yet a third alternative offered to him, that the Lord
Mayor of London had undertaken to keep him safe if he came
to the city, and that the plan had even been formed for
his appearance at a review of the militia, fixed for May
5 in Hyde Park, but that Parliament had been informed of
the scheme and postponed the review. The story is of a
somewhat apocryphal character and wrong in its date[455],
and therefore cannot be accepted; but it is true that a
review was to have been held, and was put off by Parliament
on pretexts which have no importance[456]. The Parliament [A.D. 1646.]
declared it to be high treason secretly to receive and
harbour the King: it forbade any Royalist to remain
in London or its vicinity. Its resolutions betray
agitation, and a fear that the King would find sympathy
among the people. He would not have been freed in London
from the necessity of assenting to the introduction of
Presbyterianism; but the court at Oxford was convinced that
the city would not compel him to such hard conditions, and
that his liberty of conscience would be safer than with the
Scots[457]. And in fact the King all but took the way to
London. He did not take his two nephews with him, though
that had been his intention hitherto, for Rupert was easily
recognisable by his great stature, and was hated in the
country. Attended only by his captain, Hudson, and the
faithful Ashburnham, whose servant he pretended to be, with
a valise behind his saddle, Charles I on April 27 quitted
Oxford, and reached Brentford and Harrow-on-the-Hill, in
the immediate neighbourhood of the capital: and here the
King was very near venturing into London itself[458]. But
the vigilance of Parliament seems to have been too severe,
his prospects not clear enough. After remaining there two
days in concealment, during which fresh negotiations had
been entered into with the Scots, he at last resolved
to betake himself to their camp at Newark. Although his
earlier dealings with them had had no result, yet he did
not appear quite as a fugitive seeking help. His arrival
gave the Scots an advantage; for they were much afraid of
his falling, in one way or another, into the hands of the
Independents, and giving to their views the authority of
his name: it was much better and safer if the King found
shelter in their camp. The English troops who were taking
part in the siege of Newark, were not only astonished, but
also jealous, at seeing their King enter the abode of the
French ambassador, near their quarters in Southwell, and soon
afterwards, surrounded by Scottish troops, remove to the [A.D. 1646.]
head-quarters of General Lesley. The Scots were afraid
that the English army, which was far stronger than theirs,
might try to carry off the King by force[459]. In London
this unexpected dénouement produced the greatest impression
on both sides. The Presbyterians were satisfied; the
Independents, says Baillie, were very wroth thereat.
After Newark had been surrendered to the English troops at
the wish of the Scots, with consent of the King--for they
did not wish to excite their jealousy any further--they
hastened to conduct him to Newcastle, near their own
frontier. They knew perfectly well how valuable he was
to them. They calculated that his presence would serve
to keep in dependence the still unconquered Royalists in
Scotland, and above all the English Presbyterians. They
thought further that the King would ultimately not refuse
to sign the Covenant, whereupon they would strengthen his
authority. Their object was to bring to completion that
combination which has been so often mentioned, with the
French, the King, and the English Presbyterians, who formed
the most numerous party in the country, and by this means
to make head against the Independents.
FOOTNOTES:
[436] Areopagitica. Milton’s Prose Works ii. 48.
[437] ‘The power which is directive and states and
ascertains the morality of the rule for obedience, is in
the law of God: but the original, whence all just power
arises, which is magistratical and coercitive, is from the
will or free gift of the people who may either keep the
power in themselves, or give up their subjection and will
in the hand of another.’ (Vane, The People’s Case Stated.)
[438] Baillie, September 16, 1644. ‘Manchester a sweet
meek man permitted his lieutenant Ol. Cromwell to guide
all the army at his pleasure--being a known independent,
the most of the Sojours (soldiers) who loved new wayes put
themselves under his command.’ 20 October: ‘All sectaries
who pleased to be sojours, for a long time casting
themselves from all the other, arrived under his command in
one bodie.’
[439] Reliquae Baxterianae 50.
[440] So Lord Holland told the French minister Montereuil:
‘ils avoient dispose des séditieux aux lieux où la lecture
s’en devait faire, avec ordre de porter le peuple à la
demande de la déposition de leur roi.’
[441] Memoirs of Denzil Lord Hollis, in Maseres i. 207.
[442] Copies of two letters sent to the Independent party
by H. M’s command. Clarendon Papers ii. 226. The first
begins ‘You cannot suppose the work is done, though God
should suffer you to destroy the King.’
[443] ‘If Presbytery shall be so strongly insisted upon as
that there can be no peace without it, you shall certainly
have all the power my master can make to join with you in
rooting out of this kingdom that tyrannical government,
with this condition, that my master may not have his
conscience disturbed, yours being free when the work is
finished.’
[444] Instruction à M. de Sabran, 29 Août, 1644: ‘Le
favoriser en tout pour rétablir la légitime autorité,
sans pourtant paroître de vouloir élever la puissance
si haut, que le roi deviendroit seigneur et monarque de
l’Angleterre, où les loix faisant contrepoids à la trop
grande puissance des rois doivent être maintenues en leur
entier pour apaiser les esprits et assoupir les troubles.’
[445] Holograph of Charles I, Nov. 1644. ‘Either he
complyes not with his instructions, or France is not so
much our friend as we hope for.’ (St. P. O.)
[446] Observations sur une lettre de Mr. Jermyn. ‘Les
Ecossois feront entrer les Anglais dans une ligue et
alliance avec la France, si elle le désire.’
[447] Instruction à Mr. de Bellièvre (Ambassade de
Bellièvre).
[448] Dépêche de Montereuil, Août 14/24, 1645.
[449] Montereuil, Oct. 12, 1645. ‘Il me dit qu’il n’y avoit
plus qu’un moyen pour sauver le roy de la Gr. Bretagne, qui
serait de luy conseiller de se jetter dédans l’armée des
Ecossais.’
[450] The question was asked of them ‘Comment ils peuvent
obliger les indépendants à accepter les dites propositions,
et ce qu’ils feront si elles sont refusées par les dits
independants. Answer 1. Par les raisons de l’alliance faite
entre eux (les deux nations), et 2. par la force même, s’il
est nécessaire.’ (Protocol in Montereuil’s papers.)
[451] Several messages sent by his Majesty to the Scots
commissioners. Clarendon Papers ii. 219, 220.
[452] ‘Qu’il tiouveroit toute sorte de sûreté dans leur
armée, qu’il y serait reçu avec honneur, qu’on n’y
forceroit point sa conscience, qu’au cas que le parlement
d’Angleterre luy vouloit ôter ses justes prerogatives, ils
se declareroient pour les assurer.’
[453] ‘That the King of Great Britain shall put himself
into the Scots army, he shall be there received as their
natural sovereign, and that he shall be with them in all
freedom of his conscience and honour.’ Montereuil refers
thereupon to ‘Les promesses que j’avois eu de leur part à
Londres.’
[454] ‘To give me a noble and friendly assistance by arms.’
Charles to Henrietta Maria, April 6.
[455] Racconto della fuga del re d’Inghilterra d’Oxonia al
campo scozzese, scritta da un cavaliere Inglese, Londra
17 Giugno 1646. Min. Rom. ‘Quando avesse trovato mezzo
di trasferirsi incognito al luogo destinato, l’averebbe
accolto in mezzo dell’ esercito.’
[456] Journals of Commons, 4 May. Rushworth vi. 267.
[457] Ashburnham Narrative: ‘They supposing that if H. Maj,
could have come safe to London--they would have accepted
him with much more moderation.’ Ashburnham himself does
not seem to have been convinced of the reality of the
combination.
[458] Hudson: ‘Where he was almost persuaded to come to
London.’
[459] Private memorandum for Lord Balcarres, May 4, 1646.
Appendix to Baillie ii. 514. Cp. Letter to Spang, May 15,
ib. 370.
CHAPTER II.
CHARLES I AT NEWCASTLE.
Externally the Scots treated the King with all the respect
due to his rank; but they allowed him no liberty whatever.
On the march to Newcastle, which was made with the utmost
haste--for they were always afraid of opposition from
the Independent army--the King sought to ascertain how
they were inclined towards him from an officer whom he
trusted[460]. As this man was telling him that he must
regard himself as a prisoner, Lesley gave him a proof of
the fact by peremptorily interrupting the conversation.
Only Montereuil, to whom it could not be refused, was
allowed to see the King occasionally; otherwise no one was
admitted. The sentinels posted round his quarters were
ordered to keep good watch on the windows, that letters
might not be thrown out unobserved and received below. The
Scots wished to separate their King from all the world,
and keep him exclusively under their own influence; for
their main object was to induce him actually to make the
concessions which were necessary to the consolidation of
Presbyterianism in Scotland and in England.
As Charles I had already declared himself willing to
receive instruction in Presbyterianism, an attempt was
first of all made to convince him of the truth of that
system. Alexander Henderson, whom the King already liked,
was immediately despatched to Newcastle, to ‘heal the
prince as a good physician of the predilection which he had
for the Episcopalian system.’ This predilection however [A.D. 1646.]
was in the King not merely a matter of feeling, but
depended on conviction, grounded on theological study.
It has always been a matter of wonder that the King was
so well able, without extraneous help, to encounter the
trained Presbyterian controversialist in the correspondence
which was preferred to oral discussion[461].
Above all things he maintained firmly that his standpoint
was a sound one both in right and historically, for that
the English Reformation had been made by those whose
right to do so could not be called in question, and that
in it there had been no intention of abolishing any of
the things which had been in use in the Christian Church
ever since the times of the Apostles. Henderson repeated
in relation to the first point the old Scottish doctrine,
that if the prince neglected the necessary reformation,
the right passed to the lower magistrates; and in relation
to Episcopacy, that it could not be shown to exist in the
first centuries. The King asked whether this last was not
the case with the Presbyterian system, for he thought that
nothing had been heard of it until Calvin. He required a
scriptural proof of the lower magistrates’ right to make
reforms. Beyond this he added that he was bound by the
oath taken at his coronation to maintain the Episcopal
establishment. Henderson remarked that the oath lost its
binding force when remitted by those for whose advantage
it was taken, as had been done in the present case through
Parliament. Charles answered that he had taken this oath
not to Parliament, but to the English Church, which was not
dependent on Parliament. Henderson replied that it was to
the Church in its entirety, for the safety of the people
was ever the highest law. The King did not admit that this
constituted any release from his oath, for on those grounds
we might set aside all laws.
The King resisted Henderson’s arguments: but might he not
be so far impressed by them as to be inclined to give way
on the representation of its being absolutely necessary?
The English Parliament had again discussed the Uxbridge [A.D. 1646.]
propositions, altered them in some points, and resolved
to present them once more to the King: but now no
further negotiation was to be allowed; he must accept
the propositions simply, like parliamentary bills. The
Scots were affected by some of these alterations; among
others the control of military matters, over which they
had before been allowed some influence, was claimed
exclusively for the English Parliament. They were well
aware of this, but considering that the chief contents of
the old propositions, namely the abolition of the Episcopal
system and the substitution of Presbyterianism, were
still retained, they deemed it better to give way on the
remaining points[462]. At the delivery of the propositions
on July 24 at Newcastle, the Chancellor of Scotland
insisted as strongly as possible that the King must accept
them without further delay. He told him plainly that if he
refused he would lose all his friends in Parliament, the
city and the country, that England would rise as one man
against him, that they would bring him to trial, depose
him, and settle the kingdom without him to the ruin of
him and his posterity. But the King had already formed
his resolution. He did not believe that all the threats
uttered by the Scots would be fulfilled, but if even the
worst came he would not yield to these demands. The English
commissioners declared, as they were instructed, that they
could enter into no discussion: their orders were to return
within ten days to London with Yes or No. The King however
still gave an evasive answer, insisting on the necessity of
a fresh debate.
It was not in this Prince’s nature to give way to threats:
the expectation of a political reaction in his favour
formed a stronger inducement. The Scots had in view not
merely the maintenance of their control over the King:
his compliance would also serve them as a weapon against
the Independents, whose influence in Parliament was daily
growing, from whom the greater stringency of the conditions
had mainly proceeded, and who wished for nothing so much
as for the failure of all negotiations. For what the Scots [A.D. 1646.]
most wished, the establishment of Presbyterianism, the
Independents most abhorred. It was clear that the King’s
procrastinating answer, which they represented as a
refusal, was acceptable and advantageous to them.
Could no means be found, not so much for informing the
King, for he knew the facts already, but for convincing him
that it was to his own interest, since the Independents
openly threatened the monarchy, to unite against them with
the Presbyterians, who would retain at least the form of
royal power? Might he not by this consideration be induced
to make a concession which otherwise he would refuse?
This was the point of view from which the state of things
was represented to the newly arrived French ambassador.
It was the same Bellièvre whom we have met with once
before at a fatal moment as representative of France
in England. He renewed his old acquaintance with Lord
Holland, receiving his suggestions chiefly in the social
circles to which the latter belonged, at the houses of
Lady Carlisle and the Countess of Devonshire: but how
different was their tone from what it had been at the time
of his first residence! Then Lord Holland had been one of
the most active leaders of the opposition to the King;
now he saw himself threatened by a party which had risen
up since, far more resolute, and really anti-monarchical:
he and his friends sought to lean on the King. Bellièvre
was convinced that the further rise of the Independents
would annihilate the crown altogether, and that the only
escape lay in an alliance with the Presbyterians; for these
latter now again spoke favourably of monarchy: in London
men seemed to regret having gone so far, and declared
themselves ready to restore to the King such authority
as his ancestors had possessed[463]. The Scots promised
to intercede for the Queen, especially to procure the
return of the banished members of her household: but they
insisted on the unconditional and immediate acceptance of
the propositions, for on this it depended whether they
could think of disbanding the army, which would of itself [A.D. 1646.]
put an end to the power of the Independents; and then it
would also be possible to limit the further duration of the
Parliament to a definite time, on the expiration of which
it should dissolve. They also gave a hope that the King
might be relieved from giving his personal adherence to the
Covenant[464]. The ambassador adopted these views without
hesitation: he could see no means of saving the crown and
state of England except in the unconditional acceptance by
the King of the propositions offered. He sent Montereuil
to Paris, instructing him to use every means to induce
the court, in consideration of the pressing danger and
of the private interests of France, to approve the terms
and recommend them to the Queen, whose influence with the
King gave some reason to expect that he might even yet be
induced to accept the propositions[465].
The propositions of Newcastle were discussed in every shape
in the French council; but much as they wished to see an
agreement between the King and the Presbyterians, they
never for an instant hesitated to reject them, as ruinous
to the Catholic Church and in complete contradiction to the
conditions claimed for the Queen of England: moreover one
king could not possibly advise another to strip himself of
the characteristic marks of sovereignty, which would be
exciting all neighbouring nations to similar rebellion.
Queen Henrietta herself was decidedly against it: the
promise that the King should not be compelled to sign the
Covenant, and that Parliament should be dissolved, she
treated as vain and chimerical. Bellièvre had expressed
the opinion that the King might hereafter revoke what he
now granted. The Queen observed that if he signed the
propositions he would give them legal validity, and neither
he nor his successors would ever be able to free themselves
from them, for the people would never suffer themselves
to be deprived of them again: he would be changing an
usurpation into a legal right. And when Bellièvre expressed
the apprehension that they would try the King and depose [A.D. 1646.]
him, and set up an independent government under the third
prince, the Duke of Gloucester, the Queen thought that even
this would be better than that Charles I should in solemn
form deprive himself of his power, and clothe Parliament
with it. Cardinal Mazarin fully concurred in all this; for
they durst not let it come to pass that the King should
remain such in name only[466].
Two points especially of the propositions repeated at
Newcastle appeared to France inadmissible; one, that
the power to dispose of the army and to raise the means
necessary for its maintenance should be given over for
twenty years, dating from July 1, 1646, into the hands
of the Parliament, as well in Scotland as in England and
Ireland; the other that a great list should be drawn up of
classes of persons disqualified to receive any amnesty,
comprising all those, Scots as well as Englishmen, who
had ever supported the King’s cause in the field or in
negotiations.
The French statesmen had a double motive for not wishing
to give the Independents the opportunity of possessing
themselves of the supreme authority: they were afraid
of their anti-monarchical doctrines and their general
influence in Europe, but moreover they feared that Great
Britain might form a compact power on principles opposite
to their own. They did not however mean to avert these
dangers by recommending concessions which were contrary to
monarchy as understood in France, but by influence over the
Scots and renewal of their league with them.
Bellièvre, who in his earlier mission had worked chiefly
for this object, was instructed to represent to them his
astonishment that, after giving the King, when at the
advice of France and to their great advantage he came to
their camp, reason to hope for more favourable terms, they
should now wish to compel him to accept less favourable
ones: they would in this way make an enemy for ever of
their King, who might yet recover his power: but if they [A.D. 1646.]
would support him now, France would be for ever bound to
them, would not only secure them against the enmity of the
English, but would even take their part if Charles I should
ever break his promises to them, and would be inclined
in the pending negotiations for a general peace to make
the concessions necessary for attaining it, so as to be
able in the next spring, before there was anything to be
apprehended even from the Independent army, to give them
help[467].
France was at this time at the height of her military power
and political influence in the world: she hoped before the
end of the year to establish her position by the conclusion
of peace at Munster: and then it was the purpose of her
leading minister to interfere actively in English affairs,
and support with all his strength the union between Charles
I and the Scots, which he hoped meanwhile to bring to
completion[468].
For this connexion concessions were necessary, and the
French court was entirely in favour of their being made,
but not of so comprehensive a kind as was demanded. Queen
Henrietta Maria warned her husband afresh against accepting
the Covenant; but she admitted that Bellièvre was right in
thinking that the Episcopalian system must be given up. She
well knew, she said, how distasteful this was to the King,
and it was equally so to herself, but there was no means of
saving the bishops without ruining himself. If he fell they
were irretrievably lost, whereas he might restore them, if
he again attained power. All seemed to her to depend on
his not giving up his prerogative in relation to the armed
force, the right of the militia; for then he would have
the means, and God would give him still more--she meant
French help--to restore all. The disorder in Ireland was
dying out: she had received from Scotland offers of great
importance, and from the Queen of Sweden satisfactory [A.D. 1646.]
assurances of friendship. If the King stood fast, and
abandoned neither his friends nor the right of the militia,
their cause might yet prosper.
Ever since July Bellièvre had been with the King at
Newcastle. He had entered into more intimate relations with
him than might have been expected from the incidents of his
first mission, but they seemed forgotten in the whirl of
later events. Bellièvre wondered at the tranquillity with
which the King awaited the terrible events impending: he
said that he admired it, but could not imitate it[469].
Some Scots also repaired to Newcastle, where the forms of
the court were still observed; amongst them Charles I’s old
confidant, Hamilton, who had been released in the course
of events from his imprisonment at Pendennis, appeared one
day when the King gave audience. It was observed that both
blushed when their eyes met: Hamilton would have retired
among the rest of those present, but the King called him
to his side. In fact he had never believed in the actual
guilt of his old friend, and when he declared this, the
old confidence was at once restored between them: the King
said that Hamilton would not quit him in his misfortunes,
and Hamilton replied that he was ready to fulfil the King’s
commands.
But thereupon Hamilton urged him to give way on the subject
of religion, as without this he would never win to his
side either the Scots or the city of London, on which all
depended. Others, who were regarded as a middle party
between Argyle and Hamilton, promised the King shelter in
the country and armed assistance, but they made the same
condition. The King was firmly resolved not to accept
it; and among his attendants there was at least one who
gave him some hope that this unendurable necessity might
be spared him. This was Murray, who was on confidential
terms with many leading men in England and Scotland, and
knew their opinions. The King formed a very close intimacy
with him, and with his aid in the first half of October
concocted an answer to the last propositions, which he
hoped would find acceptance in London and in time at least,
might bring about a happy result.
It was not the French policy, though that was now backed [A.D. 1646.]
by his wife, whose counsels usually had the greatest
weight with him, that the King adopted: on the contrary,
without any such exclusive reference to the Scots as
France recommended, he still hoped to attain his end by
the course of reconciliation with the English Parliament
once before tried. He accepted those of the propositions
which related to repression of the Papists: he declared
himself ready to give satisfaction to the Parliament in all
that concerned Ireland, in reference to war and religion:
while pronouncing a general amnesty most desirable, he
promised to go as far in the way of limiting it as honour
and justice allowed. He said further that it was impossible
for him to deprive himself for ever of the sword, and place
it unconditionally in the hands of Parliament; but since
it appeared necessary for the establishment and security
of peace, he would leave the right of the militia by land
and sea in the hands of Parliament for ten years, on the
condition however that afterwards it should stand as in
the times of his father and Queen Elizabeth. He implored
the members of Parliament, by their duty as Englishmen
and Christians, to accept this offer and thereby restore
peace[470].
There was still left the chief demand, concerning the
abolition of the Episcopalian establishment. The idea
occurred to the King himself, that in respect to this also
he might by a temporary concession calm their minds and
at the same time not violate his conscience: everything
should stay for three years in the present condition, and
during that time the question should be discussed from
all sides by a new committee, and ultimately settled in
the old parliamentary fashion. Even about this he had
scruples, and would not make the proposal until he had
received the assurance of two distinguished bishops--those
of London and Salisbury--that he might do so with an easy
conscience[471]. He requested them to tell him their
opinion freely and candidly, as they would answer for it [A.D. 1646.]
at the Judgment Day. The bishops answered that, assuming
it to be the King’s firm resolve not to depart from his
coronation oath, and to maintain the Established Church, to
which end the new proposals were meant to serve, they were
of opinion that he would not be breaking his oath by making
them, for he was only allowing for a time what he could not
prevent[472].
Thus assured by an episcopal judgment which he valued very
highly, the King offered to sanction the Presbyterian
establishment with all its forms, and the order of public
worship already adopted, for a term of three years,
without prejudice to his own personal liberty: a definite
arrangement to be resolved on after that time by himself
and the two Houses of Parliament, after new consultations
of the committee with the Assembly of Divines[473].
These were the first definite offers made by King Charles
after his defeat. They are closely connected with those
suggested by him at Uxbridge through his representatives;
but compared with them are certainly much more
comprehensive. The right of the militia is handed over to
the Parliament, no longer for three years and jointly with
the King, but completely and for ten years. He offered not
a meaningless approximation to the Presbyterian system,
but an effective recognition of it for several years.
Nevertheless his own standpoint, it is easy to discern,
was still not materially changed. The King contemplated
a return to the old state of things, unconditionally in
respect to the first point: as to the second he clearly
expected that it would follow.
The doubt was whether he would effect anything by this.
The first storm he had to withstand was from his wife. She
had wished, in accordance with the French policy, that
he should firmly hold to his temporal rights and make
extensive concessions as to religion. Instead of this
Charles I gave way a step further in temporal matters, but
in religious matters conceded so little that he could not [A.D. 1646.]
have hoped to obtain any result in Scotland. The Queen
told him that he seemed not to value the right of the
militia highly enough, and that if his conscience would
allow him to comply in the religious question for three
years, he might well have given way further to save his
kingdom.
The King was much concerned at the opposition of his wife,
whose esteem and love was a great consolation to him in
all his troubles; but even against her he stood firm. He
replied that military strength did not form so thoroughly
stable a power in England as perhaps in France, and that he
did not surrender his rights: so too he held to his claims
as to religion--the temporary compliance which he offered
would not wound his conscience, but further he would not
be urged to go. His previous ill-fortune he regarded as
the punishment of God for the weakness of which he had
been guilty in allowing the execution of Strafford and the
exclusion of the bishops from Parliament. The abolition of
the Episcopalian system would be a relapse into the same
error, would draw down the wrath of God upon him afresh,
and deprive him of his settled peace of mind--he should
fall into despair.
Charles then had an idea of resigning the supreme power
to the Prince of Wales; if he could reconcile it to his
conscience to make greater concessions to the Scots, he
might do so. But neither his wife nor the Prince would hear
of this: Mazarin also and Bellièvre deemed the project too
dangerous. They would have been afraid of a republic being
immediately proclaimed, and perhaps obtaining control of
the three kingdoms.
As the royal authority could not be induced to grant the
chief demand of the Scots, the French had no other resource
for carrying out their plan, except to try how far the
Scots would be satisfied with the King’s concessions.
At the beginning of December, 1646, his answer to the
propositions was sent to them, and met with a very
unfavourable reception. The limitation to three years of
the recognition of Presbyterianism, the exemption of the
royal family from all pledges to conform to it, the entire
omission of any mention of the Covenant, displeased the
zealous Scots in the highest degree. The French did not [A.D. 1646.]
yet despair of bringing about a good understanding: once
more Montereuil repaired to Scotland with instructions to
suggest a prospect of the open intervention of France in
favour of the King, and to promise splendid rewards to all
who should take part in the great work of restoring the
King[474]. Montereuil spoke first with Hamilton and his
friends: they assured him that they were ready to shed
their blood for their King, but that they should be able
to achieve nothing for him with their countrymen unless he
signed the Covenant. Montereuil hurried next to the middle
party, with which Bellièvre had had dealings, Traquair,
Calander, Roxburgh, Morton: they declared that they could
do nothing without the Hamiltons, and also required the
concession which was not to be obtained from the King.
In Parliament a resolution was passed in opposition to
more moderate proposals, to insist on the acceptation of
the propositions as a whole, and if the King refused, to
provide for the government of the country without him. The
Church Assembly expressed itself to the same effect: the
King should never be received in the country unless he
accepted the Covenant, and gave a satisfactory answer in
respect to the propositions[475].
Thus this negotiation also miscarried. Bellièvre attempted
to open to the King the chance of flight to Ireland or
the Scottish Highlands, for he must stay in one of his
kingdoms, so as to be able to form a party: but even
an attempt at such a thing proved impracticable; in
consequence of a fresh turn in politics the vigilance
around his person had been doubled.
Turning away from all dealings which might lead to a
one-sided alliance with the King and with France, the
Scots had again come to terms with the English Parliament.
Their religious zeal was satisfied by Presbyterianism
being now in fact introduced into England: lay elders had
been chosen and church sessions established in London: [A.D. 1647.]
the Assembly of Divines were proceeding to compile a
catechism and confession. The Scots had no objection to the
King being kept for the future in custody in England: they
hoped that either he would thus be brought to accept the
propositions, or that without this form they would succeed
in carrying out their old purposes. This concession was
joined to a new agreement, whereby all differences between
England and Scotland were fully settled: the English
agreed to pay all arrears due to the Scots, £400,000 in
all, £200,000 at once in two instalments: the Scots agreed
to quit England; the first instalment was to be paid to
them before they recrossed the Tyne, the second directly
afterwards.
We shall soon see what views, as against other common
enemies, were at the bottom of this reconciliation. The
immediate consequence was that the King’s answer to the
propositions had no effect in England; for as the Scots,
who had no reason for being entirely satisfied with them,
held firmly to them, it was not likely that the English
Parliament, from which they proceeded, should abandon
them. It was agreed that the King should be brought to
Holmby House, and remain there until he gave his assent
to the last proposals: the Scots only stipulated that
the constitution should not be further altered, nor the
succession interfered with. The moderate members of the
English Parliament readily assented, for they hoped,
having these fixed points to rely on, that they would be
better able to resist the opposite party, which aimed at
abolishing the monarchy. The Presbyterians of the two
countries, being thus united, hoped to establish for ever
their joint supremacy.
The execution of these arrangements, when once decided
on, was not delayed for a moment. The money payment
was brought in a somewhat offensive way into connexion
with the surrender of the King. On January 21, 1646/7,
Thursday, the first payment towards the stipulated sum
was made near Northallerton, both parties appearing with
military escorts: on the following Saturday the English
commissioners arrived at Newcastle, to inform the King
that he must follow them. It was Lord Pembroke, who in the
most submissive form, not omitting the three reverences [A.D. 1647.]
practised at Whitehall, made these announcements to
the King. He told him that he was deputed by Parliament
to follow him to Holmby, and be at his service on the
journey[476]. The King as usual begged for time to consider
it. He spoke first with the deputies from Scotland, who
gave him to understand, though in the gentlest terms
which they could find, that the Scottish Parliament fully
concurred. They informed him that their garrison would quit
Newcastle, and an English one enter in their stead. On
Saturday, the 30th, the Scots quitted Newcastle, and the
English entered: in the afternoon an English guard entered
the King’s presence under arms instead of the Scottish
one. The Scottish deputies left him, after presenting
a declaration of their Parliament in relation to his
surrender: and the English entered in their stead: the
latter told him that he would be received with joy by his
people (always assuming that he accepted the Covenant),
and that never had a King been more powerful in England
than he should be. He fixed February 3 for the day of his
departure: they made short journeys by day, so as not to
be exposed at night-fall to any disasters, or inconvenient
demonstration. All the magic effect of the reverence,
which for centuries had been shewn to the wearer of the
crown, still remained with Charles I. Crowds streamed in
from all sides, in order to be cured, according to the
old belief, by his health-giving touch, in such numbers
that the concourse had to be stopped by proclamation. When
they reached Holmby--a country house built by Christopher
Hatton in the splendid style of the Elizabethan age, that
at a later date had passed into the hands of the royal
family--the strictest confinement was ordered as lately
at Newcastle. No man durst approach the King, who had not
committed himself to the new order of things by accepting
the protest and the Covenant. Even of these the sentinels
let none pass, who could not produce written leave from
the commissioners, through whose hands all letters which
concerned him, had to pass. The treatment of the King
recalls what his grandmother Mary Stuart had to endure [A.D. 1647.]
at Fotheringhay: the difference was that his life was
secured by treaty with the Scots; and the prevailing
Parliamentary authority, at least in most part of the
members constituting it, was in fact of opinion that the
promise should be kept.
FOOTNOTES:
[460] Turner (to whom he spoke) Memoirs 41.
[461] The papers which passed between his sacred Majesty
and Mr. Alexander Henderson--three letters of Henderson’s
and five of the King’s, in Aiton’s Henderson 633.
[462] Cp. § xiii of the Newcastle propositions with § xvii
of the Uxbridge ones. Baillie ii. 377, 379.
[463] Bellièvre, July 15/25 from London: ‘Retablir leur roi
non seulement dans le pouvoir qu’ils appellent légitime,
mais dans une autorité fort rapprochante de la plus grande
qu’eut jamais un roi d’Angleterre.’ Ambassade de Bellièvre
1646.
[464] ‘(Les Ecossais) me promettent autant que les Anglais
une chose qui peut être la décision de cette affaire,
qu’ils empêcheront que le roi de Gr. Brne. ne soit pressé
de prendre le covenant (ib.).’
[465] Mémoire du roi à Mr. de Bellièvre, apporté par Mr. de
Montereuil. 19 Sept.
[466] A. Bellièvre, 6 Août. ‘Je suis bien de cet avis,
qu’il vaudroit mieux attendre toutes les violences que
le parlement pourroit commettre, même celle a déposséder
le roi, mais non pas que luy même consentist qu’on ne
luy laissait que le nom et la figure du roi, qu’on ne
manqueroit pas de luy oster peu de temps après.’
[467] ‘En cas qu’ils se disposent a faire leur devoir, on
se relâchera d’icy en beaucoup de choses pour faciliter la
conclusion de la paix générale, affin de nous mettre en
état de les secourir.’
[468] Henrietta Maria to Charles I, Oct. 9/19, 1646. ‘Cl.
Mazarin m’a assuré que la paix générale seroit faite devant
Noël, et cela estant, on vous assisteroit puissamment.’
[469] ‘La force d’attendre l’évènement de toutes ces choses
horribles avec une tranquillité d’âme sans example.’
[470] The King to the Queen, in Bruce 65, 67.
[471] ‘A proposition which no man but myself has thought
on.’ Charles I for William Murray. Clarendon State Papers
ii. 267.
[472] The two letters; Clarendon State Papers ii. 265, 267.
[473] His Majesty’s answer to the propositions, in Burnet,
Hamiltons 299. As it appears, it was first drawn up towards
the middle of November during a second visit of Murray to
Newcastle (Letter to the Queen of Nov. 14 in Bruce 75). The
earlier drafts, differing in some few points, were also
communicated to the Queen.
[474] ‘La paix générale se faisant, comme, Dieu mercy,
nous sommes à la veille, la France se declarera en faveur
du roy de la Gr. Brne., comme aussi, si dés à present il
ne manquoit pour faire declarer en faveur du dit roy, si
ce n’est que la France se declarast, LL. MM. y seroient
disposés, pourvu que Ton vit evidemment Futilité du
restablissement du roi.’ (Mazarin to Bellièvre, Dec. 10.)
[475] Letter of Lanerick, Dec. 17, in Burnet, Hamiltons 306.
[476] So says Montereuil, to whom the King had told it.
Jan. 26.
CHAPTER III.
THE PARLIAMENT AND ARMY AT VARIANCE.
It has always been a matter of surprise, both at the time
and since, that King Charles attached so much importance
to the maintenance of Episcopacy, even more than to the
preservation of his military prerogative. In one of his
letters to his wife he writes that a King of England,
even if he remains in possession of military power, will
have but little enjoyment of it, so long as obedience is
not preached from the pulpits, and that this can never be
obtained from the Presbyterians: for their view was to
wrest from the crown its ecclesiastical authority, and
place it in the hands of Parliament, and also to introduce
the doctrine that the supreme power belongs to the people,
that the prince may be called to account and punished by
them, and that resistance to him is a lawful thing[477]. To
these views and doctrines Charles I would not submit, being
every moment conscious that he was contending for right by
the grace of God, for the old personal authority of the
crown.
Even in the condition of strict imprisonment in which he
was kept, he still possessed power, and felt it. The Lower
House changed a number of the propositions rejected by
him--for instance the abolition of Episcopacy, and the
arrangements about the military authority--into ordinances;
but laws they could not become without the King’s assent:
it was felt to be of some importance to obtain it from [A.D. 1647.]
him. Moreover there were other complications which made the
Parliament anxious for its own sake to come to terms with
the King.
The Presbyterian majority proceeded to execute its great
long-prepared and decisive scheme for putting down the
Independents. It was this purpose which was originally at
the bottom of their connexion with the Scots, in conformity
to the interests of both parties. The Scots agreed so
easily to quit England, in order to remove the pretext on
which the retention of an army in England was justified.
To disband the army would be the ruin of the entire party
which relied upon it. For the same reason the city lent the
money requisite to content the Scots and induce them to
depart. The agreement by which the King was delivered into
the hands of the English Parliament was intended to serve
also as a reason for disbanding the army, now that all that
quarrel was terminated[478]. Under the additional influence
of various petitions which came in from all parts of the
country against burdening it any longer with the cost of a
standing army which was no more wanted, the Lower House at
the beginning of March 1647 passed several comprehensive
resolutions about the further destination of the army.
Now that England was at peace it was time to put an end to
the truce in Ireland, and prosecute the war there with all
vigour. For this purpose it was deemed advisable to send to
Ireland seven regiments of foot and four of horse, 11,400
men in all, all of whom were to be taken from the standing
army under General Fairfax. In England only so many troops
were to be retained as were necessary for garrisoning the
fortified places. County by county the fortresses were
enumerated which were to be kept or to be razed: by far
the greater part were doomed to demolition. The numbers of
the army being thus considerably reduced, care was further
taken for securing their absolute obedience. On March 8 a
resolution was passed that no member of the Lower House [A.D. 1647.]
should hold a command in these garrisons or in the army,
and that no higher military rank than colonel should be
suffered to exist under the General-in-Chief: a majority
of 136 votes against 108 further decided that the officers
of the army should one and all accept the Covenant, and
conform to the church system established by Parliament[479].
It is obvious that if these resolutions were carried
out the Independentism of the army would no longer be
dangerous,--for this very reason it was inevitable that
resistance should be offered to them.
How long and strenuously had Parliament contended with the
King for the right to control the army. It is a sort of
irony of success that now it was as far as possible from
being master of the very army which had been formed under
its eyes.
On March 21 the officers of all ranks had assembled in
Thomas Fairfax’s head-quarters at Saffron-Walden: when
the demand was laid before them to enter for service in
Ireland, they gave it to be understood that they could not
do so until satisfactory answers were given to several
questions, especially who was to command in Ireland, how
the army was to be ensured its arrears for past service,
its pay for the future, and an indemnity for all previous
acts. In reply the Parliament resolved to set apart for the
army a considerable sum (£60,000 a month), and it seemed
as if this would have an influence on the decision of the
officers. Hereupon several captains showed themselves
inclined to enter on the new service, but the rest, all the
colonels, lieutenant-colonels, and majors present, a great
number of captains and some lieutenants adhered to their
resolutions of the previous day.
It is known from the German wars what a tendency to
independence prevailed generally in the armies of that age.
The English army did not scruple to make known its views in
the manner then usual in political bodies. A petition was
despatched to Parliament in which it disclaimed every sort
of obligation except to do England service, and insisted in
the name of all, that before the army was disbanded every [A.D. 1647.]
officer’s claims should be settled and an indemnity
granted for every unlawful act done on service[480]. The
petition breathes a haughty consciousness of strength,
and is a manifesto of independence. Parliament was highly
offended, and did not delay to express its disapproval,
offering forgiveness to all who receded from the petition,
but declaring all who continued to urge it enemies of the
public peace and of the state. Nevertheless it did not
hesitate to proceed with the affair. The Common Council
of the city proving willing to grant a new loan, it was
possible to provide abundant pay for the two armies, both
that which was to stay at home and that destined for
Ireland, especially for the latter. Indeed a new commission
which was sent to Saffron-Walden met with great opposition.
The majority of the officers desired above all things to
stay with their generals, and to be charged _en masse_ with
the expedition to Ireland: but there were some who gave ear
to the requests of the commissioners. The Parliament named
General Skippon, who enjoyed the confidence of the army,
as field-marshal for Ireland, and after some hesitation
he accepted the appointment. Gradually no small number
of officers declared themselves ready to go to Ireland,
seventeen from the cavalry, eighty-seven from nine separate
regiments of foot, seven from the dragoons; these were
mostly subalterns, but some few were colonels, and there
were several captains. They hoped to be able to send a
considerable army to Ireland, about 5000 infantry[481].
Then however it was shown that in this army the privates
were not so absolutely dependent on their officers as in
the German armies. The religious impulse which had drawn
every man into the ranks produced a feeling of individual
rights, and of spontaneity of action, which destroyed the
dependence of military subordination. A distinguished
colonel, who with several of his officers was gained over
for service in Ireland, was unable to bring one of his
men with him. In other regiments and companies a certain [A.D. 1647.]
number of them followed, but always far less than half.
Manifestations now appeared not merely of disobedience but
of hostility. Every man had taken up arms for the sake
of the sect to which he belonged: he would not lay them
down with the prospect that this sect would thereupon be
oppressed. Moreover far-reaching political tendencies also
prevailed. In an address which the military representatives
elected by the separate companies--those Agitators who
had yet a great part to play--presented to their most
celebrated generals, Fairfax, Cromwell, and Skippon, they
mentioned besides the satisfaction of their own claims, the
security of the rights and liberties of the subject. They
spoke very offensively of the leaders of the Presbyterian
party in Parliament, describing them as men who, having
been raised above their proper sphere of subordinate
service, had acquired a taste for sovereign power, and took
pleasure in a tyrannical exercise of it--expressions which
amounted to a declaration of open hostility.
It was now that the leaders of the moderate party in
Parliament, and some personages outside it, turned their
eyes again upon the King. Union with him, whereby the
measures adopted by them against their opponents would
have obtained the sanction of a higher authority, would
have been of infinite value to them. Parliament, which
was bound by previous resolutions, could not officially
consent to the proposals contained in the King’s last
answer from Newcastle; but in secret they found numerous
supporters. When Bellièvre returned from Newcastle to
London, he observed an inclination, quite unexpected by
him, to make terms with the King on this basis. Holland,
Warwick, Manchester, and the two ladies who had so much
influence in the Presbyterian party, the Countesses of
Carlisle and Devonshire, declared themselves satisfied
with the King’s last concessions in respect to the militia
and the Irish war, as well as with the introduction of
Presbyterianism for three years. They only asked for one
thing more--that the King should declare himself ready
to recognise the arrangements made by Parliament under
the Great Seal, which seemed to them absolutely necessary
for their personal safety: but after that he might return
to London to meet the Parliament, in order to make a [A.D. 1647.]
definite reconciliation; and they thought that they could
promise him a good reception in the city. The Royalists,
who had come to London in numbers from the places captured
by the army, maintained there a tone of feeling favourable
to the King, which reacted on Parliament. Bellièvre was
convinced that this result would soon and easily be
realised. An important weight was thrown into the same
scale by the Earl of Northumberland, who had for a long
time sided with the Independents, from dislike to the
Scots, but now returned to his old Presbyterian friends.
Bellièvre most urgently recommended the attempt both to
the King, with whom he had found means to keep up his
communication, and to the Queen, and to the French court.
The course taken by France was once more decided by
general politics. Seeing that the Spaniards and their
allies--for peace had not long been concluded--exhibited
themselves as opponents of King Charles and friends of
the Independents, it appeared advantageous to effect as a
counterpoise a connection with the King and the moderate
Parliamentarians[482].
Queen Henrietta Maria, to whom the proposals were again
communicated, was annoyed that everything issued under the
Great Seal should be legalised in the lump; no one knew,
she said, what might not be included. She had no objection
to the Lords seeking advantage and safety for themselves,
but she required in that case a general amnesty, so that
she might not see her own adherents excluded[483].
This was also the point of view of the King, who was very
unwilling to concede anything until he should be again a
free man; then, he said, he would grant to his Parliament
everything which could be given consistently with honour
and a good conscience[484]. He wished to ascertain [A.D. 1647.]
definitely from the Lords what he had to expect from them.
The Queen urged the Earl of Northumberland to promise that
he would declare for the King in case Parliament was not to
be gained. And so things went on, with much expenditure of
words, without any agreement being arrived at, though on
the whole all had the same intention.
The Upper House resolved that it would be well for the
King to come to Oatlands, so as to be nearer Parliament;
but as some difficulties might be expected to be raised,
it was suggested that he should escape by flight from his
detention at Holmby, and come to the city. He might merely
alight at the Lord Mayor’s, appear in Parliament under the
escort of that portion of the citizens which was devoted
to him, and thence repair to Whitehall. The Countesses of
Carlisle and Devonshire recommended this plan, though they
could not suggest the proper means for executing it: not
only Warwick and Holland and many English Presbyterians,
but also some Scots were in favour of it. Bellièvre
undertook to arrange it with the King[485].
While the Parliamentary leaders were thus pursuing more
eagerly than ever the idea of an accommodation with the
King, they made at the same time earnest preparations for
either keeping the army in obedience, or getting rid of
it altogether. In reply to the complaints of the troops
Parliament agreed to concessions in respect to indemnity
and security for arrears, but insisted on the army being
disbanded. On May 25 it issued an order prescribing the
mode in which this should take place in the different
regiments, fixing the place and the day, and the direction
in which those were to move who would take service in
Ireland. Commencement was to be made on June 1 with
Fairfax’s regiment: the commissioners of Parliament, among [A.D. 1647.]
them the Earl of Warwick, set out with the money required
for completing it.
Once more there was a great opportunity for the
Presbyterian schemes: removal of the Independent
opposition, reconciliation with the King, and alliance
with France, seemed all attainable in the immediate
future. But, as has been said, this danger stimulated all
the strength of the Independents, thus threatened, and
in itself so powerful. The time was come when they must
decide whether to yield to the majority of Parliament, or
to offer resistance. Should the generals and colonels, who
not unjustly asserted that they had done most in the war
with the King, obey an authority formed on the basis of
their victory, but established with no legal warranty, and
in itself unconsolidated, if it issued orders which were
ruinous to them? Should the soldiers too surrender the
religious independence for which they had taken up arms,
for a system no less oppressive to them than the old one,
and submit to a new yoke? With these considerations of
personal interest was united a dislike to a close connexion
with the Scots, and to their influence, which threatened
to make England dependent on foreign counsels. As matters
stood then it may well be maintained that for the future
and the greatness of England, both in the British Islands
and in the world at large, more was to be expected from the
continued freedom of the army and its further victories,
than from the treaties and alliances of the Presbyterians.
That all this was fully considered we cannot suppose: but
hostilities and oppositions are at once personal and ideal:
the contending factions were maintaining at the same time
their own private cause and one of public importance.
The disbanding could not be accomplished at once. A
petition in the name of the soldiery proposed a general
assembly: the officers thought it impossible to refuse
such a meeting, because it could not well be prevented,
and would be all the more dangerous if held without the
officers: while assenting to the petition, they at the
same time requested the general to press Parliament to
revise the order for disbanding, and also to postpone the
operation of it. What if it should be still persisted in? [A.D. 1647.]
On the appointed day, June 12, the commissioners
appointed to execute it in Fairfax’s regiment arrived at
head-quarters. In order to avoid an immediate conflict the
regiment determined to move off: the major took possession
of the colours and led the troops, as if it were done on
his own account, to the appointed place of meeting. The
same feelings prevailed in the other regiments and their
commanders: of all the colonels perhaps only six did not
concur.
With this evasive disobedience was joined an act of the
most arbitrary character. The army could not and would
not let the King go to London: for then, in one way or
another, the scheme already projected would have been
executed, and through the newly-awakened sympathies of the
Londoners a royalist combination might have been completed.
The powerless King formed a subject of jealousy between
the different parties. Parliament had been unwilling to
leave him in the hands of the Scots: the army resolved to
withdraw him from the influence of Parliament.
On June 2, 1647, King Charles I had already retired to rest
at Holmby, when a couple of squadrons of Cromwellian horse
appeared before the house, under a cornet named Joyce,
who, though without any producible warrant[486], appeared
with so much authority that the audience which he demanded
to have immediately could not be refused to him. He then
informed the King that the army, fearing that Parliament
would carry him off and raise other troops in his name,
requested him to follow him. As the commissioners could
offer no resistance, the King assented, only expressing the
supposition that he would be treated with the respect due
to him, and would not be oppressed in his conscience. Next
morning he had this confirmed by the assembled soldiers,
and then for the first time asked for the cornet’s warrant.
He said that his warrant was the men behind him: the King
replied laughing, that it was a warrant which needed no
spelling. ‘But what would you do, if I did not follow you? [A.D. 1647.]
You would not, I think, lay hands on me; for I am your
King: no one is above me, save God alone[487].’
The King had been transferred without difficulty from the
custody of the Scots to that of Parliament; for therein, as
he said at the time, he changed only his place, and not his
condition: he now with a certain appearance of free-will
followed the stronger power. He had as yet no knowledge of
the plan of flight to London: the letter in which Bellièvre
informed him of it is dated on that very 2nd of June: it
was still doubtful whether he would even come to terms with
the Presbyterians. Meanwhile he felt daily and hourly the
pressure of their treatment: the Independents, from their
principles, were more tolerant gaolers.
This falling into the hands of the army, in which
fundamentally anti-monarchical principles were dominant,
was a decisive event in Charles I’s history. Who gave
instructions for carrying him off? Who was the leader
in the matter? Parliament at the time, like all its
contemporaries and posterity, had no doubt that Cromwell
was the soul of it all. Just at this time the purpose of
arresting him had again been formed, but he had gone to the
army at the right moment. Even now he remained entirely in
the background. The order executed by Joyce proceeded not
from him, but from a committee of the soldiers.
The King was immediately conducted to the neighbourhood
of Newmarket, where the announced general meeting of
the troops took place. His presence, which secured the
army against the formation of a threatening combination,
doubtless also contributed to its assuming a haughtier
attitude, and openly avowing aggressive purposes. The army
declared the resolution for disbanding it to be the work
of evil-minded men, whose object was simply to separate
officers and men, and then to ill-use both at their
pleasure: it required, besides the removal of remaining
grievances, security against this danger, which would last
so long as those men were of consideration and influence [A.D. 1647.]
in Parliament, and security too of a kind with which the
great council of the army, consisting of the generals and
two officers and two privates from each regiment, should be
satisfied.
What was now only intimated, was directly announced a few
days later[488]. The army demanded that Parliament should
be cleared of the persons displeasing to it: they mentioned
eleven by name, including Hollis, Stapleton, Clotworthy,
and William Waller, who had acted against the army and the
rights of the subject, and therefore ought not to sit in
Parliament. With this they united still more comprehensive
intentions. They condemned the perpetual Parliament,
and required, though not immediately, new elections and
periodical meetings of Parliament. In their memorials,
which were said to be composed by Ireton, appear ideas
of the most extensive import, at present only in distant
perspective, but which were soon to be further developed.
Parliament, having the capital mainly on its side, still
thought itself capable of resistance. The city troops were
strengthened, and a guard formed for Parliament: reformed
officers were taken into their service. A resolution
passed at an earlier date, forbidding the army to approach
within twenty-five miles of the capital, was called to
remembrance, and the old committee of safety re-established.
We know however how narrow was the majority which gave
Parliament its present Presbyterian character. All depended
on party, the assembly as a whole had no proper _esprit
de corps_. Instead of opposing the now advancing army
with firmness, the majority in Parliament, in consequence
of its approach, were doubtful and pliant. They revoked
the commissions given for preparations, and recalled the
expressions which had most offended the army: as moreover
the eleven accused members thought it best to depart (they
received leave of absence for six months), the Independent
interest was now the stronger: Parliament consequently
annulled the elections to the committee on the city
militia, by which the Independents had been excluded, and
assented to the King’s following the army.
A firmer temper was exhibited in the city, where the [A.D. 1647.]
Presbyterianism of the citizens was kept in constant
excitement by the preachers, who saw in the predominance of
the Independents a danger to the faith and to the safety of
their souls, so that now the offers which the King again
issued appeared very acceptable. Moreover the old royalist
interest reappeared in all its strength: an association was
planned, in which citizens, militia, sailors, and students
united, so as to conclude peace on the basis of his last
intimations through personal communication with him: it was
declared the cause at once of God and of the King, in which
no neutrality was admissible.
Although this pledge was rejected in Parliament, and
it was even declared high treason to sign it, the only
immediate effect was to inflame still more the zeal of the
citizens: as they observed that the change of opinion in
Parliament resulted from the influence of the army, they
thought that they also had a right to maintain their views
in opposition. On Monday, July 26, the Common Council
proceeded to the House of Lords, and obtained, by the aid
of a tumultuous mob, the repeal of the last resolution, as
well as of another relating to the city militia. Thence the
mob turned to the Lower House: it consisted of lads from
the workshops, sailors, and discharged soldiers: they came
into the chamber with their hats on, and in violent haste
demanded a division on the same proposals. The Commons kept
them at bay for some time, hoping for aid from the Mayor
or the Sheriffs: the former did not stir, the Sheriffs
appeared with some halberdiers, who however declined to
interfere. Late in the evening the Commons resolved to
follow the example of the Lords. The mob allowed no one to
quit the House until the clerk had legalised what had been
done with the ancient forms[489].
The power of the Long Parliament was based on its [A.D. 1647.]
understanding with the city and the army: but now the
influence of these two allies became antagonistic to each
other. By far the greater part of the members, including
some of Presbyterian opinions, with the Speakers of the
two Houses, fled from the violence of the city to the army
head-quarters. Fairfax and Cromwell now did what Essex
had avoided doing in a similar case: they welcomed the
fugitives. The city on the contrary made itself responsible
for guarding the assembly, such as it had become after the
return of the eleven members and the departure of so many
others. The city, in its official character, ordered the
army to advance no further, as it would be a breach of
the privileges of London. And in case this should still
happen it prepared to defend against the Independents the
fortifications which had been erected against the royalist
troops. An invitation was sent to the King himself to
come to London, where freedom, security, and honourable
treatment should be his portion. General Massey, who had
made a name by the defence of Gloucester, was with great
confidence appointed to defend London. The forts were
occupied, and cannon placed on the ramparts: the youths
crowded to serve. An Independent demonstration in the
streets, in which the Catholics joined, was put down by
the superior strength of the Presbyterians, as the city of
London was regarded as their chief stronghold: a dangerous
war between the armed force and the capital seemed to be
impending[490].
Determined to overpower this opposition, which they did
not rate very high, the Independent army gathered from all
directions on Hounslow Heath. Fairfax issued a manifesto
wherein he also, like the King, declared that after the
previous tumults and the flight of the two Speakers, there
was no longer at Westminster a lawful and free Parliament,
it was _ipso facto_ suspended; that all resolutions passed
by it were in their nature null and void, and that the [A.D. 1647.]
army was advancing on London to reinstate the Speakers
and the fugitive members, in whom it recognised the true
Parliament, to restore to the assembly freedom to sit and
vote, and to punish the acts of violence that had been
committed. The fugitive members, fourteen of them from
the House of Lords, about a hundred from the Commons,
appeared on Hounslow Heath. They accompanied Fairfax at a
review, and rode with him along the front of the regiments.
Everywhere they were received with demonstrations of joy,
and the cry of ‘Free Parliament!’ Their presence afforded
the army not only a pretext, but a justification for its
undertaking to advance against the capital.
The army during the last year had been continually
recruited afresh and was in excellent condition. Its
advance was assisted by the suburb of Southwark, which
had contemptuously declined to take part in the measures
adopted in the city, and had refused the artillery sent
thither. And had it come to a conflict, the Independents
within the city, who had been conquered but by no means
annihilated, would infallibly have risen to support the
attack. Who would be answerable for the bloodshed and
confusion which must follow?
Under these circumstances the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and
Common Council, resolved on the afternoon of August 3
to make peaceful terms with the army. They adopted the
declaration of the generals--for how could they venture to
defend the injustice that had been done, though perpetrated
by their own party and with their co-operation--that
the army only sought to replace the fugitive members
and restore a free Parliament, and declared that they
would open their gates with pleasure, both to the
members themselves and to two or three regiments as
their escort[491]. At the further demand of Fairfax they
evacuated the fortifications on the west side of the city. [A.D. 1647.]
On August 6 Fairfax entered London with four regiments
and his bodyguard. In the midst of the column appeared the
carriages of the two Speakers and the returning members.
The soldiers wore laurel branches in their hats: it
seemed more like a mere procession than taking victorious
possession. In Hyde Park they were received by the Lord
Mayor, at Charing Cross by the Common Council: all seemed
like the result of a friendly agreement. The members of the
two Houses immediately resumed their places, the Speakers
their old seats.
The relation of parties was not yet fully defined by
this, for many Presbyterians had fled and returned with
the rest. Still it is obvious how great an advantage the
Independents had won thereby. The army, which should have
been disbanded, took up a dominant position (it occupied
Southwark and Hammersmith) over against the city, in which
the entire strength of its opponents was concentrated.
FOOTNOTES:
[477] Charles to Henrietta Maria, in Bruce 71. ‘They will
introduce that doctrine, which makes rebellion to be
lawfull, and that the supreme power is the people, to whom
kings ought to give account and be corrected when they do
amiss.’
[478] Baillie ii. 391. ‘The money must be borrowed in
the city--they are our loving friends, but before they
will part with more money, they will press [as] hard the
disbanding of their own Armie as ours: if they obtain this,
the sectaries will be broken.’ Aug. 18, 1646.
[479] Journals of Commons v. 107, 108.
[480] The petition of the officers and souldiers, with
the several votes of the council of war, together with a
letter from His Excellency to the House of Commons. (King’s
Pamphlets 383.)
[481] Cp. Rushworth vi. 464 sq.
[482] Bellièvre to Brienne, Feb. 8, 1647. ‘Les indépendants
ne veulent point de roi, et croyent avoir jetté les
fondemens de leur république par le projet de traité qu’ils
ont avec l’ambassadeur d’Espagne.’
[483] Brienne to Bellièvre, Feb. 16, 1647. ‘La reine a
peine de conseiller au roi de se conformer à ce qu’on
desire de lui, mais les articles expliqués il pourroit bien
avoir lieu d’y entendre.’
[484] Charles I to Bellièvre, Feb. 26: ‘Quand je serai
une personne libre, je tâcherai de donner tout le
contentement à mon parlement que je puis faire avec honneur
et conscience.’ May 20: ‘C’est le temps pour mes amis de
témoigner ce qu’ils veulent faire pour moi, car il y a
encore moyen par la grâce de Dieu de faire quelque chose
de bon.’ This correspondence would be worth a special
discussion.
[485] ‘Ils ne doutent point que Sa Majesté se pourroit
retirer à Whitehall avec grand contentement de la ville et
du parlement aussi.’ Bellièvre to Charles I, June 2.
[486] Sanderson 986. Sent from the committee of troopers
in the army, after they had secured their guards, demanded
the King of the commissioners, who in amaze asked for his
warrant, whose answer that it was the sense of the army.
[487] A true impartial narrative, concerning the army’s
preservation of the King. Rushworth vi. 513.
[488] Declaration or representation, June 14. Heads of
charges, June 16. In Rushworth vi. 572.
[489] ‘(Gli artisti) loro fecero le tre propositioni,
come si essi fussero stati membre del parlamento--ed
obligarono i parlamentarii che stessero ritenuti nella
camera sino alle q ore e sigillarlo con il gran sigillo.’
The only English report which I find intelligible is the
one given by John Rushworth to Ferdinando Fairfax. Fairfax
Correspondence i. 382.
[490] The Italian reporter from whom I take this notice
adds: ‘Tutta la notte seguente delli 12 (2) il consiglio ed
il parlamento che io dico presbyteriano, furono in piedi, e
di comune accordo si per fermare la fazione contraria che
si faceva piu grande, si per assicurare il stato deputarono
verso l’armata.’ Cp. Parl. Hist. xvi. 235.
[491] Letter from the city. ‘They (the members) shall find
all posts and passes open to receive you and them, as also
such guards, two or three regiments, as your Excellency
shall think fitting for their conduct of the two Houses of
Parliament.’ Rushworth vii. 751.
CHAPTER IV.
INFLUENCE OF THE AGITATORS.
No one could yet have said which course events would take;
either opposite still seemed possible, the abolition or the
complete restoration of the monarchy, exclusive domination
of one religious faction or tolerance of several,
continuance or abridgment of Parliament, entire supremacy
of the army, or union with other powers, maintenance of
the laws, or even social reform. To estimate the contrary
expectations that existed it is only necessary to know
that the Pope at Rome solemnly took counsel as to how
far the English Catholics should be authorised to unite
with the Independents. It was maintained with a certain
confidence that the Independents would restore the King
and the episcopal establishment, but introduce universal
toleration[492].
The King found himself not altogether in bad hands. He was
again allowed Anglican worship: some old servants, like
Berkeley and Ashburnham, were permitted to be near him:
his children were brought to him, his friends might visit
him. He again received foreign ambassadors with a certain
ceremony in the hall at Hampton Court, devoted from old
times to this purpose: the commissioners who surrounded him
appeared as his ministers, though forced upon him. The King
asserted that he had the word of the chief officers that
his crown should not be assailed: in return he had promised
not to quit Hampton Court without previous reference to [A.D. 1647.]
them[493]. In the style used in the last generation by
Cuneo, the terms of the oath of allegiance to be taken
by the Catholics was then discussed between them and the
King[494].
Parliament, in spite of the influence which the
Independents had exerted on its present position, and still
exercised every moment in its debates, passed a resolution
in favour of once more laying before the King the Newcastle
propositions, which were based on the full supremacy of
Presbyterianism, and requesting his acceptance of them: for
this was required by the agreement with the Scots, a link
they were unwilling to break.
The Independents allowed this to be done, but meanwhile
entered into separate negotiations with the King, in
which terms of an entirely opposite character were put
forward. According to these the Parliament was immediately
to be transferred to Oxford, and dissolved within some
three months; the troops were to retire from the capital
and deliver up to the city militia the posts which they
had occupied. The Episcopate was to be restored to its
undoubted rights, corresponding to the old laws; but
at the same time there was to be complete liberty of
conscience: no man was to be vexatious to another in
matters of conscience, or oppress him in such[495]. At an
earlier time it had been stipulated that some specially
detested adherents of the King (seven in number, though
not named) should be excluded from the general amnesty.
Now, only four were named--Bristol and Digby, Worcester
and Newcastle: some others were to be threatened with
banishment and temporary sequestration of their property.
Finally, a more popular system of administration of justice
was contemplated. The King was astonished at the extent
of these proposals, but, as he was rightly told, had they [A.D. 1647.]
been less comprehensive he would not have ventured to
believe in their sincerity. They bore on the face of them
the character of Independentism: he could not accept them
as they stood, but in several points they pleased him
better than the Presbyterian terms. To the proffer of the
old propositions he replied that the scheme of the army
seemed to him better suited to form the foundation for
a lasting peace. He protested afresh his determination
to secure the Protestant creed with reservation of some
indulgence for tender consciences, the liberty of the
subject, the privileges of Parliament, and the laws: at the
same time he expressed a wish to discuss these propositions
in personal intercourse with Parliament and make the
acceptance of them possible. It is known that this answer
was composed in concert with Ireton and Cromwell, in a
garden house at Putney, where the head-quarters of the army
lay. The two leaders gave it to be understood that they
intended to base a definite treaty on these proposals.
Ireton said that if Parliament made opposition, it should
be cleansed of the obstructives, and cleansed again until
an agreement was obtained. Cromwell smote on his breast,
and begged the King to have confidence[496].
Cromwell then spoke with full appreciation of the moral
attitude of the King, and referred with emotion to the
scene of meeting with his children: he exhibited even a
sense of the importance of the monarchy. He was heard to
say that no man was secure of life and property unless
first of all the King obtained his rights. To other
officers, as well as to him, it seemed the most suitable
plan, considering the unbroken strength of their opponents
and the possibility of a reaction, to secure their own
future by a treaty with the King and Parliament. Their
expressions have been declared to be hypocritical, in fact
merely intended to deter the King from accepting the other
propositions, but this in any case it was certain he would
never do. Moderate Independents might honestly seek to
discover the points in which their interests would coincide
with those of the King and the Presbyterians; they might [A.D. 1647.]
wish to bring about a treaty which could be accepted by
all[497]. No doubt the interest of the army would always
have weighed most with them, only they would have taken
account of the two other parties. It was a view which was
suggested by the state of things, and at the time filled
the whole horizon; but it was certainly such as men’s views
usually are, when they are still under general discussion,
and being neither definitely formulised nor fixed by
binding agreements, may be given up again without scruple.
What was to happen if the hostility of the contending
interests proved unconquerable. In the army itself there
was still a powerful faction which would listen to none
of these agreements. It is not in fact true, as has been
asserted ever since, that every kind of manifestation in
the army proceeded from the generals themselves. It had
long before been perceived that in the Independent party
there were two separate views current. The leaders would
have been content with an arrangement with the King on the
terms accepted in his answer, the mass would not have been
satisfied with this[498]. Still less would the latter have
been contented with the concessions now contemplated.
When the King said that tender consciences must be spared,
this was by no means the liberty of conscience which the
Independents on principle desired. The King was willing
only to admit a limitation of authority in church matters:
their theory, on the contrary, aimed at the separation
of Church and State. They refused to the civil power any
authority to interfere in matters of religion, as every
man had a right to believe and to worship God as he
pleased[499].
More than this, they desired a fundamental change in
the State and the Government, not a mere union of the
Independent and Parliamentarian magnates with the King,
which would merely lead once more to the old oppression. [A.D. 1647.]
The army had taken up arms to restore the rights and
liberties of the nation, according to its judgment and
conscience; but as yet nothing had been changed, either
in the oppressive administration of justice, or in the
arbitrary dealings of Parliamentary committees, or in the
burden of tithes and the excise, or in the persecution of
the faithful.
These sentiments now found their regular expression in the
above-mentioned institution of Agitators, a name which
characterised the thing exactly. It was intended to form a
representation of the troops. Elections were held in the
companies, and from those elected the agents or Agitators
were chosen by a second process of election; agents they
were meant to be, Agitators they became: but they were
intended to represent the interests not of the separate
divisions but of the whole body. They had been formed with
the connivance of the officers, but in a short time assumed
an attitude of entire independence of them. There was a
distinction between the council of war and the council of
the army: in the former Cromwell had the chief influence,
not in the latter. They imputed to him that he had always
regarded the army merely as a means of attaining his
political ends; that it had been all-important to him to
drive away his opponents and rivals, like Stapleton and
Hollis; that after succeeding in this, he had forgotten
the cause of the army and of the people; that he was seen
to sit among the usurpers, and contribute to increase the
burdens of the people; they had honoured him so long as he
had gone to work uprightly, but now he had dealings with
the malignants who surrounded the King, and interested
himself on their behalf. Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex,
who to the last had formed a centre for the Presbyterians,
had died in the previous year without issue. The report was
spread abroad, that the King would make Cromwell, for his
good services, Earl of Essex.
On the side of the accusers were some _few_ superior
officers, such as Colonel Rainsborough, who was not wanting
in the energy requisite for leading a party, and Lilburne,
who had largely contributed to the ferment by various
pamphlets.
In October the Agitators of five cavalry regiments, among
them Cromwell’s, Ireton’s and Fleetwood’s own regiments, [A.D. 1647.]
united, and formulated their wishes in two papers--‘The
True Statement of the Cause of the Army’ and ‘Agreement
with the People’--in which their demands were set forth,
both for themselves and for the people, with much fire
and emphasis. They did not hesitate to lay it before the
next meeting of the assembly of officers, held at the
head-quarters at Putney. Fairfax was not present, but
Cromwell and Ireton were; and denied that this was the
opinion of the army. Rainsborough asserted the contrary,
and called for the punishment of those who had entered into
an understanding with the King. Violent words followed: the
papers themselves were referred to a commission, which was
to report on them.
The council of the army would not hear of any agreement
with the King. A pamphlet was put in circulation, and even
brought before the King’s eyes at Hampton Court, which said
that he must be punished personally, since he had given
occasion for so much bloodshed.
Thus there was a division in the armed force which held the
power in its hands. Cromwell, who scarcely was misjudged
by his companions in arms, would have been content for the
time, it appears, with the advantages already gained. What
a charm there is in contests like these, in overthrowing
our opponents by parliamentary resolutions, and bringing
over the majority to our side! It might be an object
of his ambition, in the old conflict of the Royalist,
Parliamentarian, and Independent interests, to gain the
upper hand for the latter, in union with the King, whereby
the existence of each individual, and also of society in
general, would be secured, with some reforms possibly, but
in the main in its present condition. On the other hand,
the majority of the soldiers represented by the Agitators
rejected all further dealings with the King: God had
hardened his heart, or he would have accepted the proposals
made to him: God had put all things under the feet of the
victorious army, and thus laid on it a duty to settle the
country according to their original convictions. The army
would have preferred to abstain from all further dealings
with the Long Parliament: it demanded the formation of a
new one on the basis of an effective representation of the
people. It rejected with increasing vehemence, not only [A.D. 1647.]
the Presbyterian, but also the Episcopalian system with
the modification last proposed, and claimed an absolute
right to universal liberty of conscience, the abolition
of a series of oppressive taxes, a thorough reform of
justice and of the entire public weal. A new political
element now emerged from profound darkness into the light
of public life: a conscious advance was made towards social
revolution.
These ideas became at once personally dangerous to the
officers, when the idea was suggested that the army ought
to elect its own officers: this was expressed in a pamphlet
of Lilburne’s, which further said that the army ought to
form a council out of the sincere friends of the people,
in order to check the usurpation of the Parliament men.
The ideas of the Agitators were as little consistent with
military subordination, which depends on a relation assumed
_a priori_ and actually subsisting, as with every other
aspect of order. It appeared as though an authority would
be created out of the midst of the army, both to command it
and to carry out the desired reforms in the nation.
The officers could not possibly let this continue, as
they saw their own existence threatened: but what means
had they of acting in opposition? The total rejection of
the proposals must have caused an outbreak of complete
disobedience. They resolved to resist the movement, while
giving way to it in part. In a detailed remonstrance
against the prevailing insubordination and mutiny, Fairfax
declared that he neither could nor would retain the command
of them under such circumstances. Military obedience is the
indispensable condition of the existence of an army. Would
it not have endangered its own internal coherence, if it
had carried out the plan of electing its own officers? At
the same time he made several promises corresponding to the
wishes expressed by the troops, which should be performed
when obedience was restored. There were some regiments
which were not satisfied, and appeared at the places of
assembly with tokens of resistance: but by far the greater
part professed themselves content. They signed a pledge
to be satisfied with what the general council of officers
should determine in respect to the army and to the entire [A.D. 1647.]
kingdom. This example influenced also the malcontents. A
court martial was held in the open field which sentenced
to death three of the chief mutineers, one of whom,
selected by lot, was shot in front of his regiment. In
the latter half of November obedience might be considered
as re-established: and Parliament voted its thanks to the
generals who had most contributed to this result.
Just as the extreme tendencies towards a general
dissolution of society came to light among the troops,
who had taken up arms of their own free inclination, and
thought that they had acquired by their victories the
right to establish universal autonomy, so also it may be
stated that they were first checked in their course by
the necessity of military discipline, the thing which of
all others is furthest removed from all self-assertion:
the troops obeyed their officers, whose commissions were
derived from a totally different order of things from that
which they recognised.
They had not, as has been said, given way unconditionally.
The promises which Fairfax had made, at the moment of the
crisis, contemplated a new Parliament, which should proceed
from free and equal elections, and wherever possible
fully represent the people. In the addresses in which the
regiments recognised the general as the chief set over
them by God, they repeated their old demands, security
for the rights and liberties of the realm according to
the assurances given to the people. The officers could
not possibly place themselves in direct opposition to the
tendencies prevailing in the army, which after all many
of them privately shared. While the troops submitted to
pay the old military obedience, the officers gave scope to
the democratic ideas which had increased in the army. An
understanding was entered into between the officers and the
Agitators, by which the former retained their authority,
but the latter maintained their rights.
The King immediately discovered what this meant. When he
saw himself threatened by the Agitators, at the moment
when the contest broke out, he had taken counsel with the
Scottish delegates, who came to him as friends, as to
where he should seek refuge from them, whether in London, [A.D. 1647.]
or perhaps at Edinburgh, or somewhere on the Border, say
at Berwick, so as to have support against extreme dangers.
But this was not altogether within his own option. In
conformity to his promise he first asked the leaders for
permission to quit Hampton Court. They were doubtless well
disposed to grant it, for they too would not let him fall
into the hands of the Agitators[500]. But how could they
have allowed him to go to the capital or to Scotland, where
their chief opponents would have employed his presence
against them! Moreover this was not the King’s intention.
He knew that the Scots would grant him nothing if he
fell again into their power, but might do so if they saw
themselves threatened by his connexion with the army. He
expected, if in the then impending contest the officers
gained the upper hand, that they would fulfil the promises
made to him, but that if they did not remain masters, they
would seek support in him, the King[501]. Not without
political calculation in his own way, as to the means of
deriving advantage from the hostility of parties, Charles I
resolved to fly to the Isle of Wight, where Colonel Hammond
was in command, a man who a short time before had expressed
his displeasure at the wild fury of the soldiers, with
whom he would have nothing more to do. In the evening of
November 10, Charles I quitted Hampton Court in apparent
flight. Attended by Ashburnham, Legge, and Berkeley, he
found the gates of the park, through which he issued,
unguarded: he was unpursued on his way through the wood,
where he himself acted as guide: it seems as though a
well-considered connivance of the other side had aided him.
From Titchfield, where he stayed in concealment, he sent
word to Hammond of his approach. Hammond could be induced to
give no further promise than that he would treat the King as [A.D. 1647.]
might be expected of a man of honour. Charles I felt that
he was still a prisoner, but at first he was treated with
much distinction. Here also the old respect for the name
of King attended him. As he passed through Newport, a lady
came out of a house to present to the King a rose which
at that late season had bloomed in her garden, and to
offer him her good wishes. In Carisbrook castle--one of
the fortresses with which Henry VIII had strengthened the
coast defences--whither Hammond conducted him, he enjoyed
tolerable liberty. No one was at first denied access to
him: old friends and servants flocked round him. The King
was still very far from despairing of his cause. While
in the Isle of Wight he added some concessions on single
points to the proposals made at Newcastle, and renewed his
request for personal negotiations in London: but he still
held to his resolution never to assent to the definitive
abolition of Episcopacy or to the sale of Church lands. He
still hoped to have in this the support of the superior
officers.
He had however calculated only that they would win the day
or be beaten; it had never occurred to him that they would
recover their superiority as against the Agitators, and
then adopt most of their ideas. The representative whom he
sent to them to Windsor was surprised at the coldness and
reserve with which he was received. At the dead of night,
in a lonely place, he had an interview with one of the
chief officers, formerly well disposed to the King, who
told him that though it looked as if they had retained the
upper hand, yet in reality it was not the case. Cromwell
had been visited by a large part of the soldiers, perhaps
two thirds of the whole, who had assured him that they
were determined not to recede from their old views, and
that if he opposed them they would make a division in the
army and try to destroy their opponents[502]: that feeling
the danger which might hence result to himself, Cromwell,
under the mediation of Hugh Peters, had joined the violent
enthusiasts: that the idea of holding to the King had again
occurred to him, but that he had rejected it, seeing that [A.D. 1647.]
even in case of victory the best that he could expect
would be nothing more than pardon: but that as he could
not bring the army over to his side, he had no resource
but to go over to theirs. Cromwell intimated to the King’s
representative that he would serve the King, so long as it
was possible without ruining himself, but that he could
not be expected to perish for his sake[503]. No notice was
taken of the King’s proposals.
Parliament also was destined by the Agitators to
destruction, but for this things were by no means ripe.
Their immediate object was to crush in the bud any
agreement with the King, and in this they fully succeeded.
Under the influence of the officers, who in turn depended
on the public opinion formed in the army, four bills
passed the Houses in the middle of December, which were
fundamentally at variance with the King’s views.
Therein Parliament in the first place demanded the entire
military authority, together with the right to impose
the taxes necessary for the maintenance of the army,
unconditionally for the next twenty years, whether the King
lived or died: after that period this power might not be
wielded by the crown without the assent of Parliament, but
might be by Parliament without the assent of the crown,
for every resolution passed by the two Houses was to be
considered as having the royal assent[504]. The concession
which the King offered was temporary and limited to his own
life; the scheme demanded by Parliament would have made the
military power for ever independent of the crown.
Parliament moreover wished to be itself equally independent
of the crown. The King was to create no new peers without
the consent of the two Houses: the nominations made by him
since his recovery of the Great Seal were to be cancelled.
Both Parliament and the army had always been most [A.D. 1647.]
apprehensive that acts done in direct opposition to the
King’s commands might some day serve as the occasion of
judicial prosecution against individuals. The demand was
now addressed to the King that all orders and decrees
against the acts of Parliament and its adherents should be
declared null and void, and that the judges should be for
ever forbidden to trouble any man in respect of them.
The four bills and the propositions appended to them are
the expression of the preponderance newly gained by the
army--a manifesto of the alliance between the leaders for
the time, the generals, and the Agitators. Not only a
change of the constitution was aimed at by them, but also a
legalisation of the régime of force at that moment existing.
In order not to be checked in its proceedings from the
side of the city, where an independent spirit still
exhibited itself, Parliament demanded the right to adjourn
at whatever time and to whatever place it pleased[505].
If it should still come to negotiations with the King in
person, it intended that they should not take place in
London. What could be the object of such a meeting? It was
assumed at the time that the prospect of it was kept open
by Parliament merely in order not to be compelled to make
offers side by side with the demands which it made; also
that, in case of his acceptance, it wished to reserve all
further points. But the King could feel no temptation to
assent. It had been remarked, especially by the Scots, that
he would thereby burden himself and his people with the
army for ever, and make Parliament a mere sub-committee
of the army[506]. Charles replied in a similar strain,
that he would never deprive himself of his sovereignty,
especially in such a way that his successors, as well as
himself, would be unable to regain it, nor would he hold
himself liable for the oppression which thereby would fall
upon his people. He considered it an unheard-of thing to
decide the most important points before negotiation began,
and declared himself resolved to accept no acts that were
offered to him before a personal interview; that neither [A.D. 1648.]
dislike to his present position, nor fear of what might be
impending, should ever move him from this determination.
He not only refused the proposals, but rejected altogether
the course adopted by Parliament[507]. Parliament surely
must have expected this; perhaps did expect it. The general
impression was that the dominant party wished to bring
about a complete breach with the King, by presenting the
bills to him for simple acceptance or rejection.
Now at last the King found that he had fallen into the
hands of a decidedly hostile power: he was treated in the
Isle of Wight altogether as a prisoner. The tone taken
in Parliament was as though he had committed a crime in
rejecting the four bills: there was a talk of confining him
in some inland castle and bringing him to trial. Ireton
intimated that the King was refusing to his people security
and protection, the return for which would be obedience;
but the latter could not be had without the former.
Cromwell appears as a man who, after hesitating a moment,
has chosen his side, and advances in the direction of his
party with full vehemence. He now repeated the words of the
Agitators, that God had hardened the King’s heart; that he
could not be conciliated, and that the brave soldiers by
whom he had been defeated and conquered must not be exposed
to his vengeance: that Parliament must expect nothing more
from him, but should govern by its own power and resolution.
Parliament now in fact decided on this course: it resolved
henceforth to send no addresses to the King, and to receive
no messages or letters from him: to send any communication
to him or receive any from him without the leave of
Parliament was to be high treason (Jan. 3). The King was
virtually excluded from his kingdom.
The general assembly of the army accepted these
declarations with joy. It asserted that Parliament could
have asked for nothing less than was contained in the last
proposals, without endangering the safety of itself and
of all who adhered to it, without deserting the cause for
which God had declared in the result of the battles. It [A.D. 1648.]
assented without opposition to the resolutions now passed,
and promised to defend them against all.
The fact that the superior officers who sat in Parliament
exhibited not only no leaning towards the King, but the
harshest aversion to his cause, completely put an end to
the misunderstanding between them and the common soldiers.
At Windsor, where the General Assembly met, the restoration
of unity was celebrated by a festival. Deputies went to the
various garrisons, in order to give an account everywhere
of the new turn of events, which the soldiers regarded as
the triumph of their opinions, and to arouse corresponding
sentiments. Seven of them, with a number of officers, laid
the declaration of the army before Parliament, which voted
them its thanks. Thus all variance between the army and its
officers, and between the army and Parliament, was removed;
and at this moment they all made common cause against the
King.
In their first zeal they had intended to pass formal
ordinances against the King’s authority; but this was as
yet avoided, the more so as no special constitutional forms
were needed to carry on the government of the country
without reference to him. It sufficed to do as was done by
a resolution of January 3, namely, to renew in relation
to England and Ireland, without reference to the Scottish
members, the authority possessed by the Committee of the
two kingdoms: the only thing needed was to replace by
some Independents the excluded Presbyterian members. The
twenty-one members of whom it was composed, seven lords
and fourteen commoners, thus took into their hands the
supreme power. Among the latter we find the two Vanes,
Haslerig, and Cromwell. Northumberland, Warwick, and other
Presbyterian lords fought for some time against agreeing to
this: the King’s friends expected a breach between the two
Houses; but on January 15 the Lords also assented to the
resolution of the Lower House.