in the event of the territorial Power being itself a
belligerent, should the ships of that Power attack, or be attacked, in
the Canal, nor were the entrances to the Canal to be blockaded. This, it
will be seen, is "neutralization" only in a limited and vague sense of
the term, the employment of which was carefully avoided in the
agreement.
The precedents invoked by M. de Lesseps from the Franco-German and the
Russo-Turkish wars, in reality, were worth nothing. When France and
Germany were at war, Egypt was at peace, and her neutrality had to be
respected, neither Turkey nor Egypt being in any way mixed up with the
dispute. As regards the Russo-Turkish war, it is incontestable that if
Russia, in the exercise of her undoubted rights as a belligerent, had
seized on the Canal as a piece of Ottoman territory, no other Power
would have had reason to complain. Whether by doing so Russia would have
made an enemy of England, and so have caused her to take part against
her, was another matter; and, influenced probably by considerations of
this kind, Russia was induced to abstain. This, however, in no way
affects the principle involved.
But, apart from the general reasoning above mentioned, there were
certain special circumstances affecting the matter which made the case
of De Lesseps still weaker, and rendered the ordinary rules regarding
neutrality inapplicable. By the terms of the Concession, although the
Canal itself was to be the property of the Company for a term of years,
the land through which it ran remained none the less Egyptian territory,
and by Article 9 it was expressly declared that the Government should
have the same right of acting for the maintenance of public security and
the enforcement of the law within the limits of the Company's property
as might be exercised at any other point of the Khedive's dominions.
Arabi at this time was a rebel, and his forces were occupying positions
in the immediate neighbourhood of the Canal. This gave the Khedive an
undoubted right to act against him, whether on the Canal or elsewhere.
To assert that the ruler of Egypt was not at liberty to suppress a
revolt in his own dominions would be too startling a proposition for
even M. de Lesseps to bring forward. Whether the Khedive interfered by
himself or by his agent, who in this case was Sir Garnet Wolseley, comes
to exactly the same thing. What took place was a simple matter of
police, and if, in the course of suppressing Arabi, certain points on
the Canal had to be occupied, the case came expressly within the terms
of Article 9. This being so, of what had De Lesseps to complain, and
where does the question of neutrality arise?
Regarded, then, from any point of view, the fallacy of the claim to
neutrality advanced on behalf of the Canal is so clear that it is
difficult to imagine how it could ever have been seriously put forward.
Here, too, it may be remarked that not only was the Canal not a
"neutral" concern, but it never possessed any of the "international" or
"universal" character claimed for it. It was, in fact, no more
"international" or "universal" than a tramway or a dry goods store, to
which the citizens of all nations could have access on payment for the
accommodation or goods supplied. Viewed in this light, the pretensions
of the President of the Company appear simply ridiculous, and in any
less distinguished individual would only have excited ridicule.
The question of neutrality having now been dealt with, it only remains
to relate the steps taken by the President of the Canal Company.
According to his published memoirs:--
"On his arrival in Egypt with his son Victor, on the 19th July,
he found that everything had been prepared by the French and
English Commanders for the joint occupation of Port Saïd, with a
view to protect the population. De Lesseps hastened to the
French Admiral's flagship, and was informed by that officer that
he had been asked by two of the French residents to land troops
for their protection. After some difficulty De Lesseps prevailed
on the French Commander to confide to him the petition, which
was signed by two names he knew very well. As the document was
legalized by the French Consul, he went straight to his house
and got that official to summon the two petitioners. They were
soon found, and De Lesseps rated them soundly for what he called
their stupidity. He told them that now he was at Port Saïd they
might sleep without fear; that he would be responsible for the
safety of everyone; and then, taking the petition, he tore it up
in their faces, threw the pieces on the floor, and told the men
who had signed it that as it was withdrawn they might go home.
They did so, and De Lesseps, returning to the French Admiral,
informed him that the petition no longer existed, and that,
therefore, he had no reason for landing. The French Admiral not
having yet been informed by his Government of their
determination not to co-operate with the English, De Lesseps
found it no easy matter to persuade him to alter his decision
with regard to the projected landing. The fact that the French
fleet had withdrawn from Alexandria when it was bombarded by the
English aided De Lesseps in prevailing on the French Commander
to abstain. When at last he had attained that object, it was De
Lesseps himself who informed the English Commander of the fact."
According to the official journal of the Canal Company ("Le Canal de
Suez"), which, however, must not always be regarded as an accurate
record of events, De Lesseps found both the native and European
population of Port Saïd much disturbed at the idea of the projected
landing, and he called a meeting of the native Notables and Sheikhs to
reassure them.
After these incidents he received from Arabi a telegram, of which the
following is a translation:--
"Thank you for what you have done to prevent the landing of
foreign troops at Port Saïd, and for your efforts to restore
tranquillity of mind to the natives and the Europeans."
De Lesseps then went through the Canal to Suez, returning again as far
as Ismailia, from which place, on the 26th, he sent a telegram to M.
Charles de Lesseps, the Company's agent in Paris, to the effect
following:--
"The English Admiral having declared to me that he would not
disembark without being preceded by the French Navy, and a
disembarkation being possibly ruin to Port Saïd, I have had to
reassure the numerous Arab population, without whom we should be
forced to suspend our works. In the presence of the Ulemas and
Notables, I have sworn that not a Frenchman shall disembark
whilst I am here, and that I will guarantee public tranquillity
and the neutrality of our Universal Canal. The Government of my
country will not disavow me."
This was followed by another telegram, of which the following is a
translation, to the same person:--
_"Ismailia, 29th July, 1882._
"To disembark at Ismailia, where there is not a solitary
Egyptian soldier, is to determine to take possession of our
Canal. The only persons here are a chief of native police and
some agents. The inhabitants are our employés, their families,
and some refugees. The invaders will find us unarmed at the
head of our _personnel_ to bar their passage with 'protests.'"
And by yet another, on the 4th August:--
"The English Admiral at Port Saïd writes me that he has decided
to take, in spite of my protests, such measures as he judges
necessary to occupy the Canal. I have decided to oppose any
warlike operation on the Canal."
On the same day, M. de Lesseps went on board H.M.S. _Orion_ at Ismailia.
He was in evening dress, and wore his Order of the Star of India, and
was attended by his son Victor and M. de Rouville, the Canal Company's
agent. He demanded the intentions of the English towards the Canal, and
protested energetically and with much excitement against any landing as
"a violation of international rights."
On the day following, M. de Lesseps telegraphed to Paris as follows:--
"The English Admiral having announced the occupation of
Ismailia, I went yesterday on board the _Orion_ with Victor. We
have signified verbally our resolution to resist, to prevent
serious disorder and interruption in navigation of the Canal. We
have obtained a declaration that a landing should only take
place on our demand."
In consequence of this last telegram, Admiral Hoskins was desired to
report on the statement that he had promised only to land a force on the
Canal upon being asked by De Lesseps. The Admiral replied that the
statement was "quite unwarranted."
The Council of the Canal Company assembled on the 5th August, and passed
resolutions supporting their President, and declaring that "the Company
could not lend itself to the violation of a neutrality which was the
guarantee of the commerce of all nations."
On the 15th the Khedive issued a Proclamation declaring that the
Commander-in-Chief of the British forces was authorized to occupy all
points on the Isthmus necessary for the operations against the rebels.
On the 19th Admiral Hoskins gave orders that no ship or boat was to
enter the Canal, and announced that he was prepared to resort to force
to prevent any attempt to contravene these orders. M. de Lesseps replied
that he protested against "this act of violence and spoliation."
On the 20th August Lord Lyons telegraphed Lord Granville as follows,
omitting irrelevant passages:--
"We communicated to M. Charles de Lesseps last night a
memorandum in the terms of your Lordship's despatch to us of the
14th instant; and we requested, at the same time, that the
transports should pay dues at Ismailia, and that the regular
traffic through the Suez Canal should be suspended during the
short period necessary for the passage of these vessels. M.
Charles de Lesseps declined to express any opinion of his own,
but it was plain to us that he did not expect that the wishes of
Her Majesty's Government would be acceded to by his father."
As the sequel showed, M. de Lesseps' acquiescence was not deemed by the
English Government essential to the carrying out of the operations
decided on.
M. de Lesseps, ever since his arrival in Egypt, had continued to assure
Arabi that if he let the Canal alone the English would also respect it.
His theory was, "Le Canal est la grande route ouverte à tous les
pavilions. Y toucher amenerait contre nous l'Europe, le monde entier."
Towards the end of July, M. de Lesseps, having learned that the blocking
of the Canal had been decided at the Egyptian camp, telegraphed to Arabi
to do nothing to it, adding the words, "_Jamais les Anglais n'y
pénétreraient, jamais, jamais!_" Nevertheless, secret orders were given
to Mahmoud Pasha Fehmi to prepare everything for the military occupation
of the Canal jointly with Mahmoud Choukri Bey, another engineer of the
National Party. This was on the evening of the 17th August.
On the 20th, after a simulated attack by the British on the lines of
Kafr Dowar, intended to cover the expedition to Port Saïd, Arabi's
look-outs signalled the movement of the English fleet in the direction
of the Canal.
The day following, M. de Lesseps having been informed of the presence of
thirty-two English ships of war and transports in the waters of Port
Saïd, sent to Arabi a telegram, the substance of which was as follows:--
"Make no attempt to intercept _my_ Canal. I am there. Not a single
English soldier shall disembark without being accompanied by a French
soldier. I answer for everything." On receipt of this message, a Council
of War was held, which, with the exception of Arabi, who still
hesitated, unanimously decided to act. The answer to M. de Lesseps was
as follows:--"Sincere thanks, assurances consolatory, but not sufficient
under existing circumstances. The defence of Egypt requires the
temporary destruction of the Canal." Fortunately the despatch ordering
the destruction of the Canal was sent by a roundabout route by way of
Cairo, and when men and material were ready to carry out the work, the
English were already in occupation, in spite of M. de Lesseps' positive
declarations. The fifteen hours' delay caused by M. de Lesseps'
communication prevented the execution of the orders of the Council.
CHAPTER XIX.
SEIZURE OF THE SUEZ CANAL.
The seizure and temporary occupation of the Suez Canal by the British
forces became an absolute necessity from the moment that Sir Garnet
Wolseley determined to make Ismailia the base of his operations.
Once decided on, the evolution was performed on the night of the
19th-20th of August in a quiet, practical, and business-like manner,
reflecting the highest credit on the British Navy.
The work at Port Saïd was carried out by the _Monarch_ and the _Iris_,
the first-named vessel being so moored off the town that her forward
turret guns commanded the main street leading to the quay, whilst the
_Iris_ was to seaward of the _Monarch_, in a position whence she could
shell the beach and the Arab town. The ironclad _Northumberland_ lay
anchored in the offing off Fort Ghemil, the object being to check an
exodus of the coal labourers from Port Saïd, and to create an impression
that the fort was to be attacked. At 11 on the night of the 19th the
ships' companies of the _Monarch_ and _Iris_ were called on deck and
warned that they would be landed at 3 a.m.
At exactly 3.30 on the 20th the landing began amidst the strictest
silence. So quietly was the operation carried out that those on board
the French ironclad _La Gallissonière_, moored close astern of the
_Monarch_, and to the same buoy, knew nothing of what was going on.
The landing party comprised two companies of seamen and one of marines
from the _Monarch_, and a small naval brigade and a company of marines
from the _Iris_, with two Gatling guns.
The plan of operations, shortly stated, was to surround the barracks in
which the Government soldiers were quartered, and then to establish a
line of sentries across the narrow neck of land which separates the
European from the native town, and to bar escape from the former. In a
few minutes the work was completed. The soldiers, who were nearly all
asleep, were ordered to surrender, and 160 of them fell in and laid down
their arms. They were then permitted to return to their barracks, two
officers only being detained in custody. The seamen were then posted
right across from Lake Menzaleh to the sea, and some temporary
earthworks were thrown up across the neck of land already referred to.
Upon Captain Seymour, of the _Iris_, devolved the delicate duty of
securing the Canal Company's offices at Port Saïd, and of preventing any
information being telegraphed through it to the Company's other
stations.
After Captain Seymour had occupied the office of the principal transit
agent of the Canal Company, a midshipman, not more than fifteen years of
age, was told off with a party of bluejackets to take possession of the
Company's telegraph apparatus. The Company's employés stood aghast with
solemn faces. Such an act of desecration had never been even dreamt of.
Presently the Company's Telegraph Agent arrived, full of dignity and
importance, and, apparently unconscious of what had taken place, walked
towards his office. He was stopped at the entrance by the small
midshipman, who said with a very good French accent, "On ne passe pas."
The Frenchman (all the important posts in the Company are filled by
Frenchmen) looked at the diminutive object in front of him with
dignified astonishment, and demanded, "Qui êtes-vous? Que voulez-vous
ici?" "Je suis ici pour empêcher le monde d'entrer," answered the
midshipman. The Frenchman, quite bewildered, looked round, and from the
long faces of his colleagues was able to guess the truth. His anger and
humiliation at first prevented his uttering a word. It was not so much
that his office had been seized, but that such an important mission
should have been confided to so small a midshipman. This was the
bitterest sting of all. Had he been suppressed by a troop of soldiers
with fixed bayonets, his dignity at least would have been saved, though
the result might have been the same. "Ces sacrés Anglais veulent se
moquer de nous en nous envoyant un gamin comme cela," was his remark to
his brother officials.
Resistance was, however, in vain, and the Company's staff had to submit
to the inevitable.[44]
Of course the vital point to be seized was Ismailia, a task which the
presence of the Egyptian force at the railway junction at Nefiché, just
outside the town, rendered especially perilous.
The force landed by Captain Fitz-Roy, of the _Orion_, consisted of 565
officers and men belonging to that vessel, the _Northumberland_,
_Carysfort_, and _Coquette_, with two Gatlings and a 7-pounder gun. The
men disembarked in absolute silence at 3 a.m. on the 20th. The silence
was so perfect that the Egyptian guard at the Lock Gates was surrounded
before the attacking force was discovered. The guard, however, fired
their rifles, and so did the sailors. The guard at the Governor's house
laid down their arms, and no further resistance was experienced in the
town. The railway and telegraph stations, the Canal lock bridge, and the
Governor's house (with the Governor) were all taken possession of and
held.
There was some slight skirmishing in making the further advance, and in
the Arab town some of the enemy were killed. The ships in Lake Timsah at
3.40 a.m. fired five rounds of shell each on the guardhouses in the Arab
town. By 4 a.m. the whole place was occupied. By intercepted telegrams
it was ascertained that the enemy were arranging to send a large force
to Nefiché to attack Ismailia and the ships, and Captain Fitz-Roy
determined, if possible, to dislodge the enemy from Nefiché, and to
destroy their camp and any of the trains running. The _Orion_ and
_Carysfort_ therefore commenced a slow bombardment at 11 a.m., at a
distance of 4,200 yards. By noon the enemy's camp was destroyed, and the
troops were retreating towards Cairo. The bombardment was then stopped
for a time, but at 4 p.m., as another train was arriving laden with
troops, firing was resumed, one shot wrecking the train, overturning the
trucks and scattering the soldiers right and left. The fortunate shot
was fired from the _Orion_ at an unseen enemy, from bearings taken from
the masthead of the _Carysfort_.
This concluded the fighting until 10 p.m., after which shells were fired
at Nefiché at intervals of half an hour until daylight, to prevent the
railway being cleared, and check troops coming from the west by train.
At 10.30 General Graham arrived with the advance guard of the army,
reinforced the different positions, and took over the military command.
Throughout the operations there was only one European injured. The
brother-in-law of the Dutch Consul happened to be walking in the
neighbourhood of the lock, and not stopping when challenged, was
unfortunately shot in the arm, and subsequently died.[45]
The account given by M. Victor de Lesseps, the Canal Company's local
agent, in his official report of the operations at Ismailia, differs
somewhat from the foregoing. It is nevertheless not devoid of interest,
and for this reason a translation of some of the more important passages
is given below.
"During the night of the 19th to 20th all the European
population, the _personnel_ of the Company, and the principal
Egyptian functionaries, were assembled at the house of M.
Poilpré, Chief Agent of the Domain, at one of the gayest of
balls, enlivened by the presence of the officers of the Spanish
and Austrian ships of war. At two in the morning, every one went
home, and commenced to sleep, when, towards 3 o'clock, in the
middle of a very dark night, the streets resounded with warlike
cries, mingled with the sound of musketry and of the rolling of
gun-carriages dragged at a walking pace.
"It is the English sailors who disembark without having warned
the inhabitants that they might be exposed to be killed in the
streets. On what are they firing?--on whom?--no enemy is before
them. The camp of the Egyptians is at Nefiché, three kilometres
from Ismailia. There are in the town only some soldiers of
police, very peaceable people, inhabiting Ismailia for a long
time, and who have never dreamed of anything but maintaining
order.
"Shortly after the embarkation, the cannon thunders. It is the
_Orion_--it is the _Carysfort_--which are sending their shells
on to Nefiché, or in the desert.
"The musketry fire continues in the streets of Ismailia. At
daybreak it ceases in the town, after having happily made only
one victim.
"It is a European, a Dutchman, M. Bröens, who, not answering
clearly to the challenge of a seaman, received a rifle bullet,
which, traversing his body, broke his left arm. M. Bröens lies
between life and death. The doctors regard his condition as
hopeless.
"The English sailors direct their steps towards our Arab
village, inhabited by our native workmen with their families,
and where they find no enemies to reply. Nevertheless, they
fire on the women and children,[46] who flee into the desert;
heartrending cries from the terrified population reach even us.
Some Police Agents are made prisoners without any of them
having tried to defend themselves.
"One of them is killed from behind, whilst trying to escape
with his family.
"Towards eight in the morning the musketry fire ceased. The
cannon thunders still, and will thunder until the morning of
the 21st.
"On landing, the English have cut our telegraph wires to Suez
and Port Saïd. Captain Fitz-Roy occupies the Port Office, and
our boats are seized. Ismailia is blocked, and we know nothing
of what is passing on the rest of the line.
"In the afternoon we think of putting the families of our
_personnel_ in safety. For 300 seamen only occupy the town, and
during the night the Egyptians of Nefiché may attack. It is
prudent to make the women and children sleep on the lake. As to
the _personnel_ and M. Ferdinand de Lesseps, they have decided
not to quit the town.
"The families betake themselves to the landing-place. Captain
Fitz-Roy opposes their departure.[47] I then write him a
letter. M. Fitz-Roy answers me verbally at seven in the
evening, when the night commences, that the families are free,
but that M. de Lesseps and all his _personnel_ shall pass the
night in the town, for he expects to be attacked. There will be
a battle in Ismailia, and he wishes that M. de Lesseps and all
his _personnel_ should be there. 'I am the master, now,' says
he.
"These odious words were quite gratuitous, since M. de Lesseps
and all the _personnel_, chiefs and employés, had declared that
they would not go out of the town, and there had never been a
question except as regards their families.
"A part of the families preferred to return to town; the other
part was enabled to embark in the boats sent by the ironclad
Spanish frigate _Carmen_, and by the Austrian gunboat
_Albatross_.
"The night, happily, passed without any incident; the silence
was broken only by the shells thrown by the _Carysfort_ and
_Orion_ on Nefiché. At daylight Ismailia woke up in the midst
of several thousands of English soldiers of the army. The Lake
is full of transports and ships of war.
"We learn then that in the night of the 19th to the 20th the
English have disembarked at Port Saïd, but peaceably, and that
Admiral Hoskins has taken possession of our offices, from
whence M. Desavary, Principal Transit Agent at Port Saïd, had
been expelled. Ships of war and transports entered the Canal
without pilots, and without paying their dues.[48]
"During the 20th and 21st the movement without pilots of the
English vessels of war gave rise to complete confusion. The
greater part got ashore, and several were obliged to disembark
their troops on the bank before arriving at Ismailia, being
incapable of extricating themselves by their own resources.
Admiral Seymour has been forced to recognize this, and the
hurry that he was in on the 21st to hand back the working to us
is the proof of it.[49]
"It is desirable to add that the British naval authorities
tried to obtain the services of several of our pilots behind
the backs of their superiors, and that all the pilots, without
exception, refused to move without the order of the Company.
"During all this crisis no _défaillance_ has been produced in
all the _personnel_ from Port Saïd to Suez. The Company may
well be proud of it."
The substance of M. Victor de Lesseps' account of the occupation of
Ismailia being telegraphed to the _Standard_ newspaper, the Lords of the
Admiralty thought the matter of sufficient importance to be noticed, and
on the 1st September communicated to the Foreign Office as follows:--
"From these reports[50] we are able to give the following
account of the occurrences of that day: Ismailia was garrisoned
by rebel troops; guards were placed at the lock, the Governor's
house, and the Arab town. The lock was surrounded by a party
under Commander Kane, R.N. The guard fired and wounded that
officer slightly. Their fire was returned, and it is believed
that it was here that a brother of one of the employés of the
Canal was unfortunately wounded, who died on the 29th ultimo in
the British hospital. The guard at the Governor's house laid
down their arms. The Arab town was occupied by Captain
Stephenson; the guard retreated and were fired upon, and two men
killed. A few rounds of shell were also fired from the ships at
the guardhouses in the Arab town.
"Sir Beauchamp Seymour also reports that he saw on the 21st
ultimo many women on board the Spanish ship _Carmen_; that he
was told by the Captains that they took refuge on board of her
and the Austrian ship _Albatross_ on the 20th. It appears that
Captain Fitz-Roy permitted two large Canal boats to be used for
their embarkation, although he did not consider it consistent
with his duty to allow Canal officers to leave Ismailia."
In the southern half of the Canal from Lake Timsah to Suez, the events
of the day were on a smaller scale, but none the less interesting. It
will be remembered that Suez had been by this time in the possession of
the British navy for nearly three weeks, and the advanced guard of the
Indian Contingent and the first battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Stockwell, had arrived from Aden.
Rear-Admiral Sir William Hewett, Commander-in-Chief of the naval forces
in the East Indies, had charge of the operations at Suez. According to
his reports, in the afternoon of the 17th August, the rebels were seen
intrenching themselves in front of the British position, and movements
of Bedouins on the left flank also called for attention. Under these
circumstances, it was decided by the Admiral not to send any of the
Highlanders away without previously reconnoitring the neighbourhood.
On the night of the 18th, Hewett caused the telegraph wires to be cut
between Suez and the first Canal station, and on Saturday morning
notices were issued that from that date, the 19th instant, until the
prohibition was formally removed, no ships or boats would be allowed to
pass into the Canal from the Suez side without special permission. The
damage to the wire on the above occasion was soon repaired, but on the
following night he caused the poles which conveyed the line across the
creek close to the Company's offices to be cut down, and placed a guard
over them to prevent their being restored.
On the 20th, at daylight, 400 Highlanders, under Colonel Stockwell, were
disembarked from the transport _Bancoora_, and marched eight miles in
the direction of Chalouf to make a feint attack in front. At the same
time the gun-vessels _Sea Gull_ and _Mosquito_, with 200 more of the
Highlanders, were also despatched to Chalouf by the Maritime Canal. The
party under Colonel Stockwell returned about 4 p.m. without having come
in touch with the enemy.
The gun-vessels, meanwhile, had been more successful. The first that
they had seen of the enemy along the Canal was a cavalry patrol, about
three miles from Chalouf. On the gun-vessels approaching this latter
place, some 800 infantry were discovered behind the railway embankment,
which thus formed a natural intrenchment. The ships at once opened fire
from their tops, to which the enemy replied, but made bad practice. This
was followed by the prompt disembarkation of the 200 Highlanders, who,
crossing the intervening Fresh-water Canal in boats, or by swimming,
climbed up the intrenchment and carried the works with a rush, the
enemy, scattered and broken, retreating across the plain. The
gun-vessels then returned to Suez.
With the exception of the Serapeum portion between Lake Timsah and the
Bitter Lakes, where no annoyance or interruption of traffic was
expected, the whole of the Maritime Canal was in possession of the
British Navy by nightfall of August the 20th. On the following day the
_Tourmaline_ and the _Don_ moored permanently at Kantara, where a
caravan road to Syria crosses the Canal, and there established a
strongly defended post; while the gunboats in the southern half
completed the link which perfected the chain from Port Saïd to Suez.
Having seized the Canal, the British prepared to protect it. Between
Ismailia and Suez this was effected by the _Mosquito_ and _Sea Gull_,
which patrolled it constantly, no force being permanently landed. In the
northern half the _Tourmaline_ and _Don_ held Kantara and the stations
adjoining on either side. Strong detachments of sailors from the fleet
at Port Saïd, with Gatlings, were landed at the other stations.
Breastworks were thrown up and regular camps established each night. At
Port Saïd a camp was pitched between the European and Arab towns, where
never less than 500 bluejackets and marines were kept. Intrenchments
were thrown up across the Isthmus from Lake Menzaleh to the
Mediterranean, and field-pieces mounted. In the Canal itself steam
launches, &c., with armed crews were used as patrols, and the fast
Thorneycroft torpedo launches of the _Iris_ and _Hecla_ were employed as
despatch boats.
Sunday, August 20th, was a busy day at Port Saïd. The whole of the
immense fleet of men-of-war and transports, as well as Sir Beauchamp
Seymour in the _Helicon_, arrived early in the forenoon. As was
expected, the Canal Company would accept no dues and would provide no
pilots. There was some little delay until the way was clear. During this
interval, to provide against possible trouble, 300 of the York and
Lancaster Regiment were put on board the gun-vessel _Falcon_, and a
similar number of the West Kent Regiment was embarked on board the
gun-vessel _Beacon_, to form the advance. These vessels arrived at
Ismailia in the evening of the same day.
Early in the afternoon the _Nerissa_ led the transport fleet into the
Canal, followed by the _Rhosina_, the troop-ship _Euphrates_, and the
rest, including the _Penelope_, Admiral Hoskins' flagship. Slowly the
stately procession passed through the Canal to Ismailia, which the
vessels one by one reached either that night or early the next morning.
Although the ships were unprovided with pilots, they were so skilfully
navigated by their own officers, that very little difficulty arose,
almost the only exception being the grounding of the _Catalonia_,[51]
with the West Kent Regiment on board. She grounded at a distance of
seven miles from Lake Timsah, and caused a temporary block; but did not
for long interrupt the passage of the other vessels.
M. Ferdinand de Lesseps, from the steps of the Empress's Chalet at the
entrance to Lake Timsah, watched the long line of British vessels of war
and transports arriving from the Canal.[52] So little space was there
that the vessels as they entered the Lake were moored abreast of each
other, bow and stern. The _Penelope_ was one of the first to take up her
position.
In M. de Lesseps' memoirs, already referred to, it is stated that he had
refused to give pilots to the British vessels, under pretext that they
were violating the neutrality of the Canal, and that it was doubtful
whether he would in the end have consented to give the pilots if he had
not perceived that the English were determined to use the Canal at the
risk of a vessel or two being stranded. He knew how detrimental the
blocking of the Canal would be to his enterprise, so he made a bargain
with the English Commander, and on receiving a cheque on the Bank of
England for £100,000 as compensation for the damage done, he placed
the whole administration of the Canal at the disposal of the British.
Being powerless to prevent the violation of the Canal's neutrality, he
thus preserved intact the pecuniary interests of the Company.
It is scarcely necessary to say that the whole of the above statement is
"fallacious," as was pointed out by Sir Beauchamp Seymour (then Lord
Alcester) in a letter which he wrote to the _Times_ as soon as the
matter was noticed by the British Press.
At 9 a.m. on the 21st Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived in the despatch vessel
_Salamis_, and issued the following Proclamation by order of the
Khedive:--
"PROCLAMATION TO THE EGYPTIANS.
"The General in command of the British forces wishes to make
known that the object of Her Majesty's Government in sending
troops to this country is to re-establish the authority of the
Khedive. The army is therefore only fighting against those who
are in arms against His Highness. All peaceable inhabitants
will be treated with kindness, and no violence will be offered
to them. Their religion, mosques, families, and property will
be respected. Any supplies which may be required will be paid
for, and the inhabitants are invited to bring them. The General
in command will be glad to receive visits from the Chiefs who
are willing to assist in repressing the rebellion against the
Khedive, the lawful Ruler of Egypt appointed by the Sultan.
"G. J. WOLSELEY, General,
"Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in Egypt."
CHAPTER XX.
TEL-EL-MAHUTA TO MAHSAMEH.
The country between Ismailia and the Delta is so monotonous that a few
words only are necessary to give a notion of its character. It is a
desert of sand, across which run the Fresh Water Canal and the railway
side by side. To the northward of these the ground is, as a rule,
somewhat higher, sloping in a southerly direction across the Canal. From
these elevations occasional peeps can be obtained of the blue waters of
Lake Timsah, and of the violet-tinted hills of Geb-el-Attakeh in the
distance. The surface is occasionally varied by low hummocks and mounds,
and is dotted at intervals by tufts of scrub, called "camel grass." The
soil is a deep light shifting sand near Ismailia, but it gradually
increases in firmness towards the westward; and at Tel-el-Kebir,
especially on the upper crests of the hills, is a fairly compact
wind-swept gravel, over which progress is comparatively easy.
The sky is here rarely cloudy, so that the sun beats down with full
force during the day, whilst at night the air becomes cool and almost
chilly, even in summer. Shelter is needed against the sun in day-time,
and at night a blanket is indispensable, both on account of the low
temperature and of the dews.
By reason of the absence of rain and the dry temperature, stores of all
kinds could be freely piled up uncovered in the open air without fear of
injury. The Fresh Water Canal, joining the Nile just below Cairo,
furnished the necessary water, of fair quality when once the mud held in
suspension was got rid of. The Egyptian flies, the worst of their
species, however, made life almost unendurable. They disappeared with
the sun, only to be relieved by countless hosts of mosquitoes.
No time was lost after the landing of the troops at Ismailia, the
advance commencing the day following the occupation. At 11 a.m. General
Graham started from the town with 800 men and a small naval contingent,
and marched across the heavy sand, arriving in position at Nefiché at
1.30 p.m.
The Egyptian camp was found completely deserted, the enemy having
retired to the westward along the Fresh Water Canal. A few tents were
left behind, and about thirty railway trucks full of provisions and
ammunition. The remains of the wrecked train which had been struck by
the _Orion's_ shell were also lying about. The locomotive, however,
which was badly wanted, was gone, and the telegraph wires were cut. The
entire force under Graham bivouacked here, and the position was at once
placed in an efficient state of defence. Shelter trenches were thrown
up, and guns were placed in position.
Later in the day a reconnaissance was made to the westward, and the
presence of the enemy was discerned about four miles distant.
The troops had carried with them two days' rations, and it was necessary
to accumulate a small stock of stores before continuing the advance. In
consequence, the next two days were devoted to preparations.
Transports continued to arrive daily in Lake Timsah, and landing went on
rapidly. On the 22nd, twenty-six transports, besides vessels of war,
were moored off Ismailia. At 4 p.m. all the bluejackets from the fleet
re-embarked, except three Gatling guns' crews and a torpedo party, who
had advanced with Graham to Nefiché.[53]
On the 23rd there was increased activity in Ismailia, several transports
arriving from Suez with portions of the Indian Contingent. The Khedive's
Palace was converted into a hospital. Lines of rails were laid down from
the landing-place to the station, and stores were disembarked in great
quantities and moved up to the front.
On the following day commenced a series of engagements, which, with some
intervals, continued until the dispersal of the Egyptian Army at
Tel-el-Kebir.
At 4 a.m. on the 24th, Wolseley made an advance with the object of
seizing a position on the Fresh Water Canal and railway which would
insure the water supply. His force consisted of three squadrons of
cavalry, two guns (R.H.A.), and 1,000 infantry (York and Lancaster
Regiment and Marines). Following the line of railway, they arrived at
7.30 a.m. on the north side of the Canal, at a point about midway
between El Magfar and the village of Tel-el-Mahuta. At this point the
enemy had constructed his first dam across the Canal, and after some
skirmishing, in which the Household Cavalry made a successful charge,
the dam was taken possession of.
From this point the enemy could be seen in force about a mile-and-a-half
further on, holding a line extending across the Canal, at a distance of
2,000 yards from the British front. At Mahuta also a large embankment
was seen blocking the railway, and a second dam had been constructed
across the Canal. The smoke of locomotives constantly reaching Mahuta
indicated that reinforcements were arriving at that point from the
direction of Tel-el-Kebir.
Nevertheless, Wolseley, at the risk of being outnumbered--the enemy's
force amounting in all to about 7,000 men--decided to hold his ground
till evening, by which time the reinforcements sent for to Nefiché and
Ismailia would arrive.
The enemy began with a heavy artillery fire from twelve guns, and their
infantry advanced to within 1,000 yards of the British line, meeting
with a steady and well-directed fire from the York and Lancaster
Regiment, which held the captured dam. From 10 to 11 o'clock the enemy
continued to develop his attack on the centre and right of Wolseley's
position. The Egyptian guns were served well, but, fortunately, the
shells used were fitted with percussion fuzes, which sank so deeply into
the sand before bursting that few splinters flew upwards. The fire was
returned by the two guns of the Royal Horse Artillery (which had taken
up a position on a sandy hillock near the railway embankment), and the
practice from which was very good. In the meantime, the cavalry, under
General Drury-Lowe, manoeuvred on the right of the position to check
the enemy's advance on that side; but the horses, just landed after a
long sea voyage, and fatigued by their march across a desert deep in
sand, were in no condition to charge.
This was the situation at noon, when two Gatling guns, with a party of
sailors belonging to H.M.S. _Orion_, arrived and took up a position for
action. The manner in which the sailors brought their guns into
position excited general admiration.
At 1 p.m. the 2nd battalion of the Duke of Cornwall's Regiment arrived
from Nefiché.
The artillery fire of the enemy was now directed more on the right,
until about 3.30 p.m. General Lowe, with the cavalry, moved forward, and
caused the enemy partially to withdraw his attack in that direction.
At 5.15 p.m. the enemy again advanced, his left pushing forward four
guns, some cavalry and infantry, but not coming within effective
infantry or Gatling fire.
Reinforcements now began to come up rapidly--Colonel Sir Baker Russell
with 350 of the 4th and 7th Dragoon Guards, and at 6 p.m. the Brigade of
Guards, under the Duke of Connaught, arrived on the scene. It was by
this time too late to begin an offensive movement; the troops were tired
by their exertions during the early part of the day, and the Brigade of
Guards, which had moved from Ismailia at 1.30 p.m., had suffered much
from the heat of the desert march. Shortly after sunset the entire force
bivouacked on the field which they had so tenaciously held all day, and
the enemy withdrew to his position at Mahuta.
The events of the day may be shortly described as a successful attempt
to seize the dam,[54] and the retaining of the position, gained in the
face of greatly superior numbers. It is therefore to be regretted that
Sir Garnet Wolseley should have thought it necessary to refer to the
matter in somewhat bombastic language in his official despatch, in which
he expresses himself as follows: "Although I had but three squadrons of
cavalry, two guns, and about 1,000 infantry, I felt it would not be in
consonance with the traditions of Her Majesty's Army that we should
retire, even temporarily, before Egyptian troops, no matter what their
numbers might be."
Had Sir Garnet only been well acquainted with military history, he might
have recollected one of the events connected with the British Expedition
to Egypt in 1807. In the course of that disastrous campaign 1,000
British infantry, under Colonel Stewart, had to retire before a force,
composed of Egyptian and Albanian troops, at El Hamad, on the Nile, and
further, were all either killed, wounded, or taken prisoners.[55]
During the night of the 24th August further reinforcements from Ismailia
continued to arrive, and the attack on the intrenched post of
Tel-el-Mahuta commenced soon after daybreak on the 25th.
As the British force advanced, the infantry in echelon, the Brigade of
Guards leading and the cavalry on the right, the enemy was observed
abandoning his earthworks at Mahuta, and falling back along the railway
line to Mahsameh. His railway trains were all seen moving off in the
same direction. At 6.25 a.m. the British artillery came into action with
the Egyptian infantry and guns posted on the Canal bank to the west of
Mahuta.
As it was of importance to capture some of the enemy's locomotives, the
cavalry and eight guns were pushed forward with all speed to cut off the
retreating trains. The enemy offered considerable resistance in the
neighbourhood of Mahsameh, but nothing could stop the advance of the
mounted troops, and Mahsameh, with its extensive camp, was soon in their
possession. Seven Krupp guns, great quantities of ammunition, two trains
of railway waggons loaded with provisions, and vast supplies of various
kinds were captured. The Egyptian soldiers fled along the railway and
Canal banks, throwing away their arms and equipment, and showing every
sign of demoralization.
The Canal had been filled with dead bodies, and the banks were still
strewn with them, probably with the idea of making the water
undrinkable. It was here that one of the English artillerymen, having
offered to fetch water for a wounded Egyptian, was shot dead by the
latter whilst doing so.
The stock of provisions captured was a most welcome addition to the
stores in hand, and in particular the grain left on the ground in large
quantities was invaluable, for the horses had been for several days on
an extremely short allowance of forage.
It will be remarked that the operations of the day hardly attained to
the dignity of an engagement, the Egyptians offering practically no
resistance, but falling back on Tel-el-Kebir, where a large camp had
been established north of the railway, and where extensive intrenchments
were begun along the crest of a range of hills running north and
south.[56]
The losses on the side of the British were small--only five killed and
twenty-five wounded; but the cases of sunstroke were numerous, the 4th
Dragoons having sixteen and the York and Lancaster Regiment twenty-five
men disabled from this cause.
On August 26th a small force of the Dragoons occupied the lock on the
Fresh Water Canal at Kassassin without opposition. This was a most
important step, because the possession of the lock gave Sir Garnet
Wolseley control of the water in the upper reach of the Canal--no small
advantage to an army worked like his on strictly temperance principles.
That it could have been accomplished so easily is an indication of the
ignorance or carelessness of the enemy. Later in the day the Duke of
Cornwall's Light Infantry, the 84th York and Lancaster Regiment, as well
as two guns of the Royal Horse Artillery, were marched to the lock,
where they established themselves, the cavalry withdrawing to Mahsameh.
A house on the left bank of the Canal was occupied by General Graham and
his staff, who remained in charge of the advanced guard. As it was known
that the enemy was not far off, the cavalry scouted by day and night,
and strong outposts were established.
CHAPTER XXI.
KASSASSIN.
The British force had now outrun its Commissariat, and for two days the
men had lived from hand to mouth. To secure the water supply it had
become necessary to push forward a force into the Desert nearly twenty
miles from the base of operations at Ismailia. The question arose how
the troops were to be supplied with food, and the want of a proper
organization for the transport of provisions began to be severely felt.
The men, weakened by prolonged exertion under a terrible sun, were
forced to live for two or three days on biscuits and muddy water,
flavoured only with the dead bodies of Egyptian men and horses. The
English horses also were short of forage and showed signs of fatigue and
exhaustion. The question of supply became an anxious one. Mules were not
forthcoming, the railway had been cut, and no rolling stock was
available, and the British force was for days almost without food.
On the third day, owing to the vigorous efforts of the navy, some stores
were forwarded to the front by the Fresh Water Canal, but the prospects
were, to say the least, gloomy. The men were compelled to live on
pigeons, water-melons, &c., looted out of the neighbouring village. On
the 27th, however, a foraging party was conducted into the country by
the transport officer, and some fourteen head of cattle were driven in,
besides some sheep and turkeys. The General ordered them all to be paid
for, and this rule was observed on subsequent occasions.
On the 28th the Egyptians made an effort to regain their lost ground by
a serious attack upon the advanced force under General Graham, at
Kassassin.
The position occupied by the British was not the most favourable for
defence. The troops were astride the Canal, and although a bridge
existed, the separation of the right and left wings was partial in any
case, and complete if the force had either to advance or retire.
However, on the right of the position the Desert rose to a ridge some
100 to 160 feet high, which with a force like Graham's, too weak to
occupy it, might easily conceal the movements of an outflanking force.
About 9.30 a.m. the Egyptian cavalry appeared in force on the left front
on the north side of the Fresh Water Canal. Graham's troops, consisting
of 57 cavalry, 70 mounted infantry, 1,728 infantry, and 40 artillery,
with two 13-pounder guns, were at once posted under cover, fronting to
the north and west, the cavalry being thrown out on the flanks to
observe the enemy's movements. About 11 a.m. it was reported that a
large force of cavalry, infantry and artillery was being moved round
towards the British right behind the ridge already referred to. At noon,
the Egyptians opened fire from two heavy guns on the left front of
Graham's position. The range being at least 4,000 yards, the shot all
fell short. After a time the fire slackened, and about 3 p.m. the enemy
were reported to be retiring.
Graham's men, who had been suffering very much from their long exposure
to the sun without food, were then ordered back to their camps.
The matter, however, was not destined to end here, for at 4.30 the enemy
advanced his infantry in great force, displaying a line of skirmishers
at least a mile in length, with which he sought to overlap the left of
Graham's front. This movement was supported by a heavy and well-directed
artillery fire, which searched the camp and wounded a sick officer in
the building occupied as a hospital.
The dispositions to meet the attack were as follows:--On the left the
Marine Artillery were directed to take up a position on the south bank
of the Canal, whence they could check the enemy's advance by a flank
fire. In the centre was the Duke of Cornwall's Regiment, extended in
fighting line, about 800 yards to the right rear of the Marine
Artillery, and the York and Lancaster extended the fighting line of the
Duke of Cornwall's with two and a half companies, keeping the remainder
in support and reserve.
The position of the infantry was an irregular echelon, the right thrown
back. A troop of the 7th Dragoon Guards was kept on this flank, and the
two 13-pounders, now reinforced by two others, took up a position on the
ridge, and promptly replied to the Egyptian cannonade. Unfortunately,
these guns had only the ammunition contained in their limbers and had
soon to cease firing for want of a further supply, though they did good
service while it lasted. The reason of the ammunition failing was the
heaviness of the road from the base to the front. Efforts were made to
get up a proper supply, but the waggons stuck in the sand and so arrived
late.
The Mounted Infantry and a dismounted detachment of the 4th Dragoon
Guards occupied a portion of the gap between the Marine Artillery and
the Duke of Cornwall's Regiment, and although the attacking force made
persistent efforts to break through at this point, it failed owing to
the steady fire of the Marine Artillery and the little band of Dragoons
and Mounted Infantry.
The enemy made repeated attempts to overcome this resistance, putting a
number of men across the Canal; and three times their guns were kept
from advancing by the horses and men being shot when trying to press
past.
Feeling secure on his left, Graham turned his attention to the right
flank of his position. On the first notice of the attack (4.30 p.m.) he
had sent a message to General Drury-Lowe by heliograph, and by a mounted
officer to Mahsameh, three or four miles distant, requesting him to move
up the Cavalry Brigade to cover the right flank, and also to send
forward the Marine Light Infantry as a reinforcement.
At 5 p.m. Graham sent a further order for the cavalry to advance under
cover of the ridge on the right, fall upon the left flank of the enemy's
skirmishers and roll up his line. The particulars of the cavalry attack
made in pursuance of this order are given later on.
Reinforcements for the enemy being observed arriving by train, still
further to protect his exposed right, Graham sent a reserve company of
the York and Lancaster in that direction. Near the same point a Krupp
gun, taken from the enemy at Mahsameh and mounted on a railway truck,
was brought into action, and worked by a detachment of Marine Artillery.
This gun was admirably served and did great execution among the
attacking force.
Although fired upon by as many as four guns at a time, not a man of the
gun detachment was hit, and the gun continued to fire on to the last,
expending ninety-three rounds. The immunity enjoyed by the gun's crew
was doubtless due to the constant shifting of the gun backwards and
forwards on the line of rails. The gun itself was protected by a
breastwork of sandbags.
At 6.45 p.m. a general advance was ordered, with the object of closing
on the enemy's infantry about the time that Graham reckoned Drury-Lowe's
cavalry charge would be taking place.
The advance was made very steadily, the British infantry firing volleys
by companies, the reserves following in rear of the railway embankment.
The Marine Light Infantry had now come on to the ground on the right and
joined in the advance, which was continued for from two to three miles,
the enemy falling back and only once attempting to make a stand. This
was on the British left, but here the Egyptians broke at the first
volley of the Marines.
At 8.45 p.m. Graham heard of the cavalry charge from an officer of the
1st Life Guards, who had lost his way. Graham's force had now been
marching forward for an hour and a half in the moonlight, and his men
had had narrow escapes in mistaking detached bodies of the enemy for
British troops. Fearing some mistake might be made, and seeing no
further chance of co-operation with the cavalry, Graham ordered the
troops back to camp.
To describe the movements of the cavalry under General Drury-Lowe.
According to that officer's report, the aide-de-camp despatched by
Graham reported at 5.30 that the enemy was advancing in force, and the
brigade was at once turned out. It consisted of the Household Cavalry,
the Dragoon Guards, and four guns of the Royal Horse Artillery. As the
troops advanced, the sound of heavy firing was heard, and, _en route_, a
galloper from General Graham arrived, and stated that the General
desired to say that "he was only just able to hold his own, and that he
wished the cavalry to attack the left of the enemy's skirmishers."
The sun had now set, and a bright moon was shining. The light, however,
was not good, and the force had to be guided by the flash of the guns
and musketry.
General Drury-Lowe made a wide circuit, so as to turn the enemy's left,
and the brigade arrived close to this portion of their line without
being noticed.
As the cavalry advanced, it was received by a fire of shells and
musketry, which, being aimed too high, was practically harmless. When
within 500 or 600 yards of the enemy, the guns of the Horse Artillery,
then in the rear of the Household Cavalry and Dragoons, were unmasked by
the retirement of the first line, and brought into action. After a few
rounds had been fired, Sir Baker Russell led a charge of the Household
Cavalry against the enemy's infantry, which had commenced to advance.
Moving steadily towards the flash of the rifles, the charge was
gallantly led and executed. The British cavalry carried all before them.
The enemy's infantry was completely scattered, and, according to the
official report, the cavalry swept through a battery of nine guns. In
daylight these must have been captured, but, unfortunately, their exact
position could not be found afterwards, and it is supposed that they
were subsequently removed during the night.
This moonlight charge was the most dramatic, as it was one of the most
dashing, episodes of the campaign. Whether the charge, brilliant as it
was, occurring so late in the engagement, had any real effect upon the
fortunes of the day may well be doubted. The general opinion of military
men appears to be that its importance has been much exaggerated. The
non-capture of the Egyptian guns is especially to be regretted, and has
indeed led to the expression of a serious doubt as to their existence.
The message referred to by General Drury-Lowe, to the effect that
General Graham wished to say that "he was only just able to hold his
own," was, it appears, not sent by the General, but was merely the
appreciation of the person who brought the message. There is no doubt,
however, that it correctly represented the situation at the time.
The British loss was a total of killed or dangerously wounded, 11;
wounded, 67. The enemy's loss is unknown, but was believed to have been
heavy, the ground being thickly strewn with their killed, more
especially in the spot where the cavalry charge took place. The burying
parties next morning found that many of the bodies had been shockingly
mutilated during the night. The circumcised had all been left untouched.
The persons committing these outrages followed a fixed plan, which they
applied to the uncircumcised corpses of both armies. They lopped off the
feet, hands, and other members, and deeply gashed the abdomen and the
upper part of the forehead. General Graham's estimate of the Egyptian
forces engaged was 1,000 cavalry, 8,000 infantry, and 12 guns.
It may be remarked that, small as was the British force employed, the
results of the engagement were of the greatest importance. It showed, in
the first place, that Arabi felt himself strong enough to attack and act
on the offensive, with a view to regain the prestige which his troops
had lost in the previous encounters. In the second place, it showed that
the campaign was likely to be something more than a parade across the
desert, and that the enemy was willing to come within range and hold his
own for hours together. It showed also that he would not stand an attack
at close quarters, and that, unless in greatly superior numbers, he
might be expected to give way if resolutely assailed.
The British left being well supported by the Canal and its banks, the
most obvious move on the part of the attack was to double up their right
and force them into the Canal, cutting off communication with their
rear. The Egyptians had no commander capable of realizing the importance
of this object, and, in consequence, the main attack was made in front,
the strongest part of the British position, and the flanking movement
was only half-hearted and unsuccessful.
With this fight ended the first part of the campaign. There was then
necessarily a pause in the military operations. A further advance was
beset with many difficulties. The railway was damaged in many places,
and blocked in others. There were no locomotives to haul the trucks
containing stores from the base to the front, and the army transport had
in great measure broken down. The draught animals were few and in poor
condition; pack-mules in sufficient numbers were lacking, and camels
were almost entirely wanting. The strong regulation carts, suitable for
use on European roads, were so heavy as to stick hopelessly in the sand.
A waggon designed for two horses required not less than six to move it
under existing conditions. The navy, it is true, was doing its best to
make up for the defects of the army transport. The boat service on the
Canal had been definitely organized under Commander Moore, of the
_Orion_, and rendered most valuable service in getting provisions and
stores to the front.
Notwithstanding all that the boats could do, it became doubtful whether
even the few troops at the front could be maintained, and every effort
had to be made to keep them supplied with the food requisite to enable
them to exist. The men bore their privations and discomforts cheerfully
until the arrival of locomotives from Suez made it possible to supply
the army properly. The water, too, was the reverse of good, the only
supply practically being from the Canal, and this at times was simply
loathsome.
In addition to this discomfort, there was always the possibility of the
railway or Canal being intercepted by marauding parties of the enemy.
Either of these contingencies would have seriously imperilled the troops
at the front.
In the meantime, the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Division, composed of Highlanders,
under the command of Sir Edward Hamley arrived at Ismailia from
Alexandria.
Three more transports with Indian troops also turned up, making the
total number of transports in Lake Timsah no less than 93, besides
men-of-war. The 3rd Brigade was not landed at once, but remained on
board the troopships, pending the solution of the transport problem.
The state of affairs at this period appears from a telegram from Sir
Garnet Wolseley to the Secretary of State for War, and which was as
follows:--
"_Ismailia, September 1, 1882._
"In reply to your inquiry of 29th ultimo, circumstances have
forced me ahead of transport, but it is rapidly becoming
efficient. The necessity of securing a sufficient supply of
fresh water in the Canal rendered it imperative to push on as
quickly as possible. My successes on the 24th and 25th, and
retreat of the enemy, have enabled me to seize (the) two
important positions on the Canal of El Magfar and Kassassin
Lock, the latter about twenty miles from this place. I am,
therefore, in a more forward and favourable position generally
than I had anticipated, and am only now waiting till my
transport arrangements are more complete to enable me to make a
further movement.
"In the absence of roads, I had always calculated on partially
using the Canal and railway in sending supplies to the front,
but the enemy having blocked the former by two large dams, and
the latter by an embankment, and the partial removal of rails,
it has been necessary to get these obstructions removed. I have
one engine on the line, and expect a second from Suez to-night,
and am preparing the land transport companies, some of which
are now landing, to supplement the other means above indicated.
"A supply of mules has arrived at Cyprus. I expect 400 more
from Malta and Italy to-morrow; and the large supply collected
at Smyrna and Beyrout at last released by the Ottoman
Government are on their way. In a desert country, like this
part of Egypt, it takes time to organize the lines of
communication."
By the 2nd September the whole of the Indian Contingent, except the 6th
Bengal Cavalry, had reached Suez, and many of its troops had gone to the
front.
Except for an occasional reconnaissance, bringing about an interchange
of shots and one real attack, the period now entered upon was one merely
of preparation for a further advance. With this object, stores first,
and then men, were gradually being accumulated at Kassassin.
On the 9th September the Egyptian leaders apparently began to realize
the fact that Sir Garnet Wolseley's force was daily increasing in size
and importance, and that if any attempt was to be made to crush him
there was no time to be lost. Accordingly an attack was made that day on
Kassassin.
On this occasion Arabi himself was on the ground, though the attacking
forces were commanded by Ali Pasha Fehmi. The Egyptian force turned out
in great strength, comprising seventeen battalions of infantry, several
squadrons of cavalry, thirty guns, and some thousands of Bedouins.
The Egyptian attack was meant to be from two sides: on the west by an
advance of the garrison of Tel-el-Kebir, and on the north by a body,
variously estimated at from 1,500 to 5,000 men, from Salahieh.
There is very little doubt that the British force came very near being
surprised. Early in the morning Colonel Pennington, of the 13th Bengal
Lancers, going out to the westward to post vedettes, found the Egyptians
advancing in force. Although he had but fifty men with him he dismounted
them behind a ridge, and opened fire on the advancing enemy, and when
hard pushed charged some squadrons of cavalry, killing ten men and
capturing five horses. Warning of the impending danger was thus given to
the camp, enabling a line of battle to be formed.
By 7 a.m. Arabi had succeeded in posting most of his guns on an eminence
described in Wolseley's despatches as "Ninth Hill," 2,000 yards to the
British right front, whilst his infantry deployed for attack, with the
right resting on the Canal, and then advanced to within 1,200 yards. A
few of his troops got south of the Canal, with a view to a flank
movement.
No sooner were the Egyptian guns posted than they opened fire. The
practice was very accurate, shot after shot falling admirably into the
British camp and lines. The shells, however, burst so rarely as to
neutralize the excellence of the aim.
The British artillery batteries and the guns on the railway replied
vigorously with shell and shrapnel. The 25-pounders did excellent work
on the enemy's right on both sides of the Canal, sending their
projectiles over the heads of the British infantry until the advance was
begun. The Horse Artillery batteries shot down the men working two of
the guns, and these were seized by the infantry as they advanced; two
others were captured by the Marines in their forward march. Their
battalion, in regular formation for attack, came upon a battery of four
guns which was playing briskly upon the Marines at a distance of 1,400
yards. Without returning the fire they kept on their way until within
400 yards, when they began firing volleys by half companies, still
continuing the march. This steady work proved too severe for the
Egyptian gunners, who broke and ran, leaving two of the four guns
behind.
The infantry also engaged, holding its ground for an hour and a half, no
forward movement being permitted until it was ascertained that no danger
was to be apprehended from the direction of Salahieh.
At 8.30 it was deemed prudent to assume the offensive, and the line was
ordered to advance, the right being always kept in reserve. The 46th
(Duke of Cornwall's), 84th (York and Lancaster), and 50th (West Kent)
Regiments, which had been stationed on the south bank of the Canal to
check any flank movement of the enemy, were ordered to retire across the
Canal bridge, and, crossing the plain in front of the camp, to form up
with the rest. The infantry, with the four batteries of artillery on its
right, moved forward about 1,000 yards and re-engaged the enemy, who by
this time had retired.
To prevent any attempt to overlap the right of the position, the 46th
was advanced in this direction over the hills. The attack in this
quarter, however, resolved itself into nothing. At 9.30 the general
advance was resumed amid a smart musketry fire, and the enemy broke and
retired with precipitation upon Tel-el-Kebir. The cavalry and Royal
Horse Artillery ran them very close, the fortifications being approached
as near as 6,000 yards.
CHAPTER XXII.
TEL-EL-KEBIR.
On the 9th September, Sir Garnet Wolseley, who had been to the front
during the engagement of that day and had made a reconnaissance towards
the enemy's lines at Tel-el-Kebir, established his head-quarters at
Kassassin.
The same day the Highland Brigade, under Sir Archibald Alison, commenced
its march from Ismailia to the front. The Guards were also brought up.
The 10th, 11th, and 12th were occupied in bringing forward troops and
stores, and in making preparations for a general advance.
At 2 p.m. on the 12th, the army was concentrated at Kassassin, the Royal
Irish Fusiliers being the last battalion to arrive.
To remain behind and guard the line of communication, 800 of the
Manchester Regiment and 500 of the Native Infantry were left at
Ismailia. At Nefiché, Mahuta, and Mahsameh, small detachments were also
stationed, whilst at Kassassin 200 of the West Kent Regiment and two
companies of the Royal Engineers were told off to form a garrison for
the time being. This left available for the forward movement 11,000
infantry, 2,000 cavalry and 60 guns.
Tel-el-Kebir, properly written "El-Tel-el-Kebir," "The Great Hill," is
the name of a peaceful Arab village on the south side of the railway
leading from Ismailia to Cairo, and on the banks of the Fresh Water
Canal. On the opposite side of the railway and Canal stands the "hill,"
an elevation of considerable height, near which Arabi had for some weeks
past been intrenching his forces.
Tel-el-Kebir had for many years past been used as a military station and
camp, and it was here that Arabi had been exiled with his mutinous
regiment in the autumn of 1881.
[Illustration: LINES OF TEL-EL-KEBIR.]
The position selected by the Egyptians for a final stand was by nature
the strongest it was possible to find in that flat section of
country.[57] Near the station of Tel-el-Kebir there is a general and
gradual rise of the ground towards the west, culminating in a range of
hills that stretch from a point on the railway about a mile and a half
east of the station, northward to Salahieh. Roughly parallel to the
Fresh Water Canal is a second series of hills intersecting the first
about two miles distant from the railway. Viewed from the railway, this
east and west range appears as a moderate hill. Its real character,
however, is that of a table-land sloping away to the northward with a
rather steep descent towards the south. The ground is generally even,
and barren almost to desolation, the soil consisting of sand and rock,
producing only a small scrub. The Egyptian intrenchments were laid out
along the crests of these hills, the lines running north and south,
starting from the railway and canal (see plan), and running in a
northerly direction for over two miles beyond the intersection, making a
total frontage to the eastward of nearly four miles. The plan included a
dry ditch from eight to twelve feet wide, and from five to nine feet
deep, in front of a breastwork from four to six feet high with a
"banquette" in rear. The trace was broken by occasional salients, where
were placed well-designed redoubts, possessing a wide command on either
flank.
In the rear were frequent shelter trenches. Passages through the parapet
were provided for field-pieces and vehicles in various places, and were
guarded by traverses and breastworks. The revetment differed mainly in
the care which had been bestowed upon it, and consisted mostly of reeds,
grass, &c. The interior slopes were the only ones thus treated.
The southern portion of the defences was practically completed at the
time of the battle. Here the revetment was neatly finished. Work was in
progress on the northern and western lines, their extremities being
scarcely more than laid out. The extent of these defensive works, which
was enormous in comparison with the number of troops at Arabi's
disposal, would seem to imply an inordinate reliance upon mere ditches
and breastworks to keep out an enemy however vigorous. It led as a
necessary consequence to the excessive spreading out of the defenders,
and the fatal weakening of the force which could be gathered at any
given point. Had the same amount of labour been expended in several
concentric lines, it would have resulted in a position of great
strength, permitting the retiring, if necessary, from one line to the
next, and an almost indefinite prolongation of the fight.
The batteries were along the front, and were thus distributed. At the
southern end of the line there were two well-built redoubts, mounting
each three guns, on either bank of the Canal. Connecting the two, and
stopping the flow of water in the Fresh Water Canal, was a stout dam. On
each side of the railway was one gun, in a small earthwork.
In front of the lines running north and south, and distant about 1,100
yards, was a formidable outwork standing on rising ground. This was a
polygonal redoubt, and mounted six guns. In the rear of this redoubt and
on the lines was a 4-gun battery, behind which was a look-out and
telegraph station, the wire running back to Arabi's head-quarters near
the railway station, and in the midst of a large camp. The diminished
size of the ditch from this point northwards is very noticeable. The
attack was evidently hoped for at and near the railway.
Following the lines in a northerly direction, the next battery was at
the intersection of the two lines of intrenchments. This was the most
elaborately finished of all the redoubts, and mounted five guns. Still
further in the same direction was another formidable battery of five
guns.[58] Beyond this there were two other incomplete redoubts, further
still to the northward, but this part of the line was hardly begun.
As regards the east and west line, intersecting the lines running north
and south, its object was to afford a defence in the event of the enemy
succeeding in breaking through those lines at the northern end, their
weakest part.[59]
To the eastward of the lines and in the direction of Kassassin was a
tolerably level desert with smooth sand and pebble.
The information, received from spies and prisoners, was to the effect
that the enemy's force at Tel-el-Kebir consisted of from 60 to 70 guns,
twenty-four battalions of infantry (18,000 men), and three regiments of
cavalry, together with about 6,000 Bedouins, besides a force of 5,000
men with 24 guns at Salahieh,[60] all under the immediate command of
Arabi himself.
The general character of the ground lying between the two armies was
that of gently undulating, pebbly slopes, rising gradually to an open
plateau from ninety to a hundred feet above the valley through which the
railway and canal ran. To have marched over this plateau upon the
enemy's position by daylight, the British troops would have had to
advance over a glacis-like slope, absolutely without cover, in full view
of the enemy, and under the fire of his artillery, for about five miles.
Such an operation would have entailed heavy loss from an enemy with men
and guns protected by intrenchments from any artillery fire which the
attacking force could have brought to bear upon them. To have turned the
Egyptian position, either by the right or left, was an operation which
would have entailed a wide turning movement, and, therefore, a long,
difficult and fatiguing march, and moreover would not have accomplished
the object Wolseley had in view, namely, that of grappling with the
enemy at such close quarters that he would be unable to shake himself
free, except by a general fight of all his army. The object was to make
the battle a final one, whereas a wide turning movement would probably
only have forced Arabi to retreat upon the cultivated country in his
rear, where, the land being irrigated and cut up in every direction by
deep canals, it would have been difficult for a regular army to follow
him. Influenced by these considerations, and also by the information
that the enemy did not push his outposts far beyond his works at night,
Wolseley determined upon the difficult operation of a night march, to be
followed by an attack on the Egyptian position before daylight.
As soon as it was dark on the evening of the 12th September, the camp at
Kassassin was struck, and all the tents and baggage were stacked
alongside the railway. The camp fires were left burning. The troops then
moved into position near a spot described as "Ninth Hill." There they
formed in order of battle and bivouacked--no fires were allowed, even
smoking was prohibited, and all were ordered to maintain the utmost
silence.[61]
The formation of the troops was as follows:--
On the right, the 1st Division, commanded by Lieutenant-General Willis,
and consisting of two brigades, viz., the 2nd, under Major-General
Graham, in front, and the 1st, or Guards Brigade, under the Duke of
Connaught, in the rear; on the left, the 2nd Division, commanded by
Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Hamley, and consisting of two brigades,
viz., the 3rd, or Highland Brigade, under Major-General Sir Archibald
Alison, in front, and the 4th, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ashburnham, in
the rear. Between the two Divisions was placed the Artillery Brigade
under Brigadier-General Goodenough. On the extreme right was the Cavalry
Division under Major-General Drury-Lowe, and on the extreme left, under
Major-General Sir Herbert Macpherson, were the Indian Contingent and the
Naval Brigade.
At 1.30 on the morning of the 13th, the order was given for the advance
of the 1st and 2nd Divisions simultaneously, and the celebrated march on
Tel-el-Kebir began. The Indian Contingent and the Naval Brigade did not
move until an hour later, to avoid giving the alarm to the enemy, by the
passing of the force through the numerous villages in the cultivated
land south of the Canal.
The night was dark, and it was very difficult to maintain the desired
formation. More than once the advancing lines, guided only by the light
of the stars, formed somewhat of a crescent shape, and there was danger
of the advancing force mistaking their comrades for parties of the
enemy. Several halts had to be made, as well for the purpose of resting
the men as for that of correcting the formation. The final halt was made
at 3 a.m., and lasted nearly an hour. Daybreak was the time fixed for
the arrival at the enemy's lines, and it would have been as undesirable
to have reached them too early as too late.
There were practically three separate but nearly simultaneous infantry
attacks, by the 1st Division under General Willis; by the 2nd Division
under General Hamley, and away on the extreme left, south of the Canal,
by the Indian Contingent, under General Macpherson. In point of time,
General Hamley's was somewhat earlier than the others, and General
Macpherson's the last of the three.
The action began at early dawn. Willis's leading brigade,[62] commanded
by General Graham, was about 900 yards from the intrenchments. Partly
owing to the difficulty of keeping a proper alignment during the night
march, partly to the fact that the line of march was oblique to the line
of the earthworks, and partly to the confusion created by an Egyptian
scout who galloped into the lines, Willis was obliged to form again
under fire, changing front forward on the left company, before
assaulting. Adopting the regular attack formation at 300 yards
distance, his men fired a volley, after which they rushed up to 150
yards distance, fired a second volley, and then reached the ditch.[63]
Here the fighting line was joined by the supports (the 1st Battalion of
the Grenadiers, the Scots and Coldstreams), a last volley delivered, the
ditch jumped, and amid the cheers of the soldiers the works cleared at
the point of the bayonet.
As soon as the brigade reached the parapet, the Egyptians broke and ran,
some stopping occasionally to fire back on their pursuers, who chased
them until the artillery had got inside the works and had begun shelling
the fugitives.
This brigade struck the trenches not 100 yards from the point aimed at.
It was longer exposed to the Egyptian fire than were the Highlanders,
whose attack had begun a few minutes before and had fully aroused the
whole line of the defence, which had been sleeping on their arms behind
the parapets.
To the Highland Brigade,[64] under General Alison, fell the task of
carrying the lines to the left. The first shots were fired at them at
4.55 a.m. from an Egyptian picket posted about 150 yards in front of the
intrenchments, then visible 300 yards distant from the Highlanders.
Immediately afterwards the enemy opened with artillery and then with
musketry. Without returning this fire, the brigade advanced steadily for
about 100 yards further, when the fire became a perfect blaze. At 150
yards bayonets were ordered to be fixed, and the bugle sounded the
advance, when with a yell the Scotchmen charged in the dim light through
the smoke, carrying the lines in splendid style in the face of
determined opposition. So stoutly was the position defended that in many
places the assailants, after mounting the parapets, were forced back
into the trenches below, only, however, to return and renew the assault.
The left battalion, composed of the Highland Light Infantry, struck the
battery already described as situated at the intersection of the two
lines of intrenchments. This redoubt had a high scarp, which held the
centre companies for some moments till the flank companies got round it
and took it. The enemy did not run far, but halted about 60 yards in
the rear of the works and delivered a heavy cross fire. The rest of the
brigade pushed steadily on, driving the enemy before it and capturing
three batteries of field guns. The advance was continued, and Arabi's
head-quarters and the Canal bridge were seized at 6.45 a.m. The Highland
Light Infantry, which had suffered severely, soon after joined the rest
of the brigade. The gallant Highlanders' attack was made entirely with
the bayonet, not a shot being fired until the men were within the
enemy's lines.
In the centre, between the two infantry attacks, marched the seven
batteries of artillery, under General Goodenough--and after the capture
of the enemy's works did good service and inflicted considerable loss
upon the enemy, in some instances firing canister at short ranges.
On the extreme left the Indian Contingent[65] and the Naval Brigade,
under General Macpherson, advanced steadily and in silence, the Seaforth
Highlanders leading, until an advanced battery of the enemy was reached.
From this the Egyptian artillery had opened fire down the line of the
Canal, although it was still too dark for them to see the approaching
troops clearly, whilst the infantry lost no time in opening a heavy
fusillade. The Highlanders deployed for attack, and then gallantly
stormed the battery with a rush at the point of the bayonet. The
Egyptians retreated upon some villages close by, where they were pursued
by a squadron of the Bengal Cavalry across the cultivated ground.[66]
The Indian Contingent scarcely lost a man--a happy circumstance, due to
the excellent arrangements made by General Macpherson, and to the fact
that, starting one hour later than the 1st and 2nd Divisions, the
resistance of the enemy was so shaken by the earlier attacks north of
the Canal, that they soon gave way before the impetuous onslaught of the
Seaforth Highlanders.
On the extreme right the Cavalry Division,[67] under General
Drury-Lowe, was designedly late in arriving, being fully two miles
distant when the first shot was fired at the Highlanders. Hearing the
sound, the division quickened its pace, reaching the intrenchments in
time to permit its two horse batteries to take in reverse and enfilade
the lines north of General Graham's assault, while the cavalry took up
the pursuit of the runaways, most of whom threw away their arms, and,
begging for mercy, were left unmolested. To have made them prisoners
would have taken up too much time, the cavalry being required for the
more important work of pushing on to Cairo. The whole Division, Cavalry
and Horse Artillery, united shortly after near the bridge over the
Canal, prior to advancing towards the capital.
The British losses in the engagement were:--
Total--Nine officers and 48 non-commissioned officers and men killed, 27
officers and 353 non-commissioned officers and men wounded, 22
non-commissioned officers and men missing. Grand total of casualties,
all ranks, 459.
The officers killed were as follows:--
2nd Battalion Connaught Rangers (attached to 2nd Battalion Royal Irish
Regiment)--Captain C. N. Jones. Royal Marine Light Infantry--Major H. H.
Strong, Captain C. J. Wardell. 1st Battalion Royal Highlanders--
Lieutenant Graham Stirling, Lieutenant J. G. McNeill. 1st Battalion
Gordon Highlanders--Lieutenant H. G. Brooks. 2nd Battalion Highland
Light Infantry--Major Colville, Lieutenant D. S. Kays, Lieutenant L.
Somervelle.
Such is the general outline of the battle of Tel-el-Kebir.
The Egyptians had been sleeping in their trenches when the attack was
made, and although in one sense surprised, were nevertheless quite
ready.[68]
Probably they never expected a night attack.[69] At the same time there
is no doubt that they knew the British army was in their immediate
vicinity and might come on at any moment, and took precautions
accordingly.
The best proof of this is the blaze of fire with which both the 2nd
Brigade and the Highland Brigade were received. Prisoners taken
afterwards stated that the striking of the tents at sunset was observed,
and that pickets were on the watch ever since. Anyhow, the English
forces, before they closed with the enemy, were subjected to a perfect
hail of bullets.
Sir Edward Hamley, relating the attack of the 2nd Division, writes as
follows:--
"Yet a minute or two elapsed after the Egyptian bugle was blown,
and then the whole extent of intrenchment in our front, hitherto
unseen and unknown, poured forth a stream of rifle-fire.
"The Egyptian infantry," writes one witness, "clustered thickly
in the parapets of the redoubts, and fired down the slopes into
the trenches. Hundreds of them, lying down, plied the heads of
the advancing brigades with fire."
A curious circumstance occurred with regard to the polygonal redoubt
already described as standing 1,100 yards in advance of the lines. This
was missed by the attacking forces, who must have passed within 200
yards of the work. It is partly accounted for, however, by the
prevailing darkness, and partly by the fact that the gunners in the
redoubt, either asleep or unprepared, let the Highland Brigade march
past them to the lines without firing a shot. It was only when day broke
that the Egyptian artillerymen called attention to the existence of the
redoubt by aiming their guns and firing at the spot where Sir Garnet
Wolseley and his staff were assembled. This was too much, and the
British artillery had to be sent for. After being under case and
shrapnel fire for a short time, what was left of the garrison threw down
arms and formed a stream of fugitives who, with ghastly wounds, poured
out from the redoubt, and scattered over the country.[70]
The missing of this redoubt was one of the lucky incidents of the fight.
Had the advancing column been aware of its existence they must have
paused to take it before storming the lines. In attacking the redoubt
the position of the advancing force would have been at once revealed to
the enemy, and the fire which was reserved for some minutes later would
have at once opened.
The Egyptian guns were 8-centimetre and 6-centimetre Krupp steel B.L.R.
of the old pattern (1868), mounted on field-carriages. The small-arms
were all Remington breechloaders. The supply of ammunition was
practically inexhaustible. At intervals of every three or four yards
were found open boxes, each containing 1,050 cartridges.
The trenches, after the battle, were found to be filled with dead,
mostly bayoneted, and the ground in rear as far as the railway station
was dotted with the bodies of those shot down in retreat. The British
cavalry, sweeping around the northern end of the intrenchments, cut down
the fugitives by scores, until it became evident that the rout was
complete. Most of the bodies were observed to be lying on their backs,
as if the men had stopped to have a parting shot at their pursuers.
The Egyptian loss in killed was not far from 2,000. There was no return
of their wounded, the army organization having disappeared; but 534 were
treated at Tel-el-Kebir, during the four days succeeding the battle,
twenty-seven capital operations being performed. Of the wounded, 202
were soon able to go to their homes, whilst the remainder were sent to
Cairo in charge of Egyptian surgeons. The British medical authorities
did all in their power to alleviate the sufferings of these poor
creatures, and furnished tins of meat, bottles of brandy, and skins of
water to those being conveyed away in the railway trucks. The greater
number, who were slightly wounded, managed to get to the neighbouring
villages, and therefore are not counted in the figures above given.[71]
It is stated--and the statement appears credible--that very few superior
officers were killed or wounded; and Arabi and his second in command
were undoubtedly the first to escape. Arabi himself mounted his horse
and rode rapidly towards Belbeis. There appears to be no doubt that
proper leaders, in every sense of the word, were wanting in the Egyptian
army. It has been both humorously and truthfully remarked that each
officer knew that _he_ would run, but hoped his _neighbour_ would stay.
The Egyptian soldiers, on the other hand, displayed real courage, as the
struggles in the trenches and their heavy loss in killed abundantly
prove. The black regiments, composed of negroes from the Soudan, were
especially noticeable for their pluck, fighting bravely hand to hand
with their assailants. It has been well observed that more intelligence
and less downright cowardice on the part of their officers might have
converted these men into a formidable army.
In the previous encounters between the English and the Egyptians, the
artillery and cavalry had borne the brunt of the fighting, and had
carried off the honours, but the battle of Tel-el-Kebir was almost
entirely an infantry action. The tactics employed, a direct assault
without flank movements of any kind, were of the simplest description.
The object, to get to close quarters with the enemy, and to crush him,
was accomplished.
After the attack, Arabi's army ceased to exist. In scattered groups it
might be found all over Egypt, but as an organization it may be said to
have been annihilated.
In view of the complete success of Sir Garnet Wolseley's tactics,
comment is superfluous. It has been said by competent critics that the
mode of attack adopted was rash to the degree of imprudence; that no
commander would dare to employ such tactics against a European foe, and
that a night march of nine miles could only be followed by an immediate
and successful assault under circumstances so exceptional as to be
providential. He has been blamed for having left his camp with his
forces so early in the evening on the 12th, and having halted half-way
from Tel-el-Kebir, and then only after midnight having set out again, a
manoeuvre which might have endangered the whole result of the
movement, and which, perhaps, may account for the surprise of the
enemy's position not being so successful as it might have been.
Again, it has been said that besides a front attack, there should also
have been a flank one, in conformity with ordinary military tactics.
In reply to these and other criticisms, it may be sufficient to observe
that the English Commander-in-Chief formed a just appreciation of his
enemy, had a strong conviction as to the proper manner of engaging him,
and had unbounded confidence in the officers and men under his own
command. What Sir Garnet Wolseley would have done had the enemy been of
a different character is another question, the consideration of which
does not come within the scope of the present work. The means adopted
were exactly adjusted to the end to be attained, and the justification
(if any were needed) for the risks run lies in the success which
attended them.
CHAPTER XXIII.
CAPTURE OF CAIRO AND COLLAPSE OF THE REBELLION.
When the Egyptian regiments, mingled together in one wild and disorderly
mass, once commenced their retreat, no chance of rallying was for a
moment given them. The cannon in the redoubts were turned against their
former occupants, and the guns of the Royal Horse Artillery rained
shrapnel shell on the fugitives. The cavalry, sweeping round from the
north and charging in amongst them, completed the rout. The Egyptians
threw down their arms and scattered themselves across the country. Arabi
himself, with a few of his chief officers, caught the train at Belbeis
and got to Cairo the same day, where it is said he began preparations
for the destruction of the city.[72]
No time was lost in reaping the fruits of the morning's work. Advances
were at once ordered in two directions, the one along the railway to the
important railway centre of Zag-a-zig, whence a double line of railway
proceeds to Cairo _viâ_ Benha, and a single line _viâ_ Belbeis; the
other road was along the Ismailieh, or Sweet Water Canal, to Cairo.
The enemy were pursued to Zag-a-zig by the Indian Contingent, the
leading detachment of which reached that place a little after 4 p.m.,
and by the Cavalry Division to Belbeis, which was occupied in the
evening.
The seizure of Zag-a-zig was effected in the dashing manner peculiar to
all the incidents of the day, and shows what may be done by a few bold
men. The squadron of the 6th Bengal Cavalry left with the Indian
Contingent led the way, and when within about five miles of the town
broke into a gallop. The horses being somewhat fatigued by the hard work
of the preceding twenty hours, were not in a condition to keep together,
and, as a consequence, the best got to the front and the others dropped
to the rear. The advanced part of the squadron was composed of Major R.
M. Jennings, Lieutenant Burn-Murdoch, R.E., and not above half-a-dozen
troopers. These pushed right into the railway station, where were five
trains filled with soldiers, and seven locomotives. At the sight of this
handful of men, the engine-drivers either surrendered or ran away,
except one, who began opening the throttle valve of his engine and was
shot by Lieutenant Burn-Murdoch, while the Egyptian soldiers, hundreds
in number, and too demoralized to think of resistance, threw away their
arms, left the cars, and ran off as rapidly as possible.
By nine p.m. the entire force under General Macpherson had reached
Zag-a-zig, not a man having fallen out by the way.
The Cavalry Division was ordered to push on with all possible speed to
Cairo, Wolseley being most anxious to save the city from the fate which
befell Alexandria. The division, making an early start from Belbeis on
the 14th, and striking across the intervening desert, reached Cairo at
4.45 p.m.
The sun was setting as the cavalry arrived at the suburb of Abbassieh.
The men had been in the saddle since daybreak, at which time they had
left Belbeis. The men and horses were thoroughly exhausted after their
long march under a blazing sun. But suffering from hunger, parched with
thirst, and covered with dust as they were, they yet remained equal to
the fulfilment of their task.[73]
The garrison of Cairo was divided into two parts; one from 6,000 to
7,000 strong at Abbassieh; the other, of from 3,000 to 4,000 men, at the
Citadel of Mehemet Ali, situated on a lofty eminence in the city, and
strongly fortified. The former, on being summoned by Colonel Stewart,
attached to General Drury-Lowe's force, to surrender unconditionally, at
once complied. Captain Watson, R.E., was immediately sent on with two
squadrons of the 4th Dragoon Guards, and a detachment of the Mounted
Infantry, to demand a surrender of the Citadel. No guides were
available, but two Egyptian officers, taken prisoners at Abbassieh,
were made to show the way, orderlies being told off to shoot them at
once in case of treachery. The route taken was round by the Tombs of the
Khalifs, outside the walls of Cairo. The city was entered, without
opposition, by the gate at the foot of the hill on which the Citadel
stands; by this means only a few hundred yards of the native quarter had
to be traversed.
It was now dark, such of the inhabitants as were met were perfectly
tranquil, and only looked with curiosity at Captain Watson's party.
Arrived at the entrance to the Citadel, the Egyptian officer in command
was sent for, and he at once agreed to give up possession of the place.
The small British force marched in and took up position in fours between
the outer and inner gates. The Egyptian infantry, nearly 4,000 in
number, with their arms, paraded by regiments in front of the great
Mosque of Mehemet Ali, inside the inner gate. They were then ordered to
lay down their arms and march down to the Kasr-el-Nil Barracks. This
they proceeded to do quite quietly, and as they marched out they passed
within a few yards of the English force, whose numbers were concealed by
the darkness.
As soon as the Egyptian troops had all left the Citadel, the various
gates were handed over to Captain Watson's force. The gates were then
closed and guards posted. It was now ten o'clock. The troopers were
literally dead-beat. But there yet remained the task of taking
possession of the fort on the Mokattam Hill, which was occupied by
Egyptian troops, and which commanded the Citadel. Watson, anxious to
save his men as much as possible, sent one of the Egyptian officers who
had acted as a guide, and told him to order the garrison to march down
towards Kasr-el-Nil Barracks, and there pile their arms. The officer
returned in a couple of hours with the keys of the fort, and informed
Watson that his orders had been carried out.
In the dungeons of the Citadel many unfortunate wretches were found in
confinement. Some of them were convicts, but several were political
prisoners. They cried out in piteous terms to be set free. Some actually
managed to break loose, and fled with their chains clanking round their
ankles. They were, however, retaken, and assured that as soon as it was
light their cases should be inquired into, and such as were not convicts
should be set free. A sentry was posted over the gate, with orders to
shoot any one attempting to escape. One man did make the attempt, and
was shot.
It only remains to refer to the combination of courage, energy, and tact
displayed by Captain Watson in thus, with a handful of men, taking
possession of the strongest fortified work in Cairo, held by a force
more than a hundred times that of his own. It should be added that the
Egyptian officer who gave up the keys of the Mokattam Fort subsequently
put in a claim for the war medal!
The Citadel being secured, the next step was to send a message to Arabi
Pasha, through the Prefect of Police of the city, calling upon him to
surrender, which he did unconditionally, accompanied by Toulba Pasha.
The vigour shown by General Drury-Lowe in his march on Cairo, and the
inestimable results of that movement, together make it one of the most
brilliant achievements of the whole campaign.
By the successful attack on Tel-el-Kebir, Sir Garnet Wolseley, at one
blow, crushed the armed rebellion against the authority of the Khedive.
By General Drury-Lowe's successful march, the most beautiful of Oriental
cities was saved from destruction, and its European inhabitants from
massacre.
So well had Sir Garnet Wolseley matured his plans before entering on the
campaign, that he had predicted his arrival in Cairo on the 16th
September. As a fact, he arrived a day earlier, that is to say, on the
morning of the 15th, when the railway brought him and the Guards to
Cairo at the same time.
Arabis' account of Tel-el-Kebir and the subsequent events is as
follows:--
"Before our trenches, &c., were completed, the British forces
attacked us suddenly at sunrise, the firing lasting for some
time, when suddenly in our rear appeared a division of cavalry
and artillery, which caused the flight of the Egyptian troops on
Wednesday, the 13th September.
"After the flight of the troops I left for Belbeis, the English
artillery following close behind me. When I arrived there I met
Ali Pasha El Roby, with whom I went to Insbuz, and thence by
train to Cairo.
"In Cairo we found a Council at the Ministry of War, all the
Princes being present. After a long discussion, all being
confident that England had no intention of annexing Egypt, it
was decided to offer no more resistance, more especially as
England was renowned for dealing always towards others with
equity and humanity; and we were confident that if the
necessary inquiries were instituted, and the feeling of the
people generally understood, England would do her utmost to put
a stop to all injustice and give back freedom to them.
"For this purpose I sent a telegram on the 14th September to
the Commander of the Abbassieh troops, ordering him to hoist a
flag of truce, and to proceed and meet the commander of the
British troops, informing him at the same time that the war was
altogether at an end, it being understood that the intention of
the British Government was to preserve the country from
ruin.[74]
"The English troops arrived in Cairo at sunset, and were met by
Riza Pasha and Ibrahim Bey Fawzi, the Prefect of Police. At
1.30 a.m. Ibrahim Bey Fawzi came and informed me that General
Lowe desired to have an interview with me at Abbassieh. The
same day the officer in charge at Kafr Dowar (Toulba Pasha)
came up to Cairo and was summoned with myself to this
interview. We thereupon went to General Lowe. When Toulba Pasha
met General Lowe he asked us whether we were willing to give
ourselves up as prisoners to the English Government. We
thereupon took off our swords and delivered them to General
Lowe, who was acting on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief,
telling him at the same time that we only gave ourselves up to
the English Government because we were confident England would
deal with us justly, and for the safety and peace of our
country we had abandoned all idea of resistance, and had
surrendered ourselves, being confident that England had no wish
to annex the country. The General agreed with this statement,
and we remained with him three days, and then were sent to
Abdin, and were treated kindly and well."
In the following telegram to Abdel-el-Al, in command at Damietta, the
defeat at Tel-el-Kebir was thus described by Yacoub Pasha, the Under
Secretary of State for War, who had been with Arabi in the insurgent
camp:--
"At half-past ten (Turkish time) the enemy attacked the line of
intrenchments, and firing commenced on both sides. We caused a
large number of the enemy to perish beside the intrenchments. I
found a train about to leave Tel-el-Kebir, and got in with a few
wounded. I know nothing after that, except that on leaving
Tel-el-Kebir I saw that a train had been smashed."
The manner in which the news of the fight reached the agricultural
population may be gathered from the following extract from the work of
one of the native historians of the British occupation of Egypt:--
"The peasants were relating to each other one morning the news
of a great victory by which the land forces of the invading
foreigner had received a blow, when suddenly a peasant rode into
the village on a cavalry horse, without his coat, belt, or arms,
and announced that the English were coming! He related how he
had been in the camp of Tel-el-Kebir, how he and his comrades
had been aroused before daybreak by a dreadful fire of musketry
and artillery, and how, before they had time to prepare
themselves for defence, the nimble foreigners came scampering
over the intrenchments and right into the very heart of the
camp. Satan must have aided them, for there was no possibility
of resistance, and even Arabi fled! By this time, he thought,
the English must be in Cairo, for they were nimble, cunning dogs
and sons of dogs, and nobody could resist them."
The submission of the Egyptian army in Cairo was speedily followed by
surrenders in other places--Kafr Dowar, Aboukir, and Rosetta yielded
without a struggle. Fort Ghemil, near Port Saïd, was occupied on the
21st September by the British.
Damietta was the last to hold out. A British force, consisting of the
Berkshire, Shropshire, South Staffordshire, and Sussex Regiments, under
Sir Evelyn Wood, was despatched against it on the 22nd September, after
negotiations with the Commandant Abdel-el-Al had failed. A portion of
the fleet under Admiral Dowell was ordered to co-operate. However, on
the 23rd, Abdel-el-Al, hearing of these preparations, capitulated with
all his forces.
The surrender of the Egyptian army at Kafr Dowar was an event of
importance. But to render what follows intelligible, as well as for the
sake of completeness, it is necessary to preface the history of that
event with an account of occurrences at Alexandria subsequent to the
departure of Sir Garnet Wolseley for the Canal.
On the 21st August, the Khedive relieved Ragheb Pasha and his colleagues
of their duties, and named Cherif Pasha President of the Council of
Ministers. With him was associated Riaz Pasha, who had in the meantime
returned from Europe.
After the departure of Wolseley for Port Saïd and Ismailia, General
Hamley took the local command, and the fresh transports constantly
arriving at Alexandria were very welcome to reinforce the garrison,
which had been considerably weakened by the departure of the main body
of the army. Only two ships of war were left in harbour, the
_Invincible_ and _Inconstant_, which latter vessel had lately arrived
from England.
The military operations dwindled into insignificance. Both sides
confined themselves to strengthening their positions and to making small
reconnaissances. Round Mex the Bedouins kept the troops well on the
alert, and several minor skirmishes took place. About August 20th, the
defences of Ramleh were strengthened by the mounting of three additional
guns. Two were taken from the Hospital battery at Ras-el-Tin, and the
third was found unmounted near Mex Fort.
On the 31st of August a party of bluejackets from the _Minotaur_ landed
at night and demolished, by gun-cotton, a house near the British
advanced posts on the Mahmoudieh Canal, which afforded cover to the
enemy. Some native houses opposite the Villa Antoniades, which had been
used by the Bedouins as a place whence to take shots at our posts there,
had for the same reason to be destroyed.
On the 1st September, Generals Hamley and Alison and the Highland
Brigade sailed for Port Saïd and Ismailia, General Sir Evelyn Wood being
left in command.
Anxious to make the rebel leader believe that the chief attack would be
on Kafr Dowar, and to prevent him from sending away his troops to
strengthen other positions, the British troops contrived daily to harass
the Egyptian lines. Generally the reconnaissances took place at dusk, as
the Egyptians seemed to prefer withdrawing their troops under the cover
of the darkness. Grown wary by experience, they refused to be drawn out
in force, but limited themselves to a brisk artillery fire.
It was at this time that an attempt was made to cut the dyke at Mex, in
order to flood Lake Mareotis, the level of which at this season was some
feet lower than that of the sea. Although it was reckoned that it would
take some weeks in this way to raise the water of the lake to its proper
level, the stratagem was not devoid of merit. One of its objects was to
enable steam launches with guns to harass the flank of the enemy's
position at Kafr Dowar.
Early in September, Mahmoud Fehmi, already referred to as having been
made prisoner by Sir Garnet Wolseley's force, was brought to Alexandria,
and, in return for a promise to spare his life, furnished full details
of Arabi's plans and position.
On the 13th September, Alexandria received the news of the victory of
Tel-el-Kebir with the wildest delight. Early in the morning it was known
that the fight had begun, and great excitement was manifested by all
classes. About eleven in the forenoon, when the facts were published,
this feeling increased perceptibly. All business was suspended.
Processions of Europeans were formed, and, preceded by bands of music,
paraded amid the ruins of the town. Hats and helmets were thrown into
the air, and cheers and cries of "Viva Inghilterra!" resounded on all
sides. The bands played "God Save the Queen" and the Khedivial Hymn by
turns. Crowds rushed for the English soldiers on guard at the Tribunals,
and embraced them frantically. Sir Edward Malet, the English
Consul-General, called to congratulate the Khedive, who also received a
congratulatory message from the Queen. Never before had the English been
so popular in Alexandria. It took some days before the excitement cooled
down and things resumed their ordinary course.
Kafr Dowar was given up to Sir Evelyn Wood on the 16th September. Yacoub
Sami, Arabi's sub-Minister of War, represented him on this occasion.
Some 6,000 men in all laid down their arms. There were 700 captured
horses, 50 field-guns with their equipments, and 15,000 Remington
rifles. The captured men were allowed to disband, and the officers were
lodged as prisoners in the Palace at Ramleh.
General Wood and his staff went out by rail, preceded, as a measure of
precaution, by the armour-clad train. The 49th Regiment had been
previously sent forward as an escort. Arrived at the bridge crossing the
Mahmoudieh Canal, the party proceeded on horseback to Fort Aslam, as the
most advanced of the earthworks of Kafr Dowar was called. This formed a
part of three long lines of redoubts, flanked on both sides by swampy
and impassable ground, and running at right angles across the railway
and Canal. These defences were supplemented by shelter-trenches and
rifle-pits. The position was one of great strength, and if held by good
soldiers could only have been taken, if at all, at a great sacrifice of
life. Each line of redoubts had a ditch of 15 feet in width in front of
it. The distance between the first and second lines was 4,000 metres,
and between the second and third 5,000 metres. Fort Aslam was the
strongest of the redoubts, and was pierced with embrasures for guns. The
passage for the railway trains was blocked by a large mass of masonry,
which Sir Evelyn Wood at once caused to be blown up with dynamite. Fort
Aslam was capable of being easily defended by 250 good soldiers. The
garrison, however, had disappeared, leaving only a dozen or so of
officers, including Yacoub Sami, who came forward to meet the English
Commander. In the fort, which appeared to have suffered but slightly,
were found 150 horses, besides quantities of arms and ammunition
abandoned by the soldiers. Amongst the cannon were some mounted Krupp
guns. Between the first and second lines the remains of one camp for
about 2,500 men were found, and between the second and third lines, of
another camp for the rest of the army. On all sides were found horses
and mules, mixed pell-mell with carriages, still loaded with silks,
clothes, calico, &c., from the shops and houses pillaged in Alexandria.
The third line of defence, that situated at Kinje Osman, the nearest
point to Kafr Dowar, was inferior to other parts of the defence, being
provided only with two insignificant bastions, armed with old cannons
and a long line of rifle-pits extending across the railway. Behind it,
in the camp of Kafr Dowar, stood 6,000 soldiers, armed with Remington
rifles, waiting to surrender to the British army. There were also
several batteries of artillery and two squadrons of cavalry. The men
were anything but warlike in appearance. Many of them had already thrown
away their uniforms, and the greater part wore only the dress of the
ordinary fellah.
The natives met with along the line showed not the slightest sign of
hostility. On the contrary, they tried to conceal their evident
uneasiness at the sight of the British force by assuming a pleased air,
and waving white rags as a substitute for flags of truce. At Kafr Dowar
itself, crowds of Arabs, mostly refugees from Alexandria, were
congregated. Many of these were pillagers and incendiaries of the worst
class, and strict orders had to be given to prevent their returning to
the scene of their former exploits.
Yacoub Sami, on giving up his sword to General Wood, assured him that no
one had been throughout more loyal to the Khedive than he, Yacoub Sami,
had been; and as for Arabi, he was simply a scoundrel and a monster who
had refused to listen to Yacoub's loyal counsels.
One of the first questions put by General Wood was as to what had become
of a Lieutenant named Paolucci, who had deserted some weeks before from
the Italian ironclad _Castelfidardo_ to join Arabi. This officer, in his
endeavour to reach the rebels' lines, had the misfortune to fall into
the hands of Bedouins, who used him in the most brutal manner.
Eventually, after five days' wandering, he succeeded in finding his way
to the camp at Kafr Dowar, but in a pitiable condition. He was destitute
of every rag of clothing, and so exhausted as to be barely able to stand
on his legs. Arabi, on hearing him say that his wish was to serve the
cause of liberty, allowed him to be removed to the camp ambulance, where
he remained till the surrender. In reply to General Wood, M. Paolucci
himself was produced. He was now dressed in an Egyptian officer's
uniform much too large for him, and was still suffering acutely. The
General, without making any observation, handed M. Paolucci over to two
marines, with instructions to conduct him to the Italian Consul at
Alexandria.[75] M. Ninet, who had been in the enemy's lines ever since
the bombardment and subsequent destruction of Alexandria, had, it was
ascertained, left for Cairo on receipt of the news of the taking of
Tel-el-Kebir.
General Wood at once gave orders for clearing the railway. Civilians
were requisitioned for the work, and so well was this carried out that
the following day, which was fixed for the surrender of the arms, the
trains were running freely between Kafr Dowar and Alexandria.
Two British battalions were despatched on the 17th, to encamp at Kafr
Dowar, and to take delivery of the Egyptian arms. The army which was to
surrender had then practically disappeared. The rifles were piled, the
officers were in charge, but their men, they said, "had gone off to the
fields."[76]
General Wood received the same day the submission of about 1,000 men
from Aboukir and 4,000 from Mex. On the 17th, the Khedive signed a
Decree disbanding the Egyptian army.
One of the most remarkable features of the campaign was the rapidity
with which it was conducted. From the firing of the first gun at the
bombardment on the 11th July until the occupation of Cairo, but
sixty-six days elapsed, the campaign proper occupying only twenty-five
in all. It served also to illustrate the power of moving large bodies of
troops by sea with a rapidity and certainty of concentration impossible
on land.
The difference between the power of steam and sails in connection with
military operations may be seen from the following examples:--
On the 19th May, 1798, Napoleon sailed for Egypt from Toulon with
favouring winds; nevertheless, it was not until the 10th June (according
to some reports the 15th) that he reached even his first port of call,
Malta, thus occupying no less than twenty-three days on this short
voyage, and it was not till the 1st July that he arrived off Alexandria.
In 1800, when Indian troops were despatched to assist in expelling the
French from Egypt, the first detachment sailed from Bombay on the 28th
December, but did not get to Suez till the end of April, 1801, and the
remainder, following some days later, only arrived at Kosseir, on the
Red Sea, _en route_ to Keneh, on the Nile, on the 8th June, nearly six
months later. As a contrast to the above, the head of the column of
British transports left England on the 30th July, 1882, and arrived at
Alexandria on the 10th August, thus completing the voyage in only eleven
days.
Much has been made of the rapidity of the French invasion of Egypt, but,
after all, Napoleon only entered Cairo on the 23rd July, that is,
sixty-five days after leaving France, whereas Wolseley left England on
the 2nd August, made the long sea-voyage by way of Gibraltar, and
arrived in Cairo forty-five days after, viz., on the 15th September.
With regard to Tel-el-Kebir, the shortness of the time occupied in
storming the intrenchments has been made use of, more especially by
foreign critics, to lessen the credit of the victory. Without pretending
that the battle was more than, comparatively speaking, a small affair,
exceedingly well-managed, the number of casualties relatively to the
number of the attacking force shows that there was a real resistance,
and that the fighting on both sides was more serious than is generally
supposed.
The news of the victory of Tel-el-Kebir, the capture of Cairo, and the
close of the war, produced a profound sensation in Europe. In England
the greatest enthusiasm was manifested, and to the events of the
campaign was given an importance perhaps in excess of their actual
merits.[77]
On the Continent, however, the opposite was the case. The very journals
which only a week before had declared that, in undertaking to subdue
Arabi, England had assumed a task the difficulties of which she had
scarcely calculated, now went to the other extreme, and described
Tel-el-Kebir as a mere military promenade. In the "Débats," M. Gabriel
Channes wrote that the fears that an Egyptian campaign would prove
hazardous were groundless. The only difficulties which the English army
had to encounter were due to the vast amount of baggage it had to
transport, owing to the men carrying nothing but their arms. According
to the same article an army less burdened would have beaten Arabi and
reached Cairo in a few days; and if the campaign had lasted some weeks,
this was only due to the slowness of the attack. The "Avenir Militaire"
maintained that Sir Garnet Wolseley did not shorten the campaign by
transferring his base to Ismailia, and that the qualities of the English
troops were not exposed to a very severe ordeal. "The attack on
Tel-el-Kebir," it added, "against troops ill on the watch, succeeded
with a promptitude which rendered a portion of those qualities useless."
Many of the Continental journals went further, and unable in any other
way to explain the dashing fight which in twenty minutes placed all
Egypt at England's feet, boldly asserted that the victory was bought and
paid for by English gold. They even named the exact sum, viz.,
£E32,000. It was, perhaps, unfortunate that the late Professor
Palmer's ill-fated expedition into the Sinaitic Desert to secure the
neutrality of the Bedouins, at a price of £5,000, should have given an
apparent colour to these reports.[78]
One author,[79] whose writings, however, are not always to be accepted
as accurate, states that Sultan Pasha (already referred to as the
President of the Chamber of Notables) was attached to Wolseley's force
with the object of securing by large bribes the fidelity of the Bedouins
in the district between Ismailia and Zag-a-zig. According to the same
authority, the Bedouins received from £3 to £2 a head, and much of the
money found its way into the pockets of officers of the Egyptian army
from the rank of Lieutenant to that of Colonel.
The events of Tel-el-Kebir are thus referred to by the same writer:--
"On the 12th September, Arabi learned towards twelve o'clock,
from a Bedouin Sheikh, that the English would attack _en masse_
the lines of Tel-el-Kebir towards two o'clock in the morning on
the 13th, throwing themselves on Belbeis to open the road to
Cairo. It was then necessary to guard this point, formerly
fortified by the French. Arabi consequently telegraphed to
Toulba Pasha at Kafr Dowar to send at once one of his best
battalions, the last, or nearly the last, which remained to him,
with orders to be in line of battle at Tel-el-Kebir at daybreak
on the 13th. At one a.m. the train brought this detachment,
which only arrived at Zag-a-zig long after everything was
finished. The battalion then returned on its steps in company
with the fugitives from the battlefield.
"At Tel-el-Kebir, during the night, between two and three a.m.,
at the first rifle shots, the Bedouins, _en masse_, threw
themselves on the Egyptian lines, shouting like demons, and
causing the wildest confusion. The native troops knew not who
was with them or against them. Whole regiments ran like hares
without striking a blow (_sic_), and the English, astonished to
encounter so little resistance, massacred the fugitives as if
at a shooting-party; 3,000 trained men belonging to the
infantry, all that the army of the East possessed, faced the
enemy, and with the last vestiges of the artillery, fired
valiantly as long as they were able. More than half of them
perished.
"It is confidently asserted that several of the Egyptian
officers, hindered in their flight by the gold which they had
in their pockets, seeking to lighten themselves, were arrested
and pillaged by the soldiers of one of the black regiments. As
to the Bedouins, their treason was so well arranged by
agreement with Sultan Pasha, that they, with the speed of the
wind, quitted their cantonments without molestation."
In considering M. Ninet's narrative, it must be remembered that he was,
from first to last, an avowed ally of the Arabist party, and also that
his sentiments towards England had always been of the most unfriendly
character. That, under these circumstances, he should seek to explain
Sir Garnet Wolseley's success by suggesting treachery and corruption is
not altogether unnatural.
It is quite possible that, as regards the corruption of the Bedouins,
Sultan Pasha, as an Egyptian official, may have acted in the manner
described. But that, as suggested by the Continental Press, English gold
was employed by Sir Garnet Wolseley to secure his victory is too
ridiculous for serious consideration. Had it been the desire of the
British Government to purchase Tel-el-Kebir in the manner stated, it is
incredible that by the expenditure of a little additional capital an
entirely bloodless victory should not have been obtained.
Further than this, Arabi himself, in all the explanations which he gave
of the war, never once hinted at the means alleged by his apologists as
having brought about his defeat. The story of the Egyptian officers
being so heavily weighted with gold as to be unable to make good their
retreat reads more like an Oriental fable than anything else.
The conclusion is that gold had as much to do with the taking of
Tel-el-Kebir as the blasts of Joshua's trumpets had to do with bringing
down the walls of Jericho.
CHAPTER XXIV.
ENGLAND AND THE PORTE.
As already stated, on the 18th August Sir Garnet Wolseley started from
Alexandria with the British force, and two days later Port Saïd,
Ismailia, and Kantara were occupied.
Notwithstanding this, the negotiations with the Porte for the despatch
of the Turkish troops were being, outwardly at least, pressed on by Lord
Dufferin. The Turkish Ministers continued to make objections to the
terms of the proposed Military Convention referred to in Chapter XV.
Meanwhile the export of mules, purchased in Asia Minor for the use of
the British force, was stopped, and the drivers were imprisoned. The
unfriendly conduct of the Turkish Government in delaying the removal of
this prohibition led to remonstrances on the part of Lord Dufferin. It
was not until the 23rd August that the Sultan ordered that the mules
and drivers were to be allowed to be embarked.
He, at the same time, sent Lord Dufferin a personal message urging that
Alexandria should be the port of disembarkation for the Turkish troops.
After an interview with the Turkish Ministers, Lord Dufferin agreed to
submit the Sultan's request to the British Government, and the Sultan's
Ministers finally accepted all the other clauses of the Military
Convention, with certain amendments. When, however, the issue of the
Proclamation against Arabi was demanded, the Ministers changed round,
and proposed to throw aside the Proclamation which had been agreed upon,
by which Arabi was declared to be a rebel, and to issue a mere appeal to
his loyalty. Lord Dufferin, assuming an air of surprise at this breach
of faith, refused indignantly to listen to any such suggestion, and
informed the Ministers that he would not sign the Convention until the
Proclamation had been officially communicated.
On the 24th Lord Dufferin was instructed that Her Majesty's Government
could not accept the amendments made in the Convention. Again the
Turkish Ministers sought out Lord Dufferin with messages from the
Sultan, pressing that the landing might be at Alexandria, and assuring
the Ambassador that the Proclamation should be communicated the moment
that the heads of the Convention were agreed to.
Things began to look as if they were in a way to be arranged, when it
was discovered, on the 25th, that the instructions given for the
despatch of the mules and the release of the drivers had been cancelled
by an order from the Palace. Lord Dufferin was at once instructed that
if this information was correct it was no longer possible for him to
continue the negotiations.
On the 27th the Turkish Ministers accepted Aboukir as the place of
disembarkation, and promised that before the Convention was signed they
would communicate the Proclamation officially, and order its publication
in Egypt. Lord Dufferin was instructed that he might sign the Convention
on the preliminary condition that the mules and drivers should be
released, and a promise given by the Porte to assist in sending them to
Egypt, and that the Proclamation should be issued at once.
On the 29th Lord Dufferin reported that he had settled the text of the
Convention with the Sultan's Ministers.
The 30th passed without any further communication from the Porte; but in
the middle of the night Said Pasha called upon Lord Dufferin at
Therapia, with a further message from the Sultan, urging that the troops
should go to Aboukir _viâ_ Alexandria; and in the morning the Pasha came
again with the Sultan's private secretary, and stated that His Majesty
was ready to take any step to remove Lord Granville's misgivings if he
were only allowed to land his troops at Alexandria. He was willing to
reduce their number from that originally proposed to 2,000, or even
1,000. Baker Pasha might go second in command, and take with him as many
English officers as he pleased, and the Turkish troops should be as much
under English control as they were in the Crimea.
The extraordinary anxiety of the Sultan to show his troops in Egypt at
this period is to be accounted for on the supposition that he foresaw
the impending collapse of the Arabi revolt, and was desirous that it
should not be accomplished without his appearing, at all events, to have
taken part in its suppression. The presence of but a single Turkish
battalion in Alexandria would have sufficed to enable him to claim the
credit of overthrowing Arabi and his followers. It was, however, not to
be. The Sultan's views were now diametrically at variance with those of
the British Cabinet. Sir Garnet Wolseley was, at this time, well to the
front, and there was little doubt that he would soon bring the war to a
close. Under these circumstances, the presence of a Turkish force in
Egypt would only be a source of embarrassment. Accordingly it was
necessary to finesse and to play off upon the Porte its own tricks of
delay and dissimulation. Lord Dufferin was therefore instructed to
inform the Porte that Her Majesty's Government were willing to meet its
proposals, and to receive 2,000, or even 3,000 troops; but that, in view
of the strong objections to Alexandria, it would be preferable that the
landing should take place in the Suez Canal.
On the 3rd September the Turkish Ministers were willing that the troops
should go to Port Saïd, promising at the same time that the Proclamation
should be issued immediately.
On the 24th August Lord Granville had authorized the Ambassador to
conclude the Convention as soon as the Proclamation should be published,
the words "such point or points on the Canal as may be previously
arranged with the British Commander-in-Chief" being substituted for
Aboukir.
On Lord Dufferin proceeding to the Porte on the 6th September to sign
the Convention, he found that the Proclamation had that morning appeared
in the newspapers in a changed form. Lord Dufferin thereupon declined to
sign. Said Pasha said that the publication, as it stood, was an act of
heedlessness, and he undertook that a correction should be published in
the official journal. A further discussion ensued as to the form of the
stipulation respecting the landing of the Turkish troops in the Canal,
Said Pasha objecting to the words proposed by Lord Granville, and
pressing for the mention of Port Saïd.
Lord Dufferin accepted, _ad referendum_, an amended paragraph to the
effect that the Turkish forces should proceed to Port Saïd, and from
thence to whatever point or points might be agreed upon between the two
Commanders-in-Chief. The British Government, however, insisted that the
clause should state that the Turkish troops would "enter the Canal at
Port Saïd and proceed from thence," whilst the Sultan wished to
substitute the word "débarqueront" for "se rendront à Port Saïd."
On the 10th September the Ottoman Plenipotentiaries, who seemed
unconscious that they were being played with all the time, came to the
Embassy with copies of the Conventions and Memorandum for signature.
They were authorized to accept the words "se rendront à Port Saïd." Lord
Dufferin, however, having in the meantime been informed of the views of
Her Majesty's Government, stated that he could not accept them. His
Lordship would agree to the retention of the words on the understanding
that a paragraph should be inserted in the Memorandum, explaining the
meaning of the words to be that the troops should "direct their course
to Port Saïd in order to enter the Canal."
It was now the eve of Tel-el-Kebir, and Lord Dufferin suddenly
discovered that it was necessary to suspend negotiations on account of
the arrest by the Turkish authorities of a number of porters who had
been engaged at Sir Garnet Wolseley's request for service in Egypt. The
men were released the same day with a promise that such proceedings
should not be repeated. The signature of the Convention, as further
amended, was authorized by telegram from Lord Granville, on the 13th,
on the condition that the Proclamation should be issued with the
amendment required by Her Majesty's Government.
On the 13th the battle of Tel-el-Kebir took place. On the 15th Lord
Granville instructed Lord Dufferin, that, in view of the defeat and
submission of the Egyptian insurgents, the British Government
contemplated shortly commencing the withdrawal of the British troops
from Egypt, and presumed that, the emergency having passed, the Sultan
would not consider it necessary to send troops; and on the 18th his
Lordship was authorized to convey to the Sultan, in the most courteous
terms, the permission given to his Lordship to drop the negotiation of
the Military Convention. He was at the same time to express to His
Majesty that the British Government conceived this step to be most
consistent with the dignity of the two countries, and that it was not
intended or calculated to alter the good and friendly relations between
them.
The Sultan now began to realize how completely befooled he had been. It
was necessary, however, to put a good face on the matter. The Turkish
Foreign Minister accordingly answered by expressing the deep
satisfaction of the Sultan and his Government at the sentiments
expressed on behalf of the British Government. He declared that the wish
of Turkey was to maintain unaltered the old friendship between the two
countries. Finally, the Minister asked, a little anxiously, what date
had been fixed on for the evacuation by the British troops.
This last question was met by Lord Dufferin reminding the Sultan of the
sacrifices made by England in order to restore order in Egypt; and
stating that whilst those sacrifices had given England power, that power
had thrown upon her great responsibility; that the Egyptian army being
disbanded, until the Khedive had organized the means of securely
maintaining his authority it was impossible for England to withdraw her
troops, although she had already greatly diminished their number, and
had no wish to keep any in Egypt longer than was justified by the
circumstances. With regard to the overtures for a closer alliance, Lord
Dufferin pointed out that the Sultan would remember that the like offer
had been made by him on several occasions, without any practical
results, owing to the apparent change of His Majesty's views. His
Lordship concluded by giving the Porte a little lecture, pointing out
that offers of friendship were unsatisfactory without some tangible
proof of the willingness of the Ottoman Government to adopt that line of
conduct which could alone render their friendship acceptable to English
public opinion; and suggested that that proof might be given by
inaugurating those internal reforms which were indispensable to the
existence of the Empire and to the maintenance of a really good
understanding with England.
No better way can be found of concluding the present chapter than by
giving an extract from his Lordship's despatch of the 18th September,
1882, to Lord Granville, which runs as follows:--
"In fact, I can only reiterate that from first to last I have
used every means at my disposal to induce the Turkish Government
to move quickly and to settle the matter out of hand. I told
them at the commencement that I had your Lordship's instructions
to press forward the Convention with all despatch; that your
private letters, as well as your public despatches, evinced your
desire to see that instrument executed; that in asking me to
telegraph to your Lordship these repeated references, they were
playing into our hands, and that their conduct was so obviously
contrary to their interests, that Europe had begun to misjudge
the situation. While ruining my reputation as an honest man,
they were enhancing it as a diplomatist, for it had begun to be
believed that the delay in signing the Convention could not
possibly result from their own incomprehensible
shortsightedness, but must have been artificially created by the
Machiavellian astuteness of the English Ambassador."
CHAPTER XXV.
RESTORATION OF TEWFIK AND EXILE OF ARABI.
On the 25th September the Khedive was able to return to Cairo, where a
great portion of Sir Garnet Wolseley's forces had assembled. He entered
the Capital at 3.30 in the afternoon, and was received with great
apparent enthusiasm. His Highness drove from the railway station in an
open carriage with the Duke of Connaught, Sir Garnet Wolseley, and Sir
Edward Malet. The streets through which he passed were lined the whole
way by soldiers of the British army.
Next followed a series of complimentary banquets and a distribution of
honours and rewards to the officers of the British forces. The Order of
the First Class of the Osmanieh was conferred by the Sultan upon Sir
Beauchamp Seymour and Sir Garnet Wolseley.[80] Other officers also
received decorations dealt out with a liberal hand. Later on, an
Egyptian medal, in the shape of a bronze star, was struck, and presented
by the Khedive to the whole of the British forces who took part in the
campaign. By the British Government both Sir Garnet Wolseley and Sir
Beauchamp Seymour were created Peers of the United Kingdom, and a sum of
£20,000 was voted by Parliament for each of them. An English war medal
for Egypt was also issued to the forces engaged.
With the exception of a small force left at Alexandria, Port Saïd, and
Ismailia, the whole of the British army was concentrated in Cairo, to be
reviewed by the Khedive, in the square in front of the Palace of Abdin.
The review, which was preceded by a march through the native quarter of
the city, took place on the very spot where Arabi and his mutinous
troops had defied the Khedive just a twelvemonth before.
The British soldiers, in spite of the hardships of the campaign,
presented an imposing appearance, the Indian regiments especially
attracting attention.
As soon as the effervescence which followed the restoration had a little
subsided, the Egyptian Government and its English advisers began to take
thought for the morrow. A decision was arrived at to reduce the British
forces to 12,000 men, which henceforth constituted the Army of
Occupation. The Egyptian army having been disbanded, and there being no
other native force available to maintain order, it became absolutely
necessary, apart from any political considerations, to retain this
number of Sir Garnet Wolseley's soldiers.
In announcing their intentions, the British Government informed the
Egyptian Ministry that England was prepared to defray all expenditure
incurred in the suppression of the rebellion, the date of the conclusion
of which was fixed at the 30th September. It was also intimated that
from that date Egypt would be expected to repay all extraordinary
expenses which the retention of the Queen's troops in Egypt would entail
on the Exchequer of the United Kingdom. The contribution for the 12,000
men to be retained was fixed at £4 a month per man, making a maximum
monthly charge of £48,000. The Egyptian Government was at the same time
informed that it was desired to withdraw the troops from Egypt as soon
as circumstances would permit, and that such withdrawal would be
effected from time to time as the security of the country would allow.
Pursuant to the intention above indicated, arrangements were at once
made for a considerable reduction in the strength of the Army of
Occupation. The Indian Contingent embarked, and Sir Garnet Wolseley, as
well as a great portion of the army under his command, left for England,
Major-General Sir Archibald Alison assuming the command.
The importance attached by Her Majesty's Government to Egyptian affairs
at this time was shown by the appointment, early in November, of Lord
Dufferin to proceed thither on a special mission. His Lordship, who had
filled successively the posts of Under-Secretary of State for India,
Governor-General of Canada, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and Ambassador
at Constantinople, was undoubtedly the most capable man at the disposal
of the British Government, and his mission was everywhere hailed with
satisfaction as preliminary to a satisfactory settlement of the affairs
of that country.
Lord Dufferin's instructions were "to advise the Government of the
Khedive in the arrangements which would have to be made for
re-establishing His Highness's authority and providing for the future
well-being of all classes of the population."
Lord Dufferin arrived at Alexandria on the 7th November, and was
received with all the honours due to his rank. He left for Cairo the
same day, the Khedive placing a palace at his disposal.
It is greatly to Lord Dufferin's credit that one of the first matters to
which he directed his attention was a question of humanity, viz., the
lot of the many unfortunates whom the late events had relegated to
Egyptian prisons.
It was not to be expected that the Khedivial party should triumph
without seeking to wreak vengeance on the heads of their conquered
adversaries. Consequently arrests were made wholesale, and the Egyptian
prisons were overcrowded. The object of the Khedive's advisers seemed to
be to make what in sporting language would be called a "big bag." Of
the leaders of the Rebellion, as already stated, Mahmoud Fehmi had been
captured at Kassassin, and Arabi and Toulba had surrendered at
Abbassieh. In addition to these, Mahmoud Sami had been arrested by the
police in Cairo. Yacoub Sami had given himself up at Kafr Dowar, and
Abdel-el-Al at Damietta. Besides these, there were about 1,200 other
political prisoners in the various gaols of Upper and Lower Egypt. These
individuals comprised all classes of the population, sheikhs from the
mosques, officers and privates of the army, members of the civil
service, police officials, merchants and land-owners.
The charges against many of these people were of the vaguest character,
such as "stirring up public feeling against the Khedive," "assisting the
rebels," &c.; some of them were absolutely ludicrous, and comprised such
offences as "dressing up dogs to imitate Sir Garnet Wolseley, and then
shooting at them."
There was reason to believe that a considerable number of the persons
arrested were denounced by their neighbours to gratify private malice or
revenge. Many others were arrested simply as a matter of precaution, or
because they were adherents of Halim or Ismail Pasha.
As may be supposed, the prisoners necessarily suffered considerable
hardships from overcrowding. But besides this, instances of ill-usage,
and occasionally of torture, were brought to the notice of the British
authorities. To remedy these evils inspectors were appointed to visit
the prisons, and the agents of the British Government made strong
representations to the Egyptian authorities to obtain a speedy gaol
delivery.
Their remonstrances took effect. A Decree was issued amnestying all
sub-lieutenants, lieutenants, and captains in the army (except those who
took part in the demonstrations of the 1st February and the 9th
September, 1881), those who were under arms on the 11th July, and those
who voluntarily enrolled themselves since that date, such persons being,
nevertheless, degraded and deprived of their rank and pensions.
Special Commissions were also instituted at Cairo, Alexandria, and
Tantah, for the purpose of investigating charges against political
offenders. The most important of these were Arabi and the other rebel
leaders.
The trial of the ringleaders of the rebellion was naturally one of the
first things to be taken in hand after the suppression of the rebellion
itself. As was only to be expected under the circumstances, the Khedive
and his advisers were in favour of treating Arabi and his associates
with the utmost severity. In this the Government met with general
support.
Public opinion in Egypt, especially amongst Europeans, was from the
first naturally hostile to Arabi. Those who had suffered by the
rebellion were not likely to be over-lenient in their views towards the
rebels, and the local European press clamoured loudly for their condign
punishment.
Opinion in Europe was divided on the question. In France and Italy,
especially, it became the fashion to extol Arabi as a sort of African
Garibaldi, whose only fault was his want of success. The same view
prevailed to some extent in England also, thanks to the agitation got up
by Sir William Gregory, Mr. Wilfred Blunt, and others. Even amongst
those who did not believe in either Arabi or the movement of which he
was the head, there was a suspicion that he was not more guilty than the
Sultan and the Khedive, and a feeling that it would be unjust to punish
him whilst they were allowed to go free.
The Egyptian Government, in dealing with the rebels, had not, however,
altogether a free hand. Sir Garnet Wolseley, in August, had proposed
that prisoners taken in the course of the military operations in Egypt
should be handed over to the Khedive. This was approved by the British
Government, but subject to the important condition that none of the
prisoners should be put to death without the previous consent of the
British authorities. This condition the Egyptian Government accepted.
The necessity of some means being found of speedily proceeding with the
trial of Arabi was more than once pressed by Sir Edward Malet upon the
Khedive. Public feeling in Egypt among the natives was much excited, and
all manner of absurd stories were told about Arabi and his relations
with the British Government. These circulated freely in the bazaars, and
were readily believed by the more ignorant and fanatical of the
population.
Early in October, two English barristers, Mr. A. M. Broadley and the
Honourable Mark Napier, arrived in Cairo to conduct the defence of the
rebel leaders. The Egyptian Government objected that, by the code under
which the proposed court martial was to be convened, prisoners were not
allowed counsel. Sir Edward Malet, however, insisted, and the Egyptian
authorities yielded the point. Next, the Government put every difficulty
in the way. At first they refused permission to Mr. Broadley and his
colleague to see their clients, and then they were told that they could
not be permitted to be present at the preliminary investigation. Thanks
to the firmness of Sir Edward Malet, who was determined that Arabi
should have a fair trial, these troubles were surmounted, and an
agreement as to the procedure to be adopted was come to by Borelli Bey,
a French advocate who acted for the Egyptian Government, and Arabi's
legal advisers.
The _Acte d'Accusation_, or indictment, was to the following effect:--
1. Arabi, Toulba, Mahmoud Sami, Mahmoud Fehmi, and Omar Ráhmi[81] were
charged with having abused the flag of truce on the 12th of July, by
withdrawing the troops and pillaging and burning Alexandria, whilst the
flag was flying.
2. Arabi, Toulba, Mahmoud Sami, Mahmoud Fehmi, Omar Ráhmi, and Ali Fehmi
were charged with having incited the Egyptians to arm against the
Government of the Khedive.[82]
3. All six prisoners were charged with having incited the people to
civil war, and with having committed acts of destruction, massacre, and
pillage on Egyptian territory.
4. Arabi, Mahmoud Fehmi, Toulba, and Mahmoud Sami were charged with
having continued the war after they had heard that peace was
concluded.[83]
The Counsel for the accused first appeared before the Commission
appointed to conduct the preliminary inquiry on the 31st October. In the
meantime, the Commission had collected a mass of hearsay evidence, none
of it on oath, and consisting mainly of letters and memoranda and of
depositions taken, according to the Egyptian procedure, _ex parte_ in
the absence of the prisoners and their Counsel. It is noteworthy that
the President of the Commission, Ismail Pasha Eyoub, had been himself a
prominent member of the Council of National Defence, and had actually
been with Arabi in the camp at Kafr Dowar.
The contention of Mr. Broadley was that, from first to last, the Sublime
Porte approved the action of his clients, also that the Khedive for a
long period prior to the commencement of hostilities wavered
systematically between the two parties, and that after the arrival of
Dervish Pasha he acquiesced at three Cabinet Councils in the early
phases of resistance to the English (an assertion in great measure borne
out by the ambiguous terms of the subsequent Proclamations). In addition
to the foregoing, Mr. Broadley relied on the fact that Arabi, rightly or
wrongly, really headed a great National movement, that he received the
moral and material support of nearly the whole of Egypt, and that he was
only deserted when he failed to secure success. It must be admitted that
the documents in the possession of the accused went a long way to bear
out these contentions.
It soon became evident that the principal part of the charges against
Arabi and his associates could not be sustained, and Sir Charles Wilson
(formerly Consul-General in Anatolia), who attended the proceedings as
delegate of the British Government, reported to Lord Dufferin as
follows:--
"The only direct evidence incriminating Arabi was that of
Suleiman Sami,[84] who stated that Arabi had not only ordered
him to burn Alexandria, but to kill the Khedive. The evidence of
this man was open to grave suspicion. He was arrested at Crete
and brought to Alexandria, where he was received by the Governor
and the Préfet de Police, one of whom accompanied him some
distance in the train. Immediately on his arrival at Cairo he
was brought before an extraordinary sitting of the Commission,
which lasted till between eight and nine p.m. No notice was sent
to me of the prisoner's arrival, or of the intention of the
Commission to examine him, though I live close to the building
in which the Commission sits. The next morning, when Suleiman
Sami's examination was continued, he was confronted with two
other prisoners, who at once contradicted his statements on
important points. His bearing before the Commission produced an
unfavourable impression, as he was the only prisoner who showed
want of dignity, and weakness when questioned. He was also so
deeply implicated himself in the burning and looting of
Alexandria, that it was only natural he should try to
incriminate others. As regards the specific charges against
Arabi Pasha it appeared to me--
"1. That if there were any abuse of the white flag on the 12th
July, a fact in itself not easy to prove, it was through
ignorance and not through design. I may mention that white
flags were flying on the Aboukir forts throughout the whole of
the military operations.
"2. That there was no evidence to connect Arabi with the
massacre at Alexandria on the 11th June, and that it is
doubtful whether a deliberate massacre of Europeans was ever
intended. That the massacres at Tantah and other places after
the bombardment were caused by the low-class refugees from
Alexandria, and that they ceased as soon as the troops were
sent down. That, after the first excitement had passed, order
was preserved, and that there are instances of orders having
been sent by Arabi to the Governors of towns, &c., to preserve
order and protect Europeans.
"3. That the evidence which connects Arabi Pasha with the
burning of Alexandria is conflicting, and that there is no
sufficient proof that he ordered the town to be destroyed. The
portion of the town actually burned by the troops seems to have
been small. The fire appears to have broken out about four p.m.
on the 12th, and the troops evacuated the town on the same
evening. It then became the duty of the Civil Governor to
preserve order, as far as he could, until the English
occupation of the 14th. It is difficult to say where Arabi's
responsibility ended and that of the Civil Governor commenced.
It is also probable that some of the fires were lighted by the
Bedouins, who had assembled contrary to the wish of Arabi, and
had entered the town on the 12th, and possibly also by British
shells.
"It is certain, however, that the houses in the Place Mehemet
Ali were burned by Suleiman Sami and his regiment. Suleiman
Sami asserted that he acted under orders from Arabi. On this
point he was contradicted by Arabi and others, and some
prisoners stated that Arabi sent messengers to prevent the
burning of the houses. It must be remembered that no evidence
was taken for the defence, and that no witnesses were
cross-examined."
Under these circumstances it became necessary to consider what was best
to be done. On the 18th November Lord Dufferin wrote to Lord Granville
as follows:--
"I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I saw the
Khedive to-day, and gave His Highness to understand that I
thought it very unlikely that sufficient proof would be
forthcoming to authorize the execution of Arabi and the
political prisoners, and I suggested the alternative of
deportation. I was glad to find that His Highness was prepared,
if required, to accept this result, provided Arabi and his
family were removed from the country _en bloc_, and his
property forfeited; in which event the Egyptian Government would
allow a maintenance for his women and children, who, the Khedive
observed, ought not to be punished for another's fault."
Towards the latter part of November all parties interested became more
or less disposed to accept a reasonable compromise, somewhat on the
lines indicated in Lord Dufferin's letter.
The English Government was aware of the block caused in Egyptian affairs
and in the projected reforms by the trial, the proceedings of which Mr.
Broadley spoke of extending over some months.
The Egyptian Government, after being informed of the inconclusive
character of the evidence, and being given to understand that no capital
punishment would be allowed, lost all heart in the business, and only
longed to get the rebels out of the country. Mr. Broadley, on behalf of
the accused, was equally willing to accept a compromise. With a tribunal
such as that before which he was to plead, he felt that his chances of
success were small. He might, indeed, drag on the proceedings for an
indefinite period, but in the end the solution would probably be less
satisfactory to his clients than would result from a well-considered
arrangement "out of court."
The details of the compromise arrived at were that all charges except
that of simple rebellion were to be withdrawn, and that as regards this
the prisoners should plead guilty. A sentence of death was to be
recorded on this plea, but a Decree should be signed commuting the
sentence to exile from Egypt. The prisoners were to forfeit their rank
and property, and to give their _parole_ to proceed to any British
possession indicated, and to remain there until permitted to leave.
Only a very few persons in Cairo were informed on the evening of 3rd
December that Arabi and his confederates were to be brought before the
Court-martial the following morning.
The proceedings were exceedingly simple, everything having been arranged
beforehand. A room had been fitted up as a Court House in the old Daïra
Sanieh, where Arabi was confined, and the proceedings were public. At
nine o'clock on the 4th, Raouf Pasha, the President, and the other
members of the Court-martial, took their seats. General Sir Archibald
Alison sat at a desk to the right of the President, and Sir Charles
Wilson on the left. Arabi was on Sir Charles Wilson's left, his Counsel
sitting just beneath him. He wore a dark greatcoat with a white
cachemire scarf round his neck. He looked somewhat thinner than he was
previous to the bombardment of the forts of Alexandria. He had grown a
short beard, which was partly grey.
The report of the Commission of Inquiry to the Court-martial was then
handed in. The following is a translation of this document:--
"We have the honour to inform you that, having terminated the
inquiry concerning Arabi, the Commission considers that there
are grounds for sending him before the Court-martial charged
with the crime of rebellion as provided for by Article 92 of the
Ottoman Military Code, and Article 59 of the Ottoman Penal Code.
It therefore sends the said Ahmed Arabi before the Court for
trial charged with the said crime. We send you at the same time
the complete _dossier_ containing the results of our inquiry
into this affair."
The President of the Court asked the prisoner if he acknowledged himself
guilty of rebellion against His Highness the Khedive in the following
terms:--"Arabi Pasha, you are charged before this Court, after due
inquiry by the Commission of Inquiry, with the crime of rebellion
against His Highness the Khedive. Are you guilty, or are you not guilty,
of the crime with which you stand charged?" Mr. Broadley then handed in
a paper to the effect that, acting under the advice of his Counsel,
Arabi pleaded guilty to the charge.
The Court then rose, the President remarking that judgment would be
delivered that afternoon at three p.m.
At the time named the Court was densely crowded, several ladies being
present, and there was a gathering of natives outside the prison. The
President, first of all, handed in an official document condemning Arabi
to death, which was read, and of which the following is a translation:--
"Considering that Ahmed Arabi Pasha has pleaded guilty to the crime of
rebellion, a crime provided for by Article 92 of the Ottoman Military
Code and Article 59 of the Ottoman Penal Code. Considering that in
consequence of this plea, no other course is open to the Court but to
apply Article 92 of the Ottoman Military Code and Article 59 of the
Ottoman Penal Code, already quoted, which punish with death the crime of
rebellion. For these reasons, the Court unanimously condemns Ahmed Arabi
to death for the crime of rebellion against His Highness the Khedive, in
accordance with the terms of Articles 92 of the Ottoman Military Code
and 59 of the Ottoman Penal Code. This sentence is to be submitted for
the sanction of His Highness the Khedive."
Immediately afterwards the Decree commuting the sentence to exile for
life was read.
Arabi saluted the Court and sat down, and the Members of the Court
prepared to retire, the sitting having lasted only six minutes. At this
moment, Mrs. Napier, wife of the junior Counsel for Arabi, had brought
into Court a bouquet of white roses for the accused, which, immediately
after the reading of the Decree, was presented to Arabi in open Court.
This was a little too much for the audience, who had restrained their
feelings during the reading of the Decree, and loud hisses arose. After
this manifestation the crowd gradually dispersed.
On the 7th December, Mahmoud Sami, Abdel-el-Al, Toulba, and Ali Fehmi
were arraigned before the Court-martial on the charge of rebellion, and
on being called on to plead, they all pleaded guilty. The prisoners were
again brought up in the afternoon for sentence to be passed on them.
They were all sentenced to death, and immediately after the Khedive's
Decree commuting their sentence to banishment for life was read.
On the 10th December the same formality was gone through with regard to
Yacoub Sami and Mahmoud Fehmi.
A day or two later Ceylon was announced as the prisoners' place of
exile, and on the 26th December the seven principal rebels left Cairo by
special train at 11 p.m. for Suez, there to join the British steamship
_Mareotis_. They were accompanied by a guard of thirty men of the 60th
Rifles, and a suite of sixty persons, male and female. Morice Bey, an
English officer in the Egyptian service, was appointed to take charge of
the exiles. The satisfaction of Arabi, who had all along suspected
treachery, at finding that he was to make the voyage in a British
steamer, and accompanied by British soldiers, with an Englishman in
charge, was unbounded, and he more than once expressed his
acknowledgments.[85]
It was, of course, impossible, after the lenient sentences passed on
Arabi and the other leaders of the National Party, to attempt to inflict
capital punishment on any of those who simply followed their lead.
On the 29th December a Decree was issued exiling a large number of the
chief prisoners remaining for various periods to Massowah, Souakim, and
other places. Others were released either with or without bail, on their
undertaking to live quietly on their country estates.
The result of the trial of the rebel leaders produced, at first, a
feeling of stupefaction on the European colony in Egypt. When the nature
of the judicial farce which had been enacted began to be understood, the
sentiment above mentioned gave place to one of profound indignation
against the Egyptian Government and its advisers. In passing upon Arabi
and his associates a sentence which was regarded as merely nominal, it
was said a premium was put upon rebellion, massacre, and pillage.
Such was the view universally entertained. Amongst the foreign
population, England lost in one day all the popularity she had gained at
Tel-el-Kebir. "On ne plaisante pas avec la justice," remarked an eminent
foreign advocate to the writer. With the natives the worst impression
was created. The idea of a compact having been made by England with
Arabi was strengthened and confirmed. With many the belief in Arabi's
Divine mission was raised to a certainty. The action of England was by a
great class of the population attributed to fear. It was given out that
Arabi was never really going to Ceylon, and that if he did he would
return to raise an overwhelming army and expel the unbelievers. The most
moderate charged England with having bribed Arabi, or, at the very
least, with having held out, as a reward for his surrender, the promise
of immunity for his past misdeeds.
However much the result of the trial of the rebel leaders may be
deplored, it was, perhaps, the best solution of the question. After a
painstaking examination Sir Charles Wilson came to the conclusion that
there was no evidence forthcoming on which Arabi could be convicted of
complicity with the riots of June 11th; neither was the evidence adduced
as to Arabi's complicity with regard to the incendiarism of Alexandria
of a satisfactory nature, and it did not appear possible to connect him
with the other massacres. The only evidence against Arabi was of a
negative character; that he could have prevented the massacres and other
atrocities appears to be freely admitted by his best friends, but this
was not sufficient ground for hanging him.
Such being the state of the case, it became necessary to consider what
steps should be taken to rid the country of Arabi and his accomplices.
The preliminary proceedings had already occupied upwards of two months,
fifty-two days alone having been spent in the examination of the
witnesses for the prosecution; the defence would probably have required
as much time; thus it would have been at least three months before a
verdict could have been arrived at. This delay was intolerable, the
current business of the Ministries and Administrations was seriously
interfered with in consequence of the great attention being paid to
these rebels. Even the consideration of the Alexandria Indemnity
Question was in abeyance.
It was determined that if Arabi could be induced to plead guilty of
rebellion, an easy way out of the difficulty could be found. As has been
stated, he was accordingly arraigned on the charge of simple rebellion,
and pleaded guilty. The trial, it is true, was generally looked upon as
a farce, and it appeared to be so, but in the face of so many
complications, it was about the only course to be adopted.
CHAPTER XXVI.
THE SOUDAN AND THE MAHDI.
Scarcely had the Arabi revolt been suppressed, than troubles which had
arisen in another quarter called for attention. Towards the end of
October, 1882, Abdel Kader Pasha, Governor-General of the Soudan,
telegraphed from Khartoum that the troops which he had sent against the
Mahdi had been cut off, and that a force of 10,000 men should be sent as
a reinforcement, otherwise he would be unable to defend the town. He
stated that, without a large force at his disposal, the insurrection
would spread through all parts of the Soudan, in which case the
pacification of the country would require an army of at least four times
the number asked for.
[Illustration]
The Soudan is a vast tract of Africa, stretching from Egypt on the north
to the Nyanza Lakes on the south, and from the Red Sea on the east to
the farthest boundary of Darfur on the west. Khartoum, at the junction
of the Blue and White Niles, is about equally distant from the northern
boundary of Egypt (the Mediterranean) and from the southern limit of the
Khedive's Equatorial dominions, Lake Victoria Nyanza, and Uganda. From
Khartoum to the ports of Souakim and Massowah, on the Red Sea, the
eastern limit of the Soudan, the distance is about 480 miles, and to the
westward limit, which is the most indefinite of all, but is generally
fixed at the western boundary of Darfur, it is nearly 800 miles. This
country is as large as India. It extends 1,600 miles in one direction
and 1,300 in another. There were at this time neither railways, canals,
nor, except the Nile at some periods of the year, navigable rivers, and
the only roads were camel tracks.
The sovereignty of the Soudan was first seized by Egypt in the year
1819, when Mehemet Ali, hearing of the anarchy prevailing there, and
wishing to introduce the benefits of a regular government and of
civilization, and at the same time to occupy his troops, ordered his son
Ismail, with a large army of regulars and irregulars, to invade the
country. Ismail reached Khartoum, and for a time governed the Soudan,
but he and all his followers were burnt alive by a native ruler, who
first made them drunk at his own table and then burned the house over
their heads. For this a terrible vengeance was taken, and Egyptian
sovereignty was established over Sennar and Kordofan.
In 1856 the Viceroy, Said Pasha, visited the Soudan, and almost decided
to abandon the country, but desisted in deference to the representation
of the sheikhs and notables, who laid great stress upon the anarchy
which would result from such an abandonment. He decreed reforms, most of
which appear to have been punctually neglected. One Governor-General
succeeded another, their chief duties being border-warfare with
Abyssinia and the suppression of the rebellions which periodically broke
out. In 1866 Massowah and Souakim were given to Egypt by the Sultan of
Turkey. In 1870 Sir Samuel Baker set out to conquer the Equatorial
Provinces, returning in 1873. Colonel Gordon, afterwards Gordon Pasha,
was appointed Governor-General of the Equatorial Provinces in the
following year.
When, by authority of Ismail Pasha, Gordon became absolute ruler of the
Soudan, he established a system of just and equitable government, which
led, after his departure, to the revolt against the misgovernment of
Egyptian officials. Gordon had warned the Khedive, before his
appointment, that he would render it impossible for the Turks to govern
the Soudan again. He was as good as his word. By treating the people
justly, by listening to their grievances, and mercilessly punishing all
those who defied the law, he accustomed the Soudanese to a higher
standard of government than any which had prevailed in those regions
before.
After Gordon's departure a horde of Turks were once more let loose to
harry the Soudanese. All his old officials were marked men, and his
policy was reversed. Ilias, one of the greatest slave-owners of Obeid,
was allowed to return to Khartoum; and this man, in concert with
Zubehr, the king of the slave dealers (afterwards interned at
Gibraltar), took advantage of the wide-spread discontent occasioned by
mis-government to foment the rebellion which, under the Mahdi's
leadership, assumed such serious proportions.
The chief causes of the rebellion were: the venality and oppression of
the officials; the suppression of the slave-trade, and military
weakness. Of the first it is unnecessary to say much. The same kind of
oppression that goes on in Turkey prevailed in the Soudan, though,
perhaps, not to the same extent. Here, as there, all over the country
there was a class of small officials on salaries of from £2 to £4 a
month, who had the responsible duty of collecting the taxes. The
officials were mostly Bashi-Bazouks, irregular soldiers of Turkish
descent. As there could be but little supervision over such an immense
area, these men had it much their own way and squeezed the people to
their hearts' content. There were instances where a Bashi-Bazouk on his
salary maintained twelve horses, twenty servants, and a number of women,
and this in places where the payment for water for his cattle alone
would have cost more than three times his salary. It was no uncommon
thing for a peasant to have to pay his taxes to the collector four or
five times over without the Treasury being any the richer.
That the suppression of the slave trade, or rather the difficulties
thrown in its way, was also a potent cause is evident from the list of
the tribes who followed the Mahdi. Many, if not the majority, of these
tribes were Baggara, or owners of cattle. These tribes were all of Arab
descent, and from time immemorial had been inveterate slave-hunters. The
Gallabahs were, also, to a man, against the Government, slave-trading
being both their principal and by far most profitable business.
As to the military weakness, there can be no doubt that the Arabi revolt
also had its effect on the Soudan population. Telegrams were actually
sent them by Arabi, ordering them not to recognize the authority of the
Khedive. At the same time all the available troops were withdrawn, and
the revolt followed almost as a matter of course.
Mahomet Ahmed, the Mahdi, was a native of the province of Dongola. His
father was Abdullahi, by trade a carpenter. In 1852 this man left and
went to Shendy, a town on the Nile south of Berber. As a boy, Mahomet
Ahmed was apprenticed to his uncle, a boatman, residing at Shakabeh, an
island opposite Sennar. Having one day received a beating from his
uncle, he ran away to Khartoum and joined the free school of a fakir,
the head of a sect of dervishes, who lived at a village close by. This
school was attached to the tomb of the patron saint of Khartoum, who was
greatly revered by the inhabitants of that town and district. Here
Mahomet Ahmed remained for some time, studying religion, but did not
make much progress in the more worldly accomplishments of reading and
writing. After a time he left and went to Berber, where he joined
another free school. This school was also attached to a shrine much
venerated by the natives. Here Mahomet Ahmed remained six months,
completing his religious education. Thence he went to a village south of
Kana, on the White Nile, where, in 1870, he became a disciple of another
fakir, who subsequently ordained him fakir, and he then left to take up
his home in the island of Abba, near Kana. Here he began by making a
subterranean excavation into which he made a practice of retiring to
repeat for hours one of the many names of the Deity, and accompanied
this by fasting, incense-burning, and prayers. His fame and sanctity by
degrees spread far and wide, and Mahomet Ahmed became wealthy, collected
disciples, and married several wives, all of whom he was careful to
select from among the daughters of the most influential Baggara sheikhs
and other notables. To keep within the lawful number (four) he was in
the habit of divorcing the surplus and taking them on again according to
his fancy. About the end of May, 1881, he began to write to his brother
fakirs, and to teach that he was the "Mahdi" foretold by Mahomet, and
that he had a Divine mission to reform Islam, to establish a universal
equality, a universal law, a universal religion, and a community of
goods; also that all who did not believe in him would be destroyed, were
they Christian, Mahommedan, or Pagan. Among others he wrote to Mahomet
Saleh, a very learned and influential fakir of Dongola, directing him to
collect his dervishes, followers, and friends, and to join him at Abba.
This sheikh, instead of complying with his request, informed the
Government, declaring the man to be mad.
In the beginning of Ramadan, 1298 (2nd July, 1881), the Governor-General
of the Soudan, Reouf Pasha, heard that on the island of Abba, on the
White Nile, in the Fashoda district, there was a certain religious
sheikh, Mahomet Ahmed, who had publicly declared that he was the Mahdi;
further, that this sheikh had been for some time very busy in extending
his influence among the tribes by means of emissaries and letters. Reouf
became somewhat alarmed, fearing the consequences which might result
from such teaching among the credulous and superstitious people of the
Soudan, and sent a party of notables and learned men, with a Government
official and a small military escort, to interview Mahomet Ahmed, and
request him to give up agitating and come to Khartoum. Mahomet declined
to do either, and boldly declared that he was the Mahdi, by which name
he will be hereinafter referred to.
On the failure of his first attempt, the Pasha, on the 11th August,
despatched by steamer an expedition of 200 regular soldiers, with orders
to use force, if necessary, in bringing the pretender to reason. At 3
a.m. on the following day the party reached Abba, where a discussion
arose between two of the officers, each of whom claimed to be in
command. Before the difficulty could be settled, the Mahdi and his
followers turned out, some 4,000 strong, attacked the force and drove
them back to the river, killing no less than 120 of their number. The
rest of the expedition succeeded in reaching their steamer, and returned
to Khartoum. After this further failure, Reouf Pasha organized a new
expedition. The officer in command was Mahomet Pasha Said, from the
regular army. Not finding the Mahdi at Abba, the Pasha followed him
leisurely on to Talka. On arriving there it was discovered that the
Mahdi had retreated into the hills of Jeb el Nuba, and the Pasha,
deeming it useless to follow him further, withdrew to Kordofan, and the
enterprise was abandoned.
In December, 1881, the Governor of Fashoda heard that the chief of the
Tajalle (a district of the Jeb el Nuba), who was friendly to the
Government, had driven out the Mahdi, and that the latter had taken
refuge in the mountains of Gheddeer. The Governor decided to follow up
this advantage and attack the Mahdi in his new position. Taking with him
a force of 400 men, the Governor left Fashoda on the 4th December. On
the morning of the 9th he reached Gheddeer after marching all night. The
troops, fatigued by the march, following their usual custom, on nearing
the wells broke their ranks and rushed to the water. At this moment they
were attacked by the Mahdists and nearly all killed, including the
Governor.
The Mahdi, seeing that he could defy the Government with impunity, was
encouraged to believe in his mission, and the various sects of dervishes
throughout the country began to think that Mahomet Ahmed might really be
the true Mahdi. The Mahdi himself, though he did not venture to leave
the shelter of the Gheddeer hills, occupied himself in fomenting the
rebellion by his emissaries and adherents.
On the 4th March, 1882, Abdel Kader Pasha was appointed Governor-General
of the Soudan, in place of Reouf Pasha.
During the interval between the departure of Reouf and the arrival of
his successor, Giegler Pasha, a German, acted as the latter's deputy.
This official formed a new expedition of 3,500 men, starting from three
points, namely, from Khartoum, Kordofan, and Sennar. By the 22nd of
April the entire force, Nubir Yussef Pasha, a Berberine, being in
command, was concentrated at Kaha, for the purpose of attacking
Gheddeer, where, as was above stated, the Mahdi had taken refuge.
In consequence of these movements, the garrisons all over the country
were left very weak, and at Sennar there were but 100 soldiers
remaining. Amr-el-Makashef, a prominent agent of the Mahdi, collecting a
force of disaffected natives and dervishes, attacked and burnt a part of
the town, killed most of the small garrison, and besieged the remainder
in the Government House. Fortunately, Saleh Aga, an irregular officer
sent by Giegler Pasha, arrived on the 13th with 300 men, and after a
hard fight defeated Amr-el-Makashef and compelled him to raise the
siege.
On the 15th of April Giegler Pasha started south from Khartoum by
steamer with 300 irregulars. On reaching the neighbourhood of
Mesalamieh, on the Blue Nile, he learned that a notable sheikh, called
Ahmed Saha, was raising men for the Mahdi at a village close by. He sent
a detachment of fifty of his men to attack the place, with the result
that the expedition was repulsed and most of the men killed. Giegler
then telegraphed for reinforcements of six companies of regulars from
Galabat, on the Abyssinian frontier, and while awaiting their arrival,
having received some small reinforcements, renewed his attack on Ahmed
Saha, but was once more defeated, with a further loss of 200 men.
On the 5th of May, however, Giegler was joined by the six companies of
regulars from Galabat, and no less than 2,500 of the great Shukuri
tribe, headed by their emir, Awad-el-Kerim, and a number of chiefs, clad
in coats of mail and steel helmets, as in the days of the Crusaders, and
riding thoroughbred Arab horses. This was a grateful sight for Giegler,
as the emir was a personal friend of his own, and had, moreover, taken
sides with the Government. Encouraged by this accession of strength, the
Pasha renewed the attack on the 6th--this time with success--and Ahmed
Saha was defeated with great slaughter.
After the victory the troops were directed on Sennar, where, on the 24th
of May, they joined hands with the forces of Saleh Agha. Giegler at once
attacked the rebels at a village in the neighbourhood of the town, and
succeeded in driving them into the river, with a loss of 800 men.
Giegler then returned to Khartoum in triumph, leaving Saleh Agha in
command. On the 3rd June the latter, with four companies of regulars,
attacked Amr-el-Makashef at Tegu, whither he had retired after
his defeat. The rebels were again defeated and dispersed, and
Amr-el-Makashef fled across the White Nile by the ford of Aboo Zed and
joined the Mahdi.
Shortly after these events the rebels again collected--it is said to the
number of 10,000 (probably an exaggeration)--at a place called Eddi
Binat, on the White Nile. Abdel Kader (who had by this time taken up his
command) got together a body of troops from Duem, Kana, and Marabieh, on
the White Nile, and despatched them, under the command of Zeyd Bey,
against the rebels. About October 5th these troops reached the
neighbourhood of Eddi Binat, where they were attacked by Sedi Habbi and
his men. The Egyptians formed a hollow square, three sides of regulars
and the fourth of Aburoff Arabs. The regulars repulsed the attack, but
some 40 or 50 rebels got in on the fourth side, and the result was a
defeat, with the loss of 800 men. Although successful, Sedi Habbi was
unable to follow up his victory, owing to his heavy losses.
This disaster was followed by an almost unbroken series of defeats for
the Egyptian forces at Shaha Fozia, Shatt, and other places.
In April, as already stated, the Gheddeer field force of 3,500 men was
concentrated at Kaha, under Nubir Yussef Pasha. His original intention
was to march at once to attack the Mahdi at Gheddeer. Finding, however,
that the direct route was difficult and water scarce, he brought his
force to Fashoda on the 22nd of April. Here they halted till the 20th of
May, thereby allowing themselves to be overtaken by the rainy season,
which much increased the difficulty of advancing through the marshy and
thickly wooded country which lay between them and their destination. On
the 7th of June the force came in contact with the enemy. The Egyptian
troops formed a square, which was assailed by the Mahdi's followers. It
was broken, and the whole force annihilated.
The situation throughout the Soudan was now very critical, but
fortunately the Mahdi, instead of following up his success and marching
on Obeid or Khartoum, remained at Gheddeer, thus giving Abdel Kader, who
had by this time taken charge at Khartoum, a chance of organizing new
means of resistance.
Abdel Kader, by drawing upon the garrisons at a distance from the scene
of operations, by forming battalions of black slaves, and other like
measures, managed, though with the greatest difficulty, to get together
a fairly respectable force. This, as soon as it was somewhat organized,
was applied in strengthening the various garrisons at the more exposed
places, and in preparing for eventualities in general.
For a short time the Government forces had a fair share of good fortune,
and in various engagements, of no great importance, came off victorious
over the Mahdists. This, however, did not last long. On the 17th of July
a force sent to attack the Hamar Arabs, on the Darfur frontier, had,
although victorious, to be recalled to Obeid to strengthen the garrison,
news having come in that the Mahdi had broken up his camp at Gheddeer
and was marching to attack that important town. The Mahdi reached Obeid
on the 3rd of September with an enormous force, and at once summoned the
garrison of about 6,000 soldiers to surrender. Many of the inhabitants
flocked to his standard, believing the defence to be hopeless; but the
garrison resolved to hold out, and intrenched themselves in the
Government buildings. Here they were attacked on the morning of the
14th, the assault lasting from 6 a.m. to 11 p.m. Though repulsed, the
attack was renewed on each of the two succeeding days, with the same
result. Eventually the Mahdi, after having sustained heavy losses,
withdrew, and devoted his energies to the blockade of both Obeid and
Bara.
The success of the Government troops at Obeid was, however, doomed to be
followed by disasters in other directions. When Obeid and Bara were
known to be in peril, a relief expedition of two regular battalions[86]
and some Bashi-Bazouks started on the 24th of September from Duem, on
the White Nile, for Bara. After two days' march they were attacked, but
defeated the enemy with heavy loss. On the 6th October the expedition
reached a place called Kan, where there was a well, situated in the
midst of a thick forest. The soldiers, after making a weak "zeriba," or
breastwork of bushes, rushed, according to their custom, to the well for
water. They were at once attacked, and over a thousand of them killed,
the remainder escaping to Bara. On the 9th Bara was attacked, but the
enemy were repulsed, and the same thing happened the following day;
after which the assault was not renewed.
The Mahdi then, to prevent assistance being sent to Obeid, despatched
emissaries to cross the White Nile, to stir up the embers of rebellion
and secure more adherents to his cause.
The foregoing brings the narrative down to the time of Abdel Kader's
pressing demand for reinforcements. At this period the relief expedition
had been all but annihilated. Obeid was held by 3,500 men and Bara by
2,000. Both garrisons were short of food and in a depressed condition.
Many of the officers and men had deserted to the enemy. The Mahdi, with
the bulk of his forces, had encamped round Bara, and Amr-el-Makashef was
at the same time operating on the Nile.
The latest reports from Darfur were six months old, and the Governor
reported that the province was disaffected, and that he could not
maintain order without the aid of additional troops.
CHAPTER XXVII.
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FUTURE.
The attitude of the European Powers towards the English occupation of
Egypt was, at the opening of the year 1883, one of acquiescence tempered
by expediency.
On the 3rd of January, 1883, Lord Granville issued a Circular Note to
the Powers on the Egyptian question. In it he recalled the fact that
events had compelled Her Majesty's Government to undertake the task of
repressing the Egyptian rebellion, a task which England would have
willingly shared with other Powers. His Lordship added that, although
for the present a British force remained in Egypt for the preservation
of public tranquillity, the British Government wished to withdraw its
troops as soon as a system capable of protecting the authority of the
Khedive should be organized. In the meantime, they considered it a duty
to give the Khedive advice, with the object of securing that the order
of things to be established should be of a satisfactory character and
possess the elements of stability and progress.
Lord Granville further declared that the danger which threatened the
Suez Canal during Arabi's revolt, its occupation by British troops in
the name of the Khedive, its employment as a base of operations against
the rebels, as well as the attitude of the Canal Company at a critical
moment in the campaign, constituted strong reasons for seeking an
international settlement of this question in order to avoid similar
dangers in the future. Her Majesty's Government thought that free
navigation on the Canal, and its protection against damage and
obstruction resulting from military operations, were questions of
general interest. His Lordship, in consequence, proposed to the Powers
to come to a common understanding to insure the freedom of passage
through the Canal for every description of vessel, under all
circumstances, with this reserve in the event of war, that the ships of
war belonging to one of the belligerent nations which might be in the
Canal while hostilities were proceeding could disembark neither troops
nor warlike munitions.
As regards financial arrangements, Her Majesty's Government thought it
possible to arrange for greater economy and greater simplicity in the
administration by modifications which would not in any way diminish the
guarantees of the creditors. His Lordship hoped that he would soon be
able to submit definite proposals on this subject to the Powers. The
Government relied on the co-operation of the Powers to place foreigners
on the same footing as natives as regards taxation.
The public papers contain no reply or acknowledgment of the
communication on the part of the French Government.
The first of the other Powers to express any opinion on the despatch was
Austria. Sir Henry Elliot called on Count Kalnoky on the 16th of January
to ask what impression had been made upon him by the document; and his
reply was to the effect that, though he could not be expected to
pronounce upon it off-hand, he would repeat assurances already given
that his Government continued to be animated by the most sincere wish
not to embarrass Her Majesty's Government in the reorganization of the
administration of Egypt. A week later the Austrian Foreign Minister had
another interview with the British Ambassador, and the conversation left
on Sir Henry Elliot's mind the impression that Count Kalnoky would make
no observations upon the Circular except with reference to the proposal
to subject Europeans to the same taxation as natives. He admitted the
justice of this proposal, and Sir Henry believed he would not object to
it; but it was, he said, a subject that required full examination before
it was decided. The suggestions of Her Majesty's Government about the
Suez Canal appeared quite to satisfy him.
On the 25th, Count Herbert Bismarck, the German _chargé d'affaires_ in
London, called on Lord Granville, and stated that his Government
accepted generally the arrangement regarding Egypt and the Suez Canal
proposed in the despatch, and was prepared to await the further
information promised respecting the internal reorganization of Egypt. He
went on to say that the German Government would continue to preserve the
same friendly attitude towards Her Majesty's Government in regard to
Egyptian affairs which they had maintained during the summer.
On the 24th January, Count Hatzfeldt informed Lord Ampthill that he was
about to instruct Count Herbert Bismarck to inform Lord Granville that
the German Government accepted and agreed in principle to the policy
laid down in the Circular of the 3rd respecting the reorganization of
Egypt.
The Italian Government took much longer time before giving any answer.
It was not till the 7th February that Count Nigra called on Lord
Granville to state their opinion. It was to the effect that they wished
to reserve any detailed expression of their views till the English
proposals were communicated in a more definite shape; but he was able to
say at once that they concurred generally in those proposals.
The Russian reply was yet later and very indefinite. Sir Edward Thornton
asked M. de Giers on the 7th February what he had to say, and the reply
was that the Imperial Government considered the views expressed in the
circular despatch as "generally satisfactory," and "they had not for the
present any objection to make to them."
The minor Powers were addressed in a Circular dated the 24th January,
and enclosing Lord Granville's despatch of the 3rd. The respective
Foreign Ministers were informed that, as their Governments were
interested in the condition of Egypt, and in the questions relating to
the Suez Canal, Her Majesty's Government had thought that it might be
agreeable to them "to have cognizance of the communication which has
been made by Great Britain on these subjects to the Porte and the other
Powers represented in the recent Conference at Constantinople."
The Spanish Government were somewhat effusive in their thanks. The
Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to lose no time in expressing the
opinion of his colleagues, and in the meantime desired to say how much
gratified was King Alfonso's Government at the courtesy and
consideration shown towards Spain.
The Portuguese Government simply expressed their thanks.
In a despatch to Mr. Wyndham, requesting him to lay the Circular before
the Porte, Lord Granville wrote as follows:--
"Having regard to the exceptional position occupied by Turkey in
relation to this important question, and to the special
interests of His Majesty the Sultan which are involved in its
solution, Her Majesty's Government desire, in the first place,
to address the Sublime Porte separately on the subject: and they
conceive that they could hardly adopt a more convenient and
satisfactory mode of placing their views before the Sultan than
by communicating to His Majesty a copy of the Circular which
they propose to address to the Powers, and which resumes all
that they have to state on the subject at the present time. You
will accordingly deliver a copy of this despatch and of its
inclosure to the Porte, and, in doing so, you will express the
hope of Her Majesty's Government that His Majesty the Sultan
will recognize the friendly sentiments which have prompted them
to submit separately to the appreciation of the Porte their
proposals with reference to Egypt, and that these proposals will
commend themselves to the favourable opinion of His Majesty, as
the result of the most anxious consideration on the part of Her
Majesty's Government, and as embodying a system of
reorganization in Egypt which, in their opinion, is best
calculated to insure the stability of its institutions, the
prosperity and happiness of its people, and the peace of Europe
in the East, and of the Ottoman Dominions."
On the 17th October Said Pasha had proposed to Lord Dufferin to open
negotiations with regard to Egypt with a view to the maintenance of what
he termed the _status quo ante_, and expressed the gratitude of the
Turkish Government for the assurance of England's intention not to leave
the English troops long in Egypt.
Lord Dufferin was instructed to say in reply that as the affairs of
Egypt had advanced only partially towards their final settlement, any
negotiation would be premature.
On the 23rd December Musurus Pasha asked Lord Granville for a reply as
to the period of the occupation by the British troops. Lord Granville
answered that he could not fix the exact date, but hoped to be in a
short time able to make a communication to the Porte on the whole
Egyptian question. The communication was the Circular Note of the 3rd
January, 1883.
On the 25th January, Mr. Wyndham asked the Turkish Minister for Foreign
Affairs if he could tell him what impression the proposals of Her
Majesty's Government with regard to Egypt had made upon the Ottoman
Government. Aarifi Pasha said that the different points presented had
been examined by the Ministers, but that they had not yet come to a
final decision as to what answer they should return.
One of the first results of the new position adopted by England in Egypt
was the abolition of the Dual Control.
As has been already shown, the institution had rendered great services
to Egypt, and tended to protect the humbler classes of natives from
exaction and injustice. That it should have been so successful in its
mission was due to the high character and administrative ability of the
gentlemen selected for the duties of Controller-General. Major
Baring[87] found a capable successor in Sir Auckland Colvin, and both in
turn worked in the utmost harmony with their French colleague, M. de
Blignières, afterwards succeeded by M. Brédif, who displayed the same
courtesy in his relations with his English colleague.
The objections to the Control were summarized in a Note addressed by the
Egyptian Government to the two Western Powers on the 7th November, 1882.
But apart from any other objection to the Control, there was also a fear
that circumstances might occur which would render that institution a
danger to the maintenance of cordial relations between England and
France. Its maintenance, moreover, was obviously incompatible with the
exclusive predominance of England in Egypt.
Lord Dufferin, on the 28th December, was accordingly instructed to
reply, on behalf of England, "that Her Majesty's Government were not
prepared, in opposition to the wishes of the Egyptian Government, and in
face of the many objections which had been raised to the continuance of
the Control, to insist on the maintenance of an arrangement which, in
its last form, was only provisionally accorded. They thought, however,
that for the present it would not be wise on the part of the Egyptian
Government to deprive themselves of all European assistance in securing
the good administration of the finances, on which must depend the
prosperity and credit of the country, and its power to fulfil its
international engagements without undue pressure on the Egyptian people.
Her Majesty's Government would recommend that, in place of the Control,
His Highness the Khedive should appoint a single European financial
adviser. This officer would attend Cabinet Councils, exercise powers of
inquiry, and give advice on financial questions, but without authority
to interfere in the direct administration of the country."
The despatch continued that "Her Majesty's Government were aware of the
great value which the French Government had attached in the past to the
Dual Control. They did not deny the practical advantages which for a
time attended the system--advantages which were owing to the common wish
of this country and of France to promote the prosperity of Egypt; but
they were convinced that this feeling on the part of France would not
extend to thinking it possible that an arrangement of a temporary
character should be continued after two of the three parties to it had
become desirous to be freed from the obligation for reasons which they
considered to be of grave importance."
It was scarcely to be expected that France would accept the arrangement,
at all events, without a struggle, and M. Raindre, the French
Consul-General in Cairo, was instructed to deny the right of the
Egyptian Government to annul the existing arrangement. This in no way
altered the programme of Cherif Pasha, who, assured of the support of
England, proceeded with the measure; and on the 18th of January, 1883, a
Decree was issued, stating that the dispositions of the various Decrees
relating to the Control were repealed. The next day the Decree was
published in the "Moniteur Egyptien," and the Control became a thing of
the past.
On the Decree appearing in print, the French Consul-General addressed a
despatch to Cherif Pasha, in which the former stated that his Government
declined to recognize the right of the Egyptian Government to upset an
arrangement which he maintained was part of an agreement between the
French and the Egyptian Governments, and which, he said, formed an
essential security for French interests. The despatch concluded with a
formal reservation of the rights of the French Government.
The abolition of the Control excited a burst of indignation from the
French Press; the action of the Egyptian Government was loudly
condemned, and there the matter ended.
M. Brédif, the French Controller, obtained leave of absence; and on the
5th February, Sir Auckland Colvin, who, in the meantime, had resigned
his post as English Controller, was appointed to the post of "Financial
Adviser," created as a substitute for the defunct Control.
One of the first measures which had to be considered by Lord Dufferin
was the reorganization of the Egyptian army. The rebellion and the
measures taken in consequence had left Egypt absolutely without any army
either to defend her frontiers or to maintain order in the interior. If,
as was then contemplated, the British forces were ever to be withdrawn,
it was necessary to provide others to take their place.
Lord Dufferin, in a despatch to the Foreign Office on the 18th November,
1882, combated the oft-repeated statement that Egypt required no army.
According to him "this was a mistake, for although an efficient
gendarmerie might be able in ordinary times to prevent the Bedouins
causing trouble along the desert border and the banks of the Suez Canal,
it was essential that these unruly Arab communities should know that the
Government held in reserve a military force capable of checking any
serious attempt on their part to disturb the peace of the country;
otherwise they would not hesitate to break through the necessarily
sparse and feeble frontier guards in the hope of plundering Cairo." Lord
Dufferin estimated that the strength of the army ought not to exceed
from 5,000 to 6,000 men.
On the question of officering the new force, he observed that the
officering of the native army had always been its weak point. The fellah
subaltern, captain, or colonel had seldom been able to acquire the
prestige or authority necessary for maintaining discipline during peace
and for effective leading in the presence of the enemy. To meet the
difficulty, Lord Dufferin approved a proposal which he found under
consideration for introducing into the Egyptian army a certain
proportion of British officers. It was also suggested that an English
General should be appointed to the chief command.
Both schemes were approved, a number of officers were selected from the
English army to fill certain grades in the Egyptian forces, and on the
13th December, Sir Evelyn Wood left England to take the command with the
title of "Sirdar" (Commander-in-Chief).
The reorganization of the gendarmerie and police was at the same time
proceeded with. In a despatch, dated the 1st January, 1883, Lord
Dufferin said on the subject of the gendarmerie that, "in consequence of
the proximity of the desert and the necessity of controlling the wild
Arab tribes which infest its borders, it was desirable that this arm of
the service should be in a great measure a mounted force, and impressed
with a semi-military character. At the same time, for economical and
other reasons, it should be also trained to discharge the civil duties
of a rural police. Under certain aspects, therefore, it would possess
the characteristics and qualifications of mounted infantry, and under
others those of simple constabulary."
The administration of the gendarmerie, to the number of 4,400 men, was
to be placed under the Minister of the Interior, and its chief was to
be General Baker, with the title of Inspector-General. Lord Dufferin in
the same despatch dealt with the question of the reorganization of the
Urban Police, and whilst pointing out the errors committed in the past,
showed how they might be avoided in the future.
Lord Dufferin next took in hand the question of the reform of Egyptian
institutions generally. On the 6th of February, his Lordship made his
report in the form of a lengthy despatch to Lord Granville, in which he
dealt with the occupation of Egypt, and the responsibilities thereby
devolving on England; the establishment of a Legislative Council, and a
Chamber of Notables elected by the people; the Tribunals, canalization
and irrigation, the cadastral survey of Egypt, the indebtedness of the
fellah, the assessment of the land revenue, agricultural taxes, national
education and the Soudan, as to which last his Lordship observed that
some persons were inclined to advise Egypt to withdraw altogether from
the Soudan and her other acquisitions in that region; but she could
hardly be expected to acquiesce in such a policy. Possessing the lower
ranges of the Nile, she was naturally inclined to claim dominion along
its entire course; and when it was remembered that the territories in
question, if properly developed, were capable of producing inexhaustible
supplies of sugar and cotton, we could not be surprised at her
unwillingness to abandon them. Unhappily, Egyptian administration in the
Soudan had been almost uniformly unfortunate. The success of the present
Mahdi in raising the tribes and in extending his influence over great
tracts of country, was a sufficient proof of the Government's inability
either to reconcile the inhabitants to its rule, or to maintain order.
The consequences had been most disastrous. Within a year and a half the
Egyptians lost something like 9,000 men, while it was estimated that
40,000 of their opponents had perished. His Lordship stated that, in the
expectation that the fresh efforts then about to be made would result in
the restoration of tranquillity, a plan should be carefully considered
for the future administration of the country. Hitherto, it had caused a
continual drain on the resources of the Egyptian Exchequer. The first
step necessary was the construction of a railway from Souakim to Berber,
or what, perhaps, would be still more advisable, to Shendy, on the
Nile. The completion of this enterprise would at once change all the
elements of the problem. Instead of being a burden on the Egyptian
Exchequer, these Equatorial provinces ought to become, with anything
like good management, a source of wealth to the Government.
Lord Dufferin then referred to the slave trade, the International
Tribunals, the right of Egypt to make commercial conventions, and the
exemption of Europeans from taxation. He then gave a retrospect of
reforms accomplished and made observations on the Egyptian Budget and
the Public Debt.
The report concluded as follows:--
"Having thus given a _résumé_ of the steps already taken towards
the reorganization of Egypt, and of the further measures in
progress or in contemplation, it remains for me to consider how
far we can depend upon the continued, steady, and frictionless
operation of the machinery we shall have set up. A great part of
what we are about to inaugurate will be of necessity tentative
and experimental. This is especially true as regards the
indigenous Courts of Justice and the new political institutions,
both of which will have to be worked by persons, the majority of
whom will be without experience or instruction. Had I been
commissioned to place affairs in Egypt on the footing of an
Indian subject State, the outlook would have been different. The
masterful hand of a Resident would have quickly bent everything
to his will, and in the space of five years we should have
greatly added to the material wealth and well-being of the
country by the extension of its cultivated area and the
consequent expansion of its revenue; by the partial, if not the
total, abolition of the _corvée_ and slavery; the establishment
of justice, and other beneficent reforms. But the Egyptians
would have justly considered these advantages as dearly
purchased at the expense of their domestic independence.
Moreover, Her Majesty's Government and the public opinion of
England have pronounced against such an alternative. But though
it be our fixed determination that the new _régime_ shall not
surcharge us with the responsibility of permanently
administering the country, whether directly or indirectly, it is
absolutely necessary to prevent the fabric we have raised from
tumbling to the ground the moment our sustaining hand is
withdrawn. Such a catastrophe would be the signal for the return
of confusion to this country and renewed discord in Europe. At
the present moment we are labouring in the interests of the
world at large. The desideratum of every one is an Egypt
peaceful, prosperous, and contented, able to pay its debts,
capable of maintaining order along the Canal, and offering no
excuse in the troubled condition of its affairs for interference
from outside. France, Turkey, every European Power, must be as
anxious as ourselves for the attainment of these results, nor
can they be jealous of the means we take to secure them.
"The very fact of our having endowed the country with
representative institutions is a proof of our
disinterestedness. It is the last thing we should have done had
we desired to retain its Government in leading-strings; for
however irresistible may be the control of a protecting Power
when brought to bear upon a feeble autocracy, its imperative
character disappears in the presence of a popular Assembly. The
behests of 'the Agent' are at once confronted by the _non
possumus_ of 'the Minister.' But before such a guarantee for
Egypt's independence can be said to exist, the administrative
system of which it is the leading characteristic must have time
to consolidate, in order to resist disintegrating influences
from within and without, and to acquire the use and knowledge
of its own capacities. If the multiform and balanced
organization we have contrived is to have a chance of success
it must be allowed to operate _in vacuo_. Above all, the
persons who have staked their future on its existence must have
some guarantee that it will endure. How can we expect men born
under a ruthless despotism to embark on the duties of an
Opposition--which is the vital spark of constitutional
government--to criticise, condemn, and countervail the powers
that be, if to-morrow the ark of the Constitution to which they
trusted is to break into fragments beneath their feet? Amidst
the applause of the liberal world a Parliament was called into
existence at Constantinople; a few months later it disappeared,
and its champion and fugleman is now languishing in the
dungeons of Taif. Unless they are convinced that we intend to
shield and foster the system we have established it will be in
vain to expect the timid politicians of the East to identify
themselves with its existence. But even this will not be
enough. We must also provide that the tasks intrusted to the
new political apparatus do not overtax its untried strength.
The situation of the country is too critical, the problems
immediately pressing on the attention of its rulers are too
vital to be tampered with, even in the interests of political
philosophy. Various circumstances have combined to render the
actual condition of the Egyptian fellah extremely precarious.
His relations with his European creditors are becoming
dangerously strained. The agriculture of the country is rapidly
deteriorating, the soil having become exhausted by overcropping
and other causes. The labour of the _corvée_ is no longer equal
to the cleansing of the canals. As a consequence the desert is
encroaching on the cultivated land, and, unless some remedy be
quickly found, the finances of the country will be compromised.
"With such an accumulation of difficulties, native
statesmanship, even though supplemented by the new-born
institutions, will hardly be able to cope unless assisted for a
time by our sympathy and guidance. Under these circumstances, I
would venture to submit that we can hardly consider the work of
reorganization complete, or the responsibilities imposed upon
us by circumstances adequately discharged, until we have seen
Egypt shake herself from the initial embarrassments which I
have enumerated. This point of departure once attained we can
bid her God-speed with a clear conscience, and may fairly claim
the approbation of Europe for having completed a labour which
every one desired to see accomplished, though no one was
willing to undertake it but ourselves. Even then the stability
of our handiwork will not be assured unless it is clearly
understood by all concerned that no subversive influence will
intervene between England and the Egypt she has recreated."
The projects of Lord Dufferin were theoretically complete, and, taken
together, formed a constitution which, on paper, was nearly perfect. An
army duly subordinate to the Executive was to form the ultimate
guarantee for order. An efficient police, carrying out the decrees of
independent and unbribed tribunals, was to offer complete security for
personal rights and liberty. A Khedive checked by a Council of
Ministers, which in turn was to be checked by a Legislative Council of
twenty-six, while all three were to learn from an assembly of forty-six
Notables what were the real wishes of the Egyptian people, was a
triumph of constitutional mechanics. A financial Councillor at once the
servant and the monitor of the Khedive, and always ready when requested
to bring the light of Western science to bear upon the lax ideas of
Oriental finance, lent to the whole structure of government a rigidity
and stability which could not be too greatly admired. In short, looking
at the whole ingenious apparatus, one could not but feel that nothing
was wanted to make it perfect except an Egyptian nation. The machine was
beautifully constructed and finished, but one looked in vain for the
motive power. In 1883 the Egypt of Lord Dufferin existed only in
imagination. For the most part it was a dream, and far off in the haze
of a remote future. The Constitution was excellent as a model, but where
did the strength reside that alone could make it work? One might search
through all its parts, from the Khedive to the policeman, without
finding a single trace of the vital force that was to work the whole. It
had no organic connection with the people of Egypt; it had not sprung
out of their wants or their aptitudes; it did not express their history
or embody their aspirations. The Ministers were responsible to the
Khedive, and the army was to obey him. On what was the authority to rest
which was to enable him to cope with intrigues in his Cabinet or
conspiracy among his troops? There could at that time be only one
answer, viz., the presence of the British Army of Occupation, and this
was the very institution which the project was intended to supersede.
The British forces in Egypt on the 31st of December, 1882, had been
reduced to 12,000 men.
At the opening of Parliament on the 15th February, 1883, Egyptian
affairs were referred to in the Queen's Speech in the following
terms:--"I continue to maintain relations of friendship with all the
Powers; order is now re-established in Egypt, and the British troops
will be withdrawn as promptly as may be permitted by a prudent
examination of the country."
The repeated declarations by the British Government of their intention
to withdraw the Army of Occupation excited the utmost alarm amongst the
European inhabitants of Egypt. These last, driven from their homes by
the events to a great extent brought about by England's intervention in
1882, had now, trusting to the protection of the British force, returned
to the country and resumed their former avocations. Upon this class the
Ministerial utterances produced the worst possible effect. Owing to the
feeling of uncertainty which in consequence prevailed, all large
operations were at a standstill. No one was disposed to lay out his
money in a country which might at any moment be handed back to the care
of a native administration, and at Alexandria miles of blackened ruins
still marked the results of British interference.
Whether the feeling of alarm was justified or not, there is no doubt
that at this time the sentiments of the natives were not friendly
towards Europeans. In the provinces Europeans were openly insulted and
threatened by the natives, and in many of the villages acts of
brigandage were of frequent occurrence.
The repeated Ministerial declarations of an impending withdrawal from
Egypt not only created anxiety amongst the European population, and to a
great extent paralyzed commerce and prevented the inflow of capital, but
they exercised a most injurious effect upon the reforms which the
British Government professed such anxiety to push forward. On every side
the same story was told. The natives, daily given to understand that the
rule of the English was shortly coming to an end, opposed a passive
obstructiveness, in those cases where they did not offer active
opposition, to the intended changes. "What is the use of your making all
these alterations," reasoned the Egyptian official, "if they are not to
last?" That they _could_ last after the departure of the English was an
idea which never appeared worthy of a moment's consideration by him.
This was the condition of things when, early in the month of March, a
petition in English, French, Italian, and Greek was drawn up and
addressed to Lord Dufferin. The document pointed out that whilst
recognizing that it was by the British forces that the disturbances of
1882 had been suppressed, the state of affairs in Egypt was such as to
show that the permanent retention of a European force was the only means
by which order could be maintained, and the security of the European
population assured. The petition bore 2,600 signatures, mostly of
influential persons of all nationalities. It was presented to Lord
Dufferin by a deputation, and by him transmitted to the Foreign Office.
From that date nothing more was heard of it, and it was probably placed
in the same pigeon-hole as the memorial for protection sent by the
British residents just previous to the riots of the 11th June.
On the 29th April, Lieutenant-General F. C. A. Stephenson was appointed
to the command of the Army of Occupation, in succession to Sir Archibald
Alison.
Lord Dufferin left the carrying out of his scheme of Egyptian reform in
the able hands of Sir Evelyn Baring, and returned to Constantinople on
the 3rd May.[88]
CHAPTER XXVIII.
OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MAHDI.
The situation in the Soudan at the period referred to at the close of
Chapter XXVI. was, it must be confessed, critical enough, and it is not
surprising that, on the 7th November, 1882, Lord Granville caused the
Khedive to be informed that the British Government were unwilling to
take any responsibility in regard to it. Left to their own resources,
the Egyptian Government had no alternative but to re-enlist about 10,000
of Arabi's old officers and men for service in the South.
Early in November the collection of these soldiers and their
concentration at the Barrage, near Cairo, began. Most of them had to be
brought in chains, and desertions were frequent. They were transported
by detachments to Berber, viâ Souakim, their arms and ammunition being
sent separately. Altogether, 9,500 were collected and despatched.
Most of these troops were deplorably ignorant of all notions of drill,
and were little more than an armed mob. Their officers were no better.
Many of them had been engaged in the recent operations in Lower Egypt,
which did not tend to increase their military spirit. Others looked on
service in the Soudan as a sentence of death, and deemed that the
Khedive's purpose in sending them was to get rid of them. Considering,
also, the superstitious notions which many of them had of the power and
invincibility of the Mahdi, and of the valour of his savage followers,
it can hardly be supposed that the new levies were such as to inspire
confidence, or that to advance with such a rabble was to court anything
else but defeat.
The first thing to be done was to try to teach them something. They
were, for this purpose, isolated from the town in a camp on the western
bank of the Nile. Here Abdel Kader devoted himself personally to giving
them instruction in drill, teaching them to fire and lecturing their
officers.
Meanwhile, on the 11th November, the Mahdi sent Amr-el-Makashef to
attack Duem, on the west bank of the White Nile. After some delay, the
Mahdist forces arrived before the town. The garrison telegraphed for
assistance, and a battalion of the newly arrived levies was sent to
their relief, but, owing to a dispute amongst the native officers in
command, it effected nothing, and Duem was left to take its chance.
After this failure, it is not surprising that Abdel Kader telegraphed to
the Egyptian Government, requesting that some European officers might be
placed at his disposal, and on 16th December, Colonel Stewart and two
other British officers arrived at Khartoum. They found that place quiet,
but Obeid and Bara were still unrelieved, and Abdel Kader was standing
out for seven additional battalions before he would advance to their
assistance.
At the end of December, news was received that Bara was still holding
out, though greatly in want of provisions, and that the Mahdi was
marching in that direction with the bulk of his forces; also, that a
second Mahdi had appeared on the scene, but had been promptly hung by
order of the first.
Abdel Kader, on 11th January, 1883, left Khartoum to take command of the
troops operating between the White and Blue Niles. His intention was to
clear the province of Sennar. As the force advanced, the country was
found deserted, the inhabitants having gone to join the Mahdi. At Abut
he determined to await the arrival of another battalion before advancing
further.
Whilst halting at this spot it became necessary to despatch the 1st
battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the Line from Khartoum to suppress
troubles which had arisen amongst the Hassaniyeh nomads on the White
Nile. The troops left in two steamers. When near the village where
operations were to commence, one steamer ran aground. The other went on,
landed three companies and opened fire on the rebels. At this moment a
handful of the latter falling on two of the companies which had not yet
formed up was the signal for a general flight of the troops to the
river, with heavy loss, including the Bimbashi (or Major) in command,
who was killed by his own men in the confusion. When the other steamer
arrived a council of war was held, and it was decided to make no further
attack upon the enemy, although they were only 400 strong. On the 26th,
another Bimbashi arrived to replace the one who had been killed. He took
the field at once, and ordered an advance on the village before
daybreak. The other officers remonstrated, saying that, if they marched
in the dark through an unknown country, they would all be killed, and
on the Bimbashi remaining firm, five of them went at once on the sick
list. The advance was made in square formation, preceded by a guard and
scouts, up to a narrow strip of forest, which lay between the Egyptian
force and the village. Two companies were ordered into the forest to
reconnoitre the road, but the officers refused to advance, saying that
they and their men would certainly be killed. Some of the soldiers at
this time, firing off their rifles contrary to orders, gave the alarm to
the rebels, who advanced through the wood, and the Egyptian force fled
back to their boats.
The above episode gives a fair idea of the fighting capacity of the
Egyptian officers and men, and the truth of the matter seems at this
period to have dawned upon the authorities at Cairo; for on the 23rd of
January a telegram from the Khedive to Hussein Pasha Serri, the senior
military officer in charge at Khartoum, ordered all operations to be
suspended, and all the troops to be concentrated there, pending the
arrival of English staff officers from Cairo.
The orders of the Khedive were communicated to Abdel Kader, who,
nevertheless, declined to obey. The reason he gave was that, by the
withdrawal of the troops, the rebellion would be allowed to extend in
the eastern provinces, and that if the expedition did not leave promptly
for Kordofan, that province, as well as Darfur, would be lost to Egypt.
It is quite possible, also, that Abdel Kader, who was undoubtedly an
able leader, was disinclined to allow the work to be taken out of his
hands. In any case, he did not for a moment relax his efforts. On the
27th he defeated the rebels at Maatuk, with a loss of 600 killed and
wounded; directed a successful engagement at Baatuk; and on February 1st
reached Kawa, where he was joined by three battalions ordered up from
Shawal and Karash. He then left for Khartoum, after giving directions
for the disposal of the force in his absence.
On the 11th of February a messenger brought the news to Khartoum that
Bara had surrendered to the Mahdi on the 5th January. Four days later
intelligence was received of the capitulation of El Obeid on January
17th. According to the details received from this last place, it would
appear that on the 16th or 17th negotiations were opened, and a meeting
of delegates on either side was appointed for the next day. On this
becoming known, many of the troops at once left and joined the rebels,
who made an attack in force on the following day. The Bey in command
ordered the soldiers to resist, but they refused and went over to the
enemy; the artillery fired in the air, and the commandant, taking this
as a sign of collusion with the rebels, made an unconditional surrender.
The capture of these two strongholds placed the whole of Kordofan in the
hands of the Mahdi, who also obtained possession of 5,500 prisoners, 600
Remington rifles and five guns.
On the 13th February Abdel Kader rejoined his troops and proceeded
towards Sennar with three battalions and about 600 Bashi-Bazouks. The
Mahdi, on his approach, advanced from Sennar to meet him with a force
estimated at from 10,000 to 12,000 men. These, under the command of
Amr-el-Makashef, attacked the Egyptians on the 24th, but after a fight
lasting three hours were repulsed with a loss stated at 2,000 in killed
alone. After this success, Sennar was occupied without resistance, and
communications were re-established between that place and Khartoum.
On the 20th February, Al-ed Din Pasha, a Turkish cavalry officer, who
was sent to supersede Abdel Kader, arrived at Khartoum, and was on the
26th March proclaimed Governor-General of the Soudan.
It now becomes necessary to go back a little to the period of the
appointment of the European officers applied for by Abdel Kader.
In January, 1883, Colonel W. Hicks, subsequently known as Hicks Pasha,
was appointed by the Khedive Chief of the Staff of the Army of the
Soudan, with the local rank of Major-General. Though not named
Commander-in-Chief till the August following, it was intended that he
should direct and be responsible for all the operations, whilst
nominally holding a subordinate post.
Hicks was a retired officer of the Indian army, which he had entered in
1849. He had taken part in the suppression of the Indian Mutiny, under
Lord Clyde, and had accompanied Lord Napier's expedition to Abyssinia,
being present at the taking of Magdala. In 1882, when holding the
retired rank of Colonel, he went to Egypt, and joined the Egyptian
service in the following year. Though a popular and attractive officer,
he is said to have had little or no experience in handling troops in the
field. His appointment was made by the Egyptian, without reference to
the English, Government. With him were associated the following British
officers, all nominated in the same manner, viz.: Colonels Colborne and
De Cöetlogon, Majors Farquhar and Martin, and Captains Warner, Massey,
and Forrestier-Walker.
Hicks and his staff left Cairo on the 7th of February for Souakim, and
started thence for Berber by the desert route on the 11th. The caravan,
which consisted of 145 camels, besides horses, and was accompanied by
350 Bashi-Bazouks and over 100 Egyptian soldiers, reached Berber on the
1st of March. Here the news of the fall of Bara and Obeid was received.
Hicks proceeded to Khartoum on the 4th of March, and the next few weeks
were spent in the necessary training of his men.
On April 6th, Hicks and Colborne, bringing reinforcements, joined the
Egyptian force encamped at Kawa, to lead it against a body of about
6,000 Mahdists, reported to be assembling at Marabieh and Abu Djumal, on
the White Nile, south of Khartoum. On the 21st, Hicks started to
reconnoitre the enemy, and on the 23rd the Egyptian army, numbering
about 5,000 men with four Nordenfeldt guns, under the nominal command of
Suleiman Pasha,[89] marched against the enemy. On the 25th, Hicks
rejoined the camp with the intelligence that the rebels had left
Geb-el-Ain and were moving to attack the "Turks," as the Egyptian force
was termed, on their march from Kawa.
On the following day the enemy threatened an attack, but, finding the
Egyptians on the alert, retired. Two days' more marching brought the
force close to the village of Marabieh. On the 28th, when about an hour
from this place, Colonel Farquhar, who had been scouting in company with
four Bashi-Bazouks, raced in to report the enemy's advance. So rapid was
this that in a quarter of an hour they were seen coming on in a cloud,
consisting of both cavalry and spearmen, led by their chiefs carrying
gaily-coloured banners. They emerged in thousands through openings in a
wood in front. Fortunately Hicks had his men formed in a solid square
and ready to receive the attack. As usual, all baggage, camels, and camp
followers were in the centre. Along each face bristled a thousand rifles
and at each corner were placed Nordenfeldt guns and rocket tubes.
"Crows' feet," or little iron spikes joined four together, were thrown
out so as to make the ground difficult for bare-footed men or unshod
horses. As the enemy came on they spread out towards the flanks, as if
with the intention of attacking the angles of the square. A couple of
rockets were discharged from the Egyptian force, but the missiles burst
amongst Hicks' own men. This was followed by the fire of the howitzers,
and no sooner had the first few shells fallen amongst the advancing
horsemen than they broke and moved off the field.
The infantry still came on boldly, sweeping with an inward curve right
and left, the extreme flanks converging towards the opposing corners of
the position. File firing commenced from the front of the Egyptian
force, which was directly assailed. The men were formed in ranks four
deep, and used their Remingtons with deadly effect. Nevertheless, though
shot down in numbers many of the enemy continued their onward rush, and
succeeded in getting close enough to the square to throw their spears
into it. Encouraged by the presence of their English officers, the
Egyptians stood their ground and poured volley after volley into the
attacking force, whilst the Nordenfeldts, when got to work, did much
execution.
After half an hour's fighting, in which Amr-el-Makashef, who was in
command, and other chiefs were killed, the force was entirely broken up
and fled in confusion. A few of the rebels continued to come up singly
after the rest had retired, and brandished their spears in defiance. One
after another these courageous fanatics were knocked over, and when the
smoke had rolled away the ground was seen strewn with corpses, most of
them within 400 yards of the square.
When victory was assured, the enthusiasm of the soldiers knew no bounds,
and unaccustomed to find themselves on the winning side, they indulged
in the wildest demonstrations, whilst the Egyptian officers rushed to
shake hands with their English comrades.
The number of Amr-el-Makashef's forces engaged was estimated at from
4,000 to 5,000 (though they may have been less), and their losses at
500. The Egyptian loss was merely nominal, only two men being killed and
five wounded. This may be accounted for by the fact that, so far as
appears, the enemy were unprovided with firearms, and that no
hand-to-hand fight took place.
After Suleiman's men had rested sufficiently, there being no indications
of the attack being renewed, the bugles sounded the advance, and the
troops were again on the march. Halting every night, a few days only
witnessed their arrival at Geb-el-Ain, whence after a short stay Hicks
and the whole force returned to Khartoum, leaving only a few men to
garrison Kawa and Duem.
Hicks, as has been seen, began well, and the immediate result of his
victory was that the province of Sennar, the capital of which had been
threatened, was entirely pacified, whilst the population of Khartoum was
reassured.
The rebel chiefs in great numbers came in, made their submission, and
returned to peaceful occupations.
The reconquest of Kordofan was now decided on by the Egyptian
Government, the annihilation of the Mahdi having become a matter of
vital importance from the fact of his emissaries being discovered
engaged in fomenting a revolt in Khartoum itself.
On the 13th of May, Hicks telegraphed to Cairo requesting that he might
be put in undisputed command of the troops, as otherwise he could not be
responsible for the proposed expedition. He was fully alive to the
difficulties of the task before him. A council of war was held at
Khartoum on the 6th of June, when the measures to be adopted in the
coming Kordofan campaign were discussed, and it was unanimously decided
to ask for reinforcements from Cairo, the available force at Hicks'
disposal being quite inadequate for the undertaking. Hicks' application
was for 6,000 men, who, he begged, should be sent in time to enable him
to commence operations as soon as the rainy season should be over.
The Egyptian Government, on the 11th of June, decided to despatch 3,000
men as reinforcements; 600 of these were Bashi-Bazouks, and 1,800 were
old soldiers who had been rejected by General Baker as unfit for the
reorganized army.
Hicks was evidently at this time in doubt as to how far he was to
exercise real authority over the expedition, and asked that distinct
orders should be sent that all directions he might give during the
campaign should be obeyed. On the 23rd of July Hicks telegraphed his
resignation in the following terms:--
"I have to-day sent to the War Office my resignation of my
appointment with the Soudan army. I have done so with regret,
but I cannot undertake another campaign under the same
circumstances as the last. Suleiman Pasha tells me that he does
not understand from the telegram of the President of the
Council, dated the 14th July, that he is bound to carry out my
views with regard to the order or mode of advance or attack of
the army now preparing for Kordofan, unless he approves of them.
In fact, he says he should be acting contrary to instructions if
he carried out my views, and did not agree with them. As my
views and his were so opposed in the last campaign, and would be
more so in the Kordofan campaign, I can only resign. Within the
last few days, on two important occasions my views have been
disregarded."
On the 31st of July Hicks withdrew his resignation and was appointed to
the chief command, Suleiman being recalled and nominated governor of the
Red Sea Provinces.
Great efforts had to be made to supply the means of transport for the
Kordofan column, and Al-ed Din Pasha himself had to go off to the
country east of the Blue Nile for camels, at least 5,000 of which were
required. Early in August he returned, having succeeded in getting
together some 4,000.
The Mahdi seems, at this time, to have also been giving his attention to
the question of transport. According to one report he had sent some
Dervishes to the Kabbabish tribes to requisition camels. At first the
tribesmen thought of refusing to obey this order, but on second thoughts
they resolved to dissemble. The sheikh accordingly wrote to say, "Send
your men down and we will give you camels." When, however, the
emissaries of the Mahdi came to fetch them they were greeted in the
following logical manner, "Your master is a lost man. If he is the
Prophet he can have no need of camels. If he is not we are not bound to
give him any," and in order that there might be no mistake as to their
views, the Kabbabishes promptly fell upon the Dervishes and killed them.
In the months of July and August the reinforcements from Cairo began to
arrive, and as they came up were concentrated with the rest of the
force at Omdurman, opposite Khartoum where a regular camp had been
formed.
On the 9th of September, 1883, Hicks' army marched out from the camp at
Omdurman on its way to Duem, 110 miles distant. The force then consisted
of 10,000 men (including camel-men and camp followers) with four Krupp
field guns, ten mountain guns, and six Nordenfeldts. The undermentioned
Europeans accompanied the force, which Hicks subsequently joined at
Duem:--Colonel Farquhar, chief of the staff; Majors Seckendorff, Warner,
Massy, and Evans; Captains Herlth and Matyuga; Lieutenant Morris Brody;
Surgeon-General Georges Bey and Surgeon-Major Rosenberg; Mr. O'Donovan,
correspondent of the "Daily News," and Mr. Vizetelly, artist of the
"Graphic."
On the march to Duem no hostility was encountered. Most of the natives
had fled at the approach of the troops. The heat was intense, the
thermometer ranging from 105 to 115 degrees Fahrenheit in the shade.
Four men and 200 camels died on the way. The expedition reached Duem on
the 20th, where it was met by Al-ed Din Pasha.
Hicks on the 6th of September had telegraphed to Cairo that he was
starting for Kordofan; he added that he expected to encounter great
difficulties in supplying his force with water. Kordofan, it may be
observed, is the driest province in the Soudan. The wells contained but
little water except immediately after the rains, and even then they were
insufficient for a large force with camels, horses, &c.
His original plan was to march to Bara and Obeid by the northern and
more direct route. By this road the distance would be about 136 miles.
Posts were to have been established along the line to keep up
communication with the river at Duem, where a depôt was to have been
formed. Both Bara and Obeid were to have been retaken and garrisoned.
The former, being thirty-five miles to the north of the latter, and
situated in a fertile country, was to have been first attacked. Here it
was proposed the army should remain for a few days to rest and replenish
its stores.
On Hicks joining the army at Duem, these arrangements had to be entirely
changed. According to Al-ed Din Pasha, the information he had obtained
led him to believe that the best supply of water would be found on the
southern route by Shatt, Norabi, and the Khor-Abu-Hable to Rahad, some
forty-five miles east of Obeid. The distance by this route, however, was
fully 250 miles, being more than 100 miles greater than by the northern
road--a very grave objection. It had been all along known that on
striking the Khor-Abu-Hable, which is a torrent taking its rise in
Ghebel-Kulfan, a mountain some fifty miles south of Obeid, the army
could follow its course for 100 miles, thus making sure of an ample
supply of water for that distance. But the difficulty consisted in
reaching Norabi, ninety miles distant from Duem, and it was this
consideration which had induced Hicks to reject this route. Now Al-ed
Din represented that water could be found between the two places, and
the question of water supply being paramount, Hicks was induced to
change his decision and proceed by the southern route, notwithstanding
the increased distance.
On the 24th of September an advance party of 2,400 infantry, one
squadron of Bashi-Bazouks, two Krupp and four mountain guns, seized the
wells at the village of Shatt, sixteen miles distant. Here the first
post was established.
On the 27th, Hicks telegraphed to the Minister of War from Shatt that
the main body of the army would march forward that day, and added, "The
difficulty of getting over the increased distance is nothing when the
facilities for obtaining water on the march by this route are taken into
consideration."
On the same day the army marched forth to its fate. Taking a
south-westerly direction, on the 30th it encamped at Zeraiga, a village
thirty miles south-west of Duem. The heat continued to be overpowering,
and the camels were dying in numbers. During the march a difference of
opinion arose between Hicks and Al-ed Din, the latter, in view of the
change of route, wishing to give up the proposed series of posts
connecting the army with its base. Hicks, on the other hand, was most
unwilling, for obvious reasons, to take any such step. In a despatch,
without date, in the General's writing, purporting to be written from a
spot twenty-eight miles from Serakna, Hicks thus expresses himself:--
"The army has arrived within twenty-eight miles of Serakna,
which place is twenty-two miles from Norabi. We have depended
upon pools of rainwater for supply, which we have fortunately
found. A reconnaissance made to-day insures us water as far as
Serakna, guides' information is vague. I regret that I have to
abandon my intention of establishing military posts and line of
communication with base at Duem. Al-ed Din assures me that the
Arabs will close in on my route after the army has passed in
sufficient force to prevent posts forwarding supplies. Besides,
the pools of rain-water, the only supply, will dry up. Water not
to be obtained by digging wells. I have no information regarding
water between Serakna and Norabi, nor reliable information of
the supply there. This causes me great anxiety."
The determination to abandon the posts was not come to without a council
of war being summoned; and Hicks on the 3rd of October, on the army
reaching a place near Serakna, wrote a report (the last communication
ever received from him) giving the opinions of the members of the
council in favour of abandoning the series of posts which he had wished
to establish, and the reasons which induced him, against his better
judgment, to bow to their decision.
After this the army appears to have arrived on the 7th of October at
Sanga Hamferid, forty-five miles south-west of Duem. A letter from Mr.
O'Donovan from that position, and dated the 10th of October, says, "We
have halted for the past three days owing to the uncertainty of the
water supply in front. Here we are entirely dependent on surface pools.
A reconnaissance of thirty miles forward yesterday by Colonel Farquhar
ascertained that the pools were barely sufficient for a rapid march to
the village of Serakna, now deserted, where there are a few wells. The
enemy is still retiring and sweeping the country bare of cattle."