ATTEMPT AT A REACTION.
It is extraordinary that amid all these storms men
actively and zealously pressed for the high offices of
state. Northumberland gave himself immense trouble to
obtain for his brother-in-law, Leicester, the post of Lord
Deputy of Ireland, or Secretary of State. He entered into
negotiations with the elder Vane, with Hamilton, with
every one who could in any way help him to this end: he
even approached the King himself[234]. In fact the King
was thinking very seriously of filling the most important
places with members of the now dominant opposition.
Cottington and Bishop Juxon, the former, so far as is
known, by express agreement with the opposition, were
dismissed from their high and lucrative offices, in order
to save them from sharing the ruin of their party. The
plan was formed of appointing in their places the Earl of
Bedford as Lord Treasurer and First Minister, and John
Pym as Chancellor of the Exchequer; the King hoped that
by their means his income would be fixed, and among other
things tonnage and poundage voted to him in perpetuity. The
Secretaryship of State, vacated by Windebank’s flight, was
destined for Hollis, the post of Master of the Court of
Wards for Lord Say. Other great offices were spoken of for
Essex, Mandeville, and Hampden[235].
The direction of foreign affairs also was to be confided to
new hands. The French hoped through parliamentary influence
to detach the King entirely from Spain, and induce him [A.D. 1641]
to interfere actively in general European politics. For
this they chiefly relied on Lord Holland, who seemed to
them the man best calculated to bring about an alliance
between the two crowns. Montereuil was in perpetual
communication with him; he can never sufficiently praise
his devotion and zeal. One day Holland spoke to this effect
to the King, who was very much pleased to find that France,
by whom he feared that he was despised, desired an alliance
with him[236]. It depended on this turn of politics whether
or not the English royal pair accepted the proposal of
a family alliance which came from the Prince of Orange:
the Lower House received with satisfaction the news of
this offer. The court had another and private motive, as
expecting pecuniary and political support from the Prince,
for whom it was of the greatest importance to enter into
close connexion with a royal house. Lord Holland was on as
intimate terms with the ambassador of Orange as with the
French. His great hope was to make himself necessary, and
so to attain to the leading position in England, which had
ever been the object of his ambition.
It was now the openly expressed condition that whatever
changes might be contemplated, royalty must not be further
attacked. The King would not allow either the Viceroy
of Ireland to be condemned to death, or Episcopacy to
be abolished. The ministers, to whom he was compelled
to entrust power, must shield him from the lowering of
dignity and loss of authority with which he saw himself
threatened. In fact ever since the first overtures of the
court to the Lords of the Parliamentary party, the latter
had, it was thought, inclined in favour of Strafford
and the bishops[237]. If the Lords had had so great an
influence in causing the outbreak of the troubles, it might
be hoped that they would be equally powerful in lulling [A.D. 1641.]
them to rest. But the growing popular tendencies were
already become too strong to be mastered by any influence
whatever. Political movements may be originated or
promoted by personal interests; but an individual when he
has attained his own ends can scarcely ever succeed in
confining them within definite limits. Immediately the
Lords saw their popularity diminish; and the Scots, who
were supposed to have an understanding with them, were
bitterly abused. Other circumstances, such as the death of
Bedford, may have contributed to this result: but in the
main it was the force of events which burst asunder the
personal alliances that had been attempted.
The more obviously impossible a compromise proved to be,
the stronger grew the sentiments of natural hostility.
Perhaps the chief of all were shown in the case of the
Queen, who already felt herself injured by the sharpness
of the anti-Catholic resolutions of Parliament, wounded
in her inmost feelings, and even defrauded of her rights.
She had come to England on purpose to improve the lot of
the Catholics: this was the concession made to her in her
marriage contract. Now however she had to look on when a
seminary priest, who had been several times banished, was
condemned to death, and even hesitated to intercede in his
behalf, since in that case the King would have exercised
his privilege of pardon. The excited people demanded of
Parliament that the laws should be carried out without
relaxation: the Lower House requested the Lords to assist
in discovering those who had interfered hitherto[238]: so
that it seemed as if the Queen herself, or her personal
following, would be made answerable for her intercession.
The proud and high-spirited daughter of Henry IV would not
endure this. She had so great an idea of the importance
of the dynasty from which she sprang that she complained
of the absence of the newly-appointed French ambassador,
little as she had had to praise in his predecessor while
present, because forsooth she thought that he would resent [A.D. 1641.]
the arrogance of Parliament, and defend her rights[239].
For she never doubted that her brother, Louis XIII, and his
minister Cardinal Richelieu, would maintain the conditions
upon which she had come to England. In February 1641 she
formed the plan of going herself to France, on the pretext
that her health required change of air. It was believed
at the time, and doubtless with justice, that the most
important and confidential persons in her suite had been
active in instigating this purpose, because they themselves
were afraid of being called to account by Parliament:
Montague, since he was reckoned a great supporter of
the Catholics, Jermyn as having been concerned with
monopolies. Other members of her household, Goring, Percy,
Croft, probably also the Duchess of Chevreuse, would have
accompanied her. But while she sought to withdraw herself
and her attendants from the indignities to which they
were exposed, she calculated also on obtaining support in
France. She desired to call attention to her own rights,
as guaranteed by her marriage contract, and hoped also
to awaken the old sympathy of the French for the English
Catholics.
The English Parliament heard of her design with misgivings.
They feared either a real re-awakening of the old religious
animosities between the two nations, or at least a breach
in the friendly relations between the parliamentary leaders
and the French government. Lord Holland hastened to warn
the latter against Montague, as a man who would cause the
greatest difficulties, since he had persuaded the Queen to
take Strafford under her protection, which, through her
influence with the King, would very greatly hinder the
restoration of a good understanding with Parliament[240].
He declared that Montague had not the cause of religion at [A.D. 1641.]
heart, his reason for interesting himself in the English
Papists being that they were friendly to Spain, and
that if France wished to do any good to the Catholics,
it would be better attempted through him, Lord Holland,
and his influence with Parliament. He told the French
ambassador one day in plain words that he did not desire
the Queen’s confidence if such people were to share it with
him. Montereuil replied that it was not the wish of his
government, which had no reason to care for these men.
The Parliament had in its power a decisive means of
preventing the Queen’s journey, which would have disturbed
relations with France, and given her suite a new
importance: it had only to apply to Cardinal Richelieu.
He cared far more for a good understanding with the
Parliament and its leaders, who possessed the power, than
for the renewal of friendly relations with the court,
which was of importance only when it was on better terms
with Parliament. If Richelieu had to choose between the
two, he could have no hesitation. Moreover the scheme of
re-awakening the sympathy of the French court for the
Catholics abroad was at variance with his policy.
Hard as it was to drive away from the French coasts
the sister of the King of France, who was on the point
of coming to Dieppe to breathe her native air and
recruit her health, the Cardinal adopted this course
without much hesitation. When the Queen’s request was
laid before him--it came through an English Catholic
named Forster, who had always been on good terms with
the French embassy[241]--he answered by a refusal. The
manner of it was highly characteristic. He did not write
himself, but in order that he might have no cause to fear
any misrepresentation of his language, he let Forster
take note of his words, and submit the report to him.
The Cardinal said that the Queen would be welcomed in
France, if the state of her health rendered it absolutely
necessary, but if this were not the case, he prayed her
to consider whether her journey did not admit of a little [A.D. 1641.]
delay. Her absence from England would be injurious to the
Catholic religion: besides, she would surely not leave her
husband in the midst of his difficulties. Perhaps too it
might be difficult for her to get back to England[242].
Another time, when the present troubles were removed, he
would with pleasure welcome her in France.
The Queen was beside herself with rage when she received
this answer. She said among her friends, that though the
conduct of Parliament grieved her much, she felt the
behaviour of the Cardinal more deeply still. She uttered
much strong language in a very bitter tone, and is said to
have added that for her life she would never set foot on
the soil of France, unless to assert her husband’s rights
over it.
As however she must stay in England, she was in no way
disposed peaceably to await further injuries. The course
of events, the aversion displayed in many quarters to the
violent measures of Parliament, powerful factions in all
three kingdoms, awakened in her the hope of even yet being
able to excite a reaction.
Above all there was known to be a royalist feeling in the
army, which was still in quarters in the North. It was
jealous of the superior care bestowed by Parliament on the
Scottish troops: besides, it was unwilling to suffer the
royal power to be abased, or to pass under the authority of
the dominant faction in the Lower House. The Queen asserted
later[243] that the impulse did not come from the court,
but that the offers made were voluntary. The first to come
forward were officers who had seats in Parliament, such as
Captain Ashburnham, who sat for Ludgershall, Wilmot who
sat for Tamworth, and especially Henry Percy, member for
Northumberland. They considered that the army had grounds
of complaint against the Lower House, and not against the [A.D. 1641.]
King, who even in these times found means to supply the
wants of the soldiers, and they resolved to offer him their
services. This was in March, when the great questions
under discussion were inflaming the spirits of all. They
calculated that if they could make sure of the Tower, and
the army were to advance on London, Parliament would be
obliged to accept the conditions that they might propose.
These were three:--that Episcopacy should be maintained,
that the crown should be endowed with an income equivalent
to its former one, and that the army in Ireland should
not be disbanded before the Scottish army had dispersed.
Thus their scheme aimed not at the restoration of a
non-parliamentary government, but at the combination of
the parliamentary constitution with a strong monarchy and
the old episcopal institutions. So at least their words
implied. The Queen states that the majority of officers in
the army were agreed on this. Among the leaders we find her
personal friends: they had bound themselves together by
formal oaths.
In Scotland a similar movement had been observed still
earlier among those who had signed the Covenant. In the old
castle of Merchiston is still pointed out a well-preserved
room of that date, among the ornaments of which are
conspicuous a crown and the cypher of Charles I. Here often
assembled round Lord Napier a party of friends who felt
themselves at variance with the anti-monarchical tendencies
which the movement in Scotland had developed. Once in the
last Scottish Parliament words had been dropped to the
effect that they had no further need of the King, that
they might depose him and introduce a new order of things.
It is true that these men had from aristocratic _esprit
de corps_ opposed the earlier attempts of Charles I, but
from the same feelings, obviously, they would not endure
the domination of any party which might obtain the upper
hand in the Committee of the Estates. In the young James
Graham, Earl of Montrose, jealousy against Argyle, the
most powerful member of the Committee, was united with a
loyalty inherited from his ancestors, and now again called
to life, to which he at times gave utterance in vigorous
stanzas. Beside him was old Napier, who might be regarded [A.D. 1641.]
as his second father, a man of insight and resolution.
Others joined these two, amongst them some of the chief
nobles of the country, Home, Athol, Mar: so early as August
1640 these and others united after the Scottish fashion
in a bond ‘to oppose the particular practices of a few,
from which the country was suffering,’ with reservation of
the Covenant, and to rescue from them the religion, the
liberty, and the laws of the realm[244].
In the beginning of the year 1641 Montrose and Napier
entered into direct communication with King Charles. They
urged him to recognise the abolition of Episcopacy which
had actually taken place in Scotland, and the constitution
of the three estates--for they liked the bishops and their
authority as little as did the other nobles--and then to
come to Scotland and hold a Parliament in person. Among
the attendants of Charles they found no longer any support
in Hamilton, who had reconciled himself to the Scottish
commissioners; but Traquair, Robert Spottiswood, and the
Clerk Register Hay, were zealous in their favour. Traquair,
when the commissioners continued to threaten, had sworn to
mingle heaven, earth, and hell together before he would
yield. The eyes of the two parties were turned to the next
Parliament: each expected then to overpower its enemies,
and give the vacated offices to its friends. Montrose and
Napier calculated on gaining the support of the King, who
allowed his presence to be looked for. The commissioners
were in great agitation on the subject[245].
Although in Ireland, after the removal of Strafford, there
had arisen a violent storm of indignation against his
administration, and against the Privy Council which had
supported him, yet by no means all were carried away by it.
Among other facts we find that the Upper House postponed
to a distant date the discussion of the grievances and
complaints raised by the Lower House, and allowed the
Chancellor, who had been accused by the Commons, to
continue his duties as their speaker. Moreover there was [A.D. 1641.]
the army which Strafford had raised: it had been recruited
from among the hardiest natives of the Catholic faith, but
still there were many Protestant veterans among them, and
the officers were exclusively Protestant. In the Irish army
the same spirit prevailed as in the English: it would not
abandon the interests of the crown, and it would not allow
itself to be disbanded.
In the meetings at which the spirit of military and loyal
devotion to the throne was displayed, it was deemed
possible to bring about a reaction against the tendencies
dominant in Parliament. So far as can be ascertained,
a project was arranged for liberating Strafford from
the Tower, and setting him at the head of an army. The
enlistment which had been sanctioned as for a foreign power
might serve for the purpose of putting trustworthy troops
into that fortress: great offers were made to Balfour, the
governor, if he would co-operate. Colonel Goring, governor
of Portsmouth, appeared so trustworthy that he was let into
the secret of the enlistments. If there were once again a
force which should declare for royalty, but in a moderate
fashion, it was expected that support would be forthcoming
for it in the remotest districts. In every discussion in
Parliament the Lords had let it be seen that rebellion
was as hateful to them as treason: they would not let
themselves be overborne by a popular faction. The Bill of
Attainder seemed to them an attempt to rob them of their
privilege of being tried by their peers: many other lives,
they thought, might be endangered in the same manner. They
were fully conscious of the intimate connexion between the
privileges they enjoyed and the royal prerogative[246]. Why
might not all the strength of the clergy and the efforts of
the Catholics be united in favour of a change of this kind?
It was assumed that support for such a movement would
be forthcoming from France. The Queen had already let
Montague go over, and the Parliament was certainly afraid
of hostile interference from that quarter. In order to
prevent it at the outset Lord Holland sent word to France
that every favour shown to Montague would be an injury [A.D. 1641.]
to the Parliament. Properly speaking, there was no need
of these warnings. It may be affirmed with certainty that
the Queen, after Richelieu’s first refusal, had never
approached him again. We have Montague’s letters, and his
purpose seems to have been to go to Rome: he cherished
the hope of being raised to the Cardinalate, through the
recommendations of the Queen, to which he expected to add
French support. It was for this that he intrigued and
wrote: at least he never had any communication on political
matters with the leading men of the French government.
Very probably when the Queen first planned a visit to
France there was the idea in the background of seeking
help from thence for a reaction against the Parliament;
but if the Cardinal refused to allow her to cross over, a
plan which was opposed to his policy was little likely to
obtain support from him. In England there was some fear
of certain transports which were being fitted out on the
coast of Normandy, but it was known that they were destined
for Portugal. It transpired that one or two captains of
French mercenaries had been spoken to about an undertaking
to be attempted in England, but this was done privately
and without visible results. Nowhere as it seemed had
matters advanced very far: every one was still occupied in
preparations and hopes, when suddenly all was disclosed.
This came to pass through one of the officers who had been
most relied on, Colonel Goring, governor of Portsmouth. The
Queen states that Wilmot and Goring had quarrelled about
the post which each claimed as commander of the troops,
and that Jermyn had vainly tried to reconcile them[247].
Goring asserts that he had demanded of the King an express
sanction of the undertaking, but that he could not obtain
it[248]. Both accounts are perhaps true. The King would
probably have assented, had the thing been done without
him, but he could not bring himself to resolve to authorise
it. Goring however wished to have a retreat: these men,
with all their hopes of success, were perpetually haunted [A.D. 1641.]
by the thought that failure would be their utter ruin; and
merely to have known a matter of this sort and concealed it
might be deadly. Colonel Goring, on whose co-operation the
whole scheme was based was induced to make communications
to one or two Lords of his acquaintance. From them John Pym
received intelligence, and so had a weapon put into his
hands just when circumstances made it most useful.
FOOTNOTES:
[234] Sydney Letters ii. 664.
[235] Clarendon, History of the Rebellion 90.
[236] Montereuil reports from Holland’s account, ‘Le
comte d’Hollande--voyant que le roi se plaignoit, que
la France méprisoit l’Angletene, il avoit jugé àpropos
de lui répondre, qu’il sembloit par ce que je lui avois
temoigné, qu’on ne désiroit rien tant en costé de France,
que d’entretenir une parfaite amitié entre les deux
couronnes--à quoi ce roi avoit répondu, qu’il avoit fort
agréable ce qu’il luy disoit.’
[237] Baillie, Letters i. 305.
[238] Jan. 23, 1640-1. The Commons desired their Lordships’
assistance ‘to discover such instruments as have dared to
intercede for the interruption of public justice against
such offenders.’ Parl. Hist. of Jan. 29, ix. 168.
[239] Giustiniano, 15 Genn. ‘Con molto desideno attende la
regina l’arrivo dell’ ambasciator Francese [Montereuil was
minister ad interim] sperando, che la presenza di lui ponga
freno alla temerita di questi parlamentarii, che tentono
d’interrompergli uso di quer vantaggi, che nel trattato del
matrimonio gli furono accordati.’
[240] ‘Le Comte d’Hollande dit, que la reyne portoit le
roy a vouloir conserver le lieutenant d’Irlande, que
Montague étoit auteur de ce conseil mauvais pour la reine,
qui irritoit tout le parlement, et pour le roi qui devoit
librement donner les mains à une affaire, dont il lui
seroit difficile d’empêcher l’exécution.’ (From extracts
from Montereuil’s despatches laid before the Cardinal.)
[241] Copie de l’escrit donne par Mr. Fauster au sujet du
dessem que la reine d’Ingleterre avoit de venir en France,
18th May. (Paris Archives.)
[242] Some of these counter-arguments are taken from
Montereuil’s despatches. ‘Lesquels,’ he says, ‘peuvent être
encore appuyés de l’assurance, qu’a donné Mr. de Mayerne
son medecin, que la reine de la Grande Bretagne n’avoit
aucune indisposition, que l’obligeoit à respirer un autre
air, que celui d’Ingleterre.’
[243] Gressy: Relation des conférences avec la reine
d’Angleterre. She speaks of threats uttered against her and
her husband ‘ce qui les obligea d’accepter les offres que
la pluspart des officiers, qui étoient lors sur pied, leur
firent.’ (July, 1642.)
[244] ‘Finding that by the particular and indirect
practices of a few the country does suffer.’ Bond of
Cumbernauld. Napier, Montrose i. 325.
[245] The letters of Johnston of Warriston to Lord
Balmerino, given in Napier i. 301, are remarkable.
[246] ‘That they hated rebellion as bad as treason: that
the same blood that ennobled their ancestors did move also
in their veins.’ Trials iii. 1462.
[247] Her narrative in Madame de Motteville, Pet. xxxvii.
98.
[248] He would not undertake the thing ‘que sous un expres
advœu du roi.’ Aerssen to Orange, Archives de la maibon
d’Orange-Nassau iii. 487.